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MEMORANDUM on RAILWAY COMMUNICATION with *Western China* and the intermediate *Shan States* from the Port of *Rangoon* in *British Burma,* with MAP, by Captain *J. M. Williams,* H.M. Indian Army, Assoc. Inst. C. E., and Executive Engineer, Rangoon Division, British Burma.—London, 21 January 1865.

REPORT.

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FOR this new commerce in the East, three distinct lines of railway have been suggested, all, however, originating with Captain Sprye, a retired officer of the Madras Army, viz. :— Three routes have been proposed.

1st. His now advocated wholly land route, to commence at Rangoon, and, as indicated by a red line in the annexed map, follow as straight a course as practicable, across the north-east frontier of British Burma, to Kiang-Tung, and thence to Kiang-Hung on the Merkong or Upper Kamboja River. First, a direct land route.

2d. A river and land route, starting by river from Rangoon, and proceeding thence to Magwé, on the left bank of the Irrawaddy, in Burma Proper; the railway to commence there, and taking a north-easterly direction, as shown by the green line, marked A on the map annexed, through Yemethen and Myoung Yuwé, to strike the Takoo Ferry on the Salween River, and thence follow the first route eastward to Kiung-Tung and Kiang-Hung. Second or Magwé route.

3d. Another combined river and land route from Rangoon, by the Irrawaddy River to Mandalay, and thence by railway, *vide* the green line marked B, through Barno to Talifoo, in the north-west of the Yunan Province of China. Third or Mandalay route.

The first route will be seen to embrace a continuous railway from Rangoon to Kiang-Hung, on the Mer-Kong or Kamboja River, where it issues from the south-west frontier of China, and where the now Major-General McLeod, in 1837, reported that stream (called the Lantsang Kiang within the Chinese frontier) to be, in the dry season, 540 feet wide and exceeding 16 feet deep, and 1,600 feet wide and 60 feet deep in the floods. This river, after a southerly course of about 1,200 miles from Kiang-Hung, through the Laos States and the recently restored kingdom of Kamboja, falls into the ocean in French Cochin China. General direction of the first route.

The distance, in a straight line, between Rangoon and Kiang-Hung is shown by maps to be about 480 miles; the first and most important moiety of which, as having its terminus at the seaboard, is in British territory, and the other portion principally in the two very friendly Burman Shan States of Kiang-Tung and Kiang-Hung.

The second route involves a river navigation from Rangoon to Magwé, in Burma Proper, in N. latitude 20° 5′ and 95° E. longitude, about 460 miles by the river from Rangoon, and 60 miles beyond the British frontier; and the construction from that point of a railway, wholly in Burman territory, through Yemethen and Myoung Yurvé to the Takoo Ferry, on the Salween, a direct distance on the map of about 220 miles, to follow, from Takoo, the route of the first line 190 miles eastward, through Kiang-Tung to Kiang-Hung; being, in all, about 460 miles of water carriage, and 460 miles, in a direct line of rail, making a total distance of 870 miles. General direction of the second route.

The third route entails the much longer river navigation of about 675 miles, from Rangoon to Mandalay, the Burmese capital; with a railway thence, also wholly in Burma Proper, to Barno, 160 miles direct north of Mandalay, to be continued north-easterly 220 miles further across the Black Mountain Range, to the Chinese city of Talifoo, in the north-west of Yunan; in all, a distance of 675 miles by river and 380 by rail, making a total of 1,055 miles. General direction of the third route.

Before proceeding to offer my observations on the official papers, referred to at the head of this Memorandum as treating of these routes, it may be well for me Origin of the three proposed routes.

me to relate, as far as the information I have collected will permit, the origin of these different propositions for the attainment of the desired trade with the west of China from British Burma.

The proposal that such a trade should be established appears to have originated many years back, and long before the annexation of Pegu and Martaban, with Captain Sprye, who, after serving with his regiment and in the survey branch of the Quartermaster General's Department, through the first war with Burma, was afterwards employed in the latter branch of the service, in what were then called the "Ceded Unasserim Provinces." From that time to the present, a period of nearly 40 years, he seems to have perseveringly followed up his proposition; and the many pamphlets, circulars, and maps he has printed on the subject, show him to have been earnestly impressed with its commercial importance to England, India, and British Burma. What he has printed on the subject shows also that he searchingly collected, while in India, and has since assiduously added thereto, whatever others may have printed or written of Burma, Pegu, Siam, and China, and the countries adjacent to them.

Account of the first route.

It seems to have been the result of his research that a direct land route, by the most easy line of country from Rangoon to Kiang-Hung, was considered by him both the most preferable and practicable; though, in forming this opinion, it is also on record that he did not overlook the possible desirability, at some later period, if feasible, of branch lines being thrown off from it at the Takoo Ferry, north-westerly to the Burman capital, and westerly to some eligible point on the Irrawaddy River, midway between the capital and Rangoon, such as Magwé.

Account of the second route.

As regards the second route, that from Rangoon by river to Magwé, and thence by rail to the Takoo Ferry and Kiang-Hung, I may briefly state that it was suggested by Dr. F. Marfels, in 1863, in ignorance, perhaps, of all that Captain Sprye had so much earlier projected and submitted to the public.

Dr. Marfels, a German medical gentleman, came to British Burma in, I think, the year 1858, on the invitation of Dr. Brandis, the then conservator of forests in that country, to be employed under him. After a short time he relinquished that employment to settle in Rangoon as a medical practitioner, at a time when the commercial opening of the west of China, *viâ* that port, had become a subject of considerable public discussion. Turning his attention to it, he considered whether some other route than the direct land route might not be proposed, and receiving encouragement from some of the Rangoon community, he, in 1863, proceeded up the Irrawaddy River to Magwé, to explore a railway route from that point to the Takoo Ferry. At the same time, in order to support and locally popularise his proposal, he, without having traversed the land route from Rangoon to the Takoo Ferry, condemned it as impracticable, and affirmed the very contrary of a route *viâ* Magwé equally without having passed over it.

Interrupted by the Burman local authorities in the survey he had proposed to institute of the Magwé route, he proceeded to the capital of Burma, and there settling, became, it was said, medical attendant upon some of the court, and did all in his power to make the Magwé route to China popular to the Burman authorities, as being projected by him, and giving to Burma the advantage of having the entire railway in Burman territory. Thus actuated, he readily combined with the agent of the late firm of Halliday, Fox & Co., sent out to Mandalay at the end of 1863, to obtain from the Burman Government the concession for a railway and telegraph to China from Magwé or Mandalay.

Account of the third route.

The third route, that from Rangoon, by river, to the Burman capital, and thence by railway, *viâ* Barno to Talifoo, in the north-west of Yunan, has received the support, and has been earnestly advocated by Dr. Williams, the late agent at Mandalay of the Chief Commissioner of British Burma. Dr. Williams, assistant surgeon of Her Majesty's 68th Regiment, first came to Burma in 1858, and was subsequently appointed by the Chief Commissioner as his agent at Mandalay. In that position Dr. Williams appears to have been actuated with a strong desire to set aside both the direct land route from Rangoon to China, and the "river and land route" from Magwé, and to supplant them with the much longer and more difficult one, *viâ* Barno. Indeed, his Memorandum on the question of "British Trade with Western China," dated 25th April 1864, opens with the avowal of strong prepossession in favour of Burma Proper, the Upper Irrawaddy, and the old Chinese dry weather caravan road by Barno.

Without

Without personal knowledge or other reliable information of the country between Rangoon and Kiang-Hung, and, seemingly, equally ignorant of the wild mountainous region between Barno and Talifoo, he, with Dr. Marfels, proclaimed the direct land route "to be wholly impracticable;" and declaring the Barno one quite the reverse, wrote in its favour, and gave his influence at Mandalay towards its adoption. Thus, when the agent of Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co., arrived at Mandalay, he found Drs. Marfels and Williams there residing, ready to support and co-operate with him in following his instructions, not to negociate for the direct land route, as being Captain and Mr. Sprye's, but to obtain the concession of some other line with which their names were not associated.

While these gentlemen were thus endeavouring to supersede the "direct land route," the interest evinced in the question of trade with Western China by the manufacturing and commercial communities of England, induced the Home Government to instruct the Government of India "to report on the best means to be adopted for developing the resources and improving the intercommunications of British Burma;" and this instruction having been communicated by the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, he, I presume, took advantage of Mr. O'Riley's going from Shway Gyeen, on a mission to Karenee, and Captain Watson's proceeding from the same station to survey the River Salween, and ordered them to report upon the character, for a railway, of that portion of the road in our territory over which they would travel between Shway Gyeen and the Salween; and it is upon their consequent reports, and Dr. Williams' "Memorandum," as they bear upon the possibility and desirability of a railway to the west of China, by the one or other of their advocated routes, that I will now proceed to submit my observations as a public works officer of 10 years' service in British Burma.

Arguments in favour of the first route as compared with the other routes.

Of the three routes, the "direct land route" from Rangoon to Kiang-Hung is the one which, if feasible, must, owing to its directness, be the best; and there is no doubt, from the same cause, it would be the cheapest to construct. The cost of transport of plant and stock by the long river journey, pertaining to the other routes, would also be saved; for, as the line would be constructed on the telescopic principle, the plant and railway material would be forwarded along the line as laid down, and each stage, as completed, be brought into immediate use.

Upwards of 250 miles, a full moiety of the entire line, will be within British territory, and the remaining portion through country occupied by people who are, with their chiefs, well affected towards the British Government, though tributary to the King of Burma; and who, it may reasonably be anticipated, would, from motives of self interest, in the event of a rupture of our present amicable relations with the court of Mandalay, at once tender their support to the British, and thus guarantee the safety of the railway through their States.

Moreover, it is on record in the present General Macleod's Official Report of his mission to Kiang-Tung and Kiang-Hung, in 1836-37, forwarded to the Commission of Tenasserim Provinces on the 25th August 1837, that the princes, their ministers, and the Chiefs of those Shan States, expressed the strongest desire to have a commercial road opened between them and us; and offered every assistance and facility in their power, or that their country could afford, including the assurance that our merchandise should pass through their territory duty free.

Every one acquainted with the feelings of the Shan States and their princes of the present time, must be aware that their desire of friendship and intercourse with us, and of a commercial approach to the seaboard by our territory, has increased with the years that have intervened since the time when General Macleod visited them.

Colonel Phayre, the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, in his Administration Report of 1863-64, bears strong testimony to the present friendly feeling of the Shan chiefs towards the British Government, and their equally hostile opposition to the Burman Government. Thus, at paras. 240 and 241 of the Report, he writes:—

"During the year several refugee Shan chiefs have fled into British territory; they have mostly either been in actual rebellion against the Burman (Ava) Government, or have been placed under surveillance as being suspected.

Some of these chiefs have settled down with their followers to agriculture; and, it is hoped, may be the means of attracting large bodies of settlers. The Shan people are energetic and industrious; they would be the best colonists available to people the wastes of Burma."

"241. Since the close of the official year, the Shan chief of Nyoung Yeuvé, who raised a wide-spread insurrection in November and December 1863, arrived in the spring of 1864 at Toungoo. The strongly hostile feeling existing in the Shan States against the Burmese (Ava) Government, appears to have resulted from the declared policy of depriving the chiefs of all power, and of introducing the tax on each house or families, as it exists in the Burmese (Ava) or native possessions of the king."

No portion of the second route in British territory. The difficulty of finding funds for its construction.

The second route, recommended by Dr. Marfels, is merely a modification of the branch line along the north of our frontier, originally suggested by Captain Sprye; but, as the main line, it possesses the insuperable disadvantage that no portion of it would be within British territory, under which circumstances the question naturally suggests itself, how is the line to be made? In other words, Who will provide the funds? It cannot be expected that British capitalists will risk their money upon it without a sufficient and sure guarantee.

The Indian Government have ceased, generally, to guarantee even desirable lines in British India. Is it, then, to be expected that they will give any pecuniary aid to a line constructed wholly in Burma Proper, and commencing many miles beyond the British frontier? The guarantee of the Burmese Government, if obtainable, would be valueless in the London money market, whoever might be the directors of a company holding it.

Supposing, however, this primary and principal difficulty satisfactorily arranged, still we have a route much longer, more tedious, and, in an engineering point of view, infinitely more difficult than the "direct land route;" for it would have to cross the Great Yoma Range and its spurs, between the Irrawaddy River, at Magwé, and the Littany River.

There is the further great disadvantage attending this route, that all goods arriving by it at Magwé, from the westward, must there, on Burmese territory, be unloaded from the railway, probably warehoused, and then shipped on board flats and steamers for carriage on to Rangoon, a tedious distance, by river, of about 460 miles, where they must be again landed and warehoused, and again reshipped for transmission to English or other ports.

Objections to the third route are much greater than to the second.

These important objections are greatly magnified when applied to the third route, proposed to commence at Mandalay, a river distance of from 650 to 700 miles from Rangoon.

Concession obtained by Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co.

It is this route, which, in his "Memorandum," receives the support of Dr. Williams, and for which, together with that from Magwé, the late London firm of Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co., through their agent, obtained a concession some months back from the King of Burma; whereon, and by the disposal of which, the parties in question proposed to establish a public company in England to carry out the project; but, as yet, no steps have been taken so to utilise the concession.

Greater difficulty in obtaining capital for the construction of the third route.

And, if a difficulty is certain in obtaining British capital for the construction of a railway in Burma Proper, commencing 470 miles from Rangoon, and 60 miles beyond the British frontier, how much greater would be the difficulty of procuring capital for a wholly Burman line, commencing at Mandalay, a river distance of about 670 miles from Rangoon, to proceed thence to Barno, and across the Black Mountain Range into China?

It is well known in British Burma that the agent sent out to Mandalay by Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co., adopted the Magwé and Mandalay circuitous and difficult routes, not as being the most desirable, most direct, or most practicable, but because, as before observed, he was specially instructed to avoid any route proposed by Captain and Mr. Sprye.

This was there made public by the following extract from Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co.'s instructions to their agent, dated London, 15th November 1863, and published by their agent in the "Rangoon Gazette" of 26th January 1864, as follows:

"In order to make it quite clear, and to prevent any unpleasantness with Captain and Mr. Sprye, we are not inclined to be interested in any concession of railway or telegraph for the route proposed by them; but we wish to be kept entirely free from any invasion of their assumed rights in the above objects.

You

You are aware of the route proposed by them, and, as the telegraph will be carried to China *viâ* Singapore, we do not think this portion of this project of much value or importance."

Dr. Williams' advocacy of the Mandalay route.

It is indeed difficult to understand Dr. Williams' earnest advocacy of the Mandalay and Barno route. He opposes the direct land route on the ground of its passing through a district of wild tribes, of whom he cannot speak from personal knowledge, nor does he seem to have read the reports of those who have been among them; and he then recommends the Mandalay and Barno route, which passes through tribes of Kakyens, whose fierceness of character and warlike disposition he himself depicts as being infinitely worse than is to be found amongst any of the tribes through which the line he wishes to condemn has to pass.

Thus, in his Memoranda above referred to, Dr. Williams writes: "The Kakyens are a portion of the vast hordes of Singphos that inhabit the mountain district of Northern Assam, and stretch round the north of Burma into Western China. These extend not only all along the northern frontier, but dip down southward wherever the mountain ranges lead them, even to half way between Barno and the capital. They have ousted many Shan tribes, particularly the Palungs, from the hill districts; and wherever they appear they assume the same character of 'lords of all they can reach,' only to be appeased by some form of 'black mail.' And again, 'the Kakyens, as the Burmese call these Singphos,' levy black mail even to within six miles of Barno, the seat of a Burmese governor of the rank of a woongyee. They inspire such terror, that in the neighbouring plains no Burman or Shan will venture alone, or even in company, unarmed along the roads within their reach."

The "direct land route" can alone realise the desired object.

It is thus made clear, that unless the difficulties attending the construction of the direct land route from Rangoon be proved to be insurmountable, it is the route which can alone be followed to realise the desired object, a direct and continuous trade between Rangoon and Western China. My own conviction, after much and careful consideration of the subject, is, that any other commercial way to the west of China is impossible, unless at such an enormous outlay in construction that the object to be attained would not justify being disbursed in the territory of a foreign power.

Error into which objectors to the direct route appear to fall.

It is well here to notice an error into which the few objectors to this "direct land route" seem to fall, and which error is most apparent in both Mr. O'Riley's letter to the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Division, and in Captain Watson's report, viz., that it is the precise and only route suggested by Captain Sprye, particularised in one of his pamphlets, and traced in one of his maps as from Shway Gyeen, to Baughta, Thayet-pyin-kin-dat, &c., to the Takoo Ferry. I understand this particular route to have been indicated by Captain Sprye only as appearing to him by Hobday's map (the latest official map of the province of Martaban) to be likely to have the easiest gradient. And one of his pamphlets now before me, bearing date, London, 15th March 1860, and entitled, "China; and how best for England to Preserve her Commercial, Political, and Military Position there, in reference to American, French, and Russian Modern Approaches to it," names in its concluding page four points as more urgently claiming the attention of Her Majesty's Ministers. The first three refer severally to China, Burma Proper, and Siam; and the fourth to Pegu, thus: —"And as respects Pegu, to have a cheap single line railway or tramroad, laid by the most direct route from the port of Rangoon, by the ancient capital of Pegu, to the more north-easterly town of Shway Gyeen, on the river Littang, and thence by the most easy engineering line to our extreme north-east frontier, on, or near to, the right bank of the Salween."

It is thus shown that the projectors felt that the precise route to be adopted between the Littang and the Salween rivers, must depend on the result of a thorough survey of that part of country by professional engineers; and surely their propositions are not to be deemed wild and wholly impracticable on reports made by non-professionals travelling over the route by the one mere native bullock track Messrs. O'Riley and Watson seem to have journeyed by.

Mr. O'Riley's letter considered as a summary of his own and Captain Watson's diaries.

Mr. O'Riley's letter to the Commission of the Tenasserim Division, dated 16th January 1864, appears to be a summary of his journal, and may be considered as a summary also of Captain Watson's diary.

Both gentlemen are unanimous in condemning the "direct land route;" but their

their verdict seems to be not only premature, but quite unsupported by any of the facts detailed in Captain Watson's diary.

The observations I have to make on their report of a portion of the country, which, from my service there, and my having marched over it several times and surveyed it, I can speak of professionally with all confidence, will, I think, justify my objections to the conclusions they arrived at. The portion of their route, thus thoroughly known to me, extends from Shway Gyeen to Baughta; and to this portion of Captain Watson's report I will first direct my observations, prefacing them with a few remarks on the first portion of the line, viz., that from Rangoon to Shway Gyeen.

First portion of the direct land route.

It is generally admitted that, in this portion of the route, there are no obstacles to railway construction. Certainly, I have never heard of any being supposed to exist, and from my own knowledge of the country I can confidently affirm that there are none. This, at least, is a very favourable fact, seeing that it embraces the first 120 miles, or about one-fourth of the entire proposed line.

Distance from Rangoon to Shway Gyeen.

The distances from Rangoon to Shway Gyeen by the existing road are as follows:—

Rangoon to the ancient city of Pegu, about	45	miles.
Pegu to Pyngyhr	12	,,
Pyngyhr to Pyeenboug	8	,,
Pyeenboug to Pyenmalwen	9½	,,
Pyenmalwen to Dyoo	10½	,,
Dyoo to Hpoontaza	14½	,,
Hpoontaza to Shway Gyeen	14	,,
TOTAL distance from Rangoon to Shway Gyeen	113½	

Excellent road from Pegu to Shway Gyeen.

In March 1853, I marched over this road from Pegu to Shway Gyeen with the flank companies of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, accompanied by their heavy baggage and Commissariat stores, carried in upwards of 100 native bullock carts, and although we had a party of Sappers with us, their services were not once called into requisition to improve the road.

Captain Watson and Mr. O'Riley approve of the road from Shway Gyeen to Baughta.

From Shway Gyeen to Baughta both Captain Watson and Mr. O'Riley state, that "with little improvement, the road can be rendered available for a tramway."

State of the road in the monsoons.

Now, had they passed over this portion of the road, as I have done, during the rainy monsoon, in the only way in which it can be then passed over, viz., on elephants, they would have found that for miles the water varied in depth from six to eight feet, and they would have seen the desirability of selecting a different line for the construction of a serviceable road; certainly they would not have had far to search for such superior line, since only a quarter of a mile to the eastward of the ordinary native track the ground is elevated well above the highest floods.

Description of Burman roads.

It is well known that Burman roads, or rather bullock tracks, are formed simply by carts being driven from village to village, the constant passage of wheels wearing away the ground into two parallel ruts. Such tracks are generally opened afresh at the end of each monsoon, as soon as the floods subside. The drivers cannot take short cuts across the plains, as the water remains on them to a much later period of the year. On the other hand, they avoid the elevated ground as much as possible, on account of its being clothed with trees and thick jungle, which would entail the laborious operation of felling and clearing. They therefore skirt the high ground and its jungle, and wind their way along the contour of the rising ground, though the distance be much greater. Thus between Shway Gyeen and Kyonkyee, *viâ* Baughta, which by the Burman road is 33¼ miles, I cut a trace for the survey of a new road in 1857, by which, keeping on the high ground, I avoided all water, and reduced the distance to 30 miles.

Objection to Mr. O'Riley's remark, that "substantial bridges would be required."

Another remark of Mr. O'Riley's on the road between Shway Gyeen and Baughta requires to be noticed before leaving the portion of the subject, as it is one which is likely to create misconception as to the nature of the ground to be traversed, and the facility of constructing a railway over it; I refer to his statement, that "several substantial bridges" would be required to render the road available.

Now

Now, such a remark would naturally lead people to imagine that broad rivers have to be spanned, whereas there are only five narrow streams between Shway Gyeen and Baughta, and the two largest of these, that at Shanzeik, and one two miles further on, are not more than 50 feet in breadth, if measured a few yards to the right or left of the bullock-cart tracks across them ; of course, at such points the banks of the streams are worn down by the passage of the carts, and the span is thereby made somewhat greater ; but, by following the route of which I cut the trace in 1857, these streams are crossed at points where they are much narrower, the Shanzeik stream being there only 20 feet broad. This wholly disposes of Mr. O'Riley's statement, that "several substantial bridges" would be required.

Nature of Messrs. O'Riley and Watson's report on the Shway Gyeen to Baughta portion of the route.

I have entered thus at length on the subject of this portion of the road to show that here, at least, Messrs. O'Riley and Watson have confined themselves to a report on the existing native bullock-cart road as they found it, not as it might be at other seasons of the year, or how it might be avoided, and a better line selected. And, if this be the character of their report on this portion between Shway Gyeen and Baughta, there is surely good reason to presume that it was the same between Baughta and the Salween.

Captain Watson was well aware of the peculiar nature of the tracks or paths in this latter portion of his line of march, for he states in his journal, 23d December, that "the Karens, who first made these roads, apparently steered as straight as possible from one height to another, having no regard to mountains, a hilly road being quite as pleasant walking to them as a level one." And on this day, at least, he notices that the road over "precipitous heights might easily be avoided, by carrying the track along the sides of the hills;" yet neither he nor Mr. O'Riley appears to have borne this fact in mind on other occasions.

Description of Karen paths.

Karens carry all their traffic on their own back; thus, from early training to it, they experience little or no inconvenience in the steepness of their paths. It may, perhaps, be argued, that this is, of necessity, because their country is impracticable for cart roads; such, however, is not the case, the fact being that the Karens, divided into numerous small tribes, often at strife with each other, and oppressed by their more powerful neighbours, have sought to hide away in their hills and fastnesses rather than to open out roads to facilitate the approach of their enemies; neither has their traffic with each other been sufficient to warrant the construction of roads, which would require to be continually in use to prevent their being overgrown with jungle in a single monsoon.

Before proceeding to examine Messrs. O'Riley and Watson's report of the second division of their route, viz., that between Baughta and the Salween River, I take upon myself to pronounce that from Rangoon to Baughta, a distance of 135 miles, there is not an engineering difficulty to be encountered in the construction of a railway; but, on the contrary, landing the plant at Rangoon, every facility exists for the rapid and efficient construction of that important first division of the line, which alone will bring the port of Rangoon, commercially, all the year round, 135 miles nearer to Western China and the intermediate Shan States.

Captain Watson's march from Baughta to Boab Tsaken.

Captain Watson's journal records that he marched from Baughta, on the 16th December 1863, to Boab Tsaken, distance 15 miles; for the first six miles, as far as the village of Upper Baughta, carts are able to proceed; two miles further on the road "passes over several small but steep hills;" I imagine these to be detached hills, as he next records that, a short distance further, "the ascent of a range of hills" commences; if my conjecture be right, they can easily be avoided. In themselves, however, several small but steep hills would not be considered by an engineer to present much impediment to the construction of a railway.

About four miles beyond these hills, or 12 miles from Baughta, after crossing a mountain stream, the "ascent of the range of hills" just referred to commences, "distant from summit about four miles." Then, after a slight descent, Boab Tsaken is reached, making a total distance of 16 miles, instead of 15, as given in the journal. This discrepancy in distance occurs in other pages of the journal, from which it is to be inferred that the distances have been approximated only, and are not the result of actual measurement.

The height of Boab Tsaken above the level of the sea is given as 1,800 feet;

the height of the ground at the foot of the hills, or even of Baughta, is not given. Now, as there is only a slight descent into Boab Tsaken, we may assume 1,800 feet to be the most extreme height of the summit of this range above the country at its foot. The ascent is made in four miles, and thus the gradient is shown to be not more than 1 in 11¾.

This could, there can be no doubt, be very greatly reduced in constructing a railway, by means of partial cuttings and embankments, and by increasing the length of the ascent. There is nothing, however, in the report to show that the range cannot be crossed at a lower level; and I am inclined to think that a real survey will prove the so-called range to be merely one of the spurs of the range separating the water shed of the Sittang and Youzalem Valleys, in which case there can be little doubt that it will be found possible to cross it at a less elevation.

Boab Tsaken is, according to Captain Watson, 35 miles from Shway Gyeen, and throughout that distance he shows apparent difficulties to exist in only about four miles.

March from Boab Tsaken to Thayet-pyin-kin-dat.

On the 17th December Thayet-pyin-kin-dat is reached, distance 10 miles; the road, for four miles from Boab Tsaken, follows "over the summit of several hills," the highest point reached being "about 3,000 feet above sea level," or 1,200 feet above Boab Tsaken, from whence a descent is commenced, which continues to within three miles of Thayet-pyin-kin-dat; this makes the length of the descent about three miles. Unfortunately the level of Thayet-pyin-kin-dat is not given, and the gradient of descent cannot be calculated. But it is probable, from the direction followed, that the successive valleys or gorges are crossed at points nearer their junction with the main ridge, and, consequently, at higher levels, so that Thayet-pyin-kin-dat is higher than Boab Tsaken, and the descent from the highest point reached to Thayet-pyin-kin-dat is, therefore, less than 1,200 feet. The rate of incline of the ascent from Boab Tsaken would seem to be about 1 in 17½. It seems probable that the hills over the summits of which Captain Watson passed in the first four miles of the day's march were detached hills, for, in remarking on the magnificent view obtained from the highest point reached of the Valley of the Sittang, he writes, "the masses of the hills, not ranges, that surround you on every side impress you with the idea that Captain Sprye's proposed tramway to the borders of China, *viâ* the Youzalem and Karenee is impracticable."

This argument, certainly, appears to be misapplied, for Captain Watson distinctly records that he is not surrounded by ranges of hills, but by masses; where, then, is the difficulty of avoiding them. The native track over the summit of the hills by which he marched certainly need not be followed; and his own expression would infer that even the highest point of 3,000 feet was unnecessarily attained, and that he arrived at it merely because the Karen track took him there. But, even accepting the worst view of the case, the difficulties of this day's march, certainly not insurmountable, or even so great as those encountered in the previous day's journey, and a distance of 45 miles from the Shway Gyeen, has now been accomplished.

Thayet-pyin-kin-dat to Thailyoo Choring.

A halt having been made on the 18th, on the 19th December an advance was made to Thailyoo Choring, a distance of six miles from the last halting place. The highest point passed was the Kyouktagha, which was ascertained to be 3,220 feet, and the distance about four miles from Thayet-pyin-kin-dat, the level of which station has not been given; for the reasons, however, above stated we cannot possibly, I think, underrate the ascent to Kyouktagha, in assuming it at 1,200 feet; very probably it is not more than 800 feet; but taking it as 1,200 feet, the gradient is 1 in 17½.

The level of the camp at Thailyoo Choring is not given in this part of Captain Watson's journal, but it is indirectly fixed on his arrival at Lomatee-tat-ya-hoing, on the Youzalem, which place, we are informed, is 2,456 feet above the level of the sea, and "265 feet lower than the Thailyoo Choring," the elevation of which is, therefore, 2,721 feet above the sea level, and 499 feet below the Kyouktagha. This last descent being made in two miles, we find the gradient to be about 1 in 211¼.

Thailyoo to the Lomatee Hills.

On the 21st of December Captain Watson marched to the foot of the Lomatee Hills, a distance of 11 miles, or 62 from Shway Gyeen. This road he describes as being "very level during the whole of the march," which in no way accords with Mr. O'Riley's emphatic assertion, that, "with the exception of

of the slope over which the stockade of Thayet-pyin-kin-dat is built, not an acre of even ground was found throughout the line of march."

Lomatee Hills to Lomatee-tat-youomy on the Youzalem.

The following day, 21st of December, Captain Watson arrived at Lomatee-tat-ya-hoing, on the Youzalem River, after a march of seven miles over a "tolerably good road." The distance now reached from Shway Gyeen is 69 miles. The level of this station is 2,456 feet,—265 feet lower than Thailyoo Choring,—the descent from which has evidently been very gradual. In a distance of 18 miles, the fall is about 1 in 358. It is here worthy of notice that in his journal, on the 17th December, Captain Watson writes, "the ranges, on either side the Youzalem River, are about 4,000 feet high;" yet, the highest point he reached, before arriving at the Youzalem River, is, in his next day's march, the Kyouktagha, 3,220 feet above sea level, from which point there is a descent the whole way to the Youzalem. Where, then, is the range of 4,000 feet in height to which he refers, on the west bank of the Youzalem?

Marches eight miles northward from Lomatee-tat-ya-womy.

Leaving the Youzalem on the 23d of December, Captain Watson commenced the ascent of the range of hills on its east bank, the highest point of which he reports to be 4,000 feet. The distance from the summit he does not mention; but as the whole march is a distance of 10 miles, and the portion of it which passed me precipitious heights, appears to have been quite at the end of the march; and after the descent of the range had been effected, it seems probable that about eight miles is the extent of the ascent and descent combined.

Supposing the length of the ascent and descent to be each four miles, the gradient of the former is about 1 in 13¼.

The level of the valley beyond this range is not stated, and the gradient of the descent cannot therefore be calculated.

There is every reason to anticipate that on this range, as on the first passed over after leaving Upper Baughta, the rate of incline may be very greatly reduced in the construction of a railroad; but, adding these eight miles to the four miles of difficult ground previously admitted, it amounts to 12 miles only out of 79 from Shway Gyeen.

I have not taken into consideration "the precipitious height" over which the road passes in the last portion of this day's march, as it is here that Captain Watson informs us they "might easily be avoided, by carrying the track along the sides of the hills."

Captain Watson encounters his first real difficulties.

On the 24th and 26th of December he reports having encountered the real difficulties of his journey; unfortunately, he was unable to ascertain the altitude of the highest point reached, "because the mountain barometer had been left behind." I imagine it, however, to have been the ridge which Mr. O'Riley refers to as forming the water-shed of the "Salween and Sittany Valleys," and which he states to be 5,000 feet above sea level.

The distance travelled in these two marches was 18 miles, being eight miles the first, and 10 miles the second day, though the actual distance, in a direct line, of the second day's march, is stated to be three or four miles only.

The information given of these two marches is very meagre. No inquiries are stated to have been made as to the possibility of avoiding the difficulties; and, since 10 miles were marched in one day over this difficult ground, it is evident that it was quite impossible, in such rapid progress, to ascertain much of the nature of the ground actually passed over, and still less of the features of the surrounding country.

The difficulties encountered in this portion of the precise native track marched over by Captain Watson, in the last 18 miles, may be admitted; but that they are unavoidable and impracticable, there is nothing in his report to show. It can only be proved by the result of an accurate and extended survey by competent surveyors.

March to the Wyn Choring.

The next march, on the 27th of December, is to the Wyn Choring, distant eight miles, and 105 miles from Shway Gyeen. There is nothing in this march presenting any fresh difficulty, since the road ascended "gradually" for about two miles, to which following a "very long" descent of four miles to the Wyn Choring, along which the road led for two miles to the encamping ground.

Wyn Choring to the Kynoon Choring.

On the 28th of December a march of seven miles was made to the Kynoon Choring; and, as no obstacles were reported, none can be considered to exist.

Kyoon Choring to the Kaima-pyoo-Choring.

On the 29th of December the Salween is reached, at the junction with it of the Kaima-pyoo Choring. The distance seems to have been about eight miles, and the road appears to have been good throughout, and the last portion of it is described as "most excellent, and along which," in contradiction of Mr. O'Riley's denial of the existence of an acre of level ground, "a carriage might be driven."

The distance of Captain Watson's camp on the Salween from Shway Gyeen, is about 120 miles, and from Rangoon 233½ miles.

Kaima-pyoo Choring to the Koon Choring.

He halted three days at the Kaima-pyoo Choring for the arrival of Mr. O'Riley, on the 1st of January 1864; and on the 2d moved forward up the right bank of the Salween, eight miles to the Koon Choring, and describes the road to be "very good the whole way."

The direction the railway should if possible follow from the Koon Choring.

From this point, about 128 miles from Shway Gyeen, the projected railway would, if feasible, continue along the right bank of the Salween, eastward of the route which Captain Watson then adopted, but the practicability of the right bank of the Salween has yet to be determined. I am not aware of any report having been made of the country northwards, along the banks of that river to the Takoo Ferry, from which the requisite information can be gathered. Assuming, however (which I do not expect from Captain Watson's favourable mention of the little of it which he did see), that actual survey proves it to be impracticable for a railway, the line can follow the route taken by Captain Watson from the Salween into the valley of the Mobyé river.

Koon Choring to Pah Paus' Hill and the Too Choring.

Reverting to his journal, under the date 3d of January, he continued to travel "along a good road for about 12 miles" to the foot of Pah Paus' Hill, and thence three miles to the Too Choring.

Captain Watson receives a letter from the Karenee Chief, urging him not to proceed along the Salween.

On the 4th of January he halted to meet the sons of Kyckphogyeee, and here received the letter from the Eastern Karenee Chief, dissuading him from proceeding eastward along the Salween, the river he was deputed to survey. This, Captain Watson observes, "as matters have turned out, is all just as well, for we do not feel ourselves bound to make any further inquiries for imaginary roads on the east bank of the Salween." This is very ambiguous; I am not aware that any route by the east bank of the Salween, south of the Takoo Ferry, has ever been proposed for the railway. Captain Sprye's proposition most certainly suggests that the west or right bank should be followed to the point northward, where the Chinese caravan road crosses the river at the Takoo Ferry.

I have not yet learnt that suggestions or inquiries have been made regarding any other routes; and certainly their result has not been entered in Captain Watson's journal. He offers no reasons for abstaining from future inquiries regarding the country between the point of the Salween, which he reached, and the Takoo Ferry above named: and, as information thereof is so much needed, and must be supplied before it can be decided whether the railway shall follow, preferably the valley of the Mobyé or that of the Salween, it is, I think, much to be regretted that Captain Watson turned his back on the latter river immediately he reached it. The advantages of the Salween Valley route over that of the Mobyé, consist in its being shorter, since it forms but one side of the triangle, of which the Mobyé route forms the other two sides; and also that the range of hills forming the water-shed of the Mobyé and Salween Rivers, and which the Magwé line must cross, would be avoided.

The distance marched by Captain Watson on the 5th of January I understand, though it is not clearly stated, to be 10 miles; the road is described by him to be merely as "not very good."

On the 6th and 7th of January, 20 miles of excellent road brought the camp to Kyckphogyee's village.

The first eight miles of the road is stated to have been "well cleared and level;" and the remaining 12 miles "a scarcely perceptible ascent."

From Kyck-phogyee's village to Dan-tha-dak.

After halting on the 8th and 9th of January, Captain Watson marched on the 10th a distance of 10 miles to Dan-tha-dah, on the edge of the enormous plain that extends as far as Nyoung-Yuwé, and through which the Mobyé River runs.

The road throughout this march was "over gently undulating ground."

The edge of the Mobyé Valley is by his route 183 miles north-east of Shway Gyeen, and 297 miles from Rangoon.

Dan-tha-dak to Ngwé-doring.

On the 4th of January, by a march of eight miles, he reached the town of Ngwé-doring

Ngwé-doring, distant 191 miles from Shway Gyeen, and 305 miles from Rangoon.

From this point it is unnecessary to follow Captain Watson's journal, for it is principally occupied with the account of his detention at Tulary, and subsequent journey with his party to Mandalay.

Unnecessary to follow the journal further.

We are shown from his official journal that he marched from Shway Gyeen to Ngwè-doring, a distance of 191 miles, including halts, in 32 days; and as he halted 12 days to procure supplies, arrange for carriage, and to await at the Kamia-pyoo Choring the arrival of Mr. O'Riley, the entire journey occupied only 20 days, a rate of 9½ miles a day. It is manifest that in so rapid a march by such a road, over such a country, no survey of it could be effected. And all that Messrs. O'Riley and Watson's reports amount to, so far as I have seen, is that the native tracks they followed are not, in their present state, available for wheel carriages.

The distance from Shway Gyeen to Ngwé-doring, 191 miles, was marched in 20 days.

It will be well here, then, that I should examine a little closely the physical character of the country between the Sittany and Salween Rivers, and the general direction of Mr. O'Riley and Captain Watson's route, as shown in the annexed map.

Physical character of the country between Sittany and Salween Rivers.

The hill ranges east of the Sittany have a very uniform direction, north-west and south-east, and this is very distinctly confirmed by Mr. O'Riley.

The spurs to the west of the several main ridges branch out in directions pretty nearly due south; if anything, a little west of south; while the spurs on the east side of these ridges have a direction a little south of east.

To cross these ridges from the Sittany an engineer would not select a road having a due easterly direction, but rather seek to approach from a south or slightly south-easterly direction, from whence gradually to ascend a spur on to the main ridge, thus avoiding the labour of crossing successive spurs, with their intervening deep valleys and ravines. In illustration of this it may be well to quote a passage from the paper on the Bhore Ghaut Incline of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, read at the Mechanics' Institution, Bombay, on the 21st December 1857, by James J. Berkeley, Esq., Chief Resident Engineer of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway. "It was a fortunate occurrence that he first entered its locality (the Bhore Ghaut) as we were examining the country up the valley of the Oolassa towards Khandalla, for we thus approached the ghaut at the foot of a long spur, which is the particular feature that enabled us to obtain the present favourable incline. It was a comparatively easy task to trace a practicable route for the railway from that starting point; but had we, in the first instance, ascended to Khandalla by the short, steep, and tortuous mail road, and then examined the summit of the ghaut, with no approximate datum level to guide us, it would probably have been a work of greater difficulty and longer duration to have discovered the course which we subsequently adopted."

Again, having arrived at the summit of the ridge, the engineer would then change his course to an easterly direction, in order, gradually, to descend by one of the eastern spurs to the valley beyond.

We thus see that Captain Watson's route from Baughta to the Salween, following an easterly course, must be expected to cross successive spurs and broken ground; and this was actually found to be the case, until the ridge forming the water-shed of the Sittany and Youzalem Valleys was reached, when the easterly bearing was found to be a good one, and the descent was gradual the whole distance from Kyouktagha to the Youzalem.

I have little doubt that a somewhat similar easy descent is to be found from the Kyouktagha to the valley of the Sittany, entering the valley at a point considerably south of Baughta.

A principal point to be ascertained by survey is, whether the Kyouktagha is really the lowest pass in that ridge; very probably it is not; and, if a lower can be found, it is there the railroad must cross.

Mr. O'Riley states, that "the main ridges are connected by a confused mass of hills, without any uniformity of line or feature, and presenting a chaos of disturbance perfectly bewildering to contemplate;" yet this bewildering puzzle is easy of solution when it is borne in mind that in the valleys between the main ridges the east and west spurs of the respective ridges are thrown out and meet in different directions, abutting against, or nearly against each other, in apparent chaotic disturbance.

Mr. O'Riley's description of the features of the country.

It is over these almost interlacing spurs that the Baughta native track passes, and it is no matter of surprise that, in an ordinary march, the seeming difficulties of the route should appear unavoidable. Even a practised surveyor might be startled, until a more careful examination should reveal to him the clue to the difficulty.

Description of Karen paths similar to those passed over by Captain Watson.

I have travelled 20 miles to the north-east and 40 to the east of Shway Gyeen, and have ascended similar paths to some of those described by Captain Watson; so steep, indeed, have been some of them that, in ascending, the feet of the man only a few paces in my front have been above the level of my head; and when, after heavy toiling, we have reached the summit, and emerging into a little cleared space, expecting to see the hills towering up still higher to our right and left, we have been astonished to find ourselves, as it were, on the summit of a pinnacle looking down upon lower elevations and valleys on all sides.

Difficulties attending the selection of a line for a road in Burma.

I have also had some great experience in road surveying in British Burma; and, even in less difficult countries than that crossed by Captain Watson, I know by experience the great embarrassment there exists in selecting the best available line through dense forest jungle, where the view is limited to a few yards in every direction.

It is only by traversing and retraversing such ground in every direction that its actual formation can be accertained, and the best line for a road discovered; and I therefore confidently assert that, though actuated by the most earnest desire to select a railway route, it was utterly impossible for Messrs. O'Riley and Watson to have succeeded during their hurried march across the country.

No obstacle to the construction of a railway in the Mobyé Valley.

After entering the valley of the Mobyé River, all obstacles to the construction of a railway are reported to vanish. Indeed, we are informed by Captain Watson, that there are no difficulties after the Salween has been reached; for he states in his letter to the Commissioner of the Tenassaim Division, British Burma, when forwarding his journal, that "with very little expense an excellent road can be made from the Salween, at the mouth of the Kaima-pyoo Choring, to Ngwé-doring;" and, that "a good road already exists between Ngwé-doring and Nyoung Yuwé, which is perfectly level;" and, further than this, he states, that "a tramway might be made along the valley of the Mobyé, with the greatest ease, to the 23d parallel of latitude," which is beyond the latitude of Mandalay.

A junction might be effected at Nyoung-Yuwé with Burman lines.

To be able to reach Nyoung Yuwé with a railway, will probably, however, be sufficient in that direction. The range of hills east of the valley of the Mobyé must be surveyed for an available exit for the railway, north-eastwards to the Takoo Ferry; but, if this cannot be found south of Nyoung Yuwé, it will be no objection, since that town will make an excellent point at which to effect junctions with lines from some point on the Irrawaddy, within or near to our frontier, and with Maudalay or any other town the King of Burma may desire to place in railway and telegraphic communication with Rangoon and Western China.

Nyoung Yuwé, we are told, is about 110 miles from Nywé-doring, and therefore 300 miles from Shway Gyeen, and 415 miles from Rangoon; and, in all this distance, 30 miles only have been shown to present any difficulties; and, of these, all that are of any importance are confined to a distance of 18 miles. Surely there is no impracticability in this; the most sanguine railway projectors could hardly have anticipated so few obstacles.

The passage of the Bhore and Thul Ghauts was condemned as impracticable.

Even the passage of the Bhore and Thul Ghauts was opposed by Mr. Chapman, the founder of railways in Western India, who, in 1851, wrote—"If thus I have not greatly mistaken the force of the facts and probabilities which have been adduced, it is scarcely possible to avoid the following conclusions:—

"1st. That it is impossible that even a really good common road will be found across the Northern Concan to the Thul Ghaut.

"2d. That if such a road be found, and used merely as a common road, it will not be a sufficient advance on the present state of things, or serve as an adequate basis for a general improvement of the cotton trade or the country." And in his letter to Mr. Stephenson regarding the Bhore Ghaut, in 1847, this passage appears: "The incline would probably be not less severe than one in five, certainly not less so, if my recollection be right, than 1 in 10." And yet the railway over this ghaut has actually been constructed with an average gradient of

of 1 in 48, and with a maximum gradient of 1 in 37, which is also the maximum gradient in the Thul Ghaut.

Mr. Clarke also gave his opinion of the Thul Ghaut, in 1847, as follows :—

"The Basta is the river of the Thul Ghaut. I have ascended it from Callian to the junction of the Chumal. It affords, so far, a practicable, but by no means a straight or economical line. I ceased to follow it any higher, because, though suitable enough for a common road, it appeared to wind a good deal and to be connected with numerous ravines on its northern side, unfitting it for railway purposes. It appears to me to be in a very high degree improbable that any practicable line into the Deccan should exist between Mowlee and the Thul Ghaut and the Malsej."

And as regarding the Bhore Ghaut, he wrote,—"That the country between Kussoor and the Bhore Ghaut, and about the latter, is high and broken. The ravine north of the Bhore Ghaut, at the head of which stands the village of Kandalla, is no doubt perfectly accessible from Callian by the Oolassa, though not from Panwell; but the ground above, a part of which is traversed by the present road, is for six or seven miles almost, if not quite, impracticable. This is the final objection to the various ravines which cluster round the line of the Bhore Ghaut road."

The last 110 miles of the route to Nyoung Yuwé, is through densely populated and well cultivated country, level, and splendidly drained by the Mobyé River. The construction of the railway here must be comparatively inexpensive; and as the same will be the case through the 135 miles from Rangoon to Baughta, the gain in these portions, over ordinary outlay, as regards an average, will surely admit of some extra expense being incurred in overcoming whatever difficulties a proper survey may prove to exist, and to be unavoidable.

I am well aware it may be urged that I have assumed average gradients only; and that in some places they may be much steeper than I have allowed. True; but, with the very meagre information contained in the Reports before me, it is correctly calculated; and, after all, neither Captain Watson nor Mr. O'Riley are in a position to prove that these very steep places cannot be avoided.

Indeed, so evident was the facility of avoiding them in one place, where the road passed "over precipitious heights," that Captain Watson could not help noticing it on his march; and I am of an opinion a professional survey will show that in nearly all these precipitious ascents and descents, the road has led in a direction straight across spurs and detached hills, instead of following the direction of the former or contouring the latter.

Account of the Bhore Ghaut.

In the paper read to the Bombay Mechanics' Institute by Mr. James Berkeley, above referred to, we find that the Bhore Ghaut mail road at the steep part of the ascent overcomes an elevation of 1,586 feet in 4 miles 50 yards; so that the average gradient of the road at this point, for that length, is one in 13½ feet; and further, "the ghaut road is only about 20 feet wide, and has a great number of very acute bends in it. Its steepest inclination is one foot in nine for 480 yards, but it presents also the following formidable gradients of—

1 in 10	for 1 mile,	360 yards.		1 in 14	for 1 mile, 350 yards.
1 in 11	„	770 „		1 in 15	„ 390 „
1 in 12	„	770 „		1 in 16 and 1 in 20	for 890 „
1 in 13	„	380 „			

"Thus, the entire length of very severe inclinations upon this mountain road is 3 miles 870 yards out of 4 miles and 50 yards."

Moreover, to obtain even these gradients a considerable amount of engineering skill had been called into play; for we are informed by Mr. Chapman that the road "was obtained by means of considerable work;" and that in this distance of 3 miles 870 yards "about 40 well defined turns, besides less conspicuous curvatures" had been constructed. Evidently, that gentleman did not overrate the natural features of the ghaut, when he estimated that the incline for a railway would not be less than one in five; he merely under-estimated the engineering skill that actually overcame this ascent with a maximum gradient of 1 in 37.

It must be remembered, too, that in speaking of this incline, Mr. Chapman did not refer to the actual surface of the ascent but to the completed work,

when every possible contrivance should have reduced the difficulties to the greatest possible extent. Certainly, the obstacles presented to the passage of the Bhore Ghaut are infinitely greater than those which exist on the route followed by Captain Watson in British Burma.

The direct land route practicable, if no steeper gradients are required than are to be found on actually constructed railways.

Provided no steeper gradients are necessary than those in existing European, Indian, and American railways, I feel justified in asserting that the route to Western China, proposed by Captain Sprye, must be practicable for a railway.

At present, however, we have no reason to think that, even by the route Captain Watson followed, such gradients will be requisite.

In English railways we have, amongst others, the following gradients:—

Victoria Incline.

The Victoria Incline, Manchester, has a gradient of 1 in 49, and 1 in 59 for $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles.

Oldham Incline.

On the Oldham Incline, between Oldham and Manchester, the gradient is 1 in 27 for nearly a mile.

Lickey Incline.

The Lickey Incline is 2 miles and 3 chains in length; its gradient is 1 in 37.

Continental lines.

Among Continental railways we have, as examples, the Austrian line connecting Vienna with Trieste, and the Sardinian Railway between Turin and Genoa.

Summering Incline.

On the former, there is the Summering Incline between Payerbach and Murzzuschlag, the total distance between which places is 21·51 miles, the length of the level portion 2·04 miles, and the incline 19·47 miles.

The gradients are—

From Payerbach to Eichberg	1 in 46 for 3·848	miles.
,, Eichberg to Klamar	1 in 40 for 2·529	,,
,, Klamar to Breitenstein	1 in 47 for 3·259	,,
,, Breitenstein to Summering	1 in 50 for 3·754	,,
,, Summering to Spital	1 in 50 for 4·454	,,
,, Spital to Murzzuschlag	1 in 50 for 3·856	,,

The average gradient from Payerbach to Summering, is 1 in 47 for 13·210 miles, and the maximum gradient, 1 in 40 for 2·529 miles; with no less than 14 curves of 14 chains radius, with scarcely any straight lengths.

The shortest radius of curve on the Summering Incline is nine chains.

The average load per train is 165 tons, which is moved at a speed of $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour.

Grove Incline.

The Grove Incline was constructed to surmount the Appennines, near Genoa. It is six miles in length, and rises from 295 feet above the level of the Mediterranean to 1,184 feet.

The gradients are—

1 in 36 for 2·14 miles.	1 in 29 for ·19 miles.
1 in 29 for 1·33 ,,	1 in 36 for ·93 ,,
Horizontal ·08 ,,	1 in 50 for 1·33 ,,

This line has been regularly worked for about 10 years. In fine weather the locomotives constructed by Messrs. Robert Stephenson & Co. of Newcastle, carry up 100 tons, and as a maximum 150 tons, at a speed of 15 miles per hour; while, in the worst weather, they never carry less than 70 tons, at the same speed.

Indian lines.

Amongst Indian lines, there are the Bhore and Thul Ghauts in the Syhadree Mountains or Western Ghauts, parallel to, and distant from the sea coast only about 30 miles, presenting an abrupt and volcanic scarp towards the sea, the lowest points of which are at an elevation of about 2,100 feet above the sea, while in many places the range reaches to an elevation of 5,000 feet above sea level.

Bhore Ghaut Incline.

The following is an extract from the description of the Bhore Ghaut Incline, which appears in a paper on "Indian Railways," by James John Berkeley, M. Inst. C. E., published by permission of the Council of the Institution of Civil Engineers.

"It is 15 miles 68 chains in length, and the total rise is 1,831 feet; the average gradient is 1 in 48. The steepest gradients are 1 in 37, and 1 in 40, for a total length of 9 miles and 44 chains; 1 in 37, extends in one length for 1 mile 10 chains; and 1 in 40, for 5 miles 6 chains; short lengths of level gradients,

gradients, and of 1 in 330, are introduced into this incline to facilitate the ascent of the engine. * * * * * * *

"At the 11th mile the incline is divided into two banks, by what is called a reversing station. This subdivision was not adopted for the purpose of making two banks of the incline, but of increasing the length of the base, in order to flatten the gradient and to reach a higher level, where it encountered the great feature of the Ghaut margin near Khandalla. Without the necessary expedient of the reversing station, the practicability of changing the direction of the line would have been confined to making curves of small radius; but with the device of the reversing station, the direction was altered at a very acute angle, by means of points and crossings."

Thul Ghaut Incline.

The following account of the Thul Ghaut is also extracted from the same paper:—

"It is 9½ miles in length, and has a total ascent of 972 feet. At the end of 3¼ miles there is a reversing station similar to that upon the Bhore Ghaut incline, by which the base was lengthened, the gradient flattened, and the incline divided into two banks. The steepest gradient is 1 in 37, for a length of 4 miles and 30 chains, and the same introduction of a level portion is adopted here as on the Bhore Ghaut.

Sharper gradients than the above will probably not be requisite on the direct land route.

"For my own part, I feel much confidence that gradients not steeper than those we have been examining can be obtained between the Sittang and Salween rivers, without even the necessity of tunnelling; but, otherwise, and should it be considered of importance to avoid the construction of any tunnels on the line, the expedients that have been followed in such cases in American and Continental railways can be resorted to, viz., that of working the steep inclines by stationary engines, or by locomotives especially constructed for the purpose. This method would not be applicable to any very great length of railway; but when, as in the case before us, the obstacles to be met are of a great local character, amounting in all to only 18 miles, where they can, by any possibility, be required out of 415 miles, there can be no objection to their employment; more especially as it will not admit of doubt that by far the greater portion of these 30 miles can be readily overcome with reasonable gradients, and that steep inclines can only be requisite for very short distances, where, under other circumstances, tunnels would be constructed.

Alleghany Portage Railway.

In the Alleghany Portage Railway from Hollidaysburg to the summit level of the Alleghany range, at the point the railway crosses, the rise is 1,398 feet, of which 1204·62 feet are overcome by five inclined planes.

The length of these inclines, and the height overcome by each, are as follows:

Incline.	Length in Feet.	Gradient.	Rise Effected.
No. 1 - -	2295·61	1 in 12·71	180·52 feet
„ 2 - -	2720·80	1 in 14·35	189·5 „
„ 3 - -	3116·92	1 in 10·13	307·6 „
„ 4 - -	2655·01	1 in 10·19	260·5 „
„ 5 - -	2628·6	1 in 10·18	266·5 „

This table shows that a height of 1204·62 feet is surmounted in a distance of 2·55 miles by inclined planes, having an average gradient of 1 in 11·51, and a maximum gradient of 1 in 10·13 in one length of 3116·92 feet.

Sao Paulo Railway.

In the Sao Paulo Railway, from Santos to Jundiahy, in Brazil, an elevation of 2,550 feet is overcome by a series of four inclines; in a distance of five miles the average gradient is 1 in 10, the maximum 1 in 9·75. The total length of this railway is 88 miles.

These inclines have only lately been completed, but trains ascend and descend them with perfect ease and security; the inclines are worked by stationary engines placed at the head of each incline. But it is understood that the engineer of the line, Mr. Branlees, proposes eventually to work them

by locomotive power, employing locomotives similar in construction to those invented by Mr. Fell for the Mount Cenis Railway.

Mount Cenis Railway.

On this, the Mount Cenis Railway, the gradients vary from 1 in 12 to 1 in 25 for 25½ miles, and from 1 to 26 to level for a distance of 22½ miles. Mr. Fell's engines have succeeded in taking trains up and down the steepest of these gradients, 1 in 12, with the greatest facility and safety.

What has been accomplished in America and elsewhere successfully may be effected in Burma.

What has been accomplished in America and the Continent with success may surely be adopted in Burma and elsewhere; and it is evident that in mountainous districts, since steep gradients can be worked with facility and safety, by avoiding the necessity for viaducts, heavy embankments, and other costly works, less expense will be incurred in the formation of railways, and greater will be the chance of their being satisfactorily executed.

Still, it is most probable that an accurate survey will discover a line without gradients requiring especial provision for motive power.

Steep mountains may be ascended by "zigzags."

There is no doubt that very steep mountains may be ascended by comparative easy gradients, by the introduction of the reversing stations employed by Mr. Berkeley on the Bhore and Thul Ghauts, or, as they are called on the American lines, "zigzags;" by a construction of a series of these zigzags of inclined planes from right to left, and the reverse alternately, up the face of the hill, each incline terminating in a level space, the gradient of ascent and descent will be so reduced as to enable an ordinary locomotive engine to draw the train up one incline on to the terminating level, back it up the next incline to the second level, and so through the series.

Experience shows that there is nothing impracticable in the construction and working of inclined planes over very formidable ranges, and that such inclines are not so expensive in construction as to cause hesitation on that score.

Comparative cost of railway over mountains.

The Alleghany Portage Railway, which is a double line of railway, cost 14,700 *l.* per mile, or one-third more than the Columbia and Philadelphia Railway, also a double line and a continuation of the Portage Railway.

The length of the Portage Railway is only 36 miles.

I have shown from Captain Watson's journal, that from Rangoon to Nyoung-Juwé, supposing the "direct land route" to follow that line, is a distance of 415 miles, and that in this he passed over only 30 miles of difficult ground.

Shows to what extent the cost per mile of the direct land route, so far as Nyoung-Juwé, would probably be increased by the additional expenses to be incurred in overcoming obstacles in 30 miles.

Well, admitting that the cost of constructing the tramway over these 30 miles will be one-third more per mile than for the cost per mile of the other 385 miles, then to overcome the difficulties in the 30 miles, the average cost per mile of the whole distance has very slightly to be increased.

Thus, supposing the ordinary cost of construction of 415 miles to be 5,000 *l.* per mile, the extra local expenses incurred on 30 miles would raise the average cost on the whole distance to 5,120 *l.* per mile.

Possible cost of the railway.

A few remarks on the possible cost of the railway may here be appropriate.

Nothing of the kind having yet been constructed in British Burma, we have little data on which to found positive calculations; but we probably have information sufficient to glean some idea of what the comparative cost may be in reference to railways in other countries.

Cost of the Columbia and Philadelphia Railway.

The Columbia and Philadelphia line, which was constructed much on the principle of English railways, cost 10,000 *l.* per mile, as compared with British railways; but as, in England, heavy sums are paid for land, Parliamentary, and preliminary expenses, the comparison should only be made between the cost of the actual construction of the railway proper. This, on the Columbia and Philadelphia Railway, amounted to 5,400 *l.* per mile, very little below that of several British lines.

This shows that, for railways of similar construction, the cost in England and America is much the same.

Average cost of the upper works of American railways.

But the upper works of the American railways are not generally of so expensive a character as in the above example; and 4,000 *l.* has been estimated as the average total cost per mile of American lines.

Nature of the construction of American railways, and its effect on the cost.

This low average is occasioned, not by the cost of labour, which is higher in America than in England, but by the less expensive style of construction adopted. Bridges of timber are largely used, instead of the costly brick, stone, and iron structures common in England.

The

The extensive introduction of timber viaducts on American lines renders embankments and long cuttings to a great extent unnecessary for the crossing of deep ravines at a low level, which is imperative where stone enters largely into the construction of railway works; and generally, railways in America are constructed throughout in a more rough and less expensive style than English railways.

The cost of maintenance high on American lines.

In such construction, the cost of maintenance is necessarily greater than on railways of more substantial character. But if a prudent, safe limit be fixed to the economy admitted in construction, with reference to the consequent increased working expenses of the railway, in a new country at least, it is desirable that the outlay for construction should be as small as possible, in order rather to open out the country than to expend the capital in the construction of works of very substantial character.

There is no doubt that a line which will pay 10 to 15 per cent., and last only 20 years, must be preferable to one which lasts 10 times as long, and barely pays 2 or 3 per cent. of its cost.

I have confined my remarks to *double* lines of railway, to ascertain the relative cost of English and American lines; but to establish a comparison with the proposed line in Burma, which will at first be *single*, we must take American single lines into consideration.

American single lines; their cost.

The average total cost of single lines in America per mile, laid with plate rails on timber strings, is 3,000*l.* only.

Application to British Burma.

In British Burma we have much the same conditions of construction as in America, in the nature of the country traversed, and the large provision of timber throughout it.

The comparative cost of labour is not difficult to arrive at. I have no statement of the actual cost of labour employed on railways in America, but Captain Galton mentions as one reason why the cost of maintenance of American lines is higher than for English lines, that it is "partly due to the higher value of labour."

Comparative value of unskilled labour in Burma.

Now, though the hire of native labourers in Burma is much less than that of English labourers in England, yet their effective work falls far short of the result obtained in England; so that a greater number would be required to execute a similar amount of work; and the value of such work is actually much the same in both countries.

For instance, the average cost of common excavation per cubic yard in England is 6*d.*; in Burma it is one rupee (two shillings) per 100 cubic feet, which is as nearly as possible 6*d.* per cubic yard.

Value of skilled labour.

Thus, the cost of Burmese unskilled labour is not so high as American, but skilled labour in British Burma will not, I imagine, compare quite so favourably; and the cost of all iron and metal work will be in excess of similar work in America.

Still, it is difficult to imagine that the total cost of construction in British Burma will much exceed that in America; 25 per cent. in excess must therefore be a liberal margin to allow on ordinary lines. But a complete scientific survey can alone furnish data for a reliable estimate, as such a survey may bring to notice many facts not now apparent, which would materially affect the cost of construction.

Advantages afforded for railway construction.

In several respects the country offers peculiar advantages for railway construction.

Amongst other rocks, both limestone and laterite abound; of the good qualities of both I can speak from experience. The former yields an excellent lime for building purposes.

The latter, a rock peculiar to India generally, is nowhere to be found of so excellent a quality as in the Marataban District, especially in the neighbourhood of Sittany and Shavay-Gyeen. I observe that in the Civil Commissioner's Administration Report of 1863-64, he remarks that Mr. Theobald, of the Geological Department, had discovered at Sittany laterite of a very superior description. I have long been aware of the existence of this laterite, but the expense of conveying it to Rangoon has prevented me hitherto from introducing it there. But as far back as 1855 I had made successful use of it at Sittany, where I built the magazine of this stone; and Colonel Blake, who has

for some years held military commands in that district, has several times testified to the fact of the Sittany magazine being, without exception, the driest magazine in British Burma.

As for bricks, the pagodas and fort walls from the earliest periods have been built of them, and they are now being extensively manufactured in Rangoon and other of the principal stations.

The vast forests passed through supply teak, pyengadow (ironwood, English), and fir trees in unlimited quantities. The latter, Captain Watson mentions to be upwards of 10 feet in girth, adding that one he had measured was 13½ feet.

Agents of Indian railways arrange for supply of sleepers from Burma.

Already the agents of the Indian railways are making arrangements for the supply of pyengadow sleepers from Burma. Their cost, delivered in Calcutta, cannot be less than 3*s.* per cubic foot, whereas, *in situ*, in the forests of British Burma, their cost per cubic foot does not exceed 9*d.*! This is within my own knowledge; for under orders of the Government of India, issued in consequence of a Report I submitted on the suitability of pyengadow timber for railway sleepers, I forwarded, in 1860, from Rangoon to Calcutta, 1,000 sleepers as an experiment, which has resulted in the present demand for them.

It may thus be safely estimated that on lines of railway in Burma the cost price of sleepers will be 300 per cent. cheaper than on the Indian lines.

Difficulty of procuring labour not so great as imagined.

It has been surmised that a difficulty may be experienced in procuring labour sufficient for the construction of the railway in British Burma. At the commencement this difficulty may be in some degree experienced; but I do not anticipate that it would long continue. A regular demand will create the supply.

Every year shiploads of coolies are imported from the coasts of the Indian Peninsula, most of whom, finding employment after a time to be uncertain and by no means continuous, feel no inducement to settle in the country, and therefore return to India.

The construction of the railway, and the easy access it will give, when finished, to much of the now uncultivated waste lands of the Pegu and Marataban Provinces, would offer continuous and permanent employment to these immigrants; for, as the line is constructed, and stations established in eligible positions, a few miles apart, many of the workpeople on the line would be induced to settle around them as cultivators, to have the advantage of sending the produce to the principal markets through which the railway would pass.

Effect of the construction of railways in America on the population of the country.

This was especially the case on the American lines; and the progress of railways in every other country proves that they invariably promote the peopling and cultivation of such rich and uninhabited lands as they may pass through, than which none are richer than those of Pegu and Marataban.

Thus, in the Report on American Railways made by Captain Galton, R.E, to the Board of Trade, in 1857, referring to the Illinois Central Railway, he writes: "When the line was first opened, the country was nearly uninhabited; stations were placed at every eight or ten miles, round which villages, and in some cases towns, have sprung up, and fields of corn and herds of cattle are now to be seen on every side."

The same would no doubt occur in British Burma.

Commercial benefits.

The commercial benefits that must accrue, both to British and British Indian trade, by such a commercial approach to the populous and productive Western Provinces of China across our Burman possessions, and the adjoining Shan States, is now too generally admitted, and has been so fully expatiated upon by those conversant with this part of the subject, that any remarks thereon by me would be superfluous, especially as I have drawn up this memorandum solely to show the fallacy of the opinion that the most direct if not the only line by which we can ever hope successfully to establish commercial intercourse with Western China is impracticable; and to show the many good reasons which exist for a thorough survey of the line being now undertaken, and how hopeful are the prospects of the result of such survey.

Conclusion.

After a very careful consideration of the entire subject, giving to all the arguments and statements of objectors their full weight, I do not hesitate to record it as my professional opinion, founded on my own personal knowledge of

of the features of the country to be traversed, acquired during a residence of nearly 12 years in British Burma, that the "direct land route" suggested by Captain Sprye, from Rangoon to Kiang-Hung *viâ* the Takoo Ferry, has in no way been shown to be impracticable, but, on the contrary, that what is before me in support of such an opinion tends strongly to establish the very reverse, the perfect practicability of the route for a railway; and, since such thorough survey of the route cannot be expensive beyond its utility, the vast importance of the object to be obtained is such as fully to warrant the outlay incident to a careful survey, and the submission of the results to the British Government.

J. Williams,
Captain, Her Majesty's Indian Army,
Executive Engineer, Rangoon Division, British Burma.

RANGOON AND WESTERN CHINA.

COPY of MEMORANDUM by Captain *Williams*, Inspector of Public Works, Rangoon Division, British Burma, upon RAILWAY COMMUNICATION between *Rangoon* and *Western China*, with MAP relating thereto.

(*Sir James Fergusson.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
15 *June* 1865.

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Under 4 *oz.*

RANGOON AND WESTERN CHINA.

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 28 March 1867;—*for*,

"COPY of further PAPERS or CORRESPONDENCE between the Government of *India* and the Secretary of State, on the proposed COMMUNICATION between *Rangoon* and *Western China*; with the DISSENTS, if any, recorded by Members of the Council of *India*, and that of Sir *Charles Trevelyan* (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 373, of Session 1865)."

India Office,
11 April 1867.

J. W. KAYE,
Secretary Political Department.

(*Mr. Kinnaird.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
12 *April* 1867.

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(No. 51.—Foreign Department.—Political.)

The Governor General of India in Council to the Secretary of State for India.

Simla, 13 August 1864.

WE forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of correspondence from the Chief Commissioner for British Burmah, in which that officer reports that his Majesty the King of Burmah has made a grant in favour of Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co., and Dr. Marfels, a German physician, residing at Mandalay, for the construction of a railway and telegraph line from the city of Mandalay to the frontier of China. The translation of the "Royal Orders," as the grant is designated, will make you acquainted with the conditions of the agreement or guaranteed rules.

2. The treaty of the 10th November 1862 aimed, amongst its other provisions, at facilitating commercial intercourse with the southern provinces of China. We cannot therefore be supposed at all indifferent to any measures calculated to open up this ancient channel of trade. No doubt such a line of railway, if practicable and executed, would aid materially in effecting the object of bringing into connection, by the Irrawaddy, the southern and inland provinces of China with the port of Rangoon.

3. Although fully sensible of the advantages which the project, if successfully executed, promises to British commercial interests, we at the same time feel it incumbent upon us to call your attention to circumstances which demand the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and which cannot safely be overlooked when it is a question how far the British Government should countenance an undertaking which may early involve it in grave embarrassment.

4. Manifestly, in the event of the enterprise meeting with the support of British capital, there must be an influx of European British subjects into Burmah within the next three years. Even if the project went no further than the preliminary surveys, this operation involves the employment of a certain number of qualified men; and should the undertaking advance beyond this point, there would necessarily be the usual staff of civil engineers and railway mechanics indispensable for the construction of the works. It is needless to observe that such functionaries would, as a rule, be ignorant of the language and customs of the people among whom they would be suddenly thrown, and little disposed by previous training to conform to the ways and system of an arbitrary and jealous native Government such as the Burmese. The chances of serious misunderstanding and of frequent collision amount, under such circumstances, to a certainty; and as references to the British authorities would ensue, and could not very well be ignored, the existing amicable relations with the Burman Court would run the risk of being speedily disturbed by communications of an embarrassing and irritating character.

5. We are aware that it may be alleged that Article 9 of the agreement, where it lays down that "the followers or servants of shareholders that may be employed in the royal kingdom shall, during their residence, conform to the

customs of the country," is in harmony with the provisions of the treaty of 10th November 1862, which uses the same phraseology in Article 7; and that, consequently, the railway compact places European British subjects on no other footing than that which they hold under the treaty, to the terms of which any British subject may appeal if injured by the Burman Government, and may look to his own Government for redress should treaty obligations prove to have been infringed. The force of such an argument cannot be denied, and the Government of India would be compelled to take due notice of any well-authenticated instances in which European British subjects had wrongfully suffered at the hands of Burman authorities; but it is palpable that the frequency of such references would be much greater and the complications arising more serious when, instead of a few British traders at Mandalay, usually pretty well acquainted with the people and the country, there would be a much larger, more mixed, and more scattered community of European railway officials and subordinates spread over Burman territory, and mostly wholly ignorant of its laws and customs.

6. That our apprehensions on the subject are not groundless, is proved by the fact, that at the present time, in consequence of the maltreatment of a British subject at the capital, the Chief Commissioner is in communication with the Burman Court in order that the stipulation of conformity to the customs of the country may not receive the construction which the Burmese authorities are inclined to put upon it, namely, that of warranting the infliction of corporal punishment for the neglect, when Burmese authorities pass, of a form of respect foreign to the habits and manners of Europeans.

7. It is true that, according to the provisions of the 9th article of the railway compact, disputes, whether of a civil or criminal nature, are to be decided by the Superintendent, a Burmese official; and, in case of dissatisfaction, the appeal is to lie to the royal courts, or to any one of the ministers, on payment of fees by both parties signing a guarantee to abide by the decision—provisions which would seem intended carefully to exclude the interference of the British Government; but we are convinced that if British capital should be embarked on this projected railway and telegraph line, and British-born subjects engaged in its execution, patient submission to a Burmese superintendent and to Burman Courts cannot be expected long to continue, and that the interference of the Government of India will be invoked on occasions in which neither the merits of the case, the pressure of public opinion, nor the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government would support us in throwing back aggrieved parties on the precise words and literal meaning of the original agreement.

8. If our anticipations be correct, the permanence of our pacific relations with the Burman Court cannot fail to be endangered by the execution of this railway compact, and we do not feel at liberty to report the existence of the agreement entered into without our cognizance or sanction, without candidly laying before Her Majesty's Government the opinion we entertain, and preparing it for consequences which are likely to follow very early after the entrance of railway functionaries into the Burman territory.

9. We need not add that, if Her Majesty's Government resolve on permitting the railway agreement to take its course, the Chief Commissioner will receive our strictest injunctions to omit nothing on his part that can secure the undisturbed continuance of our present amicable relations with the Burman Court, keeping aloof as far as practicable from the intricate conflicts which are pretty sure to arise between the railway company and the Burmese, and holding both sides bound by the compact into which they have entered. We would, however, warn Her Majesty's Government that we are not sanguine that any amount of tact or care would long succeed in staving off discord between the railway company and the Burman authorities, and we would suggest that Her Majesty's Government should ascertain clearly from the company, if formed, the light in which Article 9 of the compact is viewed, and should also favour the Government of India with specific instructions on the degree to which, if at all, Article 9 should be regarded as excluding British-born subjects from that protection which is in the East extended to our countrymen in a way and to an extent

extent exceptional from the ordinary rules of European international law and custom, and which in semi-barbarous countries, such as Burmah, is justified by the nonconformity of semi-barbarous institutions to the generally accepted conditions of commerce and intercourse with more civilized states.

10. You will observe that, deeming it ungracious to object, we have authorised the Chief Commissioner to allow the two Whitworth guns, and the 600 rounds of ammunition intended by the railway company as a present to the King of Burmah, to pass; but we have at the same time intimated to the Chief Commissioner, and to Mr. Barlow, the agent of the company, that this is only done as a great favour, and one that cannot be repeated. The Chief Commissioner is called upon to report how far Act 31 of 1860 is in full vigour in British Burmah, or has been relaxed in practice under the Notification No. 1879 of the 1st October 1860, and to intimate that there is no intention on the part of the Government of India to relax with respect to British Burmah the provisions of the Act in question.

11. You will remark that the Chief Commissioner, in reply to an application from Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co., for permission to take up land for a railway and telegraph line from Rangoon to the Burman frontier, has directed them to comply with the preliminary requirements of Act 22 of 1863. When this is done, and we are in possession of the views of the Chief Commissioner on that part of the scheme which contemplates connecting the port of Rangoon with the Burman frontier and Mandalay, it will be time enough to address you; but in the meanwhile we hope to be favoured with the views of Her Majesty's Government on the important question referred to in this despatch for its consideration.

We have, &c.
(signed) *J. Lawrence.*
H. Rose.
R. Napier.
H. S. Maine.
C. E. Trevelyan.
W. Grey.
J. N. Taylor.

(No. 247.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. P. Phayre*, C.B., Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, and Agent to Governor General, to Colonel *H. M. Durand*, C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, Governor General's Head Quarters, *viâ* Calcutta (No. 127–372, dated Rangoon, the 25th June 1864).

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, that a grant has lately been made by his Majesty the King of Burmah for the construction of a railway and telegraph from the city of Mandalay to the frontier of China; the concession is made to Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co., of London, and Dr. Marfels, a German physician, now residing at Mandalay.

2. I beg to enclose a translation of the document which constitutes the royal grant. It is understood, I believe, that the line of railroad will be the present track of the Chinese caravans down to, or near to, Bhamo, which is about 200 miles north from Mandalay.

3. The agent of Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co. has also applied for permission to take up land for a railway and telegraph from Rangoon to the Burmese frontier, with the view of eventually joining them with similar works through the Burmese territory to Mandalay. I have requested him to comply with the preliminary requirements of Act XXII. of 1863, and shall have the honour of addressing you hereafter when he has done so.

 4. I may

4. I may add that the project of this railway, whether eventually successful or not, is certainly due to the treaty of the 10th November 1862, between his Excellency the Viceroy and his Majesty the King of Burmah.

(No. 248.)

ROYAL ORDER.

IF railways are constructed in the royal kingdom to reach the eastern frontier towards the Chinese Empire, it would be beneficial, and will facilitate the extension of commerce, to the western frontier of the Indian empire, and the conveyance of merchandise from the western countries to the royal kingdom, and the eastern frontier of the Chinese empire.

With the view of promoting the advancement of commerce, and the benefits arising therefrom to the merchants in the royal kingdom, and to the merchants from various other countries, it is proposed that a railway be constructed from a suitable position in the district or landing-places of the royal kingdom to reach the eastern frontier towards the empire of China. The Woongyee, lord of the township of Pakan, Thado Mengyee Maha Menghla-tsee-thoo has been nominated to issue orders to the contracting parties, Dr. Marfels and Halliday, Fox & Co.

Proclaimed in the Burmese year 1236, 9th day of moon Nayou, 13th May 1864, by the Nab Kan (Royal Ear) " Pyogyee Mhoo Menghla Mengyau."

GUARANTEED RULES for the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line.

Article 1. The construction of a railroad and telegraph line being of the utmost importance, a person should be selected to superintend the various business connected with them, and one in due time should be appointed to act in concert in carrying out the works, and shall receive a suitable salary.

Article 2. Seven hundred cubits (1,050 feet) being the breadth for the railroad and telegraph line; but in places where there are no towns, villages or houses, if an extension of the breadth is necessary for the purpose of erecting depôts for coal and machinery, and for accumulating large quantities of earth for levelling the road, 1,000 or 2,000 cubits in breadth should be granted.* If there be royal land within such grant, permission shall be given for the occupation of the same; but if there be land belonging to other people, the owner should not refuse to sell it, and the superintendent shall conjointly after consultation and careful investigation, fix an equitable valuation, and purchase the said land; likewise, if there be any other portions of paddy or garden lands, the people occupying or cultivating such lands by royal permission should be entitled to hold them; no right, therefore, can be claimed for the levy of revenue from such individuals. The superintendent shall therefore issue orders in accordance with the customary regulations.

* 1,500 or 3,000 feet.

Article 3. In the event of the discovery of gold and silver mines within the boundary of the railway or telegraph line granted by His Majesty, or on land belonging to other individuals, such gold or silver mine, &c., being the rightful property of the sovereign, shall be conceded to his Majesty.

Article 4. If there be any sacred buildings, pagodas, monasteries, tanks, &c., on the course of the railway and telegraph line, they should not be considered as having been included in His Majesty's grant, but the order of the superintendent shall be attended to regarding them.

Article 5. No duty shall be levied on teakwood planks, or other descriptions of wood and coal required for the use of the railroad or telegraph line; such materials shall be purchased at the market value of the different towns, villages, and landing-places, or labourers hired to cut and procure them.

Article 6. If materials are required for the above-mentioned purpose, such as iron or coal, application shall be made for two or three suitable and selected places within the royal kingdom where they are procurable, and permission obtained by petition to work the mines; royal duty at the rate of one per cent. shall be levied on the quantity required for the use of the railroad and telegraph line; but the customary duties shall be paid on all quantities sold or used for other purposes.

Article 7. If labourers are required for the construction of the railroad and telegraph line, and can be obtained within the royal kingdom, they shall be employed, and wages duly paid to them.

Article 8. If any of the shareholders in the railway and telegraph line desire to reside in the royal kingdom, they shall be permitted to do so, and shall pay the customary taxes of the country in the same manner as British subjects.

Article 9. The followers or servants of shareholders that may be employed in the royal kingdom, shall, during their residence, conform to the customs of the country. In the event of disputes on account of wages due to them or other causes, civil or criminal, the decision

of

of the superintendent shall be obeyed, but if considered unsatisfactory, an appeal is open to the royal (inner and outer) courts, or to any one of the ministers, on payment of fees by both parties signing a guarantee to abide by the decision; the case shall then be finally decided.

Article 10. Machinery or any other articles intended solely for the use of the railway or telegraph line, shall, on application, be allowed to be registered free of duty.

Article 11. The works for the construction of the railroad and telegraph line shall commence within three years of the signing of this contract; but if within the three years the works have not commenced, all claim shall be given up to commence them after that period.

Article 12. With reference to there being several directions for the construction of the railroad, if the Bhamo line is set aside and any other line adopted for reaching the Chinese frontier, such railway shall commence from the royal city.

Article 13. A detailed account shall be furnished to the superintendent of all the sums disbursed in the construction of the railroad and telegraph line; and if his Majesty desires to purchase them, they shall be made over to his Majesty after the expiration of fifty years from the signing of this contract, on payment by his Majesty of the amount disbursed for the accomplishment of the work.

Article 14. On the completion of the railway and telegraph line, suitable places should be selected, after joint consultation, for the purpose of appointing persons jointly to superintend and keep a registry of the transactions on the railway; the persons so appointed will jointly prevent the conveyance of contraband goods; and, after examination in the customary manner, allow such goods to pass that are not prohibited. If watchmen or guards are required, people within the royal kingdom shall be hired and wages paid to them, but if they are employed on other works, they shall be remunerated accordingly.

Article 15. After the construction of the railroad and telegraph line, persons in Government service, or soldiers, cannons, muskets, military equipment, &c., shall not be conveyed by trains without the sanction of his Majesty the King; and on production of the royal order only shall they be allowed transit.

Article 16. After the construction of the railroad and telegraph line, whenever orders are issued from the royal court regarding the transmission of intelligence, no charge shall be made for doing so, and likewise all intelligence shall be communicated to the Court before it is forwarded to other parties: whenever his Majesty the King requires the use of the train, the customary payment should be solicited, and all other parties shall be requested to wait until his Majesty's wishes have been primarily attended to. With regard to officials and other persons acting under the orders of the Government, whenever orders are issued from the royal courts, such persons and other followers shall be conveyed free of cost.

Article 17. On completion of the railroad and telegraph line, the collections made on account of the railway and telegraph charges shall be summed up together; and after deducting the various charges, 10 per cent. shall be paid to his Majesty from the amount balance.

By the royal orders of his Majesty, which we bear on the crown of our heads, concession has been granted under the 17 Articles of the guaranteed rules for the construction of a railroad and telegraph line, under the supervision and orders of the Pakan Woongyee, in the Burmese year 1226, 12th day of the waning moon Nayou, corresponding with the English year 1864, 31st day of the month of May in the year forenoon, at the northern end of the Soothan, or royal hall of the high court, in the presence of the Muggway Woongyee, lord of the royal stud; Myadoung Woongyee, lord of the royal muskets; Soung Shyee Woongyee, governor of the royal barges.

This document was signed by the Woongyee, lord of the township of Pakan Mengtha de Mengyee Maha Menghla-tsee-thoo.

Dr. Marfels, whose title is Mengyan, "Theri-Betheka-Pinhya," and Halliday, Fox & Co., by their attorney, Mr. Barlow.

Peacock Seal.	Signature of	*Woonshing Dan Pakhangyee*, Myotsa Mengyee.
L. S.	„	*Ferdinand Marfels.*
L. S.	„	*Halliday, Fox & Co.* By their Attorney, *Robert Adeane Barlow.*

MINUTE by Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, dated Simla, 9th August 1864.

I AGREE in the terms of the accompanying draft, so far as regards the probability of disputes arising between persons connected with the proposed railway and the Burmese, and the necessity which will exist for our Government affording the usual protection to British subjects; but I cannot concur with the Governor General and my colleagues in Council in recommending that Her Majesty's Government should for these reasons seriously consider whether the project should not be discountenanced and prevented.

We have applied measures of coercion to impose upon the Chinese and Japanese the common duty of commercial intercourse. In this case, an Indo-Chinese nation voluntarily offers to take the most effectual step to promote such intercourse with themselves and the Chinese.

Colonel Phayre, in his letter reporting the railway concession, observes that "the project of this railway, whether eventually successful or not, is certainly due to the treaty of November 10, 1862, between His Excellency the Viceroy and His Majesty the King of Burmah."

The main objects of that treaty were stated as follows, in the instructions to Colonel Phayre, dated 12th May 1862:

That the commercial route from Ava *viâ* Bamo to the Chinese province of Yunan should be re-opened:

That British merchants and their agents, European and Asiatic, should be allowed to pass by that route, and reside at Bamo, in order to attend to the trade:

That Chinese traders and labourers should be allowed to pass into British territory without hindrance, the special intention being that the tea planters in Assam should be allowed to send an agent to Bamo to engage Chinese labourers.

All these objects have been provided for by the treaty, which was not obtained without a serious sacrifice on our part. The abolition of the frontier duties caused the loss of a steadily increasing revenue, which already amounted to 600,000 rupees a year; and we have foregone for all time to come a much larger revenue, which was to be expected from the export and import duties leviable at Rangoon upon the trade with the independent countries in the interior. A one per cent. duty is all we can take upon the imports from Rangoon to Bamo or the exports beyond sea from Bamo through Rangoon.

It is true that there is no express mention of a railway in the treaty, but a railway is the inevitable corollary of the premises contained in the treaty. Railways have become necessary to meet the requirements of modern trade; and although some difficulties may attend their first construction, nothing can be better calculated to promote a mutually beneficial intercourse with the people of semi-barbarous countries, to induce the knowledge and habits which belong to civilisation, and in the end to prevent that friction and collision which is so much feared.

It appears from Colonel Phayre's report of 21 November 1862, that the treaty was "so worded that the steamers might come as a matter of right, and merchants settle at Bamo or anywhere else." By it, British merchants may proceed up the "Irrawaddy in such manner as they please without hindrance," and "may purchase whatever they may require (fuel, for instance), and settle in any part of the Burmese territory. The King and Minister are fully prepared under this for the appearance of British steamers, and for our merchants to settle at Bamo. I trust, therefore, that his Excellency the Viceroy in Council will consider that the road to China is thereby fully opened to our steamers as far as they can go, and that our merchants may now proceed by the Irrawaddy to Bamo, and deal direct there with the Chinese caravans."

It is plain from this that a mode of communication with Bamo was contemplated by both parties to the treaty, which involves most of the consequences of a railway; but it has been proved, by the experience of the Indus and other rivers in both hemispheres, that the facilities afforded to trade by steam vessels, are not to be compared with those offered by railways, and hence the proposal to construct a railway.

I am not afraid of any consequences to be apprehended from the construction

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of a railway to Bamo. The military power and spirit of the Burmese have been so broken by the two wars in which they have been worsted by us, and we have acquired such a knowledge of our influence in their country, that the relative position of the two Governments is now totally altered from what it was even before the last war.

The Burmese have ceased to be a conquering race, and are turning their attention to peaceful pursuits. If the Burmese Government is properly encouraged and assisted by us, there is every hope that its policy will take a commercial turn, which will be our best security for the preservation of peace, as the construction of a railway would be our most effectual instrument for carrying on war.

I am also of opinion that the chances of serious disputes arising between the railway employés and the people are rated too high. There have been some recent complaints of the conduct of a railway surveying party in the Hyderabad territory, arising chiefly from the excessive price demanded for the necessaries of life in that quarter; but generally speaking, railway construction in India has been attended with an unusually small proportion of unpleasant feeling between European and native. The natives have in particular appreciated the exactness with which ready money payments have been made to the labourers and all others concerned. The concession in this case is a business-like document, being a modification of our Indian railway contracts to suit the treaty with Burmah and the prejudices of the Government and people. The only point on which especial precaution seems to me to be required, is in the 7th article, which might, in concert with the Burmese officials, be used to cover the great vice of forced labour, by which the Burmese in former days depopulated the countries subdued by them.

We shall not be in a better position in five years hence for settling this question than we are now. On the contrary, if we force upon Burmah the policy which we have broken down in China and Japan, the Burmese Government will be confirmed in its former exclusive spirit, and will have nothing to divert its attention from military organisation. Any time we may take will have its peculiar risks, but I am persuaded that the smaller risk and the greater advantage are on the side of promoting commercial intercourse by the formation of a railway from Mandalay to Bamo, and, as a necessary consequence, from Rangoon to Mandalay. The British Government is not responsible for the concession which was granted by the Burmese Government without any previous consultation with us; and it has been studiously framed so as to save the honour and authority of the Burmese Government. It should, in my opinion, be recognised by us in that sense, and be left to its operation. We should, through our agents, render any good offices in our power, without involving ourselves in guarantees, or compromising the Burmese Government. According to the arrangement, the primary jurisdiction, in case of disputes, rests with the Burmese Government; and, as the concession was obtained by persons who evidently understood the temper of that Government, it may be hoped that their subsequent proceedings will be conducted in the same spirit. It is only in the case of the two parties to the agreement, or those acting under them, becoming seriously embroiled, that we should have to interfere.

(Political Department.—No. 65.)

The Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council, dated 7 November 1864.

1. I HAVE attentively considered in Council the reference contained in the letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 51, dated 13 August 1864, respecting the course which it is proper for the British Government to pursue relative to the recent proposal to construct (under concession from the King of Burmah) a railway and telegraph from Mandalay to the Burmese frontier of China.

2. Her Majesty's Government concur generally in the view which has commended itself to the majority of your Excellency's Government, and are of opinion that, considering the political embarrassments which would inevitably

arise from this scheme, the collisions likely to occur between the railway officials and the authorities of the Burman Government, and the extreme difficulty of protecting the former when constructing the line, and afterwards, when it is completed, the countenance and encouragement of the British Government should not be accorded to the plan.

(signed) *C. Wood.*

Liverpool, 10 July 1866.

To the Right Honourable Lord *Cranborne*, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council.

The Memorial of the Liverpool, East India and China Association

Showeth,

1. That your memorialists are extensively engaged in trade with India and China, and are necessarily much interested in every opening that can be found for its peaceful extension in those countries.

2. That since the annexation in 1852 of the Burman sea-coast provinces of Pegu and Martaban to British India, it has been proposed that the Shan States adjoining them should be commercially opened under friendly arrangements with the King of Ava by a railway from the port of Rangoon across Eastern Pegu and the Burman Shan States to the right bank of the Meikong or Upper Kamboja River, near to where it issues from the Chinese province of Yunan.

3. That having very fully considered the importance of such a peaceful extension of trade over those interior portions of Eastern Asia, and become satisfied of its practicability with the co-operation and support of Her Majesty's and the Indian Governments, your memorialists, on the 23rd September 1862, addressed a memorial to your Lordship's predecessor in office, praying that a commercial treaty might be negotiated with the King of Ava to facilitate the transit of merchandise across his territory to China. In reply to which, the then Secretary of State for India informed your memorialists, on the 25th September 1862, that "he directed the notice of the Government of India to the subject in June 1861, and that he has recently received a despatch, stating that the Chief Commissioner of Burmah has been desired to keep his attention directed to the prospect of trade with Western China, and to avail himself of every favourable opportunity to obtain knowledge of the several routes which have been suggested for tapping the commerce of China in that quarter."

4. That a commercial treaty having been negotiated with the King of Ava on the 10th November 1862, before that memorial could have reached the Government of India, your memorialists finding that no provision was made for a direct trade from Rangoon with the Shan States and China, addressed a letter to Her Majesty's President of the Board of Trade upon the subject, on 28th August 1863, urging the advantage to British commerce of a route being opened between the port of Rangoon and the south-west frontiers of the Chinese province of Yunan, and praying that a survey of the country between Rangoon and the Upper Kamboja River might be undertaken.

In reply to which the President of the Board of Trade informed your memorialists, on the 4th September 1863, that "copies of their letters had been transmitted to the Foreign Office and to the Secretary of State for India."

5. That not being favoured with any communication thereon from the Foreign Office, your memorialists, on the 13th November 1863, addressed a letter to Her Majesty's then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Earl Russell, referring to their above letter to the President of the Board of Trade, and respectfully inquiring whether Her Majesty's Government had decided upon taking any action thereon; "to which Earl Russell replied, under date 25th November 1863, informing your memorialists that the matter to which they referred more immediately comes within the department of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, to whom this Association should address themselves."

6. That, consequently, your memorialists, on the 27th November 1863, addressed a letter to Her Majesty's then Secretary of State for India, stating that

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Earl Russell had referred them to him for the desired information, and requesting that they might be furnished with it. In answer to which, the Secretary of State for India informed your memorialists, by letter dated 7th December 1863, "that the Government of India had been instructed to report on the best means to be adopted for developing the resources and improving the intercommunications of British Burmah. Pending the receipt of this report, Sir Charles Wood is not prepared to issue any further or more specific orders on the subject."

7. That by the Parliamentary Papers of 1864, "China, 0·77," your memorialists see that upwards of 20 memorials were forwarded to Her Majesty's Ministers from other principal commercial chambers and associations of the kingdom, advocating and praying for the extension of trade from Rangoon to the Burman Shan States and Western China.

8. That, nevertheless, your memorialists have not been favoured with any communication on a subject so important to your memorialists and to the country at large, nor have they learned that Her Majesty's Government has as yet decided upon taking action thereon.

9. That the memorandum and map by Captain Williams, Inspector of Public Works in the Rangoon Division of British Burmah, dated 21st January 1865, and presented to Parliament last Session (Parliamentary Papers, Rangoon and Western China, 373, 1864), fully establishes that a railway for direct commerce from Rangoon with the Burman Shan States and Western China can be easily and cheaply constructed, Captain Williams' elaborate report concluding with the following forcible paragraph:

"After a very careful consideration of the entire subject, giving to all the arguments and statements of objectors their full weight, I do not hesitate to record it as my professional opinion, founded on my own personal knowledge of the features of the country to be traversed, acquired during a residence of nearly 12 years in British Burmah, that the 'direct land route' suggested by Captain Sprye, from Rangoon to Kiang Hung *viâ* the Pakoo Ferry, has in no way been shown to be impracticable; but, on the contrary, that what is before me in support of such an opinion, tends strongly to establish the very reverse, the perfect practicability of the route for a railway, and since such thorough survey of the route cannot be expensive beyond its utility, the vast importance of the object to be obtained is such as fully to warrant the outlay incident to a careful survey, and the submission of the results to the British Government."

10. That in reference to the foregoing, and without touching upon the commercial importance of extending the Indo-European Telegraph, as also proposed by Captain Sprye by the same land route to Hong Kong,—

Your Memorialists pray,

1st. That your Lordship will be pleased to authorize a thorough professional survey by some eminent railway engineer of this country, to ascertain the best line for a railway to be carried from Rangoon to the extreme north-east frontier of the provinces of Pegu and Martaban, and thence by the Takoo Ford of the Salween River through Kiang Tung to Kian Hung, or by any other preferable route to the Mei Kong or upper Kamboja River on the south-west frontier of China.

2nd. That your Lordship will move Her Majesty the Queen to send an envoy of suitable rank to the King of Ava, to negotiate, under your Lordship's instructions, the necessary friendly and equitable arrangements with his Government, in so far as the line may have to pass across Shan territory tributary to his Majesty.

And your Memorialists will ever pray.

(signed) *A. D. Anderson,* Chairman.

(Political.—No. 75.)

The Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council, dated 29th September 1866.

Para. 1. I FORWARD for your information, copy of a Memorial* I have received from the Liverpool East India and China Association, upon the subject of opening a communication between Rangoon and the western frontier of China.

*Dated 10 July 1866.

2. I have considered this memorial in Council, together with the papers noted in the margin.† This question was brought before you in 1864, by the grant of a concession from the Burmese Government to Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co., for a railway and telegraph line from Mandalay to the western frontier of China. You expressed yourself adversely to this particular scheme, entered into without your cognizance and sanction, on the ground that the class of persons whom it would introduce in large numbers into Burmese territory might, through their ignorance of native customs, endanger our present amicable relations with that empire. My predecessor, in his Despatch of the 7th of November 1864, No. 65, concurred in your objections to the proposed undertaking.

†1. Memorials on the subject of opening up a direct communication with the West of China from the Port of Rangoon. (Parl. Paper, 1864.)
2. Memorandum on Railway Communication with Western China and the intermediate Shan States from the Port of Rangoon in British Burmah, by Captain J. M. Williams. (Parl. Paper, 1865.)
3. Journal of the Salween Surveying Expedition during the season 1864–65. Calcutta.
4. India Foreign Letter, No. 51, 1864.

3. It is evident that these objections apply, in some degree, to every proposal for establishing a communication, either by road or railway, between British Burmah and Western China, and they will carry more or less weight, according to the part of the empire through which the communication is proposed to be carried, the disposition of the population through whose country it will pass, and the extent of foreign soil it will have to traverse, on all which points much additional light has been thrown by the report of Captain Williams, which has been made since the date of the correspondence between my predecessor and your Government in 1864. Still more material will be the means of forming an estimate of the extent of the commercial advantages by which such difficulties would be counterbalanced, and which are believed to be little inferior to those realised in Eastern China.

4. It is desirable that Her Majesty's Government should be able to give a definite reply to the various commercial bodies who attach great value to the establishment of such a communication. It is impossible for them, however, to form any conclusion as to the policy of permitting or discouraging such projects, until they are in possession of more extended information with respect to the probable cost of the projected road or railway, the direction it would take, and the points on the British and Chinese frontiers it would connect. In the absence of a reliable survey, the difficulties of the intervening country, and, consequently, the cost of surmounting them, must remain a matter of conjecture. Until these facts are ascertained no estimate of the commercial advantages likely to ensue from the undertaking can be formed, and consequently one of the main elements of a decision upon the policy of encouraging it will be wanting.

5. Her Majesty's Government have given due weight to the objections urged in 1864, by your Excellency's Government, on the ground of the danger of a surveying party coming, whether through misunderstanding or otherwise, into collision with the local authorities or the people of the countries through which such an expedition would pass, and thus leading to political difficulties. Her Majesty's Government consider it an indispensable preliminary to the commencement of such a survey, that the full and free consent of the ruler of the territory in which it is to be made should in each case be obtained, and the issue of the expedition recently formed under your authority to explore the course of the Upper Salween sufficiently demonstrates that whatever danger might attend the operations of engineers or surveyors, not qualified by previous training to avoid collision with the authorities of the Burmese or other Native Government, no such danger can attend the exploration of a surveying party properly selected and prepared.

6. Unless, therefore, some circumstance with which they are unacquainted should constitute in your judgment an insuperable objection to such a course, Her Majesty's Government authorise you, after duly obtaining through your Chief Commissioner

Commissioner in British Burmah, or otherwise, the consent of the Court of Mandalay and the Chiefs of the territories which intervene between the Burmese Empire and the Chinese frontier at or near Kiang Hung, to take the requis measures for forming a surveying or exploring expedition to ascertain the best route for a road or railway between the frontiers of British Burmah and Western China, and the probable cost of executing the same.

7. Judging by the conduct of the King of Burmah and of the Chiefs of the Shan States, with respect to the Salween expedition, there is no ground for anticipating any opposition at their hands, if they are sufficiently assured of the amicable intentions of Her Majesty's Government, and at the same time of the importance we attach to the accomplishment of this survey.

8. I must entirely leave it to the discretion of your Excellency's Government to decide upon the details of the expedition, and upon the order in which the necessary investigations shall be carried on. Her Majesty's Government desire that the information which they are anxious to obtain shall be procured in whatever manner may be in your judgment most effectual, and most in accordance with the public interest.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Cranborne.*

(Foreign Department—Political—No. 197.)

The Governor General of India in Council to the Secretary of State for India.

Fort William, 8 December 1866.

WITH reference to your Despatch, No. 75, dated 29th September last, giving cover to a Memorial from the Liverpool East India and China Association, upon the subject of opening a communication between Rangoon and the western frontier of China, we have the honour to transmit herewith the accompanying copy of a letter from the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, and of our reply thereto.

2. In the present state of the finances, we deprecate even the probable expenditure which a preliminary exploration of the country would involve. We believe that the measure would not lead to any satisfactory results; and especially that it would not furnish any solid data on which to estimate the approximate cost of a railway or road through Burmah. The utmost it could effect would be to give some general idea of the practicability of such works. so far as the physical features and the political condition of the region are concerned.

3. To form a tolerable estimate of the cost of a road or railway, a large staff of engineers would be required for at least a couple of years, and even then there would be little certainty of what would prove the actual cost of the work.

4. We do not doubt that a road or railway through Burmah might be constructed, but we feel sure that the cost would prove very large, and we consider that under no circumstances ought such a charge to be debited against the revenues of India; at the same time we are not aware of any other source from which the charge could be met.

5. Other considerations which we also desire to submit to your Lordship's notice are, that in a territory so thinly populated as Burmah, the labourers required to execute the work would have to be imported for the purpose, at a considerable sacrifice probably of human life, and that the difficulty of securing adequate police and administrative protection along the whole length of the contemplated line, would necessarily be very great among states and tribes which are not only independent of our sway, but, under native governments, weak, fluctuating, and untrustworthy.

6. We trust, therefore, that we may not be required to undertake the scheme; but in case Her Majesty's Government may still be of opinion that it should be prosecuted, we beg that your Lordship will instruct us by telegram to that effect.

No time will really be lost by this apparent delay, for the interval up to the date at which we may expect to receive the telegram, will be occupied by the preparatory arrangements which the Chief Commissioner has been directed to negotiate with the King of Burmah.

We have, &c.
(signed) *John Lawrence.*
H. S. Maine.
W. Grey.
G. N. Taylor.
W. N. Massey.
H. M. Durand.

(No. 58.)

From Colonel *A. P. Phayre*, C.B., Chief Commissioner of British Burmah and Agent to the Governor General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General,—No. 190, dated Prome, the 22nd October 1866.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No 937, dated the 14th ultimo, together with enclosed copy of a memorandum on proposed railway communication between Rangoon and Western China, by Captain J. M. Williams, Executive Engineer, Rangoon Division. Being away from the records of my office, and not having with me a copy of the map referred to in the memorandum, I fear I may not be able to give so distinct or intelligible an opinion on each point as I could wish. I trust, however, that due allowance will be made for this by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council.

2. It will be observed that Captain Williams's memorandum refers to three routes, two being partly by the Irrawaddy River, and one direct from Rangoon, entirely by land. It is the latter which he advocates. As I understand also, he adopts entirely the line advocated by Captain Sprye, that is, from Rangoon to Baughta north of Shwegyeen, on the Sittang River, and thence in a north-easterly direction across ranges of hills to gain the valley of the Salween River, from thence to follow the right bank of the Salween as far as what is called the Takau Ferry, in about 20° 50′ N. L., and from thence north-east to Kiang Hung in 22° N. L., near to or on the great Cambodia River.

3. When the present object is rather to ascertain the probable expense of a survey than to speculate upon various lines, it may at first appear scarcely worth while to mention this proposed route, and then to proceed to refer to another; but it is necessary to do so. For instance, I am inclined to think that the line, instead of leaving the valley of the Sittang River near Shwegyeen, should proceed up by the right bank of the river to Toungoo, our frontier station, and thence probably as far north as Yemethen, in the Burmese territory, in about 20° 30′ N. L. As it is agreed on all hands that the Burmese terminus of what may be called the line of Southern Yunan should proceed to about Kiang Hung, on the Cambodia River from about the position of Yemethen, it would have to turn eastward.

4. In regard to the probable cost of a survey of such a road as that indicated by Captain Williams from Rangoon to the borders of China, I beg to submit a copy of a memorandum drawn up by that officer, and dated the 6th instant. Undoubtedly, as remarked by Captain Williams, what has to be now provided for is a mere reconnoitring survey; a selection, in fact, of the line of least apparent difficulty from eye or rough measurement between two points, Rangoon being one, and a spot on the great Cambodia River, or east of it, somewhere about the 22° N. Lat. being the other. Now, the general line advocated by Captain Sprye and by Captain Williams, and that I have indicated, at some parts of their courses deviates not less than 150 miles from each other: even to reconnoitre these two lines will be a work of considerable labour. I should say it cannot be done in one season, as Captain Williams has calculated. That officer has given for one season seven months' work, with salaries to those employed, as entered

entered in the margin. I think we must consider that two seasons will be consumed in this work; and, as observed by Captain Williams, an officer should certainly go in political charge of the party; his salary, while so employed, should not be less than that of the Chief Engineer, and 500 rupees a month besides, as travelling allowances. This would bring the total expenditure for two seasons of seven months each up to 91,000 rupees. If, then, I state the probable cost of the reconnoitring survey at a lakh of rupees, I feel I shall not be overstating what is probable.

	Rs.
Chief Engineer for seven months at *Rs.* 2,000 - - -	14,000
Assistant Engineer at *Rs.* 800 -	5,600
Travelling expenses and contingencies - - - -	7,000
Lascars, &c. - - - -	1,400
TOTAL - - *Rs.*	28,000

5. In regard to the probable success in the construction of a railway with reference to physical difficulties, I believe, if the line apparently advocated by Captain Williams turning north-east from Baughta be followed, the physical difficulties met with will be far greater than any yet encountered by railway enterprise in India, I mean as far as mountains constitute physical difficulties. If the line up the Sittang valley to about Yemethen be followed, no difficulties will be encountered until the line gets into the hilly country of the Shan States; then, however, they, no doubt, would be considerable. In any case, however, I fear the grand difficulty will be that of labour. In all these countries population is sparse, and the people, as a rule, abhor digging labour.

6. Notwithstanding the great difficulties which, I think, will have to be encountered in building a railway, I think the national interests involved in opening out, or endeavouring to open out, direct communication between Western China and Rangoon are so vast, that I think a surveying party should be sent to explore and roughly survey the proposed line or route. I feel assured that the Burmese Government will not oppose the plan, though undoubtedly they have an undefined dread of such a work. I should recommend the party being arranged for as soon as possible.

7. I must admit that I cannot form any opinion as to objections which might be urged against the proposed road, as involving our political relations with China. As far as the Burmese Government is concerned, I think they will not oppose the plan. It will undoubtedly be necessary to provide very carefully against misunderstandings during the construction of the line. This must be done by stationing Government officers at intervals along it.

8. The finances of the Burmese Government are so deranged, that they could not possibly be expected to aid in the work. They will probably ask for some pecuniary compensation for granting a right of way through their country and through the tributary Shan States.

9. As regards the mercantile community in British Burmah, they are most anxious to have the communication established. It is naturally felt that it would raise Rangoon in a few years nearly to a level with Calcutta or Bombay. On the 1st of December last I had the honour to submit a proposal from two gentlemen of Rangoon, Mr. W. S. Steel, of the firm of Gladstone, Wyllie & Co., and Mr. Leon Hernandez, agent for a company trading to Burmah. These gentlemen are prepared to form a company to carry out the project of a direct railway from Rangoon to Western China on the same terms that have heretofore been granted to railway companies in India.

10. I would venture to suggest that a party should be sent from the Chinese side to meet the survey party on the Cambodia River somewhere about Kiang Hung, in latitude 22° north. From that side also it would be advisable to make it a point of special inquiry as to what amount of traffic is likely to be brought to feed the railway carried to the Cambodia River or some distance east of it.

Railway Communication with Western China.

(Reference, Government of India Letter, No. 937, dated 14th September 1866, regarding a proposed survey of the route.)

The letter above quoted directs that an estimate be submitted of the probable cost of surveying such a route as that indicated in my memorandum dated 21st January 1865, from Mandalay to the borders of Western China.

Now the route advocated by me in my memorandum is the direct route by land from Rangoon on the sea-board of British Burmah to the borders of Western China by the valley of the Sittang and Salween, in direct opposition to the route *viâ* Mandalay, commencing as it would do several hundred miles from the coast and entirely beyond British territory.

As the very cogent objections to the Mandalay route are detailed at length in that memorandum, I will not now refer to them, except to observe that the result of conversations which I have since held with mercantile gentlemen in England, and inquiries made on my return to this country, has been to convince me still more of the soundness of my arguments against that route. I will, however, remark, that so valueless in the English money market was the concession obtained by Messrs. Halliday, Fox & Co. for a railway from Mandalay to China, that the creditors of that firm were unable to realize anything upon it.

For the reasons thus mentioned, and as the route is referred to by the Government of India as the one indicated by me, it appears probable that, through a clerical error, Mandalay has been named as the route instead of Rangoon.

The "direct route," so called in my memorandum above referred to, in order to distinguish it from the other routes which combine river and land communication, would follow the valley of the Sittang to the most convenient point of departure for crossing the watersheds of the Sittang and Salween valleys to the Takoo Ferry, whence to Kiang Hung few, if any, difficulties are anticipated.

The object of my memorandum was to dispel the impression that was gaining ground consequent on Messrs. O'Reilly and Watson's Report that the only route which I consider can be financially feasible was physically impracticable. I therefore examined their reports in detail, and endeavoured to show that even the indentical lines followed by these officers had not been proved impracticable, and that there was good reason to believe that a proper survey would prove the reverse. But, as I then explained, "the precise route to be adopted between the Sittang and Salween Rivers, must depend on the result of a thorough survey of that part of the country by professional engineers."

The most convenient point of departure from the Sittang valley would doubtless be about the latitude of Toungoo, but it must be remembered that the hill ranges to be crossed may be considered as spurs or offshoots of the Himalayan range, and therefore the nearer we approach the north, the ranges to be crossed may be expected to increase in elevation and steepness.

I am inclined to consider that the best plan will be for the expedition either to proceed *vid* Toungoo, returning by a more southerly route, or, leaving the Sittang near Shwegyeen, examine that route, and return *vid* Toungoo.

Mr. Steel has already submitted proposals for the construction of a railway by the direct route so far as lies within British territory, *vide* Chief Commissioner's memorandum dated 1st December 1865, and he informs me that Messrs. Gladstone, Wyllie & Co. are willing to render every assistance in their power towards the construction of a railway to Western China by that route, and that they are prepared to form a company to carry out the project on the same terms that have been granted to railway companies in India.

All that is now needed is, definitely to decide the question of the practicability of the route; for this purpose no detailed survey is required; that must follow when a feasible route has been selected. All that is immediately requisite is a reconnoitring survey.

This can probably be done under favourable circumstances in one season of seven (7) months. It should be conducted by an experienced engineer, accompanied by an assistant, so that, in the event of casualty to one officer, the result of the survey may not be lost.

The

The cost of the survey must be mainly dependent on the salaries of the officers who may be appointed, and, therefore, on the individual selections made by Government; but the following may, I think, be taken as an approximate estimate:—

	Rs.
Chief Engineer of the survey, salary for seven months, at 2,000 rupees	14,000
Assistant, at 800 rupees	5,600
Travelling expense, clearing an occasional trace, contingencies, at 1,000 rupees	7,000
Survey posts and Lascars, at 200 rupees	1,400
TOTAL *Rs.*	28,000

It would, however, be most desirable that a political officer should accompany the expedition, and Captain Watson, from his local knowledge and experience, coupled with the great interest he takes in the project, would render invaluable service. The salary of this officer, at whatever rate it may be fixed, must be added to the above estimate.

(signed) *J. M. Williams*, Captain,
Superintendent of Works, British Burmah.

Rangoon, 6 October 1866.

(No. 59.)

From *J. W. S. Wyllie*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General, to the Chief Commissioner, British Burmah,—No. 1174, dated Camp Agra, the 24th November 1866.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 190, dated 22nd ultimo, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council to forward, for your information, the accompanying copy of a Despatch* from Lord Cranborne, and of its enclosure, on the subject of opening a communication between Rangoon and the western frontier of China.

* No. 75, dated 29 September 1866.

2. His Excellency in Council requests that you will ascertain the views of the Burmese Court and of those Chiefs through whose territory the surveying party will have to pass, and that, in accordance with the instructions contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Secretary of State's Despatch, you will obtain the consent of the several potentates to the expedition. Your negotiations with the King of Burmah should also make provision for His Majesty's deputing an officer to accompany the party.

3. Should your replies on these preliminary points be satisfactory, and should the Government of India ultimately determine to sanction the expedition, the arrangement of all details as to the route which should be adopted in going and returning will be left to your discretion. The line should undoubtedly commence in the vicinity of Rangoon.

4. The attention of the expedition, if eventually it be despatched, should not be limited to the selection of the route which, on solely geographical grounds, may appear the best for a road or railway, but should include all collateral information as to the habits and social condition of the people and the character of the Chiefs by whom they are governed. No safe opportunity should be omitted for obtaining the most reliable data of all kinds on which to base an estimate of the feasibility and probable cost of the undertaking in contemplation.

5. The Governor General in Council approves of the proposal that there should be a political officer at the head of the party, under whose general instructions the surveyors should conduct their inquiries.

6. His Excellency in Council also agrees to the different salaries which you propose. I am, however, to remark that, if the work occupies two seasons, provision must be made for an expenditure of two entire years, because the intervals between the seasons for field operations will be occupied in digesting the information

formation obtained, and in making out the sketch maps and reports required by the Government.

7. I am, in conclusion, to request that you will submit for approval the names of the officers whom you would recommend for appointment to the expedition. You will take care to submit the names of those only whom you may have ascertained to be available for the service.

(Political.—No. 20.)

The Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council; dated 7 February 1867.

Para. 1. I HAVE considered in Council the Foreign letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 197, of the 8th December last, containing, with reference to my Despatch, dated 29th September (No. 75) 1866, an expression of your opinion, together with that of the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, on the subject of the proposed communication between Rangoon and Western China.

2. I am unable to concur in the reasons which induce you to "deprecate "even the probable expenditure which a preliminary exploration of the country "would involve." I find from the report on the administration of British Burmah for the year 1865-66, that the surplus of revenue over expenditure in that province was more than six lacs on a gross revenue of 100 lacs, whereas for the same year the surplus of revenue over expenditure throughout the whole of India was only estimated at two lacs on a gross revenue of 47 crores. Even after allowing for the contribution to central expenses due from British Burmah, it is evident that an additional half lac may, without injustice to the rest of India, be, for two years, spent in an undertaking which will be productive of benefit to that province. I trust, however, that the expenditure of a smaller sum may prove sufficient to obtain the information sought for by Her Majesty's Government. The papers which I have received from you do not permit me to doubt that such benefit may be anticipated from any measures tending to facilitate communication between British Burmah and Western China. In the administration report above referred to, I find the following observations:—

"Para. 72. To the eastward of Burmah lies the country of the Shans. This people is divided into numerous small clans, each under an independent Chief. It is this political separation, and the mutual jealousies of the many States, which render them unable to resist the Burmese power. The people are industrious and energetic; they long for self-government and free trade; they possess a marvellous capacity for travelling as petty traders. Placed in a country having no great navigable river, for the Salween is full of rocks, rapids, and falls throughout its course, all their trade is carried on by land. They have no carts, but carry their goods for hundreds of miles on the backs of bullocks, or on their own shoulders. They come yearly in large numbers to British Burmah. A road, whether railway or other, which passed from Rangoon through Shan land and touched China, would extend commerce with this enterprising people, and bring the products of Yunan direct to British Burmah. There is more than one route by which this object might be accomplished.

"73. Considering that the population of British Burmah is not more than two millions and a quarter of souls, and that the means of traffic with adjoining countries, except by the line of the River Irrawaddy, are merely by bullock carriage over unmade tracks, the value of the import and export trade is very large. It speaks well for the consuming and producing capacities of the people, that their consumption of the textile fabrics of Europe is proportionately greater than that of any Indian Presidency. The importance of facilitating commerce with such a people is self-evident."

3. I find that in his letter to you of the 22nd October last, the Commissioner reiterates his views upon this subject, and that they are fully shared by the mercantile community of Rangoon:—

"Para.

" Para. 6. Notwithstanding the great difficulties which I think will have to be encountered in building a railway, I think the national interests involved in opening out, or endeavouring to open out, direct communication between Western China and Rangoon are so vast that I think a surveying party should be sent to explore and roughly survey the proposed line or route. * * * *

" 9. As regards the mercantile community in British Burmah, they are most anxious to have the communication established. It is naturally felt that it would raise Rangoon, in a few years, to a level with Calcutta or Bombay."

4. Looking at these opinions, and bearing in mind the enormous advantages which have resulted from the establishment of communications in cases where a far smaller amount of traffic had previously existed to encourage the undertaking, I retain the opinion that, both in the interest of England and British Burmah, this survey should be carried forward. I have, therefore, to request that you will act on the instructions contained in my former Despatch.

5. In doing so, I must carefully guard myself from even appearing to undertake, that if a decision should ultimately be arrived at in favour of the construction of such a road or railway, the necessary capital will be either furnished or guaranteed by the general revenues of India.

6. Your Excellency will understand, that in renewing these orders it is not my wish that you should take any step which shall, in your judgment, incur any grave risk of political embarrassment.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Cranborne.*

DISSENT by Sir *E. Perry* from Draft Despatch, passed 7th February 1867, respecting Communication between Rangoon and China, concurred in by Sir *James Hogg.*

THIS whole subject has been several times before the India Office during the last six years, and also before the Government of India, and has been fully considered in every point of view. The proposal in every shape, whether for road, railway, or survey, has been rejected by all the authorities. When a similar scheme was laid before the Geographical Society, it was also condemned as wild and visionary.

All the petitions from the Chambers of Commerce and others, contained in the papers laid before the House of Commons in 1864, were considered by the Secretary of State in Council of that year, and Sir Charles Wood then distinctly refused to sanction the survey of the country between Rangoon and Kian Kung, with the view to the construction of a road.

The reasons for that refusal, chiefly political, and in accordance with similar views expressed by the Governor General in Council, are contained in a Despatch of the Secretary of State in Council, dated 7th November 1864, refusing sanction to a proposed railway between Rangoon and the Burmese frontier.

When, therefore, the present Governor General in Council, in reply to a recent reference from this office, strongly deprecates even the small expenditure which a preliminary exploration of the country would involve, it is impossible to imagine a stronger body of Indian authority against the proposal.

The objections which have hitherto weighed chiefly with this office are political, though the financial ones are scarcely less substantial.

The line in question is about 500 miles in length, and for about a half traverses foreign territory. Much of this is in a very anarchial condition, and the best parts, those inhabited by the Shans, who are tributary to the Burmese, are understood to be very desirous to throw off their allegiance and come over to us. Other parts of the line, between the Shans and China, are inhabited by wild tribes of warlike character, and of whom we know little or nothing. It does not require much Indian experience to foresee that if we make and maintain a line through the country of these Burmese, of the Shans, two wild tribes, we shall have very speedily to annex the whole country in self-preservation, and this is a result much to be deplored.

But, secondly, the financial features are almost equally grave. Of course it is

the desire of every British statesman to open up new channels of commerce, to promote civilisation, to develope resources; and it is not at all wonderful that the different Chambers of Commerce should be led to believe that, if only good communications could be opened between Western China and Rangoon, the latter port would soon become a Calcutta or Bombay.

But, on examining the various documents in question, which bear a wonderful family likeness, and which evidently are founded on the various appeals to the public that one individual (Captain Sprye) has been making for the last 40 years, it will be found that various statements are hazarded which none of the information we possess in this office tends to confirm.

Thus, to use the words of one chamber (that of Leeds), "Your memorialists are credibly informed that the province of Yunan is fertile and thickly peopled, being covered with populous cities, connected together in all directions by the high roads, navigable rivers, lakes, and canals."

The Bristol Chamber of Commerce, that of Halifax, and the East India and China Association, make similar statements.

Yet, when this subject was fully discussed in the Geographical Society, Sir John Davis, Mr. Crawfurd, and other eminent authorities on China, agreed that Yunan was the most barren, the wildest, and the least populous of all the 18 provinces of the Chinese Empire, having, in fact, only 51 inhabitants to the square mile, whilst the most populous have between 800 and 900.

It must be added to this, that the line on this side of China also goes through most wild and thinly inhabited districts, and the economical difficulties of the route are forcibly pointed out by the Government of India.

On financial grounds, therefore, it appears to me that a railway, which alone has been advocated by projectors, would be a most costly and unremunerative undertaking, and that the Government of India are well justified, in the present state of their finances, with a probable deficit, and so many schemes of a more remunerative character pressing on their attention, in demurring so strongly as they do even to the preliminary expenses of a survey.

For all these reasons, I object to the Despatch, even with the additional paragraph giving a discretion to the Governor General not to act upon it if he thinks any serious political objections intervene.

(signed) *E. Perry.*

I concur. (signed) *J. W. Hogg.*

8 February 1867.

(Foreign Department.—Political.—No. 13.)

The Governor General of India in Council to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd January 1867.

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 197, dated 8th December last, on the subject of the projected railway communication between Rangoon and the frontiers of Western China, we have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the accompanying copy of a correspondence with the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, from which it will be observed that we have authorised the immediate survey of that portion of the projected line which lies between Rangoon and the Burmese frontier, as proposed by Colonel Phayre, and have directed that preparations for the equipment of the surveying party should be commenced forthwith.

From Chief Commissioner, dated 28 December 1866, No. R. 227.
To Chief Commissioner (telegraph message), dated 4 January 1867.
To Chief Commissioner, dated 5 January 1867, No. 20.

From Colonel *A. P. Phayre*, C.B., Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William; No. R. 227, dated Rangoon, the 28th December 1866.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1174, dated the 24th ultimo, on the subject of opening a communication between Rangoon and the Western frontier of China by means of a railway.

2. I have addressed the agent to the Chief Commissioner at Mandalay, requesting that a passport may be applied for to the Burmese Government for a surveying party across the Shan States, and that a Burmese officer may be appointed to accompany the party. I have no doubt but that this request will be complied with.

3. But in any case it is desirable that the portion of the proposed line, which, commencing from Rangoon, must pass through about 250 miles of British territory, should be surveyed at once; and as the season during which such work is practicable in British Burmah does not extend beyond the beginning of May, there will not now be time for more than about three months of field work, for some time will necessarily be consumed in the preliminary arrangements, even after sanction shall have been received to what is proposed.

4. On the subject of what is proposed for the present season, therefore, I beg to submit copy of a memorandum, dated the 27th instant, by Major Oliphant, Royal Engineer Corps, Officiating Chief Engineer of British Burmah. Major Oliphant, to whom I expressed my willingness to recommend him for this important duty, has generously waived his claim thereto in favour of Captain J. M. Williams, Superintendent of Works in British Burmah, who has long taken a deep interest in the proposed survey for a rail to the border of China. Captain Williams is fully competent to perform the duty, and Major Oliphant recommends as his assistant Mr. E. D'Avigdor, a Civil Engineer not in the Government service, but who has been employed in local surveys in this province, and has always given satisfaction. For the season ending about the 1st of May 1867, no political officer will be required, so that the establishment for the survey of the line of rail for this season is recommended to be as follows:—

	Rs.
Captain J. M. Williams, Superintendent of the Survey, at 1,500 rupees per mensem, for four months	6,000
Mr. E. D'Avigdor, Assistant Surveyor, at 800 rupees	3,200
A Native Surveyor, at 100 rupees, for three months	300
An Interpreter, at 50 rupees, for three months	150
Contingencies, such as travelling expenses, guard, classes, &c., for three months	2,350
TOTAL *Rs.*	12,000

The above will include, besides three months' anticipated field work, one month for plotting and reporting on the results.

5. For the season of 1867-68, the full establishment recommended in my letter, No. 190, dated the 22nd October 1866, will have to be engaged. But before that time comes round the report of the survey now recommended within British territory will have been received, and the experience gained may, perhaps, lead to a modification of some of the arrangements.

6. In order that no time may be lost, I beg earnestly to recommend that an officer of experience may at once be sent by the Public Works Department to relieve Captain Williams. On this subject I beg to solicit the attention of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to the remarks by Major Oliphant in paragraphs 9 and 10 of his memorandum.

7. Should his Excellency in Council be pleased to approve of the arrangements now proposed for the season of 1866-67, I beg that the approval may be conveyed to me by electric telegraph, in order that as much as possible of the short field season in British Burmah may be turned to advantage.

8. I likewise beg to solicit sanction to the sum of 12,000 rupees as budget grant extraordinary for the duty in question during the current year.

MEMORANDUM by the Officiating Chief Engineer, British Burmah, on the Organization of a Surveying Party for the investigation of a Route for Road or Tramway between Rangoon and Western Frontier of China, to the Chief Commissioner, British Burmah; No. 1117 C.-72 C., dated Rangoon, the 27th December 1866.

IT appears to me desirable, irrespective of the decision of a route beyond British territory, to settle first the vexed question of the difficulties which are stated to exist against the probability of success in the construction of a practical road or tramway within our own boundaries.

2. For this purpose the present working season will most probably suffice; and as it does not appear to me to be at all necessary that the Government should be put to so large an expenditure as the institution of a permanent or regular survey party on the scale approved by the Government of India in the Foreign Department letter, No. 1174, dated 24th November 1866, would involve, I would merely advocate the organization of a temporary expedition to be formed under the following conditions:—

3. I have, sir, as you are aware, waived the claim, which you very kindly admitted as my right, of taking charge of the survey in favour of my assistant, Captain Williams, solely on the ground of that officer's having represented to me his earnest wish to be allowed to carry out the examination of a project in which he has been much interested, and the feasibility of which has been consistently advocated by him. I need hardly say that I should have been most glad to have been able to take up this very interesting duty, but not wishing even in appearance to do an act of injustice to Captain Williams, I prefer that he should be selected by you for the charge of the survey.

4. As an assistant to Captain Williams, I should recommend that Mr. E. D'Avigdor, C.E., be employed. By taking advantage of this gentleman's services the Government of India will be spared the necessity of sending an officer to relieve any one else in Government employ who might otherwise have been selected for the duty.

5. The survey, including all plotting of details and compilation of reports, may be carried out in four months. The probable cost, all charges comprised, will be as follows, if my recommendation be approved, viz.:—

	Rs.
Captain Williams, as Superintendent of the Survey, 1,500 rupees per mensem, for four months - - - - - - - - -	6,000
Mr. E. D'Avigdor, C.E., 800 rupees per mensem - - - -	3,200
One Surveyor at 100 rupees, for three months - - - -	300
One Interpreter at 50 rupees, say three months - - - -	150
Contingencies, such as travelling expenses, guard, classies, &c., for three months of field operations, say - - - - -	2,350
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	12,000

or an average of 3,000 rupees per mensem.

6. The cost may possibly exceed this amount if much trace cutting be required, or if the procural of baggage elephants be difficult; but as an approximation the amount denoted is sufficiently accurate.

7. The main object of the proposed survey during the present season will be to select a practicable route from some point near the town of Sittang to the mouth of the Pah-choung, which falls into the Salween River, and forms the boundary of our territory in that direction. The more important question of a definite establishment for the investigation of the continuous route to the Western Frontier of China may be deferred for the present, as the lateness of the season prohibits any extension of the survey beyond the limits of our own territories during the current year.

8. The mercantile community interested in the question will have the full assurance, under the proposed selection of officers for the duty, that their interests will be thoroughly attended to, and the Government of India will have the experience of the temporary expedition to serve as a guide for the future, both as regards the *modus operandi* and selection of officers for the duty of carrying out the more extended scheme.

9. In order that the ordinary duties of the Chief Engineer's office may not be interfered with, it is essential that Captain Williams should be relieved by a thoroughly competent substitute, as it would be manifestly inappropriate to sacrifice efficiency in the current duties of this department, even for the very desirable object of investigating the question of a road to China.

10. As soon as an efficient officer is sent to relieve Captain Williams, he will be at liberty to proceed at once upon the duty I have proposed for him; and should you consider it necessary or desirable for the furtherance of the project, Mr. D'Avigdor might be sent on in advance to make all necessary arrangements in anticipation.

11. The

11. The main difficulties are supposed to exist in our own territories, and it is therefore unquestionable that the settlement of these difficulties, one way or the other, by a competent engineer, as Captain Williams is admitted to be, would place the matter out of the range of either ignorant or interested agitation.

12. The political bearing of the question (having reference to recent reports of French exploration of the Cambodia River) is probably far more important than its commercial, as regards our actual knowledge of the countries to be traversed and attained. The discussion of the subject in this point of view is, however, out of my province, and therefore simply as a public works question, I solicit the Chief Commissioner's consideration of the proposals I have submitted, believing them to be, as regards economy both of time and money, the best which can be made for the fulfilment of an object which has been the subject of fruitless discussion for many years.

SERVICE MESSAGE.

From Calcutta, dated the 4th January 1867.
From Officiating Secretary, Foreign Department.
To Rangoon.
To Chief Commissioner.

"YOUR letter, dated 28th ultimo, No. R. 227, regarding railway communication between Rangoon and Western China, received. Government sanction your proposals, viz., the examination of the country to the Burmese frontier, and the scale of allowances proposed for the surveying party. Captain Luard, of the Royal Engineers, will be also attached to the party. Preparations should be commenced forthwith. Further orders from Public Works Department and by post."

From *J. W. S. Wyllie*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Commissioner, British Burmah; No. 20, dated Fort William, the 5th January 1867.

HAVING received and laid before his Excellency the Governor General in Council your letter, dated 28th ultimo, No. R. 227, on the subject of the projected railway communication between Rangoon and the frontiers of Western China, I am directed to state that the Government of India approves your proposal for the immediate survey of that portion of the projected line which lies between Rangoon and the Burmese frontier.

2. The surveying party may be constituted in all respects, as you suggest, with the following modification:—The Governor General in Council thinks it desirable that Captain Williams should have associated with him some officer who possesses a knowledge of railway engineering; accordingly, Captain C. H. Luard, R.E., at present officiating as Deputy Consulting Engineer in the Railway Department, Bengal, has been selected for the duty, and will proceed to join at the earliest practicable date.

3. Preparations for the equipment of the party should be immediately begun.

No. 21.

COPY of the correspondence forwarded to the Public Works Department, for information, and the issue of subsidiary orders. After settling the allowances to be drawn by Captain Luard, it is requested that the papers may be communicated to the Financial Department for the purpose of obtaining sanction to the expenditure involved.

(Political Department.—No. 41.)

The Secretary of State for India in Council to the Governor General of India in Council, 16th March 1867.

THE letter of your Excellency's Government, dated 23rd January, No. 13 of 1867, in the Political Department, transmitting correspondence relating to the survey of that portion of the projected line of railway between Rangoon and Western China, which lies between the former place and the Burmese frontier, has been received; and I have to communicate to you my approval of the measures reported in these papers.

I have, &c.

(signed) *Stafford H. Northcote.*

RANGOON AND WESTERN CHINA.

COPY of further PAPERS or CORRESPONDENCE between the Government of *India* and the Secretary of State, on the proposed COMMUNICATION between *Rangoon* and *Western China*, &c. (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 373, of Session 1865).

(*Mr. Kinnaird.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
12 *April* 1867.

Under 3 *oz.*

PAPERS

(WITH A MAP)

RELATING TO

RECENT PROCEEDINGS AT SALANGORE

CONSEQUENT UPON THE

SEIZURE BY PIRATES OF A JUNK

OWNED BY

CHINESE MERCHANTS OF PENANG;

AND THE

MURDER

OF THE

PASSENGERS AND CREW.

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21. Admiralty	Dec. 16, 1871	Enclosing copy of letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett, with one from Commander Blomfield: instructions should be issued to the effect that such expeditions as that recently undertaken should not be engaged in without reference to the Commander-in-Chief on the station, unless immediate action is necessary, in which latter case action is to be confined to ordinary naval duties	44
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PAPERS relating to recent proceedings at Salangore, consequent upon the seizure by Pirates of a Junk owned by Chinese Merchants of Penang, and the Murder of the Passengers and Crew.

No. 1.

Acting Governor Anson to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received August 21.)

My Lord, *Government House, Singapore, July* 14, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have received a letter from the Acting Lieutenant Governor at Penang, on the 24th ultimo, informing me that a junk, owned by certain Chinese merchants of that settlement, had sailed from thence bound for Laroot, in the country of Perak, in the Malay Peninsula, where it should have arrived in about a day and a half, but that the junk had not been heard of in Laroot, although more than eight days had elapsed.

2. Some information had, however, reached the owners, that the junk, which had on board in all forty-nine persons, including crew and passengers (a number of the latter being taken on board just as the vessel sailed), had been seized by some of the passengers, who were pirates, who had murdered the crew and the rest of the passengers, numbering in all thirty-four men, women, and children, and carried off the vessel. The junk was valued at 1,500 dollars, and the cargo, including 3,000 dollars in specie, at 7,000 dollars.

3. A Chinaman, one of the owners, who came with the letter from Penang to see me upon the subject, and to ask my assistance, informed me that when passing in the steamer, on his way down, and when near the "Torch" light ships, he had seen a junk, hull down, sailing along in-shore of the steamer, which, he felt convinced from the appearance of the sails, was his vessel.

4. I immediately ordered the colonial steamer "Pluto" to be got ready, and to start the following morning with an Inspector, a detachment of Police, and the Chinese part-owner of the junk on board: to proceed to Malacca, there to take on board Deputy Commissioner of Police Cox, and a party of police, who, I thought, would be more useful on such an expedition than additional men from here, then to proceed to Langkat, Kallang, and up the Malay coast, and, if necessary, on to Delli, in Sumatra, and down that coast in search of the junk, or of tidings of it.

5. In accordance with these instructions, the "Pluto" proceeded the following morning to Malacca, and then on to Langkat, Kallang, and Salangore, where the missing junk was found at anchor, and the greater part of the cargo in the shops of the town; the money, of course, being missing.

6. Mr. Cox, and Mr. Bradberry, the commander of the "Pluto" succeeded in securing the junk, and nine of the pirates, six of whom were on board; but meeting with decided opposition and threats from Rajah Mahdie and his followers, who afterwards fired upon the "Pluto," they left for Penang with the junk and prisoners.

7. On receipt of a telegram from Acting Lieutenant Governor Birch, informing me of what had occurred, I immediately placed myself in communication with Captain Robinson, commanding Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," Senior Naval officer of this division of the China squadron, and requested him to proceed to Salangore, and endeavour to secure the remainder of the pirates, and to obtain possession of the stolen property. At the same time I telegraphed for the "Pluto" to meet the "Rinaldo," at the "Torch" light vessel on the north sands, 200 miles from Singapore, 160 miles from Penang, and about 30 miles south-west of the Salangore river.

8. This arrangement was carried out with the results stated in the Report of

Captain Robinson, which, I regret to say, communicates the distressing intelligence that an officer and nine men of the "Rinaldo" were wounded.

9. The "Pluto" then returned to Penang, conveying the wounded men and a letter to Acting Lieutenant Governor Birch, informing him of what had occurred.

10. On receipt, by telegram, of this information from Acting Lieutenant Governor Birch, and of an intimation that Captain Robinson desired the assistance of troops from Penang, I telegraphed back authority for the troops to be sent, and, at the same time, chartered here a small steamer, of strong build, and light draught of water, and despatched the master attendant, an officer, 25 sepoys, and a medical officer of the 19th Madras Native Infantry, with three twelve-pounder howitzers, and a sufficient supply of ammunition, to the assistance of Captain Robinson.

11. The Reports of Mr. Bradberry, the Commander of the Colonial steamer "Pluto;" of Mr. Cox, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Malacca; of Colonel Shortland, 19th Madras Native Infantry; and of Commander Robinson, of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo,"—will place your Lordship in full possession of all that occurred at Salangore.

12. There can be no doubt, from the frequent complaints which have from time to time reached Penang of interference with, and piratical attacks on vessels in the neighbourhood of Salangore and the Kallang Straits, that Rajah Mahdie has for a very long time been carrying on depredations of this nature undiscovered and undisturbed; and it is to be hoped that the chastisement he and his followers have received at the hands of Captain Robinson, together with the destruction of their war Prahus and Fort will produce a very salutary effect, not only upon themselves, but upon all other native chiefs on both sides of the Strait of Malacca, who connive at such lawless transactions.

13. I annex a short account of the late disturbances between the Sultan of Salangore and Rajah Mahdie, called here "the Kallang war," together with an outline of the recent history of that country furnished to me by Mr. C. J. Irving, the Auditor General (who was acting as Lieutenant-Governor of Malacca during the time Captain Shaw was acting as Colonial Secretary), who has given a good deal of attention to the subject.

14. Mr. A. N. Birch, the Acting Lieutenant Governor of Penang, in making all the arrangements at Penang in connexion with this affair, acted with great promptness and energy, and at the same time with much consideration and caution. Captain Robinson speaks in warm terms of the assistance rendered to him by Mr. Bradberry, the Commander of the "Pluto;" Mr. Skinner (late Cadet), Acting Police Magistrate of Province Wellesley; and Commander Grey, R.N., my private secretary.

15. Captain Robinson and the officers and men of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," merit the thanks of the Colony for the services they have rendered to the trading community of the three Settlements by routing this nest of pirates.

16. Your Lordship will observe from Captain Robinson's Report, that the "Pluto" is quite unfit to be employed as a gun-boat, owing to not having strength to carry a gun, thickness of plate to resist a shot, and to the boilers being situated above the water line, and, therefore, liable to be injured by shot from an enemy.

17. Her Majesty's ship "Teazer," just returned here, leaves this evening for Langkat with a letter from me to the Sultan of Salangore, calling upon him, in terms of the Treaty, to seize and hand over the remaining pirates, and requesting him to appoint some person to govern the town and district of Salangore, in whom this Government can have confidence. The "Teazer" will then visit Salangore to ascertain what has been going on there since the "Rinaldo" left.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. E. H. ANSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Commander Bradberry to the Lieutenant-Governor, Penang.

Sir, *Penang, July* 1, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of my log regarding events which happened on our cruize after the piratical junk in question, for your information, which is as follows:—

Monday, June 26, 1871.—9 A.M., Mr. Barnum, Inspector of Police, and nine men, came on board; 2·30, weighed and proceeded full speed towards Malacca to embark a fresh detachment of police, and then proceeded on a cruize of a piratical junk.

Tuesday, June 27.—6·30, anchored at Malacca and officially reported the arrival of the vessel. 1·15 P.M., Mr. Cox, Deputy Commissioner of Police, and eleven men came on board, weighed and proceeded at once towards the Kallang Straits. 6 P.M., sighted two junks, bore up for them, but finding them not to be the one in pursuit of, stood on our course again. Midnight, anchored in the Kallang Straits and sent a boat up the river in charge of Mr. Daniels, second officer, with a letter from his Excellency the Administrator to Tunku Dia Oodin; Mr. Cox and Mr. Barnum also accompanied.

Wednesday, June 28.—3·4 A.M., boat returned after delivering the letter to one of Tunku Dia Oodin's men, he being higher up the river at the time; we were also informed that no junks answering to the description given had been there. Daylight, weighed and proceeded towards Salangore, having a letter for the Sultan of that place. 7 A.M., sighted a junk a-head, came up with her and inquired whether she had seen any junk according to description given; he answered in the negative, on which we stood in for Salangore. 9·30 A.M., anchored about three miles off the mouth of the river in 3 fathoms of water, when Captain Bradberry, Mr. Daniels, second officer, Mr. Cox, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mr. Barnum, Inspector of Police, and three peons, went up the river to communicate with the Sultan of that place and give him the letter from his Excellency the Administrator. 11 A.M., arrived at the village, and in the river saw a junk and two or three other craft laying at anchor; on the off side, on inquiry, found the junk to be the one in pursuit of; boarded her and took six prisoners, who we left on board the junk in charge of Mr. Barnum and Mr. Daniels, with two Lascars and one Peon; Captain Bradberry and Deputy Commissioner Cox now landed, and in some of the Chinese stores found the missing cargo. By this time Rajah Moossa arrived, when I presented the letter from his Excellency to him, he being the eldest son of the Sultan. We now returned to the vessel, accompanied by Rajah Moossa and some of his followers, and steamed the "Pluto" up the river, where we anchored off the village in 3 fathoms of water; we now landed at once with our crew, having got the full permission and assistance of the Rajah to re-ship the cargo on board the junk, as also to capture as many of the pirates as possible; we continued with our work very successfully till 9 P.M.; up to this time we had taken three more prisoners, in addition to those taken on board the junk; on capturing the fourth—evidently one of the head pirates, he having belt round his waist, and, as we supposed, full of money—whilst trying to get him into the boat he laid hold of one of the Malay Chiefs by the leg, at the same time whispering something in his ear, on which the Chief told us to give him over to his charge, and he would be responsible for him; we did so, and the prisoner escaped and ran into one of the huts, where he was pursued by Mr. Cox; this excited the Malays, who immediately drew their krisses and threatened our party, causing most of us to take to the boats, which shoved off to the ship, leaving a few of us, including Captain Bradberry and Mr. Cox, still on the beach; the boat now returned to the shore and the remaining party retired; when in the boat the Malay Chief called out for Mr. Boon Tek to come on shore, and on being told he was not in the boat, tried to persuade Mr. Cox to land, evidently meaning mischief, but Mr. Cox refused to go, and returned to the ship, when we made all preparations for an expected attack during the night; shortly after our return on board two guns were fired, and then all was silent. 3 A.M., received an insulting letter from one of the Malay Chiefs. About 8 A.M. Rajah Moossa came on board, and after staying a while went on shore to consult with his subordinate Chiefs regarding the capture of the remaining pirates, six in number, but could get no satisfaction. Rajah Moossa gave us all the assistance possible, and would have done more had it not been for him being in bodily fear of Rajah Mahdie, as also his own subordinate Chiefs, who appear to have a great sway in the place (Rajah Moossa when on board expressed a wish to be freed from the thraldom of Rajah Mahdie). 1 P.M., hauled the junk up astern of the "Pluto" and secured her, when we weighed and proceeded, with junk in tow, for Penang, where she now lays in safety.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BRADBERRY:

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Mr. Cox to the Lieutenant-Governor, Penang.

Sir, *Penang, June* 30, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Administrator, the following circumstances in connection with the cruize of the Colonial steamer "Pluto," in search of a Chinese junk, supposed to have been taken away by pirates on leaving Penang for Laroot, within the last fifteen days.

On the 27th instant I left Malacca under instructions from the Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements, on the above duty, with the following party of police under my orders, viz., one inspector and nine constables from Singapore, and myself, one corporal, and ten constables from Malacca.

We left Malacca at 1 P.M. on the 27th instant, and directed our course to Kallang, where we arrived about midnight, and on our tract overhauled two junks, which were not the particular junk we were in search of.

After coming to an anchor in the Straits of Kallang, a party of police under my orders, with Inspector Barnum and the second officer of the "Pluto," proceeded in one of the ship's boats, with the intention evidently of going to Kallang to deliver a letter from his Excellency to Tunku Dia Oodin; but, as the tide was falling rapidly, it was necessary to abandon the idea; in consequence, the letter to the Tunku was sent to him by one of his headmen, who undertook to dispatch it the same morning. After calling and inquiring at the stockades at the mouth of the Kallang River about the junk we were in quest of, we returned to the vessel at 4 A.M., and at 5 A.M. weighed anchor and stood in the direction of Salangore. On our way thither we fell in with a junk, which turned out, after examination, not to be the one we were in search of.

At 10 A.M. we anchored off the bar at Salangore, and deemed it expedient, with Captain Bradberry, the second officer, Inspector Barnum, and a small party of police to proceed on shore, little imagining at the time, of the success that was to follow. We landed at Raja Mahdie's hill, and after a little inquiry from the authorities on shore, learnt that a junk, answering the same name and description as the one we were looking after, had already arrived some ten days ago, and discharged her cargo. Acting upon this information, we proceeded to the opposite shore, where the junk was lying, and boarded and took possession of her, as well as six of the pirates on board. The owner of the junk could not fully recognize her at the time, as she had undergone some alterations; but after seeing some of his goods and the crew on board, he was satisfied that it was his junk, which was left in charge of Mr. Barnum and the second officer of the "Pluto," when Captain Bradberry and myself went on shore to look after the cargo which had been disposed of. My troubles and difficulties here commenced—a large party of Malays and Bugis surrounded us, with a determined opposition to resist us to the utmost of their power; one Malay went so far as to hold up his fist in my face, and only withdrew it after some remonstrance—the crowd at this time was increasing, and another Malay chief, whose name I have since ascertained as that of Syed Mashahoor, came up with a retinue of armed followers; I went to meet him, and received him cordially, but he treated me and his Excellency's letter to the Sultan of Salangore with the utmost contempt. Explaining to him my object in view appeared to have no effect upon him. His language to me was also highly insulting. Simultaneously Rajah Moossa arrived, who received us with the greatest attention and respect; we invited him on board, and he accompanied us to the "Pluto," and through his persuasion the steamer was brought up the river and anchored in mid-channel, abreast the fortified stockades and forts of Salangore.

A consultation was then held on shore amongst the assembled chiefs, as to whether they would or would not give up the junk, and such of her cargo as was then on shore. After a great deal of hesitation, Rajah Moossa allowed us to remove the goods, and remained by us until 7 P.M., during which time the goods were carried from the different Chinese shops to the beach, and from thence on board the junk in the ship's boat. In the meanwhile I sent for an armed party of police, who, in conjunction with Rajah Moossa's men, went in search of some pirates who are supposed to have concealed themselves in the jungle on shore, but without any success. A little after dark, the same day, three Chinese pirates, who were concealed in the jungle were arrested by the police and boat's crew, after a hard pursuit, and were at once dispatched on board. They were all identified by one of the prisoners, the steersman of the junk. About this time another Chinese pirate was also arrested, and, while being taken by our men to the beach, was rescued by a Malay Chief named Rajah Mahmood, through

(1730—1/22—4737) F.O.-50C.

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whose instrumentality be got away, although pursued by me into a stockade at great risk to my life. Rajah Mahmood collected a large body of armed Malays, who drew their weapons, and yelling to murder us all outright; and it was with extreme difficulty and hazard we managed to reach the vessel with safety, as numbers of the police and crew of the steamer were obliged to swim off to the ship. The cargo, which was lying on the beach, was, as I am told, taken possession of by the Malays immediately after our return to the ship that night. Under these circumstances, we were compelled to remain under arms all night, expecting a surprise. Two guns from Rajah Mahdie's stockade, with shots, were fired at us at intervals, which took no effect. At 3 o'clock the following morning a letter was received on board from a Chief on shore, named Rajah Mahmood, which, according to its tone and bearing, was highly insulting to myself and Captain Bradberry.

Rajah Moossa called on board at 8 A.M., the 29th instant, as promised, when I took the opportunity of explaining to him the treacherous manner of, and evinced by, Rajah Mahmood and his followers on shore the previous evening. It was then he told me, in confidence, that Rajah Mahdie, who held a powerful stockade, and the following subordinate Chiefs, named Syed Masahoor, Rajah Mahmood, and Rajah Berkat, were all acting in opposition to him, and were it not for them he would have been able to do more for us.

I have every reason to believe, from what has transpired, that the Chiefs above named distributed and shared amongst themselves part of the cargo of the junk taken to this place; and besides, to screen the offenders, who are still at large at Salangore, received from them considerable sums of money, the proceeds of the sale of the cargo. Their conduct, in this respect, I think is highly reprehensible.

I believe that six of the Chinese pirates are still at Salangore, under the protection of these Chiefs, who in a great measure have connived at all their actions.

I must place on record the fact that, were it not for the precipitate and high-handed measures taken by me and Captain Bradbury in this affair, we should never have been able to capture the junk, or recover any of the property; and if there was a gun-boat close at hand, we certainly would have been in a position to recover all the cargo which was taken there in boats lying in the river. We left Salangore at noon, the 29th, and on passing Rajah Mahdie's stockade were fired at seven times; none of the shots took any effect.

Mut Ally, as well as the other subordinate Chief, who has shown such hostility to the Government and its servants, who were duly accredited on this duty, should, I think, be brought to a sense of their position, and that a certain amount of coercion is necessary to compel them to deliver up the prisoners who were still in Salangore, as well as the property.

There were in all nine Chinese pirates arrested in connection with this case.

The following is a list of the junk's cargo which has been recovered, viz.:—

21 baskets sundries.
13 cases sundries.
2 bundles salt fish.
9 carongs, sundries.
1 bundle China medicine.
1 bundle vermicelli.
23 bags rice.
10 tubs of cocoa-oil, and other miscellaneous goods.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE COX,

Deputy Commissioner of Police, on Special Duty in the Colonial steamer "Pluto."

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shortland to Captain Robinson.

Sir, *Colonial Government steamer "Pluto," July 7*, 1871.

IN accordance with instructions mutually arranged on between us, on the evening of the 5th instant, I have the honour to state, that the troops under my command*

* Detachment Royal Artillery: 1 lieutenant, 3 non-commissioned officers, 1 trumpeter, 17 gunners.—Detachment 19th Regiment Madras Native Infantry: 2 native officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 1 bugler, 100 privates, 2 water-carriers, 1 lascar.—Medical Department: 1 staff assistant-surgeon.

effected a landing at the lower fort, at the entrance of the Salangore River, at about 8 A.M. on the morning of the 6th instant. The splendid precision of the fire from Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," under your command, prior to our landing, entirely cleared the lower fort of any enemy; *a landing over rocks, and through low brushwood, which would have been attended with the utmost risk, and all but impracticable had we met with opposition.

Having fully satisfied myself that no enemy whatever existed in the lower fort, I, in conjunction with Lieutenant Stopford, of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," (and who commanded the party of Marines and sailors which accompanied the land party†), at once pushed on to the upper fort, which commands the village of Pomurtung, as also the lower fort at the entrance of the river, and also the river which we had entered. The party under Lieutenant Stopford's orders proceeded by a jungle and swampy path direct to the upper fort, while the detachment of the 19th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, more immediately under my command, proceeded by a slight detour towards the east for the same object. The party of the "Rinaldo" arrived first, and met with no opposition; and it is needless to add, my immediate party met with none either. In our advance to the upper fort, the splendid fire from the "Rinaldo" over our heads, would alone have prevented any resistance, save from a most determined enemy.

By this time, about 9·30 A.M., the party of Artillery, under command of Lieutenant Shippard, Royal Artillery, as per margin,‡ had pulled up in the river and effected a landing at the village of Pomurtung, and disembarked the two small field pieces they had with them, and a reserve party of fifty men of the 19th Regiment also landed at the same place with them. No enemy was to be seen, and we found but one dead body of a Malay in the upper fort, who had evidently been killed in the morning by the "Rinaldo's" fire, his comrades leaving him behind in their retreat. Finding no one to treat with, and under your instructions and those of A. M. Skinner, Esq. who accompanied the expedition as Political Agent, I caused the powder, some 200 barrels, of 20 lbs. each, to be conveyed away by a working party of the 19th Regiment, and then proceeded to fire the huts, destroy the stockades (as far as possible), spike the guns, burn and capsize the gun-carriages, and otherwise do as much damage to the upper and lower forts, and by blowing up the Chief's house, and firing the huts and houses in the two forts, rendered them so far uninhabitable. No booty of any kind was taken beyond the small supply of gunpowder; there was nothing to take.

I beg to append a Return of guns found in the two forts, and to remark that the lower fort, which commands the entrance of the Salangore River as well as the upper fort looking towards the river, was armed, as you will see, by heavy ordnance; the upper fort was built on a hill, and had a most commanding position of some 200 feet in height, with a steep ascent on all sides; both forts were most formidable positions. The splendid firing from the "Rinaldo's" guns on the 4th instant, the traces of which were apparent on all sides, and caused breaches in the defences in all directions, doubtless gave the enemy a most severe lesson, and with that, and the splendid firing on the morning of our entrance, thoroughly cleared out the enemy; and to this is attributed our success without a casualty. One man of the Detachment Royal Artillery was struck down by sun-stroke, and died shortly after, I regret to say.

I would beg, in conclusion, to bring to your notice the valuable assistance I received from Lieutenants Stopford, Maud, and Ward of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," all and each of whom were most zealous and eager in the embarking and disembarking of the men; in assisting me in demolishing the stockades, and with the help of the fine set of marines and sailors from the man-of-war in spiking and capsizing the guns, &c., the men under their command worked as British sailors always do, with a heart and a will. The troops were all re-embarked by 4 P.M.

I have, &c.
(Signed) VINCENT SHORTLAND.

P.S.—On the 7th instant the "Pluto," with the troops on board, again entered the Salangore River, and anchored off the village of Pomurtung, but the object was entirely of a political and not military nature, and other matters, left to Mr. Skinner's management.

V. S.

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* *Sic in orig.* Probably "We effected."
† 3 European officers, 330 Royal Marines and sailors.
‡ See previous page.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

RETURN of Guns, &c., captured and found in the Upper and Lower Forts in the Salangore River, on the 6th July, 1871.

Description.	No.
Upper Fort :—	
Iron guns, 32-pounders on carriages	2
Ditto, various calibre on carriages	9
Ditto, various calibre disconnected	1
Ditto, 24-pounder disconnected	1
Ditto, burst	1
Brass gun disconnected	1
Ditto, swivel	2
Lower Fort :—	
Iron guns, 32-pounders on carriages	13
Gunpowder, French manufacture, 20-lb. barrels	200

Rough calculation taken to Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo."

(Signed) V. SHORTLAND, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding the Troops.*

Colonial steamer "Pluto," July 7, 1871.

Memorandum.

Colonel Shortland has omitted 3 guns dismounted in lower fort, and 5 in battery on north side of river. Total, 38 guns in position.

(Signed) G. ROBINSON,
Commanding Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Commander Robinson, R.N., to Acting Governor Anson.

Sir, *"Rinaldo," off Salangore, July* 6, 1871.

IN consequence of a requisition from you on the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to state that, within twenty-four hours after receiving your letter, I started from Singapore to meet the Colonial steamer "Pluto" at the rendezvous arranged by telegraph, then to proceed to Salangore, for the purpose of seizing the six pirates still at large concerned in the murder of the thirty-four men, women, and children on board the junk, and to take such measures as may seem best for the punishment of those Malays who resisted the Colonial officers and men in their attempt to secure the pirates.

On the evening of the 2nd we fell in with the "Pluto" at the rendezvous, off the North Sand Light-ship, in the Strait of Malacca, and proceeded in company with her towards Salangore. At 4·45 on the morning of the 3rd we anchored near the Bar of Salangore River, manned and armed boats, and sent them, with field-piece party, to "Pluto." Our party consisted of ninety-five men and officers, under my personal command.* At 7·30, "Pluto" started for the river, with boats in tow; at 8, stopped to overhaul two prows sailing out of the river; at 9, grounded on the bar. Commander Grey, your Private Secretary, who was on board as my guest, then left the steamer in her gig, with the second officer, for the purpose of obtaining information that might be useful to us. At 1, floated and proceeded; 2, anchored off the town of Salangore, when Commander Grey returned on board. Sent boats away manned and armed to search both sides of the river and vessels at anchor. Lieutenant Stopford was in charge of the pinnace, with Mr. Skinner and Commander Grey, and that party proceeded to search the houses on the south side of the river. Lieutenant Maude was in charge of the cutter, armed with a rocket, and went to search a few huts on the north side. Mr. Williams, Sub-Lieutenant, was in charge of the other cutter, and proceeded to

* Lieutenant G. Stopford, Senior Lieutenant; Acting Lieutenant E. D. Maude; Sub-Lieutenant C. G. Williams; Acting Sub-Lieutenant J. A. Ward.

search the vessels at anchor; he was accompanied by the owner of the captured junk and the only survivor of the crew. Maude had with him the second officer of the "Pluto," who speaks Malay, and one of the "Pluto's" men, who knows the place.

After the lapse of an hour and a half, I saw Lieutenant Maude's party return, and immediately afterwards firing began between the natives surrounding them in houses and jungle and that party. Lieutenant Maude's story is as follows:—On landing, he asked for Rajah Mahmood, and was told that he was away, and that no one knew where his house was. He then marched about 200 yards on the path leading from the beach. A native then told him the Rajah would come, so he halted, and waited about ten minutes. Finding he did not arrive, he continued his march, and after going about a mile, met the Rajah,* who saluted and shook hands, and said he would go off to the "Pluto." They all marched together to the beach, where Maude drew up his men. The Rajah went between the boat and the small-arm men, with about twenty men round him. He was told that the boat was ready, when he replied that he would not go now, as he wanted to cross over to the other side. Maude told him if he did not go willingly, he must force him. Immediately afterwards a shot was fired at our men from the nearest house, at a distance of only ten yards. The Rajah and his men instantly fled into the jungle, and heavy firing immediately followed from huts and jungle. One of our men fell mortally wounded at once, and Maude was obliged to make the best of his way back to the "Pluto," followed by a continuous fire, which did not cease till he got alongside. As the "Pluto" was only 200 yards off, a return fire was instantly opened by those of our men who remained on board, and from the field-piece, which I had ready for use in the bow of the steamer. The other boats returned when they heard the firing. Several men fell to the fire of Lieutenant Maude's men, and Rajah Mahdie was said to be one of them.

I have to deplore the following loss:—

Lieutenant Maude, cut on hand with kris.

William Horton, leading seaman; thought to be mortally wounded: shot through the lungs.

William McGee, ordinary; shot wound in side.

James Cole, leading seaman; shot in shoulder.

Edward Barnes, ordinary; shot in neck.

Charles Bradley, armourer; shot through both legs.

Thomas Biddlecombe, smith; shot in hand.

You may imagine how painful it was for me to order the "Pluto's" anchor to be weighed without inflicting more decided vengeance on the piratical rascals who had fired on Lieutenant Maude's men; but our men, crowded in boats, were at a fearful disadvantage from enemies concealed in the jungle; and we had no medical man to attend to the wounded. However, I called all hands aft, and told them I would land and take the forts at the entrance of the river directly the "Pluto" got close to them. The jungle there seemed less dense, and it seemed the only revenge open to us at the moment. But Captain Bradberry of the "Pluto" then made such a strong remonstance to me—that his vessel had only half-inch plates, and that his boiler was above-water, that I reluctantly changed my mind, and determined to take "Rinaldo" in next day, if possible. I am very glad now that I did change my mind.

Under these circumstances I decided to return to "Rinaldo," anchored about six miles off, and to send "Pluto" to Penang with wounded, and with a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor asking for a surgeon. I also advised that some troops should be sent to assist in jungle fighting; and desired that a telegram be sent to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

It cannot be too strongly or clearly stated that no violence had been offered to Rajah Mahdie, or his men, when Lieutenant Maude's party was attacked.

On the 4th at 4·45 A.M., weighed, and proceeded alone under steam for Salangore River.

I knew that it was touch and go whether we could get over the bar (more than two miles in width) at the top of high water; that we had no chart of the river; that we had no surgeon on board; that it would be twelve hours before we could get out again, and that for the whole of that time we might be under fire: yet took the responsibility of incurring all risks for the sake of punishing the pirates for their treacherous attack of the previous day, and for the sake of teaching them to respect the flag for the future. According to Horsburgh's sailing directions this has always been

* It turned out to be the Rajah Mahdie.

a piratical haunt, and no doubt they felt themselves secure in the strength of their position.

At 6·15, when about 400 yards from the forts, on the southern entrance of the river, fire was opened upon us from these forts, and from those on the northern bank. It was a hot and well directed fire, and was, of course immediately answered by the "Rinaldo;" in less than five minutes we had three men wounded, and had suffered severely in hull and rigging, but by steaming past their batteries into the river their position was turned, and before they could get most of their guns round we had either dismounted them, or rendered their chief defences untenable.

At 6·40 anchored in 3½ fathoms in the centre of the river, off the town of Salangore; laid out an anchor astern to keep guns bearing on the Forts: this service was done under fire by Mr. Richards, the boatswain.

About 8 the enemy was driven from all his guns. I then directed each gun to fire once every quarter of an hour, to prevent him from reopening his fire, and this practice was regularly kept up during the day, except when we saw him trying to man a gun, when two guns would fire till he withdrew.

A fire of musketry was directed at us from time to time, as the river is barely half-a-mile broad.

At 10·28 ship grounded in soft mud, happily with her broadside bearing in the proper direction. Had the fort on the hill commanding the town possessed powerful guns, we should now have presented a fair mark at 700 yards distance, for they might have sent a plunging fire upon our upper deck, the whole of which must have been visible to them; but they could do nothing against the superior power and accuracy of our guns.

At 11·40 the ship was in 11 feet of water, our draught being 15 feet 4 inches. At 2·30, flood-tide making up strong, ship dragged best bower anchor; let go small bower.

At 3·5, ship swung to tide, weighed port anchor; 4·30, weighed starboard anchor; 4·30, weighed kedge and steamed out of river; 5·30, ceased firing, after having silenced all the forts and partially burnt the town and houses on opposite bank. At 6, anchored in roads to wait return of "Pluto" from Penang.

It may be asked why, after silencing the forts, we did not land and destroy the guns. The reply is, that although they were driven from their batteries, they remained concealed in the jungle, which surrounded them on all sides, and that I did not feel justified in sending my men to be shot down by a concealed foe. There were, I am glad to say, but three men wounded on our side, viz., George Lucas, quartermaster, John Hawkins, boatswain's mate, and Edwin Bush, A.B.

Inclosed is a report from the boatswain and carpenter, from which it will be seen that the fire was both well-directed and heavy.

It was a hard day's work, and it is very gratifying to me to be able to say that every officer and man did his duty well.

I had the greatest assistance from Commander H. R. E. Grey, your private Secretary, who happened to be my guest for the cruize, and who, when his advice was requested at critical times, gave it with remarkable self-possession and good judgment. Commander Grey remained on the bridge the whole of the time we were under fire.

What I have to say of the officers and men of this ship, I hope you will see in my despatch to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

The "Pluto" returned yesterday at 4·30 P.M. from Penang with the troops, as per margin.* The Honourable Arthur Birch, Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, had generously sent the whole of his disposable force. These troops were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Shortland, 19th Madras Native Infantry, whose report upon the proceedings of this day is inclosed. Shortly after the "Pluto" anchored, there was firing from the forts, as if they were getting the range of their guns. We all expected a stubborn resistance this morning, but were mistaken. The punishment we gave them on the 4th proved enough for their stomachs. We started from our anchorage this morning at 5·30, the "Pluto" following a little way astern. It was arranged that "Rinaldo" should engage the lower forts, and that when they were silenced, the landing of the troops and blue-jackets should begin.† No return was made to our fire, though we remained off the batteries at 400 yards distance; so, after a little, the signal was made for "Pluto" to close, and the disembarkation soon commenced.

* Detachment of Royal Marines: 1 lieutenant, 3 non-commissioned officers, 1 trumpeter, 17 gunners.—Detachment of 19th Madras Native Infantry: 2 native officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 1 bugler, 100 privates, 2 water-carriers, 1 lascar.—Medical Department: 1 staff assistant surgeon.

† "Rinaldo's" landing-party: Lieutenant Stopford, Acting Lieutenant Maude, Acting Sub-Lieutenant Ward, Acting Sub-Lieutenant Warren, and 68 sailors and marines.

The forts close to the beach on the southern entrance of the river were first occupied and destroyed: the landing party then advanced up the hill to the fort commanding the town. There was no Malay seen alive, evidently they had only just cleared out, for a dead Malay was found who must have been killed by our fire this morning. We spent the day in utterly destroying this nest of pirates. The town of Salangore is completely burnt down, the forts demolished, the guns spiked and broken up. Had it been possible to make terms with any one, I might have spared the town on the condition that the six pirates concerned in the murder of the thirty-four men, women, and children, on board the junk should be given up. I would also have inflicted a fine to pay for the expenses of this expedition. Failing this, we have done all the damage we could, and it is not likely any act of piracy will take place hereabouts for some time to come.

A flag of truce was shown at 10 A.M. at the landing-place on the north bank of the river opposite the town. Mr. Skinner and Captain Grey went to answer it, but those who displayed it proved to be people of no importance, whose object was simply that a few houses on that side might be spared. They said that a great number of men had been killed by our fire on the 4th.

Mr. Skinner, who was sent in the "Pluto" on both occasions from Penang by the Lieutenant-Governor, as a Magistrate and Political Agent, proved of immense service; his knowledge of the Malays and their language, his foresight and ability, render him a most valuable adviser.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shortland and I had never met before, but we worked together in perfect accord. Colonel Shortland had sole charge and command of the landing party, and, if I may be permitted to give an opinion, seems to be an officer of great experience, and thoroughly up to his work. He thinks it would have been extremely rash to have attacked such strong positions with the "Rinaldo's" men alone.

The object of the "Rinaldo's" mission has been accomplished to the best of my power and judgment, and if the six pirates are still at large, it is because it is simply impossible to say where they now are.

Friday, July 7.—It was rather late yesterday before our work on shore was done. In steaming out we could not see a fishing-stake, our only guide in crossing the bar, and took the ground. In spite of all our efforts, assisted by "Pluto," we remained hard and fast, for the ebb-tide had just begun to make; so at 10 P.M. preparations were made for shoring the ship up. After working incessantly from 4 A.M., it was no small demand to make upon the ship's company to begin at that hour to hoist out a topmast and other heavy spars. It is very gratifying to be able to state that they answered this call upon their strength with wonderful cheerfulness and willingness. I never saw any officers or men work so well before. Between 12 and 1 A.M. Her Majesty's ship had only four inches of water under her keel, but having been carefully shored up, and the bottom being soft mud, she remained perfectly upright. At the top of high water this morning she was got off, partly by her own engines, partly by sail, for the wind was fair, partly by means of an anchor we had carried out, and partly by the towing of the "Pluto." No strain or damage of any kind has been sustained.

I beg to say that Captain Bradberry, of the "Pluto," afforded me at all times most hearty assistance.

I return to Singapore to morrow, and have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE ROBINSON.

P.S.—Five piratical prows were burnt, three with two 24-pounders and one small gun each. All had arms, viz., spears, muskets, pistols, &c. They measured from 80 tons to 100 tons a-piece.

G. R.

Boatswain's Report.

LIST of Rigging, &c., shot away during Action at Salangore, July 4, 1871.

2nd shroud, port side, just above netting.
5th shroud, starboard side, stranded.
Main tack.
Main sheet.
Main clew garnet.
Main top-sail lift.
Main top-gallant yard rope.
Main top-sail clewline.
Main top-sail reef tackles.
Main top-gallant sheets.
Main top-gallant clewline.
Main top-gallant mast rope shot through in three places.
Fore bowline.
Fore brace.
Fore top-sail brace.
Main royal clewline.
After main brace.
Main leechlines.
Gaff mainsail, shot through in several places.
Quarter-deck awning.
Quarter-deck awning ridge chain.
Several ratlines.
Waist and quarter-deck ridge ropes.
9-inch snatch block.
Main top-sail yard down haul.

(Signed) P. RICKARD, *Boatswain,*
Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo."

Carpenter's Report.

DEFECTS, Losses, &c.. sustained during Action at Salangore, July 4, 1871.

Starboard Side.

Foremost bridle-port blown to pieces.
Head berthing and hammock netting shattered in several places.
One round shot entered hull below anchor,
One round shot through topsides, carrying away 6 feet of covering board and quick work.
Caulking and copper sheathing shaken.
One lower half-port lost overboard.

Port Side.

One round shot beneath bower anchor.
One round shot beneath monkey chains.
Two steps of side knocked away.
Rabbit of after-cabin port carried away by the splinter of a ball.
Caulking and sheathing shaken, and all seams require chinnam.

Mainmast splintered below spider band by shot.
Spider band broken.
Gig smashed beyond repairs.
One shot through second cutter.
Dingy and first cutter badly shaken.

(Signed) JAMES F. BERRY, *Carpenter,*
Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo."

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

Memorandum by Mr. C. J. Irving relative to the Disturbances in the Territory of Salangore.

IT will be seen from the Report contained in the "Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds, relating to India and neighbouring Countries," Vol. I, Part III, that at least as early as the publication of that volume, viz., 1862, the state of Salangore, although nominally under one Chief, was divided into several almost independent States. In that Report the States enumerated are (counting from the south), Lookoot, Langkat, Kallang, Salangore, Birnum. These same five States appear prominently in the affairs that are now taking place, but there is an additional one, Iceram (the position of which I am not quite certain about, but I think it is close to Salangore), the Rajah of which appears also to be a person of importance.

The present Sultan of Salangore resides at Langkat, and may therefore be considered to be the Rajah of Langkat, as well as Sultan of the whole country.

The late Rajah of Lookoot, Tunku Sleyman, was a partizan of Tunku Dia Oodin (whose position will be treated of further on). He was shot in the course of the fighting on the Kallang River in 1870, and was, I believe, succeeded by his brother, who I have little doubt is on the same side.

The present Rajah of Kallang may be said to be Tunku Dia Oodin, who has recently driven out Rajah Mahdie.

The nominal Rajah of Salangore is Tunku Moossa, the eldest son of the Sultan (he is generally known as Tunku Long, quasi Tunku Satong, eldest born); but I was informed by Tunku Dia Oodin, that Rajah Mahdie, after he had been driven out from Kallang, had joined with the Rajah of Birnam and Juram, and had come down upon Salangore, and taken possession of it.

Recent events seem to show that Moossa was left in the nominal command by these men, but that he was to a great extent under their control.

All that I know about the Rajah of Birnam is, that he is called Rajah of Hitam (black). This is most likely only a nickname, and I shall expect to find him indentified with the "Rajah Mahmood," or the "Rajah , whose names appear in the Reports of the recent proceedings at Salangore.

The Rajah of Jiram is called Rajah Ali. It is probable that he also may prove to be one of the Chiefs who took a prominent part in the recent affair.

Tunku Dia Oodin is the son-in-law of the Sultan, and a brother of the present Sultan of Quedah. He claims to hold full powers from the Sultan to exercise all rights of sovereignty within the territory of Salangore; and he showed me a document which purported to give such powers. Rajah Mahdie's people, however, when I was up at Kallang in April 1870, told me that they did not believe the document was genuine.

There is a letter from the Sultan to the Governor, dated the 17th August, 1870, which would seem to place the genuineness of the Powers beyond doubt. The Sultan writes:—"He informs our friend that our son (in-law), Tunku Dia Oodin, younger brother of the Sultan of Quedah, is married to our daughter. In the work of governing the country, he is empowered to direct this work of ours along with us." But this came through Tunku Dia Oodin himself; and if it can be supposed that the Powers are a forgery, the letters may be all forgeries too.

I may state, however, my strong belief that there is no forgery in the case, and further, that the Sultan is as strongly on the side of Tunku Dia Oodin as his nature, which seems weak, and timid, and cunning, allows him to be.

Besides the "powers" from the Sultan, Tunku Dia Oodin showed me agreements which he had entered into with Rajah Moossa, of Salangore, and Rajah Sleyman, of Lookoot, and several other chiefs whose names I have forgotton, binding the parties mutually to support each other.

At the time then, of the outbreak of the civil war in Salangore (if the term may be applied to affairs on such a small scale) the parties, thus—

I.—1. The Sultan (and Rajah of Langkat) Abdul Sumad.

2. Tunku Dia Oodin, *alias* Tunku Kudin, son-in-law of the Sultan of Salangore, and brother of the Sultan of Quedah.

3. Rajah Moossa of Salangore, *alias* Tunku Long or Sutong, eldest son of the Sultan.

4. Rajah Sleyman, of Lookoot.

5. Several other chiefs of importance.

II.—1. Rajah Mahdie, of Kallang.

2. Rajah Hitam, of Birnam.

3. Rajah Ali, of Juram.

In order to understand the cause of the war it is necessary to go back about twenty years. About 18—, a Chief from Rio came to Salangore, named Rajah Dowlah and was married to Rajah Sidah, the sister of the present Sultan. He obtained from the Sultan as her dowry, the territory of Kallang. He had one son by Rajah Sidah, Tunku had one by a former wife, viz., Tunku Ismail, who is now Tunku Dia Oodin's second in command at Kallang.

At the time Rajah Dowlah was made Rajah of Kallang, Rajah Mahdie (a nephew of the present Sultan) held a small district in the neighbourhood. Quarrels sprang up between the two and finally Rajah Dowlah was ousted (about 18—*) and came to Malacca, where he died in 18—*. Rajah Sidah (female), I believe still lives at Malacca with her son who is a lad of about * years old. I believe that Rajah Mahdie offered to do something for her and her sons; and I was told that she said she would rather starve to death than put a piece of his bread into her mouth.

The Sultan seems to have acquiesced at first in Rajah Mahdie's usurpation, and might, probably have continued to do so, but that disputes arose about the payment of tribute. I rather think that Rajah Mahdie refused at last to pay anything. At any rate, there were difficulties, and just at this time Rajah Sidah sent her son Tunku to Langkat.

* These blanks are in the original document.

The Sultan (so I was told) was much moved at seeing his sister's son, and so, partly from consideration of his dollars, and partly from consideration of his sister, he was induced (this is the current story) to countenance a scheme for driving out Rajah Mahdie, and reinstating Rajah Sidah or her son.

The war began, I believe, by an invasion of the Kallang territory by Tunku Ismail (Sidah's step-son) supported by Rajah Sleyman of Lookoot. They did not make very much progress, and then it was that Tunku Dia Oodin came first into the field. His connection with the affairs will be seen from the accompanying memorandum of a statement which he made to me on the 16th of June last.

Tunku Dia Oodin seems to have gone to Langkat, when the war broke out, with 400 Quedah men, with a view, as he expressed it, of guarding his house, that is, looking after his own or his wife's property and interests there, and that the Sultan then gave him the "full powers" referred to above, and commissioned him not to support one side against another, but to obtain possession of the country in the Sultan's name, and there to settle the quarrel between Rajah Ismail and Rajah Mahdie.

Tunku Dia Oodin accordingly went to Kallang with his forces in the month of , 18 . Rajah Ismail at once agreed to abide by his decision, but Rajah Mahdie gave only a palpably evasive answer, and plainly showed his intention of holding the country by force. Thereupon Tunku Dia Oodin blockaded the river and Rajah Mahdie's stockades on the banks, and by the month of , 1870, had succeeded in obtaining possession of the whole of them. Rajah Mahdie, however, succeeded in breaking through the enemy's lines before the last stockade was starved out with about 200 followers, and joining with the Rajahs of Birnam and Juram, got possession of Salangore in the manner above described.

Tunku Dia Oodin has stated to me on several occasions that he has been much hindered in his operations by two causes: the first being the half-hearted support of the Sultan of Salangore; and the second, his being unable to obtain the men that he required from Quedah. The first of these difficulties disappeared, I believe, after Sir H. Ord's visit to Langkat in May 1870. Tunku Dia Oodin told me that, immediately after this he received supplies of ammunition from the Sultan. I believe that the Governor's visit stimulated the Sultan to a more decided line of policy. Up to this time he seems to have been swayed backwards and forwards by different advisers, and I have heard it said that he was, to a certain extent, actuated by the fact that the blockade in the Kallang river brought the tin across country to his own river, the Langat, and therefore into his own treasury. However this may be, Tunku Dia Oodin now makes no complaint of want of support from the Sultan of Salangore.

As regards his second grievance, not obtaining more men from Quedah, the matter is one which is entirely in the hands of the English Government. The Sultan of Quedah says he is willing to give the men if he is assured of the assent of the English Government and the Siamese Government. The Siamese Government say, "that they have no objection if the English Government have none." Sir H. Ord wrote distinctly to the Sultan of Salangore, on the 30th June, 1870, that he had no objection to the Sultan receiving aid from Quedah; but still, between the two Sultans and the two Governments, the question goes round and round, and the assistance which, if given in July, 1870, would in all probability have put an end to the war in a few weeks, is still not forthcoming.

I have only to add, that Rajah Mahdie while he had possession of Kallang, is reported by the Lieutenant-Governor of Malacca to have been a bad neighbour, harbouring runaway convicts and other offenders, and refusing to give them up. He is the same man who, in March 1867, received Governor Cavanagh, who went to inquire about a Chinaman who was detained, with much insolence. He refused to come on board the "Pluto," and even threatened to detain Lieutenant Protheroe who went to see him in his stockade, and had not that officer startled him into more prudent behaviour by a counter-threat, to throw his lighted cigar among the powder and cartridges that Mahdie had before him, it may be doubted whether he would not have detained him.

The Chinaman was detained, and had to be ransomed by his friends.

Tunku Dia Oodin has I think always evinced a desire to give the Government every information about his proceedings, and to meet the views of the Government. He appears to me, and I have seen a good deal of him, to have what may be called European ideas about his Government, and I am inclined to think that, if circumstances gave him the chief command at Salangore, he would prove a good ruler and a good neighbour to the Colony.

(Signed) C. J. IRVING, *Auditor-General.*

Inclosure 7 in No. 1.

Newspaper Extracts.

From the Penang "Argus" of July 1, 1871.

PIRACY.—ANOTHER brutal outrage on the high seas has been committed, and the Government has no means at its disposal of assisting in the work of affording security to the people of the settlement. Singapore, as a matter of course, enjoys the presence in its roadstead of two or more gun-boats, whilst Penang is seldom blessed with the sight of a man-of-war. It is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs, we think, and one which, it is to be hoped, the Lieutenant-Governor will bring to the notice of the Secretary of State. Penang is completely ignored in all its requirements, and it is time its voice should be heard.

The act we have to notice to-day was committed in Klang Straits. It would appear that on the 14th of June a junk owned by the Chinese firm of Waing Cheong Long, left this port for Laroot, with a crew mustering up in all nine men, with a general cargo and 3,000 dollars in specie. On leaving port she took on board a number (forty) of passengers. On the 22nd of the same month information was brought to one of her owners, Ong Hong Buan, to the effect that the passengers she had shipped outside of the limits of the port had murdered the crew and taken possession of the junk. An affidavit and, we believe, a petition were presented to the Lieutenant-Governor on the same day by Ong Hong Buan, when he was advised to proceed, without loss of time, to Singapore in the "Historian," which was expected to leave on the same afternoon. He did so, and was the bearer of despatches for the authorities at Singapore, where he arrived on Sunday last. His Excellency the Administrator sent, in the "Pluto," an Inspector of Police and nine peons, with orders to take a reinforcement of police at Malacca. The Deputy-Commissioner of Police at Malacca and eleven peons having embarked, the "Pluto" proceeded in her search for the missing junk, and arrived at Kallang at midnight of Tuesday last. The police went on shore, but shortly after returned, having been unable to obtain from the authorities on shore any information about the junk. The "Pluto" then made her way to Salangore, where she arrived at noon of Wednesday. The missing junk was there, and soon after was identified by Ong Hong Buan, one of her owners. The police landed and were received by some petty Rajah, who stated that Rajah Moossa was not at Salangore. A message having been sent to him, however, he shortly after came, when the despatch from his Excellency the Administrator was handed over to him. He read it, and expressed his readiness to afford all possible assistance to the police to recover the missing property, and, the owner having informed the Rajah that the cargo of the junk had been landed and was in the houses of certain Macao Chinese, he at once gave an order that it should be restored. The police visited the junk and apprehended six men found on board. Three of these men were part of the junk's crew, whom the pirates had spared as they required their services to bring the vessel into harbour. The steersman at once pointed out four other men on shore who were implicated in the murder of the crew; of this number three were arrested; the fourth was permitted to make his escape after being once in the custody of the police. Rajah Moossa then visited the steamer and shortly after returned to his house. Another Chief, by name Mamood, in the absence of Rajah Moossa, interfered with the restoring of the cargo and ordered his men to prevent any more to be returned to the junk. He prevented the police arresting the fourth man who was implicated in the act of piracy, and when the police attempted to give chase he ordered his men to draw out their kris and dispose of the police, and the owner, who were standing near him. Finding it impossible to obtain redress, the police returned on board, and on the next morning the conduct of Rajah Mahmood was reported to his Chief. But as no notice was taken, the "Pluto" left Salangore with the junk in tow, and nine of the pirates in irons in her hold, and steamed for Penang, where she arrived yesterday morning.

We await to see what notice the Government will take of the conduct of this Rajah Mahmood, who is well known for the annoyance he has caused to the English for many years, and who should be taught a lesson which he will remember for some considerable time.

We are informed that a gun-boat has been telegraphed for from Singapore. We hope she may bring the authority to our Lieutenant-Governor to demand an explanation of the Rajah of Salangore for the treatment given to the police in this case.

It is not unlikely, we think, that the pirates implicated in this case have among the Chiefs of Salangore many friends, and judging from the interest taken by the Chief Mahmood in the case, we have no hesitation in saying that man had some interest as well in the spoils.

Will the Government of the Straits permit an outrage of this kind to be perpetrated without inflicting summary punishment upon the offenders, as may act as a warning to all evil-disposed maurauders who fancy they can carry on piracy in these waters unmolested?

The nine men apprehended by the police at Salangore and brought in the "Pluto" on Friday last, were charged with murder and piracy before the Magistrate to-day. The Solicitor-General appeared for the Crown. The evidence of Ong Hong Buan, the part owner of the junk, and that of Messrs. Barnum and Cox, of the police, was taken, and the prisoners remanded, at Mr. Logan's request, to Friday next.

From the Penang "Gazette" of July 1, 1871.

With respect to the piracy committed on the coast of Perak, mentioned in our last issue, some further particulars have transpired. It appears that the Chinese junk named the "Kim Seng Cheong," Kong Lee, Nacodah, was dispatched on the 14th of June from Penang for Laroot with a cargo consisting of 7 coyans of rice, 20 cases of sundries, including piece goods, 32 piculs of salt fish, 16 piculs of oil, 15 pigs, and 2,000 dollars. Three days after she left a report was current that a junk had been attacked off Laroot. Some days after this the report was again repeated, when one of the owners of the junk returned from Laroot with the information that the junk had not arrived, and that all the rivers had been searched without finding her. The authorities were then applied to, and one of the owners, named Ong Hong Buan was furnished with a letter from the Lieutenant-Governor to the Colonial Secretary for the services of the "Pluto." He started for Singapore on the 22nd, arrived there on the 25th, and next day left in the "Pluto" in search, with a party of nine Singapore policemen under command of Inspector Barnum.

At Malacca, where the "Pluto" called, the party was joined by Deputy-Commissioner Cox and eleven policemen, and left again on the 27th of June for the mouth of Kallang River, which was reached about midnight, and a letter was sent on from there to Tunku Dia Oodin, but no information could be obtained there, and at 5 A.M. the "Pluto" proceeded to Salangore, reaching there about 10 A.M.; on the way three junks were boarded and searched, but nothing was discovered to implicate them.

At Salangore the police landed on the right bank of the river and obtained information that a junk of the same name as the one sought for had discharged her cargo about ten days previously. Crossing to the opposite side of the river the party there found the missing junk, with six Chinese on board, one of whom was identified as Leng Ah Cheok, her steersman; considerable alterations had been made to her, but the gong, drum, and cymbals found on board still had the junk's name on them, traces of blood were also on the deck, which had apparently been recently scraped. On the police going on shore and making search, a great quantity of her cargo was found. This had been sold, and was discovered in three shops. The search was prosecuted in face of great opposition; a large crowd being collected, and two Chiefs who were present defied the authority of the British Government, and scornfully spoke of the letter from the Administrator to the Sultan of Salangore as being so much waste paper, and that it was great presumption for the party to have made the search, or even to have landed without leave.

Rajah Moossa, son of the Sultan of Salangore, afterwards came to the spot, and received Mr. Cox very cordially; he also went on board the steamer, and at his suggestion she was brought into the river and anchored. Mr. Cox then went on shore with Rajah Moossa; and the latter, after holding a consultation with his Chiefs, authorized the removal of such of the cargo as was identified by Hong Buan, every assistance being rendered for the removal of the cargo into the junk. This having been done he left, and at 4 P.M. a party of police and some of Rajah Moossa's men were dispatched inland in search of the other pirates that had been concerned in the capture of the junk, but they returned at dusk without success. Soon after that, three more pirates were arrested as they were coming towards the village, and delivered up to Mr. Cox. A Chinese, who was identified by the steersman, Leng Ah Cheok, was also

brought to the beach and delivered to Mr. Cox. He had a large quantity of money on his person. On seeing one of the Malay Chiefs, who was standing near him, he seized him round the legs and claimed his protection; at the same time he whispered to a bystander, who immediately went away and returned with Rajah Mahmood and a large body of Malays. Rajah Mahmood and his followers, in a menacing tone and with drawn krisses, then insisted that Messrs. Cox and Barnum should liberate the man, and that he be responsible for his being forthcoming if he was wanted. The man was set at liberty, and immediately ran away into a neighbouring stockade, into which he was pursued by the police and the boat's crew. Upon this the Malays attacked them, and some of them, being overpowered by numbers, were obliged to beat a retreat. The Malays then rushed out of the stockade, demanding, in a most threatening manner, an apology, asserting that the English had no right to enter their territory or to arrest any one. As the boats were pulling out, they called upon Mr. Cox to return, as they wanted to speak to him, and in particular to the Baba, but Mr. Cox thought it best to secure his retreat. The remaining part of the cargo, which had been removed from the shops to the beach, was taken possessionof by the Rajah Mahmood's followers, who evinced, by their demoniacal yells and drawn krisses, most hostile intentions. In consequence of this, all hands in the steamer were kept on the alert in expectation of an attack, especially as boats from Rajah Mahdie's stockade were continually hastening to reinfore the threatening Malays, and two shots were fired from the stockade at the steamer. At night, boats were observed from the steamer conveying goods, which were supposed to be part of the cargo, but the police were unable to interfere. The following morning Rajah Moossa came on board the steamer, and told Mr. Cox that were it not for the opposition of Rajahs Berkat, Mahmood, and Syed Masahoor, his subordinate Chiefs, he would have been able to have given to the police more assistance in recovering the stolen cargo. At this time there were several other boats lying close to the steamer, loaded with the cargo of the junk; but the "Pluto," not being sufficiently armed, could do nothing. On leaving Salangore, at the outer bar, shots were fired at intervals from Mahdie's stockade. The "Pluto," with the junk in tow, then succeeded in leaving the river, a pilot having refused to Captain Bradberry, who, however, had previously taken the precaution of sounding the entrance to the river. The "Pluto" arrived here yesterday. The nine arrested men were brought before the Police Magistrate this afternoon, when some evidence was taken, and they were remanded.

We are glad to learn that his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang has taken very decided and energetic steps in the affair of the junk. Mr. Birch telegraphed yesterday to Singapore for the services of the "Rinaldo," which has been ordered to proceed to the "Torch" light-ship, there to meet the "Pluto," and thereafter to proceed in her company to Salangore, and to make peremptory demand for the surrender of any that can be proved to have been engaged in the piracy, the restoration of the remainder of the stolen cargo, and also, we hope, to insist upon an ample apology from the Rajahs for their acts.

We cannot, however, say much in favour of the Singapore Government sending the "Pluto" upon her errand with such an insufficient armament, and such a small number of men. The conduct of the police under Messrs. Cox and Barnum was highly praiseworthy. It required some pluck, with about a score or so of policemen such as we boast of in the Straits, to run the risk of a collision with a lot of infuriated Malay robbers, to recover as much as was done of the stolen cargo, to have succeeded in bringing the junk back to Penang, arrested some of the pirates, and procured sufficient evidence to bring their crime home to them. The Rajah Mahdie is a man of no small magnitude in his own estimation. We believe that General Cavenagh, when about leaving the Colony on his way home, attempted to see this man for the purpose of obtaining restitution of a cargo of tin which his followers had taken from a Malacca Chinaman, but the man refused to receive him, and grossly insulted General Cavenagh and the officers he had sent ashore, and even used threatening language to them. Such a Chief is deserving of scant consideration from the Colonial Government. Let us hope that Colonel Anson will be equal to the occasion.

No. 2.

The Admiralty to the Colonial Office.—(Received August 29.)

Sir, *Admiralty, August* 28, 1871.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, copies of a letter of the 6th ultimo and its inclosures from the Captain of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo,"* reporting his proceedings on an expedition undertaken by that vessel, with the assistance of the Colonial vessel "Pluto," and troops sent from Penang against pirates at Salangore, in the Straits of Malacca.

2. My Lords request you will at the same time inform the Earl of Kimberley that they are anxious that their thanks should be conveyed to the Colonial Authorities, and the troops employed for the co-operation rendered on the occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) VERNON LUSHINGTON.

No. 3.

The Colonial Office to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Downing Street, September* 6, 1871.

I AM directed by the Earl of Kimberley to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, with the copy of a letter from the Captain of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," reporting his proceedings on an expedition undertaken at the request of the Straits Settlements Government against pirates at Salangore.

Lord Kimberley desires me to state that he has also received a Report from the Governor of those Settlements, and to transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a despatch his Lordship has addressed to Colonel Anson in reply.†

I am further to request that you will move their Lordships to make known to the officers and men of the "Rinaldo" that Lord Kimberley fully appreciates the ready assistance given to the Local Government, and the gallant manner in which the necessary operations were carried out.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. H. MEADE.

No. 4.

The Colonial Office to the War Office.

Sir, *Downing Street, September* 6, 1871.

I AM directed by the Earl of Kimberley to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, a copy of a despatch from the Governor of the Straits Settlements reporting the circumstances under which a detachment of Her Majesty's troops had been sent from Penang in aid of an expedition against pirates at Salangore.‡

Lord Kimberley requests that his thanks may be communicated to Colonel Shortland, and the officers and men employed under him, for the ready and valuable assistance rendered by them to the Local Government on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. H. MEADE.

No. 5.

The Earl of Kimberley to Acting Governor Anson

Sir, *Downing Street, September* 6, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 14th July, reporting the capture of a junk by Salangore pirates, and the measures which you took in consequence in conjunction with the naval and military authorities.

* Inclosure 5 in No. 1. † No. 5. ‡ No. 1.

While I greatly regret that the officers and men of Her Majestys ship "Rinaldo" should have suffered such serious losses, I am glad to be able to express a general approval of the zeal and courage displayed by all those who took part in these proceedings. I notice with especial satisfaction the favourable reports in which Captain Robinson, R.N., and Colonel Shortland, 19th Madras Native Infantry, speak of the assistance rendered by the officers of the Colonial Service who were concerned; and I have requested the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War to make known to Captain Robinson and Colonel Shortland that I fully appreciate the ready and able manner in which they carried out your wishes.

As I have not received from you any copies of the written instructions which you gave to Mr. Cox and Captain Bradberry in the first instance, or of any which you may have issued to Captain Robinson and Mr. Skinner, I am not able at present to form a definite opinion as to the course taken by your Government, but as far as I can judge, a serious mistake seems to me to have been made in sending the "Pluto" to enforce the surrender of the pirates, a service for which she was entirely unsuited.

It would have been best, considering the notorious character of the Salangore Malays, that a ship of war should have been sent on in the first instance, and the event shows that no time would have been really lost had you delayed action until you could secure the services of a proper vessel; but if you were of opinion that it was necessary to take steps at once without waiting for a ship of war, the "Pluto," should only have been sent to search for the junk, and, if necessary, to make a formal demand for the delivery of the stolen cargo and offenders. On such demand being refused, the Commander of the "Pluto" should have been directed to report the circumstances, and no attempt should have been made to compel compliance with the demand until it could be supported by an adequate force.

The capture of the junk with the six pirates on board, which was effected by Captain Bradberry without meeting with any resistance, deserves approval for the successful manner in which it was executed, but the landing of a small party of police afterwards to seize the cargo and the remaining pirates, was a hazardous and ill-advised proceeding, and it is fortunate that it was not attended with fatal consequences.

As it does not seem to have been understood that my predecessor decided that the Colonial vessel was not to be armed, nor to be used in services of this kind, I have to expressly instruct you that the "Pluto" is not to be employed on expeditions where there is any probability of a collision with an armed force, and that she is not to carry any armament larger than would be sufficient for her own protection in the event of her being attacked by pirates at sea.

At the request of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I have to communicate their Lordships' thanks to the Colonial Authorities for the co-operation rendered by them on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 6.

Acting Governor Anson to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received September 4.)

My Lord, *Government House, Singapore, July* 28, 1871.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 14th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, as soon as the Colonial steamer "Pluto" returned from Penang, I dispatched the Colonial Secretary and Mr. C. Irving, the Auditor-General, to overtake Her Majesty's ship "Teazer," and to go in company with Commander Blomfield to visit the Sultan of Salangore and deliver my letter to him.

2. I further instructed the Colonial Secretary to urge upon the Sultan the appointing of Tunku Dia Oodin, or some other person in whom this Government could have confidence, as the responsible officer of his Government.

3. The result of this expedition (Mr. Birch's account of which is annexed) was, I consider, very satisfactory, the Sultan having given Tunku Dia Oodin full powers, not over the Salangore River and the surrounding district, but over the whole of his territory.

4. He declared Rajah Mahdie to be a pirate as well as a rebellious subject of his

own, and he expressed much satisfaction at his having been so thoroughly chastised by Captain Robinson, of her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo."

5. He had previously sent five of the six remaining pirates and the tail of the sixth, who died at Langkat, after he was secured, to Malacca, with a letter assuring me of his desire at all times to carry out the Treaty made with the Indian Government in 1825.

6. I think the affairs of Salangore are likely henceforth to be far more satisfactorily conducted than they have hitherto been, and that Tunku Dia Oodin will have a sufficient force at his disposal, with the aid of the steamer which he possesses, to prevent the harbouring of pirates in that territory in future.

7. Captain Blomfield rendered great assistance to Mr. Birch, as did also Mr. Charles Irving. Mr. Birch deserves great credit for the manner in which he conducted the negotiations on this occasion, the satisfactory results of which cannot but affect beneficially the trade of these settlements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. E. H. ANSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Acting Governor Anson to His Highness the Sultan of Salangore.

I INFORM my friend that a very serious act of piracy has been committed by persons resident in my friend's territory, who have been aided and protected by my friend's subjects Rajah Mahdie and Rajah Mahmood.

The circumstances of the case are these. A junk left Penang for Laroot with a crew and passengers numbering forty-nine persons. Sometime after leaving Penang, fifteen of these passengers who were pirates, murdered the crew and remaining passengers, in all thirty-four persons, and carried the junk away to my friend's village at Salangore.

When this news reached me I sent the Government steamer "Pluto" to look for this missing junk, and the Captain of the steamer found the junk at my friend's village with six of the pirates, and some of the cargo still on board, and they were all taken to Penang.

My officers also caught three more of the pirates ashore, and took them also to Penang. They also caught another, who was one of the principal of them, but Rajah Mahdie allowed this man to escape. Rajah Mahdie, and the other Rajahs named above, then threatened the lives of my officers, and would not allow them to look for the remainder of the pirates, and even fired guns at my vessel.

When my officers returned to Penang they sent me a message by means of the new iron rope (telegraphic cable) which has been laid down at the bottom of the sea between Penang and Singapore, telling me what had happened. I immediately sent the English man-of-war "Rinaldo," Captain Robinson, to meet the "Pluto" at Salangore. When the "Pluto" arrived at Salangore, Captain Robinson sent an officer on shore to request Rajah Mahdie to go off to him, as the representative of Her Majesty the Queen of England, on board my vessel the "Pluto," as he wished to talk to him about this affair.

Rajah Mahdie said he would go, but when he came near the boat he said he would not go; and when the officer urged him to go, he ran away, and the people immediately fired upon the officer and his boat's crew, wounding some of them. Captain Robinson then returned to his own ship the "Rinaldo," which was outside the bar of the river, and the "Pluto" again returned to Penang, and my officers again sent me a message by telegraph, telling me what had happened.

I then immediately sent back a message to Penang to send Sepoys and guns to Salangore in my vessel, and I sent more sepoys and guns in a steam-vessel from Singapore.

In the meantime Captain Robinson took his ship the, "Rinaldo," into the Salangore River, and fired into the forts, and drove Rajah Mahdie and his followers out.

He then returned to Singapore to inform me what he had done. I beg to remind my friend that, in the Treaty between this Government and Salangore, signed at the Fort of Salangore, by Sri Sultan Ibrahim Shah, on the 5th day of Mohurrum, in the year Hijurat, 1241, or 20th August, A.D. 1825, in the IVth Article, "His Majesty the King of Salangore engages not to permit any pirates to resort to any part of his territory; and in Article V, the King of Salangore engages to seize and to return to

Pulo Penang any offenders, such as pirates, robbers, murderers, and others, who may escape to Salangore.

I therefore now ask my friend to give orders to seize and send to me the six pirates, who still remain in my friend's territory, who were of the number of those who murdered the people on board the junk, and brought the junk into Salangore. I also ask my friend to give orders to seize and hand over to me Rajahs Mahdie and Mahmood who caused their followers to fire upon and wound the sailors of Her Majesty the Queen of England, that they may be punished as they deserve.

I must further ask my friend to give me some guarantee that pirates shall not be again allowed at Salangore, or to occupy the forts there. I therefore ask my friend to place some person in the office of Governor or Chief over the country about the Salangore River, whom this Government can trust to carry out the Treaty between this Government and that of your Highness.

I will in a few days send an officer of rank from here to Kallang to meet your Highness, in order to discuss this matter, and make satisfactory arrangements for the future, and I trust your Highness will receive him with the honour due to his position as the representative of this Government.

(Signed) A. E. ANSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Mr. Birch to Acting Governor Anson.

Sir, *Colonial Secretary's Office, Singapore, July* 26, 1871.

IN compliance with your Excellency's instructions, I left Singapore on the 17th instant, and proceeded in the "Pluto" to Salangore, with Mr. C. I. Irving, and there joined Captain Blomfield in Her Majesty's ship "Teazer." On the morning of the 19th, having the night before met Tunku Dia Oodin, and taken him on board from the "Rainbow," in which vessel he was coming down to meet your Excellency, we landed with Captain Blomfield, who had been there for two days, and had explored the Salangore River for some miles, and we examined the forts which had been destroyed by the "Rinaldo." The position is an exceedingly remarkable one, and might be rendered almost unassailable, since, if the upper fort was properly armed, no vessel could approach. The effect of the "Rinaldo's" fire was everywhere visible, not only in the destruction of the forts themselves and the large trees on the top of the hill, but in the general demeanour of the people, who were sent for by Tunku Dia Oodin, and came from the neighbouring Kampong, which, to judge by its appearance from the hill, extends inland for about two miles.

2. The lower forts were garrisoned by about 100 men of Tunku Dia Oodin's, and his people had unspiked several guns, and put four or five into position, in case any of the Rajahs who were engaged in the disturbance should return.

3. After thoroughly exploring the place we weighed anchor, the "Teazer" leading, and steamed up the river for about thirteen miles. At every village we passed the women and children were seen fleeing to the jungle, but the men came down to the banks of the river perfectly unarmed—a very unusual practice for a Malay.

4. The same thing occurred when we landed and made inquiries as to the whereabouts of Rajahs Mahdie, Mahmood, and Seyd Masahoor, and, though we were all strongly armed, I did not observe a single man out of several hundreds who had even a-kriss.

5. The people reported that Rajah Moossa, the Sultan's son, had been threatened by Rajah Mahdie, and having escaped up the river previous to the "Rinaldo's" arrival, was now making his way by land across the Kallang.

6. Rajah Mahdie was reported to have run away after the treacherous fire on Lieutenant Maude's party, and Rajahs Mahmood and Seyd Masahoor to have remained and fired on the "Rinaldo" the next day. The accounts were very conflicting and uncertain, but I am inclined to think Mahdie has gone to Burnam or the Perak River; that Mahmood was concealed in the jungle not far from Salangore; and that Syed Masahoor went to Bukit Jermin, and on that being approached by Tunku Dia Oodin's people, he fled into the interior, and was in the neighbourhood of the mines on the Salangore River, above Passang.

7. We returned the same evening, and anchored at the mouth of the river. I am confirmed in the view I take of the vicinity of Rajah Mahmood by the fact that a small vessel was found endeavouring to leave with a number of krisses, spears, swords,

and muskets; but, on being boarded from the "Teazer," the arms were claimed as belonging to Tunku Dia Oodin. On this being investigated it was found to be false, and the arms, which had in the interval been landed, were directed to be sent on board of us. This order was partly complied with, and several krisses, swords, spears, and muskets were sent down. I handed over the muskets to Tunku Dia Oodin, and the krisses and spears, with the swords, were given over to Her Majesty's ship "Teazer." I have little doubt this vessel was being sent out by the partizans of the Rajah in the Kampong, who felt that our presence there was rather perilous for their Chief.

8. On Thursday, the 20th, we weighed at daylight and steamed down in heavy rain to the mouth of the Kallang River. Here we met Rajah Moossa, who informed us he had had a long and perilous journey by land, and was delighted to feel himself safe on board a British ship.

9. In your Excellency's name we thanked him for the way he had behaved when the "Pluto" first went up and found the junk, and presented him with the pistol you had sent by me. He confirmed entirely what we had heard at Salangore, and stated that he had left his wife at the Kampong, and barely escaped with his wife and one of his children, while the others had fallen into the hands of Rajah Mahdie.

10. Here the "Pluto" anchored, and we went on board the "Teazer" with Captain Blomfield, and proceeded up the Kallang River. Not knowing the depth of water, and being unwilling to rely on the native pilot, we anchored after three or four miles, and I went away with the officers who were sent ahead to sound.

11. In about three or four miles we met two European officers under Tunku Dia Oodin, going down to meet him at the mouth of the river, and asked them to bring the ship up, as they were accustomed to the river.

12. We then proceeded to Tunku Dia Oodin's stockade, where we found everything very nicely arranged. The bazaar seemed flourishing, and Rajahs Ismail and Abdulrahman evidently firm adherents of the Tunku. We took these Rajahs on board and returned to the mouth of the river, where we met the "Fair Singapore" which had just arrived from Quedah with Rajah Yakoob, the younger son of the Sultan and brother of Rajah Moosah.

13. Captain Blomfield here showed the Rajah some shell and shot practice from his large guns, with very good effect.

14. I wrote to the Sultan, telling him we were bringing a letter from your Excellency, and should leave for Langat the next morning, which letter I sent to him by Rajah Yakoob, who is his favourite son.

15. On the morning of the 21st we weighed anchor at daylight and proceeded up to Langat, about 30 miles, but along a perfectly practicable river, and anchored in the stream within about 600 yards of the Sultan's palace, and at the entrance of the Iagree River, up which Sir H. Ord and Lord C. Scott had pulled in their boats last year when they visited the Sultan.

16. We fired a signal gun on anchoring, and the Sultan at once fired a salute from his palace. Rajah Yakoob came off with a message from his father to say that he had received the letter and would be very glad to see us, but hoped we would not blame him for what had happened.

17. We were much struck here by the different attitude assumed by the people, who flocked to the river banks in very large numbers and all well armed.

18. After consulting Captain Blomfield, we decided on landing at 2 o'clock and delivering to the Sultan your Excellency's letter, and we considered it our duty to take all the precautions in our power to guard against ambush or surprise. Captain Blomfield landed as large a force from both ships of officers and men as could possibly be spared, and we marched up to the stockade, having Rajah Moossa and Tunku Dia Oodin with us.

19. The Sultan met us at the entry of the stockade, and taking me by the hand escorted me to his Audience Hall, where he had chairs arranged for us all. Our men were drawn up under the command of Mr. Robinson in the vestibule, and within a few yards.

20. The verandah of the Audience Hall, and the outer yards of the Palace were crowded with Malays, while the whole population appeared to be thoroughly armed. The Sultan again fired a salute.

21. Having briefly explained to His Highness the purpose of our visit, we caused to be read to him your Excellency's letter, with which he expressed himself, several times, highly delighted, and he then informed us that he had caught and sent off the rest of the pirates to Malacca. He declared himself to be utterly irresponsible for the acts of Rajahs Mahdie, Mahmood, and Syed Masahoor, and expressed his regrets

at what they had done. He declared them to be bad men and pirates who had long devastated his country.

22. On our requiring Tunku Dia Oodin to produce an old power which he had given him in 1868, and which the Tunku had brought down to Singapore; the Sultan acknowledged the genuineness of the document and appealed to Moosa, who likewise acknowledged it, but he endeavoured, with the usual habits of all Orientals, to gain time, and said it would be necessary that he should confer with the chiefs, and that, if we would go away, he would send a letter to Singapore.

23. This I at once declined, and informed the Sultan that I required an answer in twenty-four hours, and should expect it to be sent to me before 5 P.M. the next day, and that any neglect to comply with this demand, or any unsatisfactory reply would be attended by very serious consequences.

24. We did not consider it desirable to salute His Highness till he had satisfactorily answered your Excellency's letter, and after being shown over all his town and stockades by the younger Rajahs, we went, and, accompanied by the Sultan, our whole party re-embarked, taking some animals for fresh provisions, which he sent down to the boats, and for which he refused payment when I offered it.

25. Very early the next morning I wrote him a letter, of which I now annex a copy, reiterating my demands, and sent it to His Highness by Rajah Yakoob, requesting him to distinctly say that I still adhered to the 5 P.M. for an answer, that only one hour would be given after that, and that I should then take all the tin in the place and require an indemnity. Your Excellency will observe that I had not hitherto demanded any indemnity, as, in accordance with your verbal instructions to me, I did not feel justified in doing so if the Sultan disowned the acts of Rajah Mahdie.

26. After breakfast we visited the Parcelor Hill in our boats, and cut a path for some miles through the forest, till we deemed it time to be returning.

27. On our return at 3 P.M. I found two replies from the Sultan, one being an order outlawing Rajahs Mahdie, Mahmood, and Syed Masahoor, and the other being a new appointment of Tunku Dia Oodin as Governor of all his provinces, but with a proviso that he was to act in concert with Rajah Bot of Lookat and his brothers, Rajah Yaya and another. I was inclined to believe this addition to be owing to the presence of Rajah Yaya, the brother of Rajah Bot; and as I feared it would be likely to lead to fresh complications, I signalled to the "Teazer" to land again in force, which we did again in half-an-hour, though on this occasion in undress, but still fully armed.

28. On arriving, we were again met by the Sultan and escorted to our seats. I thanked him for the capture of the pirates and for outlawing the rebellious and piratical Rajahs, congratulated him on appointing Tunku Dia Oodin, but explained that the injunction to consult with Rajah Bot was not likely to work well, and that I preferred his renewing the full powers he had already acknowledged as genuine. His Highness at once acquiesced, and had fresh chops put on the instrument, which was then witnessed by Captain Blomfield and myself, and handed over by the Sultan in our presence to Tunka Dia Oodin.

29. The Sultan then gave over to me a very handsome pair of tusks, which he requested might be sent in his name and that of his three sons, Rajahs Moossa, Kahaar, and Yakoob, to Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen. His Highness also handed over to me about 1000 dollars' worth of tin belonging to Mahdie, which had been left by him when he fled after the "Rinaldo's" fire at Salangore, and which I brought down in the "Pluto."

30. I took occasion to say a few words to Tunku Dia Oodin before the Sultan and the assembled Chiefs, exhorting him to maintain good government and to open up his country, to which he replied suitably and well, and I have every confidence in his sincerity and his desire to improve his territory.

31. Everything being thus, as I trust your Excellency will think, satisfactorily settled, Captain Blomfield saluted the Sultan's flag, which he at once returned.

32. At daylight on the 23rd we weighed anchor, and were proceeding down the river when the native pilots took us over a sandbank, on which the "Teazer" grounded. She was immediately, in the most masterly manner, shored up by her lower yards, and in a few hours, with the falling tide, was high and dry. Soundings were taken all round, and it was found that they had brought us by the very shallowest passage, but advantage was at once taken of the occasion, and all hands were employed from both vessels in cleaning her bottom.

33. At 6 P.M. she floated, and we steamed down and anchored for the night.

34. I parted company with the "Teazer" on the 24th instant, and proceeded to Malacca, reported to Captain Shaw what had been done, took on board the pirates, and

arrived here yesterday afternoon. My very best thanks are due to Captain Blomfield, and the officers and men of Her Majesty's ship "Teazer," for the patient way in which they went through the trying work of exploring these rivers, and I have very little doubt that the entire success is owing to the determined attitude that by the presence of so large a party of armed men, it was in our power to assume.

35. To Captain Blomfield personally I am much indebted for much sound advice, which was always cheerfully given.

Mr. Irving proved a most valuable colleague; his extensive knowledge of the language was of great assistance, and his advice and suggestions were on several occasions of the utmost value to me.

36. This expedition has served to show me the absolute necessity of what I have so often urged, the appointment of a regular interpreter, and the Government can nowhere find a better than Mr. Ibrahim, whose services were kindly placed at my disposal by the Maharajah of Johore, and who so ably did all the work on this occasion.

37. All the three rivers up which we went are thoroughly practicable for some miles, and should, I would submit, be for some time regularly visited by some of our vessels. It also appears to me very important to explore the Birnam river, which is the boundary with Perak, and there Rajah Etam holds the Birnam stockade.

38. We intercepted some correspondence which showed that Mahdie would have got help from Perak, had not his brother ran off with the wife of the Rajah Muda, of that country.

39. It would also be desirable to send a vessel as soon as possible to visit Lookoot.

40. Tunku Dia Oodin begs that your Excellency will at once prohibit any arms or ammunition clearing from our ports for any part of his territory, except on his own special pass.

I have. &c.
(Signed) J. W. BIRCH, *Cotonial Secretary.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Mr. Birch to the Sultan of Salangore.

ABOUT the consultation that we had yesterday, we believe that we understood all that our friend said, and also that our friend understood all that we said.

Nevertheless, in order that hereafter there may be no misunderstandings, we think it proper to write down what was said, so that our friend may see it, and we shall show a copy of it to the Governor of the Colony.

First of all we ask our friend to give order to seize and deliver up the pirates and also the chiefs who supported them. We understood our friend now have seized six pirates and sent them to Malacca. We thank our friend for this. Now we beg our friend to give an order in writing to seize Rajah Mahdie, Rajah Mahmood, and Syed Masahoor and the others, so that we may take it with us, and show it to the chiefs who reside at Birnam, Salangore, Juram, Kallang, Lookat, Raga, and other places. Furthermore we begged of our friend to appoint one man whom the English Government could trust to act as our friend's Vakeel, and conduct the affairs of the whole country between Malacca and Perak, and we promised to assist our friend's Vakeel in case any of our friend's subjects ventured to dispute his authority.

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

The Sultan of Salangore to Mr. Birch.

(Translation.)
(After the usual compliments)

WE have received our friend's letter, and have become acquainted with its contents.

With regard to the three men, Rajah Mahdie, Syed Masahoor, and Rajah Mahmood, they are really evil persons, and are the ruin of our country.

If they are discovered in any place in our territory, our friend may capture them, and our men will assist him.

Dated July 22, 1871.

Inclosure 5 in No. 6.

Power given to Tunka Dia Oodin, by the Sultan.

(Translation.)

IN the year 1285, of the Hejirah of the Prophet, on whom be the peace and blessedness of God Most High, on the 5th day of the month Rabi-al-Awal, on Wednesday. Now of a truth on that date, We, the Sultan Abdul Samad, son of the late Tunku Abdullah, who occupies the throne of his Kingdom in the country of Salangore, the place of rejoicing, do give a declaration to Tunku Dia Oodin, the son of the late Sultan Zein al Rashid, who has become a son to us. And now we declare to all the Princes and Nobles, and all subjects who are under the jurisdiction of our country, that we give up the country with its dependencies to our son Tunku Dia Oodin, to govern and open up so as to bring it into proper order for us and for our sons, viz., Rajah Moosa, and Rajah Kahaar, and Rajah Yakoob, and for all the inhabitants of the country also, so that they may receive a course of justice in all matters. And our son Tunku Dia Oodin is empowered to do whatever may be effectual towards fostering our country and causing profit to us. No person must oppose our son's proceedings. And now we confirm as to this place Langkat, that it is our gift to our son Tunku Dia Oodin, to be the place where he should carry on our business as aforesaid. This is what is declared. The end of the ends.

This instrument was renewed and made over and delivered to Tunku Dia Oodin, in our presence at Langkat, the 22nd July, 1871.

(Signed) J. W. W. BIRCH.
B— W. BLOMFIELD, R.N.

No. 7.

Acting Governor Anson to the Earl of Kimberley.—(*Received September* 4.)

My Lord, *Government House, Singapore, July* 29, 1871.

IN continuation of my despatch of yesterday's date, I have now the honour to forward to your Lordship a Report by Mr. C. J. Irving, in reference to the late events at Salangore.

2. This Report is a continuation of that from the same gentleman which I forwarded to your Lordship with my despatch of the 14th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. E. H. ANSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Mr. C. J. Irving to Acting Governor Anson.

Sir, *Singapore, July* , 1871.

YOUR Excellency having been pleased to direct me to accompany Mr. Birch on the recent visit to the Salangore, Kallang, and Langkat Rivers, I have the honour to submit the following Report with reference to such of the occurrences as appear to bear on the present political position of the country.

2. In dealing with this Salangore question, I have always, as I believe your Excellency is aware, held a strong opinion that one of the first and most essential points to be attended to, was the bringing about of an interview between Tunku Dia Oodin and the Sultan of Salangore, and the verification of the document purporting to appoint the Tunku the Sultan's "Wakil Mutalak," or Agent, having full powers, which he has held now for three years,* but the authenticity of which has been disputed by Rajah Mahdie and his adherents. I felt, therefore, great satisfaction when, on the evening of Tuesday the 18th instant, we encountered in the Kallang Straits the vessel, the "Rainbow," in which the Tunku was proceeding towards Singapore with the view of meeting us. He immediately came on board the "Pluto," together with his principal native officer, an Arab of the name of Syed Zein; and I was glad to find that the confidence in the English Government, and the desire to act in conformity with its

* The document bears the date 5th Rabi-al-awal, 1285, answering to the 26th June, 1868.

views, which I had observed in him on previous occasions, seemed in no wise diminished. He was at once informed that some doubt had been thrown, by some of his opponents, on the authenticity of the powers he claimed from the Sultan. In reply, he expressed some indignation at the charge, and stated that he desired nothing better than that the English authorities should go to the Sultan and ascertain the truth of the matter for themselves; at the same time expressing his willingness to accompany the expedition.

3. On the following day, Wednesday the 19th, we proceeded to Salangore, where we found Her Majesty's ship "Teazer," Captain Blomfield, and after inspecting the ruins of the forts at the mouth, went up the river with the "Teazer" and "Pluto" some twelve or fourteen miles, and landed at one or two small kampongs there. The poor villagers appeared to be in a state of great terror at first, but on finding themselves kindly spoken to, they soon became reassured, and brought us cocoa-nuts, &c. All attempts, however, to get information from them as to the whereabouts of the Rajahs failed, as it was natural to expect. Probably they knew nothing of the matter, and if they did, they would be too much afraid of subsequent vengeance to say anything.

4. The poor people gave a miserable picture of the oppression that they suffered at the hands of the followers of the different Rajahs, and I have no doubt that in this respect every word that they said was true. They said that they were obliged to live "deam-deam," that is, very quietly and unobtrusively, that they dared not cultivate their lands, and had to exist on cocoa-nuts; and that even as it was, they were fired at and plundered, and abused. A suggestion that the English Government might step in and settle the country was received with a sort of gasp of satisfaction, the genuineness of which could not, I think, be doubted by any one having any acquaintance with these people.

5. And here I think I should insist on the importance that should be attached, in dealing with these native Malay States, to the wide distinction that exists between the ordinary villagers and the adherents of the Chiefs, the "humba Rajah," or "Rajah's slaves," as they are called. It is from this class alone, as I believe, that the committers of piracies and other atrocities are drawn. The villagers have nothing to do with the offenders beyond having to submit to their oppressions. A vivid picture of such a state of things, as existing in the Eastern States of Pahang, Tringanu, and Callantan, is to be found in an interesting account of a voyage to those countries in 18 by a native of Malacca named Abdullah,* and a very few inquiries served to convince me that the state of affairs in the Western States was equally lamentable. One man was pointed out to me (and the case was given merely as an illustration) as having quite recently perpetrated two of as horrible and cold-blooded murders as ever were heard of. On one occasion a poor villager, merely because he had declined to give his daughter to one of the "humba Rajah," was summoned down the river by the Rajah, and krissed at the landing-place by three of his adherents. The same Rajah was stated to have, on another occasion, krissed a woman with his own hand, and without a word of inquiry for being suspected of creating (so to speak) and having in her possession a "Pulong," a name that the Malays give to a horrible phantasy of theirs, a sort of "bottle-imp," which they believe can be let loose and made to take demoniacal possession of the enemies of its creator. Another Rajah was named to me as being in the habitual practice of taking away the villagers' daughters and distributing them among the "humba Rajah." My principal informant in these matters was Syed Zein. He wound up his account with what was, I think, a genuine burst of indignation. He said that such a state of things was as opposed to Mohammedan law as it was to English law; and that, in fact, there was no law and no justice at all in the land; and how, he asked, under such a state of things, could it be expected that the place would become a country?"

6. We left Salangore on Thursday the 20th, at 6 in the morning, taking with us two of the head men of the place, the "Tuan Busar," and the "Imaum," whom Tunku Dia Oodin wished to accompany the expedition with the view of showing the Sultan (as I understood) that he was not without influential adherents among the Salangore people. We arrived at Kallang about half-past 10, and there found Rajah Moosa, who had fled from Salangore after the first affair with the "Pluto" (when he gave up the junk to the police), and had made his way across country to Kallang. He seemed a young man of weak capacity and little influence, but being the Sultan's eldest son, his presence was of importance. Rajah Yakoob, the Sultan's third son, arrived the same evening from Penang in Tunku Dia Oodin's steamer, the "Fair Singapore." He is his father's favourite son, and at Tunku Dia Oodin's suggestion, he took a letter to the Sultan from Mr. Birch to announce our coming and prepare his

* He was the father of the Interpreter Ibrahim, who was employed on this occasion. I think your Excellency would find the work well worthy of a perusal.

father. On the following morning, Friday, the 21st, at 6 o'clock, we left Kallang Straits (having on the previous day visited Rajah Mahdie's old stockade at Pancallan Batu (on the Kallang River), and arrived at Lang at about half-past 10. At 2 o'clock we landed and proceeded to the Sultan's residence: Your Excellency's letter to the Sultan we found when we got to Salangore had not yet been delivered, and it was suggested that instead of sending it on shore, as was at first proposed, we should take it ourselves, and have it read in open Court. This course seemed desirable, as it was known that there were chiefs about the Sultan, notably one, Rajah Yaya, brother of Rajah Bot, of Lookat, who were supposed to be ill-affected to English interests, and by whom the true purport of the letter might not improperly be kept from the Sultan's knowledge. Accordingly, after Mr. Birch had explained the object of the visit, your Excellency's letter was read out by the Interpreter. It was listened to with great attention by the Sultan and the Chiefs, and by the Malays, who thronged in great numbers round the open audience-hall. Both during the reading of the letter and in the course of Mr. Birch's address to him, the Sultan expressed emphatically his disconnection with Rajah Mahdie and his proceedings, and gave the English Government free leave to take him and deal with him as they pleased. As regards the appointment of a proper Vicegerent for the country, which was the other main point, both in the letter and the address, the Sultan asked for time to consider the matter, and Mr. Birch gave him till 5 o'clock P.M. on the following day.

7. I should state that Mr. Birch, in the course of his address, produced the document referred to above (paragraph 2) as having been given by the Sultan to Tunku Dia Oodin, in 1868, and asked him distinctly whether the document was genuine or not, and the Sultan at once, and as distinctly, stated that it was. Mr. Birch then took occasion to say that, without in any way wishing to dictate to the Sultan, he might observe that the renewal of the authority given by that instrument to Tunku Dia Oodin, would be very acceptable to the English Government. After the letter was read, and the hour fixed for the receipt of an answer on the following day, we returned on board.

8. After our return, Mr. Birch mentioned to me that he was not altogether satisfied that sufficient stress had been laid, in the course of the interview, on the two main points, first, that the person to be Vice-Regent must be one whom our Government could approve; and secondly, that the authority to arrest Rajah Mahdie and the others should be addressed to the Sultan's own subjects, as well as to the English Government. I suggested that if there were any doubts on these points, they might be met by a letter to the Sultan recapitulating the principal points of the discussion, and accordingly such a letter was, on the following morning, Saturday the 22nd, drawn up, translated into Malay, and sent on shore. I should state here that, shortly before this, we heard verbally, that the Sultan's people had arrested six more of the Chinese pirates and sent them to Malacca, and that in the letter in question an acknowledgement of the fact was made to the Sultan. A list of Rajah Mahdie's partisans (those implicated in the piracy) was sent at the same time. See inclosures .

9. After the letter was dispatched we spent a few hours on shore at Bukit Jugree, (the "Parcelar Hill" of the charts,) and almost immediately after our return, at half-past 3 in the afternoon, two letters were received from the Sultan addressed to Mr. Birch. One of these letters, relating to the arrest of Mahdie and the others, we considered to be satisfactory. It is true that in the main it was an authority addressed to the English Government, rather than to the Sultan's own people; but there was a clause stating that the latter would assist in the work, which we thought would be quite sufficient, provided the question of the Vice-Regent was settled satisfactorily, and a person appointed who could be trusted to be anything but backward in giving effect to an order, however faintly expressed, directing him to deal with Mahdie and his adherents.

10. The second letter was a very curious and suggestive document. Tunku Dia Oodin had told me previously, that there was at Langkat a certain Rajah Yaya, one of the brothers of Rajah Bot of Lookoot, and that this man had great influence with the Sultan. In fact, he intimated to me that the Sultan was in a certain way under his hands, as, indeed, the poor, weak old man seems to be always under the hand of some one or other. It was, therefore, not a little amusing to find, that in the letter which was now received, and which purported to give powers as Vice-Regent to Tunku Dia Oodin, a clause was inserted to the effect that he was in all things to act, not with the Sultan's own sons, Moosa, Kahaar, and Yakoob, the Sultan's affection for whom cannot be doubted, but with Rajah Yaya, Rajah Bot, and Rajah Mejed, the other brother. The clause was obviously inadmissable, but Mr. Birch handed the

letter, without any expression of opinion to Tunku Dia Oodin, and asked him to take it away and consider it at his leisure. In a few minutes he returned, and pointed out that the letter professed to give him full powers, and distinctly threw upon him the responsibility for all acts done under his Government. "This," he said "is right and proper. I am quite willing to accept entire responsibility. But if I am to be responsible I must be free to act, and how can I be free to act if I must consult always these three men?"

11. The letter of appointment as it stood being, therefore, pronounced on all hands to be inadmissible, it was at first suggested that the original instrument granted 1868 should be copied out with the alteration of the date, and submitted to the Sultan for his seal; but it afterwards occurred to us that it would save time and be more satisfactory in several respects if the original instrument itself were re-executed and formally witnessed, with the proper date, by Mr. Birch and Captain Blomfield. This plan was finally adopted, and we then went on shore again, and Mr. Birch briefly explained the objections to the recent letter of appointment, and proposed the re-execution of the original document. The Sultan appeared, and I have no doubt really was extremely delighted with the idea, and at once sent for his seal, which was brought by Rajah Yaya. I should state that the seal which was brought and used in the first instance was not the great seal, similar to that put on the instrument in 1868, but the smaller seal that is used in the conduct of ordinary business. The difference at once caught my attention, as I happen to have had a conversation about the seals only the day before, and I pointed out the misunderstandings that were likely to arise from it, adding, at Mr. Birch's suggestion, that it was not that the English Government had any doubts as to the effectiveness of the smaller seal, but that evil-disposed persons might take advantage of the point hereafter to raise troublesome disputes. I believe that affair was a final ruse of Rajah Yaya's. If so, he bore his defeat with wonderful good temper, and brought the great seal, and prepared the paper that covers the impression with great equanimity. The document was thus stamped and witnessed and delivered to Tunku Dia Oodin, who thereupon kissed the Sultan's hand, and received the congratulations of those present. I must not omit to state that previously Mr. Birch had stated his full convictions that Tunku Dia Oodin would make use of his powers with full consideration for the rights of the Sultan's sons, and the other Rajahs; and the Tunku immediately stood up in silence, as a sign that he pledged himself accordingly.

12. Tunku Dia Oodin then raised the question as to what his title was to be. The Sultan was for postponing the question for future consideration; but Mr. Birch pointed out the inconvenience that would result if the Tunku had no distinctive title by which the English Government could address him, and I was appealed to to make a suggestion. I could have wished that Tunku Dia Oodin had raised the question before, so that it might have been properly considered. As it was, the only title that occurred to me as being safe to propose, as not involving troublesome territorial and constitutional questions, was that of "Wakil Yamtuam," or Sultan's Viceroy. The idea was received with general acclamation, but whether Tunku Dia Oodin was satisfied with it, I was not quite sure, and I forgot to speak to him on the subject afterwards.

13. We then took our leave; the Sultan presenting a pair of elephant's tusks for Her most gracious Majesty the Queen. It was noticeable that he particularly expressed his desire that Her Majesty should be informed that the offering came from his three sons—Rajah Moossa, Rajah Kahaar, and Rajah Yakoob—whose names, as I have pointed out above, were not so much as mentioned in the letter of appointments in which the names of Rajah Yaya and the others appeared.

14. On the following morning, Sunday the 23rd, we left Langkat at half-past 6 in the morning and anchored at Kallang Straits at half-past 7 in the evening, having been delayed some six or seven hours through the "Teazer" getting aground on a sandbank. At Kallang we parted with Tunku Dia Oodin, who it was arranged should accompany the "Teazer" in his own steamer the "Fair Singapore" to Salangore. The "Pluto" left Kallang at 7 o'clock A.M., and after calling at Malacca, and taking on board the six pirates referred to above (paragraph 8), arrived at Singapore on the afternoon of Tuesday the 25th.

15. In the course of the five days they were on board the "Pluto," I had repeated conversations with Tunku Dia Oodin and Syed Zein, on the subject of the recent history and future prospects of the Salangore territories. As regards the former I found that the Memorandum which I drew up on the subject on the instant contains some inaccuracies, which I propose to correct in a separate paper. In the mean time I annex a Genealogical Table (Inclosure 3) of the Sultan's family which will serve to show the relationship amongst most of the persons concerned. It will be seen

from that, and from inclosure , that I was wrong in thinking that Rajah Mahmood was the same person as Rajah Hitam of Burnam; that Rajah Sijah (not Sidah) is the cousin and wife's sister of the Sultan, and not his own sister; and that Rajah Sleyman (who was killed at Kallang), was not, as I supposed, the Rajah of Lookoot, but of Sungai Raya, close to the Malacca frontier. The Rajah of Lookoot, Rajah Bot, is a rival, if not a declared enemy, of Tunku Dia Oodin instead of a friend, as I thought.

16. As regards the future prospects of the country, Tunku Dia Oodin said that, now that the English Government had pronounced itself on his side, he felt no doubt whatever of his power soon to establish his authority over the whole country. When this was done, he said that it was his wish to establish a regular system for the collection of the revenue and administration of justice in the several Rivers. For this purpose he stated that he should require the services of European officers. I represented this to Mr. Birch, and, with his concurrence, I told him that we thought that he had been singularly fortunate in his choice of the two principal European officers at present in his service, M. Langlois and M. de Fontaine, but that he should bear in mind the danger that he ran, if he trusted entirely to his own judgment in such a matter, of getting into his service men who might prove inefficient, or even positively harmful, and urged him, in case he found himself in a position to offer suitable remuneration to Europeans, to apply to the Colonial Government for its advice and assistance in selecting them. He promised to take the matter into consideration, and I think that a communication from him about it may be shortly expected. I also advised him to endeavour to get a clear insight into the state of his finances, to draw up a statement of his outstanding liabilities, and frame a rough estimate of his revenue and expenditure, and said that, either privately or officially, I should be very happy to give him any advice or information that might suggest itself to me. I think that on this point, too, a communication from him may be expected.

17. If the Tunku succeeds in these two points, and places his Finances and the Administration of Justice on a sound footing, I think that the prosperity of this country may be considered as assured. It is a magnificent territory, with a fine soil and great mineralogical resources. It is watered and opened up by fine navigable rivers, which run up within easy distances of the richest tin districts. It wants only security for life and property, and a few easily-constructed roads to make it burst into exuberant life. In the few months that have elapsed since one river, the Kallang, has been pacificated, no less than three thousand Chinese have flocked to the mines there. When the Salangore and the other rivers are similarly opened, a rush of population to the gold and tin districts watered by them may, I think, be most confidently expected. Johore, with not a tithe of the resources of Salangore, has become a thriving and opulent state,—and why? Simply because the East Indian Government selected the most intelligent of the Native Chiefs, the present Maharajah, and supported him by their advice and their influence. How it is that, with such an example existing, the States of Salangore, Perak, and Penang (to the north of these, the Peninsula is more or less under Siam) should have been abandoned to a state savagery, is, I venture most respectfully to submit, a lamentable and almost inexplicable circumstance.

18. I have only to express, in conclusion, the gratification that I feel at finding that the high opinion which I had formed, and which I had so often expressed, of the intelligence and honesty of purpose of Tunku Dia Oodin is confirmed by the judgment of Mr. Birch, and, as I believe, also by that of Captain Blomfield.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. J. IRVING, *Auditor-General.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Rajah Mahdie's Partisans.

IMPLICATED IN THE PIRACY.

Tunku Punglima Rajah, otherwise Rajah Burkat.
Syed Masahoor.
Rajah Mahmood, son of Rajah Burkat.
Syed Yaya, Rajah of Tumyung.
Syed Yaya, of Linggi.
Istana Rajah, a stranger from Sumatra.
Hadgi Mahomed, son of Hadji Isahak, of Pulo Penang.
Rajah Isa, of Salangore.
Rajah Ali, of Juram.

NOT IMPLICATED IN THE PIRACY.

Rajah Bot, of Lookoot.
Rajah Yaya, his brother.
Rajah Mejed ditto
Rajah Hitam, of Burnam.

Note.—None of the above (I believe) are relations of the Sultan, except Rajah Mahdie himself, and Rajah Bot and his brothers. See Inclosures B.

Note.—It was believed at Salangore that, after the bombardment, Rajah Mahdie had gone to Burnam; Rajah Burkat to Lookoot; Syed Masahoor up to Salangore River into the jungle; Rajah Mahmood to the jungle at the back of Permettang (not far from the forts on the right bank of the river).

It was reported that Mahdie had fled before the bombardment; Syed Masahoor gave in next; and that it was Mahmood who stood out to the last. It was from his stockade that the fire was opened on Lieutenant Maude's party.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Genealogical Table of the Royal Family of Salangore,

SULTAN IBRAHIM, Signer of Treaty of 1825.

Sultan Mahomed (died 1858).				Tunku Abdullah (died before his brother).		
R. Fleyman.*	R. Lijah (woman).	R. (woman).	R. Unjung (woman) married	Sultan Abdul Sumud	married	other wives.
Concubine (gundik).	R. Dowlah.†	R. Jumaat.†				
R. Mahdie.*	R. Abdulrahman.	R. Bot of Lookat.‡	Rajah Moossa.	R. Kahaar.	R. Yakoob.	Wife of Tunku Dia Oodin.

* Anak Gundik; *i.e.*, son by a concubine.

† Rajahs Dowlah and Jumaat came from Rhio. Dowla's son, by another wife, is Rajah Ismail. There was another brother named Rajah Hussein, whose son, R. Sleyman of Sungai Raya, was shot at Kallang, and succeeded by his brother, R. Dowd.

‡ Rajah Bot's brothers are R. Yaya and Rajah Mejed.

No. 8.

The Earl of Kimberley to Acting Governor Anson.

Sir, *Downing Street, September* 26, 1871.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of the 28th and 29th July last, forwarding letters from Mr. Birch, the Colonial Secretary, and Mr. Irving, the Auditor-General, reporting the result of their mission to the Sultan of Salangore, accompanied by Her Majesty's ship "Teazer," for the purpose of procuring the surrender of the remaining pirates who seized the Chinese junk, and murdered the crew and passengers, and of obtaining from the Sultan security that pirates should not be harboured at Salangore, or allowed to occupy forts there.

It is satisfactory to learn from the clear and interesting accounts given by Mr. Birch and Mr. Irving, that the result of their mission has been so completely successful, and that not only have the remaining pirates been surrendered, but that assurances have been given by the Sultan that he will use his best endeavours to prevent piracy in his dominions in future.

I am glad to be able to approve your proceedings in sending this mission, and the manner in which your instructions were executed.

Mr. Birch appears to have conducted a difficult negotiation with ability, and to have been efficiently supported by Mr. Irving, and Captain Blomfield, who commanded the "Teazer." I have requested the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to convey to Captain Blomfield my thanks for the ready assistance he gave to the Colonial Government.

In ordinary circumstances the proper course would have been to make formal application in the first instance to the Sultan for redress for the outrage committed at Salangore, and not to have resorted to force unless the Sultan failed to execute the Treaty, and to make due reparation. But as it appears from the papers before me, that the Chiefs in possession of the Government at Salangore were in rebellion against the Sultan's authority, and that the Sultan has expressed his satisfaction at your proceedings, I am not disposed to question the course you pursued. I need scarcely, however, observe that, in dealing with native States, care should always be taken that all means of obtaining redress by peaceful means are exhausted before measures of coercion are employed.

I trust that Tunku Dia Oodin, who has been appointed to the Government of Salangore, will fulfil the expectations formed of him, and that in future the obligations of our Treaty with the Sultan will be duly executed by the Salangore authorities.

I observe that Mr. Birch, in the concluding paragraph of his letter to the Sultan, speaks of assistance to be given to the Sultan Vakeel in case his authority is disputed, I conclude that this referred to general countenance and support, and that no promise of material assistance was given by Mr. Birch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 9.

The War Office to the Colonial Office.—(Received September 7.)

Sir, *War Office, September* 4, 1871.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the accompanying copy of a letter from the officer commanding the troops in the Straits' Settlements, reporting that two expeditions had been formed against piratical strongholds in the Malay Peninsula.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. E. STORKS.

Inclosure in No. 9.

Colonel Phillipps to the Adjutant-General to the Forces.

Head-Quarters, Straits Settlements, Singapore,
Sir, *July* 14, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that on the 4th instant the force named in the margin left Penang,* under Lieutenant-Colonel Shortland, 19th Regiment, M.N.I., to act with Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," against a pirate stronghold in the Salangore River, in the Malay Peninsula; no report has been received as yet from Lieutenant-Colonel Shortland.

One gunner, 2nd Brigade Royal Artillery, died from sunstroke; full particulars will be sent by next mail.

A force, as per margin,† left Singapore on the 5th July, for a similar purpose, and returned on the 9th idem without landing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) PAUL W. PHILLIPPS.

No. 10.

The Admiralty to the Colonial Office.—(Received September 7.)

Admiralty, September 7, 1871.
Sir,

WITH reference to my letter of the 28th ultimo, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, copies of a further letter No. 3 of the 28th July, and its inclosures, from the Commander of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," in regard to the expedition undertaken against pirates at Salangore.

I am, &c.
(Signed) THOS. WOLLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Commander Robinson, R.N., to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

"Rinaldo," Singapore, July 28, 1871.
Sir,

I BEG to report the perfectly successful termination of the Salangore affair; their Lordships would like to be acquainted with such a result without delay.

2. Her Majesty's ship "Teazer" having returned from Batavia, was dispatched to Salangore on the 15th instant; a copy of the Administrator's letter requesting her assistance, and a copy of Commander Blomfield's orders, are inclosed.

3. The Colonial steamer "Pluto" (draught 7 feet, horse-power 80), having returned from Penang on the 6th, started on the 17th with the Honourable the Colonial Secretary, to join the "Teazer," both vessels were then to proceed to the River Kallang, a Colony about forty miles to the southward, where the Colonial Secretary was to obtain an interview with the Sultan of Salangore, who resides there. The territory of Salangore extends from Malacca to Perak, a distance of about 130 miles.

4. The "Pluto" returned on the 26th, the Sultan having yielded to all the demands the Colonial Secretary was instructed to make on behalf of the Government of the Straits' Settlements.

5. The demands were, 1st, the surrender of the six pirates concerned in the capture

* Royal Artillery: 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 1 trumpeter, 1 rank and file.—19th Regiment Madras Native Infantry: 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 subudar, 1 jemudar, 5 havildars, 105 rank and file, 1 bugler, 2 bherietics, 1 lascar.

† 11th Regiment Madras Native Infantry: 1 assistant-surgeon, 1 subudar, 4 havildars, 25 rank and file, 1 bugler, 2 bherietics, 1 lascar.

of the junk, and the murder of thirty-four of her people. The pirates were brought back by the "Pluto."

6. 2ndly. The acknowledgment that the Rajahs at Salangore had acted without authority. The Sultan said they were pirates and rebels; that he would have Rajah Mahdie, Rajah Mahmood, and others seized and punished, and that they had acted altogether without his authority.

7. 3rdly. The appointment of a Rajah at Salangore, who would keep order. Tunku Dia Oodin has been appointed with full power, who is very friendly to the English.

8. The question of indemnity was not raised, as the Sultan entirely repudiated the acts of the Rajahs at Salangore, who were, in fact, rebels till their power was broken by the destruction of the forts by the "Rinaldo." The Sultan was represented to be an imbecile opium-smoker; this seems a mistake, for the Colonial Secretary found him very astute, and in the full possession of all his faculties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE ROBINSON.

P.S.—The "Teazer" and "Pluto" explored the River of Salangore for a distance of fifteen miles from the mouth.

G. R.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Acting Governor Anson to Commander Robinson.

Sir. *Government House, Singapore, July* 14, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to request that you will be good enough to allow Her Majesty's ship "Teazer" to convey a letter from me to the Sultan of Salangore, at Langkat, and then to proceed on to Salangore to observe the present state of things, and what has occurred there since Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" left.

I would also suggest that it would be well that the "Teazer" should, if possible, explore the Salangore River above the forts which the "Rinaldo" engaged on her late visit to that place.

It is my intention to send the "Pluto" to Langkat as soon as possible after her return to Singapore, and it would be well if the "Teazer' could remain in the neighbourhood examining the coast and endeavouring to obtain some information concerning the movements of the pirates, until you can communicate further instructions to Commander Blomfield by that Government vessel.

I shall, after receiving an answer to my letter, send a Government officer, and probably also proceed myself to meet the Sultan, to endeavour to arrange matters connected with the future Government of Salangore, and it would be very desirable that a man-of-war should be present on that occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. E. H. ANSON.

Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

Memorandum.

"*Rinaldo,*" *Singapore, July* 14, 1871.

YOU will lose no time when ready for sea, in proceeding to Salangore, using coal as economically as possible on your way.

The object of your cruize is to prevent Rajah Mahdie from returning to Salangore. and to support by your presence the friendly Malays who were left in possession on the 8th instant.

You will not attack any fresh place without a requisition from the Colonial Government. If it should be ascertained that the six pirates still at large are being protected by Rajah Mahdie, the proper course is for the Colonial Government to represent

the fact to the Sultan, who is bound by Treaty to give them up. Should the Sultan confess his inability to control Mahdie, it will then remain for the Colonial Government to demand the assistance of a man-of-war.

It would be advisable to explore the river of Salangore as far as practicable, but not unless the "Pluto" is in company to render assistance in the event of your getting ashore.

Armed proas of a suspicious nature in that river you can capture.

Should you be fired upon when on this service, you must act according to your best judgment. Boats should on no account be sent out of sight of the ship, and your men should on no account be exposed to jungle fighting.

I shall expect you to return here in a fortnight or three weeks.

(Signed) GEORGE ROBINSON, *Commander.*

Commander Blomfield, R.N.,
Her Majesty's ship "Teazer."

No. 11.

The Colonial Office to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Downing Street, September* 28, 1871.

WITH reference to your letter of the 7th instant I am directed by the Earl of Kimberley to transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a despatch from the Officer Administrating the Government of the Straits Settlements, with copy of a letter from Mr. Birch, the Colonial Secretary, reporting the result of his mission to the Sultan of Salangore, on which occasion he was accompanied by Her Majesty's ship "Teazer."*

I am to request that you will move the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to convey to Captain Blomfield Lord Kimberley's thanks for the ready assistance he gave to the Local Government on this occasion.

I am further to suggest, for their Lordships' consideration, that Salangore and the other creeks and rivers of this portion of the Malay peninsula, should be visited by one of Her Majesty's ships as frequently as may be consistent with the other requirements of the naval service. In Lord Kimberley's opinion such occasional visits are very desirable, in order to check any disposition towards piracy in those waters.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. H. MEADE.

No. 12.

Acting Governor Anson to the Earl of Kimberley.—(*Received September* 11.)

My Lord, *Government House, Singapore, July* 28, 1871.

IN connection with my despatch of 14th July, 1871, I have the honour to forward to your Lordship a corrected return of the guns and ammunition found in the forts at Salangore, furnished by Lieutenant-Colonel Shortland, who commanded the troops on the late expedition to that place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. E. H. ANSON.

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* No. 6.

Inclosure in No. 12.

RETURN of Guns, &c., found in the Upper and Lower Ports on the Salangore River, on the 6th July, 1871.

Description.	No.	Remarks.
Upper Fort:—		
Guns—Iron on carriages	2	24-pounders.
Ditto, ditto	9	Various calibre.
Ditto, iron dismounted	1	24-pounders.
Ditto, ditto	1	
Ditto, burst	1	
Dltto, brass dismounted	1	18-pounder, stamped arms, 1604.
Ditto, ditto, swivel	2	Would throw a 2-lb. ball.
Gunpowder (kegs)	200	Rough calculation, 20-lb. kegs, French manufacture,
Lower Fort:—		
Guns—Iron	13	24-pounders, and various calibre.
Ditto, ditto	3	Found on slope of hill. Muzzles pointed to river.

(Signed) VINCENT SHORTLAND, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding the Troops.*

Penang, July 10, 1871.

No. 13.

Acting Governor Anson to the Earl of Kimberley.—(*Received September* 25.)

My Lord, *Government House, August* 7, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Sultan of Salangore has sent me a pair of elephant's tusks, with a request that they may be forwarded to Her Majesty the Queen in the name of himself and his three sons, as mentioned by Mr. Birch, the Colonial Secretary, in his Report attached to my despatch of the 28th July last.

2. I shall be glad of instructions from your Lordship as to the disposal of these tusks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. E. H. ANSON.

No. 14.

The Earl of Kimberley to Acting Governor Anson.

Sir, *Downing Street, October* 6, 1871.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 7th August, I have to request you to forward to this country the pair of elephant's tusks which the Sultan of Salangore desires to present to Her Majesty in his own name and those of his three sons. I will then submit them for Her Majesty's acceptance.

As regards the 1,000 dollars' worth of tin stated to been handed over by the Sultan to the Colonial Secretary, I should be glad to learn whether this was intended as compensation to the owners of the vessel which has been seized by the pirates, or on what other ground it was accepted, and how it has been disposed of.

I have, &c.
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 15.

The Admiralty to the Colonial Office.

Sir. *Admiralty, October* 12, 1871.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Kimberley, extracts of a letter from Vice-

Admiral Sir Henry Kellett, dated the 2nd August, No. 255, from Yokohama, expressing his approval of the conduct of the officers and crew of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," on the occasion of the expedition against Malay pirates at Salangore.

I am, &c.

(Signed) VERNON LUSHINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 15.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

(Extract.) "*Salamis*," *at Yokohama, August* 2, 1871.

COMMANDER GEORGE ROBINSON, of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," has transmitted to me, under date 10th July, a Report of his proceedings against pirates at Salangore, a duplicate of which, he acquaints me, he has forwarded direct to you, for the information of the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty.

As their Lordships are already in possession of all the details of this expedition, it will be unnecessary for me to say more than that, from a professional point of view, I have every reason to regard Commander Robinson's proceedings, and the conduct of all under his command, and all associated with him, with unqualified approval.

The question of the propriety of the initiation of this expedition, by the Government of Singapore, is also before their Lordships, and will therefore require no comments from me.

My opinion, however, is, that no action should be less energetic and decisive, to rid the sea of intolerable and merciless Malayan pirates, than that adopted by Commander Robinson.

I desire that their Lordships will be good enough to cause it to be made known to Her Majesty the Queen that I was deeply touched with her gracious solicitude in telegraphing to inquire for the wounded.

No. 16.

Acting Governor Anson to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received November 27.)

My Lord, *Government House, Singapore, October* 19, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, of 6th September, 1871, regarding the Salangore piracy case.

2. Your Lordship appears to be under the impression that I sent the Colonial steamer "Pluto" with a party of armed police to attack a stronghold of pirates known to exist at Salangore, and, under that impression, very justly blames me for having done so.

3. The facts of the case, however, were as follow:—I received the Report of the capture of the junk and the murder of all the passengers on board by the hands of one of the owners, who had been sent down by the Acting Lieutenant-Governor of Penang to communicate personally with me on the subject.

4. This Chinaman came to the Government House late on Sunday afternoon, and informed me that he had on his way down the Straits seen his junk sailing along inshore to the south of the "Torch" light-ship; that, being far off, he could not see the hull, but knew the junk by the sails, one of them being new and white.

5. As this was about ten days after the junk had left Penang, and there were many other junks constantly about that part of the Straits, I put very little credence in this man's story.

6. However, I asked him where he thought the junk had gone, and he replied either to the Dindings or some place south of that down the coast towards Malacca, or else to Delhi, in Sumatra, or some place south on that coast.

7. There had been from time to time complaints of petty piracies along the Malay coast, but it was always supposed that they were committed by small gangs of Malays of bad character, and there was no knowledge of any organized gang of pirates.

8. Merchants of Penang and Singapore traded with Salangore, but they appear to have had no suspicion that the Fort there was occupied with any view to piratical purposes, as they made no communication to this Government concerning it.

9. A war had been going on in Salangore between Rajah Mahdie and Tunku Dia Godin (on behalf of the Sultan), and the former had been turned out of his stockade in Kallang Straits by the latter, but this Government was not aware that Mahdie

had fortified himself at Salangore, or that there were any guns, or even a fort at that place until the "Pluto" went there in search of the junk.

10. The last case of piracy which had occurred was that in which, about nine months ago, Captain Grey, of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Algerine," captured the thirty-nine pirates, who were afterwards tried by the late Chief Justice Sir Benson Maxwell at Malacca. This case originated also in the Kallang war, but the persons engaged in it were some of Tunku Dia Oodin's men whom he had enlisted in Quedah to assist him in his attack on Rajah Mahdie's stockade, and who, finding the war over after the stockade was taken, stole some of the Tunku's boats, turned pirates, and seized a small vessel belonging to Penang. These pirates were found at one of the Sumbilan Islands by Captain Grey, but when captured never made the slightest attempt at resistance.

11. My own opinion was that a few bad characters from Perak, some, perhaps, of those who had from time to time committed gang robberies in Province Wellesley, having grown confident, had extended their operations in this new form to Penang and taken possession of the junk.

12. I considered it almost certain that they would have taken the junk to some out-of-the-way place up one of the rivers or creeks, and after securing the money and valuables, have abandoned or more probably scuttled or burnt it.

13. I confess I never myself expected that the junk or the pirates who seized it would be heard of again; at the same time I considered it right to do what I could, not only in the interest of the persons concerned in the case in hand, but also with the object of letting it be understood along the coasts that cases of this nature would certainly be investigated with the object of bringing to justice the perpetrators of such crimes.

14. The first thing, then, to be done was to obtain tidings of the junk before all traces of it or of the cargo were made away with. In order to do this, it was necessary, without delay to search the whole of the two coasts, on each side of the Straits south of Laroot, on the Malayan side, and of Delhi on the Sumatran side.

15. For such a purpose a vessel like the "Rinaldo," drawing 15 feet 6 inches of water, was quite useless. I therefore ordered the "Pluto," which vessel draws only 6 feet of water, to start for Malacca as early as possible the next morning, to take on board a sufficient number of armed police (no gun was put on board) for her protection, or that of the boats when employed in making inquiries on shore, to proceed, keeping as close to the land as possible, to the entrance of Kallang Straits, the first place where it was supposed any tidings were likely to be heard of the missing junk, and then to continue on up the coast to the Dindings, sending off boats to any vessel, boat, or canoe that might be fallen in with, or to any house or person that might be seen on shore to make inquiries.

16. I did not consider it likely, should the junk be found, and some of the pirates be still lurking near it, that any attempt would be made to interfere with the steamer with armed men on board. I had, therefore, directed the Captain of the "Pluto," should he fall in with the junk, if possible, to take possession of it.

17. Neither I nor any one else contemplated that the junk would be found with some of the pirates on board, being openly plundered in a considerable place like Salangore.

18. Had there been the least reason to suppose that it would be found in any particular place, and under such circumstances, I should certainly have requested the Captain of the "Rinaldo" to go there at once, and should have communicated with the Ruler of the country requesting his assistance.

19. In defence of the action taken by Inspector Cox and Captain Bradberry, it must be remembered that they were not prepared to find the junk under such circumstances; and that they communicated with the Representative of the Sultan at Salangore (to the Sultan as well as to Tunku Dia Oodin I sent letters by Captain Bradberry in the event of his requiring assistance from either of them), who received them very kindly, and gave them encouragement and assistance in recovering the goods that were in the shops, and in removing them down to the beach for the purpose of being shipped on board the "Pluto."

20. At first everything appeared favourable to the restoration of the property to the owner, who was on board the steamer, and everything was conducted in a friendly manner until Rajahs Mahdie, Mahmood, and Syed Masahoor, with their followers, suddenly interfered.

21. The three pirates captured on shore were taken by the followers of the Representative of the Sultan (and by his orders), assisted by Inspector Cox and some of his men, and the fourth pirate, who ran away and was chased by Inspector Cox, was more-

over pointed out to him by the officers of the Sultan's Government, who also assisted in the chase for his recapture.

22. Your Lordship will now, I think, see that it was never anticipated that any engagement would take place with pirates, and that the "Pluto" was only sent as a convenient vessel to try and obtain tidings of the missing junk, and if possible to bring it back; and further, to endeavour to obtain such information as would afterwards enable the pirates to be traced and captured through the instrumentality of the Ruler of the country in which they might have taken refuge.

23. There was, as I have already stated, no reason to suppose there was any organized system of piracy in the Straits, no such case as the present having occurred for many years, and this one may be considered as resulting only from the Kallang war.

24. The steamers belonging to this Colony under the Indian Administration were, I have always understood, specially provided for the suppression of piracy in the Straits; and it is, I believe, almost entirely by their means that piracy, once so rife in these waters, was put down.

25. I trust your Lordship may consider this explanation satisfactory, and that your Lordship will acquit me of having taken so imprudent a course as to send the "Pluto," with a small party of police, armed with very old and inefficient carbines, to attack a piratical stronghold instead of requesting the services of a man-of-war for that purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. E. H. ANSON.

No. 17.

The Earl of Kimberley to Acting Governor Anson.

Sir, *Downing Street, December* 9, 1871.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 19th October, stating the reasons which induced you to send the colonial steamer "Pluto" to Salangore.

The explanation you have now furnished is satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 18.

Acting Governor Anson to the Earl of Kimberley.—(*Received November* 27.)

My Lord, *Government House, Singapore, October* 24, 1871.

SINCE writing my despatch of 19th instant, relative to the Salangore piracy case, I have seen the letter of Sir Benson Maxwell in the "Times."

2. I think the previous correspondence on this subject must have satisfied your Lordship that there was no intention on the part of this Government to wage war upon, or to interfere injuriously with the country of Salangore; but that, on the contrary, the question at issue was treated as purely one of piracy, and that this Government, when it was found that the junks and pirates were at Salangore, co-operated with the Sultan's officers, under the direction of Rajah Moosa, the Sultan's son and Representative, in capturing some of the actual perpetrators of the crime on board the stolen junk; and that Captain Robinson afterwards punished the rebellious Rajahs and their followers who had interfered to support the pirates against the authority of the Sultan, and who had fired upon the officers and men of the "Rinaldo."

3. It was particularly with the object of making it clear that this Government acknowledged the kind assistance rendered, as far as he was able, by the Sultan's Representative at Salangore, that I sent the present of a handsomely-finished gilt revolver to Rajah Moosa by the hands of Mr. Birch.

4. I regretted, however, to hear from Mr. Birch, on his return, that he had been so peremptory in his manner to the Sultan when arranging about the appointment of a proper Governor for Salangore, and I expressed to Mr. Birch my disapprobation of this on his return.

5. There is no doubt that the arrangement the Sultan was proposing, namely, to

appoint another Rajah very little better than Mahdie himself, to govern jointly with Tunku Dia Oodin, would have been a most unwise measure, and one from which nothing but the worst results could have been anticipated.

6. The proverbial dilatoriness and "shilly shallying" of the Malays may, however, in a great measure, be taken in justification of Mr. Birch's active and vigorous opposition to it; but still it is a pity that, under the circumstances, an empty threat should have been made when, in all probability, patience and perseverence would have gained the same object.

7. I was much pressed to call upon the Sultan for an indemnity, but I could see no sort of excuse for doing so, as I did not consider he was in any way responsible for the acts of Rajah Mahdie, who had injured the trade of Salangore quite as much as that of this Colony, and because he was as much interested in the overthrow of Mahdie as was this Government.

8. There is a statement made by Sir Benson Maxwell in his letter, that three of the crew of the junk survived and escaped to Penang. This is incorrect: the only person whose life was spared was the steersman, who was found on board the junk at Salangore, and was included among the six pirates captured there.

9. The information regarding the missing junk was brought to Penang by a Chinaman from Laroot, and was merely to the effect that there was a rumour, that the junk had been taken by pirates and the passengers and crew murdered.

This is of little importance, but I mention it in order that your Lordship may have exact information on all particulars connected with this affair.

10. Sir Benson Maxwell has also fallen into the error which I have elsewhere explained, that it was known that the pirates were at Salangore, and that the "Pluto" was sent there direct with a letter requesting their extradition.

11. With regard to Sir Benson Maxwell's statement, that the police "had no more right to do such an act there, than a French police agent has to arrest a communist in the streets of London," putting aside the absurdity of the comparison, I presume it could hardly be objected to, that if a nobleman came up to interfere with the Government official who had just handed over the Communist to the French police agent in the streets of London, and assisted the Communist to escape, the police agent would be justified in assisting the Government officials in running after and recapturing him; and this corresponds with what was really done by the police at Salangore.

12. It was evident, after the "Pluto's" visit to Salangore, that we had to deal with pirates in Rajahs Mahdie and Mahmood and Syed Masahoor, and that the Government of Salangore were powerless to assist us. Nevertheless, Captain Robinson endeavoured to treat with these people, and it was only after his men had been treacherously fired upon and several of them dangerously wounded, that Captain Robinson treated them as pirates and punished them as they deserved.

13. I annex a copy of a letter received from Captain Robinson who has just returned from St. Paul's Island and Australia, where he went to the assistance of Her Majesty's ship "Megæra."

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. E. H. ANSON.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Commander Robinson to Acting Governor Anson.

Sir, "*Rinaldo*," *Singapore, October* 24, 1871.

A LETTER from Sir Benson Maxwell having been published in the "Times," I beg leave to make one or two remarks upon it, in case it should receive any support at home.

1. During the "bombardment" of Salangore not more than a dozen shot fell into the town, the fire being directed at the forts.

2. On the 4th July, when the place was burnt down, there was not a creature in it. Some houses on the north side of the river, upon which a white flag had been hoisted, were spared.

3. The 100 or 200 dead bodies which Sir Benson Maxwell takes upon the authority of an unnamed newspaper had no reality. No one on board the "Rinaldo" saw more than five dead bodies during the whole time we were at Salangore.

4. The war proas are called "piratical" by me because they sided with the pirates, and fired upon the "Rinaldo" while the ship was returning the fire from the forts. No harm was done to the other proas lying in the river.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE ROBINSON.

No. 19.

The Earl of Kimberley to Acting Governor Anson.

Sir, *Downing Street, December* 6, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 24th of October, commenting on a letter addressed by Sir B. Maxwell to the "Times" newspaper on the 9th of September, in reference to the Salangore piracy case.

I have, &c.
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 20.

The Admiralty to the Colonial Office.—(*Received December* 4.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December* 2, 1871.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Kimberley, a letter from Commander Bloomfield of Her Majesty's ship "Teazer," dated at Penang the 6th August last, reporting his proceedings at Salangore, in completing the destruction of the fort and guns recently captured by the "Rinaldo," also reporting the state of affairs at that place.

2. Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett, in a letter dated the 18th September, has expressed his entire approval of the conduct of Commander Bloomfield and his Officers on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) THOS. WOLLEY.

P.S.—It is requested that the inclosures to this letter may be returned when done with.

T. W.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Commander Bloomfield to Commander Robinson.

Sir, "*Teazer*," *Penang, August* 6, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of my arrival at Salangore on 17th July. I found at anchor a schooner of the Tunku dia Oodin, in charge of Mr. Pennyfather, who, in conjunction with a Malay, Tunku Chi, was acting for Tunku dia Oodin and holding the forts with about 150 men. They were under no immediate apprehension of being attacked by Rajah Mahdie, who with Rajah Mahmood and Seyd Masahoor, had not been heard of since the departure of Rinaldo. Raja Moossa was reported to be gone to Kallang. Tunku dia Oodin was expected to arrive from Penang in a day or two with an additional force.

Some guns had been unspiked and put in position in the forts for the defence of the Tunku's men, and I did not deem it advisable to deprive them of this means of holding their position until my return from Langkat. I found that Tunku Chi had detained and taken away the rudders of several Straits' trading prahus, with passes under English and Dutch colours at anchor off the town, and after sending Tunku Chi with an officer and an interpreter to each vessel to examine them, I directed him to return the rudders and release the vessels, which he did. Being unable to obtain any information about the Salangore river, Mr. Barrett, Navigating Sub-Lieutenant, volunteered to sound it, with the aid of Mr. Pennyfather, and they having returned with satisfactory accounts of its depth, I arranged to proceed up it shortly after low

water on the following day, (19th), and Her Majesty's ship "Pluto," arriving on that morning with the Colonial Secretary and Mr. Irving and Tunku dia Oodin. She followed me up the river to a mile or two above Campong Quedah, which is on the left bank, about 11 miles from the mouth, when finding that I should scarcely have time to get out of the river before dark after visiting the Campong with Mr. Birch, I returned to Salangore. The river gradually narrows from about 200 yards in breadth for the first 4 miles to about 70 yards at the Campong: it is very tortuous, with a flat country on either side, nearly on a level with high water-mark, and bordered as far as I went with continuous Nipa and Mangrove; occasionally we passed a house or two with boats hauled up amongst the Nipa. White flags were displayed at all these, and the natives seemed to be in the greatest terror, either running away or showing themselves unarmed, as did all those with whom we had an interview at the Campong.

At Campong Parrang, which is on the right bank and nearly opposite to Quedah, there is a rather strong stockade, not visible from the river, with one old gun in it; the village itself is on a much larger scale than the others, which consist for the most part of from six to a dozen houses, with small cocoa-nut plantations.

Rajah Taffa, a relative and friend of Moossa, is the recognized Chief. The spring tide was running very strong, with a rise and fall of at least 15 feet, which necessitated speed in turning the bends and care in anchoring, there being scarcely room to turn between the banks; some of the former are almost complete circles, so that on an average it is probable we advanced in a direct line about a third of the distance traversed, which was estimated both way by patent log. The morning of the 20th I steamed, in company with the "Pluto," up the Colony Strait to Qualla, the mouth of the Kallang River, where I left the "Pluto" at anchor, and proceeded up the river with the Colonial Secretary, and anchored just below Pângallan Botu, the stockade, late of Rajah Mahdie, on the left bank of the river, about ten miles from Qualla. On landing we found the stockade to be in charge of a Mr. de Fontaine, in the service of Tunku dia Oodin, and formerly a midshipman in the French Navy. He appeared to be able and energetic, and with a handful of men and two 18-pounder carronades, which he had dragged in sampans through 6 feet of jungle into position on a neighbouring hill, had displaced Mahdie, who was holding the stockade about a year ago with a strong force and numerous guns. Mr. de Fontaine had replaced most of Mahdie's old guns with serviceable 18-pounders. He informed me that the bombardment of Salangore by the "Rinaldo" had been of very material service in aiding the Tunku's cause all over the country, and frightening those who were inclined to take Mahdie's side; also that the unprecedented appearance of a man-of-war up the several rivers would be sufficient to do the rest. Kallang River is said to be navigable for vessels of the "Teazer's" draught for some 15 or 20 miles as far as Dammarara, and for boats by poling for more than 80 miles above Pângallan Batu to Qualla Lampart, in the neighbourhood of the tin mines, although it is probable that the base of the mountains from which it takes its source is not more than 25 miles distant; the banks were higher and the country much less swampy than Salangore, becoming hilly and fertile on approaching Pângallan Batu. The stockade is elevated about 30 feet above the river, and is a square inclosure, as usual, with a raised embankment on which guns are mounted; these, like many at Salangore, in Mahdie's time, were without means of elevating, being either laid upon two parallel timbers placed in the desired direction, or when on a carriage lashed down with rattans in a fixed position. It was the custom of Mahdie's men before firing a gun to assemble round it and pray for a successful result. I observed one of these guns dismounted with the muzzle broken, and I was informed that a lucky shot had been fired from one of De Fontaine's 18-pounders under these circumstances which had killed a large number of men at their devotions, dismounted the gun, and had probably effected a great deal more from their superstitious fears. There are two stockades of an inferior description, also in charge of Mr. de Fontaine at the Qualla, or mouth.

After visiting Rajah Ismail, the native chief and Collector of Customs for the Tunku (at whose godown all tin coming down the river is stopped and weighed, one-tenth being deducted in kind, and a further duty of $2\frac{1}{4}$ dollars for every 3 piculs demanded in coin for guard dues, &c.), and embarking a European, Mr. Langlois, Assistant Collector, who is acquainted with Langkat, I returned to Qualla. The revenue from tin in this river is estimated at from 4,000 dollars to 5,000 dollars per month; and the Salangore, when properly opened up, will probably bring in more than this, forming a total revenue of over 100,000 dollars a-year. The next morning (21) I passed down Toomaut Strait with the "Pluto," and entered Langkat river at high water; after steaming about 25 miles we reached Langkat in four hours. I moored abreast the landing-place, leading to the Sultan's house, from which we were about 400 yards

distant. There was just room to swing the "Teazer" one way, with $2\frac{3}{4}$ feet at low water. Bukit Tugon S.W. and S. about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Immediately on arrival, after receiving the Sultan's assurance that he was ready to receive us, I, after communicating with the Colonial Secretary, landed our armed party, and landed, with him, Mr. Irving, the Tunku, Rajah Moossa, and Ismail, and my own officers, and paid a State visit to the Sultan, who received us hospitably, covering the muzzles of the guns round his house, and in our presence. The letter from Colonel Anson was read, and an answer demanded within twenty-four hours. On the following evening a favourable reply having been returned, proclaiming Rajah Mahdie, Mahmood and Seyd Masahoor as outlaws and pirates, and investing Tunku dia Oodin with full powers over the whole seaboard of his territory, we paid a second visit to the Sultan, on which occasion his chop was publicly affixed to the Tunku's commission; and, at the request of the Colonial Secretary, after the document had been read to the assembled natives, I signed it with him as witnesses to its execution, and the Tunku kissed the Sultan's hand. The Sultan then requested that a pair of elephants' tusks might be presented to Her Majesty the Queen, in the name of his three sons, whose names he specially desired should be mentioned to her. We then re-embarked, and I saluted the Sultan's flag (yellow).

Langkat river is even more tortuous than the other two, Bukit Tugon being frequently visible ahead or astern on approaching Langkat. The country is apparently more fertile and richly wooded than Kallang river; mibary and ijupalnis, with many forest trees, and an occasional tree fern, taking the place of the wearisome mangrove and nipa of the Salangore. Tigers and elephants abound, we were informed, on the banks of both rivers, but especially above Pangallan Batu, on the Kallang river, where the latter come down to drink, the water being quite fresh there. Tin-carrying is prohibited for the present in the Langkat river, and all must pass down the Kallang or Salangore. From Langkat there is a cutting navigable for boats, but dangerous at spring tides, on account of the rapidity of the current and the number of snags in all parts of the stream, from Langkat river into another river, which was close to the foot of Bukit Tugon, and thence into Malacca Strait, to the southward of the islands (*vide* accompanying chart).* I passed from Langkat, with Mr. Birch, down this cutting and the river, so far as the foot of Tugree hill, which we ascended; and I understand that this is the stream by which Her Majesty's ship "Icarus's" boats went to Langkat a year or two ago. On the morning of the 23rd I left Langkat, at the commencement of the flood tide, in company with the "Pluto," for the river's mouth. On the way out, through the ignorance of the Malay pilot on board the "Pluto," I was led, in following her, directly on to the shoalest part of a sandbank, in mid-channel, which stretches angularly across the river, about two miles within the entrance, and is partly dry at low water. The tide having turned before our taking the ground, and then ebbing fast, it was useless to attempt getting the ship off, and I immediately shored her up with lower yards. By 2 P.M. the ship was nearly high and dry, and an opportunity, much wanted, afforded of cleaning and examining the bottom, of which I availed myself, Mr. Birch kindly giving me men from the "Pluto." At 6 P.M. she was afloat without injury, and I steamed, in company with the "Pluto," out of the river, and anchored at 8·30 off the mouth of the Kallang river. Here the "Pluto," with colonial officers, left for Malacca and Singapore, and I proceeded, on Tuesday, the 26th, to an anchorage on the edge of the bank off Bukit Tergon, accompanied by the Tunku's steamer "Fair Singapore," but was unable to approach the shore nearer than three or four miles.

At 10 A.M., being near high water, I took the boats, armed, with Lieutenant Nuthall, Sub-Lieutenant Robinson, and Mr. Barrett, N.S.L., the Tunku and Mr. Langlois accompanying me in my own boat into Sungi Bulo, where was reported to be a stockade of Mahdie's. I also took about sixty of the Tunku's Sepoys. The entrance to the river or creek is bordered by an extensive mud flat, and the channel narrow and intricate. On approaching the stockade there was hardly room for boats in single file, and a double row of stakes had been placed across the river, with a 7 feet passage in the middle, just before reaching the stockade. The latter had been burnt, and the guns, four in number, with the usual pointed slips of bamboo stuck in the ground in all directions, lying on the ground. There was just time to knock the trunnions off, roll the guns over into the river, and get the boats out before the falling tide barred our exit. The stream was bordered by mangroves and stinking mud. I then tried to effect a landing for the men on the sandy beach, a mile to the southward

* Not printed.

of the river, but a flat of soft mud extending half-a-mile to seaward of the beach prevented this, and the Tunku and myself, with Mr. Langlois, were dragged through the mud by natives in a sampan, the boats returning on board. The natives were assembled unarmed; and the Tunku informed them of our visit to Langat, and the powers conferred on him by the Sultan, which I told them, through Mr. Langlois, our Government were prepared to support. He also read the extract from the Sultan's letter, calling upon all his people to assist in the apprehension of Mahdie, Mahmood, and Seyd Masahoor. We could, however, obtain no information about them. The principal people were then directed to come on board and see the Sultan's chop, and make themselves acquainted with the Tunku's flag, which they did; and in the mean time we visited Campong Terra, which consists of a number of scattered Malay houses, and a vast cocoa-nut plantation, bordered by a fine sandy beach. We embarked from a point opposite to Pulo Besar 2′ to the south of the river's mouth.

I proceeded on the following morning (26th) to Salangore, embarking the Tunku, who dispatched the "Fair Singapore" to Malacca. I steamed at once up the river, flying the Tunku's flag, and anchored off Campong Penang, mooring close to one bank with just room to swing one way to the tide, sending Mr. Barrett to make a further examination of the river by boat, and landing myself, with Mr. Langlois, to see Rajah Taffa and look at the stockade. Taffa afterwards assembled his people on board, and the same process was gone through as at Terran. He asked what security they would have from attack when I was gone, as all the people on the banks of the river had been living from hand to mouth for the last two years, in a state of constant fear. I told them that that must depend on the rapidity with which they gave information of movements hostile to Tunku-Dia-Oodin, and I also consider myself justified in saying that they would be occasionally visited by a man-of-war. Mr. Barrett returned in the evening, having examined ten miles more of the river, in all 22′ from the mouth, at which distance it ceases to be tidal. It is not navigable for anything but boats beyond about 5′ above Campong Passany; and I should not advise vessels drawing more than 10 feet water ascending the river until a more accurate survey is made. It is a safe rule in navigating all these rivers, on approaching points, to steer over to the opposite shore, keeping close along it where the deepest water will always be found, the shoalest being frequently in mid-channel, and, as a rule, deep water will always be found in the narrowest, and shoal water in the widest, parts of the river.

On the following morning (27th) I returned to Salangore with the Tunku, who assembled his people as before, and read his powers. I then went over the stockade and forts with him, and selected eleven of the best guns, which he agreed with me should be placed on Salangore Hill for the defence of his own residence, and all the others in the numerous stockades and forts destroyed. Having effected this, I received information on Friday evening that there was strong suspicion that Rajah Taffa (who was on board) was aiding in the concealment of Mahdie at Passany. I detained him and put a guard on the river to stop all boats proceeding up, and steamed the next morning with about sixty of the Tunku's men and my own boats to Campong Passany to surround the village and make a thorough examination of the houses and stockade. This was effectually done by Lieutenant Nuthall and Sub-Lieutenants Robinson and Warren with Mr. Langlois, but no followers or signs of Mahdie were discovered, and I returned in the evening to Salangore. On the way to Penang the ship hung upon a bank about four miles up the river, and nearly in mid-stream, with scarcely any water on it at low-water springs for about half-an-hour, but with the aid of an anchor and the flood tide she same off without injury. On Monday, 31st, after embarking Tunku dia Oodin, I proceeded to Penang, arriving here at 4 P.M., the following day. I propose to remain a week at Penang before going to Singapore, should my services not be required. I inclose a chart showing the position of the rivers and places I have visited, and sketches of the rivers themselves by Messrs. Warren and Barrett, whom I desire to bring to your notice for the creditable way in which they have made use of such flying visits, and for the zeal and ability shown by the latter officer in examining the River Salangore, hitherto quite unknown. I also inclose a list of guns destroyed by me, and of those remaining at Salangore. It is desirable, in my opinion, that a flag-staff should be erected upon Salangore Hill and the guns left placed in a position for defending it without delay, as a 100 men have suddently been discharged by the Tunku upon some question of time and pay, and the place is being temporarily held by 40 men under Mr. Langlois who, though able and energetic, does not profess to understand military matters.

It is probable that unless some practical aid is given by us matters will gradually

r
elapse into their original condition, and I am convinced that the sooner Tunku dia Oodin is firmly established in his new position by us now the less trouble we may have hereafter. There are no stores of any description at Salangore.

I have, &c.
(Signed) B. W. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 21.

The Admiralty to the Colonial Office.

Sir, *Admiralty, December* 16, 1871.

WITH reference to my letter of the 13th ultimo, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Kimberley, copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett, dated 30th October, forwarding a letter from Commander Blomfield, of Her Majesty's ship "Teazer," dated 20th September, reporting the state of affairs at Salangore.

The Vice-Admiral states, that he has given directions that such expeditions as that recently undertaken against the pirates in the Straits of Malacca, should not be engaged in without reference to the Commander-in-chief on the Station, unless immediate action should be necessary, in which latter case care is to taken that such action is confined to the ordinary duties of the Navy, and that diplomatic and political affairs be carefully avoided.

My Lords propose to approve of the directions given by the Commander-in-chief, if the Secretary of State concurs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) THOS. WOLLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 21.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

"*Ocean,*" *at Hong Kong, October* 30, 1871.

FORWARDED, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with reference to my submission of the 6th August last.

With regard to this matter, and the recent proceedings of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," in suppressing piracy on the seaboard of the territory of the Sultan of Salangore, I have given directions that no such expeditions be undertaken in future without reference to me, unless immediate action is absolutely necessary, in which latter case care is to be taken that such action is confined to the ordinary duties of the Navy, and that diplomatic and political affairs be carefully avoided.

(Signed) HENRY KELLETT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 21.

Commander Blomfield to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett.

Sir, "*Teazer,*" *Singapore, September* 20, 1871.

WITH reference to my letter of proceedings of 2nd August, 1871, in which I gave an opinion that Tunku dia Oodin should receive some practical aid and support from our Government, until firmly established in his position as Governor of the seaboard territory of the Sultan of Salangore, I have the honour to inform you that his Excellency the Administrator, has given me verbally to understand that it is contrary to the policy and instructions of Her Majesty's Government to interfere in any way with the management of the affairs of the various Governments of the Malay Peninsula, and consequently no further steps will be taken. I therefore deem it my duty, as I have been to a certain extent mixed up with the appointment of Tunku dia Oodin to his present position, he having been suggested by the Colonial officers in my presence, and with my concurrence, to the Sultan (who was desirous of giving it to his half-witted son, Rajah Moosa), as the most fitting person to hold the appointment; and I, having

afterwards, with the Colonial Secretary, signed my name to his commission as a witness, to acquaint my Commander-in-chief with the circumstances, so far as I am able; they are as follows:—

Tunku dia Oodin, brother of the present Rajah of Quedah, and son-in-law of the present Sultan of Salangore, was given the commission which has lately been confirmed, between two and three years ago, but as both the Kallang and Salangore Rivers were at that time in possession of the rebel Rajahs—Mahdie and Syed Masahoor—the Tunku was obliged to engage in a war, at a great expense to himself, to dislodge them; he had already succeeded in expelling Rajah Mahdie from the Kallang River, and establishing law and order, with the aid of the young Frenchman mentioned in my letter of proceedings, and was actually at Pangallan Batu on the Kallang, engaging him to undertake the capture of the Salangore Forts, when the report of the "Rinaldo's" guns attacking them was heard in the river. The result of that attack you are already in possession of.

The object of my mission to the Sultan of Salangore, by direction of Commander Robinson, of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," was to convey a letter to the former from his Excellency, the Administrator, demanding that the remainder of the pirates who had murdered the thirty-two men, women, and children on board a Chinese junk found in the Salangore River, should be given up to Her Majesty's Government, together with their aiders and abettors, Rajahs Mahmood, Mahdie, and Syed Masahoor, also that a ruler in whom our Government could place implicit confidence should be appointed to govern the whole of the sea coast, and put a stop to all further piracy.

These demands were made with the "Teazer's" guns bearing upon the Sultan's palace, and an answer insisted upon within twenty-four hours.

With respect to the first of the three demands, the Sultan told us, what we afterwards found to be true, that the pirates had already been given up at Malacca, with the exception of one Chinaman, who had died, and whose queue was sent in proof.

With respect to the second demand, the Sultan did not actually engage to deliver up the rebel Rajahs, it being probably entirely out of his power to do so, but he proclaimed them in his reply to the Administrator as pirates and outlaws, and called upon all his people to aid the Tunku and ourselves in their capture.

It was in consequence of this Proclamation of the Sultan (a copy of which I took with me and desired the Tunku to read, in my presence, to his assembled subjects, on the different rivers, over whom he had been appointed as Governor, assuring the natives that the latter would receive our support, and believing that such support was required in the common interests of civilization in a notorious piratical State) that, after consultation with the Colonial Secretary, I took upon myself to act as I did, being also under the impression that, until the rebel Rajahs were actually given up, the demands contained in the Administrator's letter were not fully satisfied, and that, therefore, if necessary, we had a right to exert some control over the actions of the Tunku, whilst giving him our aid. Under these circumstances it appeared to me a good opportunity for opening up the rivers, and substituting law and order for piracy in the Salangore coast, by giving countenance and active support to a Governor of our own recommendation.

The Tunku, who was my guest on board for several days, always expressed himself as most grateful to the British Government for their approval of his appointment by the Sultan and as most anxious for its advice and assistance in the conduct of his affairs.

He is no doubt much involved in debt at present, in a great measure the consequence of his wars with the rebel Rajahs, and partly, perhaps, of his own extravagance, but as the revenue from tin alone of the Kallang and Salangore Rivers is expected to bring in near 100,000 dollars a-year when the country has recovered from its present alarm, and the rivers are freely open, the Tunku would have no difficulty in paying his debts, provided that his revenue and expenditure were properly assessed by a trustworthy European, whose services at a proper salary he could have no difficulty in obtaining. At present I believe Tunku dia Oodin is entirely ignorant of both revenue and expenditure, his financial affairs being in the hands of an Arab of doubtful character, whose business seems to provide him with funds when he requires them and who is believed to look well after his own interests.

The Tunku has European tastes, and professes to be desirous of taking the Maharajah of Johore as his model, and no doubt is sincere, but his natural good-natured indolence will probably, without firm advice and assistance, allow matters to relapse into their original condition under the old system of squeezing and extortion by petty

Rajahs, which paralyzes the trade of the country, and a few years might see his own displacement by one of the many envious Rajahs, sons, or relatives of the Sultan and a repetition of the cause of the late Salangore affair.

A proper police force and guard boats might be easily established in each of the rivers were the Tunku to appoint trustworthy Europeans recommended by the Straits Government at a proper salary, and this he has expressed himself to me as desirous of doing, but I believe he has neither the energy nor determination to enable him to undertake it without a helping hand, and I think that leaving him to shift for himself with many enemies, whilst his affairs and country are in a state of chaos, the moment the Sultan has been induced to appoint him would be productive of no ultimate good. Moreover, the knowledge, if such be the case, that we have ceased to interest ourselves in his concerns would be sure to give fresh encouragement to the rebel Rajahs over whom the Sultan appears to have no control whatever.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. W. BLOMFIELD.

No. 22.

The Colonial Office to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Downing Street, December* 28, 1871.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 16th December I am directed by the Earl of Kimberley to state that he concurs in the proposed approval of the instructions issued by Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett as to the employment of Her Majesty's ships in expeditions similar to that recently undertaken against the pirates at Salangore.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. H. MEADE.

PAPERS (with a Map) relating to recent proceedings at Salangore consequent upon the Seizure by Pirates of a Junk owned by Chinese Merchants of Penang; and the Murder of the Passengers and Crew.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1872.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

EMIGRATION OF CHINESE COOLIES

FROM

MACAO.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty,
1871.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

[C.—403.] *Price 3d.*

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Correspondence respecting the Emigration of Chinese Coolies from Macao.

No. 1.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 13.)

My Lord, *Lima, March* 9, 1869.

IT appears that, from what is now published in the papers, the Portuguese Consul-General, in the month of August last year, in writing to the Governor of the Portuguese Colony of Macao on the subject of coolies imported into Peru, mentioned a circumstance, the truth of which had been recently denied in the "Comercio" newspaper, which is the following:—

He says: "An agriculturist from this coast took forty-eight contract Chinamen in Callao, and fearing probably that he might lose them, marked them with a hot iron as if they were slaves. The press of the country denounced the deed as a crime; and on my part I had to protest against a thing so contrary to Christian civilization, and to the ideas of a Republican country, and remit to your Excellency copy of this note and answer which was given me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of this country. The affair was brought before the Tribunals, but I do not know when it will be terminated; however, whatever may be the result, your Excellency shall be informed when the cause is ended."

Copy of the Portuguese Consul-General's note to Senhor Polar, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency's reply, are herewith inclosed, as well as copy of the Decree of the Governor of Macao and Timor, prohibiting further exportation of coolies until official information was received of the adoption of energetic means to forbid deeds such as the one complained of.

The publication of these documents in the public press has led lately to several observations regarding the state of the Chinese emigrants in Peru, and also the policy of this kind of immigration as affecting the future interests and population of the Republic.

When Peru was a Colony of Spain, of course African slaves were imported hither as into most Spanish Colonies, and in considerable numbers. In general they were, I believe, well treated. Since the manumission of blacks during General Castilla's Presidency in 1855, thoughts were naturally turned towards where to obtain supplies of agricultural labourers, and, after the practice of other nations, Chinese coolies were brought into Peru, where at present, between those working out their contracts, and those who are perfectly free, there must be several thousand,—say 10,000.

Most of those who have been brought hither under contract, on their arrival were generally taken up by the chief "hacendados," agriculturists and proprietors, to work upon their estates; and the position of the coolies, or most of them, of course with many exceptions, has been, it is to be feared, not the most satisfactory to the Chinese themselves.

The difference between the black and the Chinaman may have contributed in many cases to this unenviable state of things. The blacks came to this country a raw material; soon picked up the language, and easily became initiated in the religion, customs, and ideas of their masters; but the coolie, on the contrary, has remained in general pre-eminently Chinese in almost every respect, except that of learning easily to speak the language, and making himself handy in general pursuits; the blacks soon became nationalized, but as a race of slaves; the Chinese never lose their national predilections; and although members of an inferior class in their own country, and possessing more intelligence than the blacks or the native Indians, are therefore more keenly sensitive regarding their position, as many cases of suicide and desperation manifestly evince.

The blacks Christianized had the advantage of community of ideas with the Peruvians in general; the Chinese brought up under Pagan influences finds himself isolated in this respect, seeks for the society of his fellow-countrymen, talks his own tongue when he can, and indulges in many vices which unfortunately accompany him from his native soil, among which gambling and opium-smoking are not the least detrimental to his progress and civilization. Not having the same strength as the black, though more agricultural knowledge and system, his physical nature must have at times been severely tried; and the lean and wretched specimens which are to be seen at times, both in Lima and the country, show that these men must have wrestled hard with their lot in performance of their various tasks in working out their contracts.

When the Chinese have got free of the contract work, they generally contrive to repair to towns and villages, when they set up as vendors of vegetables, rice, Indian corn, and are very apt in buying and selling the necessaries of life, and often realize considerable profits. They also enlist their services in culinary occupations; a great many houses here, and in other towns throughout Peru, employ them as cooks, in which art they become tolerably efficient.

When they become perfectly free of the "haciendas," and are their own masters, their lot in Peru is the same as that of the population in general; and provided they do not offend against the laws, they are not persecuted or interfered with by the authorities. Not mixing up with the people, they are neither liked nor particularly disliked, but are looked upon as a kind of anomaly in the social body, with whom no one cares to have much communication.

The coolie trade, under its best aspect, can hardly be looked upon as much other than a kind of white Slave Trade, legalized by certain laws and regulations which there is too much reason to fear are not always conscientiously complied with, especially, it may perhaps be conjectured in the operations of obtaining the emigrants.

There may be very good people engaged in it, and there may be others who are sufficiently hardened to consider it nothing more than a commercial speculation, such as importing dry goods or cattle; their chief object being to get the cargo into port in an undamaged state. Of late years, according to reports which are in the papers, the coolie voyages to Callao being in general successful, have not called for much remark or observation. These emigrants chiefly come hither in Italian or native vessels.

Last year, however, as an example that the Chinese are not always so enchanted in coming hither from their native country, a vessel which had brought a cargo of them put into Callao, and the subsequent episode demonstrates that, when an occasion offered, these colonists even had recourse to violence to get back again to China. They were placed in a smaller vessel to be conveyed up the coast north to their destination. From accounts received towards the end of last year, it would appear that, after leaving Callao, the coolies rose upon the captain and crew; killed several, and the captain's life was only spared in consequence of a coolie, to whom he had been kind, interceding for him. They then set the vessel's head for China; and after much difficulty reached the coast of Kamschatka, where they let the captain go, and escaped.

That there are ferocious characters amongst some of these emigrants is evident. Not long ago at Guadaloupe, or thereabouts in North Peru, a coolie, for some reason or other, killed seven persons in a family where he was employed. He was seized by the authorities and brought under escort to some small town, where he was locked up for the night. The populace hearing this, broke into the prison, dragged him forth, and in spite of the authorities kindled a fire and burnt him. Another case occurred not long ago, also in North Peru. A Chinaman in some altercation stabbed the overseer of the estate; the populace seized him likewise, and committed him to the flames.

This summary treatment shows the kind of feeling which some of the lower orders in a North Peruvian province harbour against the coolies. Any of the worst Peruvian assassins would never have experienced a similar mode of punishment in his own country.

If such examples are repeated I apprehend something disagreeable will happen some day when the coolies are massed together; and that serious acts of vengeance may be attempted, which the local authorities may not find it so easy to prevent. The greatest criminals can only be punished by the local authorities, and not by the populace. They know that, and therefore such incidents as above related, are dangerous precedents.

To those who affect really to see Peru move along the road of progress, Chinese immigration presents a system that ought to be discontinued; because, although agriculture may be for a moment benefited, the country in the end will gain nothing as to improvement in the population, or in the useful increase of industrial knowledge.

What these countries want are emigrants from civilized countries; families who might live in terms of intimacy and reciprocal friendship with the natives of the soil.

and improve them by examples, and intermix by marriage in forming an industrious people.

This is a hard problem to solve for many reasons, but the increased importation of Chinese will never solve it.

Those Chinese who settle down here with Peruvian wives only obtain mulattos and persons of Indian or negro origin. The descendants of these, although they might become more intelligent than the parental stock, would probably, unless a great religious and educational move preserved them, evince a greater aptitude for evil tendencies and immorality than their progenitors.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. STAFFORD JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the Lima "Comercio" of February 27, 1869.

(Translation.)

CHINA.

THE Governor of Macao and Timor, and their Dependencies, decrees the following:—

The Portuguese Consul-General in Lima having communicated to this Government by a despatch of the 2nd of August last, the horrid deed practised by an agriculturist of the suburbs of that city against forty-eight Chinese emigrants conducted to that country in the capacity of labourers, by marking them with a hot iron, as was formerly done with African slaves, and also many of these same labourers being wanderers about, and that there are Chinese colonists begging public charity in the streets of the town, on account of being abandoned by their "patrones," when being mutilated they are no longer fit for the service for which they were contracted, I have determined, after having heard the Government Council, that until official information has been received by which it is shown that energetic means have been adopted to forbid deeds of such a nature, barbarous as well as contrary to the civilization of the age, His Majesty the King, not determining otherwise, let the following be observed:—

1. Until further notice the permission granted by this Government to open establishments of emigration for Callao, is suspended.

2. In the same manner, there shall not be matriculated any Asiatic emigrant or colonist destined for the above port at the Superintendent's office of Chinese emigration; nor shall there be any contracts signed in the Chinese "procuracion" office.

Let the authorities who have to do with this Decree thus understand it, and put it in execution.

Macao, November 18, 1868.

(Signed) ANTONIO SERGIO DE SOUZA,
Governor of Macao and Timor.

Portuguese Consulate-General, Lima, June 17, 1868.

The Undersigned has the honour to address himself to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, calling his Excellency's attention to one of those deeds which dishonour the man who may be guilty of it, and the nation that does not punish the criminal,—a deed of high political, humanitarian, moral, and industrial consequences.

The "Comercio," No. 9,772, published a letter to the Society "Friends of the Indians," dated Lambayeque, 11th May, disclosing one of those acts which are a disgrace to humanity in the 19th century.

An agriculturist, devoid of conscience, took forty-eight Chinamen, and fearing that they might escape from him, instead of causing their likenesses to be taken by photography, preferred instead of this means, which would have cost him a few dollars, to mark them with a red-hot iron.

It appears incredible, Excellency, that in the epoch in which we live, there exist men capable of committing such barbarous acts; however, the deed is true and needs no comment.

The Undersigned would abstain from calling your Excellency's attention to the matter, if the colonists who came contracted for Peru did not proceed from a Portuguese Colony, and with the arms of this nation stamped upon each contract, and if the Governor of Macao did not recommend to the Undersigned very particularly to render an account respecting every vessel that may have sailed from the above port, as to the treatment

received during the passage by the coolies. It may appear that, upon the arrival of the colonists to the shores of Peru my jurisdiction should have ceased, if these unfortunate people who come to fertilize the Peruvian soil with the sweat of their brow and to further husbandry—so much in want of hands—had found protective laws to assist them in their forlorn state; unfortunately this is not the case, because we see agriculturists (there are honourable exceptions) who look upon the colonist, not as a man, but as a tool and less than a slave.

Sufficiently has the Press, at various times, uplifted its voice in favour of this race, degraded through the avarice of their masters ("patrones"). These evils have occurred without any measures having been adopted in favour of these wretched people.

The Undersigned finds himself placed in the hard but inevitable necessity of requesting the Government of his Excellency to cause the proper orders to be issued that the contracts of the forty-eight colonists who were marked with the ignominious iron should be cancelled, and themselves placed completely at liberty, and also that the author of this crime be committed for trial and receive the punishment the laws determine in similar cases.

If by extraneous influences the deed of which the Undersigned has been treating remain unpunished, the Undersigned will behold himself in the painful necessity of sending to his Government a copy of this note, adding to it the disagreable feature which the streets of Lima present on account of the great quantity of Chinese mutilated in the service of their "patrones," and forsaken by them when they can no longer toil, in order that they may go and live on public charity, with the object that my Government, if they deem proper, should dispatch the necessary orders to the Governor of Macao not to permit emigration of Chinese coolies from that port to Peru.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) D. NARCISO VELARDE,
Portuguese Consul-General.

To his Excellency Senhor D. M. Polar,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Peru, &c.

Answer.

INFORMED of your esteemed communication dated yesterday, in which, referring to a letter published in the "Comercio," No. 9,772, denouncing the deed of forty-eight Chinese colonists having been branded by an agriculturist with a hot iron, you request that the Peruvian Government might cause the contracts of the said Chinese to be cancelled, I have forwarded a copy to the Minister of Justice in order that through his Department proper orders may be given for investigating the matter, and for the trial of those, according to the laws, who may be found to be delinquents.

(Signed) J. M. POLAR.

Senhor D. N. Velarde,
Portuguese Consul-General.

No. 2.

Mr. Hammond to Sir F. Rogers.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 24, 1869.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Granville, the accompanying copy of a despatch which has been received from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Lima,* upon the subject of Chinese emigration to Peru.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 3.

Sir F. Sandford to Mr. Hammond.—(Received May 18.)

Sir, *Downing Street, May* 17, 1869.

A COPY of your letter of the 24th ultimo, with the despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peru, on the subject of the treatment of Chinese labourers imported

* No. 1.

into that country from Macao, was referred to the Emigration Commissioners; and I am directed by Earl Granville to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of their Report upon it.

I am to take this opportunity to return the original inclosure to your letter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) F. R. SANDFORD.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Mr. Murdoch to Sir F. Rogers.

Sir, *Emigration Board, May 7, 1869.*

I HAVE to acknowledge your letter of the 3rd instant, with a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peru on the subject of the treatment of Chinese labourers imported into that country from Macao.

2. The circumstance which more particularly gave occasion to this despatch was the branding with a hot iron, by an employer, of forty-eight Chinese, who had been allotted to him. This atrocious act of cruelty called forth a strong denunciation from the press, and a communication from the Portuguese Consul-General in Lima to the Governor of Macao, which led to a prohibition by the latter of all emigration from Macao to Peru. The Consul-General also applied to the local Government for the liberation of the Chinese, and the prosecution of the employer, but the decision on that application is not given. So far, however, as the matter has yet gone, the result is good; and the strictness and loyalty with which the present Governor of Macao has carried out the emigration laws, and has, up to the present time, put down the practices which made the emigration from Macao a disgrace to humanity, are a guarantee that he will carry out the prohibition which he has now issued as to emigration to Peru.

3. The description which Mr. Jerningham gave of the condition of Chinese in Peru makes it very desirable that this should be the case. He says that, while the uncivilized negro easily adopted the language, the religion, and the habits of his employer, and thereby becomes amalgamated with the people of the country, the previous education of the Chinese in their own country prevents their doing so; that they accordingly obtain no sympathy from their employers, and that their emaciated appearance shows how severely their physical strength is taxed, and how hard a life they are compelled to lead. Under these circumstances they associate as much as possible together, and indulge in the vices, including gambling and opium smoking, to which they were addicted in their own country.

4. Mr. Jerningham further expresses his conviction that the emigration from Macao to Peru is little better than a Slave Trade; and he cites, as an example of the feeling of the Chinese, the seizure of the American vessel, the circumstances of which were communicated to the Colonial Office in the Foreign Office letter of 27th February last, and some outrages which have been committed by Chinese in Peru. Mr. Jerningham's conclusion agrees with all we have heard from other quarters as to emigration from Macao, but it may be hoped that, unless the Portuguese Government overrule the proceedings of the present Governor, the atrocities which have in former years disgraced that emigration, may be considered now as at an end.

5. The despatch requires no action on the part of Earl Granville, and I return it herewith, with its inclosures, in conformity with your directions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) T. W. C. MURDOCH.

No. 4.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir C. Murray.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 20, 1869.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Lima upon the subject of the treatment in Peru of Chinese labourers imported from Macao.* I also transmit to you a copy of a letter from the Colonial Office,† inclosing a Report addressed to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Emigration

* No. 1. † No. 3.

Commissioner, to whom Mr. Jerningham's despatch was referred; and I have to instruct you to communicate, in guarded language, to the Portuguese Government the substance of the Commissioners' Report.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 5.

Sir C. Murray to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 7.)

My Lord, *Lisbon, May 27, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 20th instant, and to inclose copy of a note which I have this day addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicating to his Excellency, in obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch, the substance of a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Lima, and of a Report by the Emigration Commissioners upon the subject of the exportation of Chinese coolies from Macao to Peru, and of the treatment they meet with in the latter country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CH. A. MURRAY.

Inclosure in No. 5.

Sir C. Murray to the Marquis de Sá da Bandeira.

M. le Ministre, *Lisbon, May 27, 1869.*

I HAVE been instructed by Her Majesty's Government to bring under your Excellency's notice some particulars respecting the treatment and condition of Chinese coolies imported into Peru from Macao; these particulars form the subject of a Report from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Lima, which is substantiated by other documents. The most prominent feature in this Report is the relation of the fact that a Peruvian agriculturist, in August 1868, took forty-eight contract Chinamen imported to Callao from Macao, and probably fearing that he might lose them, branded them with a hot iron, as if they were slaves.

This act of atrocious cruelty having been reported to the Governor of Macao, his Excellency forthwith issued an order prohibiting the issue of Coolie Emigration Licenses from Macao to Callao—this order to remain in force until official information should be received to the effect that the authorities at Callao had taken energetic measures to prevent the recurrence of such acts, which his Excellency very properly designates as "barbarous" and contrary to the civilized usages of this age.

The Portuguese Consul-General in Peru, Dom Narciso Velarde, likewise wrote a very strong appeal to the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Dom Juan Polar (a copy of which has doubtless been sent to your Excellency), in which he not only reports the above-mentioned act of cruelty, but portrays in vivid colours the sufferings and miseries that these unfortunate coolies are habitually exposed to in Peru.

From my knowledge of the hatred which your Excellency bears to everything that wears the form of cruelty and oppression, I have no doubt that you will approve and sustain the energetic measures adopted by the Governor of Macao, and I am happy to add that my confidence in the sentiments of humanity by which the Portuguese Government will be guided in this matter, is shared by those British authorities in whose Department it is classed. For the Secretary to the Colonial Emigration Commission in London uses the following expression in a letter recently addressed by him to the Earl of Clarendon:—

"The strictness and loyalty with which the present Governor of Macao has carried out the emigration laws, and has up to the present time put down the practices which made the emigration from Macao a disgrace to humanity, are a guarantee that he will carry out the Decree which he has now issued as to emigration to Peru."

I inclose, for your Excellency's information, two or three printed official letters on this subject, in case they shall have hitherto escaped your observation. These I shall be obliged by your returning to me at your convenience, as I have no duplicate copies; and I avail myself, &c.

(Signed) CH. A. MURRAY.

No. 6.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir C. Murray.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 8, 1869.

I HAVE to state to you that I approve the note, copy of which is inclosed in your despatch of the 27th ultimo, which you have addressed to the Portuguese Government upon the subject of the exportation of Chinese coolies from Macao to Peru, and of the treatment they met with in the latter country.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 7.

Sir C. Murray to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

My Lord, *Lisbon, January* 12, 1870.

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch of the 20th of May, 1869, upon the subject of the emigration of Chinese coolies from Macao to Peru, and of the treatment they receive there, I have the honour to inclose herewith translation of a note addressed to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, under date of the 8th instant, in answer to that which I forwarded to his Excellency upon this subject on the 27th of May last, copy of which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship in my despatch of that day's date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CH. A. MURRAY.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Senhor Leal to Sir C. Murray.

(Translation.)

Most Illustrious and Excellent Sir, *Lisbon, January* 8, 1870.

IN compliance with the wish expressed by your Excellency in your note of the 27th of May of last year, I have the honour to return herewith the printed document inclosed therein, relative to the act of cruelty said to have been committed by an agriculturist in the suburbs of Callao of Lima, upon forty-eight Chinese contract colonists; and I beg to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government has learnt by news subsequent to the energetic measures adopted by the Governor of Macao, that happily, for humanity's sake, it is not true that those colonists were branded with a hot iron, as it had been reported.

Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government did not fail to derive satisfaction from the esteem with which Her Britannic Majesty's Government viewed the line of conduct pursued both by the Governor of Macao, and by the Consul-General of Portugal in Peru.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) MENDES LEAL.

No. 8.

Consul Robertson to Mr. Hammond.—(Received January 9, 1871.)

Sir, *Canton, November* 26, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a despatch I have addressed to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, reporting the capture of the French ship "Nouvelle Pénélope" by the Chinese coolies, who had been shipped at Macao for the West Coast of America.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Consul Robertson to Mr. Wade.

Sir, *Canton, November* 17, 1870.

ANOTHER of those coolie tragedies which have been so frequent of late has occurred, resulting in the murder of the master, several of the crew, and the pillage and stranding of the vessel.

It appears that the French ship "Nouvelle Pénélope," Levigoureux master, left Macao on the 1st of October, bound to Callao with 300 coolies on board. All went on well for a day or two; when, suddenly, a rush on deck was made by a body of Chinese, armed with belaying pins, billets of wood, &c.; the master was knocked down, and his throat cut, the crew overpowered, several of them taking to the rigging, and the ship was in possession of the assailants. Those of the Europeans who were aloft, and the mate, and two or three who were forward—eight in all, seven having been killed—were assured they would not be hurt, but must navigate the ship to the land. This they did, and made the Bay of Tien-pak, some 180 miles on the coast below Macao. Three of the European seamen were sent on shore to procure boats to land the coolies when they effected their escape; and having been assisted by the mandarins, after fourteen days' travel overland, reached Macao, and reported the occurrence. In the meantime, after waiting for a day or two, and being unable to land for want of boats, and perhaps fearing to disembark where there was a mandarin station, the pirates took the vessel to some distance further on, where they beached, and, after pillaging, abandoned her; what they left having been taken by the shore people.

On hearing this, M. Dabry, the French Consul at this port, set off in one of the Viceroy's gun-boats, for Macao, and the wreck; at the same time I wrote a note to the Senior Naval Officer at Hong Kong, and he immediately dispatched a gun-boat, the "Starling," to the place.

M. Dabry found the interpreter of the "Nouvelle Pénélope" at Macao, and received some information which would enable him to identify some of the pirates. He called on the Governor, and subsequently on the Procurador, who informed him he had arrested ten men on suspicion, and these being produced, one of them was identified at once by a peculiar scar on his throat. M. Dabry told him he was the leader, but if he would make confession and point out his confederates his life would be spared. Upon this he at once admitted he was the chief, and accused three of the ten then present as being concerned in the affair, the others he said were only coolies who took no part in it. He added there were others at Macao, and implicated the interpreter. M. Dabry, the Procurador, and these four men then proceeded to the coolie barracoons, and they pointed about eighty-three in all, who were arrested. The next question was what to do with them? M. Dabry demanded their rendition to him as having committed piracy and murder upon French territory, but the Portuguese authorities at first demurred to this. Subsequently, however, they consented to send them on board a French ship in the harbour where they now are. M. Dabry then sent the interpreter and the chief in custody on board the gunboat to Canton, with a request to the Viceroy to arrest some ten more who were known to be at Canton, and could be identified by these two prisoners, and required him to send an officer to Macao to examine the men he had in custody; but the Viceroy positively refused, saying he would have nothing to say to Macao coolie affairs, and M. Dabry might do what he liked with his prisoners. On this M. Dabry came up, and had an interview with his Excellency who repeated this to him. M. Dabry urged it was not a question of coolies, but one of murder on the high seas, and he was bound to arrest Chinese within his jurisdiction on information laid against them. The Viceroy said he would consult with the Footai (Governor) and send him an answer.

The Viceroy then came to me and asked what ought to be done under the circumstances. In reply, I gave it as my opinion that he ought to arrest these men on the charge of murder if they could be found, and then refer to Peking for instructions. He said he thought so too, and would consult with the Footai (Governor) on the subject, and I understand he has written to M. Dabry consenting to arrest them, but he has given no reply to a renewed demand for an officer being sent to Macao to conduct the investigation jointly with M. Dabry. So far the matter has proceeded. I may add that the chief of the pirates confessed this was the third affair of the kind he had been engaged in, and the practice appears to be for the Chinese concerned in the capture of a ship to return to Macao, re-enter the barracoons, and being reshipped endeavour to do the same again.

It is evident, however well the Macao Government regulations may look upon paper, that coolie emigration is simply a Slave Trade, and a disgrace to any Christian Government that permits its perpetration within its jurisdiction. It is well known how these barracoons at Macao are supplied, and instances are not unfrequent at Canton of the disappearance of people, and that a regular traffic is carried on in human beings for the supply of these establishments. There can be no doubt the Macao Government is honest in its intentions to protect the coolies and put down kidnapping, but there is something more than that required to stop the evil, and, indeed, it may safely be said that nothing short of closing the barracoons and forbidding the shipment of coolies will do so. This, however, is too much to expect, seeing the vested interests in coolie emigration which

exist, and it will go on, and with it such tragedies as that I have just narrated, and Macao will preserve a reputation it has long since carried of being a disgrace to European civilization.

I hope you will not think this expression of opinion too strong, but when it is considered that the destruction and ultimate fate of the coolies shipped at Macao are well-known, and have frequently been denounced in the public prints, and therefore the Macao Government must be cognizant thereof, it is matter for surprise that it sanctions such proceedings under the cover of humane regulations, and thus makes itself a party to what is neither more nor less than a Slave Trade, nor is it less surprising that the French Government permits its flag to be used for so nefarious a Traffic.

One circumstance is noteworthy:—The men pointed out as being concerned in the capture of the ship and arrested were in barracoons, which they had re-entered for the purpose of being reshipped, with the view doubtless of defeating their piracy. They must have been known to the keepers of these establishments as having formed a portion of the "Nouvelle Pénélope" shipment, and yet were allowed to enter the houses and remain there until another shipment was ready, when they would have been sent on board. The only explanation that can be thought of is that these barracoon keepers care very little whom they ship, so that they get the money for them, and it is immaterial to them what may occur after they are placed on board, and indeed profitable to ship a man two or three times over. If the Macao Government did its duty it would investigate the matter thoroughly.

As regards the surrender to the French Consul by the Macao Government of these eighty-three coolies who were arrested, it is difficult to see on what grounds this was done. The men were arrested within Portuguese jurisdiction, and ought therefore to have been tried in Portuguese Courts of Justice. Perhaps, however, the revelations which must have resulted would have been so damaging that it was thought better to get rid of them.

I inclose copy of a letter I received from M. Dabry, informing me that one of the missing crew of the "Nouvelle Pénélope" was a British subject; also extract from an Honolulu newspaper that I saw a day or two since, which gives some insight into the Macao coolie Traffic.

Your, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

M. Dabry to Consul Robertson.

M. le Consul, *Canton, le 15 Novembre,* 1870.

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que le navire Francais la "Nouvelle Pénélope," parti de Macao le 1 Octobre dernier avec 310 émigrants Chinois à destination du Callao, se trouvant à 300 milles environ de terre, une révolte a éclaté parmi les coulies le 4 du même mois, et un de vos nationaux, le matelot Acarius Edmond, né en Mai 1848 à Jersey, fils de Hypolite et de Marie Célestine Lefèvre, embarqué à Hong Kong le 12 Septembre dernier, a été jeté à la mer par les révoltés, et qu'il a disparu sans que son cadavre ait pu en suite être retrouvé.

Agréez, &c.
(Signed) P. DABRY.

(Translation.)

M. le Consul, *Canton, November* 15, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French ship the "Nouvelle Pénélope," which left Macao on the 1st of October with 310 Chinese emigrants destined for Callao, when about 300 miles from land, a rebellion broke out amongst the coolies on the 4th of the same month, and one of your fellow-countrymen, the sailor Acarius Edmond, born in May 1848 at Jersey, son of Hypolite and Mary Celestine Lefévre, shipped at Hong Kong on the 12th of September last, was thrown into the sea by the mutineers, and that he disappeared without it being possible afterwards to recover his body.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) P. DABRY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Extract from Honolulu Newspaper.

THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE PACIFIC.—THE Honolulu "Commercial Advertiser" of a late date, notices the fact that a San Salvador ship, the "Dolores Ugarte Henry VII,"

which touched a short time before, lost 270 of her chattels between that port and Callao. The Captain of the "Ugarte" desiring to deliver his cargo in better condition, had applied for leave to land them in squads of 50 for an airing. The ship had all the appurtenances of an old time slaver, barricades, sentinels, &c. The "Advertiser" objects to making the Hawaiian Islands the half-way house of the Slave Trade. But the Hawaiian Government has encouraged this very business, only in a milder form. It has introduced coolie labour in the islands, and while these coolies may have been treated humanely, the precedent was a bad one. These men are brought, here bound by a certain contract made abroad, and which is enforced on the Islands.

The Slave Trade is rife in the Pacific. If every ship engaged in this business were blown out of water it would be a good thing for humanity. All the atrocities of the African Slave Trade and the horrors of the middle passage may be found in these coolie ships. The San Salvador flag has recently been found very convenient bunting for hoisting over any ship about to be engaged in a questionable business.—*Bulletin.*

[Most of the coolie ships from Macao assume the San Salvador flag, whether rightly or wrongly there is no means of ascertaining, and it is not likely the Macao authorities make strict or any inquiries in the matter.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.]

No. 9.

Earl Granville to Sir C. Murray.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1871.

WITH reference to your despatch of January 12, 1870, and to previous correspondence on the subject of the exportation of Chinese coolies from Macao, I transmit to you the accompanying extracts from the "Globe" and "Overland China Mail" containing an account of frightful sufferings endured by and cruelties practised towards a number of coolies on board a Salvadorian ship, the "Dolores Ugarte," while on a voyage from Macao to Honolulu, *en route* for Callao.

I have to instruct you to bring the matter before the Portuguese Government, and, in doing so, you will express the regret of Her Majesty's Government that they feel compelled, as one of the Powers having Treaties with China, to call their attention to this painful occurrence, for which, however, they feel assured, the Portuguese Government are in no way responsible, and which will be viewed by them with feelings of horror.

As it may prove of use to the Portuguese Government to be made acquainted with the steps which have been taken by Her Majesty's Government to prevent similar atrocities being perpetrated on board coolie ships sailing from Hong Kong, I take this opportunity of transmitting herewith copies of correspondence which has taken place on this subject with the Colonial Office, and I have to direct you to communicate to them the regulations which are now in force; and although Her Majesty's Government are fully sensible of the efforts made by the Government of Macao to put a stop to the mal-practices attending the shipment of coolies from that place, they earnestly hope that the Portuguese Government will continue to support and assist the praiseworthy attempts of the Government to suppress proceedings which from time to time make the emigration from Macao a disgrace to humanity.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 9.

Extract from the "Globe" of December 30, 1870.

THE Honolulu newspapers contain a frightful account of the sufferings experienced by a ship-load of Chinese coolies on board a San Salvador ship on a recent voyage from Macao to that port, *en route* for Callao. The vessel, "Dolores Ugarte" by name, is registered 800 tons burden, and left Macao with no fewer than 608 coolies on board. In consequence of a disposition to mutiny which had manifested itself among the coolies before leaving port, they for the first three weeks of the voyage were not allowed upon deck, but were stowed away between decks in four rows, a space of only 16 inches wide being allotted to each individual. At the end of this term of imprisonment the coolies were allowed to come up on deck in gangs of 50 for one hour's exercise in the course of the day. Sentries fully armed kept watch and guard over the wretched creatures, lest in

a moment of desperation they should turn upon their gaolers. On one occasion a scuffle did take place between the crew and the coolies exercising, which resulted in eighteen of the latter jumping overboard. To add to their miseries, the ship's stores fell short, and they were put upon an allowance of 1 lb. of boiled rice and less than a pint of water per diem. This very insufficient quantity of water, coupled with the crowded state of the hold, produced among them intense thirst, and they eagerly thrust their dollars through the gratings of the hatches in exchange for the cups of water which were given by the crew only in return for these equivalents. As may easily be imagined, disease soon made its appearance among them, and twenty-five died before the vessel reached Honolulu. The condition of the ship on arriving at that port is spoken of as indescribable. The mate himself confessed that the stench from the main hatch was so overpowering that it was impossible to hold one's head over it "one minute without vomiting." Forty-three of those too ill to proceed were landed at Honolulu, where, by the exertions of a kindly resident, they were permanently detained. Their plight was most pitiable. Twelve were in the last stages of decay—some with ship-fever, and others with diarrhœa; two were rendered blind for life by ulcers which had formed in the corners of their eyes, and all were in a dreadfully emaciated condition. If this account be not exaggerated—and we have no reason, judging from somewhat similar cases which have from time to time been made public, to believe that it is—it reflects infinite discredit on the Portuguese Colonial Government at Macao. But further, it is of great importance to the other European States which have Treaties with China that the iniquities of this traffic should be put an end to. What account will the wretched survivors of the ship-load send back to China of their treatment by the foreigners? Probably a large proportion of them were men kidnapped from the interior, who recognize no distinction between the various races of Europeans, and whose friends and friends' friends will henceforth look on every foreigner as a possible man-stealer and a cruel oppressor. Truly, after reading the account of the sufferings of these wretched coolies, we cannot be surprised at the ready belief accorded by Chinese mobs to the charges of kidnapping which have lately been repeatedly brought against foreigners.

No. 10.

Earl Granville to Sir C. Murray.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1871.

WITH reference to my preceding despatch I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch, and of its inclosure, from Her Majesty's Consul at Canton,* reporting the capture of the French ship "Nouvelle Pénélope" by the Chinese coolies who had been shipped at Macao for Callao; and I have to instruct you to call the attention of the Portuguese Government to this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 11.

Earl Granville to Consul Robertson.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1871.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon,† respecting the sufferings endured by coolie emigrants from Macao on board the "Dolores Ugarte."

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 12.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 4, 1871.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your Lordship's information, and for communication to M. Chaudordy, a copy of a despatch, and of its inclosure, from Her Majesty's Consul at Canton in regard to the capture of the French ship "Nouvelle Pénélope" by the Chinese coolies who had been shipped at Macao for the west coast of America.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

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* No. 8. † No. 9.

No. 13.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(*Received February* 14.)

My Lord, *Bordeaux, February* 10, 1871.

YESTERDAY, in obedience to the instruction contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 14th instant, I gave the Comte de Chaudordy copies of Mr. Consul Robertson's despatch to your Lordship of the 26th November last, and of his despatch to Mr. Wade of the 17th of the same month respecting the seizure by coolies of the French ship "Nouvelle Pénélope," and the murder of the master and several of the crew.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 14.

Sir C. Murray to Earl Granville.—(*Received March* 8.)

My Lord, *Lisbon, February* 27, 1871.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatches of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose copy of a note which I have addressed to the Marquis d'Avila, calling, as I am instructed by your Lordship to do, his Excellency's serious attention to certain painful facts connected with the shipment of Chinese coolie emigrants from Macao; and expressing the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the Portuguese Government will continue to support the Governor of Macao in his attempts to suppress proceedings which, from time to time, make the emigration from Macao a disgrace to humanity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CH. A. MURRAY.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Sir C. Murray to the Marquis d'Avila.

M. le Ministre, *Lisbon, February* 15, 1871.

I HAVE been instructed by Earl Granville to bring to the knowledge your Excellency and of His Most Faithful Majesty's Government certain very painful facts connected with the present mode of exportation of Chinese coolies from Macao.

Your Excellency will learn from the inclosed copies of extracts from the "Globe" and "Overland China Mail" newspapers the frightful sufferings endured by a number of coolies on board a Salvadorian ship, the "Dolores Ugarte" while on a voyage from Macao to Honolulu. Your Excellency will also learn from the accompanying copy of a despatch addressed by Mr. D. B. Robertson, Her Majesty's Consul at Canton, to Mr. Wade, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, the details of the capture of the French ship "La Nouvelle Pénélope" by the Chinese coolies who had been shipped at Macao for Callao.

In bringing these matters before your Excellency I have been instructed to express the regret of Her Majesty's Government that they feel compelled, as one of the Powers having Treaties with China, to call the earnest attention of the Portuguese Government to these painful occurrences, for which, however, they are willing to believe the Portuguese Government are not responsible, and which will be viewed by them with feelings of horror.

As it may prove of use to the Portuguese Government to be made acquainted with the steps which have been taken by Her Majesty's Government to prevent similar atrocities being perpetrated on board coolie ships sailing from Hong Kong, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency a copy of the Chinese Passenger Act, 1855, and I have to add that, although Her Majesty's Government is fully sensible of the effects of the efforts made by the Governer of Macao to put a stop to the malpractices attending the shipment of coolies from that place, it earnestly hopes that the Portuguese Government will continue to urge upon the Governor of Macao the necessity of taking more effectual measures to suppress proceedings which, from time to time, make the emigration from Macao a disgrace to humanity.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) CH. A. MURRAY.

No. 15.

Sir C. Murray to Earl Granville.—(Received May 9.)

My Lord, *Lisbon, April 29, 1871.*

IN reply to your Lordship's despatches of the 17th January, and with reference to my despatch of the 27th February, respecting coolie emigration from Macao, I have now the honour to inclose to your Lordship translation of a note from the Marquis d'Avila, in reply to that which I addressed to his Excellency on the 15th February.

In this note your Lordship will perceive that it is stated that all those guilty of the crimes committed on board the "Nouvelle Pénélope" that could be discovered, were delivered, by the Governor of Macao, to the Viceroy of Canton for trial and punishment.

As to the case of the "Dolores Ugarte," the Marquis d'Avila informs me that nothing whatever is known at the Department of Marine and Colonies in Lisbon.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CH. A. MURRAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

The Marquis d'Avila to Sir C. Murray.

(Translation.)

Most Illustrious and Excellent Sir, *Lisbon, April 24, 1871.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which your Excellency addressed to me on the 15th February last, calling, as instructed by your Government, the attention of His Majesty's Government to the lamentable events which took place on board the ship "Dolores Ugarte" belonging to the Republic of San Salvador, bound from the port of Macao to Honolulu with a shipment of coolies, and to the capture of the French ship "Nouvelle Pénélope," made by other coolies who were in the act of being conveyed from that same port to Callao, Lima.

It is my duty to state to your Excellency, in reply, that the Minister of Marine, to whom I communicated the contents of your said note, informs me that with respect to the ship "Dolores Ugarte" nothing is as yet known in that Department; and that with regard to the French ship "Nouvelle Pénélope" he had in due time received from the Governor of Macao the official report both of the rising of the coolies on board the said ship, killing the captain, the mate, and eight seamen, and of the capture of a great number of the criminals, who were discovered at Macao in the barracoons of emigration, and all of them were delivered over to the Viceroy of Canton, with the assent of the French Consul.

From the despatches of the Governor of Macao dated the 10th November and 9th December, 1870, copies of which are inclosed, your Excellency will see that many of those malefactors appeared at Macao for the purpose of re-emigrating, thus following the example of many other criminal coolies who take to emigration as a mode of living. This fact evidently proves that the crime was not committed owing to their having been deceived or forced, but solely through malice.

In your note above-mentioned your Excellency requests that more energetic measures should be adopted with a view to prevent the repetition of similar occurrences, but, as your Excellency cannot fail to admit, and as the Minister of Marine judiciously observes, it is impossible to prevent the coolies from committing crimes on the high seas, on board the ships conveying them to their destinations.

What could be done was done; the criminals who were discovered were apprehended, and delivered to the proper authority to be tried and punished.

The Minister of Marine adds that from the contents of another despatch from the said Governor, dated the 21st January last, relative to a certain correspondence which had taken place with the Viceroy of Canton upon Chinese emigration, it may be seen that the said Governor had been informed by the French Consul at Canton, M. Dabry, that the Viceroy himself admits that emigration is carried on in a legal manner, and with scrupulous attention on the part of the Portuguese authorities.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) MARQUIS D'AVILA AND BOLAMA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Senhor de Souza to the Minister of Marine and Colonies.

(Translation.)

Most Illustrious and Excellent Sir, *Macao, November* 10, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, on the 1st October last, the French ship "Nouvelle Pénélope," left this port with 310 coolies on board, bound to Peru.

Some days afterwards, about 120 miles to the west of Macao, the coolies rose, killed the captain, mate, and eight sailors, and compelled the remainder of the crew to take the ship to the nearest land, where they landed, after having plundered the ship.

Two sailors, and two coolies, brought the news of this lamentable event to Macao; and the French Consul came here for the purpose of requesting me to send a vessel in search of the ship; but neither the corvette "Sá da Bandeira," nor the "Camões," could be employed on this service.

The French Consul at Canton having become aware of that event, proceeded with two Chinese gun-boats, commanded by Frenchmen, in search of the ship; and they returned with some Chinese, and reported the complete loss of the ship on some shoals on the coast, about 150 miles to the west of Macao. Previous to the arrival of the French Consul, the Procureur for Chinese Affairs had ordered the arrest of about twenty coolies, who had been denounced as forming part of the passengers of the ship, and who, in course of the inquiry which was made, did really declare that they had embarked on board the said ship.

After the Consul's arrival, he inspected a vessel which had emigrants on board, and there sixteen of those belonging to the "Nouvelle Pénélope" were discovered, whom I ordered to be landed immediately under arrest. He also proceeded to inspect the barracoons, where a few were also met with, and twenty-four more were caught at the Controller's Office, in the act of registration; this number included some of the heads of the revolt.

It appears that, among the passengers, there were a number of coolies who had already been marked in the ear at Hong Kong as professional thieves, and who made the revolt for the purpose of robbing the ship, which they they thought contained money and a valuable cargo.

The fact of these criminals presenting themselves afresh, for the purpose of emigrating (some of whom were already on board), fully proves that the crime was not committed because they found themselves cheated or forced, but simply and solely through perversity.

Proceedings are about to be instituted against those accused of having taken part in such an abominable crime, in order that they may be delivered afterwards to the Viceroy of Canton, or to the French Consul, as the crime was committed on board a vessel of that nation on the high seas.

It is likely that the fact (although the Consul has no claim to present to the Chinese Government for compensation), will again give rise to the complaints of the Viceroy of Canton against the emigration carried on through this port, upon which subject he has made no rejoinder after my reply. Anything else that may occur respecting this unpleasant affair, shall be communicated to your Excellency.

(Signed) ANTONIO SERGIO DE SOUZA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 15.

Senhor de Souza to the Minister of Marine and the Colonies.

(Translation.)

Most Illustrious and Excellent Sir, *Macao, December* 9, 1870.

IN addition to my despatch of the 10th of November last, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in consequence of inquiries made, a great number of coolies who were passengers on board the ship "Nouvelle Pénélope," alluded to in my despatch above mentioned, have been captured in the Emigration barracoons, and even in the act of making a new registration in the Controller's Office when about to re-emigrate.

In accordance with the examination made at the Office of the Procureur for Chinese Affairs, 72 were indicted, some as the perpetrators of the murders committed on the high seas on board that ship, and others as accomplices.

The French Consul at Canton having two Chinese gun-boats under his orders for the

purpose of attempting the capture of the criminals, applied to me in writing, in accordance with the letter of the Treaty of Extradition between Portugal and France, for the delivery of the Chinese criminals, as the crime had been committed on the high seas under the French flag.

But the VIth Article of the said Treaty did not allow me to accede to his application, because it requires the previous assent of the Viceroy of Canton. I therefore replied to him in this sense, and I stated to him that I could not receive any official communication from him upon this subject, because it is the French Consul at Hong Kong who has an exequatur for this place.

But as he showed me a despatch from the Viceroy, from which it was seen that the Chinese authorities had agreed to act in concert with him in this matter, I ordered the Chinese in question to be delivered on board the Chinese gun-boats at the disposal of the Viceroy, to whom, at the same date, I communicated my proceedings, in order to prevent delay in the correspondence.

The Viceroy replied to me that he had directed the commanders to convey the prisoners to Canton in order to be tried there; and he informed me that he was making a similar communication to the French Consul.

I afterwards learnt from an unofficial source that the Consul had made a new investigation; and that, after having set apart the criminals from the other Chinese passengers of the said "Pénélope," and whom I had sent as witnesses, he ordered the delivery of the latter to different agents, and he transferred to other Peruvian firms the contracts which they had originally signed, and many of them have already re-embarked again as emigrants.

Therefore all the Chinese ex-passengers in the above-mentioned ship have been officially delivered to the Viceroy of Canton with the assent of the French Consul, who wanted to claim them; and this affair has thus been brought to a conclusion, and I have nothing further to communicate to your Excellency thereupon.

God preserve, &c.

(Signed) ANTONIO SERGIO DA SOUZA,
Governor of Macao.

No. 16.

Consul Robertson to Mr. Hammond.—(Received May 13.)

Sir, *Canton, April 4, 1871.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your separate despatch of the 25th of January, inclosing copy of a despatch to Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, respecting the sufferings endured by coolie emigrants on board the San Salvadorian ship "Dolores Ugarte," while on a voyage from Macao to Honolulu, *en route* for Callao, and a copy of the "Globe," newspaper, in which a leading article appears on the subject.

The case of the "Dolores Ugarte" is one of great atrocity, but the records of this traffic in human beings, for which Macao is notorious under the guise of emigration, afford, I fear, could the truth be known, many similar ones.

That the Portuguese Government at Lisbon may be ignorant of what is going on is possible, but that the Portuguese Government at Macao is so, when year after year and month after month almost, the local press and common report give details of transactions unequalled even in the days of the Slave Trade on the African coast, it is difficult to believe. In the meantime the traffic continues, and Macao and its people flourish exceedingly upon the proceeds of this export of human merchandize.

The reply, I believe, of the Portuguese Government to any inquiries or remonstrances that may be addressed to it on the subject, is simple and straightforward:—"The Governor of the Settlement is instructed to frame regulations for Chinese emigration, and to see they are strictly observed, and this has been done," and with this all further responsibility or care for the welfare of the emigrants, as they are termed, appears to cease.

I will briefly mention the mode of conducting emigration under these regulations. There are five agencies at Macao for Cuba and the South American States on the Pacific seaboard, whose business it is to collect coolies. They represent firms in those countries, to whom the coolies when shipped are consigned, and who dispose of them on arrival to the highest bidder. These agencies employ sub-agents (Chinese), who go into the interior and procure men whom they bring to Macao and lodge in the barracoon of their employer. After a short period they are taken before the proper Government officer, and are asked if they are willing to emigrate, and, on assent, a contract is read over to them, which they

sign. Before they are shipped they are transferred to the Government Depôt, where they remain three days or so, and if, while there, they decline to emigrate, they are discharged.

Nothing can be fairer than this, and the Portuguese Government may point to it and say, "What more can be expected? Many of the coolies may have been kidnapped, many may have sold themselves or been sold by others, but it is really so difficult to get at the truth from Chinese, or to know what to believe or disbelieve, that we cannot enter into such questions; we see that they understand their contracts, and give them every reasonable opportunity to stay, if, on reflection, they do not like to go, and there our duty in the matter ends.

It may be questioned, however, whether the duty of the Government ends with the observance of the strict formalities of the transaction, and whether it is not bound to go a step beyond, and have some regard not only for the humanitarian side of the question, but also for the good name and repute of the local Government of Macao. I will not, however, touch upon so obvious an obligation for a Christian State, feeling assured there must be circumstances which interfere with the adoption of such a course of which I am in ignorance.

Of course, so far as the Macao transactions are concerned, the atrocities and kidnapping ascribed may be, and probably are, overstated; but when from 75 to 100 dollars, equal to 15 or 20*l.* sterling in currency, are paid by an agency for each Chinese shipped, it may naturally be assumed that the means employed to obtain coolies from the coast and in the interior are frequently such as they are represented to be, and indeed I have myself interfered for the restitution of members of a family whom I have known, who had been kidnapped and lodged in a barracoon. I do not wish for one moment to reflect upon the mode in which the Government inspection is conducted, but that it must be very cursory is evident from facts that occasionally become known. For instance, in the case of the French vessel "Nouvelle Pénélope" the coolies on board having risen, murdered the captain and part of the crew, and compelled the rest to navigate the ship to the land again, where they landed and dispersed; all who were subsequently arrested, to the number of about 120, were found and captured in the barracoons, to which they had been taken by the Chinese agents, or returned on reaching Macao, to enter again on board some other vessel as emigrants. Now the keepers of the barracoons knew perfectly well these men had only a few days previously been shipped on board the "Nouvelle Pénélope," the report of whose capture was known to every one. Indeed the leader or headman of the *émeute* on being arrested, and under promise that if he would make a clean breast of it his life would be spared, frankly acknowledged this was the second or third affair of the kind he or his associates had been concerned in, and that had it not been for the exertions of the French Consul he was under no apprehension of being interfered with, and yet I have not heard that the Macao Government has taken any proceedings against the keepers of the barracoons for harbouring people whom they knew were on board a vessel in which murder and robbery were committed. That it was aware of the fact there can be no doubt as the arrests were made in the barracoons in the presence of the Procurador. It is one of these men, known to be a principal in the murder of the master, and who escaped to Hong Kong, whose rendition on the demand of the Chinese authorities has been the subject of intricate and lengthy proceedings in the Supreme Court of that colony.

If the Portuguese Government could be induced to adopt similar rules for regulating emigration as those in force for British emigration, and which have, I see from your inclosure, been communicated to it by Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, much would be done to correct many of the existing evils, provided they were faithfully carried out. I trust, however, that the representations made to that Government of the cruelties these unhappy coolies were subjected to on board the "Dolores Ugarte," will move it take some steps for the prevention of such atrocities for the future. I must say, however, that the French and Italian Governments are highly to blame for allowing their flag to cover such proceedings, or sanctioning the masters and owners of such vessels adopting the San Salvador flag for the voyage only, as there is reason to believe is too often the case.

But these countries are not alone to blame. The paper called the "Java Handelsblad" gives an account of the treatment and disposal of certain Chinese coolies who were landed at Java from shipwrecked or burnt vessels from Macao, and if true, the same disregard for human sufferings appears to prevail in the Dutch Colony of Batavia, as it does in the Portuguese one of Macao. Perhaps, however, it was the cheapest and readiest way of getting rid of objectionable Chinese, if that can be any excuse for such proceedings.

I have, &c.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

No. 17.

Earl Granville to Sir C. Murray.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 25, 1871.*

WITH reference to your despatch of 29th April, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Canton,* on the subject of coolie emigration from Macao; and I have to instruct you to communicate the substance of the same to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the information of the Portuguese Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 18.

Mr. Doria to Earl Granville.—(Received June 27.)

My Lord, *Lisbon, June 16, 1871.*

AS instructed by your Lordship's despatch of the 25th May, addressed to Sir Charles Murray, I communicated confidentially to the Marquis d'Avila, in conversation yesterday, the substance of the despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Canton, on the subject of coolie emigration from Macao.

His Excellency has promised me to bring the matter under the serious attention of the Governor, who is but recently appointed to the Governorship, and is still in Lisbon. His Excellency begged me to furnish him with a Memorandum in order more effectually to impress it on the consideration of the newly-appointed Governor, who, he states, is a young man, and therefore will be more inclined to feel for the sufferings inflicted by this system of traffic in human beings.

I have, in compliance with the Marquis d'Avila's request, caused extracts to be made from Mr. Robertson's despatch which forms inclosure in your Lordship's above despatch, which I have sent to his Excellency.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of my note for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. DORIA.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Sir C. Murray to the Marquis d'Avila.

M. le Ministre, *Lisbon, June 16, 1871.*

AS requested by your Excellency when speaking to you confidentially yesterday on the subject of the cruelty and abuses of coolie emigration at Macao, I have the honour to inclose a Memorandum relative to the subject with which your Excellency desired to be furnished in order to press the matter on the attention of the Portuguese Governor, who is shortly to proceed to his new post, in the hope of preventing such atrocities for the future.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) WM. DORIA.

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* No. 16.

CORRESPONDENCE respecting the Emigration of Chinese Coolies from Macao.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1871.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

EVACUATION OF CANTON.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1862.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

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Correspondence respecting the Evacuation of Canton.

No. 1.

Mr. Parkes to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received December* 14.)

Sir, *Canton, October* 27, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the evacuation of Canton by the allied troops was completed on the 21st instant, and that on that morning possession of the city was restored to the Chinese authorities.

The arrangements for this event had been previously announced to the Chinese in the Proclamation of which I inclose a copy, issued by the Tartar General-in-chief, the Viceroy of the Two Kwang Provinces, and the Governor of the Province of Kwang-tung. The concluding paragraph of this document will probably be read with interest, as recording in a few true and forcible words the manner in which the occupation has been conducted, and the good effects resulting from it. It is a well-merited tribute to the behaviour both of the allied troops and the Chinese population, and affords evidence of the necessity and the success of a measure which is now happily terminated.

A remarkable proof of the good feeling that has been maintained between the allied troops and the people may be seen in the fact that during the three years and ten months that the occupation continued, only two instances occurred in which attempts to take life were committed by the Chinese upon our men. I except, of course, from this general statement the frequent attacks made by hired assassins during the hostilities of the summer of 1858, when, following their usual mode of treacherous and cowardly warfare, the Chinese Government set a price, rising in the case of certain individuals to an immense sum, on the head of every man or subject of the allies. It should also be noticed, as a proof of the mildness of the military rule of the latter, that the two offenders in the instances above mentioned were the only Chinese who suffered capital punishment at our hands during the whole period of the occupation.

The same respect evinced towards the troops has been likewise shown by the Chinese towards all foreigners. Prior to the occupation, the foreigner passed through the streets of the suburbs only—for, as is well known, within the city he was not allowed to set his foot—at the risk of being insulted, or assailed with stones and the vilest invective. This tone and language was laid aside from the moment of the capture of the city; and the single foreigner may now walk about its streets or suburbs, or penetrate, as many have done, into remote parts of the province, with the same degree of security as is enjoyed at those other ports where the Chinese authorities have insisted on proper behaviour on the part of the people, or have not incited them to oppose or annoy the foreigner. The occupation has at least proved that most of the professedly popular opposition which we encountered at Canton prior to its capture was the effect of official instigation, and as the political end which the Mandarins then attempted to serve no longer exists, we may hope that any repetition of this double-dealing on their part will not be experienced.

Much of the credit of the present friendly disposition of the people is due to the orderly behaviour and the efficiency of the allied police, five-sixths of whom were taken from the British force. To these men the people would run for aid and protection under all circumstances, and applications for the interference of the Allied Commissioners in strictly native matters, which in most cases were reserved for the action of the Chinese tribunals, were also constantly pressed with the same degree of eagerness. The confidence of the people in a strong and inoppressive Government, added to their own governable character, materially facilitated the task of maintaining order in a vast and most intricate city, containing a population of upwards of 1,000,000 inhabitants.

The satisfactory change in the conduct of the authorities and people towards foreigners, and the consequently improved position of the latter, is doubtless the principal result of

the occupation, and the one that was most to be desired; but other monuments of the event will remain in the Shameen site, and the introduction of an organized system of emigration. The former work has set at rest a long-vexed question which has formed an element in many of the old Canton misunderstandings. The community have been provided with most commodious building ground, obtained without any encroachment on the public or private interests of the Chinese, at an outlay proportioned, it is true, to the great extent of the accommodation obtained, but which, although undertaken, in the first instance, on Government responsibility, has already been nearly repaid by the community. The latter measure, emigration, being now confirmed by Treaty, has secured a new and unlimited supply of labour for the British West Indian and other Colonies, and the present is now the third year in which advantage has been taken of the arrangement.

I beg to refer you to the inclosed printed account for authentic details of the ceremonies attending the delivery of the city into the hands of the Chinese authorities.

Being detained here until this date by the closing duties of the Allied Commission, I can report the maintenance of perfect order thus far by the Chinese authorities, and the prospect, if they continue the precautions they have adopted, of their being able to hold the city against any domestic enemy.

With a view to the convenience of the Chinese authorities, and to prevent disturbance, the evacuation was conducted as gradually as possible, and our guards, as they were withdrawn from each post, were relieved by efficient detachments of Chinese troops. The present garrison of the city, numbering upwards of 8,000 men, Tartars and Chinese, should be sufficient for every purpose of defence, and upwards of 100 pieces of artillery have been already mounted by them upon the city walls.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES,
Late one of the Allied Commissioners for the Government of the City of Canton.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Proclamation.

(Translation.)

MU, General commanding the Eight Banners of the Manchou and Chinese garrison of Canton and the Marine battalion of Manchou troops, General-in-chief of the forces in the province of Kwang-tung:

Laou, bearer of a button of the highest class, a President of the Board of War, a member of the Board of Censorate, Viceroy and Commander-in-chief of the Two Kwang provinces, and Comptroller of Supplies:

Ke, of the Imperial kindred, a Vice-President of the Board of War, an associate member of the Board of Censorate, Governor of the Province of Kwang-tung, Commander of the forces, and Comptroller of Supplies:

Jointly proclaim, for public information, that the Allied Commissioners of England and France have personally arranged with the Viceroy that, on the 21st of October, the allied Commanders will withdraw the whole of the troops now garrisoning Canton, together with the Allied Commission, and restore possession of the city.

This action of the two nations, in withdrawing their troops and restoring the city before the completion of the payments of indemnity, establishing proof of the mutual relations of sincere good faith and of perpetual devotion to concord and friendship, is a subject of high gratification to the Tartar General and Viceroy, which is equally shared by the Governor, in his residence at Shao-chou-fu.

On their own part, the Tartar General and Viceroy have likewise determined that on the 21st of October, they will together proceed to the Hall of Assembly on the Heights, in order to conduct the arrangements for the restoration of the city, with the allied Commanders and Commissioners, on a footing of mutual courtesy. Salutes will be mutually fired, and flags exchanged, to develop the element of joy, in order that the admirable intention of cordial harmony between the Chinese and foreign nations may be auspiciously illustrated.

This Proclamation is accordingly issued, that the inhabitants of the city and its neighbourhood may be thoroughly informed. Men of all descriptions within and without the city are accordingly hereby notified, that on the day aforesaid, on the restoration of Canton by the allied nations of England and France, the firing of salutes and exchange of flags will take place, in mutual manifestation of courtesy and respect.

Furthermore, during the occupation of Canton by the allied troops of England and

France, during a period of four years, their conduct has never been otherwise than friendly towards the military and people of the whole city, and the military and people having also corresponded with courtesy and friendship, harmony has been maintained from first to last. Now that the troops are being withdrawn, the Consuls of England and France will continue to reside within the city, while the merchants and people of all nations will constantly pass in and out, or reside therein at their pleasure. It remains the duty of yourselves, the military and people, to continue to them the same respectful and courteous relations that have prevailed during the occupation, and then perpetual amity between our respective nations will be secured. The Tartar General and Viceroy sincerely hope that henceforward, by firmly adhering to the Treaties of Peace, both Chinese and foreigners will enjoy together the blessing of prosperity and peace.

Let all be thoroughly informed hereof, and act obediently.

A special Proclamation.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Account of the Evacuation of Canton, on the 21st October, 1861.

THE evacuation of Canton was completed on the 21st instant, and after three years and ten months of occupation by foreign troops, the authority of the Chinese is once more supreme in the city. Nearly all the troops and stores having been previously removed, the ceremonies attending the restoration of the city into the hands of the native authorities commenced on the morning of the 19th, when all the chief authorities, headed by the Viceroy, called at the Allied Commissioners' Yamun to take leave of the Commanders and Commissioners. They were received in state, with English and French guards of honour and the band of Her Majesty's 99th Regiment, together with salutes from a battery of Royal Artillery. The reception-hall of the Allied Commission was draped with flags, and chairs were arranged securing due order of precedence. In the absence of Brigadier-General Crawford, C.B., detained by illness at Hong Kong, the French Commandant-Supérieur took the lead in receiving the authorities, while Captain Borlase, C.B., and Colonel Dowbiggin, Her Majesty's 99th Regiment, represented the British forces, followed by Mr. Harry S. Parkes, C.B., and M. de Tanouarne, the Allied Commissioners. The Viceroy expressed his gratification at the mark of confidence displayed by the contemplated rendition of Canton, together with his regrets at the severance of ties cemented during several years of friendly intercourse; and after some conversation the authorities withdrew, shaking hands with the assembled officers. In the afternoon the visit was returned, the Allied Commanders and Commissioners, with their suites, proceeding to the Viceroy's Yamun, the courtyard of which was lined with the troops of his brigade of guards; and in his reception-hall they found not only the authorities assembled, but also a collation in the European style laid out with the utmost elegance. This unexpected feature was acknowledged as a delicate mark of attention, heightening the friendly effect of the farewell visit. While formal leave was being taken of the Viceroy, his Excellency is said to have made special allusion to the Consuls of England and France, as being delivered into his care, with a promise to watch over their safety.

The final ceremonies immediately preceding the evacuation commenced at 7 A.M. on Monday the 21st instant, when the Chinese authorities proceeded to the Heights, for the purpose of accepting the formal rendition of the city. After all had assembled, a battery of Chinese artillery saluted the allied flags with twenty-one guns, which were returned by Captain Twiss's battery, under Lieutenant Hannen; and as the last shot resounded, the flags of England and France were lowered from the pinnacle they have occupied since 1857; and the Commanders, rising, announced to the Viceroy that the occupation of Canton had ceased, and that from that moment they resigned into his hands the civil and military government of Canton. In reply, the Viceroy, rising with all his suite, expressed with evident feeling his gratitude for the confidence shown in the good intentions of his Government, and his conviction that friendly feelings between the three nations must be cemented from that hour.

The scene at this moment was decidedly impressive, and worthy of an historical event such as it signalized. The long line of the Chinese authorities, in their half-mourning garments of black serge, presented, it is true, a sombre appearance, but this was relieved by the glitter of the naval and military uniforms, occupying the opposite side of the late Garrison Church, which had been fitted up for the ceremony of the day. While the formal rendition was taking place, the Chinese banner, of yellow silk decorated with an Imperial dragon, was hoisted from the English flag-staffs on the Heights and at the landing-place,

as well as at the mainmast-head of Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx," from which vessel a Royal salute to the Chinese flag was fired, in response to which the Imperial junks likewise fired twenty-one guns. The native authorities hereupon left the Heights to prepare to receive the allied officials at the place of embarkation. Their procession was formed in order as follows:—

The Viceroy Lao-tsung-kwang.
Chinese General Kwen-shou.
Chinese Admiral Wen-hsien.
Tartar Lieutenant-General Ku.
Tartar Lieutenant-General Hai.
Financial Commissioner.
Judicial Commissioner.
Salt Commissioner.
Grain Commissioner.
Brigadier of Viceroy's Guards.
Commandant of Kwang-hip Troops.
Lieutenant-Colonel of Governor's Guards.
Prefect of Kwang-chou-fu.
Magistrate of Nanhai District.
Acting Magistrate of Puan-yu District.

Shortly after the Chinese had departed, the Allied Officials commenced their final move, and proceeded in the order detailed below to the place of embarkation. The military road, nearly a mile in length, was lined with crowds of natives, whose demeanour was thoroughly respectful, while Chinese troops were drawn up in line, with arms and banners displayed on the walls and the parade-ground. The order of the Allies as as follows:—

1. Commandant Supérieur of French Forces, M. Coupvent des Bois.
2. Senior Naval Officer, Captain Borlase, C.B., R.N.
3. Senior Military Officer, Colonel Dowbiggin, Her Majesty's 99th Foot.
4. French Commissioner, M. de Tanquarne.
5. British Commissioner, Harry S. Parkes, Esq., C.B.
6. British Consul, D. B. Robertson, Esq.
7. French Consul, M. le Baron de Trenqualy.
8. French Bishop of Canton.
9. British Chaplain, the Rev. J. H. Gray.
10. Captain the Hon. G. Keane, R.N., Her Majesty's ship "Charybdis."
11. Captain Day, V.C., &c., Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx."

12—14. Three Staff (British).

15—17. Three Staff (French).

18. Interpreter to Allied Commission, Wm. S. Frederick Mayers, Esq., Her Majesty's Civil Service.

In a temporary building at the landing-place, the native authorities were awaiting the Allied Officials, who were placed this time in the post of honour, *i.e.*, on the left, as being guests instead of hosts as before. While the troops, artillery, &c., were embarking, the band of the 99th Regiment played its last airs in Canton, and the native authorities, the Commanders, and Commissioners, took farewell of each other. The Viceroy was understood to say that he had no sincerer wish than that he might be appointed Ambassador to England and France, in order that he might not only see those countries, but also contribute further to that good understanding which so happily prevailed, and of which the cloudless weather might be considered as both typical and as a striking mark of Heaven's approbation.

The final leave-taking was then completed, and the embarkation took place amid a salute to the Allied Commanders of fifteen guns from the Imperial junks, acknowledged by Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx." The gun-boats with the troops left at once for Hong Kong, and Chinese soldiers took possession of the landing-place.

The British Consular flag was hoisted in the late Allied Commissioners' Yamun at the moment when the flags upon the Heights were struck; and Her Majesty's Consul will henceforward reside within the city, Her Majesty's Government having leased half of the Yamun for the purpose, the Consulate office being retained at Honam still. The French Consular flag was likewise hoisted at the Treasury Yamun, and both Consuls were saluted later in the day with fourteen guns from Her Majesty's ship "Sphinx."

No. 2.

Earl Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1861.

I HAVE received from Mr. Parkes a despatch reporting the termination of his duties as one of the allied Commissioners for the government of the city of Canton, and I have to instruct you to convey to Mr. Parkes Her Majesty's entire approbation of the tact, judgment, and ability which he has shown during the whole period that he has acted as British Commissioner.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

CHINA.

CORRESPONDENCE respecting the Affairs of Canton

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1862.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

108665

CHINA. No. 2. (1864.)

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

FITTING OUT, DISPATCHING TO CHINA, AND ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL,

OF THE

ANGLO-CHINESE FLEET

UNDER THE COMMAND OF

CAPTAIN SHERARD OSBORN;

AND THE

DISMISSAL OF MR. LAY

FROM THE

CHIEF INSPECTORATE OF CUSTOMS.

Presented to the House of Lords by Command of Her Majesty.
1864.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS

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[The Correspondence respecting the Inspectorate System has already been presented to Parliament. The Correspondence respecting the Rebellion in China will be included in a separate collection of Papers relating to China.]

No. 1.

Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn to Earl Russell.—(Received August 14.)

Chinese Government Agency, 6, Little George Street, Westminster, S.W., August 13, 1862.

My Lord,

WE, the undersigned, on the part of the Emperor of China, have the honour to apprize your Lordship that a green flag, bearing a yellow diagonal cross, has been adopted as the national ensign of the European Chinese force, and to beg that your Lordship will be pleased to cause this fact to be notified in the "Gazette," for general information.

We have, &c.

(Signed) H. N. LAY.
SHERARD OSBORN.

No. 2.

Mr. Lay to Earl Russell.—(Received August 29.)

6, *Little George Street, Westminster, August 28, 1862.*

My Lo_,

WITH reference to my letter of the 13th instant, respecting an ensign for the European-Chinese force, I beg to be allowed to press upon your Lordship the necessity of this step.

1. By the law of nations, vessels without a recognized flag are subject to capture or detention.

2. The British ensign cannot be hoisted in vessels the property of the Emperor of China.

3. The ensigns on board Chinese vessels are in hue and colour dependent upon the taste e commanders. China has no national flag.

4. The flag I propose appears to be one least likely to be mistaken for that of any other

nation; and your Lordship will appreciate the great importance, in view of cases of the "Arrow" class, of binding the Chinese Government to the use of one ensign in their naval force. I see no reason to apprehend any difficulty in obtaining the formal consent of the Emperor to the flag proposed.

Lastly, I have already purchased five vessels. As public property, it is desirable that they should be exempted from the payment of port charges and harbour dues. And it is essential, in order to guard against detention by the customs, as the vessels can have no register, that they should have an officially recognized flag. I trust, therefore, that your Lordship will not deem me importunate in again requesting you to cause the notification of the adoption of the flag in question to be published in the "Gazette."

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. N. LAY.

No. 3.

Mr. Layard to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1862.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to transmit to you copies of two letters from Mr. H. N. Lay,* notifying the adoption of a green flag with a yellow cross to designate the vessels of war which he and Captain Osborn are fitting out for the service of the Chinese Government, and requesting that this notification may be published in the "Gazette."

I am to request that you will state to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that before taking any steps in this matter, Lord Russell would be glad to be informed whether their Lordships are aware that the Chinese Government has no national distinctive flag, as stated by Mr. Lay, and whether they see any objection to a compliance with Mr. Lay's wishes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 4.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Layard.—(Received August 30.)

Sir, *Admiralty, August* 29, 1862.

IN reply to your letter of yesterday's date, transmitting copies of two letters from Mr. Lay, notifying the adoption of a green flag with a yellow cross, to designate the vessels of war which he and Captain Osborn are fitting out for the service of the Chinese Government, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will state to Earl Russell that they will give the necessary orders that the flag chosen by Mr. Lay be respected by their officers; but their Lordships cannot recommend that an official notification of a national flag for Chinese vessels should appear in the "Gazette" until the adoption of the flag has been approved by the Chinese authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

No. 5.

Mr. Layard to Mr. Lay.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1862.

IN reply to your letters of the 13th and 28th ultimo, I am directed by Earl Russell to inform you that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will give directions to Her Majesty's naval officers to respect the flag chosen by you and Captain Osborn to designate the vessels of war which you are fitting out for the service of the Chinese Government, but that no notification respecting this flag can be published in the "Gazette" until it has been approved by the Government at Pekin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

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* Nos. 1 and 2.

No. 6.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1862.

I INCLOSE copies of a correspondence with Mr. H. N. Lay and with the Admiralty,* relative to the adoption by Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn of a green flag with a yellow cross, to designate the vessels of war which they are fitting out for the service of the Chinese Government, and I have to instruct you to inquire of Prince Kung whether the Chinese Government sanctions the adoption of the flag in question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 7.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of the "London Gazette" of this day, containing an order of the Queen in Council, authorising Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn to enlist men and to equip vessels for the service of the Emperor of China.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 8.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Lay.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1862.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to state to you, that it appears to Her Majesty's Government that unless you are already provided with a written authority from the Chinese Government for the steps which you are taking to provide that Government with naval assistance, you should procure such authority; and I am accordingly to request that you will take steps for obtaining such authority as soon as possible, although in the meanwhile Her Majesty's Government are prepared to act on the assurances of Mr. Bruce, and not interpose any delay in your proceedings.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 9.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1862.

I INCLOSE, for your information, copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to Mr. Lay,‡ suggesting that he should procure some written authority from the Chinese Government for the steps which he is taking to provide that Government with naval assistance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 10.

Mr. Lay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 8.)

Chinese Government Agency, 6, Little George Street,
Sir, *Westminster, October* 9, 1862.

MY absence from England has prevented my receiving before yesterday your letter of the 10th September.

With reference to Earl Russell's desire that I should obtain a written authority from the Chinese Government for the steps I am taking to provide it with naval assistance, I have the

* Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

† See Paper presented to Parliament in Return to an Address of the House of Commons, dated June 4, 1863 (No. 341.)

‡ No. 8.

honour to state that I hold such written authority, dated the 14th March, 1862, from my *locum tenens*, Mr. Hart, to purchase and equip a steam fleet, in accordance with instructions from the Imperial Government.

I have since received regular remittances from the Foreign Customs for that purpose, by direction of Prince Kung.

I may add, for his Lordship's information, that on the 28th June last, I received through Mr. Hart a despatch from the Chinese Foreign Office relative to the proposed fleet. This despatch prays the Inspector-General of Customs in earnest terms to use the utmost despatch in procuring the vessels. It repeats the instructions issued to the Governors of various provinces as to the amounts to be contributed by them towards the cost of the fleet; refers to the Emperor's anxiety that no time should be lost; and closes with a second earnest appeal to the Inspector-General for these reasons "not to lose a day."

With respect to the flag for the fleet, I have written for precise authority. As soon as I receive it, I will not fail to apprise Earl Russell of the fact.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. N. LAY.

No. 11.

Mr. Lay to Earl Russell.—(*Received January* 29.)

Chinese Government Agency,
6, *Little George Street, January* 28, 1863.

My Lord,

REFERRING to my letter to your Lordship of the 28th of August last, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship a drawing of the flags. Ensign:—Green ground, intersected by two yellow diagonal bands, bearing the Imperial Jack in the centre. Jack:—Yellow, triangular, with Imperial blue dragon. Which, under the authority of the Emperor of China, conveyed to me through Prince Kung, have been chosen for the use of the European-Chinese naval forces. The Jack bearing the Imperial crest was transmitted to me from Pekin by a recent mail.

In order to enable me to dispatch the vessels purchased in this country to China, I beg that your Lordship will cause the necessary notification to be inserted in the "Gazette" for the information of foreign Powers as well as of our own authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. N. LAY.

No. 12.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 7, 1863.

WITH reference to your letter of the 29th of August last, I am directed by Earl Russell to transmit to you, herewith, a copy of a letter from Mr. Lay,* stating that he has received authority from the Chinese Government to use the flags of which drawings are contained in the accompanying inclosure, and asking that the necessary notification may be inserted in the "Gazette," for the information of foreign Powers, as well as of the British authorities.

I am to request that, in laying the same before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, you will move them to take the proper steps in compliance with Mr. Lay's request, if they should see no objection thereto.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 13.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(*Received April* 18.)

My Lord, *Pekin, January* 4, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward translation of a despatch from the Prince of Kung, by which your Lordship will see that the Chinese Government have adopted a national flag, for which they claim the same privilege as that accorded to other nations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

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* No. 11.

Inclosure in No. 13.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.) *Pekin, October* 22, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

It is the usage of foreign vessels to fly a national ensign so easily recognised that a glance suffices to show, at any distance, that such or such a vessel is a Government vessel, and the removal of this ensign is prohibited.

The war vessels of China have flags which enable them to be distinguished, and to those already in use there is now to be added a dragon ensign. The flag will be three-cornered. That carried by large vessels will measure ten Chinese feet in the perpendicular; that of small vessels seven or eight Chinese feet. Its length along its other sides may be varied at discretion. The ground will be yellow, and on this will be designed a dragon with his head toward the upper part of the flag. This will, to a certain extent, make the flag recognisable the moment it is seen.

The proposal having been submitted to the Throne, His Imperial Majesty has issued a Decree instructing the naval forces of all the provinces to adopt it; and the Prince trusts that the British Minister will forthwith signify to the officers of the British Navy in different parts of the empire, and to all British vessels, that, whenever they meet the above described dragon ensign they are to regard it as the Government flag of China; that, as with foreign flags, the removal of it is an unauthorized proceeding; that if it be removed (the offender) will be punished for violation of the rule (*lit.* steps will be taken as in the case of violation of prohibitions); and that, no matter what the cause of quarrel, or what the rights of the question, the violation of the prohibition must be severely punished before any further discussion,

The Prince hopes the British Minister will issue most positive instructions on this subject.

A necessary communication addressed to the Hon. Mr. Bruce, &c. &c. &c.

Tung-Chih, 1st year, intercalary 8th moon, 29th day (22nd October, 1862).

No. 14.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 22, 1863.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,* copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister in China, inclosing a copy of communication from Prince Kung, relative to the national flag adopted by the Chinese Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 15.

Captain Osborn to Earl Russell.—(Received January 8, 1864)

My Lord, *Shanghai, November* 23, 1863.

AS I fear that Mr. Lay, by some accident, has failed to send you the correspondence which has taken place between us and the Prince Regent of China, as well as Sir Frederick Bruce, I take the liberty of enclosing a copy; for I feel that, in justice to Mr. Lay, myself, and the officers and men of the force under my command, it is only proper that your Lordship should be put in possession of all the circumstances connected with the dissolution of a force organised under Her Majesty's Order in Council of August, 1862.

I have reported all the circumstances to the Admiralty, and send home Commander Chas. S. Forbes, R.N., to give all further information.

I am proud to say, that every officer and man in the force has supported me in the line of conduct I considered it necessary to carry out, and that is my best consolation under as sore a disappointment as could well befall a naval officer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

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* No. 13.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

The Prince of Kung's Letter of Instructions to Mr. Lay.

(Translation.) *Pekin, October* 24, 1862.

THE Prince of Kung, charged by Imperial authority with the superintendence of Foreign Affairs, addresses a communication to the Inspector-General, Mr. H. N. Lay.

The official records show that, at the interview which the Acting Inspector-General had with me in the autumn of 1861, he represented that, in order to render our navy efficient, it was absolutely necessary that foreign vessels and foreign guns should be procured. He subsequently addressed me in writing, begging that orders might be issued to the custom-houses to contribute towards the purchase of foreign vessels and guns. The Foreign Office thereupon memorialised the Emperor on the subject, and His Majesty's assent having been obtained, ordere were issued to the custom-houses to pay into the hands of the Acting Inspector-General ths amount sanctioned for the above purpose; and the Acting Inspector-General was desired to act without delay.

The Acting Inspector-General has now come to the capital, and apprised us that all the arrangements connected with the purchase of vessels and guns he has officially handed over to the Inspector-General, Mr. Lay, to carry out on his behalf in England, and that he has remitted the monies paid by the custom-houses to the Inspector-General Lay, who is proceeding in the matter with the utmost despatch.

Mr. Hart has stated, further, that the ability of the Inspector-General Lay is great, and that he possesses a mind which embraces the minutest details,—that he is therefore fully competent to make the necessary arrangements with more than a satisfactory result; and he has accordingly requested us to address a despatch to the Inspector-General Lay, to serve as his authority.

In any arrangements which the Acting Inspector-General might have made with respect to the purchase of vessels and guns, there is no doubt that he would have taken the greatest pains, and would have left no point unconsidered; but as he has now requested that the management of the whole affair should be entrusted to the Inspector-General, this will be, of course, still more satisfactory. I therefore address this despatch to the Inspector-General, and transfer the management of the affair into his hands.

There are three important points:—

1. The purchase of the vessels, guns, gunpowder, coal, and the miscellaneous articles for the use of the vessels.

2. The engagement of officers, gunners, and seamen, and others, for service in the vessels; and the arranging the terms and conditions of every description of agreement.

3. The retention, as proposed, of a sum of money to meet the salaries and wages that may be settled by the agreements, and also to provide for the payment of compensations and other items in time to come.

The above three points we leave the Inspector-General to dispose of, as in his discretion he may see fit.

The money already collected from the custom-houses has been transmitted, through Mr. Hart, to Mr. Lay; and that still due should be, as collected, handed through Mr. Hart to Mr. Lay, who is alone charged with the responsibility of its disbursement.

And we leave it to Mr. Lay to appoint, if he think fit, a person to help him, and also to make whatever arrangements may, in his judgment, seem desirable, with a view to the successful carrying out (of the objects in view).

China is in urgent need of vessels and guns. Effort should therefore be made to effect, with the least possible delay, their completion and dispatch to Shanghai, there to await orders. The work (put into the vessels) should be strong, the materials genuine—both of super-excellent quality—that so the high trust we have confided to Mr. Lay may be fulfilled.

In the event of the Inspector-General's returning to his post before these ships and guns are ready and dispatched to China, and if any other circumstances which we cannot here foresee should arise, let the Inspector-General report thereupon to us himself, and recommend a person trustworthy in all respects to act in his room; so that, in respect of the arrangements subsequently made, the responsibility may be definitely fixed.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Agreement entered into between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn.

London, January 16, 1863.

THE following conditions embody our mutual understanding :—

1. Osborn agrees to take the command of the European-Chinese navy for a period of four years, and stipulates that there shall be no other European naval Commander-in-Chief.

2. Osborn, as Commander-in-Chief, is to have entire control over all vessels of European construction, as well as native vessels manned with Europeans, that may be in the employ of the Emperor of China, or, under his authority, of the native guilds.

3. Lay will procure from the Emperor such an authority as may be necessary to cover Osborn's acts as the Commander-in-Chief of the European-Chinese navy.

4. Osborn undertakes to act upon all orders of the Emperor which may be conveyed direct to Lay; and Osborn engages not to attend to any orders conveyed through any other channel.

5. Lay, upon his part, engages to refuse to be the medium of any orders of the reasonableness of which he is not satisfied.

6. Osborn will appoint all officers and men on board the vessels of the force, subject, however, to the approval of Lay, as the representative of the Emperor.

7. Osborn's subordinates will not be at liberty to act without his permission; and Lay will not authorise his subordinates to call upon them to act without having first consulted Osborn, and obtained the necessary order.

8. Lay and Osborn agree to carefully inquire into any complaints that may be preferred against the officers and men employed in the force by Chinese officials.

9. The force being European, it is indispensable that the flag under which it acts should have an European character, first, to secure its own efficiency; secondly, to ensure for it due respect in the eyes of the foreign communities.

Lay, therefore, agrees that the flag shall be green, with two yellow diagonal bands, bearing in the centre a blue imperial dragon. Green is chosen because it is rarely used by European Powers, and therefore not likely to be confounded with any other national colours.

10. Lay undertakes to procure from the Emperor, as soon as possible, a sum of money as a guarantee fund, to cover the pay and maintenance of the force for four years, and in the meantime it is understood that the vessels, with their equipment, will constitute the security for the just claims of the force.

11. In the event of the death of either Lay or Osborn, these conditions, which are entered into with the authority of the Emperor of China, are not, it is understood, in either case to be departed from.

12. The conditions of this understanding, the terms of the formal agreement, and the printed instructions, shall be formally ratified by the Emperor at Pekin, before Osborn shall be called upon to act with the force under his command.

13. In the event of Osborn's death from disease while in command of the force, Lay will recommend the Emperor of China to make some grant to his widow and children,

(Signed) H. N. LAY.
SHERARD OSBORN.

Our motive for drawing up the above memorandum is, that there may be hereafter no deviation from a plan of action long deliberated and decided upon by mutual consent.

We have to deal with Asiatics, prone to deceit and falsehood, ready to evade any engagement directly it interferes with their views or momentary interests. We are about to afford them material military aid, and it behoves us to guard against its being misapplied, and thereby bring scandal upon ourselves, and those who in Great Britain have promoted our views; above all, we are to take care that the great power, and proportionate responsibilities, conferred upon us by Her Majesty's Order in Council, be not abused by us, by our successors, or by the Chinese authorities.

Clause 1. This condition needs no explanation. It is made a *sine qua non* by Captain Osborn.

Clause 2. This we agree, too, is most necessary. We are aware that for some time local mandarins have been, without imperial authority, purchasing vessels of European construction, arming them, placing crews of all nations in them, and giving over the command to British or American subjects selected by themselves. Lorchas, or junks, commanded by Europeans, half pirates, half privateers, are swarming in the Yang-tsze. They claim, in many cases, to be men-of-war belonging to particular mandarins, guilds, or hongs. It is the object of this force to

extinguish all these dangerous freebooters. They should come under Imperial authority, without which no European has a shadow of right to levy war in China.

Clause 3. This is inserted to meet any objection that might be raised, on the ground that Europeans are serving without commissions, or direct authority from the Emperor.

Clauses 4 and 5. These are to meet the following difficult questions :—Is this squadron to carry on war in China upon a Chinese method ? Through what channel is Captain Osborn, unacquainted as he is with the language, to communicate with the Emperor or Regent ? How shall he be protected against the charge of disobedience of orders ? How are cruel or unjust orders from Pekin to be prevented ? How shall European officers and seamen levy war for a barbarous sovereign, without being made to participate in acts which our country would repudiate ? How shall the officers be protected from orders, the execution of which would involve breaches of international law or treaty rights ?

There is in our opinion no other way of meeting these difficulties than by arranging that, as Mr. Lay is to live in Pekin, and as the revenue which he collects is to be the guarantee for the maintenance of the force, he—as one well competent, from a knowledge of the language and people—should be the channel of inter-communication between the ruler of China and Captain Osborn, and that in the event of any order being at variance with law or justice, he should submit it to the European representatives, and supported by them, decline to communicate it to Captain Osborn.

The remaining clauses do not seem to us to need explanation.

Inclosure 3 in No. 15.

Mr. Lay to Captain Osborn.

Sir, *Pekin, September 25, 1863.*

I BEG to inclose for your information the translation of a letter to your address from the Prince of Kung, which was sent to me in July last, and to invite your attention to the marginal notes I have appended to it. From my remarks you will see that the Prince has not been quite accurate in making it appear that I had requested the appointment of a Chinese officer to command the steam fleet, or that I had consented that the fleet should be placed under the irresponsible authority of the local officials, as my letters to his Highness, which are upon record, show. I never gave more than a qualified assent to the rules with which he has furnished you. I accepted the money clauses, but those having reference to yourself and the fleet generally, I told the Ministers plainly, would have to be considered upon your arrival. The Prince doubtless thought that by declaring positively that these rules had been agreed to by me, the chances of your offering any opposition to them would be diminished.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. N. LAY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 15.

The Prince of Kung's Letter of Instructions to Captain Osborn.

(Translation.) *Pekin, July 8, 1863.*

HIS Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung issues these instructions to Osborn, the Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese steam navy.

Whereas China, in view of the then unfinished military operations, did last year direct the Inspector-General of Customs—Lay, to purchase foreign steamers and guns for use in the fight, and for the subjugation of the foe, and whereas the said Inspector-General has arrived at Pekin, and reports that the seven steamers, and the store-ship purchased, will shortly arrive at Shanghai, and requesting the appointment of an officer to take the command, highly recommends the said Osborn, as having hitherto in England been zealous in the performance of his duties, of high military capacity, and, being thoroughly versed in naval affairs, able to assist a high Chinese officer* in the management of such vessels, so that there may therefrom be expected a speedy sweeping away of the appearance of rebellion, and whereas I, the Prince,

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Remarks by Mr. Lay.

* This is not correct. So far from requesting that a Chinese should be appointed, I told the Ministers, when they brought forward the proposition, that it was altogether out of the question.

memorialized the throne, requesting that the officer already nominated by the Governor-General of the Two Keang, and the Governor of Keangsoo, might be appointed Chinese Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, and that the said Osborn might be appointed Assistant Commander-in-Chief, and that the expenditure of the fleet should be controlled, for a period of four years, by the Inspector-General Lay, and whereas on the 23rd of the 5th Moon (8th July) the Imperial edict was received. "Let it be as proposed. Respect this:"

Now, therefore, in addition to hurrying despatches to the Governor-General of the Two Keang, and the Governor of Keangsoo, that they may at once order the Chinese Commander-in-Chief to repair to Shanghai with his officers and men. and take up his commission on board ship, it is further extremely proper to furnish the said Osborn with a copy of the agreement, in five articles,* entered into between the Inspector-General Lay and the Foreign Office, and to appoint the said Osborn to be Assistant Commander-in-Chief, and to direct him, in accordance with the articles of the agreement, to co-operate with the Chinese Commander-in-Chief in the command of the fleet now commissioned.

It is to be expected that the fleet will act with vigour against the enemy. The crews are to be kept under strict discipline, and not suffered to annoy the people. If trading vessels, whether Chinese or foreign, illegally engage in the carriage of munitions of war, they are to be seized and detained until receipt of orders from the Foreign Office. If there are pirates on the Chinese seas or rivers, from time to time, no matter where the place may be, they are to be captured and destroyed, in order to the complete restoration of tranquillity.

As regards smuggling, and smuggling guilds, at the ports on the coast, and up the rivers, the fleet is authorized to take measures for the due repression of the same.

The said Assistant Commander-in-Chief will, moreover, consider himself under the orders of the Governor-General of the Two Keang and the Governors of Keangsoo, and will take their instructions as to the disposal, from time to time, of his force.

Inclosure.

Five rules agreed upon respecting the steam fleet:—

1. It has been settled that the post of Chinese Commander-in-Chief of the steam fleet now purchased shall be filled by the High Officer selected by the Chinese Government, and that Captain Osborn, C.B., a British subject, shall be Assistant Commander-in-Chief, for a period of four years. The affairs of the fleet are to be managed by the said Commanders-in-Chief in a friendly spirit of co-operation. Whilst Captain Osborn assists the Chinese Government in the command of the fleet, he will take the instructions of the Governors-General and Governors as to the employment or distribution of the force.‡ In all operations, he is always to confer personally with those officers before either undertaking or staying these, and is to accept the Chinese decision as final.

2. Captain Osborn, in the capacity of Assistant Commander-in-Chief to the Chinese Government, will receive a commission from the Foreign Office giving him the requisite powers. The foreign crews will be duly controlled by him; and in the event of any individual injuring the people, or acting in a lawless manner, Captain Osborn will exercise due severity in the punishment of the same, in order to the sustaining of proper discipline.

3. In order to the insuring of beneficial results from the fleet now purchased by the Chinese Government, Chinese sailors, as time and circumstances will permit, ought to be chosen for service on board the steamers, in order that they may become experienced, and, that long-

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** Remarks by Mr. Lay.*

* The Prince chooses to assume that the rules were agreed to by me, while the fact is that I declared over and over again that assent to them was impossible; my most decided opinion being that to accept the terms proposed would be to court certain failure and discredit.

† I forwarded a translation of our agreement officially to the Prince, and in my covering letter called his special attention to one point embodied in that agreement, viz., that you would be under the orders of the Imperial Government at Pekin, and the Imperial Government alone. His Highness "burked" my letter, and up to this time has not acknowledged its receipt. Neither has he, I may add, approved the general agreement and Book of Instructions, which shows, were other proof wanting, that he could not have been under the impression that the questions relative to the steam fleet were disposed of.

‡ These conditions would practically place you under the orders of the lowest officer on the staff of either of the officials named. Prince Kung has seen that our military officers will act under Taoutais and Foutais; and hence it has occurred to him that if you could be persuaded to occupy a similar position, the Imperial Government would be relieved of all trouble and responsibility. I have told the Ministers that I would rather see the force disbanded and the ships sold than consent to such a proposition. There can be but one naval Commander-in-Chief, yourself; and but one master, the Imperial Government.

continued practice may prevent them from forgetting their duties, and thereby rendering the fleet useless. The working of the ships and the management of the guns and other arms, Captain Osborn and the other Commanders will exert themselves to teach to such sailors, in order that they may attain a real acquaintance with the same.

4. It is agreed that for the support of the fleet, consisting of seven steamers and one store-ship, there shall be appropriated the monthly sum of 75,000 taels. This amount is to cover the expense of salaries, wages, rations, ammunition, coals, rewards, compensations, as well as every other possible, and, at the present time, impossible-to-be-indicated expenditure. The control of the expenditure is confided to the Inspector-General Lay. The Office of Customs at Shanghai will provide 10,000 taels monthly; the Kiukiang Customs will provide 10,000 taels monthly; the Foochow Customs will provide 34,000 taels monthly; the Amoy Customs will provide 6,000 taels monthly; the Canton Customs will provide 10,000 taels monthly; and the Swatow Customs will provide 5,000 taels monthly. In all will be provided, monthly, the sum of 75,000 taels, which, in the proportions above-mentioned, will be received from each Office of Customs by Mr. Lay monthly. Every three months Mr. Lay will send in an account of the expenditure to the Foreign Office, which, in turn, will communicate the same to the Board of Revenue. Should there be any surplus money, Mr. Lay will retain it for future use.

5. From the 17th day of the 6th moon—that is, from the 1st day of August—it will be the duty of each of the said Offices of Customs to hand over in full, before making any other appropriations, from the duties received, the monthly sum fixed on to the person appointed by the Inspector-General Lay to attend at the bank to receive the same. In the event of the money not being forthcoming, the Inspector-General Lay will at once proceed to deduct the same from the duties. For a period of four years, and for each month during that period, this rule is to be in force.

Inclosure 5 in No. 15.

Captain Osborn's Remarks upon Prince Kung's Letter of Instructions.

Pekin, September 28, 1863.

IN the first place these instructions are in direct contravention of my formal agreement with Mr. Lay, which runs to the following effect: That I was to be Commander-in-Chief of the European-Chinese Navy, with entire control over all vessels of European construction, as well as native craft manned with Europeans in the employ of the Emperor of China, or under his authority, in the employ of natives; and I was to have an authority from the Emperor to cover my acts as Commander-in-Chief of the European-Chinese Navy. On the other hand, I bound myself to act upon all orders from the Emperor conveyed through Mr. Lay, and not to attend to those delivered through any other source.

A copy of this agreement was furnished to the Prince; yet in spite of it, and indeed ignoring it entirely (for I am told he has not even acknowledged the document), the Prince sends me orders to place myself and my people under the authority of the Foutai Le, as well as that of no less than three other provincial authorities.

Prince Kung acknowledges that the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of my force was filled up by the Governor-General of Keangsoo, and merely confirmed by the Emperor; and further, he (Prince Kung) directs the said Chinese Commander-in-Chief to repair on board a ship at Shanghai. This would virtually suspend me from the post I at present hold by virtue of a temporary commission, granted me by the Inspector-General, Mr. Lay, upon the authority of Prince Kung's instructions and promises of last year.

Apart from the conclusions which Mr. Lay has arrived at, as to the want of good faith displayed in the document before me, my own suspicions are aroused by the crafty wording of its contents. In one paragraph I am superseded, and have, apart from the Emperor, Prince Kung, and the Board called the Chinese Foreign Office, all provincial high officers placed over me; in another, I am enjoined to act in a friendly spirit of co-operation with my superiors; and this is immediately followed by a carefully-worded sentence, in which I am distinctly warned that the distribution of the Force will be dependent upon the whim of the Governors and the Governors-General of the Provinces; that I am to follow their instructions in all things, and, as the original document runs, I am "not to act, advance, retire, or remain stationary, without conferring with those dignitaries, and to consider their decision as final!"

Mr. Lay says very justly, in his marginal notes, that these conditions would practically place me under the orders of the lowest officer on the staff of either of the officials named.

I have no intention of submitting to such terms, and for the following reasons:—

1. Naval operations for the suppression of all the disorders enumerated in the Prince's

orders could not be successful, fettered as I should be under such a system. It may be the Chinese system; if so, it explains their unfitness for war or naval operations.

2. I came here to serve the Emperor, and under him the Regent; not to be the servant of mere provincial authorities. On that point I stand distinctly upon the terms of my agreement.

3. The officers and men of the force were entered under a specific agreement to serve me as Commander-in-Chief. Directly a Chinese officer steps in as my superior in that force, the agreement is null and void; and, without it, all law and order would cease, and my power be at an end.

4. By submitting to such instructions and violation of my original agreement, I should at once deprive myself of the power to assist in carrying out in China the policy of Western civilisation. My force, powerful as it will be for good or evil, might be directed against the interests of commerce or of common humanity. Brutal butchery might be perpetrated, and I should be powerless to prevent it. My men and officers, the pick of many from the Royal Navy of England, would be associated upon equal terms with the rowdies and pirates the Foutai might be pleased to employ. My power to restrain my own men within the bounds of ordinary discipline would be *nil*, and the European-Chinese Force, instead of being a blessing, would become a curse to the Chinese people, and to the best interests of Europe in this empire.

5. If I was weak enough to forget what is due to my own position, and attempted to act upon such instructions, I am certain that I should come to a dead-lock with the provincial authorities within a month, exactly as it is at present the case with Major Gordon, R.E. He is insulted by his Chinese superior, the pay of his men suddenly stopped at the will of the Foutai; he is called upon to attempt impossibilities, and deprived of adequate forces; and he has again, for the second time, virtually resigned office as the military coadjutor of the Foutai. Yet they wish me to be "the naval assistant" of such a Mandarin.

6. To the argument advanced by the Chinese Foreign Office, "that the course proposed by Prince Kung is a usual one in China," I reply, I did not come here, or my followers either, to accustom ourselves to the treatment usual with Chinese sailors or soldiers, or to assist them in a retrogressive policy in the treatment of European employés or Europeans in general.

The employment of ships of war and war steamers of European construction is an innovation, that of European officers and gentlemen still more so. I and my force are part and parcel of a new order of things, indicating "progress in China." I will be no party to her lapsing back into her ancient system, and treating Europeans as if they were Chinamen.

European commerce in China, and consequent intercourse, is a departure from all foregone customs.

The presence of Europeans at the open ports is the same.

The residence of European Legations in Pekin strikes at the root of China's most ancient prejudices.

The entire responsibility of the conduct of the provincial authorities towards our merchants and missionaries being forced upon the Ministers at Pekin, is another departure from the most cherished institutions of these people.

I merely claim for the European force under my command another stride in the same wise direction, and I will not, on all the foregone grounds, depart from a line of policy decided upon by Mr. Lay and myself after long and careful discussion—a line of conduct approved of, I am sure, by my countrymen and profession, and which I see more and more reason not to swerve from, since I have noted the present bearing of the Pekinese authorities towards foreigners.

I may add in general terms that if I required any confirmation of my opinion of the utter impossibility of serving the Chinese Government upon the terms the Prince suggests, I should find ample grounds in my own experiences whilst at Shanghai, as well as in the information General Brown gives me of Major Gordon's present position.

I found on my arrival at Shanghai that the Foutai's agents had tampered with the crews of the vessels under my orders. They were told that the Foutai would give them higher wages than those I engaged them at; that they would all be made officers; and that the discipline existing amongst the Europeans in his steamers was far pleasanter than the order I enforced. Puzzled to find such a different system existing in what was called the Imperial service, the men became naturally disaffected, and anxious to leave me to join the Europeans employed by the Foutai; and to enable them to do so without prejudice to their pockets, I found they were actually offered 12*l.* a-head bounty, the money to be lodged in the names of the deserters in an English bank. I had to discharge fourteen men, and was detained several days at Shanghai in consequence. It was no fault of the Foutai's that I was not detained there altogether.

Foutai Le is an able Chinaman, and as unprincipled as all Chinese officials. His plan

would be to render me powerless, and then to use or toss me aside, just as he does all European leaders in his force. He is a civilian by education, ruling over military and naval affairs without the slightest knowledge of either. He is squandering the revenue of the province as well as that derived from European trade, and is in league with unprincipled traders at Shanghai. Although he can procure from the British stores all such military supplies as he can require, he is encouraging the import of munitions of war by private firms, and granting permits to land the same, in spite of all our proclamations against the importation by foreigners of goods contraband of war. Having secured the services of an excellent officer in Major Gordon, who appears to have entered his service, not that of the Emperor of China (for he holds no authority from the latter), Foutai Le proceeds to render him powerless and to hamper his action in two ways:—First, by depriving him of the means to carry out any decisive measures; and next, by placing in exactly similar positions a number of other Europeans, and playing one off against the other. Major Gordon wishes to attack Soo-chow-foo, and asks for one hundred Europeans. The Foutai agrees, but says the hundred men must only be entered for one month. Gordon declines to enter into any such agreement, seeing its injustice and folly. The Foutai insults him by questioning his desire to fight the rebels, and proposes that the assaulting column shall be formed of all the European officers in his employ, and that over their bodies the Chinese would advance to victory.

Again, what faith can I have in any Mandarin's listening to my advice as a subordinate, when I am told by General Brown, Commander-in-Chief of our Military Forces in China, and the superior of the Foutai, that he will listen to no advice or suggestion the General offers; that he purposely avoids all conference with him; and when an interview is sought by General Brown, insolently replies that he is too busy to see him; and be it remembered that Foutai Le is not a bit more unreasonable than other Mandarins, and that he is an average specimen of his class.

(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

Inclosure 6 in No. 15.

Mr. Lay to Captain Osborn.

Sir, *Pekin, October* 13, 1863.

I REGRET to say that at an interview which I had to-day by appointment with the President of the Foreign Office, Wensiang, he requested me to intimate to you that the Prince of Kung would decline to ratify the agreements entered into by us under his letter of instructions of October, 1862.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. N. LAY.

Inclosure 7 in No. 15.

Captain Osborn to the Prince of Kung.

Your Royal Highness, *Pekin, October* 15, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to request that you will be pleased to furnish me officially and in writing with your decision relative to the agreements entered into between your agent, Mr. Horatio N. Lay, C.B., Inspector-General, and myself.

The Inspector-General informs me that after a delay of four months and a half, during which time Your Royal Highness has neither acknowledged a single letter nor referred to the agreements, Wensiang informed him formally that you intended to adhere to your manifest intention of ignoring all such agreements, as evinced in your instructions already addressed to me.

I may remind you that I have now been three weeks in Pekin fruitlessly endeavouring to point out to the members of your Foreign Office, through Mr. Lay, that your instructions to me are entirely contrary to the understanding under which Her British Majesty's Government permitted myself and others to agree to serve the Emperor of China, and that I declined to act except upon the terms explicitly laid down in your agreements.

To all these representations no attention has been paid.

I therefore avail myself of this opportunity to remind you of the circumstances under which the force I command has been placed at your disposal. Last year (1862) you applied in an unofficial form to the British Minister of Legation in Pekin for assistance to procure

men-of-war of an European construction. You were recommended to employ your own official, the Inspector-General, as the best agent, You set aside a large sum of money. You ordered the vessels, and you gave instructions to both Mr. Hart and Mr. Lay to procure not only ships but proper officers and men to fight and manage them; and lastly, you furnished your Inspector-General with a formal authority to enter into all such agreements as he might think necessary to carry out the object you had in view. Upon the strength of that authority to your agent, and supported as your wishes were by the official representations of his Excellency Sir F. Bruce, Her Majesty's Government were pleased to suspend, in favour of China, the Neutrality Act, and the Admiralty of Great Britain granted me and other officers permission to serve the Emperor of China for a stated period, and every assistance was given by all departments to aid the Emperor to carry out the wishes expressed in your instructions to Mr. Lay.

The Inspector-General having satisfied me that the powers you had given him were ample, I entered into certain agreements with him, subject to your ratification as Regent of China. It only remains for me to say, that my power to maintain order and discipline in the force is now at an end, and that if I do not receive a favourable reply within forty-eight hours it will be necessary to immediately disband the force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

Inclosure 8 in No. 15.

Captain Osborn to Sir F. Bruce.

Your Excellency, *Pekin, October* 19, 1863.

PRINCE KUNG having failed toratify the agreements entered into between Inspector-General H. N. Lay, C.B., and myself, it becomes necessary for me to disband the European-Chinese Naval Force.

I have the honour to inclose you copies of the agreements in question, as well as all correspondence, and to request you will inform me whether you see any objection to my surrendering to Prince Kung the eight ships which I have brought out to this country. They are Imperial property, and I have no right to detain them; but I would submit that there might be some danger if vessels of so formidable a character were trusted to the rowdies and pirates now so numerous in Shanghai, and who I dare say are quite ready to serve the provincial authorities without agreements or guarantees.

Directly I receive your Excellency's official instructions upon that point, I shall, in conjunction with Mr. Lay, proceed to dissolve the force, sending the officers and men to England in detachments, and reporting all the circumstances to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and sending them an exact description of the ships if you decide upon not surrendering them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

Inclosure 9 in No. 15.

Sir F. Bruce to Captain Osborn.

Sir, *Pekin, October* 20, 1863.

I HAVE received your letter with its inclosures, informing me of the refusal of the Prince of Kung to ratify the agreements entered into by his agent, Mr. Lay, with yourself, and of your consequent resolution to disband the force.

I have informed His Imperial Highness of my conviction that Her Majesty's Government would not have consented to the organisation of this powerful squadron had it not been on the understanding that it was to be placed under the orders of an officer in whose prudence and high character they had full confidence, and that I will not consent to the ships and stores being handed over to the Chinese Government without instructions to that effect from Her Majesty's Government.

I, therefore, request you to take measures for keeping them in deposit until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government be known.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 10 in No. 15.

Captain Osborn to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Pekin, October 27, 1863.*

CONSEQUENT upon the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 20th instant, in which you acquaint me that you will not consent to the surrender of the ships and stores to the Emperor of China, and desire me to take measures for keeping them in deposit until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government shall be known, the following questions have arisen in my mind, upon which I solicit your early instructions:—

1. If the Emperor of China should repudiate the arrangements recently sanctioned for the regular payment of this force, what steps am I to take to avoid selling the ships according to the 10th Article of my agreement? As Prince Kung has already repudiated his formal instructions to Mr. Lay, I am compelled to anticipate the probability of his treating all his engagements in the same fashion.

2. Where shall I procure funds for the maintenance of the force, pending the orders of Her Majesty's Government?

I have, &c.
(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

Inclosure 11 in No. 15.

Sir F. Bruce to Captain Osborn.

Sir, *Pekin, November 6, 1863.*

AS you are aware, the scheme of keeping the ships of the flotilla in deposit, awaiting instructions from Her Majesty's Government, has been abandoned, and the Chinese Government has requested me to send the vessels to England to be disposed of. His Imperial Highness expresses his thanks to yourself for the trouble to which you have been put in procuring the fleet, and in bringing it out to China, and requests you to accept 10,000 taels, in addition to your pay, for the labour entailed upon you by it. He further requests that the ships may be put under another flag. That, however, is a point which must be left to your own discretion. I have, therefore, to request that you will take charge of the vessels and men, with a view to the disposal of the former in England, or in India, as you may think best. The officers and men to be sent home and paid up to their arrival in England. But, as the contract may be construed to give them a claim for pay for three months after their arrival, or up to the 30th of August, it will be advisable to obtain the opinion of counsel, as to the liability of the Chinese Government, they having declined to accept the flotilla, on the ground of their agent having exceeded his authority in the conditions attached to the scheme. You will feel with me, that our honour is involved in winding up this affair upon terms as little onerous as possible to the Chinese Government.

I will give instructions to the Consuls to contribute what may be required, out of the monies received by them on the indemnity account, to meet such part of the expenses of sending the vessels home as the Chinese Government is unable to provide for. The sum so advanced will form a lien on the ships, and to be deducted from the expenses of sale, or set off against the value of the ships and stores, should Her Majesty's Government decide on taking any of them back.

I think it but just to express my entire approbation of the honourable and dignified course you have pursued during the discussion of the question at Pekin. An officer more alive to pecuniary advantages, less scrupulous as to the interests of Great Britain, and less careful of his own honour, might have admitted some unsatisfactory compromise as to his position, and might have trusted to an arbitrary exercise of the power wielded by him to have extricated himself from future embarrassments. By your firmness you have saved Great

Britain from complications, and you have vindicated the honour of the British uniform in the eyes of the Chinese by refusing to accept an unbecoming position.

However disappointing the result of your honourable wish to advance the cause of progress in China, you have the consolation of knowing that you have gained the respect and approval of persons of every nation who are acquainted with the course you have pursued.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 16.

*Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1864.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to request that you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that it appears, from the accounts received from China, that, in consequence of some disagreement between Captain Sherard Osborn and the Chinese Government, the vessels which that officer purchased and equipped as vessels of war in this country, for the service of the Emperor of China, were about to be sent, some to India and some to England, to be disposed of by sale.

These vessels are understood to be fully equipped for belligerent purposes, and Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it is incumbent upon them to take any precaution that may legally be within their power to prevent them from passing in their present state into the hands of any Power or State engaged in hostility with another Power or State in amity with Her Majesty.

Her Majesty's Government would therefore desire that the attention of the Naval, Colonial, and Indian authorities, both at home and on any station abroad within Her Majesty's dominions where the vessels may be expected to be met with, should be called to the necessity of taking such measures as may be legally within their power in furtherance of the views of Her Majesty's Government in this matter; and specifically as regards Captain Osborn, who is an officer in Her Majesty's Naval Service, that he should be pointedly cautioned against disposing of any of the vessels to be used in the naval service of a belligerent Power.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 17.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1864.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information and guidance, a copy of a letter which I have directed to be written to the Admiralty, Colonial, and India Offices† respecting the vessels which were bought and equipped by Captain Sherard Osborn for the service of the Emperor of China, and which are now to be disposed of in consequence of the disagreef ment which has occurred between that officer and the Chinese Government.

If that officer should be still in China when this despatch reaches you, you will make to him a communication to the effect stated in my letter to the Admiralty.

I have furnished Sir H. Parkes with copies of this despatch and its inclosure, in order that he may at once communicate with Captain Osborn, if that officer should be at Shanghai when Sir H. Parkes arrives at that port.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

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* A similar letter was sent to the Colonial and India Offices. † No. 16.

No. 18.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received January 13.)

Sir, *Admiralty, January* 12, 1864.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of Earl Russell, a copy of a letter from Captain Sherard Osborn, stating that, acting upon the instructions of Her Majesty's Representative in China, he was about to send the major portion of the Anglo-Chinese naval force organized in England by him to England, and take the rest to Bombay, and reporting the causes which have induced him to take those steps.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. PAGET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

Captain Osborn to Secretary to the Admiralty.

My Lord, *Shanghai, November* 20, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to request that you will lay before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the inclosed papers and correspondence connected with the force organized in Great Britain by me under Her Majesty's Order in Council, and I have to inform their Lordships that acting upon the instructions of Sir Frederick Bruce, Her Majesty's Representative in China, I am about to send the major portion of the squadron to England, and take the rest to Bombay.

The latter vessels I shall lay up, and return overland to England to make the necessary arrangements for their disposal.

The circumstances which have led to this unexpected change in the disposal of the European-Chinese naval force are as follows:—

In September I reached Shanghai with nearly all my force, and instead of receiving, as I expected, full powers as Commander-in-Chief, I found a note from Mr. Lay urging me to hasten to Pekin; at the same time the local Mandarins commenced to intrigue by trying to persuade my crews that the scale of pay I had established was far below what they could give. They inveigled nearly all the stokers from one ship, and tried hard, in combination with the European rowdies in Shanghai, who appeared to know of some difficulty connected with my powers, to get up a general desertion, so that the ships would fall into the hands of the Mandarins.

My men behaved, however, very well, and I was able to collect the squadron at Chefoo, in Shantung, and leave the ships in excellent order, under the charge of Captain Burgoyne, my second in command.

On my arrival at Pekin I received the letter of instructions marked No. 4. It was perfectly inadmissable, and the remarks I have annexed represent all the arguments against it which I used with the Mandarins forming the Foreign Board. I found their tone personally polite; but Wensiang, the Prince's Minister, was at little pains to disguise the fact, that within a very recent period the opinions of Prince Kung and his colleagues had changed as to the policy of employing Europeans under the direct authority of the Emperor, and that instead of centralizing the responsibility at Pekin, as European policy dictated, the Mandarins had evidently decided upon again reverting to their ancient system of thrusting the responsibility upon the provincial authorities.

It was, in short, simply the object of Prince Kung to make me the servant of the local provincial Mandarins, instead of that of the Emperor.

I told him that Her Majesty's Order in Council gave me no power to pass either my own services or those of others to the irresponsible action of local Mandarins, and that we all came to China to serve the Emperor or his Regent, not Chinese prefects or intendents.

All the European Ministers at Pekin cordially supported these views of my duty and position, but to all my representations urging the Regent to ratify the terms of the agreement I had entered into with his agent upon the faith of his instructions, I received

nothing but idle excuses; and at last, after four months endeavour on the part of Mr. Lay, and five weeks' additional labour by myself, I felt it was weakness to temporize any longer. To a point-blank question I received at last a blunt verbal refusal, and having then addressed a letter to Prince Kung, to which no reply was given, I handed the whole affair over to the British Minister.

Sir F. Bruce then requested me to retain the ships until the decision of Her Majesty's Government was known. I believe his Excellency informed Prince Kung that neither he nor his colleagues, the other Ministers of Legation, would consent to let him have a squadron of so formidable a character, whilst the Prince evinced such a determination to evade all responsibility as to its control or disposition.

The Prince, either from ill will, or want of power, persisted in refusing to assume the responsibility of employing my force under the direct authority of the Emperor, and concluded the affair by making some idle excuses for non-ratification of his agent's agreements; and after thanking me for my services in fitting out the squadron, requested Sir F. Bruce to cause the ships, stores, and men to be again got rid of.

Sir F. Bruce then addressed me the inclosed final letter, and although I did not feel called upon to relieve Prince Kung from the difficulties arising from his own want of good faith, still I hope their Lordships will think I have done right in undertaking the disagreeable task of disposing of the ships and stores at the request of Her Majesty's Minister, and to prevent so formidable an armament falling into the hands of the villains now swarming in Central China.

I think the perusal of the inclosed documents will lead their Lordships to the same opinion as the one I hold, in common with every one at Pekin, that the change in Prince Kung's views since 1862, when he led our Minister to believe that he was in earnest in desiring to reform the naval and military forces of this empire, is solely owing to his subordinates in the provinces having discovered that they can hire Europeans to defeat the Taepings, and yet be able to perpetuate the old misrule of every department of the State.

To the gross abuse of the Orders in Council of last year by Europeans in Shanghai, I trace the failure of my effort to serve these people in a way which would really serve their own as well as European interests.

I am now dispatching all the force to England, except two paddle dispatch vessels, and one gunboat, which I intend to place in Bombay harbour, and then proceed overland to London.

Commander Charles J. Forbes, R.N., whom I am dispatching to England on business connected with the legal opinion required as to the terms of the agreement, will be able to furnish their Lordships with all particulars connected with the vessels of the force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SHERARD OSBORN.

No. 19.

Mr. Lay to Earl Russell.—(*Received January* 13, 1864.)

My Lord, *Pekin, November* 10. 1863.

THE present mail conveys to your Lordship the papers having reference to the dissolution of the naval force which Captain Osborn and myself were empowered by Her Majesty's Order in Council to organise for the Emperor of China. And I gladly avail myself of the privilege your Lordship kindly accorded me, to submit to you some account of my proceedings in this country in regard thereto.

On my arrival in Pekin, on the 1st of June last, I placed the agreements which I had entered into, under his letter of instructions of the 20th October, 1862, in the hands of the Prince of Kung.

These consisted of:—

1. The agreement between myself, as agent for the Emperor of China and the officers and crews of the vessels, to which were appended certain regulations for the discipline of the force organized.

2. The agreement between Captain Osborn and myself, which embodied the principles we had laid down for the government of our conduct in this country.

This was framed so as to insure Captain Osborn a proper position; and to provide against his being placed upon a footing with the filibusters in the employ of the Chinese local authorities.

We were careful to guard against the possible mis-employment of the force by the Emperor, by my engaging to be the medium of all instructions to Captain Osborn; and to prevent orders being at any time issued to him at variance with Treaties or international obligations; I promised (as is the case in my own department) to refuse to convey instructions, of the reasonableness of which I was not satisfied.

Pains were taken to make this agreement stringent in its terms, for my experience made me mindful of the defect in the Chinese character, falsity and bad faith; and I felt that unless the Emperor were securely bound by conditions of the above nature, which he would have to ratify before the flotilla could be called upon to act, any obligations that might be entered into on his behalf would share the fate of all Chinese engagements, whenever it becomes convenient or safe to repudiate them.

The serious responsibilities which I incurred in entering upon the undertaking at all made it incumbent on me, in the exercise of common prudence, to adopt every precaution against the possible misbehaviour in time to come of the Chinese Government. And upon no other conditions than those laid down would I have consented for one moment to become instrumental in procuring force of a formidable character for an Asiatic Power, knowing well that, unrestricted by any conditions, it would sooner or later be tempted to direct that force against our own interests or the interests of other European Powers, leading to complications in which Captain Osborn and I would certainly be sacrificed.

When I presented the agreements for formal ratification, the "Foreign Board" (Prince Kung, it seems, has ceased for a year past to occupy himself with the details of foreign affairs) suggested modification of the terms of my agreement with Captain Osborn. I referred to the Prince's letter of authority to me, which, I observed, had been written upon a draft sent out from England by me for his signature; in that letter he had given me explicit authority to arrange on his behalf the terms of all agreements; under it I had arranged the only terms upon which I could obtain the sanction, in the first place, of my own Government, and in the second, the services of officers of proper standing; and by it the Prince must be held bound.

I may mention to your Lordship, that before I acted upon that letter, I took the precaution to fortify myself with a legal opinion, which pronounced it sufficient to warrant my entering into all terms and conditions.

The Board said the Prince would ratify the agreements if I would consent to Captain Osborn's being placed under the orders of the local authorities. I answered that this could not be entertained. Captain Osborn had permission to serve the Emperor of China only, and could receive orders only from Pekin.

Thus the matter stood until Captain Osborn's arrival in September. Satisfactory financial arrangements for the maintenance of the force were made in the meantime, the Board taking it for granted that the money question would be the only one which would be considered of real importance by us.

When Captain Osborn arrived, we lost no time in explaining jointly that the proposal to place him under the orders of the local Mandarins was inadmissible. The Board tried hard to persuade us to yield the point, but finding us firm, declared at length that the Prince would in that case decline to ratify the agreements.

I asked repeatedly that this decision might be communicated in writing, but in vain. The Prince had skilfully ignored his letter of instructions throughout, and had left the letter, in which I had drawn his attention to the important clauses of the agreement, unacknowledged.

We informed the Foreign Board that if the Prince refused to ratify, the force must be disbanded.

The matter was then placed, with all the correspondence connected with it, in the hands of Sir F. Bruce, from whom, as your Lordship will receive a report of the subsequent proceedings, I forbear trespassing upon your time by referring to them here.

I think that the motives which have influenced Prince Kung to repudiate the agreements entered into under his written authority may be easily explained. When he ordered the steam flotilla, the Government had not yet recovered the effects of our last expedition. A vague feeling of alarm as to the future prevailed; the recent progress of the rebels had been rapid; no less than four of the open ports, Canton, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, were in danger of capture; the Government was beset with appeals from the foreign Ministers for action, and was, in short, told that if it did not make an effort we should have to treat with the rebels.*

* "See Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented to Parliament in 1863, page 13.

The Prince was therefore ready to do anything, and while in this mood signed the letter of instructions to me.

In the meantime, however, under the auspices of Admiral Hope and General Staveley, the Government obtained, through the local authorities, all the aid that it needed. Officers were lent; guns and ammunition supplied; and before my return Ningpo was recovered, the other ports secured against attack, and the rebels driven back within the walls of Soochow.

The Chinese Government found itself relieved of its embarrassments in a manner most acceptable to it; the local Mandarins obtained the services of as many officers and men as were necessary, upon the simple terms of so many dollars a-month, without guarantees or agreements of any kind; the Government was not required to give a single pledge or to incur any responsibilities.

When, therefore, the terms upon which the naval force had been organized were submitted for ratification, it was not strange that they should be pronounced unacceptable. The Chinese Government naturally prefers unconditional aid, to aid fettered by restrictions. My aim has been to make reform and progress the condition of aid. It is only thus, I believe, that aid can lead to any good in China, or that we are justified in affording it.

The military assistance, as at present rendered at Shanghai, is under the irresponsible control of the local Mandarins, and will, I apprehend, be found attended with troublesome, if not serious, consequences. My observation, after five month's residence in Pekin, leads me to doubt altogether the sincerity of Prince Kung's friendly professions, and my belief is that the anti-foreign party is gaining strength daily.

In Sir F. Bruce's despatches, advocating the formation of this naval force, he coupled the reformed administration of the Customs with the promised re-organization of the executive forces of the empire. To have passed the naval force into the hands of the local authorities would have been to destroy all hope of improvement in any direction. As soon as it had served its purpose of slaughter, it would have been thrown aside.

With Sir F. Bruce, I had hoped that Her Majesty's Government would have been relieved, by means of this flotilla, of the expense of maintaining order at the open ports; and that the Chinese Customs' establishment would have been furnished with the necessary support to enable it to contend against the hostility of European evil-doers, and to render it independent of the local authorities, whose interest it is to restore the former corrupt state of things.

Disappointing as the dissolution of the force must be to all concerned, I feel that no one has greater cause than I of complaint against Prince Kung. Obliged to return to England by ill health, induced by wounds and years of toil in the Chinese service, I sacrificed my leisure while in England to his service. My proposals on his behalf were well received in England, and met with the kindest support of Her Majesty's Government. On my arrival here, the Prince treated the whole matter with assumed indifference, and fancying that we had gone too far to withdraw, and that from the number of Europeans in Chinese employ ready to serve upon his terms, he was independent of Captain Osborn, he attempted to impose his own conditions.

Although our hopes have not been realized, I have at any rate the consolation of feeling that we have not broken a single pledge made in England, and that the refusal of the force placed at the disposal of the Chinese Government, through the generosity of Her Majesty's Government, is an act for which Prince Kung and his colleagues are alone responsible.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) H. N. LAY.

No. 20.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Lay.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1864.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th of November last, respecting the dissolution of the Anglo-Chinese squadron lately under the command of Captain Osborn.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 21.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(*Received January* 18, 1864.)

My Lord, *Pekin, November* 19, 1863.

THE Chinese Government having, after four months discussion, resolved definitively not to ratify the conditions to which Mr. Lay had engaged to procure the Emperor's assent, and which Captain Osborn considered indispensable to enable him to direct the flotilla without compromising his country or his own honour, that officer placed the affair in my hands. It is finally arranged that the ships, with the officers and men, are to return to England, the Chinese Government having agreed to pay all expenses and fulfil the contracts entered into with the men, and having requested me to assist them in the sale of the ships for their benefit, Captain Osborn has undertaken this duty, and intends to dispose of two of the smaller vessels in India, if possible, not wishing to risk them a second time round the Cape.

I interfered to prevent the ships being handed over to the Chinese, because they could not make use of them, and because of the danger of their being bought by the Japanese, or falling into the hands of adventurers who might have used them against the interests of commerce.

I will write at length by next opportunity, by which time the necessary documents connected with this affair will be ready for transmission. I will only add here, that Captain Osborn has merited the highest approval by the superiority he has shown to pecuniary considerations, and by his resolution not to undertake this delicate service, unless upon such conditions as would have enabled him to preserve the British name from being sullied by the perpetration of excesses in his presence, and from being dragged into proceedings which would have created embarrassment with other foreign Powers. At the same time, I do not think the Chinese Government open to the charge of bad faith, as the conditions they were called upon to ratify are not such as the authority given to Mr. Lay entitled him to assent to in their name.

Mr. Lay mistook his position, and over-rated his influence when he resolved on starting this flotilla without having previously ascertained that the terms agreed upon with Captain Osborn would be accepted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 21.

The Prince of Kung's Letter of Instructions to Mr. Lay.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 21.

Agreement between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn, signed in London, January 16, 1863.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 15.]

No. 22.

Earl Russell to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1864.

HER Majesty's Government approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch of the 9th of November, with reference to the refusal of the Chinese Government to ratify the agreement between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(Received January 27, 1864.)

(Extract.) *Pekin, November 19, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of various documents, forwarded to me by Captain Osborn, on the refusal of the Chinese Government to agree to the conditions on which, alone, he had consented to organize a steam flotilla for the service of the Emperor of China.

Also, of my correspondence with the Chinese Government and with Captain Osborn, on the disposal of these war-vessels, and on the arrangement, ultimately agreed on, for sending them and the officers and men to England.

In order to understand clearly what has taken place, it must be borne in mind that though the flotilla sailed in winter from England for China, it was not until Mr. Lay arrived here in the spring that the Chinese Government had any intimation of the composition of the force, of the cost of its maintenance, or of the contents and scope of the undertaking entered into by Mr. Lay with Captain Osborn; I must call your Lordship's attention to the latter document, as the refusal of the Chinese to ratify it has proved fatal to the success of the scheme.

Mr. Lay proceeded at once to urge on this Government the necessity of conferring upon himself and Captain Osborn the authority he had engaged in his undertaking to procure. His recent arrival from Europe, the honours conferred on him by Her Majesty, and his acquaintance with men of influence and standing, enabled him to assume, in dealing with the Chinese Government, rather the dictatorial tone of an independent authority than the language of persuasion appropriate to the agent of the Government he was addressing. His hopes of success were strengthened by the reserved attitude of the Ministers of the Treaty Powers, all of whom, on different grounds, had reason to be dissatisfied with the dilatory proceedings of this Government in granting redress for illegal acts committed by the local authorities. The Prince and his advisers were thus led to infer that a scheme which promised to strengthen the hands of the central Government, as against provincial influences, could not fail to be acceptable to foreign Ministers, as being a step towards that policy of centralization which they had always advocated, and that a feeling existed in their minds that the difficulties encountered by Mr. Lay were attributable to retrograde views.

So far, therefore, as foreign influences were concerned, Mr. Lay was more favoured by events than he could have reasonably expected, considering the exclusive composition of the force and the jealousies which, in this respect, it was fitted to awaken. I can state positively that nothing fell from the foreign Ministers calculated to thwart him in his attempts to obtain the ratification of these agreements, and that his failure is due to the spontaneous resolution of the Chinese themselves; their motives being the opposition of the provincial authorities; the reluctance of the Chinese Government to assume the responsibility of directing the force instead of leaving it to be directed by local Governors; and, above all, the alarm and suspicion engendered in their minds by the proposals contained in the understanding entered into by Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn, by which they considered that the exclusive control of the operations would be vested in Mr. Lay, who would thus be enabled, indirectly, to compel them to act in all matters in subservience to his will.

Mr. Lay injudiciously, in my opinion, held language and advanced pretensions which tended to increase their apprehensions in this respect. He proposed that they should give him a "Foo" to reside in, that is to say, one of the palaces conferred by the Emperor on princes of the blood, such as those inhabited by the Ministers of England and France; a class of building which the highest officers of the Chinese Government are not permitted to inhabit. He acted as if he held the independent position of head of a great revenue department, which put him on an equality with Wensiang and the superior Members of the Foreign Board, and, as, therefore, only accountable to the Prince of Kung, the Vice-Regent of the empire. The members of the Foreign Board could obtain from him no specific statement, or account, of the sums expended by him, or anything beyond vague assurances that the money had been rightly spent, and would be accounted for in due time, and he insisted on the dismissal of the two Chinese superintendents, placed by this Government at the head of the Customs Department, and the appointment of himself as sole director and recipient of the foreign Customs revenue, amounting already to about £3,000,000 sterling, with a fair prospect of increase. In fact, it is impossible to doubt that Mr. Lay, full of large schemes of progress and commercial development in China, desirous of arriving at immediate results, and conscious that the course of

improvement will be both uncertain and slow, if depending solely on the influence which events and persuasion combined may gradually exercise in the Chinese mind, aimed at solving the difficulty by obtaining the sole command of the most certain source of the Imperial revenue, and of the most efficient branch of its executive. Armed with this power he hoped by threats of suspending the action of the flotilla, and of withholding the funds, that the Chinese Government would be compelled to adopt such measures as he should propose. He was to dictate the policy to be pursued; it was to be promulgated to the empire by Imperial Decree; and to be executed by the flotilla and such land forces as might be required, the expenses of which were to be provided for out of the Customs revenues.

I believe I am correct in assuming that an article in Blackwood's Magazine of January 1863, entitled "Progress in China," contains a statement of the results anticipated by those who promote this course of policy, and I concur with Mr. Lay in thinking that nothing short of a dictatorship lodged in European hands, and so supported by foreign influence as to render the Chinese powerless to defeat or thwart it by intrigue or opposition, would enable its supporters to realise the promises it holds out. Even thus, looking to the reluctance of the Chinese Government, and the determined hostility of provincial authorities, this scheme could not have been successfully carried out.

The Chinese Government, however, comprehended at once the scope and bearing of this scheme, and look upon it as an insidious attempt to take the administration out of their hands. They were unacquainted with Mr. Lay, and employed him as their agent for the purchase of ships and hiring of men at Mr. Hart's suggestion, who recommended him as a person on whom they might rely, and who, being in England, could carry out their wishes in a satisfactory and economical manner. They had no such special confidence in him as would have induced them to put themselves in his hands. They do not look upon the Inspector-General as anything more than a subordinate officer in their employ, to whom a general superintendence is given over the foreigners engaged to aid in the collection of the Customs revenue on foreign trade, but on whom no control is bestowed over the application of the receipts. They do not consider him as a political officer at all, nor do they consult him as of right even in questions affecting foreign trade. It was only at my invitation, and contrary to the intentions of the Chinese Government, that Mr. Hart was able, two years ago, to come up to Pekin, and it was only by his tact, good sense, and modesty, that he obtained access to the Prince of Kung, and turned to useful account the favourable impression he made upon his Imperial Highness and his advisers. It is a significant mark of the light in which they view Mr. Lay's pretensions, that he never was admitted to the Prince's presence during these months of discussion. Indeed, he would not have seen him at all had I not requested an interview with the Prince, which he anticipated would be of a disagreeable character. To forestal any remark I might make on his not having seen Mr. Lay, he sent for him in the morning, and had a few minutes' conversation with him on indifferent matters.

If the hope, therefore, was entertained in any quarter that Mr. Lay enjoyed, either on account of his personal merits, or in virtue of his office, any such influence over the Chinese Government as would enable him to carry out the views he entertained with their concurrence and assent, it was founded on an entire misapprehension of his position, and of their feelings towards their foreign employés. They looked upon him as an agent for a special purpose, whose authority was limited to the purchase of ships and to the engaging of men to bring them out. They certainly did not contemplate conferring upon him any authority to tie up their hands for years as to the manning of these vessels, still less that he should take upon himself to determine, at his will, how the operations of the ships were to be directed, and under whose immediate orders they were to be placed; and they were totally indisposed to alter the character of the office he bears, to give to him, or to any foreigner, a leading part in the administration of the Government, or to invest him with any control over the Customs' revenues, except in so far as was required to meet the expenditure of the foreign part of the establishment. They are profoundly irritated, not only because of the embarrassments in which they are involved by his having exceeded his authority, but on account of the position he thus sought to create for himself. They attribute his conduct to personal motives, and their confidence in the good faith of foreign agents has been most seriously shaken.

After much discussion the enclosed paper was drawn up by the Chinese Government, and in order to mark that they could go no further, it was invested with the form of an Imperial Decree, the form they adopt when discussion is closed. Whether, as they assert, they understood Mr. Lay to acquiesce in this arrangement or not I am unable to determine, and it is of little consequence, as it remained with Captain Osborn to decide how far he would consent to the modification of his understanding with Mr. Lay.

That officer shortly afterwards reached Pekin. During his voyage up the coast incidents were not wanting to show him that his position would be one of more difficulty than he had

been led to expect. He found that he would have to encounter the bitter opposition of a large section of the foreign communities, and the active hostility of the provincial authorities. Agents were employed at Shanghai to go on board his ships and to seduce his men, by offers of higher pay, if they would enter the service of the Governor of Keangsoo. He was obliged, in consequence, to discharge some of his men who became dissatisfied with the rates of pay assigned to them, and to remove his vessels up to Chefoo to prevent the disorganization of his force. He felt that the efficiency of his squadron required not only that he should be freed from the control and interference of the provincial officers, but, further, that effectual steps should be taken to prevent them from offering employment to his men, otherwise his ships might be disabled at any moment. In addition to these difficulties in the provinces, he found on his arrival at Pekin that the Chinese Government looked upon the flotilla as part of a scheme to place them in a position inconsistent with their dignity and independence of action, and therefore doubly indisposed to antagonise the provincial authorities in its behalf. He accordingly decided, after mature reflection, to abide by the terms of his understanding with Mr. Lay, and to call on the Chinese Government to declare whether they would ratify the agreement or not. On receiving a verbal refusal through Mr. Lay (no written communication having been addressed to him during the period of delay granted in his letter), Captain Osborn enclosed to me the documents with the accompanying letter. It was essential that a decision should be come to at once, as he held no commission, and his authority to enforce discipline among his men was liable to be called in question.

Thus far I had taken no part in the discussions between Mr. Lay and the Chinese Government. Indeed, I studiously avoided expressing any opinion on the proposals made to them, for I felt much embarrassment as to the answer I should be compelled to give if the Chinese Government put the question to me: Are we bound to ratify this agreement against our convictions? I foresaw, also, that if I were to attempt to extort their assent against their will, the question would become a political one, for the Chinese would certainly have consulted the other foreign Ministers, and in spite of their wish to act with me in a friendly and large spirit, I could not expect their support in any attempt to impose this scheme upon them by menace. I therefore resolved to leave the matter to be arranged, if possible, by the Chinese themselves with their Agent and Captain Osborn, and to protract, in the interest of the scheme, the suspense in which they were held as to my opinion and intentions.

During this period I had two interviews with the Foreign Board. In neither did they allude to the flotilla, and I imitated their reserve. Our conversation turned on the dangers arising from the employment of foreign adventurers by the local Governors, and on the impossibility of foreign officers of character being induced to serve the Chinese by land or sea, unless they held formal commissions from the central Government, and unless they were secured against the caprice and jealousy of the provincial authorities. In fact, this was the line of observation most likely to induce the Government to accede to Captain Osborn's terms; for if they and the provincial Governors had felt convinced that they would be deprived of the foreign element which has gained for them all their late successes near Shanghai, and would have to rely on purely Chinese resources, they would have had a strong inducement to agree for the moment to the conditions proposed.

So long as Governors can obtain on their own terms foreign officers and steamers officered by foreigners sufficient to repel the insurgents, it is idle to expect that the Government at Pekin will undertake the organization of an Imperial force either on land or on the sea, and thereby relieve local Governors from the responsibility of maintaining tranquillity in their provinces, which is the established principle of Chinese administration. Of their reluctance to make this change in their system, we have abundant proof in the abandonment of foreign drill at Tientsin, in their refusal to engage, under contract, French drill instructors, or to accept the gratuitous services of officers whom the Russian Government offered to lend them for that purpose.

It was now, however, incumbent on me to interfere directly, and the first step I took was to inform the Chinese Government that I could not consent to hand over the ships to them without instructions from Her Majesty's Government. My reasons for taking the step were, that the ships were held as security by Captain Osborn for fulfilment of the terms agreed on by the men; that the latter were entitled to be sent home, and that it was not quite clear whether they were to be paid up to the time of their arrival in England or up to the 30th of August next. Moreover, these ships are not of a kind that the Chinese could manage, or that it would be safe to put in the hands of the class of foreigners who are on board the small steamers bought by the Governor of Kiangsoo (about ten in number), and which have proved so efficient in the operations near Soo-chow. On the other hand, it would not be safe to sell them on the coast, as they might fall into the hands of hostile Daimios in Japan, or be

bought for employment as Confederate cruizers in these seas. The inclosed copy of a despatch from the Minister of the United States will show that he was alive to this danger; and I may add that M. Berthemy was equally of opinion that the flotilla should not be given up, as there was no means of guaranteeing to what purposes the ships might be turned. It struck me, also, that if the Chinese found that they could not have the ships without ratifying the agreements, they might, perhaps, be induced to reconsider their decision; and in order to throw away no chance of inducing them to accept the flotilla, and to put myself in as good a position as possible to deal with the pecuniary difficulties that would ensue from its rejection, I took advantage of the Prince's reluctance to face an unpleasant discussion, and declined the interview proposed by Wensiang unless the Prince were present.

Having sent me the inclosed despatch, they sought an interview with the Minister of the United States, Mr. Burlingame, upon whose friendly desire to arrange matters satisfactorily I could thoroughly rely. Before entering into the subject, he required them to state, distinctly, whether they had definitively resolved not to ratify the agreements entered into with Captain Osborn. They replied in the affirmative, adding that it was impossible for them, in the face of opinion in China, to take the direction of the flotilla out of the hands of the local authorities, or to ratify conditions which, to use their own phrase, would deliver them over, bound hand and foot, to Mr. Lay.

Mr. Burlingame, in three protracted interviews, argued the question at great length, in order to ascertain whether any feasible scheme could be hit upon which would meet their objections and enable the flotilla to act; but finding that the points on which they differed with Captain Osborn were such as to render a compromise impracticable, Mr. Burlingame advised them to state their reasons fully for not ratifying the agreement, to thank Her Majesty's Government and Captain Osborn for what had been done in their behalf, and to request me to have the vessels returned to England under Captain Osborn, to be there sold, the proceeds, after discharging all liabilities, to be remitted to the Chinese Government. This advice was followed to the letter, as your Lordship will see by the inclosed despatch; and the Chinese, of their own accord, and without a suggestion from any one, added that they wished Captain Osborn to accept 10,000 taels (3,300*l.*) in consideration of the labour entailed upon him by this flotilla. To this letter I returned the reply of which copy is inclosed.

I think the arrangement proposed, in consequence of which the vessels are to leave China at once, is more advantageous to all parties than the one I originally suggested, for expense is thereby avoided, and the danger obviated of keeping a large number of men on the coast in a state of idleness, and subject to no sufficient authority, during the period that must have elapsed before instructions from England could have been received. Captain Osborn takes two vessels to India in the hopes of disposing of them there, and the rest will sail for England as soon as the necessary arrangements are made.

I cannot express too strongly my sense of the friendly and valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Burlingame in bringing about an arrangement which provided satisfactorily for all the interests concerned, and in such a manner as not to compromise those friendly relations which I am so anxious to maintain with this Government; and I think this incident illustrates the importance of adhering, in China, strictly to a just and fair line of policy. The belief that I, as British Minister, would respect the rights of the Chinese, and that I would not force the flotilla upon them from selfish political considerations, induced my colleagues to abstain from interfering while the question was under discussion, and thereby secured for the flotilla a deliberate and unfettered consideration on the part of the Chinese Government; and I am certain that this course was more favourable to the success of the scheme, had success been possible, than any other that could have been adopted. It appeared to me also, that I should not have been justified in taking a more active part, for I had reason to believe that your Lordship had no cognizance of the undertaking of so novel a character entered into by Mr. Lay wih Captain Osb orn; and the absence of instructions was to me a significant proof that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of being a party to, or responsible for, the arrangements under which the operations of the flotilla were to be conducted. Had the Chinese voluntarily accepted the squadron, the onus of the difficulties it would have encountered would have rested on the Chinese Government; but the burden would have been thrown on Her Majesty's Government by the Chinese, and with justice, had it appeared that this flotilla, exclusively British in its character, directed by British officers and agents, and imposed by British pressure, was acting under a Chinese flag, which the Chinese Government, contrary to its wishes, had been compelled to hoist on board the ships.

Moreover, the Chinese Government has latterly shown its inability or indisposition to carry out the various suggestions I made for strengthening the central power, of which the flotilla is only one, and it was evident that there was no disposition on the part of the Chinese to

incorporate it into their system, so as to subserve the general purposes of police and revenue; but that, if forced to accept it, they would have directed it against Nanking, and would then have left it to be disorganized by the ill-will and intrigues of the provincial authorities. Putting aside the consideration that Her Majesty's Government would not have assisted in the formation of the force had this been the only object contemplated, I must observe that such a course would have been full of danger to our trade.

In fact, this flotilla ought to have been designed to carry out the revenue laws, and to assist in suppressing piracy. Less formidable and expensive vessels would have been sufficient for these purposes, and they would have been at the same time, though in a subordinate degree, of much use in assisting military operations. Whereas, a purely war squadron was provided, with officers who looked to *actions d'éclat*, and not to the disagreeable and prosaic task of stopping smugglers and robber-junks. And further, if it was considered necessary that the flotilla should be taken out of the hands of the Government who paid for it, and the exclusive control over its operations vested in its foreign commander and the foreign agent employed in procuring it, these conditions, of so singular a nature, ought to have been submitted and agreed to before the vessels were allowed to sail for China.

I owe it to Captain Osborn to state that he has shown great sagacity in appreciating the situation, and the most honourable spirit in the course he has pursued. In spite of the great pecuniary advantages secured to him he would not consent to any compromise which might hereafter place him in a false position, or involve his country in embarrassment.

I have only to request your Lordship's indulgent consideration amid so many difficulties, and to beg that Her Majesty's Government will enable me to redeem my pledge to the Chinese Government, and that every assistance may be given in the disposal of the ships and their armament, in order that the loss entailed upon them may be as light as possible.

Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

Mr. Lay to Captain Osborn, September 25, 1863.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

Understanding between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn, January 16, 1863.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 23.

The Prince of Kung's Instructions to Captain Osborn.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 23.

Captain Osborn to Sir F. Bruce, October 19, 1863.

[See Inclosure 8 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 5 in No. 23.

The Prince of Kung's Instructions to Mr. Lay, October 24, 1862.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 6 in No. 23.

Remarks by Captain Osborn on the Prince of Kung's Instructions to him, September 28, 1863.

[See Inclosure 5 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 7 in No. 23.

Mr. Lay to Captain Osborn, October 13, 1863.

[See Inclosure 6 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 8 in No. 23.

Captain Osborn to the Prince of Kung, October 15, 1863.

[See Inclosure 7 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 9 in No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to Captain Osborn, October 20, 1863.

[See Inclosure 9 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 10 in No. 23.

Captain Osborn to Sir F. Bruce, October 27, 1863.

[See Inclosure 10 in No. 15.]

Inclosure 11 in No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to Prince of Kung.

Sir, *Pekin, October* 20, 1863.

I AM informed by Captain Osborn that, in consequence of the refusal of your Imperial Highness to ratify the agreements entered into by your agent, Mr. Lay, with that officer, he is about to disband the force engaged in England, for the service of the Emperor of China.*

As Her Majesty's Government took an active part in promoting the equipment of the vessels composing it, and certainly would not have consented to the organization of the squadron had it not felt satisfied as to the prudence and high character of the officer under whose command it was to be placed, it is my duty to report what has taken place to Her Majesty's Government, and to request instructions as to the disposal of the ships and stores. I have informed Captain Osborn, therefore, that they are to be detained until those instructions are received.

I have, &c:
(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 12 in No. 23.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.) *Pekin, October 25, 1863.*

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

The Prince has to acknowledge the receipt of the British Minister's despatch of the 20th instant, on the subject of the purchase of a steam flotilla and armament by the Chinese Government.

Inasmuch as the Chinese Government of its own motion authorized the Acting Inspector-General Hart to purchase (vessels), the Prince therefore did not trouble the British Minister with any particulars in regard to the matter; but as the Prince is now in receipt of a letter from the British Minister on the subject, it becomes His Highness's duty to put his Excellency in possession of the full particulars of the matter.

In the memorandum which Mr. Hart submitted in person to the Members of the Foreign Board, last year, as to the officers, gunners, and crews of the steamers (it was proposed to purchase), he mentioned that it would be necessary to appoint a Chinese high officer to act with Captain Osborn in all matters connected with the control and management (of the fleet); he also mentioned that there should be selected 200 Chinese (Hoonan men), to serve as gunners; 200 Shantung men, as sailors; 100 Manchoos, as marines, and 50 Manchoos, to act as powder-monkeys. It appeared to the Members of the Foreign Board, upon examination of his proposition, that it would be of advantage, and not injurious to China. It was not proposed that the people to be engaged for the steamers should consist wholly of foreigners, nor was there any intention of depriving the Chinese Government of the military authority. The Foreign Board therefore memorialized the throne, and received His Majesty's sanction and permission to carry out the proposal, and the Prince issued official instructions to Mr. Hart to proceed with the purchases, &c., in accordance with that sanction, stating clearly, moreover, in his letter, that it must rest with the Governors-General and Governors to appoint officers to the fleet.

Mr. Hart subsequently informed (the Members of the Foreign Board) that, with reference to the purchase of vessels and guns, he had officially addressed the Inspector-General Lay, who was at that time in England, and had placed the whole matter in his hands, and that therefore it would be necessary for the Prince to issue to Mr. Lay a letter of authority to enable him to act.

The Foreign Board considering that it had Mr. Hart's memorandum before it, expected that, no matter who might be entrusted with the management of the affair by Mr. Hart, under the authority of the Chinese Government, he would still act in accordance with that Memorandum. Mr. Hart afterwards informed the Board that his Memorandum was only a general idea of the probable arrangement, and had reference only to the number of Chinese soldiers (to be employed); but that foreign officers, gunners, and crews, &c., would have to be engaged for service on board the vessels by Mr. Lay, to whom it would have likewise to be left to arrange the various agreements for the amounts of salaries, wages, &c., at the time of their engagement by him. The Foreign Board, considering that as the matter to be arranged remained the same, Mr. Hart having first been entrusted to proceed in the matter, and Mr. Lay afterwards having succeeded to the management, the mode of proceeding would, as a matter of course, not differ from Mr. Hart's original memorandum, accordingly prepared the letter of instructions to Mr. Lay as Mr. Hart had suggested. Comparing that document with the letter which Mr. Lay, on his arrival in Pekin, addressed to the Prince, inclosing an agreement in thirteen articles, it was found to differ very materially from Mr. Hart's memorandum. For instance, he proposed that all orders (to Captain Osborn) from His Majesty must pass through him (Mr. Lay), and that if conveyed through any other channel they could not be obeyed. As China would thus have spent several millions of revenue without obtaining an atom of power, his arguments (in support of the agreement) were rebutted, and in the place of it five other articles were drawn

up, every sentence of which was discussed and settled in personal interviews with Mr. Lay and Mr. Hart, and without the slightest word to the contrary on their part. The money clauses for monthly expenditure were also one by one discussed and settled; and that being done the arrangements determined by the five articles and the money clauses were embodied in a Memorial, and respectfully submitted to and approved of by His Majesty. Since that time all the monies for monthly expenditure, and for purchase and equipment, have been regularly paid over according to agreement.

The regulations have been ratified, and large monthly payments made, it was expected that as soon as the vessels arrived they would accomplish their work, and that there would be no further discussion.

But now the Inspector-General, all at once turning his back on the Imperial Decree, disobeys the five Articles which had been discussed and settled in personal interviews, and had received the sanction of His Majesty, and brings up afresh the thirteen clauses which it was settled face to face should not be put in force, and insists upon their adoption. This agreement in thirteen articles is not only at variance with Mr. Hart's memorandum appended, but is different from the Prince's letters addressed to Mr. Lay and Mr. Hart, and is not in accordance with the intentions of His Highness when he gave his authority to Mr. Lay to enter into the various agreements, and hence the Foreign Board did not acceed to the agreement in question.

Moreover, when it had been distinctly settled at the time in a personal interview that the five Articles should be the rules of action, and when the Inspector-General had received a despatch announcing that these articles had been ratified by His Majesty, and when in accordance with these five Articles he has already been paid over the money to cover expenses for several months, how is it that he presumes to disobey an Imperial Decree, looking upon it as mere child's play?

The British Minister and Mr. Wade have on former occasions urged that Chinese military authority ought not to be delegated to foreigners. The principle for China and foreign countries is in this matter identical. And the Prince is still rejoiced to think of the surpassing discernment of the British Minister and Mr. Wade, of the justice and fairness of their remarks, and that they do not share the wish of the Inspector-General, who would insist upon imposing restrictions on the Chinese Government.

As the British Minister has addressed a despatch to the Prince on this subject, his Highness has not been able to avoid entering thus fully into particulars in his reply. If the British Minister will but weigh the matter impartially he will, without doubt, perceive plainly (the real state of the case, or, that the Chinese Government is in the right.)

Inclosed are copies of Mr. Hart's memorandum of the letter of instructions to Mr. Hart, of the two letters to Mr. Lay; of Mr. Lay's letter to the Prince, inclosing the agreement,* and a copy of the five Articles discussed and agreed to in personal interviews with Mr. Lay; all which the Prince requests the British Minister carefully to peruse.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency Sir F. Bruce, K.C.B., &c.

Tung-Chih, 2nd year, 9th month, 13th day (October 25th, 1863).

Inclosure 13 in No. 23.

Regulations proposed by Mr. Hart in regard to the (Chinese) Officers, Gunners, Sailors, &c., to be appointed to the seven Steam-Vessels.

1. AN officer of high rank must be appointed to act with Sherard Osborn in all matters connected with the control and management of the fleet.

Seven additional officers (should) be appointed, the number to be added to hereafter as occasion may require.

These officers should not exceed thirty years of age.

2. Two hundred Hoonan men should be selected to serve as gunners. To be had at Hankow, as soon as the vessels arrive.

3. Two hundred Shantung men, to serve as sailors. To be had at Tung Chow as soon as the vessels arrive.

4. One hundred Manchoos as marines, and fifty Manchoo boys, to serve as powder-monkeys. To be had at Tientsin as soon as the vessels arrive.

* The second letter to Mr. Lay is identical with the one addressed to Captain Osborn inclosing the "Five Articles," which together form Inclosure No. 5.

The gunners, sailors, and marines must be selected between the ages of eighteen and thirty; the boys between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.

Several cooks will also be required on board each ship.

Of the seven vessels, it is probable that four will be large, and three small. Each large ship ought to have on board about forty gunners, forty sailors, twenty Marines, and ten boys. Each small ship ought to have about ten gunners, ten sailors, ten marines, and three or four boys.

It is absolutely necessary that all the men appointed to serve on board the vessels should be strong and healthy.

The above is only a general idea of the probable arrangement. What the actual arrangement will be can only be known when the vessels arrive.

Inclosure 14 in No. 23.

Instructions from Chinese Foreign Board to Mr. Hart.

(Translation.) *Pekin, February* 1, 1862.

THE Foreign Board gives urgent instructions to Acting Inspector-General Hart.

Mr. Hart stated in a despatch received some time ago by this Board, that, after his arrival at Shanghai, he had had an interview with his Excellency Sieh (then Governor of Kiangsoo) on the subject of the purchase of foreign ships and guns, who had said that, if no more than 800,000 taels were wanted, the getting of the money would be a matter of no difficulty; and that if the Foreign Board in Pekin would give an order on the subject, the Shanghai Customs could, within a period of four months, easily provide at least 200,000 taels.

Mr. Hart himself suggested that it would be sufficient if the Shanghai and the Canton Customs were each required to provide 200,000 taels, Foochow; 100,000 taels, and Amoy and Ningpo each 50,000 taels.

The Foreign Board thereupon wrote to his Excellency Sieh, to arrange the matter as proposed. This is all on record. But as there is at present a most urgent need for the guns and arms, on account of the recent loss in succession of Ningpo and Hangchow, in the Province of Che-Kiang, this Board has obtained from His Majesty a decree, commanding the Governor of Kiang-Soo, in conjunction with the Superintendents of Customs at Canton and Foochow, to provide funds immediately for the line of foreign steamers, and to commission officers to proceed with these, when procured, to the port of Ningpo, to cut off the escape of the rebels; and also commanding the Governors-General and Governors of Kwan-tung and Fu-kien in like manner to hire steamers for the same purpose. This Board has now to instruct Mr. Hart to lose no time in consulting with his Excellency Sieh on the immediate carrying out of these projects. Let there be no further delay when the steamers have been procured and equipped with arms, either of their Excellencies Sieh or Tseng (Governor-General of the Two Keang) will appoint officers to proceed in the vessels, first to Ningpo to oppose and exterminate the rebels, and after that place has been recovered to clear the river and go right at Nanking. With such steamers as these will be, we may hope in a given time to see that little plague extinguished. As it is feared that the land-route is not at present quite free and open, a duplicate copy of this despatch is being sent by steamer.

Tung Chih, 1st year, 1st month, 2nd day (February 1st 1862.)

Inclosure 15 in No. 23.

Mr. Lay to the Prince of Kung.

(Translation.)

Sir, *June* 29, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, on the 15th of January, 1863, of the letter of instructions furnished to me by Your Imperial Highness, and to report that, in conformity therewith, I engaged in England Captain Sherard Osborn to act as Commander-in-Chief of the naval force there organised; and that in accordance with your instructions, in which you drew my attention to the three important matters,

namely, the purchase of vessels, guns, powder, coal, &c., the engagement of officers and crews, together with the drawing up of every description of agreement, and the setting apart a guarantee fund in order to meet the claims for salaries, wages, &c., I entered into an agreement, in thirteen articles, with Captain Osborn. The important provisions of this agreement are:—

First. That Captain Osborn is an officer under the orders of the Foreign Board, from which he must receive all orders and instructions so that he may act in concert with the Governors-General and Governors.

Second. That he must have authority and control over all steamers the property of native guilds as long as they are in the employment of the Emperor of China. This is necessary because the men in charge of these vessels are all foreigners, who, under pretext of being in Government employment, claim exemption from all supervision, and then furnish supplies to the rebels, to the very serious detriment of the public service. Moreover, it is a fact that steamers owned by Chinese subjects do, under cover of a foreign flag with which they stealthily provide themselves, engage in smuggling and every kind of illegal practice.

Third. Captain Osborn and myself agreed that there must be provided beforehand, and deposited in a foreign bank, a sum of money about sufficient to cover the pay and maintenance of the force for four years, so as to satisfy Captain Osborn and the officers and men that their pay would be punctually paid, it being apprehended that the pay would not be forthcoming, which might lead to refusal to work on the part of the crews; therefore this arrangement was made. In the meantime we agreed that, until the arrival of the men in China, the vessels and their equipment would be the security for the claims of the force.

I have the honour to submit to your Imperial Highness a copy of the agreement in thirteen articles translated from the original English.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. N. LAY.

Inclosure 16 in No. 23.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.) *Pekin, November* 2, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung makes a further communication in reply on the subject of the purchase of the steamers by the Chinese Government.

As Captain Osborn purposes disbanding the entire force which he has under his command, it is the duty of the Prince of Kung to set forth (beforehand) clearly and in precise terms the reasons why the Chinese Government has not been able to accede to the Agreement in thirteen Articles entered into between Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn.

1. Article 4 of that Agreement runs as follows; "Captain Osborn undertakes to act upon all orders of the Emperor which may be conveyed direct to Mr. Lay, and Captain Osborn engages not to attend to any orders conveyed through any other channel."

Now, as Captain Osborn is not a subordinate of Mr. Lay's, why should it rest with Mr. Lay to transmit the orders which Captain Osborn can alone obey. The Prince's letter of instructions to Mr. Lay only stated that when the purchase and equipment of the vessels should be completed they must proceed to Shanghai there to await orders for their distribution. There was no such language in it as that the commander of the vessels should receive his orders from Mr. Lay, and through no other channel. If that were the case then China would be placed completely in his (Mr. Lay's) hands. The Prince's letter of instructions had no such intention as this. For these reasons (the 4th Article) cannot be acceded to.

2. Article 5 runs as follows: "Lay, upon his part, engages to refuse to be the medium of any orders of the reasonableness (or practicability) of which he is not satisfied. Now, in regard to orders that could not be carried out, Captain Osborn could well have consulted with the Chinese high officers (on the spot); but if it were as (this Article) proposes, then the Chinese high officers could hold no communication with Captain Osborn, and thus important operations would be seriously impeded. Therefore this Article could certainly not be agreed to.

3. Article 10 provides that "Mr. Lay must, in addition, procure a sum of money about sufficient to cover salaries, wages, and other expenses for four years. For the

present, while in England, the vessels and their equipments must stand as security (for all claims)."

Now this Article shows that Mr. Lay cannot trust the Members of the Foreign Board, how, however, can the Prince so far trust Mr. Lay as to hand over to him, a single individual, such a large sum of money. Moreover, China has never followed such a rule as to pay four years' salary beforehand. (This Article) for these reasons cannot be agreed to.

The above three Articles are not only disadvantageous to China, but do not accord with the (Prince's) original letter of instructions. As for the less important objectionable points (in the Agreement) it is unnecessary to point them out one by one.

The Prince and the Members of the Foreign Board have seen that the said agreement in thirteen articles contains provisions very much at variance with the object which the Chinese Government had in view in the purchase of the vessels; and now that Captain Osborn is about to take home and disband the force which he has brought out, the Prince has to express his sincerest thanks to the British Government for its friendly intentions in allowing the equipment of the vessels, and in granting special permission to officers to come to China. His Highness must also thank Captain Osborn for all the trouble to which he has been put in procuring the fleet and in bringing it out to China. The Chinese Government will, as a matter of course, pay to Captain Osborn and to all his officers and men their salaries, wages, &c., and all their miscellaneous expenses up to the day of their arrival in England; and, in addition, will present 10,000 taels to Captain Osborn as a recompense for the (additional) trouble (to which he will be put). All these moneys to be given out of the sum that will be realised by the sale of the vessels.

The Prince would also request the British Minister to be so good as to suggest an effectual method by which the money spent in the original purchase of the vessels, guns, and equipments may be refunded to the Imperial Treasury of China.

As these vessels are not to be in the service of the Chinese Government, the Prince has also to request the British Minister to withdraw and cancel the Chinese flag at present used by them.

As the British Minister has already read the Prince's original letter of instructions to Mr. Lay, his Highness incloses, herewith, for his Excellency's perusal, a more particular and clear explanation of the important points in that letter.

A necessary communication addressed to Sir Frederick Bruce, K.C.B., &c.

Tung-Chih, 2nd year, 9th month, 21st day (November 2nd, 1863).

Inclosure 17 in No. 23.

Explanation of the more important Points in the Prince of Kung's Letter of Instructions to Mr. Lay.

(Translation.)

1. THE Prince's letter of instructions states:—"The Acting Inspector-General Hart has now come to the capital, and apprised (the Foreign Board) that all the arrangements connected with the purchase of vessels and guns he has officially handed over to the Inspector-General, Mr. Lay, to carry out on his behalf in England." Now when this office was discussing with Mr. Hart the question of the purchase by China of ships and crews, it was originally proposed that seven foreign officers, in addition to Captain Osborn, should be engaged, and that the rest of the men employed should be men from Hoonan, from Shantung, and Manchoos; that this is so, this office has at present the memorandum in Mr. Hart's own handwriting to show, and there was no talk of employing a large number of foreigners; and as Mr. Hart, according to his own statement, handed over officially to Mr. Lay "all the arrangements" connected with the carrying out of the scheme, it is plain he must have informed him of "all the arrangements" deliberated upon by the Foreign Office in conjunction with himself.

2. The letter again states:—"There are three important points; first, the purchase of the vessels, guns, gunpowder, coal, and miscellaneous articles for the use of the vessels; second, the arrangement of officers, gunners, and seamen, and others for service in the vessels, and the arranging the terms and conditions of every description of agreement (or of each class's agreements); third, the retention, as proposed, of a sum of money to meet the salaries and wages that may be settled by the agreements, and also to provide for the payment of compensations, and other items in time to come. The above three

points (the Prince) will leave the Inspector-General to dispose of, as he in his discretion may see fit."

Now it is perfectly plain from the letter that the phrase, "each class's agreements," only refers to the salaries of the officers and the wages of the men, and to nothing else, and that the expression "to dispose of as he in his discretion may see fit," refers merely to the several kinds of payments, and to nothing else.

3. The letter again states:—"The money already collected from the Custom-houses has been transmitted through Mr. Hart to Mr. Lay, and that still due should be, as collected, handed through Mr. Hart to Mr. Lay, who is alone charged with the responsibility of its disbursement."

Now the phrase, "alone charged with the responsibility," was used only in reference to the various payments, and nothing else.

4. The letter again states:—"China is in urgent need of the vessels and guns; efforts should therefore be made to effect their completion and dispatch with the least possible delay to Shanghai, there to await orders."

Now it is plain to the comprehension, even of a woman or a child, that the phrase, "to await orders," means nothing else than to await the Prince's orders; and Mr. Lay, while on the one hand not inserting in the agreements what the letter of instructions set forth, namely, that the force must await orders (at Shanghai), has on the other embodied in them arrangements he was never instructed to make.

For these reasons, therefore, these agreements cannot be acted upon.

Inclosure 18 in No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to the Prince of Kung.

Sir, *Pekin, November* 6, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Imperial Highness's despatches of October 25th and November 2nd, inclosing papers connected with the steam flotilla, and stating the reasons which have weighed with your Imperial Highness in declining to ratify the proposed agreements.

Your Imperial Highness will have observed that I have maintained the strictest reserve while this question was under discussion. It was for China and China alone to decide for herself on a matter so intimately connected with her internal administration, and I should have acted contrary to the spirit in which I am instructed to conduct the relations of Great Britain with China, had I endeavoured to press its acceptance against the convictions of your Imperial Highness, after the long and full discussion the subject has undergone. The British Government, in the belief that this scheme had met with your Imperial Highness's approval, had placed ships, officers, and men at your disposal; but it certainly did not intend to force them on your acceptance, in the event of your deciding that the conditions on which alone this force could act were such as you could not agree to. I shall not therefore discuss the arguments advanced in your Imperial Highness's despatch, on which it is not my province to pronounce any opinion, and I shall confine myself to expressing my sincere regret that the details of this scheme were not communicated to your Imperial Highness before the expedition left England, as much expense and embarrassment would have been thereby avoided.

My duty in this matter is to assist your Imperial Highness, as far as possible, in finding a way out of these difficulties, and I have much pleasure in acknowledging the just and liberal spirit in which your Imperial Highness is disposed to treat the claims of the officers and men engaged to serve in these vessels. A question may arise on the contracts entered into with these men as to the date up to which they are entitled to be paid, namely, whether up to the 30th of August of next year, or only up to the time of their arrival in England. This question I have no power to decide; but as I am anxious that the Chinese Government should be put to no unnecessary expense, I have instructed Captain Osborn that he is to take the opinion of a competent legal authority on the point, and to be guided by it. He is also to dispose of the vessels on the most advantageous terms, and remit the balance, after payment of expenses, to the Chinese Government. I can assure your Imperial Highness that you may have full confidence in him, and that after the handsome manner in which he has been treated by your Imperial Highness, no effort on his part will be wanting to justify it.

As there may be some difficulty in providing the funds necessary for the winding-up

of this affair, I will instruct the Consuls to advance what may be required out of the forthcoming payments on account of the indemnity, the sum thus advanced to form a lien on the ships, and to be repaid out of the proceeds of the sale. I feel assured that Her Majesty's Government will appreciate the considerate spirit in which your Imperial Highness has acted, and will willingly assist Captain Osborn in carrying out his instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 19 in No. 23.

Sir F. Bruce to Captain Osborn.

Sir, *Pekin, November* 6, 1863.

AS you are aware, the scheme of keeping the ships of the flotilla in deposit awaiting instructions from Her Majesty's Government has been abandoned, and the Chinese Government has requested me to send the vessels to England to be disposed of. His Imperial Highness expresses his thanks to yourself for the trouble to which you have been put in procuring the fleet, and in bringing it out to China, and requests you to accept 10,000 taels in addition to your pay for the labour entailed upon you by it.

He further requests that the ships may be put under another flag. That, however, is a point which must be left to your discretion.

I have, therefore, to request that you will take charge of the vessels and men with a view to the disposal of the former in England, or in India, as you think best; the officers and men to be sent home and to be paid up to their arrival in England. But as the contract may be construed to give them a claim for pay for three months after their arrival, or up to the 30th of August, it will be advisable to obtain the opinion of counsel as to the liability of the Chinese Government, they having declined to accept the flotilla on the ground of their agent having exceeded his authority in the conditions attached to the scheme. You will feel with me, that our honour is involved in winding up this affair on terms as little onerous as possible to the Chinese Government.

I will give instructions to the Consuls to contribute what may be required out of the monies received by them on the indemnity account, to meet such part of the expenses of sending the vessels home as the Chinese Government is unable to provide for. The sum so advanced will form a lien on the ships, and to be deducted from the expenses of sale, or set off against the value of the ships and stores, should Her Majesty's Government decide on taking any of them back.

I think it but just to you to express my entire approbation of the honourable and dignified course you have pursued during the discussion of this question at Pekin. An officer more alive to pecuniary advantages, less scrupulous as to the interests of Great Britain, and less careful of his own honour, might have admitted some unsatisfactory compromise as to his position, and might have trusted to an arbitrary exercise of the power wielded by him to have extricated himself from future embarrassments. By your firmness you have saved Great Britain from complications, and you have vindicated the honour of the British uniform in the eyes of the Chinese by refusing to accept an unbecoming position. However disappointing the result of your honourable wish to advance the cause of progress in China, you have the consolation of knowing that you have gained the respect and approval of persons of every nation who are acquainted with the course you have pursued.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 20 in No. 23.

Mr. Burlingame to Sir F. Bruce.

Sir, *Pekin, November* 7, 1863.

WHEN the Chinese Government refused the doings of its agent, Mr. Lay, and there was nothing left for Captain Osborn but to dissolve the force of the flotilla, the question was how it could be done with safety. I feared that the ships might fall into the hands of the Confederates, who are supposed to have agents in China, and then there was

the common apprehension from lawless men on the coast in the interest of the Taepings as well as from pirates, and the desire of the Daimios in Japan to procure steamers at any price.

It was clear that the Chinese could do nothing of themselves with the steamers, and that unless something were done by you, they would certainly fall a prey to one of these several dangers. In my solicitude, on account of the rebels in my own country, I made an earnest protest against the delivery of the ships to the Chinese. You responded in that spirit of comity which has ever distinguished our relations, that the ships should be taken back to England, and that no effort on your part should be spared to prevent them from taking a direction against the interests of my country.

Though subsequent events made it necessary for the ships to take the direction indicated by the desire of the Chinese themselves, still I should be wanting in appreciation of your conduct did I not mark it with my most heartfelt thanks, and at as early a period as possible bring it to the attention of my Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. BURLINGAME.

No. 24.

Mr. Hammond to Captain Osborn.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 1, 1864.

I AM directed by Earl Russell to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd of November and its inclosures, giving an account of the circumstances which have led to the dissolution of the force organized under your command for service under the Emperor of China.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 25.

Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell.—(*Received February* 9, 1864.)

My Lord, *Pekin, November* 27, 1863.

AS I anticipated from the language of the Chinese Government, the failure of the flotilla scheme has led to their dismissal of Mr. Lay. This step is in accordance with their system, for they hold an employé responsible for the management of any business confided to him, and reward or degrade him according to the event.

At the same time they have acted fairly by him. They have allowed him 3,000 taels (1,000*l.*) a-month for the expenses of his establishment during his residence at Pekin; they allow him salary at the rate of 8,000*l.* a-year from the 1st of May, 1863, to the month of March next, by which time his accounts are to be made up, and they present him with 6,000 taels (2,000*l.*) as a gratification on leaving their service. I do not think that more could have been demanded, as the high salaries given to the Custom-house employés were fixed on the ground of the uncertainty of the duration of the employment, and it is impossible, in my opinion, to maintain that Mr. Lay's dismissal is a capricious act on the part of the Chinese, or that they had not fair ground to complain of his conduct, as the cause of the pecuniary loss which this Government has suffered, and of the censure to which the Members of the Foreign Board are thereby exposed. I do not admit that a man who serves the Chinese as an agent is entitled to exceed his authority, and if he does exceed it he must do so at his own risk, and take the consequences.

Mr. Hart is appointed in his place, and I trust that the change will make the Custom-house work more smoothly. He will reside on the coast, coming here when sent for on business, an arrangement which was found to work satisfactorily during Mr. Lay's absence in England. It is very desirable, with a view to the maintenance of the Custom-house administration, that the head of it should not be permanently at Pekin, for if he is he is supposed to act as the adviser of the Chinese in matters not appertaining to his office, and thereby incurs the odium of the errors they commit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 25.

Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.) *Pekin, November 15*, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung addresses a communication to Sir F. Bruce in reference to the failure of Inspector-General Lay to manage the business connected with the purchase of the flotilla in accordance with the instructions with which he had been furnished, in consequence of which a useless waste of the Chinese public money has taken place. The Prince would observe that the Chinese Government can only give to any person it may employ the power to transact business in its name, on condition that he is bound and able to act in his capacity as agent in such a way as that China shall reap an advantage in every particular.

In the present instance, however, Mr. Lay, while drawing salary from the Chinese Government to the extent of over 10,000 taels per annum, and while having been treated by them with uniform liberality, has failed to carry out satisfactorily the business of purchasing steamers, with which he was charged, and has wasted to no purpose the revenue of the country.

If Mr. Lay were a Chinese subject, either in a public or private capacity, it would be (the Prince's) duty to have him punished according to the law; but considering that he is an Englishman, it remains (for the Prince) to instruct him to return to England, as it is not expedient that he be further employed by the Chinese Government. Mr. Lay has been instructed to wind up all the affairs in his hands that are still unsettled, and to make up clearly and hand over all his accounts within a period of four months; and the Chinese Government, in order to show its generous compassion, will continue during these four months to give him his usual salary.

If Mr. Lay fails to hand in a clear account of all moneys, and to have all matters in his hands settled within the four months, the Prince will then again consult the British Minister as to how he may be compelled to do as he is required, and (will request) his Excellency to aid in bringing the matter to a satisfactory conclusion.

The Prince has now appointed Mr. Hart to the post of Inspector-General of all the Customs Affairs.

Inclosed are copies of the letters (of dismissal) to Mr. Lay, and of the letter appointing Mr. Hart Inspector-General of Customs, the purport of which the Prince would request the British Minister to communicate to the Consuls at the several ports.

A necessary communication.

Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Lay.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung issues these instructions to Mr. Lay.

As you, the Inspector-General, have failed to carry out satisfactorily the flotilla scheme, with which you were charged, it is not expedient that the Foreign Board should continue you any longer in its employment, and accordingly Mr. Hart has been already appointed to succeed to the post of Inspector-General of Customs Affairs, and you are hereby commanded to cease discharging the duties of the said office of Inspector-General from and after the day on which you receive this despatch.

You are also instructed to hand over at once to the Foreign Board the various moneys in full now in your hands on account of tonnage dues, and to proceed to Shanghai; and then, within a period of four months, reckoning from the day you receive this despatch, to make up clearly all your accounts, both of income and expenditure, and to hand them over, each and all, together with all sums of money of every description, which you may have to return (to the Chinese Government), as well as all business you may have in hand, to Mr. Hart, the newly appointed Inspector-General, who, having taken them over, will report on the matter to this office, and await its instructions.

Though you are no longer in office, the Chinese Government, in order to show its desire to treat you with more than its bounden liberality, authorize you to draw your usual salary up to the end of the four months to which you are limited.

As the time allowed you is amply sufficient, you will not exceed it in the slightest.

Inspector-General Hart and the Superintendents of Customs at the various ports, have been written to on the subject, and this most important despatch is addressed to you in order that you may act in obedience to it.

Inclosure 3 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Hart.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung issues these important instructions to Mr. Hart, for his information and guidance.

Mr. Lay has been dismissed from the post of Inspector-General of Customs, and has been instructed to proceed to Shanghai to wind up everything still unsettled by him, and We (knowing that) you, from the date of your entering the Customs to the present time, have in all cases acted harmoniously and with success, hereby appoint you to the post of Inspector-General of Customs Affairs. You will reside and transact all business at Shanghai; and if any important question arise, you are authorised, as heretofore, to come to the capital as occasion requires, to report and deliberate thereupon.

You will report, as it may be necessary, all matters of daily occurrence at the several ports both on the northern and southern sea-board, and on the Yang-tsze, to their Excellencies Li or Chung, as the case may be, Ministers Superintendents of Trade, and will abide by their instructions.

The late Inspector-General, Mr. Lay, has been given a period of four months within which he is to transfer all business into your hands, to make up carefully all his accounts, both of income and expenditure, to hand them, together with all sums of money he may have to return (to the Chinese Government) over to you, the Inspector-General.

You will therefore, on receipt of this despatch urgently press Mr. Lay to transfer immediately into your hands all matters with which he has been charged, and which are still unsettled.

Your prudence, tact, and experience are known to all, both Chinese and foreign, and it will behove you to be still more careful and diligent, so as to justify your present appointment.

A copy of the letter (of dismissal) to Mr. Lay is inclosed herewith for your instruction and guidance.

Their Excellencies the Ministers Superintendent of Trade have been written to on this subject.

Inclosure 4 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Sir F. Bruce.

(Translation.) *November* 20, 1863.

THE Prince of Kung addresses a communication to Sir F. Bruce.

The ex-Inspector-General of Customs, Mr. Lay, has informed this office that he is anxious to return to England at once; that he can produce detailed accounts of the money spent by him in the purchase of the steam flotilla, and of the sums assigned to him for the monthly expenditure of the vessels; and that the balance in hand is still considerable. He therefore prays the Prince to give him authority to go over these accounts with the newly-appointed Inspector-General, Mr. Hart, to whom, after they have been thoroughly investigated, the books and all sums of money still on hand are to be handed over for transmission to the Chinese Government. He prays that Mr. Hart be instructed to issue a clear discharge on the accounts; and that, should any error in these or deficiency in the moneys be (afterwards) discovered, the responsibility should rest with Mr. Hart in both cases. He also states that he has requested Sir Frederick Bruce to guarantee that nothing unsatisfactory in the settlement shall take place.

Although Mr. Lay has failed to manage successfully the business of the flotilla, the Prince takes into consideration that he has been for several years in the employment of the Chinese Government, and has discharged the duties of the office of Inspector-General with great zeal. Although he will start for England before the termination of the four months (to which he has been limited), the Chinese Government will not calculate (his pay) by so many months, but will allow him 8,000 taels, to be paid out of the sum hitherto

allowed for the expense of the residence of the Inspector-General at the capital, which will cease from and after the 5th day of the 10th Chinese moon, being the 15th of November, 1863. This allowance to be conditional on Mr. Lay's handing over, on his arrival at Shanghai, the accounts of the flotilla and the several sums now in his hands, clearly and satisfactorily made out.

In addition to the above, the Prince will still further show his generous consideration for Mr. Lay by giving him a sum of 6,000 taels to defray his travelling expenses to England; this sum to be deducted from the money which he has still to return to the Chinese Government.

In reference to Mr. Lay's statement, that he has requested Sir Frederick Bruce to guarantee that there will be nothing unsatisfactory in the transference of the accounts, the Prince calls to mind that the British Minister, in a late despatch (November 6, 1863), observed that, it is his duty in this matter to assist the Prince of Kung as far as possible to find a way out of these difficulties. The Prince hopes that his Excellency, having thus professed his willingness to assist the Chinese Government, will direct Mr. Lay, in transferring the books to Mr. Hart, to investigate the accounts with scrutinising care, so as to avoid ambiguity or mistake.

The Prince has issued to Messrs. Lay and Hart letters of instruction, copies of which are herewith inclosed, together with an approximate statement of the accounts of the flotilla rendered by Mr. Lay.

A necessary communication.

Tung Chih, 2nd year, 10th moon, 18th day (November 20, 1863).

Inclosure 5 in No. 25.

Memorandum by Mr. Lay to the Foreign Board.

(Translation.) *November* 20, 1863.

THE sum of 251,960*l.* 2*s.* 1*d.* was transmitted to me in England, in bills at six months (I will calculate with Mr. Hart whether this sum in Chinese money corresponds with the amount of the bills he transmitted). I will give Mr. Hart minute accounts as to how this money was expended, and also a statement of the loss suffered in consequence of my having to cash the bills before they came due.

2. When I came to Shanghai I drew on the Shanghai Customs for 120,000 taels, but as the Customs had no money in hand, I made arrangements for a loan to that amount on their account, the terms being that the sum should all be repaid with interest by the Shanghai Customs within twelve months. Afterwards, as the Amoy Customs sent up an extra sum of 20,000 taels, I diminished the amount of the loan to 100,000 taels.

(The reason why this money was required was as follows:) When I was in England I received frequent letters from Mr. Hart, at Shanghai, urging me to hurry out the ships, and accordingly (with a view to save time), I bought on credit in England the stores and equipments that were still required, together with the store ship and despatch boat, stipulating that the prices should be paid as soon as they reached Shanghai. My first intention was to use (for this purpose) the Customs Guarantee Fund of 120,000 taels deposited at Shanghai, but as I feared that this sum might have to be carried to the fund set apart for the purchase of the steamers (Mr. Hart having told me that there was still a considerable debt under that head), I was compelled to ask permission to borrow 120,000 taels; I found, however, afterwards, that it would be some time before the stores, &c., would arrive, and that I could apply [the Guarantee Fund] as proposed. For this reason the 120,000 taels were never drawn, though I still retained in my hands the authority to do so, in order to be prepared to meet any other expenditure which Captain Osborn might have to incur. I diminished the sum to be borrowed, however, by 20,000 taels, inasmuch as the Fuhkien Customs sent in to the steamer fund an extra sum to that amount. I shall ascertain, in conjunction with Mr. Hart, how much the Shanghai Customs has already paid (to the loan account). As this sum of 100,000 taels has not been drawn or made use of, I shall return to the Foreign Board the documents connected with the transaction.

3. Previous to my departure from England, when I was not aware that certain sums of money had been sent from China, I gave a bond for 50,000*l.* to the Oriental Bank, in order that Captain Osborn might have a sum to draw upon. Afterwards, on my arrival in China, I found on enquiry that Mr. Hart did not know how much money had been sent home, the reason of his not knowing being that M. Meritens (Commissioner of Customs

at Foochow) had not reported the amount borrowed (and sent home) by him; accordingly, after my arrival in Pekin, I requested authority to draw from the Customs the sum of 150,000 taels. (After I left England) Captain Osborn received the money sent home from China (to wit, the sum borrowed and forwarded by M. Meritens), and did not draw upon the 50,000*l.* for which I gave the bond. The 150,000 taels has been apportioned between the different Customs, and paid up in the following manner:—

	Taels.			Taels.
Canton, to pay ..	30,000	.. ..	has paid	30,000
Swatow „ ..	20,000	.. ..	„	20,000
Foochow „ ..	30,000	.. ..	„	10,000
Amoy „ ..	20,000	.. ..	„	10,000
Shanghai „ ..	20,000	.. ..	„	20,000
Kiukiang „ ..	30,000	.. ..		..
Total ..	150,000	.. ..	..	90,000

These are all the sums of the payment of which I have been informed up to yesterday, November 19th, 1863; for any other sums that may have already been paid in by the Customs, and of which information has not reached me, I shall account separately.

4. The allowance for the maintenance of the flotilla, at the rate of 75,000 taels per month, will amount, for the three months commencing August 1st and ending October 31st, 1863, to 225,000 taels. This sum has been apportioned and paid up in the following manner: —

	Taels.		Taels.
Canton, to pay ..	30,000	.. has already paid	10,000
Swatow „ ..	15,000	.. „	5,000
Amoy „ ..	18,000	.. „	6,000
Foochow „ ..	102,000	.. „	34,000
Kiukiang „ ..	30,000	.. „	10,000
Shanghai „ ..	30,000	.. ..	..
Total ..	225,000	Total paid ..	65,000

The amounts received for the first of the three months have already been reported (as above) and sent in, but I have not received the second or third months' allowances. If any farther sums have been paid over on this head, I shall account separately for the sums so paid with Mr. Hart.

5. There is deposited at Shanghai a (Customs) Guarantee Fund of 120,000 taels. This sum of money was deposited in the Oriental Bank, from April 1861, the date of my departure for England, to April 1863, and 12,000 taels interest at five per cent. per annum has accumulated thereon. Prior to April 1861, owing to the unsettled state of affairs, the sum was only temporarily lodged, and did not produce any interest; this sum, principal and interest, I shall return immediately to the Chinese Government.

6. The cost of the vessels, guns, and warlike stores, and all salaries, wages, and expenses incurred up to the arrival of the flotilla in China, will be paid out of the item of 1,070,000 taels.

7. The entire cost of maintaining the flotilla after its arrival in China will be charged against the monthly sum of 75,000 taels, provided by the Customs, beginning at August 1st and ending October 31st, 1863.

This sum of 75,000 taels was originally intended to cover all expenses for salaries and wages, for ammunition, &c., for stores and coal, for rewards and compensations for wounds, and for every kind of unforeseen expenditure. As, however, the flotilla has never come into action, there must be a large balance of this allowance for the three months to be returned to the Chinese Government.

8. Of the 375,000 taels allowed for taking the flotilla home, Mr. Hart and myself will account for 162,000 taels (being the estimate for salaries and wages), according to the accounts rendered by Captain Osborn; Sir F. Bruce and Captain Osborn will account for the remaining 213,000 taels, being the sum estimated to cover miscellaneous expenses.

Inclosure 6 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Lay.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung issues important instructions to Mr. Lay.

Whereas the sum of 1,070,000 taels, in all, has been sanctioned by His Majesty at the request of the Foreign Board to be applied to the purchase of steamers and munitions of war, and a further sum of 225,000 taels has also been sanctioned for the expenses of the fleet for the three months commencing August 1st and ending October 31st, 1863, the two sums amounting in all to 1,295,000 taels; instructions were given to hand over these sums of money to you; the ex-Inspector-General, and their disbursement was entrusted to you alone. These moneys, therefore, might from time to time have all been paid over to you. You have now stated, however, to the Foreign Board that of the first item, you received in England only 251,960*l.* 2*s.* 1*d.* (you will calculate with Mr. Hart, you say, whether the equivalent of this sum in Chinese money corresponds with the amount which Mr. Hart transmitted to you by bills); that after you came to Shanghai you made a loan on behalf (of the Chinese Government) of 120,000 taels, which you diminished afterwards to 100,000 taels, in consequence of the Fuhkien customs having sent in an extra sum of 20,000 taels towards the fund for the purchase of the ships, that this money has not been drawn or made use of yet, and that you will return the documents connected with the transaction (to the Chinese Government). Again, that after your arrival in Peking you requested authority for the several custom-houses to set aside for you in all 150,000 taels; that of this sum you have only received 90,000 taels, the balance not having yet been paid up; that of the sum allowed for the monthly expenditure of the flotilla you have received the amount for one month (August), but that you do not know for certain whether the remainder has been paid in or not; that you have full and particular accounts to show how much of these moneys has been received and spent, and how much has not. You state, moreover, that you will hand over in full to the Chinese Government the 120,000 taels of customs' moneys, together with two years" interest thereon, amounting to 12,000 taels; which was placed in your hands as a guarantee fund in 1861; that you will now hand in a memorandum of all the moneys, and that, when you reach Shanghai, you will hand over all accounts and sums of money in your hands to Mr. Hart, who will give you a clear discharge thereon; that Mr. Hart will be responsible for any mistakes in the calculation, and that Sir Frederick Bruce will guarantee that the accounts, &c., will be handed over satisfactorily. You have also handed in a memorandum to the above effect, to which you have affixed your signature.

The Prince is addressing a despatch to Sir F. Bruce on this subject, and also to the Imperial Commissioner Li (Governor of Kiangsoo), who will instruct Mr. Hart to act in accordance herewith, and to receive over the documents connected with the loan. You are also instructed to lose no time in starting for Shanghai, so that you may immediately hand over all accounts, and all sums of money in full, of every description, which you may not have expended to Mr. Hart, who will take them over after due examination, and will send in his report on the matter to the Imperial Commisioner Li for transmission to this office.

Inclosure 7 in No. 25.

The Prince of Kung to Mr. Hart.

THE Prince of Kung issues instructions to Mr. Hart.

(The first part of the letter is a quotation from the foregoing letter to Mr. Lay from its beginning down to the end of the paragraph ending—"To which you have affixed your signature.")

The Prince is addressing despatches on this subject to Sir F. Bruce and the Imperial Commissioner Li. Mr. Lay has also been instructed on the subject; copies of the despatch to Sir F. Bruce, and the letter to Mr. Lay are inclosed herewith for your instruction and guidance. You will immediately on the arrival of Mr. Lay in Shanghai examine minutely into all the flotilla accounts, and ascertain what moneys he has still in hand unexpended. You will take the accounts and money over, and give a clear discharge thereon when you have received everything over satisfactorily. You will make your

report to the Imperial Commissioner Li, who will submit it to the scrutiny of this office.

You will, in conjunction with Mr Lay, closely investigate (all accounts), and conscientiously go over all the calculations so as to avoid the slightest error or omission. If there be any mistake the responsibility will rest with you alone.

If any other sums, over and above those mentioned in this letter, have been given over by any of the Custom-houses on the seaboard, or on the Yang-tze, to Mr. Lay, and are still unaccounted for by him, you will ascertain the facts (in reference to them), and report (to this office) accordingly.

A most important letter of instructions.

No. 26.

Earl Russell to Sir. F. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1864.

I HAVE received your despatch of November 19, inclosing copies of correspondence connected with the refusal of the Chinese Government to confirm the arrangements made by Mr. Lay in regard to the vessels to be employed in their service under the command of Captain Sherard Osborn, and reporting the course you had yourself pursued with reference to this matter; and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your conduct in this respect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUSSELL.

CHINA.

Correspondence respecting the Fitting Out, Dispatching to China, and ultimate Withdrawal of the Anglo-Chinese Fleet under the Command of Captain Sherard Osborn; and the Dismissal of Mr. Lay from the Chief Inspectorate of Customs.

Presented to the House of Lords by Command of Her Majesty. 1864.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CHINA. No. 7 (1869).

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

ATTACK ON BOATS OF HER MAJESTY'S SHIP "COCKCHAFER"

BY

VILLAGERS NEAR SWATOW.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1869.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Correspondence respecting Attack on Boats of Her Majesty' ship "Cockchafer" by Villagers near Swatow.

No. 1.

Consul Robertson to Mr. Hammond.—(Received March 9.)

Sir, *Canton, January* 24, 1869.

I HAVE time only to send a few lines so say that a gun-boat arrived this morning with despatches for the Admiral Sir Henry Keppel, who is staying here with me, saying that the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer" were exercising in the river above Swatow, and on passing a large village called Outang-pai were pelted with stones and insulted. Lieutenant Kerr, commanding the "Cockchafer," landed for the purpose of communicating with the elders of the village and remonstrating. He found a respectable-looking individual whom he requested to take him to the elder's house, but he refused; Lieutenant Kerr then said he should detain him, and the man threw himself on the ground. Upon this the villagers turned out and opened fire upon the party; in fact they were surrounded and took to the boats under a very heavy fire, by which the gunner, boatswain's mate, and one seaman were dangerously wounded and seven seamen slightly. I went as soon as possible to see the Viceroy, and the result of the interview is that the Viceroy will dispatch one of his gun-boats, with deputed officers on board, to demand the surrender of the actors in this attack, and co-operate with a naval force of Her Majesty's ships which will be at once dispatched from Hong Kong. In any operations which circumstances may render necessary, the Admiral will himself proceed there. These villages are fortified and independent of Imperial authority, and are neither more nor less than a lawless set of thieves. As nothing will be done except in strict accordance and in co-operation with the Chinese authorities, there is no cause for uneasiness; and an exhibition of force will doubtless produce a wholesome effect upon the minds of the lawless population of Swatow and Chao-chow-foo.

I am, &c.
(Signed D. B. ROBERTSON.

No. 2.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received March 20.)

Sir, *Admiralty, March* 20, 1869.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, dated the 23rd of January, reporting an attack made on the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer" by piratical villages on the banks of the River Han, near Swatow, and stating the course he proposes to pursue in consequence thereof.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, "*Rodney*," *at Hong Kong, January* 23, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the copy of a letter which has just reached me from Lieutenant Howard Kerr, commanding Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," at Swatow, accompanied by a second letter from Her Majesty's Consul at that port.

2. These letters will acquaint their Lordships with the circumstances of an attack made on the boats of the "Cockchafer" by the piratical inhabitants of the village of Outang-pai, when away exercising in a creek leading from Swatow to the Treaty port of Chao-chow-foo, resulting in the gunner and boatswain's mate being dangerously wounded, five men seriously and three slightly wounded.

3. No other course than that adopted by Lieutenant Kerr could well have been followed at the moment.

4. It is apparent that these villages must be punished, not merely for this, but for repeated outrages seriously interfering with our Treaty rights of trade at Chao-chow-foo.

5. It is my intention to at once proceed to Canton, with a view of communicating, through Her Majesty's Consul, with the Viceroy of the Two Kwang Provinces, within whose jurisdiction I believe Swatow and its neighbourhood to be situated.

6. Should his Excellency express the ability and intention of at once punishing the perpetrators of this gross outrage on the British flag, I will confine my co-operation to affording him the means of transport for his troops; should, however, the means at his command not be sufficient for the purpose, it would appear to be my duty to assist him in bringing these piratical villagers to a sense of their position.

7. The presence in this harbour of the "Rodney," "Adventure," "Perseus," "Rinaldo," and smaller vessels, places a force at my disposal ample for the occasion.

8. In conclusion, I may add that Her Majesty's Minister in China, apparently anticipating an event such as has occurred, wrote to me on the 25th June, 1867, with reference to a survey being made of the River Han and approaches to Chao-chow-foo :—

"Should any opposition be offered, as it can only come from piratical and insurgent villages, the gun-boats will be at full liberty to expel any attack or put down any opposition made to their progress."

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Lieutenant and Commander Kerr to Commodore Jones.

Sir, "*Cockchafer*," *Swatow, January* 21, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that yesterday I proceeded up the creek leading from Swatow to Chao-chow-foo in the boats for exercise, and that on our return, while passing the village of Outang-pai, we were assailed with stones thrown from behind the bank of the river.

2. As this has frequently occurred to foreigners passing up and down creeks in the neighbourhood of Swatow, I landed with men to see the chief man of the village, and to insist on such unjustifiable proceedings being stopped.

3. A short distance from the place the stones came from we found a respectably dressed man, whom I desired through an interpreter to show me the way to the chief man's house.

4. He refused, saying that the chief man was away, so I told him if he refused to comply with my request I should detain him and carry him down to the mandarin at Swatow.

5. He then tried to run away, and as he was not allowed to do so he threw himself upon the ground.

6. The alarm had already been given in the village, and numbers of men with spears and fire-arms assembled and commenced to fire upon us.

7. We returned the fire, and in a short time drove them back.

8. We then returned to the boats, but had not gone far when the men in great numbers from the neighbouring villages commenced to fire upon us from behind the embankment of the creek.

9. When driven back from one position, they soon reappeared further down the creek, and so kept up a running fight for about two miles.

10. I have not been able to ascertain with any precision the number of men engaged against us; but from all accounts it could not have been less than 500.

11. I sincerely regret to state that Mr. Ley, gunner, and William Grayling, boatswain's mate, are dangerously wounded, five men seriously, and three slightly wounded.

12. We had three boats engaged—this vessel's gig and cutter and a gig belonging to Consulate manned by our men, in all twenty-three men and officers.

13. I cannot but in justice say that Mr. Ley, gunner, and William Grayling, boatswain's mate, who had charge of the cutter and Consular gig, showed the utmost coolness and gallantry, and that all the men opposed by such overwhelming numbers behaved admirably.

14. I have since heard that the village where the attack was first made upon us has been notorious for its hostility to foreigners, and that Mr. Wingate, United States' Consul at this port, was insulted there a few days ago on his return from Chao-chow-foo.

15. I do not think it is possible for a gun-boat to go up the creek as far as the village; but I am gathering as much information on the subject as possible.

16. The village of Outang-pai is about five or six miles by road from Swatow, and seven or eight miles by the creek (which is very winding) from the river.

17. I am of opinion that it would not be advisable to march up to the village from Swatow without a force of 300 or 400 men, as although a much smaller force would probably succeed in defeating the men opposed to them, and destroying the village, it would not be enough to prevent loss on our part.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HOWARD KERR.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Acting Consul Alabaster to the Senior Naval Officer, Hong Kong.

Sir, *Swatow, January* 22, 1869.

LIEUTENANT KERR will have reported to you the circumstances of his affair at the independent village of Outang-pai, some eight or ten miles from this; and I hereby write, therefore, to express my concurrence in the course taken by him, and to urge the necessity of a force being sent hither without delay to read the semi-piratical villagers the sharp and decisive lesson I have the instructions of Her Majesty's Minister, in anticipation of some such outrage as this, to see taught them.

The interests of commerce at this port have so suffered from the compromisemade when a boat's crew of the "Weazel" were seized in 1860, that I trust this opporunity may be taken to thoroughly re-establish the prestige on which our safety here depends; and much as the sufferings of Lieutenant Kerr and his men are to be deplored, they will be a gain in the long run, if severe and prompt punishment overtakes the offenders,—for it was certain that sooner or later a collision must occur between foreigners and the semi-piratical villages in the neighbourhood, and a case in which right was as clearly and entirely on our side could scarcely have occurred until an example had been made. The safety of foreign life and property on the way to Chao-chow-foo would have been a matter dependent on the variable temper of the villagers, and a catastrophe might easily have resulted, which would not have admitted of such easy solution as the present.

There are various other matters pending here which would be more readily settled if there was force on the spot, but which have not so far seemed sufficiently important to justify my applying for the special presence of a large ship on their account alone.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES ALABASTER.

No. 3.

Consul Robertson to Mr. Hammond.—(Received March 22.)

Sir, *Canton, February* 6, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your information copy of a despatch I addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking with reference to an attack made by some villagers in the neighbourhood of Swatow on the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer,"

whereby several of the officers and men were more or less wounded, and the measures taken in communication with the Viceroy of this Province to punish the offenders.

In addition I inclose a minute of the interview between Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel and the Viceroy, together with a copy of a despatch and its inclosures I received from the former acquainting me with the results of the expedition, from which you will see that Commodore Oliver Jones, having proceeded to Swatow with Her Majesty's ships "Rinaldo," "Perseus," and the gun-boat "Bouncer," where he was joined by the gun-boats "Leven" and "Cockchafer," attacked and destroyed three villages and the town of Outang-pai. Submission was then made by the Chiefs, and the operations were concluded.

At an interview with the Viceroy, I communicated the contents of the Admiral's despatch. His Excellency expressed much regret that Commodore Jones had not awaited the arrival of his Commissioner before proceeding to extremities in accordance with the arrangement made with Sir Henry Keppel, and in this I fully concur with him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

P.S.—To complete this series, I beg to add to the above inclosures, copies of the despatch I received from Sir Henry Keppel, informing me of the attack on the boats which I received after his return to Hong Kong, and my reply.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Consul Robertson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Canton, January* 27, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a gun-boat arrived here on the 24th instant with despatches for Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel, who was staying with me here, reporting an attack made on the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer" by the inhabitants of a village called Outang-pai, about six miles up the river from Swatow, who fired upon them and dangerously wounded two, seriously five, and slightly three, of the party. Inclosed are copies of the Report of Lieutenant-Commander Kerr and Mr. Acting Consul Alabaster, which will give your Excellency the full particulars of the affair.

On the receipt of these despatches the Admiral did me the honour to consult with me on the subject, and I went at once to see the Viceroy. The inclosed minute of the interview, which I drew up at the request of the Admiral, will place your Excellency in possession of the arrangements I made for the redress of this outrage, and I trust you will approve of the course adopted.

The opinion I expressed to the Admiral was that advantage should be taken of the opportunity thus afforded of giving these turbulent villages a sharp lesson, and that even a military parade at the city of Chao-chow-foo would have a happy effect upon the gentry and populace of that troublesome place; but you will see the Viceroy was so strongly opposed to the latter proposition that, in deference to his wishes, I withdrew it, and arranged for joint action only in any operations which might ensue.

I am not yet aware of the strength of the naval force that will be detailed for this service, but the Admiral will be present in Her Majesty's ship "Salamis" to control and regulate.

Your, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Lieutenant and Commander Kerr to Commodore Jones, January 21, 1869.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 2.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Acting Consul Alabaster to the Senior Naval Officer at Hong Kong, January 22, 1869.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 2.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

Minute of an Interview, on the 24th of January, 1869, between Consul Robertson and the Viceroy Juilin.

Sunday, January 24, 1869.

HER Majesty's Consul called upon the Viceroy by desire of Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel, and laid before his Excellency the contents of despatches from Lieutenant Kerr, commanding Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," and Her Majesty's Consul at Chao-chow-foo, reporting the boats of that vessel having been without provocation fired upon by the villagers of Outang-pai, whereby the gunner, boatswain's mate, and one man were dangerously wounded, and seven others slightly so. The Consul represented the grave nature of this outrage and the necessity of immediate and decisive steps being taken to punish the offenders, in which the Viceroy fully agreed. The Consul proposed the appointment of officers, to be despatched at once to Swatow, with instructions to demand the surrender of the principals concerned in the attack, and to co-operate with the naval force that would be detached from Hong Kong under the immediate supervision of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in any operations that might result with a view of enforcing the arrest and punishment of these men. He further suggested the advisability of a military demonstration being made at the city of Chao-chow-foo, in order to impress upon the people the necessity of their being of good behaviour. To the first of the Consul's propositions the Viceroy yielded a ready assent, and some time was occupied in the detail of arrangements with reference thereto; but to the second the Viceroy demurred, on the grounds that the people of Chao-chow-foo had not as yet given cause for complaint, and he feared a military demonstration would cause the assembly of large crowds of people from the neighbourhood, who were naturally turbulent and ungovernable, and the result would probably be that which it was most necessary to avoid, viz., a collision with the mob. He stated that he had received the assurances of the gentry and others of their intention to preserve the peace and quiet of the city, and had accepted them, and they would have just cause for complaint against him if he sanctioned anything which appeared like a departure from the trust he had confided to them. Besides, Mr. Consul Alabaster had himself testified to the perfect quietude of the city. If, however, hereafter, any outbreak took place, he would gladly request the co-operation of Her Majesty's forces to suppress it. The Consul replied, he had made the suggestion simply with a view not only of preventing future difficulties as regarded foreigners, but also under the impression, from what he had so frequently heard from the Viceroy of the turbulent and contumacious character of the Chao-chow-foo populace, that a demonstration of the kind would be of essential service to the local authorities. If, however, the Viceroy thought differently, he believed he was only speaking the sentiments of Sir Henry Keppel when he said he would not press the subject further. The Viceroy expressed his satisfaction, and remarked that the 4,000 troops which were engaged in pacification in that part of the province should receive orders to close on Chao-chow-foo, and take in hand the reduction of these disaffected villages; and he trusted ere long there would be no cause for complaint against them. The Consul then took his leave, with the understanding that the Chinese gun-boat should at once be despatched, with competent officers as agreed upon.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 3.

Minute of an Interview, at Canton, on the 25th January, 1869, between the Viceroy Juilin and Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Canton, January 25, 1869.

HIS Excellency Juilin, Viceroy of the Two Kwang Provinces, called this afternoon upon his Excellency Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel, K.C.B., Commander-in-chief, &c., &c.

At the interview the Viceroy took occasion to express his sense of the obligation he felt under to Sir Henry Keppel for the courtesy and consideration he had received from his Excellency in all matters requiring their mutual intervention, and the support his Excellency had given in the suppression of piracy on the coast. Such proofs of confidence and goodwill inspired the Viceroy with sentiments of profound respect and regard for Sir H. Keppel, and afforded promise of the happiest results hereafter.

The Viceroy then alluded to the late unfortunate event at Swatow, when the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer" were fired upon by the villages of Outang-pai, and several of their crews wounded. His Excellency expressed great regret, and added that, with the assistance of Her Majesty's squadron, ample amends should be made, and a lesson given to these turbulent people which would prevent similar outrages. He then mentioned the measures he was prepared to take in co-operation with the Commander-in-chief. He should at once despatch one of his steam gun-boats to Swatow with a civil officer in whom he had confidence, to communicate with the local authorities, and make such inquiries respecting the affair as might be useful, and further to demand the surrender of the ringleaders. Another of the steam gun-boats would proceed to Hong Kong, report to the Commodore, and accompany the squadron about to be detailed for Swatow. He had also that morning sent orders for the 4,000 troops now acting in the province for the suppression of disaffection to move on the city of Chao-chow-foo at once, and proceed to clear the neighbourhood of these turbulent villagers; and he trusted that this, together with the joint action of the officers of both Governments, would have the happiest results.

Sir Henry Keppel in reply expressed his satisfaction at the opportunity his visit to Canton afforded for an interview with the Viceroy. In this unfortunate affair at Swatow, his sole desire was to act with deference to his Excellency's wishes, and in consultation with him, and he was rejoiced to find how entirely their views were in accord. He wished neither to burn nor destroy, nor commit any act of a belligerent nature. Her Majesty's boats had been fired upon, and Her Majesty's seamen grievously wounded; in fact, one or two of them might die—without any adequate cause for so serious an outrage, and he desired to confer with the Viceroy regarding the mode of obtaining the punishment of the offenders, and he was prepared to co-operate for that purpose with the Imperial officers, and render such assistance as might be found necessary. He should himself be present in order to regulate the movements of Her Majesty's squadron, in order that nothing might be done which would appear like independent action on its part. Respecting the suppression of piracy, he, Sir Henry Keppel, had endeavoured to place the matter upon a proper basis with regard to the respective rights of both countries. Some irregularities had existed, the amendment of which had received his immediate and earnest attention. In a matter of that kind where great latitude for action was a necessary consequence of the peculiar service required from officers, deviations from a strict regard for international rights would sometimes occur, but he had endeavoured, and he believed successfully, to rectify such errors.

The Viceroy remarked that officers would occasionally make mistakes; he found it so with his own: but with entire confidence between superiors, such as existed between Sir Henry Keppel and himself, and with a liberal construction placed on acts as well as motives, such occurrences were easy of settlement, and would even strengthen the ties of mutual regard and esteem.

With reference to visiting the city of Chao-chow-foo, Sir Henry Keppel observed that, in all probability, he should do so, on which the Viceroy remarked that he hoped his Excellency would be attended with as small an escort as possible; and, indeed, he should prefer Sir Henry Keppel waiting until the troops he had sent should arrive, as he much feared a concourse of rabble might be the cause of something unpleasant occurring. Sir Henry Keppel observed that he was not at all certain of going to the city, and, under any circumstances, would do so only on the invitation of the authorities. The Viceroy again expressed his appreciation of his Excellency's consideration.

Some conversation followed with respect to an Imperial steam gun-boat being permanently stationed in Hong Kong harbour, for the purpose of being always at hand for joint expeditions. The Viceroy thought it was advisable, but requested a despatch on the subject, as there were various circumstances attending it which required consideration.

On taking leave the Viceroy renewed in the most impressive manner his expressions of esteem and regard for Sir Henry Keppel, and trusted on his next visit to Canton his Excellency would do him the honour of dining with him.

January 26, 1869.

The Viceroy sent his card early this morning with his farewell wishes to Sir Henry Keppel on his leaving for Hong Kong.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 3.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to Consul Robertson.

Sir, *"Salamis," at Swatow, February* 2, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, the copy of a letter from Commodore Jones, reporting the operations conducted against the piratical villages which attacked the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," together with the copy of a letter from Her Majesty's Consul at this port referring to these proceedings, and inclosing a document from the offending villages, acknowledging the justice of the punishment they received, and promising to avoid future cause of offence.

In communicating to his Excellency the Viceroy the particulars contained in these documents, I have the honour to request that you will explain away any ill-feeling that might possibly result from Commodore Jones having commenced operations before the arrival of the Viceroy's Commissioner, who was appointed to give countenance to our action on Chinese territory.

It appears that the Commodore, hearing that the inhabitants of these insurgent villages were strengthening their defences and preparing for resistance, considered that it would economise life on both sides to strike a prompt and decisive blow, and show these turbulent villagers that there was little hope of a successful resistance to the formidable force opposed to them.

His Excellency will be pleased to hear that the action of the force was strictly confined to those villages which so unwarrantably attacked the "Cockchafer's" boats, and that every means was adopted to confine the punishment to the individuals who were there and then firing upon us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 7 in No. 3.

Commodore Jones to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *"Rinaldo," Swatow, January* 30, 1869

IN obedience to your orders of the 26th January, to proceed in this ship to Swatow, and with the "Perseus," "Cockchafer," "Leven," and "Bouncer," under my orders, to bring the villagers of Outang-pai, &c., to punishment for their attack on the boats of the "Cockchafer" on the 20th instant, I have the honour to report that I arrived at this port on the 28th instant about 10 A.M. The "Perseus" and "Bouncer" arrived during the afternoon of the same day. I found lying here the "Cockchafer" and "Leven." I at once communicated with Her Majesty's Consul, and he procured me a sufficient number of boats to land my force.

2. Next morning (29th instant) early I left the ships and landed the marines at Swatow, with orders to march up to the creek and await there the arrival of the rest of the force.

3. About 8 A.M. the boats and lighters having arrived, I proceeded, the marines marching up to protect the boats from fire from under the banks, the rest of the force going by the creek. The small-arm men were landed soon after at a convenient spot.

4. About 10 A.M. we arrived off the village of Tang-tun, and landed two of the field-pieces.

5. Parties of armed men were seen behind the village walls and others on the hills behind, in large numbers, making signals and waving flags.

6. I threw out two companies of marines as skirmishers, placed the field-pieces on the right, formed the remainder of the riflemen as supports, and detailed Commander Charles E. Stevens, with about sixty small-arm men, with orders to pass on the proper right of the village and clear the hills beyond of the armed men there.

7. The advance was then sounded, orders having been given not to fire unless fired upon, nor to injure any unarmed or unresisting persons.

8. As soon as the force was in motion, a fire was opened upon it from the village walls, which was responded to by the field-pieces and skirmishers, the skirmishers advancing rapidly to the walls.

9. The enemy did not wait but evacuated the town, keeping up a running fire as they retreated.

10. Observing one of the gates open I ordered Lieutenant St. Vincent Nepean with his company into the village to drive the enemy out, the remainder of the force skirting round the proper left of the village and driving the enemy before it.

11. I advanced to some hills about half-a-mile to the rear of Tang-tun, and having driven the enemy out of range, halted while detachments were sent in to burn the village.

12. Having effectually destroyed the village, there being little but burnt walls left standing, I withdrew the force to the boats and let the people have their dinner.

13. When the people had dined and rested I resumed operations, marching upon the village of Po-leng; the field pieces having been re-embarked, the boats under Commander Lord Charles Scott going up the creek and keeping abreast of the land force.

14. I sent the blue-jackets under Commander Charles E. Stevens round the proper left of the village of Po-leng, and with the marines under Captain William G. Hale, R.M.L.I., skirted the right, and, as there was no firing upon us from it, that village was left unmolested.

15. The force next proceeded towards Outang-pai, the scene of the commencement of the attack upon the "Cockchafer's" boats.

16. Another village was in front of it; between it and Outang-pai we saw the enemy massed in considerable force, making a great display with banners, firing gingals and advancing upon us.

17. Upon approaching the village a brisk fire was opened upon us from the walls and houses. An attack on it was instantly made, but, as every street was more or less barricaded and every gate and door closed, some time was occupied in forcing our way through and driving the enemy out. Pitfalls and trous-de-loups with broken spears and other sharp-pointed irons were plentifully dug about, in one of which Lieutenant Rodney Lloyd fell and got wounded in the leg.

18. As the principal point of attack still was in front, and it was getting late, I did not wait to fire the village completely, merely burning the house of one of the principal people who was said to be implicated in the attack on the "Cockchafer's" boats.

19. The force was now in front of the south face of Outang-pai, which is a considerable town of from 7,000 to 10,000 inhabitants rather than a village. This front extended not less than two miles (it is said to be four miles), and the local difficulties before it were considerable—a broad and deep creek skirting it, besides many smaller ones. The heavy fire from our rifles, and a flanking fire from the boats, cleared the front of the town of fighting men. After marching about a mile, a part of the wall which appeared less strong than the rest was selected for the place of attack, and skirmishers having been thrown out, a general advance took place.

20. Two large and deep ditches were found to be in front of the walls, which were forded, and the gates, after some delay, forced.

21. Two companies of marines were then ordered to advance in parallel lines through the town towards the creek, two companies of blue-jackets were detailed for burning the town, and the remainder of the force under Commander Charles Stevens was ordered to follow up, in order to protect the fire party and prevent them straggling.

22. But little resistance was offered after the force entered the town, the fighting men having fled through the opposite part.

23. By sunset a great part of the town was destroyed, and considering that sufficient punishment had been inflicted on these people to deter them from attacking our boats again, I withdrew the force to the boats and returned to the ships.

24. About 5 P M., the Captain of the Chinese gun-boat "An-lan" arrived, stating that he had brought some Chinese officials and that he was ordered to render us any assistance in his power.

25. I have great pleasure in reporting to you the good conduct of the whole of the force under my orders on the occasion of this successful expedition.

26. Commander Charles E. Stevens of the "Perseus" was conspicuous for his gallantry in leading his men, and judgment in directing them, and throughout the day rendered the most effective and zealous good service. I particularly recommend him to your favourable consideration.

27. Acting Commander Hardy McHardy of the "Rodney" proved himself an able leader.

28. Commander Lord Charles T. M. D. Scott of the "Rinaldo" had command of the flotilla, and rendered the most efficient assistance.

29. Captain William G. Hale, R.M.L.I., of Her Majesty's ship "Rodney," commanded the marines admirably, maintaining order and steadiness under trying circumstances, and always leading them in every attack. Second Captain Frederick

A. Ogle, R.M.A., and Lieutenants Frederick Baldwin and Adolphus B. Crosbie, R.M.L.I., all did their duty nobly.

30. Among the Lieutenants, who all did well, it is difficult to select those who merit peculiar commendation, but I particularly noticed the zeal of Lieutenant St. Vincent Nepean of the "Rodney."

31. Lieutenant Rodney M. Lloyd of the "Bouncer" behaved with his well-known courage and judgment, being equally ready to take the important but dull duty of bringing up the scaling ladders as to lead an attack. There is no officer in the force to whom I feel more indebted for good service rendered than to him. He was slightly wounded.

32. Lieutenant Orford S. Cameron, of the "Leven," though with a broken arm, led his men, and did good service.

33. Lieutenant Howard Kerr, of the "Cockchafer," also did good service.

34. I am much indebted to Captain E. C. Sim, R.E. (whom Major-General Brunker at my request lent to me) for his valuable advice, which led to much of the success of the expedition.

35. With the officers attached to me personally, I am most satisfied. My Secretary, Mr. Francis A. Carter, by my side all day, was of the greatest use to me. Lieutenant Hugh M. Tyler, of the "Rodney," and Sub-Lieutenant John M. Prickett, of the "Perseus," did duty as aides-de-camp, and as the force was necessarily much separated they ran great risks in conveying my orders; throughout the day they showed great clearness, zeal, and bravery.

36. I may mention that Lieutenant Thornhaugh P. Gurdon, Supernumerary of the "Princess Charlotte," though holding no command in the force, made himself conspicuous by his courage and activity.

37. Lieutenant Herbert F. Gye, of the "Rodney," was unfortunately much burnt by an explosion of gunpowder in his face and hands, whilst burning the village of Tang-tun, and I unfortunately lost his services early in the day.

38. As it was probable that the force might have been detained some days up the creek, I ordered Mr. Thomas P. Pullinger, Acting Paymaster of the "Rinaldo," to make the necessary arrangements for provisioning the men, which he did admirably.

39. All the Sub-Lieutenants, warrant, and subordinate officers behaved well and conspicuously.

40. George Wheeler, chief gunner's mate of the "Princess Charlotte," whom I brought up as my coxswain, was by my side all day, and was conspicuous for his conduct and good shooting. I recommend him to your favourable consideration.

41. Commander Lord Charles Scott reports that Lieutenant John Hext, in command of the pinnace of the "Perseus," was conspicuous for his zeal, and for getting his gun into action throughout the day.

42. The medical officers, Surgeon William G. Ridings, of the "Rinaldo;" Surgeon Astley Cooper, of the "Perseus;" Assistant-Surgeons Bradley Gregory, of the "Rodney," Henry D. Stanistreet, of the "Leven," and John Craw, of the "Perseus," behaved with their wonted zeal and courage. Fortunately their services were not much required, but every preparation was made by them to meet any contingency.

43. I would particularly call your attention to the ready assistance I received from Mr. Charles Alabaster, Her Majesty's Consul at Swatow, in conducting this expedition. He procured me transport and accompanied the force, being constantly in the very front, and giving me the most necessary advice and information.

Attached is a list of the casualties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) OLIVER J. JONES.

Inclosure 8 in No. 3.

List of Casualties which occurred during the Operations against the Villages of Tang-tun, Outang-pai, &c.

Lieutenant Herbert F. Gye, of "Rodney," severely burnt about hands, arms, face, neck, and ears, by an explosion of gunpowder. (Eyes not injured.)

Lieutenant Rodney M. Lloyd, of "Bouncer," wounded in leg by a poisoned spear.

Lieutenant Philip P. Aitken, of "Rinaldo," contused by blows given with a door-bar.

Michael Queally, ordinary of "Rodney," slight wound in groin from a slug-shot.
John Stowers, private, R.M L.I., of "Rodney," head badly cut by a stone.
Joseph Cochrane, ordinary of "Leven," slight wound in hand from a slug-shot.

Inclosure 9 in No. 3.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Commodore Jones.

Sir, *Swatow, January* 31, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translations of three petitions presented me this morning by the elders of the villages concerned in the attack on the "Cockchafer's" boats, fully submitting.

I propose, should you approve, to issue a Proclamation in reply informing them that unless again attacked or insulted we have no desire to attack them further, and shall leave them at peace until forced to the contrary by misconduct on their part.

From all I hear the successful issue of the expedition has had the happiest effect on the country round, the clemency extended to the villages which offered no resistance having been as fully appreciated as the necessary severity used with those from which our force was fired upon, and I have to thank you for the extraordinarily prompt and effective protection you have afforded the port, in which, for the first time since its opening, life and property are at length secure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure 10 in No. 3.

Petition from the Inhabitants of Tang-tun.

(Translation.)

THE inhabitants of Tang-tun unite in addressing the Consul.

On the 8th day of this month, some children, on seeing your great country's war boats passing, were much frightened, and running away foolishly excited our people to attack them, for which the great army has entered our village and punished us. We repent our fault fully, and prostrating ourselves, beg undeserved that mercy may be shown us, and promise that, men and women, we will, one and all, live peaceably and quietly for coming generations under your favour. Trusting that the great Consul will hear our prayers, &c.

[Similar petitions from the villages of Outang-pai and Poleng.]

"Rinaldo," at Swatow, January 31, 1869.

Submitted for the information of the Commander-in-chief.
(Signed) OLIVER J. JONES, *Commodore.*

Inclosure 11 in No. 3.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to Consul Robertson.

Sir, *"Rodney," at Hong Kong, January* 23, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, the copy of a letter I have received from Lieutenant Howard Kerr, commanding Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," reporting that when detached with his boats for exercise, on passing the village of Outang-pai, River Han, the party under his command were assailed with stones and subsequently fired on from the villages and banks by a force estimated at 500 men, which resulted in an officer, petty officer, and eight men of the party being more or less severely wounded.

I have to request that you will be pleased immediately to bring this case to the notice of his Excellency the Viceroy, offering him my friendly co-operation towards promptly bringing this piratical village to justice, and conveying my request that he will be pleased

to dispatch a Chinese gun-boat, with officers commissioned to act in the matter, to accompany the force under my command now in readiness to sail for Swatow, and o co-operate with the same.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 12 in No. 3.

Consul Robertson to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Canton, January* 28, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 23rd instant, inclosing copy of a letter from Lieutenant Howard Kerr, commanding Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," reporting the attack made upon the boats of that vessel by the inhabitants of the village Ou-tang-pai, whereby an officer, petty officer, and eight men of the party were more or less severely wounded; and in reply to state I lost no time in carrying out your Excellency's instructious, and the inclosed copies of notes of the interviews had with his Excellency the Viceroy will place you in possession of the arrangements made for a friendly co-operation in the bringing of the offenders in this affair to punishment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

No. 4.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 24, 1869.

I HAVE laid before the Earl of Clarendon your letter of the 20th instant, and its inclosures, respecting the collision which took place between the boats of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Cockchafer" and the Chinese villagers on the banks of the Han River, near Swatow, on the 20th of January last.

Further particulars, showing the attack and destruction of the villages engaged in that affair, were yesterday received from Her Majesty's Consul at Canton, whose despatch and its inclosures I am to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in case they should not yet have been received from Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Keppel.

The Lords of the Admiralty will observe that on learning at Hong Kong, on the 23rd of January, that the boats of the "Cockchafer" had been attacked, Sir Henry Keppel very properly requested Her Majesty's Consul at Canton to call the attention of the Viceroy to the matter, and to offer the friendly co-operation of Her Majesty's forces for bringing the offenders to justice; that the Viceroy, on the 24th of January, expressed to the Consul, and on the following day, the 25th, to Sir Henry Keppel himself, his readiness to take measures, in co-operation with Her Majesty's forces, despatching one of his gun-boats to Swatow, with a civil officer, to communicate with the local authorities, and detaching another to accompany the British squadron about to be detailed for Swatow. The Viceroy was assured by Sir Henry Keppel that those forces would act in concert with the Viceroy's, and render such assistance as might be required, and that Sir H. Keppel would himself be present to regulate the movements of Her Majesty's squadron, in order that nothing might be done which would have the appearance of independent action on their part. It seems, however, from Commodore Jones' despatch of the 30th of January, that on the 26th of January, the day following Sir Henry Keppel's interview with the Viceroy, he was ordered by the Admiral to proceed with the squadron to Swatow to punish the villagers, and that, on his arrival there, he commenced a series of operations which ended in the destruction of the villages, attended, doubtless, with serious loss of Chinese life; but, beyond noticing the arrival, after the action was over, of a Chinese gun-boat, with officials on board, with offers of assistance, no allusion is made by the Commodore to co-operation with the Chinese forces, nor any reason given, except apprehension lest the villagers should be enabled by delay to strengthen their defences, why that co-operation was not waited for, nor why the attack was made independently of it.

The character of the whole transaction was thus changed; instead of being a measure of redress spontaneously afforded by the Chinese authorities, it became one in which the action of the British force was independent of them, and the Lords of the Admiralty will judge whether it would not be desirable to obtain from Sir H. Keppel some explanation of this departure from the plan of operations agreed upon with the Viceroy.

But, at all events, Lord Clarendon directs me to submit, for the consideration of the Lords of the Admiralty, whether it would not be expedient to restrict naval officers from exposing Her Majesty's flag to insult by passing up, without any adequate cause, in armed boats, through narrow waters flowing through notoriously hostile populations; and whether they should not be required, in the event of the Chinese authorities expressing their determination to punish, in co-operation with Her Majesty's naval forces, parties who may have insulted Her Majesty's flag, to suspend any independent action, and only so far to interfere by force as their intervention may be required to support the action of the Imperial forces who may be engaged in redressing and punishing the insult which may have given cause for complaint.

The inclosed papers being forwarded in original, I am to request that they may be returned to this office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 5.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul Robertson.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 6th of February, inclosing Reports of events arising out of an attack made by the Chinese inhabitants of villages in the neighbourhood of Swatow on the boats of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Cockchafer;" and I have to acquaint you that I entirely approve of the judicious tone of your communication with the Viceroy of Canton in regard to that matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 6.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1869.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I caused to be addressed to the Admiralty* on receiving from Mr. Consul Robertson an account of the attack on the boats of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Cockchafer," near Swatow, and of the subsequent proceedings of the naval squadron under the command of Commodore Oliver Jones.

I also inclose a copy of a despatch to Consul Robertson,† informing him that Her Majesty's Government approve his communications with the Viceroy of the Two Kwang respecting these occurrences.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 4.

† No. 5.

No. 7.

Acting Consul Alasbaster to Lord Stanley.—(Received March 30.)

My Lord, *Swatow, January* 24, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister, reporting an outrage committed by neighbouring villagers on the boats belonging to Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," stationed at this port.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Swatow, January* 22, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to report one of those outrages for which this port is distinguished.

Yesterday, Lieutenant Kerr, commanding the gun-boat stationed here, took a party of his men, numbering twenty-three, all told, for exercise up the creek at the back of Swatow.

When they had proceeded some eight miles, and were passing the village of Puting, they were yelled at and stoned by the villagers on the banks.

Lieutenant Kerr very properly thought it desirable that the insult, one of not unfrequent occurrence in this neighbourhood, should not pass unnoticed, and immediately landed with the intention of demanding redress from the headmen.

Appealing to a respectable man who was looking on, and who, it appears, was one of the headmen of village, he requested him to point out the residence of the Chiefs.

The man refused, and Lieutenant Kerr told him therefore that he must accompany him back to Swatow, and see the mandarins. This was resisted; and the man calling to the village braves, fire was at once commenced on Lieutenant Kerr and his party.

The fire was of course returned; and having dispersed the attacking party, Lieutenant Kerr withdrew his men to the boats.

Scarcely had they got a mile, however, on their way back, when they were attacked by an overwhelming party of villagers, who poured in a destructive fire on the boats, wounding Lieutenant Kerr and ten of his men—two of them very severely.

With much difficulty Lieutenant Kerr got away, the boats being much damaged by the fire. And I learn some nine or ten of the villagers were killed, and twenty or so wounded.

Three villages, those of Puting, Outang-pai, and Sang-tung, the second one of the most powerful of the eighteen villages whose holy alliance in old days against foreigners your Excellency has heard of, took part in the outrage.

Were all my countrymen gifted with supernatural prudence, and capable of submitting patiently to every kind of insult and outrage, I should have deplored the occurrence; but it was impossible that the eighteen villages should continue to hold the mistaken impression in which our longsuffering patience has encouraged them, that foreigners were afraid of them, without an explosion occurring sooner or later; and I am therefore glad that the necessity of action should have occurred in a case in which foreigners and Chinese are agreed that the villagers are at fault, as the opportunity properly used will enable me to secure the safety of foreigners in the part of the country necessarily continually traversed by them, and in which they have hitherto been invariably exposed to insult, and in which their presence has been always attended with risk.

Summary vengeance might possibly have been taken by moving the gun-boat up the creek, and bombarding the village: but this would have been attended with no results as regarded the villages further from the bank, who would still have thought themselves unassailable; and I have therefore written to the Admiral for a force sufficient to obtain ample satisfaction, and convince the villagers generally of the policy of respecting foreigners, without, I trust, the further effusion of blood or sacrifice of life.

If this force arrives, I hope to be enabled to report to your Excellency the final removal of all obstacles to quiet residence on the part of foreigners. The other districts have all, more or less, recognized the danger of interfering with us; and the eighteen villages, our nearest neighbours, are the only remaining antagonists, as they have always been the most bitter ones, we have to overcome.

Mr. Brenan was returning from Chao-chow-foo, where he had been passing some time in perfect security, the day of the occurrence, and I was greatly apprehensive for his safety; but my messengers fortunately reached him before his arrival at the village, and he returned to the city, whence he has since arrived by the other route.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

No. 8.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Lord Stanley.—(*Received March* 30.)

My Lord, *Swatow, January* 31, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting the successful issue of the expedition sent up to obtain satisfaction from the villages concerned in the attack on the boats of Her Majesty's gunboat "Cockchafer."

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Swatow, January* 30, 1869.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 22nd January, I have the honour to report that on the 28th instant Commodore Jones arrived with some 400 or 500 men to punish the villagers for their attack on the "Cockchafer's" boats.

I had written to both Taoutae and District Magistrate, but neither came; I understand being desirous of saving appearances in case, as was generally anticipated, we should get the worst of it.

The District Magistrate went so far as to write in reply to a letter I had written him before the force arrived, asking him to have the head man who was present at the outrage arrested, as if he sympathised with the villagers—an admirable manner of cloaking his inability to comply with my request. I sent the letter, copy of which I inclose, to the Commodore at once, but he did not think it necessary to deviate from the course determined on at Canton between the Admiral and the Governor-General, and on Friday morning, the 29th instant, the force left for the scene of action, the Commodore himself in command, I accompanying him at his request, in case my presence might prove useful.

No opposition was offered at the intervening villages, who seemed to have made up their minds to see the issue of the first attack before deciding what course to take; but it was confidently expected that none of our force would return alive,—the villages, since their successful resistance of Koxinga, the conqueror of Formosa, having had the reputation of being invincible.

But on arrival at the first of the offending villages, Tang-tun, the villagers opened fire on our force before communication was possible, and the village had, therefore, to be assaulted and burnt, the braves retreating precipitately.

I was in hopes that this lesson would have been sufficient, and accordingly induced the Commodore to spare the next village at which no opposition was offered, and to pass over a little firing at the village of Upper Outang-pai; but on nearing the main village we were met by the braves in force, with their banners and gingalls, marching to attack us. A couple of shells and a volley scattered them however, and the village, or more properly speaking the town, was rapidly assaulted and taken, and, being the chief offender, set fire to.

The force then returned, and I have this morning received a deputation from the villages acknowledging the righteousness of their punishment, and begging for mercy.

I trust, therefore, that there will be no further trouble, and though I cannot but regret the destruction of property and loss of life the villagers have brought on themselves, I must rejoice that the affair has been unattended with loss of life or serious injury to limb on our side, and the severity of the lesson will, I trust, have the effect of preventing the necessity of such expeditions for the future.

Until this moment life or property has never been really safe at Swatow, but I think I can now report them so.

The Taoutae has since our return written twice to say he is coming, and requesting that everything may await his arrival; but he has not yet arrived, and I shall, if he does not do so soon, issue a Proclamation to the villagers to inform them that they will not be again molested unless they again offend, as they appear to be in great apprehension of an attack on our part.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

No. 9.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Lord Stanley.—(Received March 30.)

My Lord, *Swatow, February 6, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting the steps I have taken since the attack on the villages concerned in the outrage on the boats of Her Majesty's ship "Cockchafer."

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Swatow, February 5, 1869.*

IN continuation of my previous despatch I have the honour to report that affairs are at length approaching a settlement.

On Wednesday the Commodore and myself went up to the villages to ascertain positively whether there was still any disposition on the part of the villagers to try their strength with foreigners.

Until an unarmed party had landed and entered the village there could be no certainty as to the treatment passers-by would experience, and we went up, therefore, without escort,—Commodore Jones, myself, Lieutenant Keppel, R.N., Captain Sim, R.E., and one blue-jacket, landing alone.

Two of the elders came down to meet us, and we went up to a temple in the town without the slightest attempt at molestation—the people keeping to their houses, saying not a word, and scarcely venturing to look at us.

At the temple we were met by the assembled Elders, the Taoutae, and the District Magistrate.

The Taoutae was very anxious that I should appear to sympathise with the people, which I, of course, refused to do; and having declined to take any notice of a deputation of wailing women, the Elders were drawn up and I addressed them.

I told them that there was nothing we shrunk from more than war and bloodshed, but that they had themselves alone to blame for what had occurred; that had they even submitted when our force was present, not a soul would have lost his life, and that if they refrained from attacking foreigners they would not in the slightest degree be molested; but I warned them that, if so ill-advised as to insult or injure foreigners again, still heavier punishment would overtake them. I then distributed the Proclamations I had taken with me, and we returned.

Far less damage seems to have been done than I thought, the official report of 290 houses burnt being exaggerated; some 30 or 40; or some 150 rooms nearly, having been destroyed by the fire, and I am glad to find that scarcely any women suffered, although, but for the Commodore's humanity in stopping his men firing, while the villagers were firing from behind the women, many must have been sacrificed.

On our return the Commodore at once left for the "Rinaldo," leaving the gun-boat "Cockchafer" and "Janus" for our protection, to be retained as long as I think desirable.

The next day I had another interview with the mandarin, the Taoutae still holding me responsible for the, to his mind, precipitate manner in which satisfaction had been

obtained,—a point on which I did not feel called upon to argue, although, in fact, the expedition has throughout been entirely beyond my control; but he admitted that the punishment had been well deserved, and that the villagers had brought it on themselves: he also showed himself more reasonable in discussing what still remained to be done, and although still anxious to make capital out of the affair and save himself by attempting to show that we had been unreasonable in our action, he evidently showed he felt the weak nature of his position. In the evening he sent me a long letter inferring that the expedition was contrary to Treaty provisions, and asking me what was to be done, which I have not yet had time to properly answer; and this morning he sent me a cool proposition to agree to, that in future foreigners should always give three days' notice of short walks in the country, and five days' if their excursions were to extend beyond thirteen miles.

I returned this promptly, and sent, in reply, my proposal for the final settlement of the affairs as follows:—

That to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of an important step requiring to be taken, and there being no Chinese authority on the spot to consult, a Sub-Prefect should be permanently stationed at Swatow;

That any foreigner going for a walk should be able to obtain a runner from the Local Police Magistrate on application;

That the Taoutae himself should be bound to come to Swatow within seven days at any time his presence might be required in writing;

That the elders of the surrounding villages should be bound to protect foreigners wandering in their neighbourhood, and warned that they would be held responsible for any insult or injury offered by the villagers; and, for my part, I engaged to prohibit foreigners shooting in the immediate neighbourhood of the villages.

To this he has sent me a verbal message that he agrees, and the document is to be finally discussed and sealed to-morrow. I am glad that everything has eventuated so desirably, and that he has had the sense to withdraw from his untenable position of saving himself both from attack from the people and reproof from his superiors by making out foreigners to have been from the first unreasonable.

And the Treaty, thus proposed, carried out, I trust the sharp and decisive lesson taught by Commodore Jones will be initiative of a new era in the position of foreigners at Swatow and Chao-chow-foo.

I might possibly, by bullying and blustering, have obtained more, but I have preferred, with force in my hands, to ask only what all would allow to be, without possibility of question, evidently just and reasonable.

In conclusion I inclose copy of a letter I have just received from Admiral Keppel relative to my share in the expedition.

Your, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to Acting Consul Alabaster.

Sir, "*Salamis*," *at Swatow, February* 2, 1869.

COMMODORE JONES, in reporting the recent operations conducted against piratical towns in the River Han, bears the following testimony to your valuable co-operation and assistance. I have the honour to request that you will accept my cordial thanks for your useful services on the occasion:—

"I would particularly call your attention to the very valuable assistance I received from Mr. Chaloner Alabaster, Her Majesty's Consul at Swatow, in conducting this expedition. He procured me transport and accompanied the force, being constantly in the very front, giving me the most necessary advice and information."

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

No. 10.

Mr. Matheson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

My Lord, *The Holmwood, Dorking, March* 31, 1869.

AS it is probable that the Swatow affair in China will lead to some inquiry at home, it may be of service to your Lordship to be put in possession of the accompanying extracts from the letters of missionaries stationed there.

These men are men of peace, and earnestly desire the welfare of the Chinese; and although they offer no opinion on the political questions involved, yet their remarks are wholly opposed to that morbid philanthropy which will in all probability be excited in some quarters by these accounts from China.

Having addressed your Lordship separately in regard to the affair in Formosa, I have, &c.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DOND. MATHESON,
One of the Committee on Foreign Missions of the English Presbyterian Church.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Extracts from Letters of Missionaries at Swatow.

THE Rev. H. L. Mackenzie writes on the 6th of February, 1869:—

"You will all, I doubt not, rejoice with us that this Swatow affair has not arisen in connection with missionaries, and unite with us in praying that it may be overruled for the progress of the gospel of peace. We, as missionaries of the native church, are certainly more immediately and extensively interested in and affected by such matters than either Consuls or merchants; and living as we do among the people, and going out and in among them, we cannot but be concerned as to the results of so grave an affair.

"The district in which the villages are where this matter has occurred, is occupied by people who have persistently and wickedly cherished a hostile spirit towards foreigners. And now, without pronouncing any opinion on the conduct of officials, I cannot but think that the severe punishment has been permitted to fall upon these villages because of their wickedness, and for their ultimate good. O-Teng-pue and the others are, and have been, notorious for their lawless and cruel feuds among themselves, feuds characterized by bloodthirsty hate, as well as for their implacability towards foreigners, and at length a severe and marked retribution has overtaken them. I think I see in this the hand of God."

The Rev. James Masson writes on the 2nd of February, 1869:—

". . . The Chinese laughed at the small force of foreigners when they saw it all fairly off (on their way up the river), thinking that they would be cut to pieces by the superior numbers of the villagers; and if numbers could have done this, it would certainly have been done: for this Teng-hai district, it is said, could muster 60,000 fighting men, O-Teng-pue itself boasting of 10,000 warriors, and this district has the reputation of being very belligerent and bloodthirsty. O-Teng-pue, moreover, in anticipation of trouble, had made peace with the villages with which it was at feud, in hope of their making common cause against foreigners, of whom the whole district cherishes a strong hatred; but of the whole eighteen, only three or four prepared for giving them fight.

* * * * *

"A Chinaman in the service of the Consul told us that the Consul had sent him to several O-Teng-pue men to urge them to settle the matter before extremities were resorted to, but they all treated such an arrangement with scorn, telling him that they would cut the heads off the foreign children, and manure their fields with their bodies. The English seem to have spared life as much as they could on the day of hostilities, firing only on the Chinese when they were resisted and fired upon."

Dr. Gould, medical missionary, writes on the 6th of February, 1869:—

* * * * *

"Had the Chinese not compelled the force sent to punish them to fire by their

resistance, there is no reason to believe that there would have been any loss of life. The Chinese themselves of these villages seemed surprised that the British acted so leniently, considering how much was in their power, and contrasting their conduct with what the Chinese themselves would have done in like circumstances. The region has been the most notoriously hostile to foreigners all along, of all Tiechew, and it was a district where few of us cared to go; the people uniformly disliking us or our message, and by no means slow to show their feelings by acts of an unmistakable kind.

* * * * *

"Without passing any opinion on the merits of the case, as between the Chinese and the British, and while exceedingly glad and thankful that it has not occurred in connection with missionaries or mission work in any sense, I am very hopeful that God, 'the judge of the heathen,' will overrule this for the opening up of the district to the messengers of his gospel, the glad tidings of peace. These villages are constantly at feud with each other, and commit unheard-of cruelties on their neighbours when they are fighting, and on any who fall into their hands. In some cases they chop up the bodies of the slain, even taking out the heart and eating it. It is some satisfaction to us that the trouble has broken out in this rather than in any other part of the district, while, at the same time, we feel sorry from our hearts for the poor people, who have, to some extent at least, brought this trouble on their own heads."

No. 11.

The Earl of Clarendon to Acting Consul Alabaster.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 2, 1869.

I RECEIVED your three despatches of the 24th and 31st of January and 6th of February, inclosing copies of despatches to Sir Rutherford Alcock respecting the events in the neighbourhood of Swatow, consequent on the attack made on the boats of Her Majesty's ship "Cockchafer" by some Chinese villagers.

The unfavourable impression which, from the accounts received from Her Majesty's Consul at Canton of the transactions referred to, was entertained by Her Majesty's Government, is entirely confirmed by your reports, and I regret to have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government disapprove of your conduct.

Knowing the character of the neighbouring population, you should not have allowed the Commander of the "Cockchafer" without remonstrance to court the collision which the commonest foresight could have anticipated. It is one of the essential duties of Her Majesty's Consular Officers to discountenance and discourage any measures on the part whether of private individuals or of Her Majesty's naval forces calculated to lead to a breach of the peace. Her Majesty's Government look to Consular Officers for prudence and discretion, and cannot too strongly disapprove their undertaking to decide for themselves whether any proceedings of the local authorities or turbulent populations are such as should draw down on them summary vengeance, and be resented by direct acts of war.

In the present case, you should not have contented yourself with referring to local authorities of subordinate rank, when the Governor of the Province was within easy access, and, as experience has shown, fully prepared to grant redress by the punishment of the assailants. A Consul may very properly in cases of difficulty seek protection from British naval officers, but there is a wide difference between doing so and encouraging acts of violence after the pressure for protection is over.

If a naval officer thinks it his duty to have recourse to such measures he must be allowed to do so on his own responsibility, but a Consul should not, unless in great extremity, make himself party to such measures. His duty is to moderate, not to sanction violence.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 12.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 2, 1869.

MR. ALABASTER has transmitted to me copies of his despatches to you of the 22nd and 30th of January and 3rd of February, respecting the events in the neighbourhood of Swatow consequent upon the attack made on the boats of Her Majesty's ship "Cockchafer" by some Chinese villagers; and I now inclose for your information a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to him, disapproving of his conduct.*

I have to instruct you to communicate to Her Majesty's Consuls the purport of this despatch for their guidance in similar cases.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 13.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Matheson.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 5, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, inclosing extracts from letters of certain missionaries stationed at Swatow; and, in reply, I am to state to you that Her Majesty's Government cannot concur in the expressions of satisfaction contained in those extracts respecting the events which have recently occurred in the neighbourhood of Swatow.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. OTWAY.

No. 14.

Mr. Otway to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 5, 1869.

WITH reference to Mr. Hammond's letter of the 24th ultimo, I am directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of despatches to Sir R. Alcock and Acting Consul Alabaster,† respecting the attack on the boats of Her Majesty's ship "Cockchafer," and the subsequent proceedings of the British squadron near Swatow.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. OTWAY.

No. 15.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 7.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 6, 1869.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, dated the 1st February, together with a copy of the order he had addressed to Commodore Jones, the Senior Naval Officer at Hong Kong, relative to the punishment of some villages, the inhabitants of which had committed an unprovoked attack on the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer" in the River Han.

A copy of the letter which was addressed to Sir Henry Keppel on the 26th ultimo on this subject, and which was forwarded by last mail, is also transmitted herewith.

My Lordships would be glad to be informed whether Lord Clarendon sees any reason to alter the opinion he had formed of these transactions as communicated to their Lordships by Foreign Office letter of the 24th ultimo, and on which the communication made to Sir H. Keppel was founded.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

P. S.—The inclosures to your letter of the 24th ultimo are returned herewith as requested.

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* No. 11. † Nos. 11 and 12.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, "*Salamis*," *at Swatow, February* 1, 1869.

IN continuation of my letter of the 23rd of January, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that on reaching Canton I represented to his Excellency the Viceroy, through Her Majesty's Consul, the grave outrage committed without provocation on the boats of the "Cockchafer," and expressed my intention to dispatch a force to punish these piratical villages, acting in co-operation with such force or officers as the Viceroy might think fit to dispatch.

2. The Viceroy yielded a ready assent to the proposition, and the following day called upon me, expressing his great regret at what had taken place, and adding, that with the assistance of Her Majesty's squadron, ample amends should be made, and a lesson be given to these turbulent people which would prevent similar outrages. He then mentioned his intention of dispatching one of his steam gun-boats to Swatow with a civil officer in whom he had confidence, to act as Commissioner.

3. Having addressed the order, of which a copy is annexed, to Commodore Oliver J. Jones, that officer immediately left for Swatow in the "Rinaldo," arriving on the 28th of January; he started the following morning for the offending villages.

4. At this time the Chinese gun-boat with the Commissioner had not arrived, but the co-operation of a Chinese gun-boat on the spot was offered; the Commodore would doubtless have waited for the Commissioner's arrival were it not that rumours were hourly reaching Swatow that the inhabitants of the villages were strengthening their defences, and massing men: a prompt attack, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to protract their resistance, tended to economize life on both sides. The Commissioners reached Swatow a few hours after my arrival on the afternoon of the 31st instant.

5. Commodore Jones' letter will fully acquaint their Lordships with his proceedings. The good results likely to follow the punishment of these piratical villages is evidenced in the annexed letter from Her Majesty's Consul, giving cover to petitions from the villagers, expressing their contrition, and promising to preserve order for the future.

6. I have much pleasure in directing their Lordships' attention to the able and gallant service of the Commodore on this occasion, and to his gratifying account of the exemplary conduct of the officers and men employed under him, which reflects very creditably on the discipline of the ships from which they were detailed, and will, I trust, meet with some mark of their Lordships' approval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Orders addressed to Commodore Jones.

By the Hon. Sir H. Keppel, &c., &c., &c.

YOU are aware that on the main route to the Treaty port of Chao-chow-foo the piratical villagers residing on the banks of the River Han have repeatedly interfered with British trade and interests, levying a black-mail on produce the property of British merchants. British subjects have been held to captivity in these villages; they are not merely at war with themselves, but with society generally.

Where outrages have been committed, the native authorities have professed their inability to exact redress without the assistance of Her Majesty's ships, and we have thus, on two recent occasions, acted successfully in co-operation with the Chinese Imperial troops.

You are now furnished with Lieutenant Kerr's Report on the unprovoked attack made on the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," resulting in two officers and eight men being wounded on our side.

Her Majesty's Minister has already informed me that we are at full liberty to repel any such attack, or to put down any opposition made to our progress up the river to the Treaty port of Chao-chow-foo.

On receiving an account of the outrage on the "Cockchafer's" boats, I at once placed myself in communication with the Viceroy of the Two Kwang Provinces, through Her Majesty's Consul, and offered my co-operation with the Imperial forces in order that these piratical villagers may be brought to a sense of their position. His Excellency has

accordingly appropriated a gun-boat to convey the proper officer to the scene of action to co-operate with any force I may dispatch.

Having every confidence in your skill and judgment, you are to take the "Perseus," "Rinaldo," "Severn," and "Bouncer," under your command, dispatching them as soon as they are ready to Swatow, where they will meet the "Cockchafer" and "Banterer."

You are also to detach such a force from the "Rodney" as will make up your landing party to at least 400 men, including field-piece parties.

You will hoist your broad pendant in the "Rinaldo," directing the Commander of that vessel to bear you as lent for particular service, and proceeding when ready to Swatow.

On arrival you are to place yourself in communication with Her Majesty's Consul.

Your duty will be to bring the villagers of Outang-pai, &c., to punishment with as little delay as possible, co-operating with the Chinese officials to this end, and acting in accord with the Commissioner dispatched by his Excellency the Viceroy, and to the best of your judgment.

You will keep your communication open with Swatow, and intimate through the Chinese officials that we are only at war with such of the piratical villages as are at war with us.

Amongst the latter must be considered the inhabitants of the villages who are known to have participated in the attack on the "Cockchafer's" boats.

Dated on board the "Rodney," at Hong Kong, the 26th day of January, 1869.

(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

To Oliver John Jones, Esq.,
Commodore of the Second Class, and
Captain of Her Majesty's ship "Princess Charlotte."

By command of the Commander-in-chief,
(Signed) W. B. RISK, *Secretary*.

Inclosure 3 in No. 15.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Admiralty, March* 26, 1869.

I AM directed by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you the copy of a letter from the Foreign Office covering a despatch and its inclosures from Mr. Consul Robertson, on the subject of the destruction of the villages concerned in the attack on the boats of Her Majesty's ship "Cockchafer" in January last.

My Lords, with the information now before them, entirely concur in the views taken by the Earl of Clarendon of these transactions, and I am to request that you will furnish their Lordships with precise information explanatory of the reasons which led you, on the 26th of January, to instruct Commodore Jones to "bring these villages to punishment," after the communications which had passed between yourself, Mr. Robertson, and the Viceroy of Canton on the previous day.

I am directed to add that their Lordships regret that the mail which brought such detailed information of these occurrences to the Foreign Office did not contain corresponding despatches from you.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. H. BRIGGS, *pro Sec.*

No. 16.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received April* 8.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 7, 1869.

WITH reference to my letter of the 6th instant, on the subject of the punishment inflicted on some Chinese villages in the neighbourhood of Swatow for outrages committed on boats of the "Cockchafer," I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, copy of a letter from Commodore Jones, dated 6th February, inclosing a plan showing the movements of the forces employed, and reporting his having paid a friendly visit to the villages on the Chao-chow-foo Creek, subsequently to the operations of the 29th January.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Commodore Jones to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, "*Princess Charlotte,*" *Hong Kong, February* 6, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to send you, for their Lordships' information, a copy of a letter addressed to the Commander-in-chief, in continuation of my despatches to him (which doubtless have been forwarded to their Lordships) relative to the operations at the villages near Swatow; also a plan showing the movements of the forces employed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) OLIVER J. JONES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Commodore Jones to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, "*Princess Charlotte,*" *Hong Kong, February* 6, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to report to you that on the 1st instant the Taoutae of Chao-chow-foo, attended by a large following, waited upon Her Majesty's Consul and me at the Consulate at Swatow. Next day Her Majesty's Consul and I returned his call at his yamên in Swatow. The Consul told him that he intended proceeding up the river to Outang-pai, and distributing to the elders of the villages who had fired upon the "Cockchafer's" boats Proclamations to the effect that as they had acknowledged their fault and implored our clemency, no further offensive steps would be taken; that we wished for peace and not war, and that unless we were again attacked they need fear no aggression from us; but if they again attacked our boats or people, a more fearful retribution than the one they had lately suffered would fall upon them.

The Taoutae and his advisers said that the people were in a very excited state, and that if we went up they might from fear or panic fire upon us, and begged we would delay going up until they had calmed down, and suggested three or four months before any one went there or to Chao-chow-foo. We (for I intended to accompany the Consul) replied, that if he had any fears he might send officers to notify we were coming in peace, and that we would defer our going to Outang-pai till the next day. After considerable hesitation, seeing that we meant to carry out our intentions, he agreed to send a mandarin with us, and to go out there himself to receive us.

Next day, the 3rd instant, the Consul and I, accompanied by Lieutenants L. C. Keppel and H. M. Tyler, and Captain C. E. Sim, R.E., proceeded up the river, taking only my galley and the Consulate boat, towed by the "Sylvia's" steam-cutter, and arrived at Outang-pai at 1 P.M. The Consul sent for some of the elders of the town, and with them we entered it and soon met the Taoutae and suite, and with him proceeded to a temple in the heart of the town, which had been prepared for the interview.

Though the people did not present a threatening appearance, still as they had so lately suffered so much at our hands they did not look very amiable, and I confess that, being entirely in their power, I thought our position much less pleasant than when under their fire a few days before.

At the gate of the temple we were met by a crowd of suppliants; no doubt people who had lost friends or property.

After some conversation with the Taoutae, the Consul sent for the elders of the town, and after expatiating upon the enmity of their attack upon the "Cockchafer's" boats, and pointing out to them how they had brought punishment upon themselves by that act and by firing upon my force, assured them that, unless they provoked further punishment by future aggression, they were safe from any further attack and annoyance at our hands, and gave his proclamations to one of them for distribution.

The aspect of the elders was marked by submission and an acquiescence in the justice of our dealings.

We then broke up the interview and returned to our boats, without the slightest insult or annoyance; and I think it may be reasonably inferred that the lesson which has been taught these people will not be speedily effaced, and that the creek by Outang-pai will be a safe high road for the commerce of the interior of the country for many a long day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) OLIVER J. JONES.

P.S.—My services being no longer required at Swatow, I left that port in Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" on the afternoon of the 3rd instant, and arrived here at 1 P.M. next day, and shifted my broad pendant to the "Princess Charlotte."

O. J. J.

No. 17.

Mr. Murray to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1869.

I HAVE laid before the Earl of Clarendon your letter of the 6th instant and its inclosures respecting the attack on the boats of Her Majesty's ship "Cockchafer," and the subsequent proceedings of the British squadron under the command of Commodore Jones in the neighbourhood of Swatow; and I am to request that you will state to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that his Lordship sees no reason to alter the opinion on these transactions expressed in Mr. Hammond's letter of the 24th ultimo, and that he concurs in the instructions which their Lordships have addressed to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, and of which a copy is inclosed in your letter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JAMES MURRAY.

No. 18.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Lord Stanley.—(Received April 10.)

My Lord, *Swatow, February* 8, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose duplicate copy of a despatch sent to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting an attack on the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," as I have reason to suppose that the copy forwarded to your Lordship at the time of the occurrence has miscarried.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock, January 22, 1869.

[See Inclosure in No. 7.]

No. 19.

Acting Consul Alabaster to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 10.)

My Lord, *Swatow, February* 10, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, informing him of the final settlement of the late difficulties at this port.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 19.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Swatow, February* 8, 1869.

I AM happy to report everything settled, and I trust your Excellency will think satisfactorily.

When the Canton Commissioners had left the Taoutae breathed more freely, and we soon drew up and put into execution a Treaty on the basis sketched in my last, he freely admitting that my demands were most reasonable, and that he had only made objections for the sake of effect.

As soon as the Treaty, copy of which I inclose, was signed and sealed, he drew out a Proclamation, and set to work getting the signatures of the various village elders to the bonds I required from them promising to protect foreigners who may happen to visit their villages, the expedition having enabled him to get a power and influence in the neighbourhood never possessed by the officers of the present Dynasty before; and the most important villages having signed, I allowed him to return to Chao-chow-foo, where his presence was urgently required.

During the negotiations he tried hard to restrict our access to the country, but was obliged to own that he could not support his propositions by sound arguments, and gave in to my demand on the point that an escort should always be obtainable, if desired, with a suite.

He also tried to obtain influence over the villagers by inducing me to promise an indemnity to those who had suffered unavoidably in the punishment deserved by their fellows, but I at once warned him that any expression of sympathy with the villagers would be considered by me as an adoption on the part of the authorities of the insult offered our flag and injury done our men, and he then proposed that he should at the same time relieve those who seemed unfortunate, and follow up the guilty who had escaped.

To this I had no objection, for in punishing a village, as in punishing a nation, individual injury and injustice must be done, and I was glad that the punishment which we had roughly administered should be fairly adjusted so that the guilty alone should be the sufferers, and I rejoiced also at the opportunity doing this would give him of establishing his power securely, as it must be to our advantage that the responsible Government should really govern the country, and that we should be spared the awkward dilemma of having either to ask redress through those who, however willing, could not grant it, or of seeking it direct ourselves.

In conclusion, I trust your Excellency will support the representation the Taoutae is making, that the Prefect at present stationed at Hwang-kang may be removed here, as it is absolutely necessary that there should be an officer always on the spot of standing and authority sufficient to act in cases of emergency. The Customs deputy, whom the Taoutae has appointed temporarily to represent him, is admirably fitted for the post, but he is not an executive mandarin, and his usefulness must be greatly impaired by the necessity he will be under of acting through others.

Your, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

P.S.—A shooting-party just returned reports having experienced perfect civility even while passing the scene of a clan fight, and I purpose taking my gig to the Fu city in a few days.

Inclosure 2 in No. 19.

Agreement between Acting Consul Alabaster and Taoutae Chang.

CHANG, Taoutae of the Hëen, Chia and Chao District, &c., and Mr. Consul Alabaster, make an agreement:

That the above named Taoutae, not being able to reside permanently at Swatow, will station an official there, so that when any matter affecting both nations arises it may be settled as circumstances demand;

That, in the event of any important matter occurring, the Taoutae will come to Swatow within seven days of receipt of a letter requesting his presence there;

That henceforth, when a foreigner wishes to make an excursion, he will, on application at the Police Magistrate's office, be supplied with a runner to accompany and protect him;

That, henceforth, Englishmen will be forbidden to shoot in the immediate vicinity of villages;

That a Proclamation will be issued requiring the village elders to prevent the villagers from insulting, injuring, or throwing stones at foreigners, and warning them that, in future, they will be held responsible for any outrage committed;

That the villagers will be required to bind themselves to respect the above-mentioned Proclamation, and to afford assistance to and protect any foreigner who may find himself amongst them;

That the Taoutae will petition the high authorities to represent at Peking the necessity of appointing the Maritime Prefect or some other official to reside permanently at Swatow, so that public business may be more easily carried on.

No. 20.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Lord Stanley.—(*Received April* 10.)

My Lord, *Swatow, February* 18, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, in which I report to him my return from a successful trip to Chao-chow-foo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Swatow, February* 17, 1869.

I HAVE to report to your Excellency the result of an extremely pleasant trip I have just made to Chao-chow-foo. Mr. Richardson, having occasion to visit his hong in that city, I determined to go up also, in order that if anything occurred I might be on the spot to witness and possibly settle the difficulty.

We went up by the Ket-yang route and were treated with great civility by the villagers at Tao-kao where our boat stopped, the elder having always been favourable to foreigners.

From here we walked to the city unattended by any escort, and although we passed through a village of very evil reputation, heretofore carefully avoided, met no insult or attempt at molestation. On arrival at the city I saw the Taoutae and transacted various business matters in the most friendly spirit, he showing himself even more ready to meet me in reasonable discussion than I have found him on previous occasions.

Next morning I walked through the town absolutely unattended with far greater comfort than a Chinaman could walk down Regent-street, and got into my gig, which as it was the first that has ever visited the city I thought might possibly cause a commotion, without collecting more than twenty or thirty peaceable idlers to gaze at me at the bridge, a visit to which a recent writer in the "Consular Gazette" declared would convince any foreigner, if he returned alive, of the impossibility of the peaceful opening of Chao-chow-foo.

With my Consular flag flying we pulled down to Swatow pass, the villages recently chastised, causing some manifestations of curiosity, but none of ill-feeling. At one place we were hailed and invited to have some sugar cane, and at Boekoe, a large village where

we stopped to give the crew (Chinese) some refreshment, an elder came off to the boat and the people who crowded round us showed every desire to cultivate pleasant relations with the foreigner. At the villages which fired on the "Cockchafer's" boats not a word was said to us as we went slowly by.

The battle is therefore won, and your Excellency's instructions are carried out. Unarmed and unescorted the round to the city has been accomplished; the Consular flag has waved without insult at the city and in the inner waters; the city is shown to be open and its approaches safe and practicable to foreigners. Until now I could never feel perfectly easy that, when some gig would have to go up that, like the "Cockchafer's" boats, the novelty might not be met with injury and insult, but it is now apparent that the officials and people have accepted the position that they are convinced that we can and will have our way, and, as has so often happened before, their opposition has suddenly and entirely ceased.

My trip a year ago would have been madness, and even now until my safe return few had faith in the soundness of my judgment.

Your, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

No. 21.

Consul Robertson to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received April* 19.)

Sir, *Canton, March* 4, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of the despatch I addressed to Sir Rutherford Alcock, inclosing the despatch I received from Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel, K.C.B., with its inclosures, relative to the attack by the naval force on certain villages near Swatow in this province, a copy of which I inclosed in my despatch to you of the 6th ultimo; since the transmission of which I sent the Vice-Admiral a reply, copy of which I forwarded in the above-mentioned despatch to Sir Rutherford Alcock, and now inclose.

I have also the honour to forward translation of a despatch from the Viceroy to me, transmitting a copy of the Reports of the Taoutae and Prefect of Chao-chow-foo and the Commissioner sent from this to co-operate in the matter, with my reply, and my covering letter to Sir Rutherford Alcock forwarding the same.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 21.

Consul Robertson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Canton, February* 13, 1869.

SINCE the date of my despatch of the 27th ultimo, reporting the attack made on the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer" by a body of villagers in the neighbourhood of Swatow, and the measures that were about to be taken to punish this outrage, I have received a despatch from Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel, K.C.B., marked Confidential, inclosing copy of the Report of Commodore Oliver Jones and of a despatch from Mr. Acting Consul Alabaster, copies of which I have the honour to inclose, together with my reply to the Vice-Admiral, and a Minute of the interview between Sir Henry Keppel and the Viceroy Juilin, which was drawn up subsequently to my forwarding despatch of the 27th ultimo to your Excellency.

From this you will see that Commodore Jones proceeded with Her Majesty's ships "Perseus" and "Rinaldo" and the gun-boat "Bouncer" to Swatow, where he arrived on the 28th ultimo, and found there the gun-boats "Leven" and "Cockchafer;" and, on hearing that the villagers were fortifying and preparing for resistance, he determined to proceed without waiting for the Viceroy's Commissioners or the Admiral, who were to follow. Accordingly on the following morning he landed in force, and, having been fired upon by the villagers, attacked and destroyed three villages with considerable loss of life on the part of the Chinese, but none on our side, or injury to speak of. The head men then sent in their submission, and the operations terminated. The Commodore's Report gives the full particulars.

I immediately waited upon the Viceroy, and informed him of the occurrence. His

Excellency was greatly disturbed at the news, and you will see in my reply to the Admiral a *résumé* of what took place at the interview.

I think Commodore Jones is much to blame in disregarding the arrangement for a joint co-operation. Had he awaited the arrival of the Commissioners, which took place whilst the attack was proceeding, a resort to force might have been avoided. As it is, the Viceroy, I conceive, has just cause for dissatisfaction and complaint, and I hope it will lead to nothing more serious.

The Viceroy informed me that he had received reports from the Taoutae of Chaou-chow-foo and other officials strongly animadverting upon Commodore Jones' action, which he said he would send for my perusal.

As this affair has appeared in the public prints, and been much commented upon, I thought it well to forward the correspondence to the Foreign Office, which I did in a despatch, copy of which I have the honour to transmit, with the hope that my having done so will meet with your Excellency's approval. I also forward copies of the inclosures referred to in the postscript to that despatch.

Your, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 21.

Consul Robertson to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Canton, February* 13, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 2nd instant, with its inclosures, having reference to the proceedings of Commodore Oliver Jones at Swatow in punishing the villagers who fired upon the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer" on the 20th ultimo.

I lost no time in communicating in person with the Viceroy, who expressed much dissatisfaction at the disregard of the arrangement for a joint co-operation made between your Excellency and himself, and regretted that Commodore Jones should have thought it necessary to land his force and attack and destroy the villages in question with great loss of life, previous to your arrival and that of the Commissioners appointed to confer with you on the measures to be taken. He felt, he said, that the prestige of the Imperial Government had been injured, and his own authority lowered in the opinion of his subordinate officers and the people, by what had taken place.

I replied by expressing my regret also at the occurrence, but, as the villagers were known to intend fighting and were strengthening their position, Commodore Jones considered that less loss of life would be caused by immediate operations.

To this the Viceroy answered, Had Commodore Jones awaited the arrival of the Vice-Admiral and the Commissioners, probably no resort to force would have been necessary. His hasty action, however, has placed us all in the wrong, and he should feel great difficulty in reporting the matter to Peking.

Of course, I endeavoured to allay his Excellency's uneasiness, but there is no doubt he feels much aggrieved, and, I confess, I think with reason. Fortunately I made him fully aware that Commodore Jones acted upon his own convictions and responsibility, otherwise an occurrence of this kind might afford grounds for a grave misunderstanding.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 3 in No. 21.

The Viceroy Juilin to Consul Robertson.

(Translation.) *Canton, February* 8, 1869.

THE Viceroy received on the 25th ultimo the honourable Consul's despatch, in which he communicated the fact of a disturbance having been committed by country people near Swatow, resulting in the wounding of British officers and seamen; and he hereupon commissioned certain civil and military officials to proceed on board a gun-boat to Swatow for the purpose of investigating the affair, compelling the surrender [of the guilty parties], and reporting for superior action. A communication to this effect was forwarded to the honourable Consul. On the 6th instant the Viceroy further received the following despatch from the Taoutae and Prefect of Chao-chow-foo :—

"A report has reached us to the effect that at noon on the 20th of January, certain English foreigners to the number of twenty and upwards, proceeded in three boats to the township of Ngow-ting Pao,* in the Ch'êng-hai district, and engaged in a fight with the country people, killing a large number of the inhabitants of Ngow-ting and the adjacent villages, the foreigners also having some of their number wounded. This announcement filled us with consternation and astonishment; and we instantly directed an official to proceed with all despatch to Swatow and join the local authorities in ascertaining the cause and details of this hostile collision, reporting the same to ourselves as a preliminary matter, and taking action also with the District Magistrate in restoring tranquillity, and viewing the scene of [and sufferers by] the affair. Shortly afterwards we received reports from the Sub-District Magistrate of To P'u and the District Magistrate of Ch'êng-hai to the following effect:—'On the day above-mentioned, the foreigners were on a shooting excursion in the country, when a crowd of small children collected around them to look on, and were laughing and enjoying the fun; but neither party understanding each other's language, the foreigners apprehended that there was a design to mock at them, and consequently grew angry. Upon this the elders of the place sought by gentle expostulations to appease them, but instead of this, they seized the elders to carry them away. The villagers hereupon came forward to rescue them, from which a fight arose, resulting in six of the villagers being killed and ten or fifteen wounded, four of the foreigners being also wounded, but none dangerously. No communication on the subject has been received from the Consul at the Magistracy; but joint measures have been actively instituted for the maintenance of order, and stringent injunctions have been laid upon the notables and elders of the various townships, to use every endeavour for controlling the younger members of the community, and to await the action of the authorities.' The foregoing having come to hand, we were on the point of transmitting the report to your Excellency when, on the 25th instant, we received a despatch from the British Consul, Mr. Alabaster, stating that 'on the 20th instant Lieutenant Kerr, the officer commanding the man-of-war at Swatow, proceeded with a body of his men on board three boats flying the British flag to a conveniently spacious locality in this neighbourhood for purposes of drill. On passing through [the village of] Fow-lung,† the evil-disposed inhabitants of that village assailed them violently without provocation, and threw stones and bricks at the party. Lieutenant Kerr, apprehensive of a collision, landed with the design of seeking out the notables and elders in order that they might restrain the people. He met with one of the elders standing by and looking on without doing anything to keep the villagers in order, and remonstrated with him about the affair. The man made an excuse, saying that he had nothing to do with the matter, and Lieutenant Kerr consequently resolved upon taking him to Swatow and bringing him before the authorities. The lawless inhabitants, however, refusing to listen to reason, swarmed together, waving banners, and commenced an attack by a discharge of fire-arms. The seamen from the gun-boat had no alternative but to return the fire in self-defence, and Lieutenant Kerr at once re-embarked his men. The lawless villagers of Fow-lung, Tang-tun, and Ngow-ting, however, assembling to the number of some thousand or more, pursued the party as they went along, maintaining a heavy fire, and wounded eleven of the gun-boat's men. The wounded are now in the surgeon's hands, but it is impossible to say whether any loss of life among them will or will not be the result. The Consul has to bring this transaction to [the Taoutae's] notice. With reference to this communication the Taoutae ventures to observe to your Excellency that, according to the Treaty, when foreigners proceed to travel among the interior villages, a stamped passport must be obtained from the local authorities, or else, on a communication being made by the Consul, informing the Taoutae of the direction in which it is wished to travel, an official is appointed to proceed and co-operate with the local authorities and notables in joint measures for [the traveller's] protection, in order that disturbances may by these means be obviated. When foreigners, heretofore, have visited Chao-chow-foo, or have proceeded into the interior to travel or for shooting, the Taoutae has invariably sought to persuade them to desist from the intention, and has exhausted every effort to stop them, but unfortunately, owing to the foreigners being unimpressed with the local circumstances, it has been impossible to hinder their journeys. On all such occasions it has been incumbent on the Taoutae to appoint capable officials and to detail bodies of police and soldiers to afford protection along the route, and he has at the same time commanded the notables and elders of all the places adjacent to the line of travel to exhort the people to remain quiet, and to take all possible measures of precaution. Wherever foreigners have gone, a mob of sight-seers collects, and the ignorant rabble, with the idle lads and cowboys of the place, follow at their heels and amuse themselves with laughter and uproar.

* Called Outang-pai in the naval reports.—W. F. M.
† Called Poleng in the naval reports.—W. F. M.

This is the inevitable consequence; but, owing to the exertions of the authorities and notables in staving off collisions and energetically smoothing matters down, it has been possible to dissipate threatened troubles and to preserve the peace. Of this state of affairs all the Consuls are, in fact, eye-witnesses, and it is well known to the members of the foreign community also; but, nevertheless, it is constantly urged in their interviews and correspondence, that this dispatching of officials and levying of braves is an unnecessary trouble. Thus, after an immense expenditure of effort on our part, they, on the other hand, persist in regarding it as mere child's play. When, however, a collision has been provoked, they seek to slip out of the difficulty by one pretext or another, and endeavour to cast the responsibility off their own shoulders. Then, not only do the people suffer injury at their hands, but, still further, ignorant of the difficulties that hamper their own authorities, they cherish feelings of discontent in their minds and cast obloquy [on the Government]. The above may show what embarrassments one meets with in dealing with foreign affairs. Thus, for instance, in the present case, where twenty or twenty-five foreigners proceeded to Ngow-ting, they neither applied for passports nor notified the local authorities, but pulled headlong,* with flags flying, straight into the villages most notorious for their turbulence and lawlessness. Mr. Alabaster, in the despatch received from him, states that they went there to drill; but is it possible that he does not know that a foreign military force going into the villages to drill must infallibly excite a general perturbation? Then again, when the elders of the village intervened for the purpose of maintaining order, and the elders themselves were seized to be carried away, it was no more than the natural consequence that the villagers came to the rescue and pursued the party. When, in addition, it is known that the locality is famous for its turbulence and lawlessness, and neither side would give way to the other, can it be wondered at that a collision ensued? The statements contained in Mr. Alabaster's despatch respecting the origin of the outbreak, do not agree with those elicited by the local authorities, and, moreover, he makes no mention whatever of the loss of life and wounds inflicted on the villagers. The rights of the case will not escape your Excellency's discrimination; whilst the other side, knowing well, as they do, that this affair did not arise from aggression on the part of the villagers, are certain to seek all possible means of raising other issues, in order to impose their view of the case on their own superior authorities. Thus, four days elapsed after the occurrence before a communication was sent in on the subject. The villagers, however, having suffered so heavy a loss, cannot be expected to submit patiently; yet, if both parties can be kept within bounds and not seek to take revenge, there would be no further cause for apprehension: but the Commissioner who was sent to report on the matter states that at his interview with Mr. Alabaster the latter signified extreme dissatisfaction, and said that he had applied to the military chief of his nation, who would shortly arrive at Swatow and would attack and take the villages in question. Should this really be the fact, these turbulent and refractory villages are certain to get wind of the intention and prepare for resistance, and in such a case the state of the country threatens to become desperate indeed. We have ordered the Magistrate and Special Commissioner and the Sub-Magistrate of To Pu to see Mr. Alabaster, and to arrange with him for a proper settlement of the affair on an equitable footing, as also to quiet the feelings of the notables and people of the villages, and [induce them] to await further inquiry and action, without any rash movement or attempt at revenge. In addition to these measures, we lay the matter before your Excellency, and beg that you will, if it seems fit in your judgment, communicate with the Consul at Canton, Mr. Robertson, or address the British Admiral at Hong Kong and urge him on no account to dispatch a naval force to Swatow; but, on the contrary, to enjoin upon the Consul there to act in consultation with the local authorities, both parties proceeding carefully and equitably after mature deliberation, thus affording satisfaction to Chinese and foreigners alike, and averting the danger of further disastrous occurrences. We await your Excellency's instructions, by which we shall be guided, &c."

On the same day with the foregoing, the Viceroy received an additional Report from the Taoutae to the following effect:—

"On the 28th January, I received a despatch from Mr. Alabaster, stating that the eleven foreign man-of-war's men who were wounded are out of danger, and that he had applied to the Admiral at Hong Kong to bring a force to Swatow; and he requested, in addition, that I would proceed to Swatow to take joint action in the matter. I at once replied, stating that I would take my departure for that place on the 30th of January, and I gave orders, at the same time, to the officials Lin Yang-ki and Cheng Ming-tai to proceed in company with the District Magistrate, as a preliminary measure, to the aforesaid villages, and to direct the notables and elders to keep the younger men in order, and not allow them

* Lit., "blindfold."

to make any further attempt toward taking revenge. I, at the same time, wrote earnestly to Mr. Alabaster, begging him to hold back for a time the men-of-war from Hong Kong, and on no account to bring about a disaster on a great scale by taking an armed force against the villages, but that, on my arrival at Swatow, measures should be devised in concert for action, in conformity with the Treaty. On the 29th of January, just as I was getting ready to embark, I received expresses at midnight from the Sub-Magistrate of To Pu, and the Magistrate of the district, severally reporting that the foreigner's squadron had arrived at Swatow from Hong Kong, that [the Commander] had not landed, and the officials had been powerless to prevent [immediate action], and that on the 29th January [the Commander] had proceeded with a large number of armed boats, carrying 300 or 400 men, and had forcibly entered Tang-tun, Fow-lung, and the adjacent villages, upon which they made a general attack with artillery and small arms, and that the villagers, old and young, had dispersed in flight, not venturing to oppose resistance. The reports further stated that intelligence had been obtained by police-runners, who were sent to seek information, that all the villages had been burnt and a great number of the inhabitants, both male and female, killed, wounded, or carried off as prisoners. No exact returns had, however, up to that time been obtained, and it was not until long after dark that [the force] returned to the anchorage. On receipt of this intelligence I was indignant and horrified.

"At 7 A.M., on the 30th, I set out, intending to proceed with all possible dispatch and reach Swatow on the same day. I venture to observe that, according to the Treaty, British subjects committing any offence are to be dealt with exclusively by their own authorities, and Chinese guilty of any offence against British subjects are to receive punishment at the hands of the Chinese authorities; and justice, it is provided shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides. Now, in the present case, the action of the foreigners in proceeding with a large armed force to the villages to drill was in itself certain to produce sensation and alarm; yet no previous notice was given to the local authorities, that they might take measures to preserve order. When a collision actually occurred, a large number of the villagers were killed and wounded, and although some of the foreigners were also wounded, still they incurred no loss of life, so that the villagers have already been the most grievous sufferers. Even allowing, however, that the villagers may be unquestionably in the wrong, it still remained a duty to act in conformity with the Treaty, and to leave the matter within the jurisdiction of the authorities; and in the event of the local authorities failing to act impartially, there would then still be time to set an avenging armament in motion. Far from this, however, on the heels of Mr. Alabaster's request that I would proceed to Swatow, and after interviews on two occasions between my Commissioners and himself, when he received the assurance that a thorough inquiry should be made into the affair, [he], after all, without any mutual consultation and agreement, precipitately took the naval force to attack the villages, and wantonly burned them down and destroyed their inhabitants. Such a proceeding was indeed a disaster that it was impossible to foresee.

"On my arrival at Swatow, at a personal interview, I exerted every effort to prevent [further action], and dispatched Commissioners to Tang-tun, Fow-lung, and the adjacent villages to obtain an accurate return of the killed and wounded among their inhabitants, and of the buildings burnt and destroyed, as also to assuage the popular excitement.

"I shall report further, as soon as possible, with all dispatch."

At the same time with the foregoing, the Viceroy also received a report, as follows, from his Special Commissioner, the Magistrate Kwo Yung:—

"Having received your Excellency's written orders on the 26th January to proceed to Swatow and institute action with reference to the collision between certain villagers and a British naval force, as also your Excellency's verbal instructions enjoining the course of action to be pursued, I embarked forthwith, in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Chang, on board the gun-boat 'Anlan,' and arrived at Hong Kong at noon on the 27th. Here I ascertained that the British had dispatched a force of 400 men, which had left the day previously; and Lieutenant-Colonel Chang thereupon went on shore to consult with the British military Chief. At 3 P.M. we got under way, and hastened forward day and night, against a head wind and a heavy sea. On the 29th at noon we reached Swatow, when we were astonished to find that early on the morning of that day Mr. Alabaster, the Consul, had proceeded in command of a naval and military force of 600 or 700 men, with which the villages had been attacked and taken and the houses burnt to the ground. The town of Swatow was also in a state of alarm and perturbation. The first thing I did was to send off the despatches for the local authorities with which your Excellency had charged me, and at the same time I hastened to prepare a communication (to the Consul), which I directed the military officer in command of the Swatow fort to take forward himself, in which I called upon him instantly to withdraw the armed force and return to Swatow for

the purpose of joint deliberation. Towards evening the Consul did, in fact, return with the force, and the public mind became somewhat quieted. On the following morning I had an interview with Mr. Alabaster, when he stated that the conduct of the villagers of Ngow-ting had been altogether too outrageous, and that, the British forces having arrived here, there was no other course but to proceed to the spot; yet that their intention was not that of [commencing] an attack, had not the villagers been the first to fire, which left no alternative but to go on. They were forced to fight, and some scores of the villagers had been killed and wounded; a like number of their dwellings having been burnt down, which would serve as a lesson to them for the future, whilst only two of the foreign troops had been wounded. The force was already returning when he received my despatch, he added; and now that the villagers themselves confessed that they had done wrong, all he required was that the elders should give bonds to abstain from further aggression on their part, whereupon they would be molested no farther. Finding this to be the position of affairs, all I could do was to urge him in the first place to send back the men-of-war, and to await, as regarded further measures, the directions of your Excellency on the receipt of Reports from hence. Mr. Alabaster thereupon sent back two of the men-of-war with the land forces the same evening, and the remainder of the force continues in a quiet state. I have directed the managers of the trade guilds to notify to the villagers that they must peaceably await the equitable arrangement of the grievance, and, on the arrival of all the authorities concerned, whatever measures appear necessary will be taken with a view to the most effectual settlement of the affair and to the prevention of a recurrence of difficulties. The above constitutes a summary of my proceedings on the two days subsequent to my arrival at Swatow."

On receipt of the above despatches the Viceroy has to observe that the XVIth Article of the British Treaty provides that "British subjects who may commit any crime in China shall be tried and punished by their own authorities, and that Chinese subjects guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities." The XVIIIth Article provides that in any cases of insult or violence offered to British subjects, the local authorities shall at once take the necessary steps to afford protection and punish the offenders; and the IXth Article, in addition, prescribes that persons proceeding to the interior beyond a distance of 100 li must apply for passports; the provisions of this Article not applying to the crews of ships. There is no provision in the Treaty for proceeding to the interior to shoot, or for martial exercises. Now, in the present instance, as regards the original act of aggression, the British man-of-war's men, in proceeding to the interior to drill, were doing what the Treaty does not authorize; whilst, as regards the conduct of the villagers in throwing stones, undeniably wrong as this was, all that the British Naval Officer should have done was to report the affair to the Consul, Mr. Alabaster, in order that the latter might call upon the local authorities to take measures in conformity with the Treaty for maintaining order and severely punishing [the offenders]. That the Naval Officer should, on the contrary, have presumed to make one of the elders prisoners, thereby provoking a conflict which resulted in serious loss of life on the part of the villagers, was a proceeding which must be viewed as contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. On the receipt of the honourable Consul's original communication in relation to this matter, the Viceroy at once despatched civil and military officials to investigate and take action in the matter. This was in strict compliance with the Treaty; but before these officers had arrived, Mr. Alabaster had led the British forces to attack the villages, upon which a fire was opened that entailed a further heavy loss of life, and destroyed a large number of dwellings. The Viceroy, who has always looked with equal regard on the subjects of either country, is inspired, on perusing the Reports of this occurrence, with the profoundest sorrow. He has issued orders directing that accurate returns of the killed and wounded and of the houses destroyed be obtained, and that the necessary measures for appeasing and affording relief [to the sufferers] be taken; and it is his duty, in addition, to bring the foregoing to the notice of the honourable Consul, in order that he may transmit the same to his Excellency the British Minister [and request that his Excellency will] issue stringent instructions to the Consul at Swatow and all military forces, enjoining upon them that henceforward they must strictly abide by the provisions of the Treaty, in order to the due consolidation of amity and goodwill. The Viceroy further requests that the honourable Consul will inform him in reply of the steps he has taken, in order that the matter may be placed on record. He avails, &c.

Tung Chih, 7th year, 12th moon, 27th day.

Inclosnre 4 in No. 21.

Consul Robertson to the Viceroy Juilin.

Canton, February 27, 1869.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Viceroy's despatch of the 8th instant, forwarding copies of the Reports of the Taoutae and Prefect of Chao-chow-foo, and of the Special Commissioner, the Magistrate Kwo Yung, with reference to the events which have occurred, originating from the attack made by the villagers of Fow-lung, &c., near Swatow, upon the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer."

He has read these Reports with attention, and finds them generally erroneous; but as the Taoutae and Prefect were not present, and speak only from hearsay, mistakes in facts and circumstances are naturally to be expected. He observes, however, with regret, the hostile tone assumed by these officers, and their endeavours to palliate the conduct of the villagers, and thus excuse themselves from the blame that rests upon them for not keeping these people in order. Had they done their duty, the late unfortunate event would never have occurred.

The Undersigned, however, is unwilling to enter upon this subject. Unfortunately a collision has resulted, entailing loss of life and property, brought on in the first instance by the turbulence and violence of the villagers. He regrets Commodore Jones did not await the arrival of the Viceroy's Commissioners, before attacking the villages, in accordance with the arrangement between the Viceroy and his Excellency the Vice-Admiral. Whether he was justified or not in this proceeding, the Undersigned is not prepared to say, but he will forward the Viceroy's despatch and inclosures, as requested, to his Excellency Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, for his consideration.

He takes, &c. (Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 5 in No. 21.

Consul Robertson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Canton, February* 27, 1869.

IN continuation of my Report of the proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Force in punishing the villagers of Fow-lung, &c., near Swatow, for firing upon the boats of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," I have the honour to forward copies of a despatch to my address from the Viceroy, and my reply.

Your Excellency will see from the contents of the Viceroy's communication that he looks upon the action taken by Commodore Oliver Jones in a very grave light, no less than breach of Treaty; and undoubtedly it is so, if strictly viewed by the provisions of the XVIth Article, I feel, indeed, that we are placed so utterly in the wrong by the precipitate action of that officer, that I replied to the Viceroy's despatch as briefly and generally as possible, thinking it my duty, however, to remark upon the animus displayed in the Reports of the Taoutae and Prefect, caused, I have reason to believe, by a desire to shield themselves from the blame justly attachable to them for their laxity and misgovernment of the district. My efforts, however, have been directed to placing the matter in the light of an untoward affair, brought about by the notorious lawlessness and turbulence of the villagers, with the expression of my regret that Commodore Jones did not await the arrival of the Viceroy's Commissioners, previous to taking action in the matter.

Your, &c.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

No. 22.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 21.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 20, 1869.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter from Commodore Jones, dated the 13th February, covering copies of a correspondence relative to the results of the late expedition to Swatow.

It is presumed that the inclosures to Commodore Jones' letter enumerated below have already been received at the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 22.

Commodore Jones to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, "*Princess Charlotte*," *Hong Kong, February* 13, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to send a copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Alabaster, at Swatow, to Sir Rutherford Alcock, and one of a semi-official note which accompanied it, which I hope you will read with satisfaction, as showing the happy results of the expedition you did me the honour to place under my command.

I have, &c.
(Signed) OLIVER J. JONES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 22.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock, February 8, 1869.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 19.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 22.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Commodore Jones.

My dear Commodore, *Swatow, February* 12, 1869.

I SEND herewith a copy of my closing despatches to Sir Rutherford, by which you will see that everything seems satisfactorily settled, and I have, therefore, thought it unnecessary to detain the "Janus" longer. I am going to Chao-chow-foo to-morrow or Monday, and coming down in my gig, which will settle the question decisively one way or another: for myself I do not anticipate the slightest objection being made to my progress; but the novelty of a foreign boat at the city may excite a little wonder, and, perhaps, a brickbat. I hope, however, not.

The lesson you have taught is very marked here in the difference of demeanour of the Swatow people, since the fight; they are now as civil as they were insolent.

Yours very truly,
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

No. 23.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 22, 1869.

I HAVE received from Mr. Alabaster a copy of his despatch to you of the 8th of February, reporting that the difficulties arising out of the "Cockchafer" affair had been settled.

I have already informed you of the views taken by Her Majesty's Government of that matter, and of the conduct of Her Majesty's Consular and Naval authorities in regard to it.

I cannot, however, but notice the postscript of Mr. Alabaster's despatch. He says: "A shooting party just returned reports having experienced perfect civility, even while passing the scene of a clan fight, and I purpose taking my gig to the city in a few days."

I have to instruct you to convey to Mr. Alabaster the expression of my surprise that, looking to the troubled state of the country, such a rash proceeding should, as it would seem, have been sanctioned by him, without any attempt to prevent it; and I have to desire that you will inform Her Majesty's Consuls generally that it is their duty to discountenance similar acts of imprudence on the part of British subjects, whom they will warn that they must not expect redress to be obtained for them for injuries to which they may have wantonly exposed themselves.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 24.

Sir R. Alcock to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 1.)

My Lord, *Peking, March 3, 1869.*

MR. ALABASTER, in charge at Swatow, informs me that he has forwarded direct to your Lordship copy of his despatches to me respecting a recent naval affair on the banks of the river between that port and Chao-chow-foo.

This district has long been notorious for the clan fights and the piratical habits of its inhabitants, who have commonly shown themselves far beyond the control of the Chinese authorities: no warrant of theirs could be executed, and it is not long since the chief authority of Chao-chow-foo sought the assistance of Her Majesty's Consul and the Commander of one of the gun-boats to that end.

The quarrel appears to have originated in a wholly unprovoked attack from the shore on one of the boats of the ship stationed at Swatow which was proceeding up the river with the Commander on board. Beginning with stones, it ended with gingall-shots, which wounded several men.

The Admiral, who seems to have had an interview with the Governor-General at Canton on the subject, determined at once to send up Commodore Jones with an adequate force to punish the assailants and effectually deter the leagued villages from any ulterior proceedings calculated to endanger foreign life and property, under the delusion that they were strong enough to do so with impunity.

Although this was not effected without a good deal of damage to the offending villages, and many of their piratical occupants were either killed or wounded in the onslaught which they were the first to provoke, there is not much to regret. Nothing but a trial of strength of this kind, and their total and hopeless defeat in fair fight, could have brought peace or any security to the river and neighbouring port, and sooner or later to such means we must inevitably have resorted, or been cut off from Chao-chow-foo, if not Swatow, and seen our trade destroyed by a turbulent federation of robbers and pirates who set all law at defiance, and were much too strong to be dealt with by their own authorities.

The opening of the river has brought me the mail of the 1st of January and numerous post despatches before the courier overland with the previous mail and correspondence, so that I have not the whole of Mr. Alabaster's reports; enough, however, to satisfy me that the naval operations were conducted with great spirit and with as little injury to life and property as the circumstances would allow. I have had verbal communication with the Tsung-li Yamên on the subject, of which they had only seen notices in the Shanghae newspapers; but they appear to me disposed to take the same view, and, admitting the lawless and turbulent character of the people, to recognize both the necessity for action and the merited nature of the punishment inflicted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

CHINA. No. 7 (1869).

Correspondence respecting Attack on Boats of Her Majesty's Ship "Cockchafer" by Villagers near Swatow.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1869.

[*Price 5d.*]

LONDON:
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CHINA. No. 1. (1869.)

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RELATIONS

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1869.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

LONDON:
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Correspondence respecting the Relations between Great Britain and China.

No. 1.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Burlingame.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 28, 1868.*

I GATHERED, from the conversation which I had the honour to have with you on the 26th instant, that the objects of the Chinese Government in sending a Diplomatic Mission to Europe were twofold; one, that by means of such a Mission the European Powers might be disabused of an impression which it was supposed at Peking that they entertained, that the Chinese Government had entered upon a retrograde policy, and contemplated not only refusal to enlarge their relations with Christian nations, but even restriction within narrower limits of the intercourse which, under Treaty, those nations were now entitled to hold with the Chinese dominions; the other, to deprecate any intention on the part of European Powers to bring to bear on China any amount of unfriendly pressure to induce her rulers to enter precipitately on a new system of policy which would seriously affect her independence.

I understood from you, that the Chinese Government were fully alive to the expediency, or even necessity, for their own interests, of facilitating and encouraging intercourse with foreign nations; that they were sensible of the advantages that would result from a greater assimilation of their rules and practice to those of other nations, and from the adoption of the improvements by which the industry of Europe had been so much developed, and the happiness of its people so much increased; but that with all this they felt that any attempt abruptly to introduce new systems or new ideas among a people whose knowledge of foreign nations was of recent date, and who had been brought up under a traditional system, to which they had been accustomed and were attached, would not only produce confusion and even revolution in the country, but would tend to retard instead of promoting the progress, the necessity for which the Chinese Government fully admitted and were desirous to encourage, though they wished to be allowed to do so by degrees, and without any sudden and violent shock to the feelings, passions, and even prejudices of their people.

Her Majesty's Government, I informed you in reply, fully admitted that the Chinese Government were entitled to count upon the forbearance of foreign nations; and I assured you that, as far as their country was concerned, there was neither a desire nor intention to apply unfriendly pressure to China to induce her Government to advance more rapidly in her intercourse with foreign nations than was consistent with safety, and with due and reasonable regard for the feelings of her subjects.

But Her Majesty's Government, I said, expected from China a faithful observance of the stipulations of existing Treaties, and reserved to themselves the right of employing friendly representations to induce the Chinese Government to advance in the course opened up by those Treaties, and to afford greater facilities and encouragement and protection to the subjects of foreign Powers seeking to extend commercial intercourse with the Chinese people.

Her Majesty's Government feel that they may fairly appeal to the Chinese Government, though always in terms of friendship, to act in this spirit towards themselves and other foreign nations; and they would do so with the more confidence because they may be excused for believing that the interests of China will be advanced in a far greater degree

than those of foreign nations, by steadily availing herself of the opportunities within her reach for applying to her Empire the skill and experience of the nations of Europe.

But Her Majesty's Government are, moreover, entitled to expect from China as an indispensable condition of their goodwill, the fullest amount of protection to British subjects resorting to her dominions. They are aware that the Provincial Governors are too often in the habit of disregarding the rights of foreigners, trusting to impunity as regards the Central Government of Peking, and to the unwillingness of foreign Powers to assert the rights of their subjects by local pressure.

Her Majesty's Government feel that they are acting in the interest of the Chinese Empire, when they announce their preference for an appeal rather to the Central Government than to local authorities for the redress of wrongs done to British subjects. It is with the Central Government and not with the Provincial authorities that foreign Powers have entered into Treaties, and it is for the interest of the Central Government that foreign Powers should recognise its supreme authority over its Provincial Governors, and that the Central Government should assume, and, on all occasions when appealed to for the redress of local wrongs, be prepared to exercise that authority.

These observations will, I trust, enable you to reassure the Government of Peking as to the friendly feelings entertained towards it by the British Government. It rests with the Central Government so to order its intercourse with Great Britain and the Queen's subjects as to avoid cause of difference, and to preserve unimpaired the friendship of this country.

I have only to add, that all Her Majesty's Agents in China have been instructed to act in the spirit and with the objects which I have thus explained to you; and generally to caution British subjects to pay due respect not only to the laws of the Empire, but, as far as may be, to the usages and feelings of the Chinese people.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 2.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1868.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Mr. Burlingame,* recording the substance of a conversation which I had held with him on the 26th instant, and stating the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the relations between Great Britain and the Chinese Empire.

Her Majesty's Government wish the policy indicated in this communication to be observed by Her Majesty's Agents in China in their dealings with the Chinese authorities and people, and I have to instruct you to give directions to Her Majesty's Consuls accordingly, and also as to the general caution to be given to British subjects, when occasion may arise, as to their demeanour towards the Chinese; although it may not be necessary that they should issue any express notification on the subject. That point, however, I must leave to your discretion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 3.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1868.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Mr. Burlingame,* recording my communication with him, and stating the views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the objects of his Mission from the Chinese Government.

I have to instruct your Excellency to give a copy of this letter confidentially to M. de Lavalette, the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne having expressed a wish to know the nature of our negotiations with that gentleman.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 1.

No. 4.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Thornton.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1869.

I TRANSMIT to you, for your information, the accompanying copy of a letter which I have addressed to Mr. Burlingame,* recording the substance of a conversation which I held with that gentleman on the 26th ultimo, and stating the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the relations between Great Britain and the Chinese Empire.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 5.

Mr. Hammond to Sir F. Rogers.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter which he has addressed to Mr. Burlingame, the Chinese Envoy,* recording the substance of a conversation which he had held with that gentleman on the 26th ultimo, and stating the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the relations between Great Britain and the Chinese Empire; and I am to request that, in laying the inclosure before Earl Granville, you will suggest to his Lordship that a copy of this letter should be sent to the Governor of Hong Kong, for his information and guidance.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND

No. 6.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 4, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter which he has addressed to Mr. Burlingame,* the Chinese Envoy, recording the substance of a conversation which he had held with that gentleman on the 26th ultimo, and stating the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the relations between Great Britain and the Chinese Empire; and I am to request that, in laying the inclosure before the Lords of the Admiralty, you will suggest to their Lordships that a copy of this letter should be sent to Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir H. Keppel for his information and guidance.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 7.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 5, 1869.

YESTERDAY, in pursuance of the instruction contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 30th ultimo, I gave confidentially to the Marquis de Lavalette a copy of your Lordship's letter of the 28th ultimo to Mr. Burlingame, stating the views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the objects of his Mission from the Government of China.

M. de Lavalette begged me to convey his thanks to your Lordship, and expressed in general terms the disposition of the Government of the Emperor to act in this, as in other matters, in accordance with Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

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* No. 1.

No. 8.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 8, 1869.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Lord Lyons,* stating that he has communicated to the French Government a copy of the letter to Mr. Burlingame, of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch of the 30th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 9.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Thornton.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 8, 1869.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Lord Lyons,* stating that he has communicated to the French Government a copy of the letter to Mr. Burlingame, of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch of the 1st instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 10.

Mr. Burlingame to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 13.)

My Lord, *Chinese Legation, London, January* 1, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 28th of December, and, in reply, to inform you that I agree to the general accuracy of your deductions from our conversation at that time.

1st. That it was the object of the Mission to disabuse the foreign Powers of an impression they were supposed to entertain, that the Chinese Government had entered upon a retrograde policy; and 2ndly, to deprecate a precipitate and unfriendly attempt on their part to enter upon a policy which might make all progress impossible from its menacing tone and "violent shock to the feelings, and even prejudices of the people."

I have also the honour to express my satisfaction with the reply of your Lordship on the part of Her Majesty's Government: first, that an unfriendly pressure shall not be applied inconsistent with the independence and safety of China; and secondly, that Her Majesty's Government desires to deal directly with the Central Government rather than with the local authorities, and that Her Majesty's Agents in China have been instructed "to act in the spirit of these views, and to caution British subjects to pay due respect not only to the laws of the Empire, but as far as may be to the usages and feelings of the Chinese people."

I agree also with your Lordship as to the importance of the strict observance of existing Treaty stipulations. Agreeing, then, as we do to these principles of action, it is equally gratifying to know that we do not differ as to the manner of their application, particularly as to the exercise of force; that is, that it should be used to protect life and property immediately exposed. These safe, the question becomes diplomatic, to be referred first to Peking, and before war ensues, to the Home Government.

The explicit manner in which your Lordship expressed yourself upon this point, not only in the conversation of the 26th, but in that of to-day, will give great satisfaction to the Chinese Government. This policy, acted upon, will make wars with China impossible, or they will not occur without sufficient cause and only after mature deliberation.

I do not recur in this despatch to other topics of our conversation, but limit myself to a statement of the points agreed upon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANSON BURLINGAME.

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* No. 7.

No. 11.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1869.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 30th of December last, inclosing a copy of a letter which I had addressed to Mr. Burlingame on the 28th of December, I now inclose, for your information, a copy of his reply,* dated the 1st of this month, after he had taken leave of me on that day on proceeding to Paris.

In the conversation which I had with him on that occasion, he said that he had called in order personally to express his satisfaction with my letter of the 28th of December, which he was convinced would have the happiest results in China.

I requested Mr. Burlingame to bear in mind, and to make known to the Chinese Government, that we should henceforward have a right to expect on its part the faithful fulfilment of Treaty engagements, the prompt redress of grievances referred to the Central Government, and friendly treatment of British subjects by the Chinese authorities. This, I said, was not only just and reasonable in itself, but also necessary in order to enable Her Majesty's Government to give full effect to the policy which they desired to observe towards China, particularly with reference to not having recourse to measures of force unless for the immediate protection of life and property.

Mr. Burlingame agreed, and promised to make a report of my observations to Peking.

You will observe in Mr. Burlingame's letter, that he clearly understands that force may be at once employed "to protect life and property immediately exposed."

When, these being secured, the question at issue has been referred to Peking to be diplomatically discussed between Her Majesty's Representative and the Central Government, the manner in which the matter should thereafter be dealt with, if it could not be amicably settled on the spot, would necessarily be left to the decision of Her Majesty's Government, after hearing the Report of Her Majesty's Minister, and full consideration of all the circumstances of the case.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 12.

Mr. Hammond to Sir F. Rogers.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the accompanying copy of a letter received from Mr. Burlingame,* in reply to the letter of which a copy was inclosed in my letter of the 1st instant, together with a copy of an explanatory despatch which Lord Clarendon has addressed to Sir R. Alcock;† and I am to request that you will suggest to Lord Granville that copies of these papers should be forwarded to the Governor of Hong Kong.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 13.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copy of a letter received from Mr. Burlingame,* in reply to the letter of which a copy was inclosed in my letter of the 4th instant, together with a copy of an explanatory despatch which Lord Clarendon has addressed to Sir R. Alcock;† and I am to request that you will suggest to their Lordships that copies of these papers should be furnished to Sir H. Keppel.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

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* No. 10. † No. 11.

No. 14.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir H. Parkes.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 29, 1869.

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of a letter to Mr. Burlingame, and of instructions which I have addressed to Sir R. Alcock,* respecting the relations between Great Britain and the Chinese Empire.

These papers will explain the views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the employment of Her Majesty's naval forces for the protection of British interests in China, and will serve for your guidance as regards the employment of them for the protection of British interests in Japan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Nos. 1, 2, and 11

CHINA. No. 1. (1869.)

Correspondence respecting the Relations between Great Britain and China.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1869.

[*Price* 1½*d.*]

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

CHINA. No. 4 (1869).

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

ENGAGEMENT

OF

HER MAJESTY'S SHIP "ALGERINE"

WITH

PIRATICAL JUNKS OFF NAMOA HARBOUR.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1869.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Correspondence respecting the Engagement of Her Majesty's ship "Algerine" with Piratical Junks off Namoa Harbour.

No. 1.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 17.)

Sir, *Admiralty, October 16, 1868.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Lord Stanley, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel, dated the 15th June last, with its inclosure from Lieutenant Domvile, commanding Her Majesty's gun-boat "Algerine," reporting the particulars of an action fought with thirteen armed junks, on the 3rd June, off Namoa Harbour, with the concurrence and at the request of the mandarin embarked on board "Algerine."

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *"Rodney," at Nagasaki, June 15, 1868.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for their Lordships' information, the copy of a letter from Lieutenant C. E. Domvile, of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine," reporting an action fought with thirteen armed junks, who, on the 3rd June, off Namoa Harbour, fired into the "Algerine" on her closing to board them, with a view to examine their papers.

2. The skill and gallantry shown by Lieutenant Domvile, and by the officers and crew of the "Algerine," in engaging and dispersing a force so vastly superior will, I trust, meet with some mark of their Lordships' approval. I may add that these vessels were engaged with the concurrence, and at the request of, the mandarin embarked.

3. With the exception of one junk captured, the piratical fleet escaped into shoal water; but Commodore Jones has dispatched the "Algerine" and "Drake" in pursuit, accompanied by the United States' gun-boat "Maumee," sent by the United States' Commander-in-chief, on the invitation of the Commodore, who has also requested the Viceroy to afford the assistance of a Chinese gun-boat.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Lieutenant and Commander Domville to Commodore Jones.

Sir, *"Algerine," Hong Kong, June 6, 1868.*

REFERRING to my Report of proceedings of this day's date, I have the honour to report to you the engagement I had with thirteen Chinese junks off Namoa Harbour on the 3rd instant. On perceiving that the above-mentioned Chinese junks were determined to fight in preference to showing their papers, I at once cleared for action and commenced. At that time there were nine junks in line of battle with their flags up, manœuvering very well by signal from their leader.

On my passing down the line they commenced firing shot and grape, which I returned with shell and shot. Our practice, though good, could not be relied upon for sinking them as, though there was a light north-east breeze, there was also a heavy rolling swell. They fired so accurately that the shot hulled us several times, but were not sufficiently heavy to penetrate; the grape flew over the heads of the pivot-gun's crew repeatedly. My endeavour was to drive them into Namoa Harbour, and then destroy them at leisure; as I saw if the wind sprung up a great portion of them must escape, and they were cruizing in too close proximity to Bost Rock and the dangerous ground thereabouts, to close them at once. About this period of the engagement two junks joined them, and two more passed down outside the gun-boat, and just at that moment the breeching-bolt in the ship's side drew, and the pivot-gun ran off the slide.

When the pivot-gun was remounted I passed down the line, shelling them, and cut off the in-shoal junk. On running up to him he lowered his sails, and I boarded him in the gig, and with the mandarin examined his papers, which were apparently correct. Seeing that I should lose the other junks if I remained to destroy or take her in tow, I pitched her guns overboard and took the captain with me, and ordered him, as he said he was a merchant-junk, to send her to join me at Namoa. It was then getting late, and although I put on all possible steam I only came up with them at dark. I then separated one, which went out to sea, and following the others, which were making for a difficult pass between two islands, I concluded the only chance of putting an end to the engagement was by going alongside and pouring in grape at close quarters; I passed down three times along the line, with grape and shell entered fuze inwards. It must have told with fearful effect by the yells that ensued, but still they fought their guns well, and shot away nearly every rope before the funnel, and riddled the fore try-sail and fore-mast main-deck awning; the starboard roundhouse was also shot away by round-shot. By this time we were close to the pass, and I had just time to turn and get through the junks to avoid running on shore. They then slipped through the pass and got away into shoal water. I immediately closed the junk that I had driven to sea, and about 10 P.M. overhauled and captured her. I found her hulls and sails much knocked about with shot, and two men wounded by splinters. As she was only in the first part of the engagement, I conclude the others must have suffered a great deal more.

I regret not having been able to follow them up; but having barely coals enough to reach Hong Kong and the port boiler leaking badly, I deemed it advisable to return to Namoa with the prize.

In conclusion, I have the honour to call your attention to the behaviour of all officers and men concerned. Mr. Quinn, navigating lieutenant, was beside me on the bridge throughout, conning; Mr. Swanson, the engineer in charge, with assistants, themselves took the fires to enable everybody to come on deck, as we were rather short-handed at the pivot-gun; Mr. James Walker, boatswain third class, and James Davey, chief gunner's mate, laid and pointed the guns with great skill and coolness when close alongside, and greatly contributed to remounting the pivot-guns so quickly. It is with great pleasure I have to report no casualties; as had the hail of grape, which cut everything forward, been ten feet further aft, there would have been few unwounded at the pivot-gun.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COMPTON E. DOMVILLE.

No. 2.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received March 19.)

Sir, *Admiralty, March* 18, 1869.

WITH reference to my letter of the 16th October last, forwarding the Report of an action fought by Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine" off Namoa Harbour on the 3rd June, 1868, with thirteen armed junks, which fired on the "Algerine" on her closing to board them to examine their papers, and which were subsequently found to be opium traders, and not piratical vessels, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel dated the 24th January, requesting instructions as to the course to be followed in the event of Chinese opium smugglers firing on Her Majesty's ships on any future occasion.

I also inclose a copy of the answer which their Lordships propose to send to Sir Henry Keppel.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir,* *"Rodney," at Hong Kong, January* 24, 1869.

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th November, 1868, referring to my letter of the 24th August last, acquainting their Lordships that the fleet of thirteen junks which attacked Her Majesty's gun-boat "Algerine" subsequently proved to be opium smugglers, and that such vessels will not permit even their own vessels of war to communicate with them;

2. I regret that their Lordships should consider that I showed want of caution in recommending Commander Domvile for the skill and gallantry with which he opposed so superior a force.

3. But as it is impossible to distinguish between a piratical fleet and a fleet of opium smugglers, and as such a collision may possibly occur again, I have the honour to request that their Lordships will be pleased to inform me whether, in the event of a fleet of the latter description firing on one of Her Majesty's ships, as in the case of the "Algerine," I shall be justified in reproving the officer who returns the fire.

4. The view I cannot help taking is, that when a number of armed vessels fire on one of Her Majesty's ships on the high seas, rather than permit their papers to be examined, the act is *primâ facie* evidence of piracy, and that the conduct of the officer who resents the insult to the best of his ability, and eventually disperses the superior force capturing one of them, deserves to be described as skilful and gallant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Admiralty, March* 18, 1869.

I HAVE laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 24th January, relative to an action between the "Algerine" and thirteen armed junks off Namoa Harbour, in June last, and requesting instructions as to the course to be pursued in the event of any further instances of Chinese opium smugglers firing on Her Majesty's ships.

It is well known to the officers employed in Her Majesty's ships on the coast of China for the suppression of piracy, that there are large numbers of well-appointed armed ships engaged in smuggling opium, which will not allow the Chinese officials to board them.

It may easily be understood that a Chinese mandarin on board one of Her Majesty's cruizers would be readily disposed to use the opportunity of boarding and seizing such ships.

These considerations should render an officer doubly cautious before he begins an action with vessels which may be wholly innocent of piracy. Not to return the fire would no doubt have required the presence of an officer of great temper and sagacity.

It appears, from Lieutenant Domvile's letter of 15th January, 1868, that he succeeded in cutting off one of the Chinese junks, and that he boarded her, and with the mandarin examined her papers, which were apparently correct.

The captain also stated that his was a merchant-junk, and it is not stated that his story was disbelieved.

If his story was true, it was clear that the other junks in his company were not pirates; but after this incident, Lieutenant Domvile commenced a sanguinary engagement, pouring in grape at close quarters as he passed three times down the line, which, he adds, "told with fearful effect."

The junk captured was proved, on trial at Hong Kong, to have been a trader, and was consequently released.

Looking to the foregoing considerations, my Lords have no hesitation in expressing their inability to concur with that part of your despatch which lays it down that "when a number of armed vessels fire on one of Her Majesty's ships on the high seas, rather than permit their papers to be examined, the act is *primâ facie* evidence of piracy."

Chinese merchant-vessels are by law entitled to navigate the high seas armed with heavy guns.

You will, therefore, give orders that Chinese vessele are not to be attacked, or their fire provoked, unless from previous information, or other unmistakeable grounds, there can be no reasonable doubt that the ship is engaged in piracy.

Such an event as the one described in this correspondence must be a great discouragement to native trade on the coast, and must justly cause ill-will between the merchant-junks and Her Majesty's ships engaged in suppressing piracy.

You will take the earliest opportunity of making the officers under your command acquainted with the remarks and instructions of their Lordships.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

No. 3.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 30, 1869.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, copies of a correspondence, as marked in the margin,* with the Board of Admiralty, respecting the action fought on the 3rd of Junè last, by Her Majesty's gun-boat "Algerine," with thirteen armed junks, off Namoa Harbour.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Nos. 1 and 2.

CHINA. No. 4 (1869).

Correspondence respecting the Engagement of Her Majesty's Ship "Algerine" with Piratical Junks off Namoa Harbour.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1869.

[*Price* 1*d.*]

LONDON:
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CHINA. No. 5 (1869).

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY

IN THE

RIVER HAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1869.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Correspondence respecting the Suppression of Piracy in the River Han.

No. 1.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received November 5.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 3, 1868.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, dated the 25th August, together with copies of its inclosures, relative to the proceedings of Her Majesty's gun-boats "Bustard" and "Drake" in assisting the Imperial Chinese troops in the suppression of piracy in the River Han.

My Lords would be glad to be informed whether, under the circumstances detailed in the accompanying correspondence, the proceedings of Lieutenant Johnson, commanding the "Bustard," in assisting the Chinese authorities to reduce the fortified town of Choo-chi should be approved.

Their Lordships desire me to call attention to the sum of 2,000 dollars, to be paid by the inhabitants of the village to the British Government, and to request they may be informed whether this sum should be retained, and, if so, to whom it should be handed over,

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *"Rodney," at Port May, August* 25, 1868.

IN paragraphs 12 to 17 of my general letter of the 18th June, 1867, I acquainted their Lordships with the proceedings of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Drake," when employed up the River Han, on the requisition of Her Majesty's Consul at Swatow, effecting the release of a British subject held to ransom in the piratical village of Linlao, and also checking a system of black-mail imposed by the Chiefs of the various villages on the boats coming down the river with produce, the property of British merchants.

2. The "Drake" on that occasion fully executed the duties upon which she had been detached, but their Lordships will observe by the inclosed correspondence that for similar acts it has been necessary to again punish the inhabitants of a piratical and fortified village named Choo-chi, situated in the same river.

3. These villages had not merely fired on the boat of Mr. Hutchings, who supplies Her Majesty's ships at Swatow, but were also living on the plunder of trading-boats, so that they had stopped all traffic in that part of the River Han to the injury of British trade.

4. Although under ordinary circumstances it would be the duty of the Chinese authorities to put a stop to such proceedings, they confessed their inability to do so without the aid of Her Majesty's gun-boat at Swatow.

5. In this special case it was desirable that such assistance should be given with a view to removing one of the many obstacles to trade in the River Han, and to intercourse with the port of Chow-chow-foo, where we have the Treaty right to trade.

6. Lieutenant Cecil T. W. Johnson, of the "Bustard," acting on the requisition of

Her Majesty's Consul at Swatow, proceeded from thence to Choo-chi, to act in co-operation with an Imperial force sent against the place.

7. The accompanying Report will acquaint their Lordships with the successful result of these operations.

8. Lieutenant Johnson appears to have behaved with much spirit by personally encouraging and accompanying the Imperial troops to the assault, while with great judgment he employed the small force under his command to the best advantage, working a 24-pounder howitzer, landed from the "Bustard," and placed in position to command the town

9. The complete surrender of this comparatively strong position appears to me principally owing to the assistance rendered by Lieutenant Johnson, and I trust the ability and prudence which marked his proceedings will meet with their Lordships' approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Lieutenant and Commander Johnson to Captain Ross.

Sir, "*Bustard*," *at Swatow, August* 4, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, in compliance with the request contained in the letter from Mr. Thomson, Her Majesty's Acting-Consul at this port, of which I inclose a copy, I proceeded in Her Majesty's gun-boat under my command on the 28th ultimo, at 4 P.M., to the town of Paou Tai, on the River Han.

I was accompanied by Mr. Thomson and Dr. C. M. Jones, also by the Mandarin magistrates of Kit-Yung.

On the following morning I proceeded up the river, and at 6·30 A.M. anchored off Choo-chi, stated by the Mandarin authorities to be the same village or town from which, in November last, Mr. Hutchings (an English contractor at this port) was fired upon when conveying provisions to the "Bustard;" this place is named in the local dialect Keh-hoi, and the circumstance alluded to was mentioned by me in a letter of proceedings dated 8th November, 1867, and addressed to Commodore O. Jones, whose permission I hold to proceed against the village, with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Consul.

On arrival at Choo-chi I proceeded, accompanied by the Consul, Doctor, and Mandarin, to inspect the forces of the latter, consisting in all of about 600 or 800 men, who, in a series of stockades, were partially investing the town.

From one of the advanced stockades I sent in a notice to the effect that, should the Mandarin forces be again exposed on attempting to enter, I should open fire on the town from Her Majesty's gun-boat.

In answer, I received a request to meet a deputation from the town between the lines.

I agreed to do so, after consulting the Mandarin, who expressed his willingness to accept as a sufficient atonement the surrender of four men whom he named as leaders in all the malpractices complained of; this surrender to be made to our forces, and the prisoners guaranteed a fair trial at Swatow by the Taoutae of the district.

The deputation would not agree to these terms, and I consequently reverted to those of my first notice, and returning, requested the Mandarin to send in his troops.

At 1 P.M., the troops advanced; but finding, after some delay, that they did not do so beyond a certain point, I proceeded, still accompanied by Mr. Thomson and Dr. Jones, to join and lead them forward.

After a considerable delay we succeeded in inducing them to assault at two separate points, accompanying them to within about forty yards of the enemy, who, from behind their very cleverly constructed earthworks, now commenced a rapid and well-directed fire, knocking over several of the Mandarin soldiers; upon which they immediately retreated to the nearest available shelters, continuing from thence the very spirited fire which they had kept up from the commencement of the assault; as, however, they were, with very few exceptions, armed with matchlocks alone, and were all barefooted, they could scarcely be expected to storm a series of formidable entrenchments protected by a species of "chevaux de frise," the surrounding ground being thickly studded with barbed-iron spikes, and therefore, after an inefficient attempt to induce a second assault, we retired, and returning on board the ship opened fire on the town at 4·30 P.M., the distance being 2,500 yards.

The firing was very good, and at one time the town was set on fire; this, however, was soon extinguished.

After an hour's firing I ceased, as by previous agreement with the Mandarin, to allow his troops to go in, and at dark they were still fighting.

At 10 P.M. I received the news that the Mandarin troops had been again repulsed, losing several men.

At 7 A.M. on the following day, 30th ultimo, I landed one of the 24-pounder howitzers, with a supply of ammunition, taking with me Mr. Herring, gunner, and a force of sixteen men, and accompanied by Mr. Thomson and Dr. Jones.

I got the gun into a very good position, and at a distance of about 600 yards, opened fire on the town, the shell bursting with admirable precision, and apparently doing good execution; at the same time I kept up a constant fire from twelve rifles, and the Mandarin troops assaulted, but were (notwithstanding our assistance) again repulsed with a good many wounded.

I would not take my men to the assault, as they were so few, and the defences of the town were remarkably strong—the garrison said to number 600 men. Moreover, we were already exposed to the fire of a gun (about an 8-pounder), which the enemy had got into a very good position, and with which they were making very good practice.

I am happy, however, to say none of my men were hit. At about 11 A.M., I had to send back for more ammunition, which was very promptly brought up to the front by Mr. W. Thomas, engineer; in the meantime another parley was requested from the town, which resulted in a promise to deliver the four men previously demanded at 8 A.M. on the following day. At that time I was waiting with a guard of six men at the spot appointed for the delivery of the prisoners, in order to conduct them in safety through the Mandarin lines to the ship, but after a messenger I sent in had been absent two hours, he returned with a letter saying it was, for various reasons, impossible to deliver these men until the following day.

I therefore returned on board, having first advised the Mandarin to procure swords and shoes for his men; and as Mr. Thomson was obliged to return, and I had no other reliable interpreter, I proceeded to Swatow, arriving at 6·30 P.M. on the 31st ultimo, and intending to report previous proceedings and ask for a reinforcement to carry out what had been begun on the 1st instant. However, Her Majesty's gun-boat "Drake," Lieutenant Crowdy, fortunately put in to Double Island for coals, and on my representing to him the above circumstances, he immediately determined to proceed on the following morning to Choo-chi.

As, up to this time, all proceedings had been carried on by me, and Lieutenant Crowdy is now anxious to proceed to his destination, he has ordered me to report all particulars. On the 2nd instant, accompanied by a respectable Chinese interpreter, I proceeded with the "Drake" in tow to Choo-chi, where we arrived at 4 P.M., and were at once visited by the Mandarin, who stated nothing had been done further in my absence.

We sent in a demand for the delivery of the town to the Mandarin, and Lieutenant Crowdy proceeded, accompanied by myself, to inspect the Mandarin lines.

At 10·30 P.M., an answer was brought that the town should be delivered the next morning at 7 A.M.; accordingly Lieutenant Crowdy, with Mr. C. Cater, navigating Sub-Lieutenant, Mr. Morley, gunner, Mr. Allison, engineer, and 10 men of the "Drake," accompanied by myself and Mr. W. Thomas, engineer, and 8 men of the "Bustard"—in all 24 officers and men—landed, and proceeded with the Mandarin to occupy Choo-chi, our force entering first and receiving first the submission of the townspeople.

We then proceeded to a yamen prepared for our reception, where the head men of the town came to deliver up their guns, &c., and again gave in their complete submission; the four men who had been claimed were, however, stated to have absconded, and their houses being pointed out were destroyed completely by the Mandarin troops. We remained in the town until we had seen the work of levelling all the earthworks and other defences thoroughly gone into by the Mandarin troops, and finding the town was stored with grain and sugar in large quantities, and consequently a wealthy one, we stipulated that the sum of 2,000 dollars shall be paid by them to the British Government, that being as nearly as we could judge the probable cost of coals, ammunition, &c., expended by us in this expedition.

This sum the Mandarin engaged to make them pay.

A close inspection of this place has, I am happy to say, confirmed me in my previous opinion that an assault with my few men would have been highly injudicious, as it was infinitely stronger than I had even imagined, and the works of a peculiarly intricate and difficult nature to anyone not previously acquainted with them.

We left Choo-chi at 5 o'clock this morning, and I arrived here at 9·30 A.M. The

"Drake" has not yet arrived, but appears to be at anchor about seven miles from this.

The behaviour of the officers and men concerned in this undertaking has been most exemplary and energetic.

I have much pleasure in mentioning the very valuable assistance I received in the first part of these proceedings from Mr. G. P. Thomson and Dr. C. M. Jones of this port, whose attention to the wounded Mandarin soldiers was untiring.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CECIL F. W. JOHNSON.

P.S.—A boat has just arrived from the "Drake" to say she has broken down, and I am about to proceed to her assistance.

C. F. W. J

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Acting Consul Thomson to Lieutenant and Commander Johnson.

Sir, *Swatow, July* 27, 1868.

I HAVE received from the Taoutae a despatch in which he applies for the assistance of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard" in coercing a piratical and fortified village named Choo-chi, situated below Kit-yung.

The village holds certain Chinese to ransom, has been engaged in plundering native boats, and has put a stop to traffic on that part of the river.

The village is the same that fired, in November last, on Mr. Hutchings (the gun-boat's contractor) who was conveying provisions to the "Bustard" while at anchor up the river.

I have also received a despatch from the magistrate at Kit-yung, in which he informs me that some time ago he received instructions from the Taoutae to proceed against the village for firing on the boat in question, but that without foreign aid he is unable to coerce the villagers.

The magistrate at the same time desires to obtain the release of the Chinese held in confinement, and to punish those who have been guilty of the piratical acts above mentioned.

I have to remark that Mr. Caine has repeatedly pressed the Chinese authorities to punish the village for firing on the contractor's boat. They now declare their inability to do anything in the matter without the aid of Her Majesty's gun-boat; and although the Chinese authorities would not, perhaps, have been prepared to take steps against the village for the one act of firing on the contractor's boat, it appears to me impolitic to refuse aid on the ground that the Chinese have other matters of complaint against the village which do not immediately concern foreigners.

Under these circumstances I have the honour to request you to proceed to the village in question with the vessel under your command, and to render to the body of Imperial troops there assembled, such aid as you may deem expedient.

Should you see fit to comply with this request, I propose to myself to accompany you for the purpose of communicating with the Chinese authorities and the village, as it is impossible to obtain the services of any other trustworthy interpreters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. P. THOMSON.

No. 2.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 21, 1868.

I AM directed by Lord Stanley to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, relative to the proceedings of Her Majesty's gun-boats "Drake" and "Bustard," in assisting the Chinese troops in the suppression of piracy in the River Han, and requesting to be informed whether the proceedings of Lieutenant Johnson of the "Bustard," in co-operating with those troops to reduce the fortified town of Choo-chi, should be approved.

In reply, I am to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of

the Admiralty, that under the peculiar circumstances of the case, and considering that Lieutenant Johnson was acting in co-operation with, and at the request of, the Chinese authorities, signified to him through the British Consular officer at Swatow, Lord Stanley is of opinion that his conduct should be approved; but his Lordship considers that, as a general rule, it is not desirable that British Naval Force should be employed to maintain the authority of the Chinese officials against refractory parties, unless such parties are actually engaged, or about to be engaged, in acts of piracy.

As regards the disposal of the 2,000 dollars exacted by Lieutenant Johnson from the inhabitants of Choo-chi, I am to state to you, that Lord Stanley is of opinion that it would have been better if Lieutenant Johnson had not levied this sum; but his Lordship considers that as it has been paid, it might be inconvenient to return it, and that the money had better be kept as a credit to the Admiralty in the public accounts.

I am, &c,
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 3.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received November* 25.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 24, 1868.

WITH reference to your letter of the 21st instant, conveying the opinion of Lord Stanley with regard to the proceedings of Her Majesty's gun-boats "Drake" and "Bustard," in assisting the Chinese troops in the suppression of piracy in the River Han, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of Lord Stanley, that they have caused the substance of your letter to be conveyed to Lieutenant Johnson of the "Bustard," through Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, but have informed that officer at the same time that they entirely disapprove of sums of money being received by officers commanding Her Majesty's ships, from Chinese of any class, without the authority of their Commander-in-chief, or the Board of Admiralty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

No. 4.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received December* 15.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December* 14, 1868.

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 24th ultimo, relative to the proceedings of Lieutenant Johnson, commanding Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard," in co-operation with the Chinese military forces, for the suppression of piracy in the River Han, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel has informed them, by letter dated the 30th October, that, under the circumstances, he had waived the claim for 2,000 dollars made by Lieutenant Johnson on the Chinese authorities, to cover the expenses of the English gun-baats during the expedition, and had caused the amount already paid to be refunded.

My Lords have approved of the course adopted by the Vice-Admiral on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

No. 5.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 17, 1868.

IN reply to your letter of the 14th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Clarendon to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that his Lordship is glad to hear that Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel had, under the circumstances of

the case, waived the claim for 2,000 dollars, which was made by Lieutenant Johnson on the Chinese authorities to cover the expenses of Her Majesty's gun-boats employed in co-operation with the Chinese military forces for the suppression of piracy in the River Han.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

CHINA, No. 1. (1869.)

Correspondence respecting the Relations between Great Britain and China.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1869.

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PAPERS

RESPECTING THE

PROCEEDINGS OF HER MAJESTY'S SHIP "JANUS"

AT

SHARP PEAK ISLAND,

NEAR

FOO-CHOW-FOO.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1869.

LONDON:
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BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

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Papers respecting the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Ship "Janus" at Sharp Peak Island, near Foo-chow-foo.

No. 1.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received April* 22.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 21, 1869.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, dated the 23rd of February, and of its inclosure, from Lieutenant Keppel, commanding Her Majesty's ship "Janus," reporting his proceedings at Sharp Peak Island, River Min, and I am to request you will move his Lordship to inform my Lords what opinion he has arrived at as to the conduct of Her Majesty's Consul Sinclair in calling for the interference of Lieutenant Keppel.

With reference to the ready compliance of Lieutenant Keppel with the Consul's requisition, my Lords hope that the instructions recently sent out, will have a satisfactory effect in checking such proceedings.

It is presumed that the other inclosures to Sir H. Keppel's letter have already been received at the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *"Salamis," at Shanghae, February* 23, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the copies of letters referring to the recent proceedings of Lieutenant Leicester C. Keppel, of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Janus," at Sharp Peak Island, River Min.

2. The Rev. Mr. Wolfe, a missionary at Foo-chow, having obtained the title deeds of land at Sharp Peak Island, the natives would not permit the workmen to proceed with a building Mr. Wolfe intended to construct.

3. Mr. Consul Sinclair, in the requisition of which a copy is inclosed, requests Lieutenant Keppel to proceed to the neighbourhood and settle existing difficulties; after describing the chief instigator of these disturbances as one Wang-yew-chow, the Consul states that Mr. Wolfe will be able to point out the exact abode of this "meddlesome man," further recommending that a large force of cutlass-men should be landed in preference to the use of fire-arms.

4. Lieutenant Keppel proceeding to the house of Wang-yew-chow, threatened to pull it down should he not agree to the terms proposed. The result was a bond for future good behaviour, of which a copy is annexed, and also the accompanying copies of Mr. Sinclair's letters of approval.

5. Lieutenant Keppel appears to have cordially carried out the Consul's views in the matter, but in acquainting Her Majesty's Minister with these proceedings I have expressed an opinion that the action prompted by the Consul more properly devolved on the Chinese authorities, who were certainly fully competent to support their authority on a small island

backed by the ample force at their command at Foo-chow; in fact, it appears by the Consul's letter that the Viceroy of the Province had made the necessary arrangements to adjust the matter at issue; the interference of the "Janus" would, therefore, appear to have been unnecessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Lieutenant and Commander Keppel to Commodore Jones.

Sir, *"Janus," Pagoda anchorage, Foo-chow, January* 22, 1869.

HAVING received a communication from Mr. Charles Sinclair, Her Majesty's Consul at Foo-chow-foo, requesting me to give protection to the Rev. Mr. Wolfe, a missionary of this place, who had purchased a piece of land at Sharp Peak Island, on which to build a sanitarium for the mission;—a powerful gentleman by the name of Wang-yew-chow, residing at a place called Ting-tow, a village containing 9,000 inhabitants, had called on sixteen other villages, ordering them to drive all foreigners from off the lands, and had issued an edict to that effect, as they feared that foreigners would get too powerful a footing, and therefore monopolize all commerce coming to Foo-chow;—

I therefore proceeded to Sharp Peak Island on the 16th instant, with the Rev. Mr. Wolfe on board; and on our arrival landed accompanied by the Rev. Mr. Wolfe, Mr. Stocker, navigating sub-lieutenant, Mr. Skeen, engineer, and Mr. Dyer, gunner; we proceeded to the proposed site for the sanitarium, and discovered that the instruments and money belonging to the workmen had been taken, and that the workmen had been beaten. On our return, when inside the village, a large mob of about 600 people gathered round us, and the principal offender being pointed out to us, we endeavoured to capture him, when they attacked us, and as a last resource we were compelled to fire a few pistol-shots at the ringleaders; being almost dark at the time, we retreated to the house-boat.

The next day I landed with an armed force, and the villagers delivering up the instruments and money taken from the workmen and apologizing for the late outrage, and informing us that the men who attacked us came from other villages, and were sent for the purpose, I did not molest the place; and informed Mr. Sinclair of our proceedings, and requested a Mandarin to be sent to act with me. Mr. Sinclair had intended coming himself, but the late severe weather prevented him. I therefore on the 19th instant proceeded to Ting-tow, and there landed the small-arm men, and, accompanied by the Rev. Mr. Wolfe, marched to the residence of the chief instigator, Wang-yew-chow, whose residence is situated about a mile from the landing-place, and on our arrival I demanded an interview, which they endeavoured to evade by stating (through a servant) that Wang-yew-chow was absent at Foo-chow; but feeling convinced that such was not the case, after waiting a considerable time, we forced an entrance through the back, but all doors being closed deemed it advisable to force the main entrance, which was done. The natives seeing that it was of no use trying to oppose us, one of the elders agreed to convey the terms drawn up by Rev. Mr. Wolfe and myself to Wang-yew-chow, and also my intention of destroying his premises should he not agree to the terms proposed therein. At first there were no signs of their agreeing to the demands; I therefore ordered everything to be got ready for destroying the house, at which the terms were signed and witnessed by three of the elders.

I am confident that unless we had used the measures stated, they would have put off from time to time anything decided, and eventually even stricter measures would have had to be resorted to.

I inclose copy of a bond to keep the peace, and also copies of letters received from Mr. Sinclair, Her Majesty's Consul, in which he has most cordially acknowledged the services I have rendered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LEICESTER C. KEPPEL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Consul Sinclair to Lieutenant and Commander Keppel.

Sir, *Foo-chow-foo, January* 19, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your despatch, dated the 15th instant, which reached me on Sunday morning, the 17th of the month.

In the first place, I have to thank you for the assistance which, at my request, you have already rendered to Rev. Mr. Wolfe in his difficulties, which he has detailed to me.

I have already acquainted you, in my private note yesterday from the Pagoda anchorage, how it happened that the boatmen feared to take me on to Sharp Peak, in the gale that was blowing, on account of the danger they seemed to think the boat would incur against a head-wind and high waves; otherwise I had started with the intention of joining you at Sharp Peak, and aiding with my advice in the conduct of the affair in question.

I am, however, glad to say, that on the Saturday previous, the Prefect of Foo-chow-foo, and another officer had, by orders of the Viceroy, proceeded to Sharp Peak Island, for the purpose of quelling any disturbance that might arise on the part of the villages.

Should you require any farther assistance, I trust that you will acquaint me with your wishes.

It seems to me, that the opposition of the people on Sharp Peak Island, will not be withdrawn until some measures are devised to bring the chief instigator, by name Wang-yew-chow, in the Ting- tow village (just below Mingan, and on the same side), to relent in his unreasonable conduct and injurious interference. The Rev. Mr. Wolfe, who has, at my suggestion, made every inquiry as to the exact abode of this meddlesome man, will doubtless by this time be able to point it out to you.

I need scarcely recommend to you great caution in the use of firearms in dealing with the natives; while I would advise the landing of a large force of cutlass-men, which alone will be sufficient to intimidate and control the mob of villagers, should you determine on landing at the Ting-tow village for holding a parley with the village elder, Wang-yew-chow (above named), who is exercising pernicious influence over these ignorant villagers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Bond to keep the Peace.

(Translation.)

WHEREAS the British missionary, Mr. Wolfe, has purchased at Chanushi Hill* a piece of ground 100 feet broad and about 100 feet wide, the title-deeds of which have already paid tax and been stamped without the least discussion on the part of the Chanushi villages, and whereas, in the 6th moon, the Undersigned issued notifications exciting every village to uncompromising hostility, to the violation of the provisions of the Treaty, and against the principles of rectitude, whilst Mr. Wolfe's intention in coming to erect a house was to seek a place of coolness, and without any other end in view, if his masons and carpenters hereafter proceed on his instructions, and within the limits of his territory, to erect his house, the people will not be allowed to tread in the old ruts of opposition, and the Undersigned guarantees that they will not make trouble. If the village on either the right or the left bank of the river hereafter excite disturbance by pulling down the premises or doing other mischief, the Undersigned will pay the sum of 10,000 dollars. This agreement he makes in good faith and of his own accord, that all troubles will hereafter be his affair. He will this day issue another notice instructing everyone to mind his own business, and hereafter, whether it be Mr. Wolfe's or any other person who seeks a summer residence here, all must remain friendly and not make any discussion; in proof whereof he makes this agreement.

(Signed) WANG-YEW-CHOW.
(Seal.)
CHANG-NING-CHU.
TUNG-HANG-TING.

Witness:
(Signed) WANG-HANG-CHI.

---

* Sharp Peak Island.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Consul Sinclair to Lieutenant and Commander Keppel.

Sir, *Foo-chow-foo, January* 21, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 20th instant, in which you are good enough to detail for my information, your successful proceedings at Pingtow village on the 19th of this month.

It is most gratifying to me to be able to express my sense of your admirable conduct of the business entrusted to your charge, through which the object we had in view has been entirely gained, of bringing the riotous villagers to their senses.

I beg leave to inclose translation of the bond of Wang-yew-chow, of the Pingtow village.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR.

No. 2.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 23, 1869.

I HAVE laid before the Earl of Clarendon your letter of the 21st instant, inclosing correspondence respecting certain proceedings of Her Majesty's Consular and Naval Officers in support of the claim of the Rev. Mr. Wolfe, a missionary, to a piece of land purchased by him for the use of the mission at Sharp Peak Island, near Foo-chow-foo.

The papers contained in your letter supply the only information that has reached Lord Clarendon on the subject, but they are sufficient to enable him to judge the Consul's proceedings; and I am to request that you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that Sir Rutherford Alcock will be informed that they are entirely disapproved, except in so far as his application to the local authorities. Those authorities, it appears by the Consul's letter to Lieutenant Keppel of the 19th of January, were perfectly ready to obtain redress for the missionary, and it was inexcusable precipitancy on the part of the Consul not to await the result of the course which, on his representation, they might take; and even if that had been unsatisfactory, the case was not one calling for forcible interposition on the part of the Consul, or of the naval officer whom he instigated to apply it, without previous reference to Peking.

The Consul's measures had a direct tendency to provoke, without sufficient cause, collision with the Chinese authorities and people, and Sir R. Alcock will be instructed strongly to censure him for what he did, and to caution him to be more circumspect for the future.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 3.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 23, 1869.

HER Majesty's Government have received from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel copies of a correspondence respecting certain proceedings of Her Majesty's Consular and Naval Officers in support of the claim of the Rev. Mr. Wolfe, a missionary, to a piece of land purchased by him for the use of the mission at Sharp Peak Island, near Foo-chow-foo.

The papers forwarded by Sir H. Keppel supply the only information that has reached Her Majesty's Government on the subject; but they are sufficient to enable them to judge of the Consul's proceedings, which, I have to inform you, are entirely disapproved, except in so far as relates to his application to the local authorities.

Those authorities, it appears by Consul Sinclair's letter to Lieutenant Keppel of the 19th of January, were perfectly ready to obtain redress for the missionary, and it was inexcusable precipitancy on the part of Consul Sinclair not to await the result of the course which, on his representation, they might take; and, even if that had been

unsatisfactory, the case was not one calling for forcible interposition on the part of the Consul, or of the naval officer whom he instigated to apply it, without previous reference to Peking.

The Consul's measures had a direct tendency to provoke, without sufficient cause, collision with the Chinese authorities and people; and I have to instruct you strongly to censure Mr. Sinclair for what he did, and to caution him to be more circumspect for the future.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

CHINA. No. 9 (1869).

Papers respecting the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Ship "Janus" at Sharp Peak Island, near Foo-chow-foo.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1869.

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REPORTS

BY

CONSUL SWINHOE

OF HIS

SPECIAL MISSION

UP THE

RIVER YANG-TSZE-KIANG, &c.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1870.

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CLASS

Reports by Consul Swinhoe of his Special Mission up the River Yang-tsze-kiang, &c.

Sir R. Alcock to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 26.)

(Extract.) *Peking, July* 15, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a series of Reports recently received from Mr. Consul Swinhoe, giving a statement of his exploratory proceedings up the Yang-tsze.

The first gives the itinerary of his journey to Chung-king on the Upper Yang-tsze, in Her Majesty's ships "Salamis" and "Opossum," as far as Ichang, and by boat and land-conveyance thence to Chung-king, together with such items of information as he was enabled to glean on his way. He was accompanied by two delegates of the Chamber of Commerce, which may account for the meagreness of commercial data; as he no doubt left it to them to collect and make public whatever was likely to be of value to the mercantile world.

These reports have lost much of their interest now that all thought of obtaining access to the Upper Yang-tsze for steamers must be relinquished for the present. It is clear, however, from the surveys made, that no navigation for steam-ships is possible higher than Ichang.

With one exception of no very great importance, at Yo-chow-foo, where the surveying party was hooted and pelted, the expedition seems to have met with no hostility on the part of the riverine populations, and in the majority of towns seems to have been well received as pioneers of commerce. From the authorities, generally, they had every assistance, and at the large city of Ichang, off which the "Opossum" laid at anchor while the party proceeded to Chung-king, Lieutenant Stokes states he met with nothing but good-will and manifestations of interest.

The second Report refers to the three points on the Poyang Lake suggested as places of call for transhipment of goods or Chinese produce. Mr. Swinhoe was not able to make any personal explorations in the lake, but he has collected a good deal of useful information, the general bearing of which is to discourage the idea that any advantage would be gained by placing a steam-tug as proposed by the Chinese authorities on the lake. The whole of the information on the other hand strengthens the view that great advantage would result if steam navigation could be allowed on the lake. Of this, however, I see no present hope.

The third Report is devoted to the landing-places proposed on the Lower Yang-tsze. Mr. Swinhoe, in this, supplies much useful information as to the eligibility and comparative value of the several stations. He is mistaken, however, in assuming that it was ever contemplated to make Consular ports of these. The proposals discussed in the commission had in view a small Customs station with probably a foreign tide-waiter or clerk, and possibly a small bonded-warehouse to give the necessary facilities to foreigners either to land or ship goods: in the one case, for transmission to the interior; and in the other, to some port. The administrative details have yet to be worked out.

Inclosure 1.

Consul Swinhoe to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Hankow, June* 5, 1869.

IN obedience to your Excellency's instructions I applied to Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Keppel for naval assistance in prosecuting the inquiries connected with my mission on towns and marts on the Yang-tsze and in its neighbourhood. The Admiral said that he was himself going up the river in Her Majesty's ship "Salamis" as far as Hankow, and perhaps beyond, and intended to have a look at the Poyang Lake on his way, and desired me to accompany him. He added that at Hankow he would have the gun-boat "Opossum" in

readiness to take me in continuation of my explorations. At this juncture the Chamber of Commerce at Shanghae expressed an interest in the inquiries, and asked the Admiral if he would order a survey of the waters of the Upper Yang-tsze to ascertain how far up they were navigable for steamers, and at the same time asked me if I would have any objection to be accompanied in my wanderings by two delegates that they desired to send to gather commercial information for them. I had every reason to be in favour of the assistance and companionship that gentlemen of commercial training would afford me, and, with the Admiral's sanction, I signified the same to the Chamber, and they appointed Mr. Alexander Michie, of Shanghae, and Mr. Robert Francis, of Kiu-kiang, to be my companions in travel. Messrs. Jardine, Mattheson, and Co., of this port, put their little steamer "Faust" at the Admiral's disposal, and the Chamber of Commerce undertook to put her in order, and have her towed by an early steamer of the Shanghae Steam Navigation Company to Kiu-kiang to take the Admiral and our party about the shallow waters of the Poyang Lake. The Admiral sent directions to two surveying officers to meet us at Hankow, and it was arranged that the "Salamis" should start on the 8th of March, and proceed leisurely to Kiu-kiang, Messrs. Michie and Francis to follow by the first Shanghae Steam Navigation Company's steamer. The "Salamis" was very crowded, and the Shanghae Steam Navigation Company had been so good as to offer free passages to all employed on the expedition.

I embarked on board Her Majesty's ship "Salamis" on the 8th March, and she left Shanghae the same morning. We visited on our way Chin-kiang, Nanking, and Woo-hoo, and arrived at Kiu-kiang on the 14th March. At Kiu-kiang we waited the arrival of the next steamer from Shanghae, which was to tow up the little steamer "Faust." Sir H. Keppel was anxious to try the navigability of the Poyang Lake to Jao-chow-foo, Shun-hung, and Woo-ching—the three towns which are desired as landing places. The passenger steamer arrived on the 17th, with the news that the "Faust's" repairs were not completed, and that she would not be in readiness for some days. It was useless for the "Salamis" to attempt the lake without a light draught tender in Company, and time pressed, so at 4 P.M. the same day we were on our way to Hankow, where we arrived the following day. Messrs. Michie and Francis, the delegates of the Chamber of Commerce, were before us at Kiu-kiang, and passed on by the passenger packet.

The Shanghae Chamber of Commerce had pointed out the desirability of ascertaining the water route across the Tung-ting Lake up the River Seang to Seang-tan above Chang-sha-foo, the capital of Hoo-nan; and they also wished the River Han examined as far as Fan-ching (Seang-yang-foo) and Lao-ho-kow. These three places are great marts connected in trade with Hankow, and the right of residence and steam approach was much desired for them all. But the trade of Szchuen offered greater attractions, and the greatest desire was manifested for an inquiry into the navigability of the river up to the chief mart, Chung-king-foo. Captain Blakiston had already shown that sea-gong steamers could reach Ichang. Foreigners could send their goods throughout the Provinces of Hoopeh and Hoonan by means of transit passes issued at Hankow, but these were rejected at the Customs barrier at Kwei-foo (the first Prefecture in Szchuen). The Chamber hoped that if we found the rapids insuperable to the class of river steamers at present in China, that a choice for the present should be made between Ichang and Shasze (King-chow-foo) whereat to establish a Consular port, which would by overcoming the barrier Kwei-foo, throw open the Szchuen trade to us, and if steam should eventually reach Chung-king, would form a port of transhipment from the lower river steam craft to those capable of stemming the rapids. The Admiral therefore consented to our exploring the river first and to doing the rest of the work afterwards as time allowed. The two surveying officers, Messrs. L. S. Dawson and F. J. Palmer, ordered to accompany us, arrived at Hankow, and the Admiral determined to take our party up himself in Her Majesty's ship "Salamis" as far as she could go, when he would transfer us to Her Majesty's gun-boat "Opossum," which he had specially detached and sent on in advance for this exploration service.

On the 23rd the "Salamis" started with our party, having the "Faust" in tow. There is an Admiralty chart of the river as far as Yo-chow-foo at the mouth of the Tung-ting Lake, so we had no difficulty on the road to that city, which we reached at 2 P.M. on the 26th. A crowd assembled on the bank below the town, and the surveying officers landing in the midst of it with their instruments to take sights, got rudely jostled and pelted by the mob. The people of Honan Province have long professed a hostile spirit towards foreigners. At the Admiral's desire I called on the officer commanding the guard-boat, who was entertaining some friends, and brought him to see the Admiral. He made profuse apologies, and offered to send to the Prefect of the city for a guard to

protect us if we wished to go on shore again. The Admiral was very anxious to get away, and all that could be done farther was to address a hurried note to the Prefect, quoting the Treaty and complaining of the outrage. I had not time to reserve a copy of this note, but I gave the Admiral an English version of it. We left the city and anchored at dark off King-ho-kow, the mouth of the Upper Yang-tsze. We travelled on nearly to She-show-hien, where the water shallowed and the pilot told the Admiral it was unsafe for the "Salamis" to attempt to advance any further. The gun-boat was anchored not far above us round the bend, and the Admiral sent our party in the "Faust" to join her. This was on the 1st April. On the 3rd the "Opossum" reached the large mart of Shasze where we stayed till the afternoon of the 5th, prosecuting our inquiries on its trade, &c. On the 9th we anchored off Ichang. Above this the river contracts and runs through a series of gorges with rocky bottom, forming in places rapids and whirlpools. The Chinese pilot engaged at Hankow refused to take the gun-boat any higher, and, of course, her Commander, Lieutenant J. E. Stokes, naturally objected to attempt unknown waters against the pilot's warnings. We knew before that the river was navigable as far as Ichang, though the "Opossum" was the first vessel that had attempted it. But it was the rapids that we wanted the surveyors to examine and give an opinion on. We accordingly sent to engage a native boat to take us as far as Kwei-foo, the first prefectural city in Szchuen, situated just beyond the series of gorges and worst rapids. Passenger boats were at the time somewhat scarce, and there was such small difference between their charge for taking us to Kwei-foo and that for advancing all the distance to Chung-king, that we thought it as well to engage one to Chung-king, in case we might find it necessary to push on so far. The captain of the boat required some days' preparation, so, not to lose time, Commander Stokes, the delegates, and I made a cruise in the "Faust" through the first or "Ichang gorge" (Hing Kwan Hea), and moored at the foot of a village called Nanto on the left bank, within a few miles of the Woo-e-tan or first rapid. The surveyors remained behind to complete their survey of Ichang. A local pilot that we had engaged was afraid to venture the "Faust" over the rapid, so we returned to Ichang the next day. On our way back we passed several large Szchuen boats with their large crews of rowers pulling down stream. The "Faust" steamed past them with ease.

The Szchuen boat was ready by the 15th April, and we at once embarked in her for the up-river voyage. Our party consists of Lieutenant and Commander Stokes with two of his crew, Messrs. Dawson and Palmer, Messrs. Michie and Francis, and myself. Our boat was a Szchuen passenger or Kwa-tsze boat with a crew of forty-five all told, and had in company a Kwa-tsze or sampan to carry the trackers from one tow-path to another, and to serve at night as a sleeping-place for a good many of them. We started in the afternoon of the 15th. It is needless here to describe the slow and painful mode of tracking, the difficulties the boats encounter at each rapid, or, in fact, any of the details of this kind of travelling. We found our experience an almost exact repetition of what Captain Blakiston underwent and has so well described in his work on the Yang-tsze. We passed the cities of Kwei-chow and Patung-hien (a city without a wall) in Hoopeh, and Woo-shan-hien in Szchuen, and at length reached Kwei-foo, the barrier city, at which all boats are examined on their way up and down the River. Before arriving at this town the Surveyors gave an unfavourable opinion on the rapids; but I thought their experience should extend to Kwei-foo before it should be accepted as decisive. They were very industrious in making a careful sketch survey so far, and took every opportunity of getting observations and fixing points. Mr. Dawson, who was the Senior officer of the two, represented that, as their opinion was against the navigability of the river for steamers until a thorough and separate survey of each rapid should be made, which would be a work of time, it was useless continuing their sketch survey any farther, when they might be doing more serviceable work at Ichang and downwards towards Hankow. I agreed with him, and he resolved to return with Mr. Palmer. Lieutenant and Commander Stokes had also accomplished all he wished to do, viz., to form an opinion of the rapids, and he also made up his mind to return with his two men. With the delegates and myself it was different. We had heard the adverse opinion expressed on the navigation above Ichang by the naval officers, and their doubts as to whether steamers could ever make use of the water way between Ichang and Chun-king: but Chun-king was reported to be the great mart of Eastern Szchuen, and it was highly desirable that we should by personal observation confirm this. At Ichang, just as we were starting in the junk for the upper waters, I had received your Excellency's despatch of the 18th March, 1869, and the only consideration with me was whether I should be acting against your Excellency's wishes by progressing further. You objected to the gun-boat advancing, for fear the Chinese should misinterpret our intentions and imagine that we were going to assist the French

missionaries in their quarrels about their Christian converts. The gun-boat was safely anchored below Ichang, and the party proceeding comprised only three foreigners with Chinese attendants. We had two visits from M. Vincot, the Roman Catholic missionary resident at Kwei-foo, and he assured us that the disturbances had in no way extended to Chung-king, or to any part of our river route. We then sent the passes that Li-hung-chang, the Viceroy at Hankow, on the application of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Hankow, had supplied Messrs. Mitchie and Francis, to the Prefect, and after taking a copy of them he gave our boat a clearance and made no objection to our proceeding. The Szchuen people were friendly and well-disposed, and we had every hope before us of a successful cruize. I therefore determined to carry on my investigations as far as Chung-king, and thence to return with all speed to Hankow. A month would be required to get to Chung-king and back to the gun-boat, and I begged Lieutenant and Commander Stokes to return as soon as possible to Hankow and leave us to find our way back by native means. This, however Lieutenant and Commander Stokes declined to do, as he considered he would be acting against his instructions if he did not carry us safely back to Hankow. It was then agreed that we should make our journey to Chung-king and back to Ichang with as much speed as possible, and that the "Opossum" would remain at Ichang in readiness to carry us down to Hankow. A junk was hired at Kwei-foo to take the naval party back to the gun-boat, and they left us on the 26th April; and the same day we started in the original boat on our further voyage.

At Kwei-foo a tribute-bearing boat of Lamas anchored just below us. The interpreter to the expedition and a Lama came on board of us. The interpreter was a native of Yunnan, and very Oriental looking. He said he was a small mandarin appointed by the Chinese Kinchai at Hlassa to escort a tribute-bearing Embassy from the Great Lama to Peking, and as soon as this duty was over he expected to get office in Kwang-tung. The Lama was of a tribe near Si-ning-foo, in Kansuh, and was one of the forty-eight Lamas that composed this mission. He spoke scarcely any Chinese. The interpreter gave us the names of places they had passed on their journey to Szchuen, through Tibet, and they tallied very fairly with the route on Williams' map of China. He told us that there was one head Lama among the forty-eight, and the rest were all Tootees. They prayed very frequently. That he himself accompanied them the whole way, but a local Wei-yuan was given them from town to town, and their expenses of travel paid by the local authorities of the towns they passed through. They were to receive 300 taels at Kwei-foo, which would be divided among them according to scale.

Every six years a large tribute of this kind was sent to Peking, and the route followed was the present one—down the river to King-chow, and by canal across to the River Han, and up it to Seang-yang-foo, &c.

There was also a three years' tribute which went by another route, mostly overland through Shensi. He had met Mr. T. T. Cooper, who had stayed with his family. He had given Mr. Cooper a mule in exchange for a gun, His family were now journeying with him.

At Kwei-foo we also called on General Pao, who assisted in suppressing the Taiping rebellion, near Shanghae. Pao returned from the campaign to this his native town, a wealthy man. His house and grounds are by far the finest within the walls of Kwei, and recalled to mind some portions of the Yuen-ming-yuen. He has not recovered from the wounds he received. He was very glad to to see us, and showed us about his premises, talking pleasantly of Gordon and other foreigners he had met, and saying what pleasure it gave him to be visited by Englishmen. He pressed us to come and spend a few days in his house. We were of course too hurried to accept this invitation.

On the 28th of April we reached and passed Yun-yang-hien, and on the 30th arrived at Wan-hien. Here we moored close to three boats of the Prefect of Kia-ting-foo, who was on his way to Peking. This Mandarin's brother, a merchant, called on us and no little surprised us by telling us that he had a cargo of white (insect) wax, which he was taking down on speculation to Shasze. He added, that as he travelled in the suite of a Mandarin no questions were put, and his goods escaped duty. Thus, I presume, the Mandarins pay expenses of travelling on service.

On the 1st of May we made a start, but before proceeding far the boat struck against a rock, and made a hole, which required the greater part of the day to patch up. On the 4th we got to Chung-chow, and on the 6th passed Fung-too-hien. On the 8th we passed Foochow, on the 9th Chang-show-hien, and on the 12th we were at Chung-king-foo. We had already sent on the delegates' Chinese assistant (a Hankow man, and one that had visited and knew well the chief trading cities of Szchuen) in a small boat from Foochow to prepare quarters for our reception, and this man met us with chairs at the landing-place, and we were soon installed in a big empty hong in the city. We expected

to have a large excited crowd thronging our doors, but we were agreeably disappointed. People did come in some numbers, but there was no rudeness. It was necessary, however, to obtain some Mandarin recognition, and I sent next morning my writer to the Hien (the Taoutae and Prefect were both away at the capital Ching-too-foo, together with the French Bishop of Chung-king, about the Roman Catholic troubles in Yew-yang-chow), with Li Hung-chang's pass, to explain the object of our visit, and to ask for a guard for our door. The Hien sent back a polite message to say that he had heard through the Prefect's office from the Prefect of Kwei-foo, announcing our passing that city with the intention of visiting Chung-king to make commercial inquiries. He took a copy of the pass, and at once sent a guard of five Braves. With the help of these men our house was kept clear of all except those that were able and willing to give the information we sought; and with one or two of them following we were able to visit what part of the city we wished to see without molestation. The people were curious but not ill-behaved. They spoke of us as the "Yang-jin" (foreign man), and we very seldom heard the term "Yang-kwei-tze" (foreign devil). We received a visit from M. Favard, the Roman Catholic Procureur, the only Frenchman then in the city, and in returning the visit Messrs. Fauvie, the Bishop of Kwei-chow, was found at their mission with two missionaries, one from Yunnan, and the other from Kwei-chow. The Bishop was on his way to Paris, but intended *viâ* Shanghae, to go first to Peking. Many of the respectable native merchants when they heard the object of our mission, called on us, and we busied ourselves nearly the whole time of our stay with collecting information on all matters connected with trade. The Chamber of Commerce had supplied Messrs. Michie and Francis with a bale of musters of foreign goods, and these we daily exhibited and heard opinions on. We also got specimens of all the various native goods that we thought would interest the Chamber of Commerce. Thus we occupied ourselves most thoroughly until the 19th of May, when having arranged with the boat we came in to take us back, we again embarked and moved down three miles to a large temple called Ta-fut-sze (or Monastery of the Great Buddha), and prepared to devote the whole of the next day to the study of the country, while our men were settling accounts in the city prior to returning. All boats upward-bound stop at this temple, and the sailors worship and give thanksgiving for safe voyage before a gilt giant idol seated on its shrine conspicuous in a building with open front below the temple wall, above high-water mark. The hills in this neighbourhood were dotted with hamlets and farms, and thoroughly cultivated. The great crop of the winter—opium—had been gathered, and rice, tobacco, cotton, maize, millet, ground nuts, and runner beans were now springing up in luxuriance. The people met us everywhere with smiles, and talked of us as simply "Yang-jin" or "Yang-tsze." No opprobrious epithets were heard from them, nor did they shout derisively at us.

On the 21st we left for our downward voyage. And passing rapidly over the ground which had been so tedious and laborious to ascend, in spite of the north wind, which blew pretty constantly against us, we reached Kwei-foo at 10 A.M. on the 25th of May.

We were delayed here till 4 P.M., for inspection, and the grant of a pass by the Customs officials.

The water had risen considerably, and most of the towns before perched so high, were now not far removed from the water level. Most of the rapids, too, had changed their character: some had disappeared, and others had arisen where before the stream ran smoothly.

After a few short delays, owing mostly to the trouble the captain of the boat had in controlling our crew, who, the moment the boat touched at a city, were off to do small trading speculations of their own, beyond the reach of the gong, which was beaten to recal them; and in one case, to the carelessness of the steersman in allowing an upward-bound junk to run foul of the boat, and break its bowsweep.

We arrived before noon on the 27th at Ichang, and were delighted to see the gun-boat anchored a couple of miles below the city. We had to stop a short time at the Lekin Station to have our Kwei-foo pass inspected; and before long, were once more on board the "Opossum." The Bishop of Kwei-chow, and his two attendant missionaries, came alongside soon after us, and spent a good part of the afternoon on board.

On the 28th the "Opossum" weighed anchor: and on the night of the 31st May, we were landed at Hankow.

A week before our return to Ichang, Lieutenant and Commander Stokes, on a visit to the city, had his attention drawn to a Proclamation posted on its walls, which professed to emanate from certain scholars and people who wished for the extermination or expulsion of the foreigners. He called the attention of the mandarins *to it*; and he tells me a counter Proclamation was issued. He speaks in high terms of the civility he

received from the people of Ichang during his stay. Large numbers of them used to crowd off, and showed great interest in the steamer and things foreign.

Mr. MacFarlane, the Second Master was, on our arrival, suffering from a rheumatic complaint; and a young man at once offered to bring a noted doctor to attend on him. The doctor came, and Mr. MacFarlane was seon cured of his painful ailment. This, and other signs of attention, were numerous. Lieutenant and Commander Stokes gave me an original copy of the Proclamation, which I inclose, together with an excellent translation of it, made by Mr. Oxenham, of the Hankow Consulate. The Proclamation is well composed; but I think, from its tenor, is either a squib or an official bugbear to scare the foreigner. It had no effect, for we found, as we passed the place, that the people were no worse disposed than before.

Mr. L. S. Dawson, the Senior Surveyor, gave me at Hankow the inclosed extract from his letter to his Commanding Officer, stating his views on the difficulties of navigation above Ichang. Lieutenant and Commander Stokes, of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Opossum," was also so kind as to favour me with his views as expressed in his report to the Admiral. He further gave me the note of his chief engineer on the suitability for steam purposes of the coal the "Opossum" procured at Ichang. I inclose these two communications.

I received, on the 1st June, your Excellency's despatch No. 6 of 7th May, 1869, ordering me to abandon all further exploration; and I have notified to Commander Stokes and the Delegates that our Mission is at an end.

I wish here to record my gratefulness to Lieutenant and Commander Stokes of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Opossum" for his kind attention to myself and the Delegates while under his charge. Messrs. Dawson and Palmer are also deserving of praise for their unremitted zeal in the survey of the river. They have promised me a tracing of their work so soon as finished, to forward to your Excellency.

We intend spending a couple of days at Kiu-kiang on our way down the river, to gather further information about the Poyang Lake; after which, we will hasten to Shanghae to prepare our Reports.

Your, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT SWINHOE.

Inclosure 2.

Proclamation posted on the Walls of Ichang.

(Translation.)

WE, the scholars and people of seven districts of Ichang, on a subject on which we have conferred and consulted together upon.

We know how, for the food we eat and the land we move on, we, our fathers and ancestors, have been, for more than two hundred years, indebted to and imbued by the deep benevolence and great virtue of the present dynasty, and how we have lived in peace and transacted our business in the ordinary manner; and as a recompense for the fatherly tenderness of heart of our sacred dynasty, there must arise good feelings amongst the people. Formerly men from the two Kuang headed an insurrection, and Nien-fei have ravaged over a large extent of country; but although they trampled and destroyed, still there always were some great officials who could point out the right course to be taken, and have credit of completing and settling the business so as to give peace and protection to the people; and there is not a man who does not confess the high order of the benevolence and virtue of the present dynasty.

Now there is a country, by name England, in a corner of the ocean, insignificant yet offensive, and with a people obstinate in their lawlessness, sudden as pigs in their appearance, and as destructive as wolves in their ravages, with a rooted desire to injure the people for their own glorification. The sea monster swallows large pieces at once, but the silkworm nibbles; so these think to add to their territory, and proclaim themselves a great nation. The doctrine they most esteem is that of Jesus, which leaves nought for those who worship at chapels but ruin. In assembly, too, they honour the Lord of Heaven; but those who worship beneath the Cross are all but as demon elfs. Moreover, what they rely on is an inaccessible port, and wickedly do they deceive men. Their fire-wheel vessels go up and down like wind; and no matter whether a place is prosperous or otherwise, nowhere do they not do their best to entice away men to ravage, in accordance with their wishes. They have encroached upon Hankow, and now desire to disturb Ichang, so as to deprive us of the sources of our livelihood, and have

designs on our land and property, with various other evils, innumerable as the hairs on the head.

For place of such reformed manners and prosperity as this, how, in these enlightened days, are we to grant permission to such born-wicked demons as these to come? On account of this, we must all be bound over to be unanimous, and with care found a secret society; and, in order to make a clearance of these imps, establish certain rules, as below:—

1. If a native slays a foreigner, the society will give him 40,000 cash.

2. If any native burns or destroys the steamer, a present of 100,000 cash will be given him.

3. If any Chinese merchants, privately selling land to foreigners for the erection of hongs or shops, are slain, no notice must be taken of it, and, on production of a written proof to that effect, a present of 4,000 cash will be given to the slayer.

4. If a Chinese merchant letting [*sic*] a house or rooms to foreign merchant for purpose of keeping a hong or shop, no notice will be taken if they are all destroyed, and, on written proof being presented, 4,000 cash will be given.

5. If men take foreigners across river in boats, they are liable to have their boats destroyed.

6. If in a struggle with foreigners, any one receives an injury, on his coming to the society for inspection as to nature of his wound, society will give him, according to severity of his injuries, money for his living.

7. If a man is killed in a struggle with foreigners, besides paying his funeral expenses, the society will give 300,000 cash for rearing of his family.

The above seven articles have been all consulted about and agreed on with our head man. All expenses will be rated on people according to their property. But this matter has no connection with the local mandarins, nor must any energetic individual interfere with Government concerns. All must act in accordance with this, and to give peace to the country.

A special notice.

Tung-chih, 8th year, 3rd month, 15th day (26th April, 1869).

Inclosure 3.

Sub-Lieutenant Dawson to Commander Brooker.

(Extract.)

THE part of the river between Ichang and Kwei-foo was particularly examined, more especially in the vicinity of the rapids, and I regret to have to give it as my opinion that steam navigation cannot be carried on above Ichang. The force of current, want of anchoring ground, intricacy of navigation, and changeable condition of the river's bed, are I consider, sufficient reasons to preclude the possibility of anything beyond a native junk being able to ascend these rapids. The descent would be, if anything more difficult, as should a vessel fail to answer her helm at the exact moment, nothing could prevent her being dashed upon the rocks.

To make a proper survey of these rapids would be, I consider, at any time a matter of much danger if not of sheer impossibility, as I found on making the attempt in a boat with ten rowers, that she was altogether at the mercy of the current, and the chance of swamping or striking a rock more than probable; this was in April, and from what information could be gleaned from the natives the most favourable time. From the appearance of what would become the river's bed in summer (now some thirty feet dry) the rapids must increase in danger and violence, inasmuch that even junks have to tranship their cargoes. On the return journey by junk, a line of soundings was obtained mid-channel, the depth of water in the gorges and above Ichang generally was found to be above twenty fathoms, rocky bottom. In one gorge forty-four fathoms was obtained. The various dangers are most abrupt, the lead giving no warning. No opportunity was lost of testing the speed of the current, although in the immediate vicinity of the rapids this had to be estimated, owing to the junk being tracked up close to the shore where the current's force was not so much felt. The river between Ichang and Yoh-chow is of a similar nature as below Hankow, and quite as navigable for vessels of seven feet draught from the beginning of April to the end of September. Local report as to the fall of the river in these parts was so unsatisfactory, that although on the whole it tends to the conclusion that the river was in April at its lowest, still unless I spoke from actual observation, or better authority on the matter, I should feel much inclined to doubt this statement. This part of the river is subject to more changes than the

river below Hankow, but nothing beyond what a pilot's experience could keep pace with. The general rule in navigating the river is to hug the steep bank, but the formation of the banks and difference of depth on either side of the ship as shown by the lead are also of great assistance. Plans of the river in the vicinity of Ichang and Shasze have been made, on scales of 2 and $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches respectively.

Inclosure 4.

Lieutenant and Commander Stokes to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

(Extract.)

THE great rise of water in the Upper Yang-tsze is, I suppose, caused by the melting of the snow on the mountains between China and Tibet. When the water is high it must be enormous in the gorges and confined portions of the river. I should certainly say that on the precipitous sides of the gorges the water must rise sixty to eighty feet, and I noticed the houses in the narrow parts were built very high up. We passed several rapids between Ichang and Kwei-chow-foo, and I consider in three of them the velocity of the current must have been eight to ten knots, very narrow, and appeared to be infested with rocks, with large boulders and rocks on both sides. I noticed most fearful eddies and whirlpools in the river also, before you came to and after you passed a rapid, which would, in case a vessel did not answer her helm at the very exact time, place her in a very critical position, and she would most likely be dashed to pieces against the numerous boulders and rocks that infest the river.

It would not matter so much if the shore was of a mud nature, but being a place infested with large boulders on each side and very narrow channels, it would be a fearful risk for any steamer, and I would not like to cross these dangers in any ship that I commanded. It would not be so bad for a steamer proceeding up against the rapids, but the great difficulty would be in the downward course, on account of the velocity of the current. I inquired of several of the junk captains who trade up to Chung-king, if a vessel of my draught could cross; they all had the same opinion, that there was not sufficient water for her. I have been informed by some Chinese merchants at Ichang, that several of the large junks are lost in crossing the rapids by striking on rocks. It is my opinion, from Ichang to Kwei-chow, the rapids are bad both during high and low water, and I should imagine they are worse during summer. I should think it would take nearly a year to survey them, and it would be a very perilous duty to perform. I did not observe any anchorage for a ship in the river, the junks when they wish to stop, either make fast to rocks, or drive piles into the shore, and make fast their ropes to them. The river is exceedingly tortuous in some places, and the width about eighty to hundred yards. The high and precipitous mountains in the gorges, and the scenery on each side is a very imposing sight, especially after the low mud banks from Hankow to fifteen miles below Ichang.

Inclosure 5.

Mr. Ambler to Lieutenant and Commander Stokes.

Sir, "*Opossum*," *Hankow, June* 5, 1869.

HAVING received on board this vessel on the 4th of May fourteen tons of native coal from the Tung-moi Coal District, about 200 miles above Ichang, I have the honour to make the following note regarding it:—

In appearance it greatly resembles good anthracite coal, but in the consumption of it, it requires large and roomy furnaces, and a slow combustion. There is no doubt it will prove a good and serviceable coal for steamers using the river, but for vessels with very small furnaces fitted to their boilers it is not so good.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES AMBLER, *Senior Engineer.*

Inclosure 6.

Consul Swinhoe to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, June* 8, 1869.

I HAD intended on my return from the up-river expedition to devote a few days to the exploration of the Poyang Lake, in company with the Delegates of the Shanghae Chamber of Commerce; but your Excellency's despatch of the 7th May, 1869, which I lately received at Hankow, has compelled me to abandon the idea. I have, nevertheless, considered it desirable to wait over a steamer at Kiu-kiang to gather any further information that the residents might, since my last visit, have obtained on the commercial advantages to be gained by admitting steamers to certain places on the Lake.

The lake, as your Excellency is aware, is at its lowest in winter, shallow and dry in many parts, with channels running in different directions. The water flows into it from the Yang-tsze, and with the river it rises in summer thirty or more feet, and is then, of course, navigable for the greater part of its expanse. Our desire was to ascertain the depth and courses of the main channels to the three places specially asked for as points of call, and to confirm by actual inspection their commercial importance.

Two of the places, Tao-chow-foo and Woo-ching, have been several times visited, and a survey made in 1866 by Lieutenant and Commander Kerr, of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Cockchafer," of the northward channel, as far as Woo-ching, and of the eastward channel to within twenty-six miles of Tao-chow, has been published by the Admiralty. In 1868, these channels were again surveyed by W. Stuart, commanding His Imperial Chinese Majesty's steamer "Elfin," who extended his examination of the eastern channel as far as Tao-chow itself; the survey has not yet been published. Of the channel to Tui-hung we know nothing.

Each of the three places named is at the mouth of two rivers. Their commercial recommendations have already been named by the Kiu-kiang Memorialists under date 1st May, 1867, and 2nd July, 1867, and by Mr. Consul Hughes, in his despatch of the 6th May, 1868. It has since been ascertained that Tao-chow might be made the port of shipment for some excellent coals that are worked on its lower river, thirty miles above the city and nine below Lo-ping-hien, and it is even believed that steamers could ascend the river to the mines. Mr. Interpreter Cooper visited these mines in February last, and reported them to your Excellency under date 24th February, 1869. Mr. Hollingworth of Messrs. Francis and Co., Kiu-kiang, was there more recently, and I inclose his observations which were published in the "Supreme Court and Consular Gazette" of the 29th May, 1869.

Tuihung is at the mouth of two rivers; the one leading eastward to Hokow, an outlet for the red-leaf black tea, and to Kuang-hsin-foo, noted for its paper manufactories, the other, southwards to Foo-choo-foo (Keang-se), whence native paper is also brought in large quantities. Tuihung offers no mart, and is not even used as a place of transhipment by the natives. The boats from Hokow pass it, and go by a circuitous route past Nanchang, round to the great port of transhipment, Wooching. In summer, the land between the winter limit of the lake and Nanchang is all flooded, and boats can proceed by a nearer course from Tuihung to Wooching, but they are never bold enough to ascend across the lake to Taochow. As on the Yang-tsze so apparently on the lake, the Chinese boatmen dread the open waters, and avoid them by making use of creeks and side channels. Tuihung has been named by the Memorialists simply on account of its position; and if a channel be found leading to it, it is not unlikely that steam would compel transhipment there, and thus save the goods the seventy extra miles to Wooching.

Wooching, in the south-west corner of the lake, about forty-five miles from Kiu-kiang, is the great port of transhipment for goods that come from, and go to, the Yang-tsze. It is also at the confluence of two rivers, one communicating with E-ning-chow (Nanchang Prefecture), the chief black-tea district of Chiangse, and the other with the provincial capital, Nanchang. A better point could not be chosen for steam approach. Wooching, however, is under the direct jurisdiction of the Capital Prefecture, Nan-chang-foo (it is a market-town or chin-she in the Sin-Keen-Hien, which has its mandarinate in the capital city); and whereas, Taochow-foo and Tuihung (a market-town or chin-she in the Yu-Kan-Hien of Taochow-foo) are both within the circuit of the Taoutae that resides at Kiu-kiang, who is Intendant for Kiu-kiang-foo, Kuang-sin-foo, Taochow-foo, and Nankiang-foo, and might be controlled from Kiu-kiang: Wooching would require some special arrangement with the authorities at Nanchang.

It is proposed to make the three places indicated points of call for steamers having their head-quarters at Kiu-kiang, or, in fact, to make them subsidiary to Kiu-kiang, so that the lake trade should flow through Kiu-kiang as at present, but with the greater dispatch and security afforded by steam. This mode of transport, it is hoped, would defeat the local exactions, and by means of transit-passes, foreign goods would be laid down cheaper at, or near, the places of consumption, delays would be avoided in bringing out the produce of the country, and thus a fresh impetus would be given to foreign trade, while foreigners would be able to regain their share in its distribution.

That the grant of steam will facilitate and expedite the transport of goods, and make communication with places on the lake safer and surer there can be no doubt. It has been said, with great semblance of truth, that the lake offers as great an obstruction to intercommunication between places on different sides of its shores as does the Atlantic between Europe and America. Its strong currents, and the storms that without warning render its shallow waters into a boisterous sea of waves, make its navigation almost impracticable to the native junk, and cause very serious delays. . At present, the better class of foreign goods, such as cottons, woollens, opium, and treasure, are transported at heavy cost overland, by means of wheelbarrows, to different parts of this province. The heavier goods, such as metals, sugar, seaweed, cotton, &c., on which the native merchant cannot afford cost of land-transit, he is obliged to convey by water; but much time is lost in waiting for fair wind. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the land route enables the merchant to escape the taxes that await him at so many points on the water-ways. Boats downward-bound to Kiu-kiang sail or scull to Takootang, where they are bound to call for inspection by the tax-collectors. From Takootang they proceed in the same way to opposite Hookow, and there meeting a towpath, are easily tracked to Kiu-kiang, a distance of fifteen miles. This leads me to the question of substituting Hookow-Hien as a Consular port in place of Kiu-kiang-foo; and I inclose correspondence on the subject cut out of newspapers published in Shanghae. It was a startling suggestion made by one of the Memorialists, but has been ably answered. The answers appear to me distinctly to prove that the choice made of Kiu-kiang in the first instance as the port of the lake, was unquestionably correct. The opening of Hookow, even as a landing-place, would perhaps be a boon to the steam interest, but would be a death-blow to Kiu-kiang.

For the Consular control of the three points of call on the Poyang Lake, I would suggest the circuit system. That an extra Officer be attached to the Kiu-kiang Consulate subordinate to the Consul; that he should reside at Kiu-kiang, and have jurisdiction at the three places of call, which he should visit once or oftener every month, returning after each circuit to his head quarters; that his personal staff should consist of a Writer, a Constable, and a Messenger, and that if found necessary he should have a small kung-kwan or office at each of the places within his circuit.

Troubles arising at Taochow or Tuihung, which could not be settled on the spot, he might easily refer to the Taoutae at Kiu-kiang on his return to his head port, that Taoutae having jurisdiction over the said two places, as above stated; or he might have a Weizuen deputed by the Taoutae to accompany him on his visits. At Wooching, however, his difficulties would be serious if he had to refer every case to the Sin-Keen-Hien or to the Grain Taoutae, both functionaries residing at the city of Nanchang, a distance of thirty-five miles from Wooching.

To provide against this I would suggest that the Chinese should station a special Weiyuen of, say, Prefect's rank, at Wooching, with whom both the Consular Officers and the Customs could deal, and in concert with whom all cases that arose could be locally adjudicated. The Customs would probably station two Officers at each place of call in preference to sending a tide-waiter with each steamer, and would regulate that the dues and duties be collected at the Kiu-kiang Office. I think it would also be well if, for the present, none but people in connection with Kiu-kiang be allowed to reside, or build godowns and houses, at these places of call; and none but special steamers with agencies at Kiu-kiang be allowed on the lake.

It would be necessary at first to put some restrictions on the ingress of the lake until a sufficiently firm footing be gained, and friendly relations established. The people of Keangse are distrustful of the foreigner, and bear no special love towards him.

The Kiu-kiang Memorialists, in their first Memorial, dated 1st May, 1867, ask to be allowed to run tug-boats on the Poyang Lake to help the junks in and out. River junks do not tow well and their boatmen have great objection to being in tow of a steamer, as we learnt to our cost on the up-river cruise. I am of opinion, consequently, that little advantage would be gained if this concession were made; whereas the right of steamers to call at certain points, with the right of residence of a conditional kind at

those points, would no doubt give a fresh start to Kiu-kiang, and if properly managed might lead to a permanent prosperity of foreign residents at this port.

The inclosed comparative statement of the trade at Kiu-kiang from 1863 to 1868 shows no signs of decline in the commerce of the place, but what is vividly felt is that foreign trade is slipping from foreign hands. May we hope that the opening of the lake to steam will restore it with increased advantages to the foreign merchants.

I append a copy of Mr. Cooper's sketch map with additions and alterations to illustrate the above remarks.

Your, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT SWINHOE.

NOTE.—Nanchang, besides being the residence of the Taoutae, or Governor of the Province, is the seat of two Taoutaes—the Controller of the Grain Tribute and the Controller of the Salt Monopoly. The former has civil authority over Nanchang-foo, Foochow-foo, and Kienchang-foo; the latter over Tuichow-foo, Yuenchow-foo, and Lin-keang-foo. The two Hiens of Sin-keen and Nanchang concentre in the city, and their Magistrates reside within its walls. R. S.

Inclosure 7.

Notes by Mr. Hollingworth of a Visit to the Coal Mines in the Neighbourhood of Loh-Ping.

THE district city of Loh-ping is in the Prefecture of Yaou-chow, in the Province of Kiang-se; it is nearly due east from the city of Yaou-chow, and about forty miles above it, on the right bank of the River Loh-an, which enters the Poyang Lake at Yaou-chow.

The most important colleries are at the foot of the Ming-shan, a hill which rises abruptly to a height about 300 feet from the right bank of the river, at a point about ten miles below Loh-ping. This hill is a very noticeable feature in the landscape, as at a distance it presents the appearance of a solitary hill, with three mounds on its top; but on reaching it, four or five mounds are observed, on one of which, that to the extreme east, is a clump of trees, surrounding a small temple, in which are a few Buddhist priests.

From the cap of this hill a very extensive view is obtained; to the east-north-east the city of Loh-ping is distinctly visible, distant about five miles by road; to the west the pagodas at Yaou-chow are just visible; and on the north-north-west, at the foot of the hill, are the collieries communicating by many roads with the coal-yards on the water side. At the extreme east of the hill, just below the temple, are situated sixteen coal-yards, nearly all of which are on the right bank of a small stream which falls into the Loh-an at this point. About a mile below on the right bank of the Loh-an are seven coal-yards, at the western end of the hill. On the opposite side of the river, which is about 300 yards wide, is a large village, where many of the coolies employed to wheel the coal from the collieries to the coal-yards reside. They cross the river in the morning with their barrows, and return after their day's work in the evening. In the river and stream opposite the lower coal-yards are numbers of junks loading coals for Chin-kiang, Soo-chow, Kiu-kiang, and other places; some are said to be capable of carrying 3,000 peculs. The coal-yards are small inclosures on the water side, to which the coals are brought from the collieries in wheel-barrows, carrying about 240 catties each, in two baskets, one on each side of the wheel. These baskets are emptied in the yard, and the coal is put into other baskets, holding about 120 catties, and carried down to the junks moored alongside the bank. The coal is not weighed, either at the collieries or at the coal-yards when being shipped off, it being sold by the basket. The distance from the collieries to the coal-yards is about a mile and-a-half, and the coolies can make five journeys a-day, receiving 60 cash for a journey, or say 300 cash per day for bringing 12 piculs of coal to the water side. The coolies who carry the coal from the yard to the junks receive 6 cash per basket of about 120 catties. When the Ming Show was visited on the 1st May, there was very little coal stored in the yards, it being shipped off as quickly as brought from the collieries. These coal-yards have all different names, and appear to be quite independent of each other.

The neighbourhood of the collieries is called Sze-tsze Kow (Lion's Mouth). There are two principal ones, called Wan-fu Ch'ang, the other Hang-shing Ch'ang. They are surrounded by a fence, and are almost contiguous. One other colliery, which has a new appearance, has been abandoned owing to an accident, involving loss of life, which happened last summer; this was caused by the falling in of a gallery. The collieries

present a busy appearance, hundreds of men at work, carrying off the coals, which are lying about in large heaps all over the compound. This contains numbers of houses, the residences of the proprietors of the mines, the miners, &c. The shafts are housed over, and numbers of fir poles are lying about to be used as props in the galleries of the mine.

The Wan-fuh Ch'ang is said to have been worked for ten years. The shaft, which is oblong, seems to be lined with timber, and divided by bratticing into four compartments. By these divisions the experienced miners are said to come up and down, the inexperienced men going up and down in the baskets. Across the top of the shaft, about 3 or 4 feet above it, are placed the windlasses, used for raising up the coals and water. These windlasses are of very simple construction, made of wood, with two wooden handles on each side; the handles are straight pieces placed diagonally, the rope was hemp, and said to be 18 chang in length. Judging from the size of the cylinder of the windlass, and the number of turns noticed when the coals were being wound up, their depth is probably correctly stated. It took six men about four or five minutes to wind up a basket of coal estimated to weigh 240 catties. It was stated that there were three galleries in the mine, and that the vertical distances between them were 18 chang each, making the depth of the mine 54 chang in all, or say 600 feet.

There were said to be similar sets of windlasses, &c., below. From inquiries made at different places and times, the statement as to the three galleries was clearly corroborated; the depth was variously stated at from 40 or 50 chang, so that 500 feet is probably not an exaggeration of the vertical depth of the mine.

It was stated that the seams were thick enough to admit of men standing upright, and that they extended in all directions. At the top of the shaft were two windlasses employed bringing up coals, and two bringing up water; but the baskets of water were small, and appeared to contain only a few gallons, perhaps about nine. The baskets appeared to be lined with skins.

The miners are said to work day and night, summer and winter. They use a sort of combination of pickaxe and hammer; and the galleries are said to be lighted by rude lamps composed of a basin of oil placed almost vertically, and carrying a wick. It is difficult to understand how fire damp is avoided, but it seems to be.

At the Wan-fuh Ch'ang about 240 miners are employed, one-half of which go down at a time; they send up to bank about 2,400 piculs a-day, when the mine is in full work. They receive about 80 cash each per day, and their food. The roads between the collieries and the coal-yards are much cut up by the narrow wheels of the barrows; but as the soil is hard and gravelly, it is probably only in very wet weather that the carriage of the coals is suspended. The situation is an excellent one for a tramway, as by taking the road to a spot a little lower on the river than the lowest coal-yards, all unevenness could be avoided, and a gradual decline could be made, though the distance would not be increased to more than two miles; at present the roads are in some places carried over an elevation of nearly 80 feet, so as to avoid a detour.

The price of the coal at the yards is 260 cash per basket, the freight to Kiu-kiang 140 cash per basket, the taxes 30 cash; or say 430 cash for 120 catties, equal to 360 cash per picul, laid down in Kiu-kiang. Before use in steamers, however, it has to be screened, and this process increases the price of the coal to about 430 cash per picul, as about 30 per cent. is dust, which is only saleable at about 200 cash per picul.

Many old workings were noticed near the Ming-shan; some said to be abandoned owing to the impossibility of overcoming the water; others on account of the miners coming to stone. In others no mining is said to have been carried on for at least fifty or sixty years, and perhaps longer.

About half-way between Ming-shan and Loh-ping are two coal-yards on the left bank of the river, supplied from the Wan-shing Ch'ang, distant about four miles to the south of the river. This colliery was visited on the 3rd of May, 1869, and was found to be in full work, similar in every respect to the Wan-fuh Ch'ang, but on a smaller scale. About 80 miners were said to be employed, of which half go down at a time, sending up 180 baskets, or say 360 piculs; the other half then go down, and do the same, making the daily yield 720 piculs. This mine is said to be about 30 chang deep, or say 330 feet, and to have two galleries. About 150 men were employed wheeling the coal to the river side: they make two journeys a-day, and appear to carry each journey 240 catties.

About a mile lower down the river, on the same side, is another coal-yard, supplied from a mine said to be 16 li distant. This colliery has been at work three and-a-half years. It was not visited.

Besides these two collieries on the left bank of the river, and those at Ming-shan on the right, no other collieries could be seen or heard of below Loh-ping, though others

were spoken of as existing near and above Loh-ning; but the shallowness of the water just below that town is perhaps the reason why the resources in its more immediate neighbourhood are not so thoroughly developed.

At Ming-shan many old workings were observed, some close to the foot of the hill itself; but none of them were at any greater elevation than some 60 or 70 feet above the river.

Inclosure 8.

Correspondence on the proposed Substitution of Hookow for Kiu-kiang as a Consular Port.

To the Editor of the Shanghae "Recorder."

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, March* 31, 1869.

WE venture to address you on the subject of Mr. Edward Cunningham's memorial to Mr. Consul Medhurst, dated 31st January, which appeared in the "Supreme Court and Consular Gazette" of the 26th instant, as there are some statements made in it regarding the Poyang Lake and Kiu-kiang, which, if allowed to pass by without notice, may cause the importance, character, and condition of the Lake to be misunderstood, as well as to confirm Mr. Cunningham's opinion, that Kiu-kiang is a failure, and that Hookow ought to be substituted for it, in case the navigation of the Lake by steam cannot be gained.

It may be as well to commence by drawing attention to the circumstances under which Kiu-kiang was chosen instead of Hookow.

The late Earl of Elgin when addressing Mr. (now Sir Harry) Parkes from Hong Kong under date 19th January, 1861, wrote as follows:—

"In the correspondence which has passed between Mr. Bruce and the Prince of Kung on this subject, Kiu-kiang is named as one of the places at which a British Consul is to be established. You will, however, when on the spot, have to consider whether Hookow, at the entrance of the channel leading from the Yang-tsze to the Poyang Lake, be not, with a view to the general interests of trade, the more eligible position for a Consul. Should you, on examination, come to the conclusion that such is the case, I am confident that Mr. Bruce will not disapprove, if with the Admiral's concurrence, and the consent of the Chinese authorities, you establish him there instead of at Kiu-kiang.

The deputation appointed by the Shanghae Chamber of Commerce, which accompanied Admiral Hope and Mr. Parkes up the Yang-tsze, reported thus, under date 30th March, 1861.

"*Kiu-kiang and Hookow.*—Both these places were visited and examined with regard to their capacities for the site of the second new port on the Yang-tsze. The latter is just at the mouth of the Poyang Lake, but the place is small, and the steepness of the hills on which it is built gives no space for the requirements of a trading depôt, while on the opposite shore, the alluvial soil is liable to be flooded in summer. It is not, nor has it ever been a place of trade.

"Kiu-kiang has always been a port of some consequence, though even before it was devastated by the Rebels, it was somewhat on the decline. Both equally command, practically, the navigation of the Poyang Lake."

Kiu-kiang was thus opened after due consideration had been given to Hookow.

We have often visited Hookow, and can quite confirm the wisdom in not opening it in place of Kiu-kiang. We will, however, mention some of the advantages which Kiu-kiang has over Hookow, remarking that we know of no advantages which Hookow possesses over Kiu-kiang.

In the first place, though Kiu-kiang is subject to storms, Hookow and other places on the Yang-tsze are equally so; with this difference, however, that Kiu-kiang possesses a creek capable of affording secure shelter to hundreds of junks, cargo-boats, &c., while Hookow has no natural shelter of any kind; there is certainly a small artificial harbour, but this is reserved exclusively for gun-boats, and the Custom-houses, to which the junks have to report in passing, are on the opposite side of the Lake. When the water in the Yang-tsze is very low, the creek at Kiu-kiang is hardly available, but then the high banks shelter the junks, though moored on the river. Again, Kiu-kiang is a place of considerable trade, whereas Hookow has no trade whatever, it being merely a garrison town, while Kiu-kiang, on the other hand, is a Prefectural city, the residence of a Taoutae, who controls the north-eastern part of Keang-se, his jurisdiction embracing all the green and red leaf tea districts in the province, as well as the pottery and most of the paper districts in addition to which the circuit is an important outlet for imports.

As to Mr. Cunningham's statement that Kiu-kiang is a failure we would refer him to

your issue of the 11th ultimo, where the imports and exports for the past six years are tabulated; this will, we think, be sufficient to refute his bare opinion. In answer to Mr. Cunningham's statement as to the detention of boats at and about Hookow for weeks in the heart of the season, we simply give it a distinct denial; and as to the statement regarding seventeen boisterous miles, and the difficulties experienced by boats, which, he says, are constructed principally for creek navigation between Hookow and this, we call it an exaggeration, as the boats used between the places on the Lake and this are not built for creek navigation, and so far from there being any difficulty in their reaching this place, they are tracked all the way up, when the wind is adverse; the only obstruction which they meet with being caused by the hulks, pontoons, &c., of the Shanghae Steam Navigation Company, which, stretching for some distance from the shore there into the river, effectually prevent boats tracking past, so as to reach the creek.

With regard to the Poyang Lake, Mr. Cunningham states that its importance has been greatly overrated, and its character and condition misunderstood. This is a very sweeping statement, and we would ask, who has misunderstood the lake besides himself?

Mr. Cunningham speaks of surveys, explorations, and Chinese accounts. We will dismiss the Chinese accounts in his own words, "They know there is no reliance to be placed on Chinese information," and ask him to what surveys and explorations he refers.

We have visited the lake, and unhesitatingly state, that the rivers, which enter at Wooching, Yaouchow and Shwuy-Hung are very important, and navigable for hundreds of miles, the above places too not being "only places of call," and further, that the Poyang Lake is not a mere swamp, as the survey of Lieutenant Kerr, R.N., commanding Her Majesty's ship "Cockchafer," will clearly show.

In conclusion we would remark that there is some inconsistency in Mr. Cunningham's memorial, as he states, that what he has to say will not conflict with any point expressed in the letter of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, dated 1st February, whereas it does most certainly conflict, in this matter of the proposed substitution of Hukow for Kiu-kiang.

We inclose our cards, and subscribe ourselves

BRITISH MERCHANTS.

(*From the "North China Daily News" of April* 7, 1869.)

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, April* 3, 1869.

Permit me to ask for a small space in your columns, in order to point out the exaggerations of that portion of Mr. Cunningham's letter to Mr. Consul Medhurst, published in the "Supreme Court Gazette" of 26th ultimo, which refers to the navigation of the river between Hookow and this port.

The "seventeen boisterous miles," of which he speaks, are, in reality, only eleven as a creek leading from the Poyang Lake, strikes the river some six miles above Hookow; this is dry in the winter only, and is always used by tea laden junks. Then, these eleven miles of dangerous navigation are again reduced to seven, because it is only to within a distance of four miles from this port, that the rocks on the south shore of the river are found, among which these junks, insisting on creeping in shore during light winds, or in tacking if they are not favourable, are apt to meet with accidents. The bar at Olyphant Island never has less than eight feet on it; and few, if any, of the tea-laden junks draw so much water. It is true that a danger does exist, but that is at Kiu-kiang itself; and Mr. Cunningham is, probably, as well acquainted with its existence as the junk masters who have to sail to yulo, or to haul round it.

What advantage it would be to have Hookow substituted for this port, I am at a loss to conceive. I have shown that the seventeen boisterous miles are rather mythical; and Mr. Cunningham forgets to state that at Hookow there are no building sites; no trade; no shelter for the junks; and that it is exposed to the full fury of the north-east gales; so much so, that junks, if caught by stress of weather, run back to Taku-tang, to a bay to the south-west of the town; which, by-the-by, is the principal Customs station on the lake, where all junks bound down pay their tonnage dues.

Mr. Cunningham, who probably thinks that the best mode of treating a failure (as he designates this port) is to abandon it, does not appear to take into consideration the interests of those who desire to see the best made out of a poor bargain. I do not propose to discuss what are the causes of its being "a poor bargain" as they, in a great extent, are due to a system of doing business which has, of late years, been introduced,

and which still prevails upon the Yang-tsze. But, instead of completely sacrificing Kiu-kiang and the foreign property here, by establishing at Hookow receiving-ships for the goods now exported from, and imported at, this place; so as to throw trade more than ever out of the reach of foreigners, and into the hands of the natives and their agents, I would propose that the right to make a good road between Taku-tang and this port should be asked for from the Chinese Government. Then Mr. Cunningham's seventeen boisterous miles need not be braved by native junks; nor would they be exposed to the danger of having their bows torn out of them in towing, (though their getting even a chance of being towed appears to me problematical, as I question whether a tow-boat would pay). The distance from Taku-tang to this is only forty li. The ground is, with the exception of two small hills, perfectly level, and a tramway could very easily be laid, which would enable teas to be placed in Kiu-kiang a couple of hours after their arrival at Taku-tang, between which place and this there exists no Customs barrier or any other cause of delay. Native tea dealers, anxious to place samples of their teas on the market, often have a couple of chests forwarded by this route; whilst the junks are waiting at Taku-tang to settle Customs matters, &c.

In the hope that the attention of the Commission, on their return from up river, may be directed to a scheme which, I think, would prove very advantageous to the interests of all who have a stake in this port, I am, &c.,

(Signed) A KIU-KIANGITE.

(*From the "North China Daily News" of April* 5, 1869.)

A Memorial by Messrs. Francis and Co., of Kiu-kiang, regarding the new Treaty (published in the last "Supreme Court and Consular Gazette") contains one or two striking passages. It notes the fact that there are now only four British firms in Kiu-kiang against fourteen in 1864, and urges the opening of the Poyang Lake as the only means of restoring the trade of the port. Mr. Cunningham, it will be remembered, suggested its abandonment, and the opening of Hookow at the mouth of the lake instead, in case the privilege of inland steam navigation cannot be obtained. The memorialists next suggest—

"The appointment of a British official of suitable rank as Intendant of Trade at Nanking, the residence of the Viceroy who controls this province and Keang Nan; mercantile matters could then be referred from Kiu-kiang and also from Shanghae and Chinkiang to Nanking, instead of to Peking, late experience having shown the desirability of this change."

And in the third place, they suggest, "that the transit duties be handed over to the local officials, and not to the Peking Government; in fact, some portion of the export duties might be treated in the same way, as at present the local authorities have little or no interest in foreign trade; they therefore collect the local duties which the transit duties were intended to replace, as if no special foreign duties existed."

(*From the "Shanghae Recorder" of April* 7, 1869.)

In our issue of the 5th instant, we published a letter from British merchants at Kiu-kiang, contravening statements made in Mr. Cunningham's Memorial on the proposed revision of the Treaties. The letter, as ably written as it was temperate, called attention to many points in Mr. Cunningham's letter where a false light had been thrown on the position of affairs at that port. Mr. Cunningham suggested boldly the removal of the port from Kiu-kiang to Hookow, at the entrance of the Poyang Lake, which place he seems to put in comparison as a place of trade with the large towns of the interior of Kiangsi. Against a proposal which, if carried out, would go far to entirely destroy the trade of Kiu-kiang, and to depreciate to the lowest possible value property in land and buildings, representing large sums of money, the mercantile community naturally object. Kiu-kiang, though always a place of considerable native trade, is acknowledged by all to be to a great extent, a failure; heavy squeezes on goods from the interior having always had a depressing effect, and we gather from the published Customs Report of 1867 that this cause has been instrumental to a considerable extent in directing the traffic to Hweichow and Hang-chow, and from that place to Shanghae, in place of its being sent

on direct to Kiu-kiang. Mr. Cunningham's proposition, like many others, is, however, qualified with an if. If, he says, steam navigation be permitted on the lake the substitution of Hookow would be unimportant. The Kiu-kiang Memorialists have ever been foremost in urging the concession, at least as far Woo-chang, which they, with probably better means of information than Mr. Cunningham, describe as an important mart. When so small a concession would set at rest the moot point of Kiu-kiang or Hookow, we trust the Kiu-kiang community will not cease their endeavours in this direction. On one point they and Mr. Cunningham are agreed, and that is the injury done to native trade by the constant detention of the sailing-vessels navigating the lake, by contrary winds. This simple drawback all unite in describing as exceedingly injurious to the trade of Kiu-kiang. How much it injures the native trade of the province we have no means of judging: but, calculating from our experience of its hurtful effects on foreign trade, we have every reason to believe that the annual loss must be enormous. No statesman, however conscientiously apprehensive of the effects of enlarging foreign intercourse, can fail to see that the advantages to the natives would be great and immediate, while the change socially would be of the smallest amount.

In addition to the fact that Hookow has not been a place of trade, its position is against it: without level ground to build godowns, there would be a difficulty in accommodating a large trade. The anchorage, moreover, is too exposed for the weak native craft which navigate the lake, while its position, again, out of the regular track of the steamers navigating the river, would be a disadvantage.

The Poyang Lake itself meets but with scanty justice from Mr. Cunningham. It is true that during the winter months the greater portion is little better than a swamp, yet even through the marshes at that season of the year are to be found channels navigable for light draft steamers. Such craft as carry every second day to Hankow cargoes of 1,000 to 2,000 tons would not be available, but a small class of boats of light draft and easily handled would readily find employment. The trading towns of Kiangsi are well known to be of considerable importance, and a large portion of the teas of the Moyune, Ninschow, and Fychow districts, not to speak of those of Hohow, would, by preference, gravitate to the Poyang Lake, were facilities for its conveyance offered.

(*From the "North China Daily News" of April* 8, 1869.)

To the Editor of the "North China Daily News."

Sir, *Shanghae, April* 6, 1869.

I AM glad to acknowledge the strength of the arguments in the excellent letter of a "Kiu-kiangite" in your paper of to-day, in favour of Kiu-kiang against Hookow.

I have been long in Shanghae, and have twice visited Kiu-kiang, but this is the first time I have heard anything said in favour, or even in defence, of the place. I have often heard the expression of regret that Hookow was not chosen in its stead. "Kiu-kiangite's" statements make its merits doubtful, for, if not a good harbour, the change would be of no advantage. As for its hill sides, I suppose they are no steeper from the water than those of Hong-kong were, or even those of Nantai at Foochow.

Its advantages or disadvantages, however, are easily ascertainable; and I did but suggest a possible alleviation of some of the difficulties which have made Kiu-kiang an unsatisfactory port.

Neither this letter, nor that of "British Merchants'" in the "Recorder," nor even that of Messrs. Francis and Co., seem to me to make good the cause of the Poyang Lake. The present means of communication with it appears to be even better than has been thought; and as, by these letters it is plain that all the trade that exists comes now to Kiu-kiang, one asks what especial advantage to that place will there be in opening subsidiary places on the lake. Also, if the trade of all of them combined scarcely gives support to four firms, would each of them, individually, give a living to one, besides that which they must still continue to contribute to the four at Kiu-kiang?

Your, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD CUNNINGHAM.

(From the "North China Daily News" of April 14, 1869.)

In view of the discussion which has been raised as to the respective merits of Hookow and Kiu-kiang, the following memorandum will be interesting.

Hookow, at the mouth of the Poyang Lake, is simply a military station, situated on some low hills, and has no trade of any kind; from it to the opposite shore is about half a mile, with a depth of seven fathoms in the middle, gradually shallowing towards the shore, with good holding ground of sandy clay. When the water is high there is little or no current in the lake, and vessel anchoring at Hookow would have to bring to in mid-channel, as with light variable winds they would swing in all directions. Could the weather be depended upon steamers could anchor about 200 yards outside the line of the rock upon which the temple stands, but it must be remembered that the north-easterly gales blow right in on Hookow, and that the only shelter is a small artificial harbour which the natives have constructed for their gun-boats—of course, utterly useless for foreign vessels. As the water of the Yang-tsze falls so a current becomes perceptible in the lake, which gradually increases to two or two and a-half knots.

In navigating the Poyang Lake it will be necessary to bear in mind the rise and fall of the Yang-tsze, and also the gradual rise of the bed of the lake. Between the Orphan and the Widow's Rock, not less than 9 feet of water are to be found; then we have a patch of 20 inches to 3 feet about 180 yards beyond the Widow's Rock, with the same depth at the mouth of the channel leading to Tu-chang, where it branches off from that to Wu-ching. After passing this patch the water again deepens until you reach the village of Chu-kee—here junks remain until the water rises, or their cargoes are taken out and sent overland to Wu-ching. Off You-chow there are 6 fathoms with a rise and fall of some 12 feet, the same rise and fall at the Pagoda below, and some 15 feet at the mouth of the river; this outlet is very narrow and the current runs about seven knots. At the Widow's Rock the rise and fall is about 30 feet. There is a strong under current at the mouth of the lake in summer, causing a great deal of chow-chow water in the river during the summer, and a shoal, which is gradually increasing, is in the course of the formation of the outlet of the lake.

To the Editor of the "Shanghae Recorder."

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, April* 14, 1869.

We take the liberty of informing Mr. Cunningham, in reply to the statement in his letter published in the North China "Daily News" of the 8th instant, that no attempt was made either in our letter, published in your issue of the 6th instant, or in that of Messrs R. Francis and Co., to which Mr. Cunningham alludes, to make good the cause of the Poyang Lake.

As, however, some interest seem to have been aroused in this matter of the Poyang Lake, we forward copy of the Memorial presented to Sir Rutherford Alcock on the 6th June, 1867, and copy of an extract of a further Memorial dated 2nd July, 1867, the latter signed by all the British mercantile residents then here. Both these Memorials were published at the time in the Shanghae papers, but, as there may be others besides Mr. Cunningham who would like to know what has been done in the cause of the Poyang Lake, we trust that you will be kind enough to publish these documents once more.

We would remark that, if the suggestion in the second Memorial be carried out, there is every reason to believe that the trade of Kiu-kiang would increase to a very great extent. It will be seen that it is proposed to open the Poyang Lake in the same way that the Yang-tsze was first opened, Kiu-kiang to become the port of entry and clearance for the lake, as Shanghae was for the river.

We again subscribe ourselves,

BRITISH MERCHANTS.

To his Excellency Sir Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and Chief Superintendent of Trade.

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, May* 1, 1867.

We, the undersigned merchants, agents, landrenters, and others interested in the Port of Kiu-kiaang, would beg to offer for the consideration of your Excellency the following facts relative to the expediency of opening up the Poyang Lake, in so far as granting permission to small tug-steamers to ply between this port and the principal places of trade on the lake as far up as Jaou-chow, distant 450 li, or say 150 miles, from Kiu-kiang. And we would point out to your Excellency the great advantages likely to arise from so doing, not only to Kiu-kiang as a port, but also to native and foreign trade generally.

Jaou-chow can be reached by water in two days from Moyune, and four to six days from Tien-kai. It is the point at which green teas from those districts are transferred to larger craft for the purpose of traversing the Poyang Lake. At present these boats often remain wind-bound for weeks, but with the aid of steam-tugs they could accomplish the passage within twenty-four to thirty hours. Growers and teamen would naturally prefer this speedy and safe route for bringing their produce to market rather than that viâ Hang-chow and Ningpo, which route, although occupying from twenty to thirty days, is availed of to a large extent at present, solely on account of its greater certainty. A further benefit to this important trade, arising from the employment of steamers, would be the perfect security in sending treasure into the interior; it is now carried overland by coolies, and takes from seven to ten days to reach its destination from Kiu-kiang, besides being subject to risk of attack by local robbers, which is by no means insignificant.

The districts now being referred to, viz., Tien-Kai and Moyune, take large quantities of foreign piece goods, which would go still more extensively into consumption were the communications made rapid and reliable, and thus the foreigner would be benefited by the expansion of trade in foreign manufactures, and the native by the greater economy in laying down goods in the interior.

Woo-ching is distant by water 180 li, or say 60 miles, from Kiu-kiang, and is the point at which black teas from the Ning-chow and Hookow districts are transhipped. It is also the centre of a large and important trade both native and foreign; the foregoing remarks, therefore, as to detention on account of contrary winds, and the benefits arising from the employment of steamers on the lake, apply equally, if not to a greater degree to this place.

We would now make a few remarks to your Excellency, relative to some of the objections that may possibly be urged in opposition to the proposed change.

1st. In regard to the "throwing out of employment of native junkmen, and injury to their trade." This is not at all likely to occur, as the shallowness of the greater portion of the lake, and the narrowness of its navigable channels will always prevent the employment of any but very small steamers, which, though adapted for the short trip between places on the lake and Kiu-kiang, could not be employed with profit in the general carrying trade, but could only be used for towing and possibly for conveying passengers and treasures to or from the particular places mentioned. Thus, in creating a larger trade and enabling the native craft to make more expeditious voyages, the result to the junkmen would be more frequent, certain, and profitable employment.

2ndly. With reference to "rowdyism and trouble likely to arise from the admission of foreigners into the interior." This is provided for by the system of Consular passports now existing, therefore no one need be permitted to take passage in a steamer without producing this document. Moreover there would be no object for any but known and responsible parties engaged in trade in visiting the interior, and further the great distance of Kiu-kiang frou the coast ports, and consequent absence of discharged seamen and deserters from the shipping is a still further guarantee against the abuse of the concession we now ask for.

In conclusion, the only people likely to suffer from the change we propose would be a few of the local mandarins, who might lose some of their illegal perquisites, against which we would place the more than corresponding benefit that would accrue to the Imperial Revenue. Under existing circumstances "transit duty passes" are a dead letter at this port, and of no avail whatever; the local authorities demand numerous small and vexatious taxes over and above those provided for by the Treaty, consequently foreigners are unable to trade with the interior, and the Imperial Government derives no advantage from the revenue it would otherwise collect.

With these remarks we leave the subject in the hands of your Excellency, feeling

confident that you will give us your invaluable support in endeavouring to develop the important and flourishing trade for which Kiu-kiang was once celebrated, and that we may derive the benefits arising from its situation as the Port of the Poyang Lake, which circumstance was, we believe, the cause of its original selection as a port suitable for British commerce and foreign trade generally.

We remain, &c.

(Signed) Jardine, Matheson, and Co.
Dent and Co.
Gibb, Livingston, and Co.
Rothwell, Love, and Co.
John Forster and Co.
David Sassoon, Sons, and Co.
Little and Co.
Birley, Worthington, and Co.
Gilman and Co.
W. R. Adamson and Co.
H. Marshall.
Coutts and Co.
For Reid and Co.,
F. H. Parker.
Thorne, Brothers, and Co.
Hogg, Brothers.
Alfred Wilkinson and Co.
Turner and Co.
Holliday, Wise, and Co.
Glover and Co.
E. D. Sassoon and Co.
Archd. Campbell and Co.
Smith, Kennedy, and Co.
Butterfield and Swire.
Gundry and Co.
For Chapman, King, and Co.
A. Michie.
Johnson and Co.
Blain, Tate, and Co.
Brand, Monro, and Co.
Bower, Hanbury, and Co.
For the Borneo Company, Limited,
William H. Dalgliesh.
R. Francis and Co.
F. H. P. Mackintosh.
John Harvey.
Robert Anderson.
J. K. Cunningham.
William Dealtry.
E. G. Hamilton.
W. Pugh.
Charlton C. Rainbow.
Tyndall Lethbridge.
Edw. W. Lovell.

Extract from Memorial, dated July 2, 1867.

We would, in the first place, allude to the memorial regarding the opening of the Poyang Lake to tug steamers, which was presented to your Excellency at this port on the 6th ultimo, and we would beg to draw your Excellency's attention to the importance which we attach to this matter.

In the memorial the privilege of employing tug steamers only is asked for, we would now respectfully suggest that this privilege be granted to steamers carrying cargo, and we would propose that this place be made the port of entry and clearance, and that all duties be payable here, so as to avoid the necessity of having Consular, Mercantile, and Customs establishments at the places on the Lake to which the steamers would resort. Should it be decided to restrict the employment of steamers to particular places on the Lake, we would name Jaou-chow and Woo-ching, as of primary importance, and Shwuy-hung, a point on the Lake where the river runs in from Hookow and other places, as of secondary importance.

These places would, we think, be easily reached by steamers of light draft, at all seasons of the year, and, so far as has been ascertained, the navigable channel of the Lake is seldom less than 300 to 400 yards in width, and 6 to 7 feet in depth, at the narrowest and shallowest places, when the water is at its lowest point, which is only for a short period during the winter.

Inclosure 9.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT of the Principal Imports into Kiu-kiang during the past Six Years.

Description.		1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.
Grey shirtings ..	Pieces ..	81,936	34,091	60,331	89,140	116,817	220,124
White ditto . ..	„ ..	10,867	5,947	6,729	5,922	5,257	6,209
T-cloths	„ ..	18,150	25,330	34,614	19,705	47,911	102,629
Chintz	„ ..	3,316	3,325	5,981	3,871	4,338	6,828
Handkerchiefs ..	Dozens ..	3,450	8,966	11,798	4,842	9,188	15,484
Velvets	Pieces ..	1,554	1,782	2,732	2,111	3,214	4,299
Velveteens	„ ..	1,412	1,572	1,110	1,188	1,237	948
Spanish stripes ..	„ ..	3,067	7,107	8,952	7,414	8,305	10,466
Habit, medium, and broad cloth	„ ..	196	561	831	1,132	1,107	1,505
English camlets ..	„ ..	1,387	2,696	3,737	5,711	7,323	10,338
Long ells	„ ..	9,390	17,160	16,544	16,013	17.642	20,980
Lastings	„ ..	698	1,391	2,075	2,477	1,515	2.082
Lustres	„ ..	820	2,590	6,230	4,620	3,731	7,803
Orleans	„ ..	190	700	960	2,176	560	600
Lead	Piculs ..	3,862	5,459	5,797	11,839	9,688	12,272
Tin	„ ..	778	2,082	2,568	2,882	2,470	4,601
Malwa opium ..	Chests ..	2,027	2,194	2,423	2,415	2,183	1,927
Brown sugar . ..	Piculs ..	17,833	24,673	38,217	41,533	30,552	37,405
White ditto . ..	„ ..	8,460	20,099	21,684	31,829	23,078	28,448
Black pepper ..	„ ..	6,352	3,261	6,686	8,222	8,025	8,603
Sandal wood . ..	„ ..	1,170	1.912	6,089	3,572	4,207	8,116
Sapan ditto . ..	„ ..	142	710	2,069	1,160	1,031	1,908
Sea weed	„ ..	20,779	26,377	33,563	34,049	31,830	38,009
Cuttle fish, &c. ..	„ ..	8,474	12,364	17,106	10,387	15,372	22,764
Cotton	„ ..	3,917	2	4,477	21,593	7,885	8,395
Copper cash . ..	„ ..	40,585	41,660	4,369	6,932	1 178	..
Drills, English ..	Pieces ..	..	..	100	732	2,935	6,106
„ Dutch ..	„ ..	..	..	..	510	3,630	3,944
„ American ..	„ ..	2,480	141	..	445	974	893
EXPORTS.							
Tea, black, green, leaf and dust . ..	Piculs ..	198,209	136,925	204,413	179,851	154,815	196,630
Paper	„ ..	121,815	71,362	42,884	54,818	27,181	54,004
Chinaware	„ ..	29,100	66,178	32,281	18,150	6,991	5,531
Tobacco, prepared ..	„ ..	1,713	1,698	1,120	47	55	52
„ leaf and stalks	„ ..	15,687	12,257	18,248	7,936	6,484	5,938
Hemp	„ ..	4,481	16,459	23,358	15,438	20,655	27,535
Vegetable tallow ..	„ ..	3,523	1,381	4,208	2,837	1,576	2,756
Grass cloth . ..	„ ..	1,316	2,449	2,419	3,177	1,751	1,916
Cotton	„ ..	..	1,490	..	..	..	..

COMPARATIVE EXPORT of Tea from Kiu-kiang, during the past Six Years.

	Old Season.	New Season.	Total from Jan. 1, to Dec. 31.
1863.			
	Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.
Black . ..	424,917	9,393,691	9,818,608
Green . ..	7,054,908	8,669,207	15,724,115
Leaf . ..	227,683	657,552	885,235
	7,707,508	18,720,450	26,427,958
1864.			
Black . ..	750,891	9,543,664	10,294,555
Green . ..	5,584,325	2,025,280	7,609,605
Leaf . ..	58,875	293,673	352,548
	6,394,091	11,862,617	18,256,708
1865.			
Black . ..	202,820	8,758,736	8,961,556
Green . ..	12,002,149	6,138,641	18,140,790
Leaf . ..	72	152,716	152,788
	12,205,041	15,050,093	27,255,134

	Old Season.	New Season.	Total from Jan. 1, to Dec. 31.
1866.			
	Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.
Black . ..	776,324	11,700,037	12,476,361
Green . ..	2,773 927	7,775,173	10,549,100
Leaf . ..	17,333	114 032	131,365
Dust . ..	23,867	799,466	823,333
	3,591,451	20,388,708	23,980,159
1867.			
Black . ..	222,164	10,993,526	11,215,690
Green . ..	1,517,981	7,789,052	9,307,833
Leaf . ..	..	117,875	117,875
Dust . ..	..	557	557
	1,740,145	18,901,810	20,641,955
1868.			
Black . ..	531,000	16,040,070	16,571,070
Green . ..	790,060	8,320,600	9,110,660
Leaf . ..	..	209,470	209,470
Dust . ..	..	326,130	326,130
	1,321,060	24,896,270	26,217,330



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Inclosure 10.

Sketch of the Poyang Lake Region.

Inclosure 11.

Consul Swinhoe to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, June* 14, 1869.

I BEG to offer a few remarks on the landing stations proposed on the Yang-tsze. My voyage in Her Majesty's ship "Salamis," in company with his Excellency Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, gave me an opportunity of making some inquiries as to the commercial advantages of most of the places suggested, and I have, since my return form Szechuen, been able to add to my former information. I will take the places in their order of position.

The first in order is Kiang-yin Hien (in Chang-chow Prefecture, Keang-soo Province), on the south bank 94 miles by river from Shanghae, and 60 miles from Chinkiang. The opening of this place, with the right of residence is very desirable. I have not visited this town, and have nothing to add to what I have already said with reference to it in my despatch of 3rd March, 1869.

The second is Sein-neu-miao, up a broad canal on the north bank, and about 14 miles from Chinkiang, with which it is connected by a canal on the opposite bank. It is a market-town (or Chinshe in Yang-chow Prefecture—Keangsoo Province), which grew to considerable importance during the occupation of Chinkiang by the rebels, and numbers of Chinkiang merchants established themselves there; but since order has been restored, the merchants have been deserting the town and returning to their former positions at Chinkiang, which is more conveniently situated for the flow of trade. At present its chief trade is in timber, which comes down the river and gets distributed at Sien-neu-miao. It was only mentioned in one of the first memorials, when it was less known than it is now.

The third and fourth are Tai-ping-foo and Woo-hoo-hien, in the Province of Anhwuy, both situated on the south bank; the first eighty miles, and the second ninety-five miles from Chinkiang. I accompanied the Admiral on a walk through the city of Woo-hoo and its suburbs on the 12th March. The city is placed about three miles from the Yang-tsze, on the bank of a small river, with very rapid current. Within its walls ruin and desolation met our eyes on nearly all sides. Few houses had been rebuilt, and few were building. But the three miles of bank on either side of the little river were lined with substantial hongs, mostly new. The river was swarming with boats of various sizes, and there was every appearance of great commercial activity. It promises to be a thriving place. It is under the jurisdiction of Tai-ping-foo and the chief Mandarins (Taoutae and Chintae), of that prefectural city, which is still an almost hopeless mass of ruins, with only a few hundred inhabitants, have deserted it and taken up their residence at Woo-hoo. The highway from Tai-ping-foo to the river lies through Woo-hoo. Tai-ping-foo never seems to have been a business place, even before it was pillaged by the rebels. I fear little advantage would be gained by making a landing station there. We were much beset by crowds in our ramble through Woo-hoo, and the Admiral was pressed for time, I therefore had little opportunity to converse with the better class of natives.

Ta-tung (a market town or chinshe, in Tsing-yang-hien of Che-chow-foo, Province Anhwuy) on the south bank, sixty-four miles from Woo-hoo, and Nganking-foo (the capital of Anhwuy) on the north bank, forty miles beyond Ta-tung, are the remaining two places of landing suggested by the Memorialists. The "Salamis" took the usual course, north of the island which shuts in Ta-tung, and we saw nothing of this proposed station. A European, said to be a tide-waiter, was standing at the point of the island, watching us with a glass as we passed. Nganking-foo we skirted close to. It is the capital of Anhwuy, and seems a large city, with a tolerably prosperous look; but there were few boats of any size about its banks, and few indications of trade.

A mercantile gentleman visited Woo-hoo and Ta-tung in January, and to him I am indebted for the following information:—

Woo-hoo is by far a more important port than Ta-tung, and is well adapted to become a commercial depôt of considerable importance. Its superiority, when compared with Ta-tung, is mainly owing to the excellence of its water communication with the interior, and its suitability to become a place of export for both green teas and silk. It also adjoins an extensive cotton-producing district, and its present trade is larger than

that of any other port on the river between Chinkiang and Kiu-kiang. A river with a depth of 5 to 6 feet of water in the winter, and 10 to 12 feet in the summer, connects Woo-hoo with the important City of Ning-kwo-foo, in southern Anhwuy, distant fifty miles. A branch of the same river runs inland over eighty miles, in a south-western direction, to Tai-ping-hien (of Tai-ping-foo), an extensive tea district. The Tai-ping tea districts are not situated in the vicinity of Tai-ping-foo, as the name would imply, but about ninety miles south-west of it, at Tai-ping-hien. They are much nearer to Ta-tung and Woo-hoo, being about fifty miles from the former, and eighty from the latter. This branch, which is only navigable in the summer, passes through Nan-ling-hien (of Ning-kwo-foo), where the cultivation of silk is carried on. The production of this article is not very large at present, owing to the devastations of the Tai-ping rebels; but it is steadily increasing every year, and is likely to become a trade of more importance before long. Boats carrying from 200 to 300 piculs of tea can come from Tai-ping-hien to Woo-hoo in the summer and autumn; but in the winter the creek is partially dry, and navigation of course rendered impossible. The silk districts of Nan-ling-hien are situated within fifty miles of Woo-hoo. Besides the watercourses leading to Ning-kwo-foo and Tai-ping-hien, there are two others eommunicating with Szan (a market town or chinshe in Kien-ping-hien of Kwang-tih-chow, Anhwuy Province) and Tung-po (also a chinshe in Kao-shun-hien of Kiang-ning-foo, Keangsoo Province). The Szan Canal is navigable for small boats in summer for nearly 100 miles, and passes through some silk-producing country; while that leading to Tung-po can be traversed by native craft of considerable size for about seventy miles. On the northern side of the Yang-tsze, a fine broad canal, navigable in summer for vessels drawing 10 to 12 feet of water, connects Woo-hoo with Sew-chow-foo (Anhwuy Province), the chief mercantile depôt for Central Anhwuy. In winter there is a minimum depth of 4 feet of water in this canal, and its average width is over 200 yards.

Tatung is situated partly on the mainland and partly on an island on the Yang-tsze. It comprises two straggling villages; that on the island being the chief centre of trade at present. The place looks poor, and with but few signs of the busy traffic that are apparent at Woo-hoo. It is one of the calling-stations for salt-junks passing up and down the river, and its trade would seem to depend very materially upon this circumstance. Hemp is extensively grown to the south-west of Tatung; rice and cotton are also produced in the neighbourhood, but not to so large an extent as at Woo-hoo. It has only one navigable creek leading inland to Southern Anhwuy, and that for merely a distance of twelve miles. Tatung is nearer the Tai-ping tea districts than Woo-hoo, but the advantages of direct water communication possessed by the latter makes it the natural port of exit for all the green teas of that part of Anhwuy. Goods forwarded from Tai-ping-Hien to Tatung have to be conveyed overland for a distance of about forty miles. Tatung is also connected by water with Sew-chow-foo on the north of the river, but the creek is said to be shallow and not much used.

I have ascertained from the same source a few instances of the barrier taxes on foreign goods sent inland from Woo-hoo and Tatung which may be worth inserting here. The facts were obtained from the native merchants at both places, and may be accepted as pretty accurate on the whole. Grey and white shirtings sent to Ning-kwo-foo from Woo-hoo, a distance of fifty miles, have to pay 60 cash, say 6 cents a piece lekim dues. Long-ells pay 400 cash a piece; Camlets 600 cash a piece; and broad cloth 1,000 cash a piece.

Cotton fabrics sent from Tatung to Sew-chow-foo have to pay, it is said, at three barriers a sum total of 240 cash a piece.

On goods of foreign manufacture sent from Woo-hoo, it is doubtful whether any impost at all is levied. Mr. Kingsmill, who visited Sew-chow-foo, states that there are no barrier charges levied on foreign goods between Woo-hoo and there.

On the opening of Woo-hoo as a landing-place opinions are unanimous, but there are some who think that the opening of Tatung and Nganking would be of no material benefit to foreign trade. Tatung is considered too near Woo-hoo, being only sixty-four miles distant; and if Woo-hoo is opened they believe Tatung will be quite unnecessary, and would not repay the expense; the steam interest would only benefit by it. Auking is also considered too near Kiu-kiang (distant eighty miles), and its trade not sufficiently promising to make it desirable to open it. Others, again, ask for as many centres of distribution as can be gained.

I inclose a sketch map, taken from Chinese sources, of the Yang-tsze from Chin-kiang to Kiu-kiang, showing the water communication with the interior by means of small rivers and canals. From this Woo-hoo and Tai-ping certainly appear to have the widest connection by water. Chinese do not often make use of land transit for the conveyance

of goods when water-ways are to be had: but many of these small streams are doubtless only available at certain seasons. The map corroborates the statements above offered in favour of Woo-hoo over Tatung, but these two places are some distance apart and in different Prefectures, and I do not see why both should not be opened. I think Tai-ping might be left out and the other three places, Woo-hoo, Tatung, and Anking, accepted as landing-places, with the right of residence. They are all three in the province of Anhwuy, in which there is at present no Consular port, and it might perhaps be considered necessary to raise one of them to that dignity. In such case I would recommend Woo-hoo, and suggest that the officer accredited be appointed Consul for Tai-ping-foo to reside at Woo-hoo, with control of subsidiary ports. The Taoutae resident at Woo-hoo is Intendent of Circuit for Anking-foo, Hwuy-chow-foo, Ning-kwo-foo, Che-chow-foo, Tai-ping-foo, and Kwangtih-chow.

But there appears to be no desire among the merchants that any of the proposed stations should be made more than landing-places, until actual experience proves their worth. For the control of these landing-places, I would submit that an officer of the rank of Vice-Consul, or at least bearing a commission, should be appointed to make the circuit of the three once a month or oftener, as occasion might require. He could reside at either Chin-kiang or Kiu-kiang, and might at first be placed under the orders of the Consul at the port, whom he would assist when his own duties did not require all his attention. He would at the established port, be accessible to all those that might seek his aid, and would save the expense of a residence and an establishment at a new place. A writer and a messenger might be allowed to accompany him on his circuit visits. At each of the three places he would need a small kung-kwan or office, which the mandarins might help him to rent at little expense, and he would require a servant at each place to look after the office. A writer and four servants would thus suffice for his staff, with perhaps the addition of a constable. A landing-place with no restriction on the right of settling, as at Treaty ports, might in time attract so many residents, that the constant presence of a Consular officer would perhaps be required. The place would then be fairly entitled to rank as a port. It it drew the trade away from an already established port, the fact itself would show that an error had been made in the choice of such port; and that port might in its turn be reduced to a landing-place.

The Customs, I presume, will station tidewaiters at each of the landing-places to take note of goods landed and shipped, and the duties will be paid through the office at Chin-kiang and Kiu-kiang. As neither of these places is in the Anhwuy province, it would perhaps be better if, by some special arrangement, they could pay at one of the three landing-places, as the mandarins will be ever-jealous if no part of such duties are allowed to pass through their hands. The Provinces of Anhwuy, Kiangse, and Kiangsoo, are all, however, under the same Viceroy.

While on the subject of Customs, it is as well to draw your Excellency's attention to the high rates chargeable, according to Treaty tariff on Chinese produce intended for consumption in China, as compared with the rates that rule in the native tariff. If a reduction in these could be effected, it would greatly add to the freight of the river steamers in short trips. This subject, I am told, is already under your consideration.

After mature deliberation, I cannot but agree with those who think that the more points of communication we have with the interior the better, and I trust that your Excellency will see fit to recommend the opening of the proposed three landing-places as an experiment worth trying.

I have already spoken of the desirability of opening Keang-yin-hien as a landing-place, between Chin-kiang and Shanghae. It is in the same province as Shanghae, and might be periodically visited by an officer from the Shanghae Consulate; though it more properly belongs to the Chin-kiang jurisdiction, as the Taoutae of the Chin-kiang Prefecture controls also the Chang-chow Prefecture, in which the district of Kiang-yin lies.

Your, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT SWINHOE.

P.S.—I inclose some cuttings from the local newspapers on the trading marts of the River Yang-tsze.

R. S.

Inclosure 12.

Extracts from Local Newspapers respecting the Trading Marts of Lower Yang-tsze.

(*From the "Shanghae Recorder" of February* 5, 1869.)

WE have been taught to believe that the extension of foreign trade was injurious to large sections of the population, and that, in pressing for its further expansion, we were likely to find arrayed against us the great mass of the people. It will probably not be believed, after all that we have heard on the subject, that in many places, at least along the banks of the Yang-tsze, the people themselves are not only friendly disposed towards a further opening of the country, but that the native merchants and people of influence have actually petitioned their authorities to pray for such an event.

Such an announcement reads strange alongside the picture drawn by Tseng Kwo-fan, of the people of the valley of the Yang-tsze, suffering in silence the evils incident on the introduction of steamers on the river. Yet, we know for a fact, that at least in one of the spots marked out as likely to be opened for foreign trade, such a course has been adopted. The reasons are self-evident, recommending themselves as much to a practical Chinaman as they do to a Western political economist.

The district round Tatung is fertile, and is comparatively thinly populated: it produces, we learn, in abundance, rice, beans, and peas, as well as large quantities of hemp. Our informant, a native merchant of the place, said it could export them to the value of 3,000,000 taels annually. It receives as imports a large quantity of Straits' sugar, raw cotton, and a certain amount of foreign piece-goods, also iron in considerable quantities from Hunan. The import of grey shirtings is said to average about 100,000 taels to 200,000 taels in value per annum, camlets of coarse qualities, and serges, are also imported in considerable quantities. In addition, the place is situated close to the green tea district of Anhwei, Tai-ping-hien being distant about 180 li, and teas being grown at various intermediate places. With these it has not, however, direct water communication, its river being small and rapid. Were inducements offered, there would be no objection to the teas being brought down in considerable quantities; as it is, during the season, some 50 to 100 piculs are said to come down daily.

From these particulars it will be readily seen, that although the trade is not of the first magnitude, it is sufficiently so to enable the native merchants to judge of the feasibility of opening the port. They desire to be enabled to carry their surplus produce quickly and cheaply to market; at present they say that, notwithstanding the ability of the country to produce large supplies, they are shut out from the markets of Shanghae and Ningpo, unless prices in those places become excessive. In imports again, they complain of the delays and expenses, 6⅓ catty shirtings, selling in Shanghae at 1·90 taels to 2·00 taels, in Tatung could not be sold under 2·20 taels to 2·30 taels. They came up under transit passes, and were freely sold in the town; but as soon as they attempted to enter the country round, they were subjected to almost prohibitory rates.

Between Tatung and Lu-chow-fu, for instance, were said to be three barrier stations, at each of them a duty of 80 cash per piece was levied; in addition to carriage, each piece had to pay for traversing about 250 miles an additional rate of about 8 per cent. on its cost at Shanghae.

Such an instance shows clearly the impossibility of commuting inland dues by payments to the Imperial Exchequer. The fact is, we must in this matter come to an understanding that these levies are to be considered provincial. It is difficult to understand what claim the Central Government has on them; it bears none of the expenses of Provincial Government; the cost of both military and police, such as they are, have to be met within the several provinces. Unfortunately, Chinese statesmen have hit on the burdensome device for raising revenue by taxing the chief source of wealth. To this, within reasonable limits, we must at present submit; it behoves us, however, to see that levies on our own trade be not diverted from their legitimate end, nor be of such an excessive amount as to be practically prohibitive.

(*From the "Shanghae Recorder" of February* 22, 1869.)

First in importance of all the trading towns of the Lower Yang-tsze, is doubtless that of Wuhu-hien. Situated at the mouth of the Tsing-shui-ho, which in its turn communicates with the Shui-yang-ho, and leads into the rich tea districts of Ning-kwoh and Tai-ping, and has ready access by a well-travelled road from Hwei-chow-foo itself

The reason of this pre-eminence can easily be divined. In addition, however, to its magnificent water communications south of the Yang-tsze, it lies nearly opposite the mouth of the T'sau-ho, a river navigable for small steamers for upwards of 100 miles to the northward to the city of Lu-chow-foo, and also to the trading station of San-ho, some 30 miles to the westward of that city.

A visit to the suburbs of Wuhu discloses a scene of prosperity rarely met with now in China. There is of course the usual assemblage of wattled huts, of ruins, and of Taiping entrenchments; but mingled with these, fine wholesale establishments where goods of all kinds and of all nations may be purchased at a moment's notice. On first entering a shop, a crowd of sleek-faced Chinese standing behind a counter, ready to serve the first purchaser to any of the numberless articles which crowd the well-filled shelves, makes an impression of comfort rare in this country. Behind, after passing one or two halls, is the wholesale department, where the master or his deputy waits the orders of his larger customers. Into one of these establishments we entered, and were courteously invited to take our place in the inner room. Here we found shirtings of all brands and all descriptions, velvets, broad cloths, camlets, lustres, chintzes, and the other goods which form the staple of our imports into China.

On all subjects our host was communicative. His goods were mostly bought at Shanghae, and came up under transit pass by way of Chin-kiang or by Soo-chow and Tungpa. So far all was proper, he had to pay no extra squeezes. His selling price for 6½ catty grey shirtings of the best chops was, at the end of January, 2·30 taels; fine long ells, 6·70; scarlet camlets, 13·40, &c.: from all which it can be seen that trade was being carried on at a good profit. The teas which are raised in the Taiping and Ningkwoh districts at present find it easier to go to Shanghae by way of Hwei-chow or Tungpa, than by Wuhu; they are all sent down on native account. Should, however, steamers call at Wuhu, he felt certain, and in this we found his ideas corroborated by a large native tea dealer, that Wuhu would be used by the Chinese in preference. He thought such a change would be for the advantage of the port. As for his own piece goods, it did not matter much, as he worked at a good profit; if steamers called, they should be certainly sold cheaper. During the summer season there was no reason why steamers of small draught should not go up to Ningkwoh, or perhaps further; there being at that time of year at least 8 feet of water all the way. In winter there was about 4 feet.

He had stated that goods sent to Wuhu under transit certificates were charged no extra duty. This rule, however, did not apply in case he wished to send the goods further. Between Wuhu and Ningkwoh, a distance of from 50 to 60 miles, were two Customs barriers, at each of which duties were levied. These on foreign goods were as below at each barrier:—

		Cash.
Grey shirting, per piece	.. ..	60
Long ells	„	400
Camlets	„	600
Broad Cloths	„	1,000
Velvets	„	400

Such were the principal heads of information obtained from the Chief of an important Chinese hong at Wuhu; they serve to illustrate the quiet but effective manner in which the Chinese suit themselves to circumstances. Reserving further comment for a future occasion, we shall only draw attention to the ingenious manner in which the squeezes are now levied. Recent events having now apparently convinced the Chinese authorities of the hopelessness of attempting to tax goods *en route* for which transit certificates have been taken out, they have adopted a cumulative charge, to take effect from the place named in the certificate. Although 60 cash, amounting to about 2 per cent. on its present value, seems a slight revenue tax on the price of grey shirtings, yet when we find that this tax is repeated at every forty or fifty miles, we can readily understand how powerful is the machinery put in motion to stop all business whatever with distant localities.

(*From the "Shanghae Recorder" of February* 25, 1869.)

Some hundred miles to the north-west of Wuhu, on a river which, after flowing through the Tsau-hu, falls into the Yang-tsze opposite Point Morton, is situated the city of Luchow-foo, probably the most important town in Central Anhwei. The Tsau-hu itself may be said to be within the valley of the Yang-tsze, but at a little distance from its northern extremity the raised table land of Anhwei commences. We have at once passed into a new country; instead of low alluvial grounds, we now arrive at a rolling

plain with rapid and shallow water-courses flowing in well marked valleys. In fact, the general aspect of the country is not unlike the central counties of England, save that not a tree is to be seen; and instead of the land being richly cultivated and supporting a prosperous population, nothing save a few half-cultivated fields, yielding wretched crops of rice or wheat, and interspersed with mud huts of a most meagre description, enlivens the dreary landscape. Coarse grasses, used by the natives in the absence of better fuel, cover the greater portion of the soil, which in winter, withering to the roots, add a dreary dun colour to the monotony of the scene. One hill, some five miles from the city, forms a conspicuous object; but as far as the eye can reach—north, east, or west—no other rising ground breaks the horizon.

Whatever may be the origin of the Chinese race, there is little doubt that they are indebted for their agriculture to a southern source. The persistency with which they endeavour to cultivate their favourite cereal, rice, in situations and climates eminently unsuited to its profitable growth, and the equally persistent objection taken to the use of wholesome animal food, seems to be sufficient proof of this. Nowhere in China, probably, are the modes of living of the inhabitants, and the staple crops, so utterly unsuited to the circumstances of the soil and climate as in Northern Anhwei. The plains, rolling in gentle undulations, and forming shallow valleys well watered by running streams, are eminently suited for the habitation of a pastoral people: green crops, cotton, and the usual European grain crops, would grow admirably in the light soil of the slopes, which here, terraced at great cost, and irrigated by the manual labour of peasants sunk to the lowest degree of penury, yield a scanty harvest of rice of such inferior quality as to be actually unsaleable in more favoured localities. The inhabitants have made the fatal mistake of depending on a single precarious crop, and have suffered mentally and bodily, and have earned in consequence amongst the other Chinese the name of being thriftless and careless. Exporting nothing, and depending, on the contrary, on other localities for their supplies of everything but what is necessary for bare sustenance, it need scarcely be wondered at that foreign goods were in slight demand. Here, indeed, were no barrier squeezes; formerly foreign goods were taxed, but latterly this has been discontinued, possibly on account of the settlement of the Weikwan affair, or possibly because the dues were not worth the collection. A few grey and white shirtings, and tea-cloths were ordinarily met with in the market; sometimes a few pieces of camlets or coarse serges. Grey shirtings sold at 3 Spanish dollars the piece; tea-cloths at 2·70 Spanish dollars. Perhaps 1,000 taels' worth might be got rid of without affecting the market, but more than that would certainly cause a decline in prices. As in the old days Spanish dollars were still the currency of the country, Mexicans could only be got rid of at a heavy discount. Opium sold at 8 dollars per 18 taels weight; sugar at 10 dollars per picul. At Luchow-foo navigation ceased; northward, eastward, and westward only, land carriage was available; the roads, it is needless to add, are of the worst description; the coolies and beasts of burden ill fed and weakly.

This is not a flattering description of the interior of one of the best provinces in China, yet its truth can be vouched for. Compared with that portion of Anhwei lying south of the Yang-tsze, the contrast is strange. Southern Anhwei, intersected by barren mountains, produces tea eagerly bought up by foreigners; the northern part of the province, forming a fertile plain, has nothing to offer at present to the foreign market; one is rich comparatively, the other poor in the last degree; with one we can drive a considerable trade, a thousand taels worth of our goods affects the market in the other. Who but a Chinese statesman could fail to see what causes have been in operation to produce so marked a difference?

(*From the "Supreme Court and Consular Gazette" of February* 27, 1868.)

WE are perhaps too much disposed to ridicule what the Chinese nation has done in advancing the country since its first great Emperors commenced the work of restraining the Yellow River. We have on a late occasion pointed out the great works of which Shantung, Honan, and Pechili are the seats. It will not now be out of place to come near home and look at the engineering works in the valley of the Yang-tsze itself. The chief positions of these remarkable works are in the upper province of Kiangsu and in Anhwei, in both of which millions of acres of fertile land lying many feet below the level of high-water in the river have been reclaimed and made to yield considerable crops. Probably the north bank of the river opposite the important town of Wuhu is the most extensive of these reclaimed districts. Here for twenty miles, in a line as straight as an arrow, an artificial river, carrying into the great river the drainage of the great Tsau

Lake, and with it a large portion of Northern Anhwei, has been made to flow between a series of lofty embankments. The rise between high and low-water level at Wuhu probably exceeds 16 feet, and this great rise occurring every year, and lasting for from three to five months has for centuries been borne by these embankments. When we consider the wilful nature of the Yang-tsze, and the changes which, within the few years it has been opened to foreign commerce, have been noticed, we cannot but admire the skill which planned, and the perseverance which executed these enormous works.

The Tsau-ho, the river of which we spoke, is not an insignificant stream: from the lake which forms its reservoir, and which is nearly as large as the Taihu, it has a course of some fifty miles before entering the artificial channel which finally conducts its water to the Yang-tsze; at its narrowest part it is some eighty yards wide, and where bound between narrow banks, has a depth even in winter of from 10 to 12 feet. In portions it widens out to a width of more than double, with a minimum depth of about 4 feet. It is not a sluggish river either: at its exit the current probably at low water flows at the rate of four knots an hour; in its upper reaches probably at about two and a-half to three.

Notwithstanding these obstacles the work of reclamation has been carried out, while by means of sub-canals the whole of the sunk country has been rendered more or less accessible. At other portions of the river the works are scarcely less remarkable, and the result is that that the valley of the Yang-tsze, from being a deserted waste, has been turned into a comparatively fertile region. One thing, however, strikes forcibly the traveller through these districts; the works are the works of a past generation, and not of the Chinese of the present day. Perched in his miserable hut of reeds, on some wider portion of the embankments, the peasant of to-day has scarcely the spirit left to keep the works of a former generation in repair. Where an effectual breach has occurred, the task of repair is at once given up as hopeless, and a district, once producing food for thousands of mouths, is given up to the growth of the gigantic reed of the Yang-tsze. Nor even in the districts where the dykes are still intact is the cultivation such as it might be made. Admirably suited for the growth of rice, the crops are small, and the grain defective, while other crops which might readily be raised are neglected by the listless cultivator. The fact is that engineering science has done much for China, but it has not done enough to raise her to the first rank among nations. Although it has with enormous labour embanked these extensive districts, it has afforded no proper means of drainage. Unless the fens are tenanted by a population so large as only to find miserable support from the produce of the soil, they cannot be kept free of water. The same mistake has been made here as throughout the rest of China; manual labour has been substituted for that of the lower animals, and this while millions of acres admirably suited for raising stock lie waste within a few miles. Man has in consequence degenerated towards the level of the beasts he has supplanted. So imperfect is the system of tillage that, after paying the expenses of working it just contrives to keep alive the hands actually engaged in agricultural operations. This seems a hopeless result from works undertaken at great cost and labour for the benefit of succeeding ages; yet, such as it is it is the actual fact. We have seen hundreds of men, women, and children engaged at the primitive chain pumps, used by the Chinese to drain their low lands or raise water for irrigation; yet the labour of a few beasts would have allowed this mass of human energy to be devoted to more useful and more civilizing pursuits: better still, a 10-horse power steam-engine would have readily done the work which consumed the powers mental and bodily of the inhabitants of a large district. The uplands might support herds of sheep and cattle, the low lands not only feed their inhabitants, but leave a margin for export. A population continually increasing in wealth and in the pleasures of civilized life, might readily take the place of the present semi-brutalized peasantry. We are aware that in stating these views we are going contrary to Chinese tradition, nay, even to the precepts of her great sages; but China, we believe, must go back even before the times of Confucius to find a wholesome system in existence. Already in the days of the great teacher wrong principles had taken deep root; their result in the present day is that China has become a bye-word amongst the nations.

CHINA. No. 2 (1870).

Reports by Consul Swinhoe of his Special Mission up the River Yang-tsze-kiang, &c.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1870.

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REPORTS

ON

CONSULAR ESTABLISHMENTS

IN

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BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

Reports on Consular Establishments in China.

No. 1.

Memorandum explanatory of the Reports of Her Majesty's Minister and Consuls in China on the British Trade and Consular Expenditure in that Country.

Foreign Office, February 17, 1870.

THE despatch from Sir R. Alcock, which forms the first of the series of papers, contains a review of the extent and value of the British trade with China, showing that of the total foreign trade with China, of 42,070,788*l.*, 36,949,604*l.* was in British goods, while of the total foreign shipping employed more than half was under the British flag, 7,165 vessels with a tonnage of 3,332,092 tons out of a total of 13,504 vessels with a tonnage of 6,385,771.

The steady increase of British trade with China is further illustrated by the Returns of the Imperial Maritime Customs, which were reprinted in this country and presented to Parliament last year,* from which it will be seen that the import of grey shirtings and T-cloths (articles of purely British manufacture) had risen respectively from 2,398,410 pieces and 730,604 pieces in 1867, to 4,768,151 pieces and 2,049,521 pieces in 1868.

That this is not an exceptional increase is apparent from the fact, that at the port of Shanghae, the import of grey shirtings and T-cloths in the first six months of 1869 amounted, respectively, to 2,933,341 pieces and 1,413,758 pieces, as against 2,070,782 pieces and 588,825 in the first six months of 1868, the imports in the first six months of 1867 being 1,231,710 pieces and 316,211 pieces, and, for the same period in 1866 890,366 pieces and 48,976 pieces.

Sir R. Alcock was especially instructed to report upon the supposed tendency of foreign trade to pass into Chinese hands, and the manner in which such a change in the direction of trade would influence the relations between British and Chinese subjects, so as to admit of the withdrawal, wholly, or in part, of Consular protection at the Treaty ports.

Sir R. Alcock states his opinion that more weight has been given to the assertion that the trade is passing into Chinese hands than a full examination of the facts would justify, and that there are contrary tendencies at work. For instance, a direct trade in imports has sprung up within the last three years at Che-foo, Tien-tsin, and New-chwang, "which is rapidly increasing, and promises not only to assume larger proportions, and be permanent, but also to establish in the hands of foreigners a trade which, as indirect, in the year 1866 was perceptibly passing into the hands of Chinese."

Sir R. Alcock adds that, "assuming, however, that the preponderating influence tends to restrict or diminish the number of British residents at the secondary ports, it cannot be rightly argued that the necessity for any Consular establishment is by so much diminished; first, because, whether many or few, there must be some Consular authority to protect and control; and, secondly, because the number of British ships and sailors brought to the port increases in a much larger proportion than the residents diminish, and these require much more looking after, and give a great deal more work, than the merchants located at the port."

Consul Medhurst, whose long experience of China enables him to speak with authority on this subject, while his position in the service precludes his being unconsciously influenced

* Parliamentary Paper, China, No. 11, 1869.

by personal reasons in favour of the maintenance of a large Consular establishment, expresses himself still more forcibly :—

"First, as regards direct trade. The Chinese take no share in importing manufactures and other merchandize from Great Britain, nor are they likely to do so until they establish native agencies at home,—a very remote contingency indeed. . . . Second, coast-trade. In this branch . . . the Chinese are daily taking an increasing share. . . . Nor is it a matter, I conceive, to be at all deprecated; for, after all, the merchandize which is thereby distributed is principally British, and an increased development of the general trade is the result. It must not be lost sight of, however, that, apart from British influence, association, and protection, and those of other nations in a minor degree, such a trade could not for a moment exist."

These views are corroborated in a remarkable degree by the memoranda furnished to Mr. Medhurst by two of the merchants at Shanghae.

These memoranda, which no doubt faithfully represent the views of the British mercantile community in China, agree that the entire direct import of British manufactures is in the hands of foreigners, principally Englishmen, as well as the direct export trade. "On the question of this trade passing into the hands of the Chinese there can be but one opinion,—such is not the case; and that the Chinese do participate in it at all is solely due to the facilities afforded to them by foreigners, without whom they could do absolutely nothing."

Both the writers point out that the indirect or distributing trade in which the Chinese have appropriated the local business is nevertheless carried on in foreign bottoms, and is dependent on foreign protection.

"Foreign protection to trade at all the open ports is and must remain the condition of its satisfactory continuance. So far as the main articles of trade are concerned, everything is carried on under a foreign flag."

The reports from the other Consulates are in the same strain.

Consul Robertson, whose knowledge of China is probably unrivalled, states that :—

"The old junk trade is entirely annihilated, and Chinese goods and passengers proceed by foreign steamers or sailing-vessels only. . . . .

"The tendency is to employ foreign steamers and vessels, and whether their cargoes are British owned or not is of no consequence, for until they are discharged they are under British protection. Indeed, the probability is, goods will always arrive consigned to some foreign firm, who will take delivery, and subsequently hand them over to the real owners, the Chinese; and, on the contrary, I am inclined to think a change in the destination of trade, if change of hands may be so termed, is likely to originate more causes for Consular interference from questions of ownership and contracts, and the many causes of dispute which arise, than exist when it is solely in foreign hands; and the more it increases the greater will be the employment of our ships, both with steamers and sailing-vessels."

It is unnecessary to give further extracts from these reports, but the opinion expressed by Mr. Acting Consul King as to the importance of retaining a Consul at New-chwang, with a view to the prospective advantages to be derived from the more general opening of Manchouria to foreign commerce and industry, and also to the Report from Consul Markham of the gradual growth of a direct trade with Great Britain at Che-foo deserve attention.

On a review of the independent statements thus received from various parts of China, it is shown :—

1. That the direct import trade, as well as the export trade,* in articles of European consumption remains, and is likely to continue to remain, in foreign hands.

2. That should the indirect or distributing trade be undertaken entirely by Chinese instead of by foreign Commission Agents, as seems probable, except perhaps as regards opium,† the result may be expected to be beneficial to British trade and shipping, as it will be followed by an increased demand for foreign goods and by the extended employment of foreign vessels.

3. That this indirect or distributing trade, on which the general trade depends, has been created and is maintained by the opening to foreign commerce of the several provincial districts of China by means of the Consular Treaty ports as ports of entry.

4. That, as in the present condition of the country, the distributing trade can only be effectually carried on in foreign vessels, Consular establishments will continue to be

* Of 1,540,988 piculs of tea exported in 1868, 1,012,493 piculs were shipped direct to Great Britain, and the remainder principally to British ports. (See Parliamentary Paper, China, No. 11, 1869.) The picul equals 133⅓ lbs.

† See Reports from Canton, Amoy, Ningpo, and Foo-chow-foo.

required as heretofore at the subsidiary as well as at the primary ports for their supervision and control.

5. That the withdrawal of a Consulate from a provincial district is equivalent to the abandonment of the present and prospective trade of the district, with a proportionate diminution in the general import and export trade and loss to British manufacturers, merchants, ship-owners, ship-builders, and seamen.

Should the Treaty Revision Convention be ratified, and Europeans be admitted to travel and rent store-houses in the interior of the country for trading purposes, efficient Consular establishments will be more than ever required to insure the new tariff and transit regulations being faithfully executed by the Chinese authorities, as well as to maintain the peace, order, and good government of Her Majesty's subjects, to which Great Britain is equally pledged.

These considerations do not apply to the islands off the China coast, where the Chinese rule is scarcely established on a firm footing among an alien race, where the constant danger of collision with the people renders foreign trade precarious and uncertain, where the demand for articles of foreign produce is limited to the villages on the seaboard with little promise of any material increase, and where the exports are not of sufficient value to British commerce to entitle the trade to special encouragement or protection on their account.

The right of access to the Island of Hainan, though conceded by the Treaty of Tientsin, and at one time reported to be of value, has never been claimed, and is resigned by the recent Convention.

Sir R. Alcock has now advised the withdrawal, on grounds both of policy and economy, of the Consular establishments in the Northern Island of Formosa, and, as a necessary consequence, its exclusion from British commerce.

The maintenance of the Consulate at Taiwan and Vice-Consulate at Tamsuy has not been attended with commercial or political advantages commensurate either with the expense attendant on it, or with the difficulty experienced in the protection of the trade with the island in the face of the open hostility of the population.

The Consular establishments could not, however, be withdrawn without giving at least six months' notice to British subjects engaged in the trade of the island, which, although of trifling national value, could not be relinquished precipitately without inflicting serious injury on individuals. Moreover, it is advisable to make an effort to induce the Chinese Government to exchange the Treaty ports of Formosa for the port of I-chang in the Upper Yang-tsze, which would open to British trade a vast area, to which at present, while the employment of steamers is prohibited, it cannot hope to penetrate.

It may also be found necessary to retain a Consular officer at Kelung, where the coal mines are to be worked under the Treaty Revision Convention.

The establishments in Formosa when suppressed will, however, supply establishments required for the new Treaty ports of Wen-chow and Wuhu, under the new Convention.

The former is described by Sir R. Alcock as affording a ready exist for a sort of tea that reaches Foo-chow-foo after a long, difficult, and expensive transit, and as the port of a comparatively populous and wealthy country which promises to take many foreign commodities. It will also be of material service to British commerce as a port in the line of communication between Foo-chow-foo, Ningpo, and Shanghae.

Wuhu is situated on the Yang-tsze, in the vicinity of Chin-kiang, with which it may be found practicable to combine it in a joint Consular establishment. Its opening to commerce is stated by Sir R. Alcock to be of "immense importance, if only for the reason that it makes the Province of Anhui a Treaty-port Province, and thus opens that province for the circulation of British manufactures, in accordance with the freedom and easy terms assented to" in the Convention.

The question remains whether the Consular establishments on the mainland of China being necessary for the preservation of political and commercial interests, the staff of officers employed in them is in excess of the demands of the service.

A complete answer to this appears to be furnished by the statement, that of the limited numbers employed in these services, seventeen were absent from China, five from Japan, and two from Siam, all but two on sick leave, and in nearly every instance after an uninterrupted residence of several years in these tropical climates.

So far from the numbers of the Consular Service in China being excessive, they have been found during the past year to be insufficient, and recourse has been obliged to be had to the employment of temporary clerks, a practice objectionable for many reasons, at Amoy, Kiu-kiang, Ningpo, and Shanghae.

An addition to the permanent establishments may be avoided, at least for the present

by some of the Student Interpreters, who will have completed their two years' course of study at Peking in the spring, becoming available for duty at the ports; but the numbers of the Consular Staff, even when thus recruited from the ranks of the Student Interpreters, will be barely sufficient to meet the requirements of the service, when allowance is made for the constant absence of a large proportion on account of illness engendered by the climate.

The result, both as regards efficiency and economy, of the system commenced in 1854, for training the junior officers as Student Interpreters, so as to give them an accurate knowledge of the language of the country before admitting them to the higher posts in the profession, has been highly satisfactory.

Were it not that the Assistants, who act as Clerks in the Consulates, are also, as a general rule, capable, when called upon, of discharging the duties of Interpreters, a much larger staff than is at present employed would inevitably be required; while the political advantages can scarcely be overrated of the Consuls and other officers in the Service being able to communicate directly with the Chinese authorities and people, instead of having perpetual recourse to the intervention of special interpreters and English-speaking Chinese.

Such a command of the language, moreover, enables them to travel freely through the interior,* and to procure reliable information as to the commercial needs and resources of many localities, which it would otherwise be both dangerous and useless to visit.

No. 2.

Sir R. Alcock to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October 29, 1869.*

I REGRET so much delay has taken place in answering your Lordship's despatch of the 5th of May last. It was impossible, however, to supply all the returns and information required without reference to the several ports; and the necessity of waiting until the Consuls could collect all the data has occasioned still greater loss of time. Nor are the returns even yet quite complete, no answer having been received from the ports in Formosa. These, however, are comparatively unimportant, and I am unwilling to incur any further delay by waiting for them.

The revision of our Consular establishment in China after a searching inquiry into the expenditure on account of the several Consulates is the principal object of your Lordship's despatch. But the necessary connection of this subject with the extent of British trading and shipping interests at the different ports, to which my attention is drawn in several paragraphs, suggests the expediency of first determining, with such degree of accuracy as may be attainable, the actual amount of those interests, as a basis of any judgment in reference to the protection required, and the Consular establishments necessary to meet the requirements, with an equal regard to efficiency and economy.

I propose, therefore, in this despatch to limit myself to such data as bear directly on the first of these points—the nature, extent, and value of British trading and shipping interests in China.

A doubt has been suggested whether the aggregate amount at all the ports as stated in the annual Customs returns gives a correct notion of the value of the trade. Whether in fact the trade has not been estimated as if it were entirely a direct trade, and the ports all primary ports of entry, whereas a large proportion of it, especially at the smaller ports, consists of re-exports of the larger ports, and therefore, as regards the former class of ports it is merely a secondary trade.

The doubt is well founded, as was shown in my despatch of the 3rd of June last, in which I sought to correct the erroneous impression those annual returns were calculated to give, and to which I had, myself, inadvertently contributed by quoting them.

It has not been without great difficulty, however, owing to the manner in which all the Custom-house returns are made up, that I have been able to separate the direct from the re-export, or coasting trade, and arrive at the facts giving at least an approximate estimate of the actual value of each separately. It has been still more difficult, and in

* See the Reports, presented to Parliament in 1869, of the Journeys in China and Japan of Messrs. Alabaster, Oxenham, Markham, and Dr. Willis. Also Mr. Swinhoe's Report of his Journey up the Yang-tsze.

some cases impossible to separate the direct from the secondary trade at each individual port.

The inclosed returns, however, have been compiled with the greatest care by Mr. McKean, under my direction, from various sources, checked and controlled by the totals of the Tables published by the Imperial Maritime Customs, transmitted in my despatch of April last, and forming No. 11 of the Parliamentary Papers of 1869 on China, and I believe they are sufficiently accurate to answer all practical purposes.

Return No. 1 shows the value of the total British import and export trade with China, in which the amount contributed to swell this sum, by Great Britain and each of her dependencies, is separately set forth, and also the sum total of the import and of the export trade of all other countries which have commerce with China. This is an exact return, care being taken that there is no double reckoning of any one production. But it is to be remarked as regards Hong Kong, the trade of which is assumed to be British, that all nations are concerned in it, and there are no statistics accessible by which the relative proportions of each country's trade can be judged. We know, however, that of a total import trade into China, of seventy-one parts, twenty-six parts are an opium trade, which is a product of India; twenty-two parts are a trade in cotton goods, almost exclusively derived from Great Britain; six parts are a trade in woollens, a British production, leaving seventeen parts only unaccounted for as the residium to make up the total import trade of Great Britain and other countries combined—or less than one-fourth. Even of this one-fourth some portion is certainly British, in the metals and other merchandize. It is fair, therefore, to assume that the trade of Hong Kong is, excepting a very small proportion, a British trade exclusively.

Return No. 1 is valuable as showing the proportion which British import and export trade bears to that of all other countries, and in the case of imports this proportion is as 12 to 1, and in the case of exports as 4 to 1.

Return No. 2 shows the total foreign direct import and export trade with China, the object being to point out the ports of entry and departure. Remembering that from Return No. 1 it has been ascertained that British imports are the twelve-thirteenths of all imports, and British exports are the four-fifths of all exports, it is easy to ascertain the exact value of each port's direct trade with Great Britain and her dependencies. The direct trade of Che-foo, Tien-tsin, and Newchwang is with Hong Kong and England almost exclusively. It is right also to state that a direct trade in imports between these three ports and England has sprung up within the last three years, which is rapidly increasing and promises not only to assume larger proportions and be permanent, but also to establish in the hands of foreigners a trade which, as indirect, in the year 1866 was perceptibly passing into the hands of Chinese.

Return No. 3 shows the importance of each port as, so to speak, the commercial capital of a consuming or a producing district; and care has been taken that in the value set down against the import trade of each port, there has been no reckoning of re-exports, and that the sum set down faithfully represents the actual value of the foreign goods consumed in each district, of which it is to be borne in mind that twelve parts out of thirteen are British. In the indirect distribution of foreign goods, chiefly carried on in steamers, all nationalities are engaged, but chiefly Americans and British; and the goods are no longer distinguished as British and those of other nationalities. There are therefore no exact statistics for ascertaining in ports of indirect shipments what proportion of the goods are British and what proportion those of other nationalities.

Return No. 4 is an attempt to ascertain the value of carrying trade of all nations between the ports of direct and indirect shipments, and of the distribution of Chinese produce for Chinese consumption. The value of the foreign produce indirectly distributed is ascertainable, and also the value of the Chinese produce carried from port to port in foreign ships for Chinese consumption; but the value of the goods gathered from the out-ports to the ports of direct exportation is not ascertainable, though important and valuable, and in so far Return No. 4 is incorrect in the omission of this item. It is probably worth about 10,000,000*l.*, which is the value of its counterpart trade in imports.

Return No. 5 shows the total British and Foreign shipping and its tonnage in Chinese waters, engaged in trade during the year 1868.

Return No 6 is an abstract of the returns made by the several Consulates of the British and foreign vessels which entered and cleared at the several ports in China during the year 1868. It is valuable only as showing the importance of each port as a resort of shipping.

The same steamers being returned many times in the same year as entering and

clearing, the actual number of vessels employed in the whole trade direct and indirect, and the total tonnage are equally unattainable at present.

It is thus shown that the total import and export trade of Great Britain, India, and British Colonies, deducting 659,206*l.* of re-exports to Japan, assuming these to be entirely British, amounts in sterling to 36,290,378*l.*, whereof 19,659,249*l.* are imports and 16,631,129*l.* exports.

Return No. 4 is chiefly valuable as showing the large amount of Chinese produce for native consumption entering into the portion of the carrying or coast trade, which gives employment to foreign shipping, to the value of 8,541,975*l.* This carrying trade on the coast of China both in Chinese produce and for the distribution of foreign goods to secondary ports, which each year is falling more and more into foreign shipping, would appear more exclusively British but for the want of regulations on our part to provide one or more ports of registry for British ships and a law of partnership with limited liability.

More weight seems to have been given to the repeated reports of Consuls that the trade is rapidly passing into Chinese hands, than a full examination of the facts would justify. A good deal of the distribution of British goods not only in the the interior but coastwise, from port to port, has in effect shown a tendency to pass from the hands of the Foreign Commission Agent or importer into that of the Chinese dealer. But this is not a very constant effect, and there are contrary tendencies at work. Moreover, as even the native distributors still prefer to employ foreign shipping, the only result as it effects the value or amount of British trade is to diminish the profits of the Foreign Commission Agents at the minor ports and to reduce their number. On the other hand the greater cheapness secured by native distribution tends in a direct way to increase consumption and demand, thus supplying a compensating balance by increasing the foreign interests and capital engaged.

Assuming, however, that the preponderating influence tends to restrict or diminish the number of British residents at these secondary ports, it cannot be rightly argued that the necessity for any Consular Establishment is by so much diminished. First, because, whether many or few, there must be some Consular authority to protect and control; and secondly, because the number of British ships and sailors brought to the port increases in a much larger proportion than the residents diminish, and these require much more looking after and give a great deal more work than the merchant located at any port.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.**

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

STATEMENT showing the Value of the Direct Import and Export Trade with China of Great Britain and all her Dependencies, and its relation to that of all other countries during the Year 1868.

Countries.	Imported from.	Exported to.	Total.
	£	£	£
Great Britain	7,343,653	12,612,251	19,955,904
Hong Kong	4,701,806	2,691,087	7,392,893
India	7,829,426	79,359	7,908,785
Australia	220,415	854,891	1,075,306
Singapore and Straits	223,164	88,109	311,273
British Channel	..	190,224	190,224
Canada	11	71,101	71,112
New Zealand	..	30,870	30,870
Cape of Good Hope	..	13,237	13,237
Total British goods	20,318,475	16,631,129	36,949,604
All other countries	1,677,116	4,103,294	5,780,410
Total	21,995,591	20,734,423	42,730,014
Deducting re-exports*	659,226	..	659,226
Total foreign trade with China ..	21,336,365	20,734,423	42,070,788

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

STATEMENT showing the Direct Foreign Trade of China with all Foreign Countries, as taken from the Official Report of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Administration.

Port of Direct Shipment.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.	Total.
	£	£	£
Shanghae	15,143,675	11,745,999	26,889,674
Canton	2,111,923	3,389,030	5,500,953
Swatow	1,188,601	59,328	1,247,929
Amoy	1,345,705	338,445	1,684,150
Foo-chow	1,151,239	4,444,307	5,595,546
Takow (Taiwan)	16,321	9,455	25,776
Tamsuy	105,344	29,739	135,083
Ningpo	181,341	10,035	191,376
Chin-kiang	..	..	..
Kiu-kiang	..	13,721	13,721
Hankow	2,313	417,122	419,435
Che-foo	319,842	38,373	358,215
Tien-tsin	345,288	238,872	584,160
Newchwang	84,002	..	84,002
Totals	21,995,594	20,734,426	42,730,020

The above sums are extracted from the Chinese Customs Report, 1 tael being converted into sterling at the rate of 6*s*.

* Chiefly to Japan.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

RETURN showing the Value of the Trade of each Port as the Centre of a Consuming and Producing District during the Year 1868, in its Connection with Foreign Merchants.

Port.	Description of Goods.	Value.	Total.
		£	£
Shanghae ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	3,736,465	
	Chinese goods ditto	1,997,363	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	8,313,155	
			14,046,983
Canton.. ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed	2,084,013	
	Chinese goods ditto	801,852	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	4,152,335	
			7,038,200
Swatow ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	1,186,654	
	Chinese goods ditto	533,449	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	838,101	
			2,558,254
Amoy	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	1,170,530	
	Chinese goods ditto	499,365	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	712,146	
			2,382,041
Foo-chow ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	1,170,808	
	Chinese goods ditto	695,574	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	4,835,320	
			6,701,702
Takow.. ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	194,430	
	Chinese goods ditto	27,205	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	211,238	
			432,873
Tamsuy ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	165,454	
	Chinese goods ditto	11,089	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	92,650	
			269,193
Ningpo.. ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	1,416,019	
	Chinese goods ditto	542,549	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	1,821,217	
			3,779,835
Chin-kiang ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	1,097,059	
	Chinese goods ditto	611,136	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	132,576	
			1,840,771
Kiu-kiang ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	860,864	
	Chinese goods ditto	178,295	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	2,305,198	
			3,344,357
Hankow ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	2,955,840	
	Chinese goods ditto	1,540,746	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	4,644,470	
			9,141,056
Che-foo ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	1,398,792	
	Chinese goods ditto	705,736	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	475,083	
			2,561,611
Tien-tsin ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	3,495,562	
	Chinese goods ditto	1,437,080	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	283,426	
			5,216,068
Newchwang ..	Foreign goods imported and consumed ..	835,467	
	Chinese goods ditto	639,286	
	Chinese goods produced and exported ..	477,486	
			1,952,239
			61,265,183

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

STATEMENT showing the Value of the Indirect Trade in Foreign Imports in China; and the Coasting Trade in Foreign Vessels in Chinese Produce.

Port.	Value of Direct Foreign Trade.	Value of Local Consumption.	Difference.
	£	£	£
Shanghae	15,143,675	3,736,465	11,407,210
Canton	2,111,923	2,084,013	27,910
Swatow	1,188,601	1,186,654	1,947
Amoy	1,345,705	1,170,530	175,175
Total			11,612,242
Deducting re-exports, chiefly to Japan			659,226
Net value of carrying trade in foreign indirect imports			10,953,016

Port.	Value of Local Produce Exported.	Total.	Difference.
	£	£	£
Shanghae	8,313,155		
Canton	4,152,335		
Swatow	838,101		
Amoy	712,146		
Foo-chow	4,835,320		
Takow	211,238		
Tamsuy	92,650		
Ningpo	1,821,217		
Chin-kiang	132,576		
Kiu-kiang	2,305,198		
Hankow	4,644,470		
Che-foo	457,083		
Tien-tsin	283,426		
Newchwang	477,486		
		29,276,401	
Value of Chinese produce exported abroad ..		20,734,426	
Value of native produce for Chinese use carried in foreign vessels ..			8,541,975

Inclosure 5 in No. 2.

RETURN of the Total British and other Foreign Shipping in Chinese Waters, engaged in Trade during the Year 1868.

Nationality.	Vessels Entered and Cleared.	Tonnage.
British	7,165	3,332,092
All other foreign nationalities	6,339	3,053,679
Total	13,504	6,385,771

Inclosure 6 in No. 2.

RETURN of British and Foreign Shipping entered and cleared at the Treaty Ports of China during the Year 1868.

Port.	British Ships Entered and Cleared.		Foreign Ships Entered and Cleared.	
	Number.	Tonnage.	Number.	Tonnage.
Newchwang	142	52,964	280	88,304
Tien-tsin	258	98,048	338	119,840
Che-foo	436	167,657	645	252,913
Hankow	313	170,798	300	189,457
Kiu-keang*	..	..	..	..
Shanghae	1,827	911,171	1,894	908,765
Chin-kiang†	..	..	..	..
Ningpo	315	78,978	548	337,916
Foo-chow	574	274,441	190	66,521
Amoy	474	206,717	367	102,833
Tamsuy and Kelung	143	42,731	74	22,502
Takow and Taiwan‡	..	..	..	..
Swatow	476	222,725	194	69,361
Canton	969	422,080	554	141,111

No. 3.

Sir R. Alcock to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 27.)

(Extract.) *Peking, October* 29, 1869.

IN continuation of my other despatch of this date, I proceed to consider the points more directly bearing on the Estimates for Services in China.

I have made the most searching inquiry into the expenditure of the Consular Establishments in China, and directed a copy of the Statements and Returns sent by the respective Consular Officers in answer to my Circulars to be forwarded direct to the Foreign Office, so that the whole of the data supplied, and to which I shall have occasion to refer in the course of this Report, will be available for reference, and supply means of forming an independent judgment.

Having in my previous despatch shown the whole movement of the foreign trade in China, its nature and value, I need only refer here to the results in their bearing on the estimates. We have, it appears, a British trade amounting in exports and imports to 36,290,378*l.*§ to deal with. There is further a carrying trade of Chinese produce and a distributing trade along the coast of foreign goods and articles entering into the foreign trade, the first estimated at 8,500,000*l.*, and the second at 10,900,000*l.* The proportion of this carried under the British flag, and consequently giving profitable employment to British shipping, cannot be accurately ascertained; but, from special causes it is probably much less than it ought to be, considering our preponderating share in the trade and capital employed in China. Despite all adverse conditions, it may safely be assumed that British interests are very largely engaged in this carrying trade.

It has been observed that our commerce with China will bear no comparison in magnitude or importance with the trade carried on by Great Britain with many other countries, notably with the United States of America and with France, or even with India,—and as a consumer of British goods China ranks below many of the smaller States of Europe and our own Colonies.

This is true enough in some respects. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to limit our view to the mere value in sterling which it represents, as an estimate of its importance, or the existing amount, as any indication of its prospective value. It is a trade with a constant tendency to increase, and as the delegates of the Chamber of Commerce clearly show in their Report on the trade of the Upper Yang-tsze, at the average rate of 3,500,000*l.* annually in the import of British manufactured goods alone. "And of the 7,000,000*l.* or 8,000,000*l.* worth of goods now annually exported from Great Britain to China, the sum of 2,500,000*l.* is retained in England to pay spinners, weavers, packers, shipping carriers, and numerous other classes of persons incidentally employed about the

* Report in press. † Not mentioned in Return.

‡ No Trade Return received.

§ Imports, 19,659,249*l.*; Exports, 16,631,129*l.*

making up and exporting of the goods," while it yields another 500,000*l.* sterling to British shipowners in the shape of freights. The United States of America have also a direct interest in our commerce in these regions, and consequently in the maintenance of friendly relations with us here and elsewhere, as their greatest customers for raw cotton—whereof some 5,000,000*l.* worth is taken to be worked up for the China market. They receive a larger sum for the raw material which they supply to England than the English do for their labour in working it up, and shipping it to China. The reporters say very truly, therefore, that the commercial interests of these nations in China cannot be separated. "Even a trade of 7,000,000*l.* in our manufactured goods becomes a matter of some importance to a country which, as they will observe, can only feed its population by finding markets in Foreign countries for the products of their working power."

China, moreover, supplies Great Britain and her Colonies with an article not at present attainable from any other country, the failure of which would probably cause more privation to the bulk of the British population than that of any other single article of food, if we except bread and meat.

Tea has long ceased to be a mere luxury, though it ranks among the first in that category, for it has become to the middle and poorer classes a necessary, often supplying the place of more solid food, and a healthy stimulus to the exhausted frame, more certain and beneficial in its effects than any other product at present known can afford. It also yields to the British Exchequer a revenue of 5,500,000*l.*; no inconsiderable proportion of the whole of the indirect taxation of the country.

Finally, China takes from India from 60,000 to 70,000 chests of opium, making allowance for the quantity smuggled from Hong Kong, worth some 40,000,000 taels, or say 10,000,000*l.*, which in its turn yields to our Indian Empire a revenue of no less than 9,000,000*l.* by the latest returns. All this vast capital, employment of labour and revenue, are involved in the protection and maintenance of our commerce and friendly relations with China.

However small or insignificant, therefore, our trade with China may seem to be by the side of the more colossal commerce with the United States, France, or India, counted by mere numerical value of imports and exports, there are other respects in which it yields to none of these in importance. I doubt, for instance, whether the United States and France together contribute so large a sum to the revenue of the British Empire as 14,500,000*l.*, which China does singly by the tea she exports and the opium imported.

As a market for the produce of our looms and manufacturing industry generally, China ranks very low. Its people are but poor consumers comparatively; and it may be supposed that we could very well dispense with their aid. But under other auspices and more favourable conditions, neither of which seem altogether hopeless, the Chinese Empire might within the next twenty years offer a vast field of commercial activity, and would soon lead to a consumption of manufactured goods ten times as large as any at present existing. We cannot wisely confine our views therefore to the present, and ought not, by a shortsighted economy or any mistaken policy, to risk all that is prospective.

With these few preliminary remarks, the relevancy and importance of which will, I trust, be evident, I proceed at once to the various considerations of expenditure and efficiency which the estimates raise.

Taking for granted that it is both the interest and the policy of Great Britain to encourage British manufactures and the profitable employment of our shipping, giving occupation to a large maritime class, and that some protection and surveillance is essential in China for the security and development of trade and shipping, the main question is narrowed to one of cost in connection with efficiency. It is of course the interest of the country to obtain a maximum of efficiency for a minimum cost, and to this end it is essential that no Consulates should be maintained which are not indispensable, and that those kept up should not be on a larger scale or with a higher rate of expenditure both in salaries and contingencies than is absolutely required to insure efficient service to the extent required.

Your Lordship has accordingly informed me that "the first point to be considered is whether the British trading and shipping interests at the different ports where Consular officers are now stationed are of that amount as to make it worth while to incur the expense of maintaining them, or whether the alternative of breaking up the Consulate and with it of putting a stop to British trade at any particular port may not be resorted to."

I can the more readily supply an answer under this head, that I have each year since my arrival in 1865, carefully considered the whole question. In 1867 accordingly I suggested the abolition of the Consular Establishment at Chin-kiang after a personal inspection, because it appeared to me that the British trading and shipping interests did not justify the expenditure incurred.

The act was much criticised by the mercantile community, but it was not the less certainly indicated as a proper measure of economy at the time, not only from the total absence of any valuable trade, but any prospect of increase. Subsequent changes in the course of trade, and the restoration of the city, have induced me since to recommend the reappointment of a Consul on the equally valid ground that the value of the trade has very suddenly increased, and now gives great promise of making it worth our while, and otherwise necessary, to have an efficient establishment on the spot.

The rapid increase of trade, more especially since the steps taken when Mr. Consul Medhurst was sent up to Nanking on the Yang-chow business, with instructions at the same time to demand redress for continuous barrier exactions at a station above Yangchow, as shown in Mr. Allen's Trade Report, and the prospective opening of Wuhu on the opposite bank, between Chin-kiang and Kiu-kiang, would either of them furnish good and sufficient reasons for replacing a Consul at the former port, and I must press my recommendation therefore.

The breaking up of a Consulate, and with it putting a stop to British trade at any particular port, is a measure which should only be resorted to after mature consideration, and I have nothing to reproach myself with in the advice to resort to it in 1867, although I now deem it desirable to re-establish what I then destroyed under different circumstances. In most cases there are vested interests in houses and land to be taken into account. Interests, also, in existing trade, whatever it may be, and the probability of the traffic increasing at some later period—a prospect which in many cases will be contingent on a Consular establishment being retained on the spot—must not be lost sight of. Foochow and Ningpo are both cases in point.

Nevertheless, taking all these into consideration, I have arrived at the conclusion that the whole of the interests connected with the Island of Formosa, with its four ports, either present or prospective, are not such as to make it worth while to persevere in keeping up Consular establishments which cost annually some 4,000*l.* per annum, as will be seen by the inclosed return.

This is indeed something under the actual cost, which may be estimated at 4,200*l.*, while the cost to the country, if we take into account the additional expense of ships-of-war visiting the ports, in coal, &c., cannot be estimated at less than 5,000*l.* The whole foreign trade does not amount to 200,000*l.* annually after a ten years' trial. The returns of last year make it only 160,859*l.* This, and a paltry export trade in camphor and sugar, and a very small import of foreign goods, are all the inducements Formosa offers for retaining an establishment in one of the unhealthiest places in China, entailing an expenditure of 5,000*l.* a-year, and incessant risk of embroilment.

We are the only Treaty Power that goes to the expense of a Consul or Consular Establishment at any of the ports. The sea-coast is alone under the authority of the Chinese Government, and the whole of the interior is still inhabited by savages. The scattered colonists from the mainland on the sea-board are but one degree removed from barbarism, and offer no hope of being consumers of foreign manufactures. The natural products of the island, consisting chiefly of camphor, sugar, and rice, can only furnish scant supplies for a coasting trade.

There are other reasons besides economy that would suggest the expediency of such a step. The climate is most trying and unhealthy, and both physically and morally it destroys the energies and health of those sent to reside there more than any other place in China, The isolation is complete; the communication with the mainland most irregular and uncertain; the people and the authorities are both very ungovernable and violent, rendering conflicts with one or both from time to time all but inevitable. Only recently the papers speak of two of the mercantile residents having been attacked and wounded; how seriously I do not know, as none of the details have reached me.

The value of any houses or land held by British subjects must be very small. The trading interests I estimate at next to nothing. The number of British subjects at each port, independent of those employed in the Imperial Customs and our own establishment, at the end of last year did not exceed nine, that is six at Takow and Taiwan (four mercantile and two missionaries) and three at Tamsuy. As regards Her Majesty's Government's property in houses or land, we have fortunately only one building, a Vice-Consulate at Tamsuy, and this the Chinese Government might be willing to take over. The two or three houses there and at Takow, built by British subjects, and the property chiefly of bankrupts, Dent and Co., McPhail and Co., and others,—might also be transferred at a reasonable price.

The only argument against such a measure, and the total stoppage of our trade by the withdrawal of Consular establishments, is that, as a matter of policy, it is open to the objection that it may appear to the Chinese a step backward, and thus become a dangerous

precedent, teaching the Chinese that if they only make the place sufficiently disagreeable, or by hindrances to trade worthless to us, they will ultimately succeed in driving the foreigner away from all the ports, I do not deny that this argument has a certain cogency, but I do not think this one objection should prevail against all other considerations. In the present instance it is a question only of degree. I do not, therefore, hesitate to advise the abandonment of Formosa, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be completed, on grounds both of economy and policy. We must set the gain in annual saving against any possible or contingent disadvantage in another direction.

The only question, I think, should be the possibility of obtaining something in return from the Chinese. If they would give Ichang on the Yang-tsze as a Treaty port in exchange, I do not think there can be any doubt that both parties would be great gainers. And Formosa has been so fruitful in troubles and complications in the past, and so likely to breed more in the future, that the Yamên could hardly fail to hail with pleasure any disposition on our part to withdraw from the island. It does not seem impossible, therefore, that they might listen to overtures of this nature.

Independent of this great reduction of establishments I am unable, after the most careful survey of the different ports, to recommend any material changes.

No. 4.

Consul Medhurst to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, October 7, 1869.*

UNDER instructions from his Excellency Sir Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B., Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, dated the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose for the information of your Lordship copies of my replies to Circulars Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12 of 6th July, and No. 13 of 12th August, from the Accountant's Department of Her Majesty's Legation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, July 21, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to reply in detail to your Excellency's Circular letter No. 9 of the 6th July as follows:—.

1st. Linguists and Writers.

There are two Linguists and four Writers employed at this Consulate at the following salaries:—

	Per Mensem. $	c.
Yang Heding, First Linguist	150	0
Leong C. Weng, Second ditto	70	0
Tao Sung Yuen, First Writer	42	50
Kwo Hee Sing, Second ditto	25	50
Tin Sung, Third ditto	20	0*
Wu Su Ming, Fourth ditto	15	0
Total salaries to Linguists	323	0

Of the two Linguists, Yang Heding and Leong C. Weng, the first is a highly educated Shanghae man brought up in America, and the second a native of the British Colony of Penang. . Yang Heding's duties are manifold, onerous, and very responsible. 1st. He is Consular Translator in the Shanghae and other dialects. 2nd. He is Interpreter to the British Assessor in the Mixed Court in the above dialects. 3rd. He acts as Registrar in Land Office and British division of Mixed Court, and has supervision under Vice-Consul of the numerous deeds and documents connected with both those Departments. 4th. He is Copyist in the above Departments and officer for the superintendency of land survey. 5th. He has hitherto acted as Interpreter to Supreme Court.

* This man receives 10 dollars per month additional from Mixed Court.

The manner in which he has fulfilled his various duties has called forth the unqualified approval and commendation of every one under whose direction he has served.

He is one of the most valuable servants connected with Consular services in China.

Leong C. Weng, Second Linguist, is employed as Translator in the Cantonese and Fohkien dialects, and in the Malay language.

The very large shipping interest with which this Consulate has to deal, and the consequent disputes of Cantonese and West Coast sailors, and questions arising among the subjects of Her Majesty's Straits Settlements resident in Shanghae, render his services most requisite and valuable.

Three of the four Writers are exclusively employed in the Interpreter's office composing from dictation, and writing or copying, all notes and despatches which pass between myself and the local authorities. The fourth (Linsung) in addition to assisting in the above duties when required, acts as Cantonese Interpreter to the British Assessor at the Mixed Court. Tao, the First Writer, is a man of first-class attainments in his own language, and has been fifteen years in the service. It would be impossible to supply his place with a man of equal attainments at the same rate of wages.

2*nd. Gaolers, Constables, Watchman, &c.*

There are a Head Gaoler and three Constables attached to the Shanghae Consulate. They are all natives of Great Britain or Ireland. Their names and rates of wages are as follows:—

	Per Month. Dollars.
Samuel Saunders, Head Constable	60
Andrew Coulter, Second ditto	45
Thomas Read, Third ditto	42
William Whelan, Fourth ditto	40
Total Constables' wages	187

Their salaries being low, as compared to those of the municipal police, who receive rates varying from 35 taels or 46·66 dollars to 55 taels or 73·34 dollars per month, with a free passage to England when they leave, in addition to a gratuity of 200 taels after three, and a whole twelvemonth's pay after five years' service in the force,—it has been the custom hitherto to allow them to receive a fee of 5 dollars for apprehending every deserter from a British ship, and a further fee of 1 dollar for taking a prisoner whose time has expired on board of his ship, or bringing him on shore again, should he again refuse duty. But these fees are now being so repeatedly cavilled at by masters and owners of ships, and they manifestly fall with such unfairness upon the seamen themselves, that I doubt much whether I shall be able to support the Constables in continuing to make the charges. The fees were, I am told, established by Sir H. Parkes, but the Judge is of opinion that an action for their recovery would fail if brought before the Supreme Court unless some better authority for their imposition can be produced.

The following is a complete list of all the servants employed in this Consulate. They are all Chinese, and most of them natives of Shanghae:—

	Per Month. $ c.
1 Compradore, whose duties consist in collecting and shroffing the fees, and generally superintending the entire establishment of servants. His wages are at the rate of	30 0
10 Office Messengers, at 8 dollars 50 cents each	85 0
1 Gatekeeper	8 50
2 Coolies to sweep and clean offices, at 8 dollars each	16 0
4 Watchmen, at 7 dollars each	28 0
1 Cook, for prisoners in gaol	7 0
2 Coolies for gaol, at 7 dollars and 5 dollars	12 0
Total Chinese servants	186 50

These rates are under those usual amongst the foreign mercantile firms.

We have no Porters or Boatman on the establishment—coolie-hire and boat-hire being paid out of the fixed allowance for office contingencies.

3rd. Number of British Subjects in Gaol during 1868.

Race or Origin.	Total Number of Prisoners.	Average length of Confinement.
		Days.
European or Colonial ..	266	40
Asiatic ..	55	21·15

4th. Moneys Expended on Medical Assistance.

	$	c.
Medical officer to Her Majesty's gaol, 200*l.* per annum	941	18
Shanghae General Hospital, relief of destitute subjects (235*l.* 11*s.* 1½*d.*) ..	1,108	50
Medicines supplied to gaol (46*l.* 3*s.* 3¾*d.*)	217	25
Total	2,266	93

Your. &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, July* 21, 1869.

IN reply to Circular No. 12, Accountant's Department, I have the honour to subjoin a list of the amounts paid at this Consulate during the year 1868 for rent, lodging-allowance, and furniture, as also for municipal taxes in Shanghae and petty repairs at Chin-kiang, which are the only items of expenditure on Consular Buildings during the period indicated. No insurance has been effected on the Shanghae Consulate—an omission which it appears to me should be repaired as soon as possible.

	$	c.	£	s.	d.
Rent, Assistant's house, January 1 to June 30 .. .. (Half-yearly rent to December 31, not paid till January 1869).	1,020	0 =	216	15	0
Rent, Consul's house, July 1 to September 30 .. .. (Quarterly rent to December 31 not paid till January 1869).	785	34	166	17	8¼
Chinese annual ground rent	86	63	18	8	2
Total for rent	1,891	97 =	402	0	10¼
Lodging allowance to Mr. Winchester, March 26 to July 15 ..	919	35 =	195	7	3
Office furniture at Shanghae, purchased by Mr. Winchester ..	41	39 =	8	15	11
Furniture at Chin-kiang, purchased by Mr. Lay, under instructions	371	0	78	16	9
Total for furniture	412	39 =	87	12	8
Shanghae Municipal taxes	1,196	35 =	254	4	6
Petty repairs at Chin-kiang	16	79	3	11	4½
Total on Consular Buildings	1,213	14 =	257	15	10½

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, August* 24, 1869.

IN reply to your Circular No. 11 (Accountant's Department), dated the 6th ultimo, I have the honour to furnish the following information with regard to the degree in which trade shows a tendency to pass from the hands of British subjects into those of Chinese.

The trade of this port as has been shown by my last report and returns, is

properly divisible into two great branches. The direct trade with Great Britain and other foreign countries, and the coast trade with other Chinese ports.

First, as regards direct trade. The Chinese take no share in importing manufactures and other merchandize from Great Britain, nor are they likely to do so until they establish native agencies at home—a very remote contingency indeed—and even were the experiment to be tried, it is very problematical how far a Chinese trader resident in England could compete successfully with a British trader upon his own ground.

Supposing that the Chinese merchants should actually do what seems now so remote, and not only consign their own produce for sale in England, but import British manufactures into China on their own account, the result would be a condition of business something like that which exists in India, but more particularly in Bombay. Chinese firms could never gain credit enough to conduct such a trade without the supervision of English firms in China. The English firms would therefore earn the commission and incidental emoluments both in imports and exports, and their beneficiary interest in the trade would be at least as great as it is now, for commercial experience in China, and probably in most other countries, has proved that the profits of any regular established trade amounts to no more on the average than a fair commission, and in fact that merchants who restricted themselves exclusively to commission business realize more in the long run than their neighbours who speculate. Therefore, if the risk of profit and loss in China trade were all transferred to the Chinese, the commissions only remaining to British firms, the latter would lose none of their real interest in the trade, their numbers would not diminish, and their international obligations now recognized would be in no wise altered.

In exports of Chinese produce, instances do occur of shipments on native account, under advance from foreign firms, both independently or in combination with foreigners, but I am informed it is difficult to induce natives to consign tea and silk in this way even at a minimum rate of commission. The proportion of tea shipped by natives under advance, compared to the total export is, I believe, decreasing, and that in silk is larger than what it used to be. In any case the Chinese would not participate in this trade were it not for the facilities afforded them by foreign firms and notably by banking corporations. A proposition has been under discussion amongst some of the principal Canton and Singapore men here to open up a direct business with London by means of Chinese supercargoes and agents at home. It arose out, I believe, of the fact that some of the native tea hongs who in July where losing about 8 taels a picul on their country purchases, were desirous of clubbing together to ship about twenty chops for sale in England, but the negotiation has come to nothing so far, and I think the establishment of a Chinese hong in London is not any the nearer realization in consequence.

Second, coast trade. In this branch, owing to the facilities, combined with greater punctuality and safety afforded by foreign steam communication with the several rivers and coast ports, which feed and are fed by Shanghae, as a centre of distribution, the Chinese are daily taking an increasing share. They are peculiarly fitted as a people for mercantile enterprise, and their habits of life and business and their own excellent banking organization, enable them to conduct their operations at a rate of economy in which Europeans cannot approach them. Their natural intimacy, moreover, with the inland markets and their peculiar propensity for combination, enable them to compete too successfully with the foreigner in this respect; and when it is taken into consideration that with all these advantages they are able to rely upon the prestige and protection which the mere presence of foreign officials and communities afford them, it is not to be wondered at that they take up this branch of the trade with such eagerness and success. Nor is it a matter, I conceive, to be at all deprecated, for after all the merchandize which is thereby distributed is principally British, and an increased development of the general trade is the result, It must not be lost sight of, however, that apart from British influence, association, and protection, and those of other nations in a minor degree, such a trade could not for a moment exist.

The above remarks apply equally to my experience at Hankow as at th port.

As regards that portion of the extract from Lord Clarendon's letter which refers to the extent to which Consular protection will be needed to foster any trade in British goods in Chinese hands, the remarks I have above made will suffice to show that it can only thrive under the shadow of Consular prestige, and were the protection and control now exercised under our international engagements towards China to be even partially withdrawn, I give it as my emphatic opinion that a corresponding influence of a prejudicial character would follow as a matter of course, both in respect of Chinese and general trade. I firmly believe, supposing such a thing to be possible, that were the

right of commercial residence with Consular and Naval protection withdrawn from all the ports, and our access limited to but one as of old, the trade would dwindle back forthwith to the compass which it commanded in former days, and the Chinese would cease to take any but the most infinitesimal share in foreign commerce. The measure would likewise, as certainly, be followed by fresh rebellions and the subversion of the already weak authority which the Government now exercises in the coast provinces.

I beg to inclose for your Excellency's perusal two memoranda on the whole subject which have been courteously drawn up for me by two of the merchants, and which give a more detailed statement of the views I have herein expressed.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 4 in No. 4.

Memorandum on the tendency of Trade to pass out of British into Chinese hands, and Deductions therefrom.

THIS, of course, only applies to local, *i.e.*, port to port trade, whether the merchandize be of native or foreign origin. It is natural that the Chinese should do their own domestic trade. If they did not, it would be an anomaly, for they are very industrious, and are proverbially apt at business. In fact, no merchants in the world can beat them on their own ground. Their qualifications are great natural shrewdness, which has been developed by the long concentration of the whole force of their character on this single point. It was the first remark made on the Chinese 200 years ago, as it is the first thing that strikes a visitor now. They have no rational or healthy amusements to divert them; no literature, art, or study of any kind worth mentioning to occupy them, and hence business is their highest and only care. It is no wonder, therefore, that they have reached a certain stage of perfection in commerce. Another advantage they possess over foreigners in this country is that their low condition of life enables them to dispense with comforts of every kind, which are essential, not only to the welfare, but even to the existence, of Europeans in this climate. The result is, that the Chinese, as compared with Europeans, do their business equally well, and at very much smaller cost. This applies generally to the "distribution" or retail of foreign goods, and in this department of business the Chinese possess another advantage over Europeans. They are more patient, and their habits of business involve protracted negotiation over cups of tea and pipes of opium, and generally turning night into day. It is a positive disappointment to a Chinaman to have his terms abruptly acceded to, as it is a violation of his sense of propriety to have them abruptly discarded. In my own experience, I have met with examples of the first. It follows that the foreign merchant's proper functions is to bring his cargo to the Chinese seaport and leave Chinese intermediaries to conduct them in retail to the consumers. But even this the Chinese merchant is unable to do without assistance from foreigners. His means of protecting himself from the danger of transport and from the rapacity of the officials, and the utterly defective means of locomotion which he possesses have proved insuperable obstacles to trade. These difficulties have now, to a certain extent, been overcome for them by foreigners, and vast extensive trade has been the result. Take, as an instance, Hankow, which is immediately under our own observation. The place owes its whole importance, both as a centre of native and of foreign trade, to the enterprise of foreigners in placing steamers on the Great River. The trade was, in the first instance, forced by foreigners taking their goods to Hankow, and insisting on selling them, and, when they could not get cash for their sales, accepting Chinese produce of every description in barter. Foreigners had then to find market for the produce of the interior of China, which had been long excluded from the commerce of the coast. Steamers on their return voyage were loaded with such articles as hemp, paper, oil of various kinds, and even crockery-ware, on foreign account, and not till these articles were realized could the foreign merchant properly consider the sale of his manufactures at Hankow complete. The natives, however, having been thus taught the way, entered into competition with foreigners in the newly-made trade, and, naturally enough, possessed themselves of the greater part of it. The steamers afforded them the very same facilities as they did to foreigners. They could travel by the steamer at one-fourth the expense that foreigners had to pay; they were safe alike from the attacks of pirates, the accidents of wind and weather, and the official plundering of the various local authorities. If they wished to insure, they could insure; while this provision, and the speed and punctuality of the steamers, encouraged the bankers and others to bring

out hoarded wealth and put it into circulation. Foreign capitalists, also, were ready t advance liberally on native ventures, and a very large capital has been imported into the trade which would have lain dormant for ever but for some great move of the kind in question.

The steam lines to Chefoo and Tien-tsin have had an effect exactly similar to that above described in the Yang-tsze. Foreigners commenced sending their own goods to the new markets, and kept possession of the trade until the natives had learned how to make use of the novel facilities which foreigners had provided for them. The same thing has happened there as at Hankow,—the natives do the most of the trade; its amount has enormously increased, and Chinese capitalists are not afraid to embark in it, because, among many other reasons, they can calculate exactly when their advances will be refunded.

These new branches of trade being the creation of steamers, would naturally collapse were steamers withdrawn. The native bankers would at once call in their capital when they found their security, not only for prompt return, but for ultimate repayment, was taken away, and the trade, in fact, could not be carried on.

Were the steamers to pass into native hands, the result would only be a very little better; for the native essays to own foreign steamers have hitherto proved lamentable failures. Even were foreign residents to be removed from the outports, such as Hankow, Tien-tsin, &c., and the steamer agents only to remain, the result would be very detrimental to trade. For a handful of foreigners exert a marvellous influence for good in China. It is a kind of guarantee to the people that they will be free from brigandage: they sow and reap, buy and sell, and build houses, with a feeling of security, wherever foreign Consular flags fly, such as they rarely exhibit in other places. There is no question at all that the present dynasty even owes its existence to the presence of foreign support in the country, and the merchants fully recognize this important fact.

Foreigners have also a certain moral influence in restraining the predatory disposition of the Mandarins. You will remember how last year the trade was stopped between Chin-kiang and the North by the terror inspired by the truculent hoppo at the Haikwan barrier. Mr. Carnie and myself went to the place in a European-looking boat, and the native merchants took courage and resumed business. Several boats loaded with foreign goods followed us, and the foreign merchants in Chin-kiang were enabled to open their sales' books again. This kind of wholesome influence of foreigners exists everywhere in China.

It has materially contributed to giving Shanghae its high character in native estimation. The great wealth of the country is gradually gravitating towards Shanghae. Bankers and merchants from the distant province of Sz-chuen are breaking up their old habits and setting up their head-quarters under foreign protection. Here they may be occasionally oppressed with heavy demands of money from the authorities, but only to a moderate extent. The mere presence of a body of foreign Consuls in Shanghae is a check on any very glaring act of oppression. The spectacle of a number of Government employés, who are not bought and sold for money, is such a tacit reproach to the Mandarins, that they are probably afraid to furnish in their own practices too great a contrast in the eyes of their own countrymen. But whatever be the reason, the fact is that where foreigners reside the native merchants have confidence; and where foreign influence is strongest is the spot of all others in which the wealthy seek security and protection. Even a few foreigners, but above all, foreign Consuls at any outport will, in the nature of things, promote trade in foreign goods.

The trade between England and China is entirely in the hands of foreigners, and the chance of the Chinese appropriating that is too remote to have much bearing on our present policy.

Concerning the extent to which the trade in British goods has passed into Chinese hands, I enclose a memorandum on the the subject, in which I have attempted to analyze that portion of it which goes to Hankow. The result of that, you will see, is progressive in favour of the Chinese.

Inclosure 5 in No. 4.

Memorandum on the Extent to which Foreign Trade has passed from the hands of Foreigners in China into those of the Natives, and on the necessity for Foreign Protection.

THE extremely limited time accorded to me for offering any observations I may wish to make on the above subject, does not admit of the careful investigation which the

importance of the questions involved demand, and I therefore confine myself to a few brief and hasty notes.

In my opinion there is no important branch of the strictly foreign trade that can in any legitimate sense be said to have passed from the hands of the foreign merchants into those of the Chinese. The frequent references to such change as an accomplished fact apply to purely local considerations, or arise from loose and inaccurate writing, which would cease if it was thought that any political importance was attached to such writing.

At no former period in the history of our relations with China have purely British interests entered so deeply into Chinese commerce as they do at present. The entire import of British manufactures, in which an increase such as we have had of late years, is of such special interest both here and at home, is, I may say without any material inaccuracy, entirely in the hands of foreigners. Of course, by far the larger part of British imports is by British firms, but American and German houses share to a considerable extent in the business, and although this may seem at the expense of British interests here, it is equally an advantage to Lancashire and Yorkshire with the trade of British firms. I here call special attention to the highly important consideration that the mere value of imports year by year is a very imperfect criterion of the benefits accruing to the manufacturing interests of Great Britain. The cotton trade is valuable to our manufacturers and artisans in proportion to the number of pieces of goods for which they can find adequate outlet, and not solely in proportion to the aggregate value of the goods themselves. Our main interest lies in the quantity of effective labour that we can employ, in the cost of labour by which the price of the raw material is enhanced by being converted into a textile fabric. Cotton is now much cheaper than it was four or five years ago, and consequently the price of cotton goods is lower than it was then, although it is highly probable that the return per piece to the manufacturing interest is greater than it was then. The import of cotton goods has enormously increased of late years, but as the raw material has fallen in value, the mere increase in the value of cotton goods imported give an inadequate conception of the benefit to the manufacturers. But taking the number of pieces imported at Shanghae during the first six months of the following years, we see the rapid strides that China has taken as a consumer of our manufactures.

	First Six Months of			
	1866.	1867.	1868.	1869.
	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.
Grey shirtings ..	890,366	1,231,710	2,070,782	2.933,341
T-cloths	48,976	316.211	588,825	1.413,758

Having given it as my opinion that our increasing import trade is entirely in foreign hands, the next important question is the condition of our export trade. Foreign houses have always shipped both tea and silk to England and America for account of native merchants; and although I have not sufficient time to make accurate inquiries, I give it as my opinion that less tea in proportion to the export is now shipped on native account than formerly and more silk in proportion than formerly. So that the increase in the one case may be counterbalanced by the decrease in the other, while the increase, especially in the total export of tea to England, has reached a point beyond all expectation.

This direct trade therefore, of which Shanghae is the most important centre, is the legitimate foreign trade between China and Great Britain. On the question of this trade passing into the hands of the Chinese there can be but one opinion; such is not the case, and that the Chinese do participate in it at all is solely due to the facilities afforded to them by foreigners, without whom they could do absolutely nothing.

Shanghae is to China what London is to Great Britain; and, if means of transit were as abundant and complete in the former country as in the latter, all the distinctive interest of foreign merchants would centre in Shanghae, and there the import trade for the middle and north of China would end and the export trade would begin. But, unfortunately, means of transit are very defective amongst the Chinese and obstacles are numerous, and therefore it has been deemed by every person who has in any way repreented our Government in the East of the first importance that we should have steam communication with several other subsidiary centres where foreigners should reside, in order that we might in some measure counteract the disadvantages of defective means of transit, and ourselves place our goods within the reach of large markets to which they would otherwise find their way with great difficulty. Thus departing from the strictly

foreign trade, we saw the necessity for our assisting the local trade by foreign appliances and experiments. The ports on the Yanz-tsze, and Chefoo, Tien-tsin, and Newchwang, were opened with the view to being the subsidiary centres drawing supplies from Shanghae and sending produce to it. Entertaining, as subsequent events proved, greatly exaggerated views of the trade to be done at these ports, foreigners flocked to them in such numbers and so many houses were established, that when experience demonstrated that very few foreigners were needed to do all the business, the collapse which ensued through insufficient trade and enormous depreciation of real estate, amounted to a calamity for foreigners in China. No sooner had the Chinese got into the routine of the foreign Custom-house and steamers than they gradually appropriated the local business without the intervention of foreign agents beyond those of the steamers. Thus, then, the local business was for a time done by foreigners mostly for Chinese, but ere long the latter learned enough to be able to act for themselves, and by their greater economy they were enabled to get the local business into their hands again. But it must be remembered that a number of foreigners are necessary at each port in order that the trade may continue, as, after all, we provide the entire machinery for the working of the local business. And the Lancashire or Yorkshire manufacturer is quite as interested in Hankow and Tien-tsin being open ports with protection for his goods when the Chinese take the goods thither in foreign vessels as when foreigners do. The growing importance of the subsidiary ports on the Yang-tsze and at the north may be estimated from the quantity of grey shirtings and *T*-cloths exported to them in foreign vessels from Shanghae during the first six months of the last four years.

	1866.	1867.	1868.	1869.
	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.
Grey shirtings	755,513	996,173	1,798,053	1,873,233
T-cloths	59,125	321,853	610,040	1,168,181

On the ground therefore of facilities for the distribution of British manufactures the opening of subsiduary ports has been a remarkable success. So that, except a reaction from the temporary and exaggerated expectations of foreigners opening up an unknown field for enterprise, there has been no transfer of genuine foreign trade to the natives.

Foreign protection to trade at all the open ports is and must remain the condition of its satisfactory continuance. Few things have been more clearly demonstrated than the failure in administrative capaeity by the Chinese so far as foreign undertakings are concerned. After all our intercourse with them, they are incapable of forming Fire or Marine Insurance Companies, Steam-boat Companies, &c. They are entirely dependent on us for every improvement by which they have benefited, and we are still essential to them for the continuance of these advantages. Indeed, even Chinese local enterprise goes on year by year more dependent on foreign capital, and there is little doubt the interests of Chinese and foreigners are more deeply interwoven now than they have been at any former time. So completely do the Chinese feel that our system of steamers, sailing-ships, insurance, advancing upon bills of lading, &c., is superior to anything they can possibly do themselves, that, at least so far as the main articles of trade are concerned, everything is carried under a foreign flag. What is not so carried is as a rule purely native merchandize, with which foreigners have rarely any concern.

An experiment has been made in the direction of identifying Chinese merchants with foreign undertakings, by placing two Chinese on the Directorate of the "Union Steam Navigation Company," and the "North China Steamer Company." The result has been to prove that they are entirely wanting in administrative capacity in schemes, to which they have not been accustomed all their lives. They fail to grasp the leading features of such enterprises, and there is little doubt that the Chinese mind is too much the creature of routine to be able to organize any important enterprise in imitation of foreigners. The Mandarins are content, and will be for perhaps fifty years to come, to have the Customs conducted by foreigners; they are conscious they cannot do it themselves, and in the same manner Chinese merchants are large shareholders in local foreign companies, and yet are perfectly satisfied that they cannot undertake such enterprises themselves, however tempting the large profits of some of them may be.

It is under foreign protection that commerce in China has been developing, and undoubtedly this security is highly prized by the Chinese. I do not see any reasons for thinking that we can dispense with any of our Consulates without injury to British interests, and the extension of them on the upper course of the Yang-tsze, where our steamers could stem the current which is now such an obstacle to rapid communication, would be an important step for our manufacturing interests, and not a costly one. We

must continue to provide the machinery for carrying on and developing our own trade, and therefore all our interests are bound up in the maintenance of our present Consulates, and in the judicious extension of them.

As to the naval force necessary to protect our commerce and meet emergencies, that is a very different question. Our trade demands at all the ports the moral protection of our flag, but the occasions on which any large number of vessels are necessary, are very rare indeed. Besides, it might be a question for investigation how far China receives the services of vessels of war. Occasionally Shanghae is left without any such vessel, and it seems to me that the actual force on the China coast is much smaller than is generally supposed. Japan seems the favourite resort of our squadron, which does appear to be out of proportion to the actual service rendered in China.

There is also the further consideration that the Chinese Authorities are gradually getting together a fleet of gun-boats, officered by foreigners, which will dispense in a great measure with the necessity for our protecting commerce on the coast, whether foreign or native, from piratical attacks. The consequence will be that we may look forward to an extension of our Consular system, accompanied by a gradual diminution of our naval force in these waters. The Inspector-General of Customs, by recommending the construction of gun-boats to the Chinese, is relieving us from the expense of maintaining a large squadron in China, as British vessels of war will soon have only the duty of protecting life and property. But every Consular flag raised in an important centre of trade is a moral protection of immense advantage to the Chinese and to the foreign trade, while it is less so to individual foreigners. At the same time I am not of opinion that any very large extension of Consular establishment is desirable, it could only take place with diminishing advantage to the foreign trade compared with the Consulates now in existence, and the difficulties attending them would in many cases outweigh their benefits.

Inclosure 6 in No. 4.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, August* 31, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to furnish the following information in reply to the requisition contained in your Excellency's Circular dated 6th ultimo (Accountants' Department), on the subject of direct and indirect trade at this port.

I would premise by remarking that the circular under acknowledgment applies less to this port than to any other in China, seeing that it has no indirect trade in British goods with any coast or river port whatever, but is, as I have shown clearly in my last trade report, the intermediary depôt whence the northern and river ports are mainly supplied with home goods. If the Consuls at these ports add the supplies of such goods, which they receive from Shanghae, to the amounts which they import directly from Great Britain, as on the example hypothetically stated by Lord Clarendon in his despatch to your Excellency, and call it an aggregate direct trade, their reports are clearly calculated to mislead the Foreign Office and general public. Whether this is done or no, I am not in a position to say; on behalf of myself, I may observe that in Return No. 1, accompanying my last Trade Report, I took especial care to exhibit the quantity and value of every article of merchandize severally received direct from Great Britain and her dependencies. In Return 3 I showed nett foreign imports, after deduction of re-exports to foreign and Chinese ports; and in Return 4 I exhibited distinctly what proportion of the whole import trade was composed of re-exports to foreign and coast ports, and, consequently, what share of it fell to Shanghae and its own proper trade.

It is in exports solely that Shanghae may any way be regarded as a subsidiary port. My Return No. 7 sets forth how much of the staple articles of Chinese produce Shanghae receives from other ports, and how much of that is re-exported to foreign countries. Return No. 9 likewise shows what proportion of the entire export trade Shanghae owes to other ports, and in my remarks on general trade (see Report) I have endeavoured to explain the position of Shanghae relatively to other ports, not only as regards exports to foreign countries, but as regards its trade with coast ports. Any new statistics on these several heads would, consequently, be now superfluous. I might with some trouble cause a tabular return to be drawn up of the total foreign imports, re-exports, and nett imports, but this would fail to show the re-exports of British goods to each individual port, which is really the information that would be valuable; any reliable statistics as to how much of British imports, direct opium excepted, are consumed by Shanghae, and

how much redistributed hence to coast and other ports; how much also of exports hence to Great Britain is contributed by other Chinese ports,—I regret to say it is not in my power to furnish, as the Customs are not in the habit of distinguishing goods carried in British vessels from those conveyed under other foreign flags; and, as all information obtainable from mercantile sources necessarily includes all foreign merchandize in its computation. Assuming, however, that Great Britain monopolizes six-sevenths of the entire trade, it is not difficult to arrive at an approximate estimate by computation, based in each case upon the aggregate figures given in my returns. As regards opium, which is essentially a British import, Return No. 8 furnishes,in a compendious shape, all necessary particulars, mport and re-export, to the several ports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 7 in No. 4.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, September 7, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a tabulated statement, which furnishes, in as compendious a shape as possible, most of the information called for in your Excellency's Circular dated the 12th ultimo.

The statement must be accepted with the qualification that the prices of provisions noted are the generally accepted market prices, which, as I have already explained in my despatch dated 6th September, are, as a rule, at the very least doubled upon the foreign purchaser by his Chinese servants.

As regards the rate of remuneration to clerks or assistants of various grades, in banks and mercantile firms of different nationalities (head No. 7, in despatch under acknowledgment), I beg to submit the following particulars as the result of my researches.

Two of the principal mercantile establishments here (not British) to whom I have applied, write to me as follows, on condition that I do not give up their names.

A. says, "We last year paid our—

	Taels.		Taels.
First Clerk	1,700	Fourth Clerk	600
Second ditto	1,200	Fifth ditto	600
Third ditto	700	Sixth ditto	500

We do not give the salaries of Silk and Tea Inspectors, who are not reckoned as General Clerks. The First and Second Clerks have been in the house for the last six and seven years respectively. In engaging a Junior Clerk, we usually make a contract for three years, at a salary 500, 600, and 700 taels. All the Clerks have free board and lodging in the house; and 60 taels a year allowance for servants' wages."

B. says, "A First Class Clerk in our establishment, say a Bookkeeper, General Manager, or Out-post Agent of long standing and experience in the house, receives about 800*l.* a year. You may take this as our maximum. In the next grade come the Managers of special Departments, receiving from 500*l.* to 700*l.*, according to length of service or other circumstances. What may be called ordinary office-hands are paid from 100 dollars to 100 taels per month, while youngsters or beginners get 50 to 75 dollars per month. We find each man a bed-room, with a certain amount of furniture, and we furnish fuel and lights. Each clerk further receives a mess allowance of 60 dollars a month, and takes his meals when he pleases, the house providing nothing except a dining-room and a kitchen, which can be used by those who wish to make up a mess."

It only remains for me to notice the closing paragraph of your Excellency's despatch, with respect to the inexpediency of admitting such a possibility as that juniors should purchase their oilman's stores, &c., on the spot, at an advanced rate, of 100 or 200 per cent. rate upon home prices. As it happens in the case of this particular port, a class of Chinese storekeepers has sprung up, who buy up at auctions all kinds of oilman's stores, &c., and retail them at prices little, if at all, above home rates, so that a junior can supply himself on the spot with the best of such articles without any difficulty. In the case of wines and liquors, however, he has not this facility, and he cannot provide himself from England or the Continent, without stinting himself to send home a large remittance at one time—a self-denial every one cannot be expected to exercise. He, consequently, must buy when he can from foreign firms here, and the rates charged are as follows:—

Sherry	7 to 10 taels per dozen.
Port	Ditto.
Claret	8 to 12 taels per dozen.
Ditto, ordinaire	3 to 5 taels per dozen.
Brandy	12 dollars per dozen.
Beer	12 dollars per cask, of 4 dozen.
Ditto, draught	14 to 18 dollars per kilderkin; 30 to 35 dollars per barrel.

Local brew of draught beer, when obtainable, half-price.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 8 in No. 4.

Tabular Statement of the Cost of Living.

I.—Average Market Value of the Principal Articles of Food.

	Per lb. Cents.		Per lb. Cents.
Beef	12 to 16	Suet	12 to 16
Mutton	20 30	Flour	8 12
Tongues	50 80	Bread	8 12
Veal	22 30	Potatoes	8 10
Pork	25 30	Garden stuff	Expensive
Fish	20 100	Rice	34 37

II.—Average price of Fuel, Oil, and Gas.

		Dollars.			Cents.
Coal ..	Per ton ..	12 to 13	Wood ..	Per 100 catties .	50 to 60
		Cents.	Oil . ..	Per catty ..	8 15
Charcoal ..	Per 50 catties ..	50	Gas . ..	Per 1,000 ft. ..	—

III.—Average Wages of Domestic Servants, and Price of Labour.

	Per Mensem. Dollars.		Per Mensem. Dollars.
Compradores	30 to 60	Gatekeepers	6 to 8
Head boys	10 30		Per diem. Cents.
Boys	8 16		
Female servants	10 20	Tailors	50
House coolies	6 10	Carpenters	50
Cooks	12 20	Masons	40
Grooms	6 8	Glaziers	50
Watchmen	6 8		

IV.—House-rent, and Estimated Rate of Interest on Original Cost.

Rate of interest charged on original outlay, including entire premises, is about 15 per cent. Rents for rooms range from 35 dollars to 50 dollars per month; for houses of six to eight rooms, 800 dollars to 1,500 dollars per annum.

V.—Usual charges for Medical Attendance and Medicines, by Foreign Practitioners.

5 taels a visit, or 50 taels per annum for each individual. Mr. Vice-Consul Forrest, for instance, pays 150 taels per annum, say 50*l.*, for himself, wife, and European female servant. Medicine, which is extra, is 75 tael cents per bottle; and four pills cost the same amount.

VI.—Chair and Boat-hire, and the necessity therefor.

Chair-hire, on ordinary occasions, costs 50 cents for an ordinary visit; two chair coolies cost 12 dollars per mensem. It is utterly impossible to go out in the hot weather, which lasts six months, without one. It must be borne in mind that there are no other means of conveyance in Shanghae, unless a resident keeps his private carriage. Native boats cost 25 cents per hour. In a large port like Shanghae, where as many as 400 vessels assemble, and where no Consulate boat is kept, the necessity to resort to these craft is obvious.

VII.—Average Rate of Remuneration to Clerks or Assistants in Banks and Mercantile Houses of different Nationalities.

See body of despatch.

No. 5.

Consul Robertson to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received November* 20.)

Sir, *Canton, October* 11, 1869.

UNDER instructions from Sir Rutherford Alcock, dated the 15th of September last, I have the honour to inclose copies of the replies which I have sent in answer to

Circulars Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12, of the 6th July, and No. 13 of the 12th August, from Her Majesty's Legation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Robertson.

Sir, *Peking, September* 15, 1869.

I HAVE to instruct you to forward direct to the Foreign Office, copies of the replies which you sent in answer to the Circulars Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12, of the 6th July, and No. 13 of the 12th August, from this office, all of which bear upon a report on the Consular Establishment which I am about to make, and will be referred to in my despatch to Lord Clarendon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Consul Robertson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Canton, August* 5, 1869.

IN obedience to the instructions conveyed in your Circular despatch No. 9 of the 6th of July, I have the honour to inclose returns of the subordinates on this establishment, distinguishing their ranks, pay, and period of service, and on which I beg to offer the following remarks.

You will observe that the period of service of the subordinates, both Writers, Linguists, Constable, and Servants are of considerable standing, in two cases only being of one year, and one was a death vacancy, and the other a discharge for gambling. This speaks well for the character of the men employed, and no complaint has ever been lodged against them.

The wages are moderate, compared with the rates that rule in mercantile establishments, and certainly moderate when reduced into sterling; for instance, take 6 dollars per month as an average of the servants wages, and which may be considered 15*l.* per annum; for this they feed and clothe themselves, and living at the office, are always available for service, day or night. The Writers and Linguists are of a superior class—the former, men of education, and the latter, proficient in English, both written and verbal. In a place like Canton, where long distances have to be covered, and the community is divided by a broad river, a larger establishment of messengers is requisite, than under other circumstances, with so much communication as there necessarily is with the Chinese authorities, largely increased by constant requisitions from the Hong Kong Government, a superior class of writers is a necessity, and these cannot be obtained under the rate of wages now paid.

The Linguists are also a necessity as Interpreters of the Canton dialect, one at the Yamên in the city, and the other at the office or Shamien.

The Constable is an Indian-born British subject. As the coast-steamers anchor off the city and there is constant conveyance of prisoners from and to Hong Kong, his services are useful and necessary.

I do not see that the subordinate establishment of this Consulate could be lowered without disadvantage to the public service, or the wages either, without malpractices and extortion being resorted to by the subordinates to pay their way.

They are barely sufficient as it is, and I am frequently applied to for an increase on the grounds of the increased expenses of the necessities of life—the truth of which I am well cognizant of. Indeed I can only attribute their remaining in the service when the wages' rates are so much higher outside, to the unwillingness Chinese feel for change, and the good treatment they meet with.

I have also the honour to inclose similar returns for the Whampoa Vice-Consular establishment, and returns of the number of British subjects, distinguishing those of European or Colonial origin, confined in the lock-ups or gaols of this establishment, with the average length of confinement in each case, and also an account of the monies expended on medical assistance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

RETURN of Subordinates employed at the British Consulate, Canton.

Name.	Position.	Period of Service.	Wages Per Month.	Remarks.
		Years.	$	
Writers and Linguists.				
1. Cha-sia-fung ..	Head Writer ..	1	30	At Shamien.
2. Lu-hsiao-ting ..	Writer	12	26	Yamên.
3 Ng-mun-ching ..	Linguist	12	35	Shamien.
4. Chen-yung	Ditto	11	15	Yamên.
5. Li-muu-hiang ..	Copyist	4	14	Shamien.
Constable.				
6. A. Duncan	Constable	7	50	Ditto.
Messengers, Boatmen, Runners, Coolies, &c.				
7. Hwang-sheng ..	Messenger	12	9	Ditto.
8. Lee-poey	Ditto	11	9	Ditto.
9. Lai-lien	Ditto	12	8	Ditto.
10. Chen-hwan	Ditto	12	7	Ditto.
11. Yun-yun	Ditto	7	6	Yamên.
12. Ho-cha	Ditto	12	6	Ditto.
13. Lao-wang	Ditto	3	6	Ditto.
14. Mung-ying	Ditto	3	6	Ditto.
15. Lum-a-cheong ..	Office Coolie .	4	7	Shamien.
16. Chow-a-kum . ..	Boatman	11	7	Ditto.
17. Chow-a-poo . ..	Ditto	11	7	Ditto.
18. Chow-a-cheong ..	Ditto	1	7	Ditto.
19. Leang-a-tung ..	Ditto	4	7	Ditto.
20. Li-a-yum	Watchman	4	6	Ditto.
21. Ou-hung-fu . ..	Ditto	4	6	Ditto.
22. Lao-tsat	Ditto	8	6	Yamê .
23. Lao-kum	Ditto	9	6	Ditto.
24. Chay-yun	Chair-Bearer ..	3	5	Ditto.
25. Wing sheng . ..	Ditto	4	5	Ditto.
26. Woo-cheng	Ditto	4	5	Ditto.
27. Peng-tai	Ditto	4	5	Ditto.
28. A-hwei	Cemetery Keeper ..	3½	6	Macao.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

Canton, August 5, 1869.

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

RETURN of Subordinates employed at the British Vice-Consulate, Whampoa.

Name.	Position.	Period of Service.	Wages Per Month.	Remarks.
		Years.	$	
Linguist.				
1. Wong-kai ..	Linguist ..	4	15	Allowed 4 dollars a-month for rent.
Constable.				
2. J. H. Jones ..	Constable ..	4½	50	European.
Boatmen, Watchmen, &c.				
3. Yun-sien . ..	Boatman ..	6	7	The boatmen not only act as such in communication with the shipping, &c., but keep the Consular grounds in order, act as gatekeepers and office coolies in rotation; wash and keep in order the gaol and office; carry the water necessary for this purpose; and attend on and cook for all prisoners.
4. A-how	Ditto	2	7	
5. A-kai	Ditto	10	7	
6. A-yat	Ditto	7	7	
7. A-lum	Ditto	2	7	
8. A-hum	Watchman ..	4	7	

(Signed) HY. HANCE, *Vice-Consul.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 5.

RETURN of Prisoners confined in the British Gaol at Canton in 1868.

Asiatic	24
European	13
Total	27
Average days	6

Remark.—Any medical assistance required is afforded by the medical officer attached to Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

Canton, August 5, 1869.

Inclosure 6 in No. 5.

RETURN of Prisoners confined in the British Gaol at Whampoa during 1868.

Origin.	Number.	Days.	Average days.
Europeans	15	111	7½
Asiatics	..	..	..
Total	15	111	7½

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

Canton, August 5, 1869.

Inclosure 7 in No. 5.

RETURN showing Amount paid for Medical Assistance.

Name.	Position.	Salary.
Dr. Wong-fun ..	Salaried Medical Officer ..	500 dollars per annum.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

Canton, August 5, 1869.

Inclosure 8 in No. 5.

Consul Robertson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Canton, August* 14, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Circular despatch No. 10 of the 6th of July, requiring information as to the direct and indirect trade at the Port of Canton, with reference to both being carried into general account of imports and exports instead of being distinguished as re-exports, and in reply to state that in the Annual Returns of Trade I made here, the re-exports are clearly and separately set forth, and being deducted from the total the net value of imports is alone carried into account.

This I believe to be the practice at all the ports, and consequently the value of trade is not fictitiously increased by the addition of imports *in transitu.*

I have, &c.

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 9 in No. 5.

Coasul Robertson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Canton, August* 5, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Circular despatch (Accountant's Department) No. 11 of the 6th July with reference to the tendency of

trade to pass from the hands of British subjects into those of Chinese, and requesting information on the subject.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to supply statistics on such a subject, and general results are the only basis on which to form an opinion. At Canton, for instance, the import trade in piece goods and manufactures has year by year ceased to be made by or through the agency of foreign firms, and I am correct in saying that for the past two years not one piece has been so imported.

Canton, however, cannot be taken as a fair criterion owing to its propinquity to the Colony of Hong Kong, to which the Chinese merchant can resort and purchase such quantities of merchandize as suit him. In articles of foreign produce the same facility prevails, consequently the passing of imports from the hands of British into that of Chinese merchants, is a natural result, and attributable to no other cause than convenience.

As regards exports, teas are occasionally shipped to the English market on Chinese account through European agency, but the practice is not so common as to assume importance as yet. Formerly a great deal was done by or through foreign firms in Chinese produce for the Coast Ports, such as medicines, dried fruits, silk, and silk-piece goods, nankeens, and a variety of articles in Chinese use, which are commonly denominated "chow-chow cargo," but the facilities afforded by foreign steamers enabling the Chinese merchants to charter or take tonnage, and, above all, to insure their goods, have removed this branch of trade from foreign hands, and it is now entirely carried on by native firms.

I omitted to state with reference to Indian raw cotton that the import still, in a great measure, continues in the hands of the Indian native merchants.

My knowledge of the foreign trade gradually changing hands is necessarily, from the position of Canton, very limited, and is gathered from reports and private information rather than personal observation, but I have no reason to doubt their authenticity, as I need only refer to the Trade Report of Mr. Consul Medhurst, of Shanghae, for the past year, in which he mentions as "a remarkable feature in the general aspect of trade the growing share which Chinese proprietors take in it," and adduces proofs thereof; evidence from such a trustworthy source is of importance, and I was glad to see it in support of opinions I have more than once expressed on the subject.

The question next to be considered is how a charge of this kind will affect foreign interests—will it cripple or will it enlarge them? and the reply necessarily involves various considerations.

If taken from a narrow point of view, it bodes no good to local foreign establishments, for they lose a source of profit which the manipulation of merchandize in a fluctuating market necessarily offers, but on the other hand, taking it in a broader sense, there is no doubt that being in Chinese hands will, to use the words in Lord Clarendon's despatch, "tend to a larger development of trade in British goods," and consequently what the local mercantile establishments may lose will be recouped tenfold to the home manufacturers by the increased demand; and the reason is obvious. Chinese can work a trade much more economically than foreigners after the first cost of laying down goods; they have facilities of getting them into the interior markets, they know what is wanted, they can afford to sell at cheaper rates, and are satisfied with less profits. To obtain these goods two courses are open—they can import them direct from England, which some do, or purchase them in the Hong Kong or Shanghae markets, and ship them for the Ports.

In this way the system works well for the extension of trade, for merchandize passes into the hands of traders who can and know how to distribute it, and thus an increased consumption is obtained and a consequent demand and supply.

In some respects it works well, too, for the foreign merchant. The Chinese trader goes to his godowns and purchases what he requires and takes it away. There are no shipping, freight, or insurance charges for sending goods on speculation to the various Ports where they may arrive at a falling or depressed market, no duties or Custom-house to look after, and consequently he can afford to sell at lower rates and with less risk and trouble; but there is this before him. The Chinese are fast arriving at the knowledge that they can import direct from England cheaper than they can purchase here, and I have heard that the establishment of an agency in Manchester has been mooted, and this in all probability would have been carried into effect, but foreigners have laid down goods for them at the usual agency charges, which answers their purpose at present. There is every prospect, therefore, that as far as imports are concerned, the business of foreign firms in them will ere long be simply agency.

I do not refer to opium, for that is a speciality and Chinese have not touched it as yet.

This change in the destination of trade is good for foreign shipping. Coast steamers of large tonnage are chartered by Chinese merchants, or tonnage is engaged by them and they come to Canton to load for the ports, and at the ports for Hong Kong.

The old junk trade is entirely annihilated, and Chinese goods and passengers proceed by foreign steamers or sailing-vessels only. Security to life and property is thus secured; indeed, the Chinese are large shareholders in foreign steamers, and thus have an interest in their employment.

Respecting the extent to which any such change may effect Consular protection, I do not see that it will affect it at all.

The tendency is to employ foreign steamers and vessels, and whether their cargoes are British-owned or not is of no consequence, for until they are discharged they are under British protection. Indeed, the probability is, goods will always arrive consigned to some foreign firm, who will take delivery and subsequently hand them over to the real owners, the Chinese; and on the contrary, I am inclined to think a change in the destination of trade, if change of hands may be so termed, is likely to originate more causes for Consular interference from questions of ownership and contracts and the many causes of dispute which arise, than exist when it is solely in foreign hands; and the more it increases the greater will be the employment of our ships, both steamers and sailing-vessels.

I have occasionally warned our people of the change occurring in the import trade and told them to look to it, but they know it better than I do, and probably see that the days of monopoly have passed away and that a new order of things has its compensations if it has its drawbacks, and at all events that trade is influenced and regulated by laws against which there is no appeal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 10 in No. 5.

Consul Robertson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Canton, August* 5, 1869.

IN accordance with the instructions conveyed in your Circular despatch of the 6th of July, I have the honour to forward a return showing the accounts of rents and insurance, including allowances for lodgings paid at this Consulate during the year 1868, and also the expenditure on Consulate buildings and furniture, and I beg to submit the following remarks:—

Rent and Insurance.—The Shamien site is held by Her Majesty's Government under lease at a ground-rent of 1,500 cash per month. The 104 dollars in the return is the amount of annual payment to the Chinese Government for the lots, twenty-six in number, yet unoccupied.

Rent Allowance to Whampoa Constable.—This ceased with the completion of the new buildings.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 11 in No. 5.

TABLE showing the Amount of Rent and Insurance paid in the Year 1868.

			$	c.	$	c.
1.	Rent of Yamên in the city				277	77
2.	Ground-rent of gate at ditto				20	0
3.	Ground-rent of Shamien site:—					
	Total paid to Chinese Government		396	0		
	Deduct amount refunded by leaseholders		291	56		
					104	44
4.	Ground-rent of Whampoa Consulate				100	0
5.	Rent allowance to Whampoa Constable, 10 months, at 6 dollars per month				60	0
6.	Ditto ditto Linguist, 12 months, at 4 dollars per month				18	0
7.	Insurance on Canton Consular buildings				250	0
8.	Ditto on Whampoa ditto				111	55
	Total				971	76

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

Inclosure 12 in No. 5.

Expenditure on Buildings and Repairs during 1868.

		$ c.	$ c.
1.	Gaol buildings at Whampoa		8,750 0
2.	Printing forms for Major Crossman, R. E.		30 0
3.	Yamên repairs	33 67	
4.	Ditto	66 67	
5.	Ditto	43 34	
6.	Ditto	16 0	
			159 68
7.	1 grate in Yamên		16 0
8.	Two grates at Whampoa		30 0
9.	Back verandah at Vice-Consul's house, Canton		800 0
10.	Repairs to Consulate, Canton	32 73	
11.	Ditto	14 42	
12.	Ditto	8 50	
			55 65
13.	Replacing staff and stays, Whampoa		40 0
14.	Lamp and bracket at ditto		6 40
15.	Bamboo ladder for gaol, Whampoa		1 0
16.	Flooring at Yamên		320 0
17.	Painting Whampoa Vice-Consulate		220 0
	Total		10,428 73

(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON, *Consul.*

Inclosure 13 in No. 5.

Consul Robertson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Canton, September 8, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Circular despatch No. 13 of the 12th of August, relative to every Consul being of opinion that his port is the most expensive in China, and as they cannot all be in that position, directing me to make a return of prices of provisions, wages rents, and such like for the information of Her Majesty's Government, for its guidance in the approaching general revision of the establishment and its expenses.

Accordingly, I have the honour to inclose a statement on the subject with a certified list annexed, together with a statement of the cost of maintenance of a small household on an income of, say 700*l.* a year, which perhaps will show more clearly than anything what living at Canton is.

Whatever my private opinion has been, I am not aware I have ever called your Excellency's attention to the subject of your circular as matter for complaint, but it stands to reason that the southern ports are greatly at a disadvantage with the northern ones: for at the latter, beef, mutton, game, wild fowl, and provisions of all kinds are cheap and plentiful; while at the former, mutton is chiefly, if not entirely, imported from the north, and of game there is none, a few wild fowl, indifferent and dear, alone being procurable in the cool season, and not even sea-fish are obtainable while the Colony of Hong Kong drains this market of nearly everything, and what is left is both bad and dear. Probably Canton is exceptional, being so near to the large European Colony of Hong Kong. I can, however, but say what I know of it, and what my experience of the cost of living is.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

Inclosure 14 in No. 5.

Memorandum by Messrs. Giffard and Moul on the Cost of Living at Canton.

A LIST of the more common articles of food, with their prices is annexed, but it cannot be said to form a criterion of the expense incurred under the head of messing. In the first place, it should be stated that the price of any article supplied by Chinese, varies according to the means and position of the person to whom it is supplied.

However anomalous it may seem, it cannot be questioned that the merchant pays for any article as much more than the Consular or Customs officer, as the latter pays more than the Missionary, and the same gradation exists with regard to charges demanded from the Tidewaiter, the Parsee, the Portuguese, and, finally, the nondescript.

A rise or fall in the price of the necessaries of life affects a foreigner but in an unappreciable degree, and while famine prices may be ruling among the Chinese populace, the European will know of them but by hearsay.

In theory a foreigner may have abundance at a moderate charge, but practically it is found impossible to live under a sum which before it is tested would appear to be extravagant.

The reason is obvious; the advantage which a domestic has over his master from his ignorance of the language is quite sufficient to make the latter helpless in any transaction, leaving out of the question the superior cunning of the Chinaman; also, as a rule, members of this service are so circumstanced that a separate establishment is a necessity, and this being the case, it is impossible to avoid considerable waste, or what in the present question is much the same, supplying with food dependents who are supposed to maintain themselves.

2. With regard to fuel, &c.—

Coals may be bought at rates varying from 10 to 14 dollars per ton; wood at from 25 to 35 cents per cwt.

Charcoal 1·25 dollars per cwt., and oil 8 dollars per cwt., or 75 cents a gallon.

The remarks made with regard to food, apply in a greater measure to fuel. More difficulty would be experienced in checking the unauthorized consumption of these articles by servants, than in the case of edibles. With regard to the latter, a person might to a certain extent detect fraud by carefully taking stock, and noting the amount consumed at each sitting, but in the case of fuel, a master is entirely at the mercy of his domestics, however accurate in his calculations he may be, for unless he himself assumes charge of the coal cellar, and thus does away with the necessity of keeping a servant for that purpose, it is beyond his power to limit their rapacity. A fair amount to set aside for fuel for one man, during one winter, is about 25 dollars.

3. The wages of boys range from 6 to 10 dollars a month, but still a good servant may be obtained for the lesser sum.

Coolies are paid 5 and 7 dollars per mensem, and the wages of cooks may be between 6 and 12 dollars a month. These sums, however, represent but a portion of the actual expense on this head; it is understood that a servant supplies himself with food and clothes, but it may be safely stated that in one way or another, however unwittingly or unwillingly, the master provides more than half of his domestic's food. Any interference on this head will result, if not to the servant's satisfaction, at least to the master's detriment, in the breakage of a certain amount of furniture or crockery.

A watchman requires 6 dollars per month, and a gardener about the same. A day labourer may be had at 20 to 25 cents a day.

4 *House Rent.*—It is difficult to state generally the rent of houses: they differ so much in size, locality, and convenience of site, that the circumstances need be stated to give an idea of the expense; it is presumed that information is required as to houses such as would satisfy the requirements of Consular officers, whether juniors or those holding the higher posts. A small bungalow containing three or four rooms is let for 30 dollars a month, and rent rising with increased accommodation, reaches 250 dollars per month for a large house containing five or six bed-rooms, sitting-rooms, offices, stables, &c. These rates are stated with reference to houses conveniently situated. The same amount of accommodation might be secured for a much smaller amount in a less desirable quarter, where an unpleasant neighbourhood and objectionable smells might tend greatly to lower the value of an otherwise suitable residence The rate of interest the rent constitutes on the original cost of building, in the case of houses lately erected, may be put down at 10 per cent. In the cases of houses, the advantages of which may have become less apparent, the rent bears of course a much smaller proportion to the original outlay.

5. The charge for medical attendance varies from 50 to 100 dollars, according to the means of the parties, and if not contracted for, usually 5 dollars, but 25 dollars a visit exclusive of medicine has been charged.

6. Chair coolies are paid at the rate of from 50 to 85 cents a day per man. Boat hire of course depends on the boat; a small sampan, 30 to 60 cents a day; other boats, 1 to 10 dollars, according to size and demand. Boatmen 6 to 8 dollars a month. The necessity for the use of boats and chairs is perhaps greater at Canton than at any other port. There is continual intercourse between the Consul and the various

Chinese authorities, and in addition, the Consul's residence is separated from the Consular Office by some three miles of street, which are at all times objectionable, and in the hot weather impossible to traverse on foot. Most of the foreign merchants and four of the Treaty Consuls have their offices and residences on the other side of a broad river which divides the community.

7. In Canton there are no foreign banks, but in mercantile houses English or American clerks are paid 300*l.* to 500*l.* per annum, Germans rather less, and Macao Portuguese 75*l.* to 300*l.* per annum. It must be borne in mind, however, that with the exception of the last, mercantile clerks have a table provided for them, and if not, an allowance is made for messing, which is not included in the above rates of salary. In the same way they are provided with house accommodation, or with means to procure the same, so that, as a matter of fact, the only expense they occur is on account of clothes and luxuries. Another advantage which indirectly affects the question of remuneration, is that which mercantile employés derive from the existence of a head or branch firm, or a residence at Hong Kong or Macao, whither they may repair for change, while with the Consular officer the desire for change of air is frequently the cause of a struggle between purse and health.

8. Freight from England is at 2*l.* to 2*l.* 10*s.* per ton of forty feet, insurance at $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 per cent. At first sight it would appear that home provisions might be laid down at very little more than cost price, but as a matter of fact it is found more economical and convenient to pay the somewhat exorbitant charges of storekeepers. The want of funds, the uncertainty of one's station six months hence, the trouble and risk of carrying provisions about as personal baggage from port to port, and the possibility of mistakes being made at home, all tend to make the China resident, and particularly the Consular officer have recourse to the foreign store, whereby his purchases are more evenly distributed over the year, and more sparingly consumed when the appreciable diminution of a small supply so unmistakeably points to the necessity of an immediate renewal.

While on the question of a Consular officer's expenditure, it would not be right to omit mentioning the large outlay on unavoidable luxuries, such as subscriptions to reading rooms, charitable contributions, and many such calls, which at home may be evaded far more easily than in China, where every foreigner of any standing is a prominent member of the community.

Articles of Food.

	$ c.	$ c.		$ c.	$ c.
Beef, per catty	0 10	to 0 14	Cabbage, Macao, per catty .	0 20	
Mutton, ditto	0 30	0 50	Carrots and turnips, ditto .	0 1	to 0 2
Pork, ditto	0 8	0 15	Cucumbers, ditto ..	0 2	0 3
Fowls	0 20	0 30	Beans, ditto	0 3	0 4
Ducks	0 15	0 20	Pears and apples . ..	0 25	
Pigeons	0 20	0 25	Pineapple, ditto . ..	0 4	0 5
Geese	0 12	0 15	Melons, ditto	0 25	0 30
Fish	0 15	0 20	Bananas, ditto	0 1	0 $1\frac{1}{2}$
Flour	0 4	0 7	Milk, 10 catties	1 0	
Bread, per 20 lbs. . ..	1 0		Ice	0 10	
Rice, per catty	0 2	0 5	Tea, inferior	0 25	0 35
Potatoes, ditto	0 6	0 10	,, superior, best ..	1 0	3 0
Cabbage, native, ditto ..	0 1	0 2	Sugar	0 4	0 9

A catty weighs $1\frac{1}{3}$ lb. avoirdupois.

Fuel, Oil, &c.

	$ c.	$ c.		$ c.
Coal, per ton	10 0	to 14 0	Oil, per cwt.	8 0
Wood, per cwt.	0 25	0 35	,, per gallon	0 75
Charcoal, ditto	1 25			

Servants' Labour, &c.

	$	$		$ c.	$ c.
Boys, per mensem	6	to 10	Watchmen, per mensem ..	6 0	
Coolies, ditto	5	7	Gardener, ditto	6 0	
Cooks, ditto	6	12	Labourers, per diem ..	0 20	0 25

House Rent.

	$
Small bungalow, 3 to 4 rooms, per mensem	30
House, middle size, 6 to 7 rooms, with garden, offices, per mensem	100
Large house, with garden, stables, offices, up to, per mensem	250

The rates of the yearly rent to the cost of building and site, about one-tenth, or, 10 per cent.

Medical Attendance.		
If previously agreed to, according to means, per annum	$	50 to 100
Occasional visits, according to distance and urgency	$	5 25
Medicines amount, in the aggregate, to, per dose	$	1
Chair, Coolie, Boat-hire,	$ c.	$ c.
Chair coolies, per day, per man, according to demand	0 50	to 0 85
Small boat, per day	0 30	0 60
Large ditto, according to size and demand	1 0	10 0
Boatman, per month	6 0	8 0
Clerks, Assistants.	£	£
English and American, per annum	300	to 500
Germans, ditto	200	400
With messing or extra allowance.		
Macao Portuguese	75	300
Freight, Insurance.	£ s.	£ s.
From England, per ton	2 0	to 2 10
Ditto, by steamer, per ton	3 0	3 10
Insurance	$2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 per cent.	

We, the Undersigned British merchants certify that, to the best of our knowledge, the prices, wages, salaries, charges, &c., set opposite the above stated article, accommodation services, &c., are those ruling at the Port of Canton.

(Signed) P. GIFFORD, J. MOUL, } *British Merchants.*

Inclosure 15 in No. 5.

ESTIMATE of the annual cost of living at Canton for a family of two persons (husband and wife) on a salary of 700*l.* per annum, less Income Tax, equal to 3,210 dollars, based on an experience of four years, during which an accurate account of expenditure has been kept, and every unnecessary expense carefully avoided.

	Per Mensem.	Per Annum.
	Dollars.	Dollars.
Household expenses (exclusive of all entertaining) viz., table, wine and beer, washing, &c.	105	1,260
Servants' wages	44	528
Clothing for two persons	30	360
Sundries, including repairs to and renewal of furniture (but not original outlay for the same), books, and newspapers, charitable and other subscriptions, &c.	30	360
Medical expenses	..	150
Travelling ditto. Health trip once a-year, amounting, on an average, to at least	..	100
Insurance premium on policy for 1,000*l.*	..	220
Ditto, household effects	..	25
	..	3,003
Leaving a margin of	..	207
Total income	..	3,210

In reality, extraordinary expenses of one kind or another more than absorb any margin such as the above.

In the case on which the above figures are based, the officer, starting clear in May 1865, finds himself in September 1869, in debt to the amount of 200*l.*, and with no prospect of saving sufficient funds in the course of a twelvemonth to enable him to defray the cost of his own and his wife's passage home, in the event of being invalided, or otherwise obliged to take leave of absence. This is after more than ten years' service, and the practice of economy above the usual average.

As regards laying by any money as a provision for the future, this is entirely out of the question.

Inclosure 16 in No. 5.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Robertson.

Sir, *Peking, September* 9, 1869.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches Nos. 18 to 21 of August 5 and 11 last.

As regards No. 19, forwarding a list of the servants at Canton and Whampoa, it seems to me that eight Messengers are a large establishment of this class of servants. I shall be glad to hear from you whether a reduction cannot be effected without disadvantage under this head.

Your, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 17 in No. 5.

Consul Robertson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Canton, October* 9, 1869.

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 20 of the 9th September, I have the honour to state that eight Messengers are no more than the exigencies of the office require, and less could not, without great inconvenience, be done with; but I think in the Interpreter's department, by not filling up a death vacancy of a Writer which has just occurred, a saving of fourteen dollars per month may be effected, and this I would recommend in preference to a reduction in the number of Messengers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. B. ROBERTSON.

No. 6.

Consul Caine to Mr. Hammond.—(Received November 30.)

Sir, *Hankow, October* 6, 1869.

BY direction of Her Majesty's Minister in China I have the honour to forward copies of the following despatches:—

Despatch dated 26th July last, detailing staff of servants employed in this Consulate

Despatch dated 29th July last, reporting that foreign trade is rapidly passing into the hands of the Chinese.

Despatch dated 26th July last, giving expenditure at this Consulate on account of rent, insurance, &c.

Despatch dated 27th July last, on subject of "allowances" to officers of this Consulate.

Despatch dated 6th September last, giving prices of principal articles of food, &c.

No communication was sent to Peking on the subject of "direct" trade, as I had already stated in my Report for 1868 that "there is no direct import trade of any consequence from either Great Britain or British Colonies; nearly the whole of the imports coming either from Shanghae or other Chinese ports."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Consul Caine to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Hankow, July* 26, 1869.

I HAVE now the honour to reply to Circular No. 9 of the 6th instant.

There is at this Consulate the following staff of servants,—namely, one Writer, who receives a salary of 40 dollars a month; he helps the Interpreter with translations of despatches, makes fair copies of these, and keeps the Chinese books of the office.

One Linguist, at 20 dollars a month; this servant helps in the Interpreter's office, and enters all Chinese despatches in the books; he also supervises the Chinese establishment, and interprets in petty police cases.

A Constable (European), 60 dollars a month; this officer has charge of the jail, effects arrests, serves summonses, &c.

A native Constable at 8 dollars per month, and another at 6 dollars per month; these convey Chinese offenders to the native authorities, and accompany the Consul in all official visits, &c.

Five Messengers at 5 dollars per month each; these men carry all official despatches from the Consul to the authorities or merchants, and accompany him in his official visits; they also attend to the cleanliness of the public offices and also man the Consular boat.

One Porter at 5 dollars. This man occupies the lodge at the office entrance to the Consulate, and sees that no idlers enter the premises.

Two Watchmen at 5 dollars each; one keeps watch all night around the Consulate and the other round the Interpreter's and Assistants' quarters.

The Constable employed at this Consulate is a Swede.

There were but two prisoners (British) confined in the jail during 1868, one for three weeks, the other three days.

TABLE showing the Establishment at Hankow Establishment.

Office.	Wages per Month.	Wages per Year.
	$	£ s.
1 Writer	40	102 0
1 Linguist	20	51 0
1 Constable (European)	60	153 0
1 ditto (Chinese)	8	20 8
1 ditto (ditto)	6	15 6
5 Messengers	25	63 15
1 Porter	5	12 15
2 Watchmen	10	25 10
Total	..	443 14

The above wages as stated are the rates ruling at Hankow. I do not consider the establishment too large; a comparison with the Customs staff and the wages paid, as given in the accompanying Table, will show that the Consulate servants do not receive high wages. Were very low wages paid it would be either impossible to obtain respectable men or else those employed would be open to bribes.

Pay of Chinese servants in Customs employ—

	£	
1st Class Linguist	600	per annum.
3rd Class „	400	„
5th Class „	200	„
Writers	80	„

Copyists, from 20 to 12 taels per month.
Coolies, 5 taels per month.
Gatekeepers, 4 taels per month.
Watchmen, 8 and 6 taels per month.

300 taels per annum is allowed for medical attendance at this port, but this amount was not paid till February of this year.

Your, &c.
(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Consul Caine to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Hankow, July* 29, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to make the following observations in reply to your Excellency's Circular No. 11 of 6th instant:—

There can be no doubt that foreign trade in imports is rapidly passing into the hands of the Chinese.

As regards this Port, it was to be expected that so long as the Taeping rebellion existed, Chinese could not cope with the foreigner. But since peace has been established

the natives possess the same advantages as the foreigners at a greatly reduced expenditure in conducting their business.

They can ship goods by river steamers, and can avail themselves of insurance on the mutual system. Trade, now that the country is pacified, has reverted to its original channel, viz., Shanghae—the great banking centre—where the extensive banking systems of the Chinese offer greater facilities than foreign banks can or will afford them. Moreover, the expenses of their business establishments, as compared with foreign firms, are very much lighter; and they are content with a small profit, on which a foreigner would starve.

Some firms still import large quantities of foreign goods, and for the sake of moving off their goods, are content to sell at even a slight loss on Shanghae rates, when the price pays on import cost. See my Trade Report for 1868, in which I have compared the goods imported by foreigners with those imported by Chinese.

It is the transit-pass system which alone keeps any of the import trade in the hands of the foreigner. When natives no longer fear the exactions of their own corrupt officials, or transit passes cease to be respected, then foreign merchants may retire from Hankow, unless, indeed, permission for the merchant to travel where he likes, to dispose of his goods, be accorded by the Chinese Government.

As regards this last point, I believe the Government is willing to permit of residence in the interior to the foreigner, provided he submits himself to Chinese law, under which proviso no one would, of course, enter the country.

But could it not be left to the Consul at the port from which the merchant starts, to allow only such as he knew to be trustworthy, to proceed into the interior; and then only if the person so desiring to proceed were a member of a firm at the port in question. A bond should be given also for a heavy amount to insure good behaviour.

The Consul, moreover, should have it in his power to recall, for misconduct, a merchant so resident, at any time, and for the slightest offence. By some such method as the above, it appears to me, that the conduct of foreigners in the country might be regulated without giving offence to the native officials.

In the tea districts here the Russians, though dressing as Europeans, receive not the slightest molestation, and live in the greatest harmony with the natives. I had the pleasure of spending a few days last winter at two of these establishments, and was consequently able to judge of the feeling of the people towards them.

The export trade being principally tea is likely to continue in foreigners' hands, unless indeed Shanghae, as it has done this season, draws away this trade by paying higher prices for chops than were ruling here.

The Hankow merchants were congratulating themselves on having at last a chance of making up for the severe losses of the last two years, when, in consequence of the higher prices at Shanghae, the Chinese tea men shipped off all remaining chops to that port. It is this great competition among themselves which causes these ruinous prices; and if merchants would only combine, as the Chinese do, they would have a good prospect of making money.

At Swatow, where I was Consul for eight years, the trade had almost completely passed into the hands of the natives. Most of the Chinese hongs were connected with Singapore, and generally employed a Singapore-born Chinese as Linguist, to transact all their shipping and Customs business; and in imports these hongs sent one of their members to Hong Kong to purchase goods and accompany them back in the steamer. This plan was found cheaper than paying the commission asked by the foreign merchant.

Should, however, the transit-pass system come into force at Swatow I have no doubt the foreign merchant will, for some time at least, have all the trade with Chaochow-foo and the country beyond.

Your, &c.
(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Consul Caine to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Hankow, July 26, 1869.*

THE accompanying Table gives the information applied for in your Excellency's Circular No. 12 of the 6th instant.

Expenditure in 1868, on account of—

	£	s.	d.
Rent	321	3	1
Insurance	53	0	7½
Lodging allowance..	9	0	0¾
Repairs to buildings, &c.	*15	12	3
Furniture	8	14	5½

Your, &c.
(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

Consul Caine to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Hankow, July* 27, 1869.

REFERRING to your Excellency's despatch of 6th July, intimating the views of Her Majesty's Government regarding the question of the continuation of the existing temporary allowances to officers of this Consulate, I beg to assure your Excellency that the cost of living, so far from decreasing, has continued steadily to increase at this port, since the period when the allowances were first granted. As an example, I may mention that oil, which is an article in much request in the East for household purposes, has risen from 8,000 to 11,200 cash per picul.

The charges for foreign stores are exorbitant, on an average the cost here being 150 per cent. on the home rates.

Servants' wages are also high, as compared with what is paid in the southern ports.

I may remind your Excellency that Consular officers, although required to keep up a certain position, are notoriously the worst paid people in the East; that owing to their poverty and the consequent curtailment of what, in temperate climates might be deemed luxuries, but which in China are decidedly necessaries, the health and constitutions of Consular functionaries suffer.

Clerks in a mercantile house (for which post a knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic is all that is required) are provided (in addition to salary ranging from 250*l.* the first year, and increasing 100*l.* a year, to 700*l.*) with airy, well furnished rooms, ice, punkahs, stable, and a well supplied table, utterly beyond the reach of a junior Consular officer.

The wisdom of this plan of economizing the health and working powers of foreigners in this country is shown by the liberal salaries granted by the Chinese Government to their foreign employés in the Customs service. The following scale of salaries paid by them at this port has been courteously furnished me by the Commissioner; and I would remark that these officers are, in addition to their pay, provided with airy, roomy quarters rent free, and that their expenses for chair coolie hire are also defrayed.

	£	
Commissioner of Customs	2,000	per annum.
Acting ditto	1,200	„
2nd Class Clerks	800	„
Acting ditto	700	„
3rd Class Clerks	600	„
4th Class Clerks	400	„
Tide Surveyor, 1st Class	800	„
Examiners, 1st Class	360	„
„ 2nd Class..	320	„
Tidewaiters, 1st Class	280	„
„ 2nd Class	240	„
„ 3rd Class	200	„

In order to further elucidate the great expense of living in this country, I may be permitted to observe that, although the pay of civil servants in India is immensely higher than that of Consular officers in China, yet those Indian banks which have branches here give their agents an additional allowance, as compensation for the higher rate of expenses in this country. The average salary of a Bank Agent in this port, excluding the use of well-furnished house, servants (public and private), food, wines, coals, &c., is about 1,000*l.* per annum.

In conclusion, I may mention that the great extremes of temperature in this district entail, in summer and winter, a great variety of expenses; large lofty rooms being necessary to ward off the heat in summer, and requiring an immense consumption of coal to warm them in winter.

* Exclusive of Major Crossman's account, which came to 777 taels 93 mace, at 73·5, equal to 1,058 dollars cents, at 4*s.* 3*d.*, equal to 224*l*, 18*s.* 2½*d.*

Under the circumstances above set forth, I trust your Excellency will be disposed to recommend to Her Majesty's Government the continuation of the allowances to the officers of this Consulate.

There being but one Assistant now attached to this office, the amount of these allowances is reduced from 550*l.* to 475*l.*

Your, &c.
(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 6.

Consul Caine to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Hankow, September* 6, 1869.

I HAVE now the honour to reply to your Excellency's circular, of 12th August last.

1. Inclosure No. 1 contains the average price of the principal articles of food. In comparing the cost of meat, it should be borne in mind that the butchers are supplied by the adjoining peasantry, and the owners of corn-mills, distilleries, &c., who sell only their worn-out meat; consequently, there is a much larger proportion of bone and gristle in this dry, tough, juiceless meat, than in meat in England, and it would be scarcely fair to compare the rates with those prevailing at home, without making an allowance of at least 33 per cent. on this account.

Sheep are not reared in this neighbourhood, but are brought hither from Mongolia and other parts outside the great wall.

They are driven these immense distances at an average rate of upwards of ten miles a day, their only food during the journey being the scanty herbage on the road-sides. During the summer they are brought the latter part of their journey in boats, and, the low pasture-lands being covered annually by floods, there is no opportunity of fattening them after arrival here.

It is impossible to keep meat during the hot months, unless preserved in ice, and it cannot be brought to table, as a rule, for more than one day.

Ice is too expensive an article for the juniors to obtain. Membership to the ice fund costs 20 taels (6*l.*). Subscription ranges besides from 20 taels (6*l.*) to 40 taels (12*l.*) per annum.

Those who pay for ice can, of course, keep their meat a day or two longer.

Pork is the cheapest meat obtainable; but, as pigs are such gross feeders in China, no foreigners can eat the meat.

Fowls are small and tough, unless reared and fed on the grounds, when, of course, their cost is increased.

Fish, owing to the immense quantity of mud held in suspension, both in the river and in the adjoining lakes and ponds, with the exception of perch and samlie, are scarcely eatable.

Flour—the native flour is so coarse and full of grit as to be entirely unfitted for bread, or any culinary use whatever. Foreign flour (American) has to be used, and is much more expensive.

2. Coal, firewood, and charcoal are the most expensive articles in daily use.

Native coal costs 4 taels 50 mace per ton; but, in consequence of the amount of dust and small coal intermixed, there is a good deal of waste. The rooms in all houses in the East being large, require constant fires to warm them in winter. My own expenditure on this account, during the six months of cold weather, amounted to 67 dollars 22 cents, or 14*l.* 5*s.* 8$\frac{1}{4}$*d.*, for eleven tons, or 2*l.* 7*s.* 7$\frac{3}{4}$*d.* a month.

In charcoal and firewood, my expenses monthly come to from 23 to 26 dollars, or 4*l.* 17*s.* 9*d.* to 5*l.* 10*s.* 6*d.* Oil, another expensive item, costs me monthly for lighting this large house 11 dollars, or 2*l.* 6*s.* 9*d.*

During the hot summer months, punkah coolies take the place of coals, as these men have to be employed night and day, or from 10 to 12 dollars a month. The expenses therefore for oil, wood, and charcoal, would alone amount to 7*l.* 6*s.* 9*d.* a month, or 88*l.* 1*s.* per annum.

3. *Servants' Wages*—

	Per month.		
	$	£ s. d.	
Head house-boy	12	or	2 11 0
Second ditto	8		1 14 0
Cook	10 to 16	or 2*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.* to 3*l.* 8*s.*	
Coolies, chair, 2 at 5 dollars each	10		2 2 6
Lamp coolie	6		1 5 6
Gardeners, 2 at 5 dollars each	10		2 2 6

Or, 13*l.* 5*s.* 6*d.* per mensem; or, 158*l.* 3*s.* per annum.

These charges I pay monthly, and have besides the cost of ahmahs, &c., who receive from 6 to 8 dollars a month each.

4. *Rent.*—Houses which cost 40,000 to 50,000 taels are now let for 1,500 taels a year; and smaller buildings, which cost from 13,000 to 16,000 taels, are let for 500 taels a year. The depreciation of property by floods destroying the foundations is calculated at 70 per cent. in five years.

5. *Medical Attendance, &c.*—The accompanying copy of a letter from Dr. Reid, our medical practitioner here, gives the information required under this head—

6. "The hire of a chair and two coolies costs per diem 70 cents, or 2*s.* 11$\frac{3}{4}$*d.* A coolie's wages per diem are 10*d.* Hire of a sampan with three men costs per diem about 60 cents, or 2*s.* 6$\frac{1}{2}$*d.* A sedan-chair costs from 28 to 40 dollars, according to the finish. Chair hire is not a necessity at this port, except during the three or four extremely hot months of the year. I consider it highly injurious for a European to move about in the sun during these months, except in a covered chair."

7. Clerks in mercantile houses commence on 250*l.* per annum, with an increase of 100*l.* a year up to 700*l.* They have provided in addition airy, well furnished rooms, ice, punkah, stable, and a well-supplied table. The total expenses including wines, beer, and foreign stores, are usually contracted for, and amount to from 80 taels or 24*l.* to 100 taels or 30*l.* a month for each person.

Managers of banks here receive from 300 to 350 taels, or 1,080*l.* to 1,095*l.* per annum; they are supplied with well-furnished houses, servants, coal, lighting, &c. Their Clerks receive 150 to 200 taels a month, or 540*l.* to 600*l.* a year, and are, like the Managers, supplied with everything.

The Agent of Russell and Co., an American firm, receives 2,500 taels, or 750*l.* a year, and their Clerks 1,050 taels, or 315*l.* a year each; and in addition they are all found in house-rent, food, servants, coal, light, furniture, wines, liquors, and everything else necessary for comfortable living. Portuguese Clerks in foreign hongs receive 100 taels a month, or 180*l.* per annum, and are besides presented with 100 taels every six months.

8. *Oilman's Stores.*—Unless a Consular officer has an agent at the port to which stores are shipped, he would run great risk in losing the greater portion of his supplies —particularly liquids—as it is well known that seamen on the way out get access to wines and beer, &c., and unless the robbery was discovered at the port of discharge, there would be no redress. Moreover, a Consular officer is not sure of being at the same port by the time the goods he has ordered arrive; in which case fresh freight and insurance have to be incurred. Losses of boxes among officers of the service have been very common, owing to the want of proper persons to look after them, or to their carelessness or indifference at the intermediate port of shipment. As an instance, I may mention that some years ago a junior Consular officer at Hong Kong obtained a shipment of wine from England, duly insured. On its arrival at Hong Kong, the officer had been removed to Shanghae, and his friends forwarded it to him there without effecting insurance, for the simple reason that a mutual friend was taking passage by the same ship. She was wrecked off Formosa with a loss of all cargo.

Where stores are obtained from England, there may be occasions when the vessel conveying them is wrecked, or makes a long voyage, or there may have been delay in executing the order; in all of which cases it would be necessary to buy stores at the port.

It would be undoubtedly the cheapest plan to obtain stores from England, but it should be remembered that the remittance must be for a four or six months' supply, whereas the monthly payments to the stores out here do not draw so heavily on an officer's funds as would a bill for a six months' supply. Freight is from Shanghae 5 taels per ton of forty cubic feet, but if only a single case of wine or stores be brought, 1 dollar is charged. Insurance from Shanghae to this is 5*s.* 8*d.* per cent. free of particular average.

In addition to the above expenses, I may mention that the juniors have to pay for a

teacher at the rate of 6 dollars per month, and likewise from time to time to incur the heavy but necessary expense of purchasing Chinese books, an outlay, as your Excellency well knows, absolutely essential for any one hoping to advance in the service.

There is another expense entailed during the floods, which annually visit this port, *i.e.*, sampan hire for marketing, in my case costing about 4 dollars a month. This year the flood has been in our compound already nine weeks.

Your, &c.
(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 6.

STATEMENT of Market Prices of Principal Articles of Food.

		£	s.	d.	Remarks.
Beef	Per lb.	0	0	4	Large bones and much gristle.
Mutton	„	0	0	9½	Poor meat
Pork	„	0	0	5	Not eatable.
Fowls	„	0	0	6½	Thin and dry, unless fed on premises.
Fish, perch	„	0	0	5½	
„ samlie	„	0	1	6	Almost equal to salmon.
Flour	„	0	0	5½	
Potatoes	„	0	0	2½	Native.
Eggs	Each	0	0	0½	3 equal to 1 English egg.
Salt	Per lb.	0	0	3½	
Sugar	„	0	0	4¾	Common cooking sugar.
Bread	„	0	0	6	Very inferior.
Milk	Per quart bottle	0	1	8	Ditto.
Paddy	Per lb.	0	0	1½	
Rice	„	0	0	2	
Charcoal	„	0	0	0¾	
Wood	„	0	0	0⅓	
Coals	Per ton	1	5	11	Native.
Oil	Per lb.	0	0	4½	Lamp.

We hereby certify to the correctness of the prices given above.
(Signed) H. RAMSAY, *Messrs. Gilman and Co.*
W. W. KING, *Messrs. Shaw, Ripley, and Co.*

Hankow, September 7, 1869.

Inclosure 7 in No. 6.

Hankow, September 6, 1869.

WE charge 200 taels for medical attendance on a hong, and an additional 100 taels per annum if there is a lady and a family to be looked after. Besides this, there is a charge of 50 taels for each accouchement. Should there be any sickness of prolonged duration, the medicines would probably amount to 60 or 70 taels per annum.

(Signed) ARTHUR G. REID.

No. 7.

Consul Mongan to Mr. Hammond.—(Received December 6.)

Sir, *Tien-tsin, September* 28, 1869.

IN accordance with instructions from Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Lord Clarendon, copies of the following document:—

1. Copy of a despatch to Sir R. Alcock, covering Returns of Writers, Office-servants, Prisoners, and Expenditure for Medical Attendance, at Tien-tsin and Taku.

2 and 3. Copies of the said Returns.

4. Copy of a despatch to Sir R. Alcock, forwarding Statements of the Amounts expended at Tien-tsin and Taku, during 1868, for Rent, Lodging, Allowance, Insurance, Consular Buildings, and Furniture.

5. Copy of the said Statements.

6. Copy of a despatch to Sir R. Alcock, forwarding Returns of Market Price of Principal Articles of Food, Servants' Wages, House-rent, Medical Attendance, Chair and Boat-hire, and of Average Remuneration to Mercantile Clerks, &c., at Tien-tsin.

7. Copy of the Returns which formed the inclosure of this despatch.

I have also been instructed, within the last fortnight, by Her Majesty's Minister, to forward direct to the Foreign Office copies of two despatches, that I addressed to him on the 26th and 30th July last, the former being a special Report upon the direct and indirect trade of Tien-tsin, and the subject of the latter being the tendency of trade at this port to pass from the hands of British subjects into the hands of Chinese.

I had already, however, anticipated these instructions by inclosing copies of those two despatches to your address, upon the 4th and 5th ultimo respectively.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. MONGAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Consul Mongan to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Tien-tsin, July* 30, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose two Memoranda, giving in detail, respecting Tien-tsin and Taku, the information required in your Excellency's Circular despatch N. 9 of the 6th instant (Accountant's Department).

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. MONGAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Returns of Writer, Office Servants, Prisoners, and Expenditure for Medical Attendance at Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate, Tien-tsin.

1. *Return of Writers and Linguists.*

One Writer at 30 dollars per month.

THE special duties of the Writer are to aid the Consul or Interpreter in translating Chinese documents received at the Consulate, to draft at their dictation and under their supervision all outgoing Chinese correspondence, and to make fair copies of the same, as well as to keep the Chinese register. His duties, in fact, are very similar to those of the Writers attached to the Mandarins; he is a man of education and official training, and I doubt that one possessing the requisite qualifications could be obtained at a smaller salary.

2. *Return of Constables and Official Servants.*

	Per Month. $
1 European Constable	50
1 Chinese Porter	6
2 Chinese Messengers, each 6 dollars	12
2 Chinese Watchmen, each 6 dollars	12
Total wages	80

Besides the above, there is the caretaker of the military burial-ground, a Chinese, who is also paid 6 dollars per month from the Consular chest. His duty is to look after the cemetery, situate about two miles from the settlement, where the officers and men who died here, during the Expedition of 1860 and subsequent occupation of Tien-tsin, are buried.

The Constable is a British subject, and his pay is less than that of the lowest class of foreigners employed as Tidewaiters in the Chinese Customs service. The Constable at Taku is also a British subject.

The rate at which the Chinese official servants are paid is about equal to the general rate of coolie hire that is paid here by merchants and shipping agents.

3. *Return of British Subjects confined in the Consular Lock-ups during the Year* 1868.

Six British subjects, of European or Colonial origin, were confined for a period of

144 days, and four British subjects of Asiatic origin for a period of 94 days, making in all ten British subjects confined for 238 days, as per following Table:—

1868.

	Number of British Prisoners.	Prisoners' Origin.	Terms of Individual Confinement.	Total Number of Days.
			Days.	Days.
	3	British or Colonial ..	27	81
	2	Ditto	15	30
	1	Ditto	33	33
	2	Asiatic	43	86
	2	Ditto	4	8
Total of prisoners ..	10			
Total of days ..	..	.. ..	..	238

The two prisoners of Asiatic origin, who received each four days' imprisonment, were Malays, and presumably British subjects; the two other Asiatics were Mahomedan inhabitants of British India.

There is at present no regular gaol at Tien-tsin, only three temporary cells, two of which cannot be used in winter; and, therefore, I have sometimes to punish offenders by the infliction of fines, whom it would be far better to punish by imprisonment and hard labour, especially where assaults are committed on Chinese by British subjects, in which cases it is highly desirable that the complainant should have ocular demonstration that the guilty parties have been actually punished. Neither is there any proper gaol accommodation at Taku at present; and, in consequence of this, the Acting Vice-Consul was obliged, only three days ago, to send to the Consular gaol at Shanghae a seaman whom he had sentenced to ten weeks' imprisonment. In April last, I was also obliged to send a prisoner to Shanghae, as, from the gaol arrangements here, his punishment could not have been adequately carried out.

I hope that Major Crossman may be able to remedy this great defect next year by the erection of a proper gaol at Tien-tsin. Any Taku prisoners who might be sentenced to lengthened terms of imprisonment could then be confined here, and the public would thus be saved the expense of their transport to Shanghae.

The medical attendant at Tien-tsin is paid for his services 100*l.* per annum, for which, besides attending generally to the whole Consular staff and to the prisoners, he is bound to supply the latter, as well as the constable and official servants, with medicine gratis.

This gentleman is paid by the Chinese Government 800 Haikwan taels, equal to upwards of 260*l.* per annum, for attending on its foreign employés in the Customs service at this port.

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Tien-tsin, July 30, 1869.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Returns of Writers, Office Servants, Prisoners, and Expenditure for Medical Attendance at Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consulate, Taku.

1. *Return of Writers and Linguists employed.*

One Writer at 30 dollars per month.

MR. GODDARD, whom I have just succeeded in the charge of this Vice-Consulate, informs me that the Chinese Writer has hitherto been employed in writing the Vice-Consul's official Chinese correspondence, keeping the register of Chinese letters received and sent, taking down, in the presence of the Vice-Consul, depositions made by Chinese informants or witnesses, and acting as Linguist generally.

2. *Return of Constables, Official Servants, &c., employed.*

	Per Month. Dollars.
1 European Constable	.. 50
1 Chinese Gatekeeper	.. 6
1 Chinese Messenger	.. 6
4 Chinese Boatmen, each	.. 5

At a port like Taku, the anchorage of which for foreign vessels is several miles in length, and which is rarely without the presence of one or two or more British merchant-ships, the services of a Constable and Boatman cannot be dispensed with.

3. *Return of Prisoners confined in the Consular Gaol during the Year* 1868.

None.

It is not to be inferred however from the blankness of this return that offences were not committed here during the year 1868 by British subjects, for it appears that many instances of insubordination, &c., occurred among the seamen on board the British merchant-vessels that frequented this port. The judicial proceedings, however, in all these cases were stopped either by the prosecutors themselves in the first instance, or by Mr. Goddard being able, when the parties were brought before him, to privately effect an amicable settlement of the cases.

4. *Return of Medical Expenditure during the Year* 1868.

110 dollars 54 cents allowance of pay from 1st April to 20th August, at the rate of 200 taels per annum, to Dr. Frazer.

(Signed) ALEX. FRATER, *Acting Vice-Consul.*

British Vice-Consulate, Taku, July 19, 1869.

Inclusure 4 in No. 7.

Consul Mongan to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Tien-tsin, July* 30, 1869.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your Excellency's Circular despatch No. 12 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith statements showing the amounts severally expended at the Tien-tsin and Taku Consular establishments respectively on account of rent, lodging, allowance, insurance, Consular buildings, and furniture during the year 1868.

I may mention that of the 42*l* 13*s*. 7¾*d*. expended at the Tien-tsin Consulate for furniture, no less than 30*l* 7*s*. 1¼*d*. (142 dollars 86 cents) was paid for an iron safe, which was required as a secure place of deposit for leases, wills, ships' papers, and other valuable documents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. MONGAN.

Inclosure 5 in No. 7.

STATEMENT showing the Amounts paid for Rents, Lodging Allowance, and Insurance, at Her Majesty's Consulate, Tien-tsin, and Her Majesty's Vice-Consulate, Taku, during the Year 1868.

	Tien-tsin,				Taku.				Totals.			
	Cash.	£	*s.*	*d.*	Cash.	£	*s.*	*d.*	£	*s.*	*d.*
Ground-rent	65,407	14	3	7¾	..	..			14	3	7¾
Rent	..	..			..	89	5	0	89	5	0
Lodging allowance ..	..	..			..	..			..		
Insurance	..	..			..	..			..		
Total	..	..			..	..			103	8	7¾

STATEMENT showing the Expenditure on Consular Buildings and Furniture at Tien-tsin and Taku, during 1868.

	Tien-tsin.			Taku.			Totals.		
	£	*s.*	*d.*	£	*s.*	*d.*	£	*s.*	*d.*
Petty repairs	3	11	5¾	25	2	9	28	14	2¾
Repairs on Major Crossman's account .	4	11	4½	33	0	4¾	37	11	9¼
Furniture	42	13	7¾	7	14	4¼	50	8	0
Total	50	16	6	65	17	6	116	14	0

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Tien-tsin, July 30, 1869.

Inclosure 6 in No. 7.

Consul Mongan to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Tien-tsin, August* 23, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the returns called for by Circular No. 13 of the 12th instant.

I would also beg to call your Excellency's attention to a very heavy expense which Consular officers in China have often frequently and unavoidably to incur, either for themselves or their families, when ill health makes a change of air necessary, viz.: the expense of locomotion.

Che-foo is the sanitarium of Tien-tsin; the passage takes about thirty hours, but a passage ticket costs 20 taels, or 6*l* 6*s*. 8*d*.; and again, the rules of the service contemplate, I believe, a change to England every five or six years, but it costs an officer, even with the Foreign Office allowance, at least 100*l*. to get from Tien-tsin to England, whilst to a married man with a family the proportionate cost is very much greater, on account of the lower scale of allowances for women and children, not to speak of the loss that is almost certain to result from the breaking up of one's establishment and the sale of one's furniture.

The non-stationary nature of a junior officer's position is, I believe, the chief reason why, as a rule, he purchases his stores, wine, and beer, &c., in China instead of procuring them from Europe; and practically, in fact, both seniors and juniors must often buy those things from the local storekeepers.

I have, &c

(Signed) J. MONGAN.

Inclosure 7 in No. 7.

Returns of Market Price of Principal Articles of Food, Servants' Wages, House Rent, Medical Attendance, Chair and Boat Hire, and of Average Rate of Remuneration to Mercantile Clerks, &c., in Tien-tsin.

(No. 1.)—AVERAGE Market Prices of the principal Articles of Food.

		Currency.		Sterling.	
		$ c.	$ c.	*s. d.*	*s. d.*
Bread	per 1 lb. loaf		0 8		0 4
Butter	.. per lb.	0 80 to	1 0	3 $4\frac{3}{4}$ to	4 3
Milk	.. .. per pint		0 16		0 $10\frac{1}{4}$
Tea	.. per lb.		1 0		4 3
Sugar, Chinese ..	.. „		0 18		0 $9\frac{1}{4}$
Beef	.. „		0 8		0 4
Mutton	.. „		0 9		0 $4\frac{1}{2}$
Fowls	.. each	0 18 to	0 20	0 $9\frac{1}{4}$ to	0 $10\frac{1}{4}$
Ducks	.. „	0 45 to	0 75	1 11 to	3 $2\frac{1}{2}$
Fish, common kinds ..	.. per lb.		0 8		0 4
Eggs	.. per doz.		0 12		0 6
Potatoes	.. per lb.		0 3		0 $1\frac{1}{2}$
Beef suet	.. „		0 18		0 $9\frac{1}{4}$
Pork fat	.. „		0 20		0 $10\frac{1}{4}$
Flour	.. „		0 6		0 3
Rice	.. „		0 4		0 2

Vegetables generally are about the same price as in England, and most kinds of fruit are cheaper here than there, but of far inferior quality.

We certify that the above are the average market prices of the principal articles of food at Tien-tsin, in dollars and sterling, at 4*s*. 3*d*. per dollar.

(Signed) J. LIVINGSTON, W. FORBES, } *Merchants resident at Tien-tsin.*

Remarks.

There is about as much flesh on one English, as on four Chinese fowls, and one English is fully equal to two Chinese eggs. Chinese pork is scarcely ever eaten by foreigners.

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Tien-tsin, August 23, 1869.

(No. 2.)—AVERAGE Market Price of Coal, Wood, Charcoal, and Oil.

	Currency.		Sterling.
	Taels.	$ c.	£ s. d.
English coal .. .. per ton	17	24 28	5 3 2¼
Chaitang coal .. .. „	12	17 14	3 12 10
Wood per picul of 133 lbs.	..	0 60 to 0 70	2 6½ to 0 2 11¾
Charcoal „ „	..	2 0 to 2 50	8 6 to 0 10 7½
Oil .. .. .. per pint	..	0 12 to 0 15	0 6 to 0 0 7¾

We certify that the above are the average market prices of coal, firewood, charcoal, and oil at Tien-tsin, and that 70 tael-cents per dollar is the rate of exchange at which coal has hitherto been sold.

(Signed) J. LIVINGSTON, W. FORBES, } *Merchants residing at Tien-tsin.*

Remarks.

The dollars are converted into sterling in the above Table at 4*s.* 3*d.* per dollar.

Coal and firewood are consumed for about six months in the year, and oil and charcoal all the year round. The charcoal is used for cooking purposes and is a very heavy item of household expenditure.

I am informed that in the coming winter English coal will be 18 taels, and Chaitang, if procurable, 13 taels per ton.

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Tien-tsin, August 23, 1869.

(No. 3.)—GENERAL Rates of Servants Wages, and Price of Native Labour in other kinds of Work.

	Currency.	Sterling.
	$ c.	£ s. d.
Indoor Servants—		
House boys .. .. per month	10 76	2 5 8¾
House coolies .. .. „	6 18	1 6 3¼
Cooks .. .. .. „	11 5	2 6 11½
Northern Amahs .. .. „	7 0	1 9 9
Southern Amahs .. .. „	20 0	4 5 0
Outdoor Servants—		
Horse boys .. .. „	6 0	1 5 6
Chair coolies .. .. „	5 0	1 1 3
Water coolies .. .. „	2 0	0 8 6
Scavengers .. .. „	1 0	0 4 3
Native Labour—		
Tailors . .. . per day	0 30	0 1 3¼
Washerman .. for 100 articles washed	3 0	0 12 9
Mechanics generally .. .. per day	0 20	0 0 10¼

We certify that the above is the general rate of servants' wages and price of Native labour at Tien-tsin, in dollars and sterling, at 4*s.* 3*d.* the dollar.

(Signed) J. LIVINGSTON, W. FORBES, } *Merchants resident at Tien-tsin.*

Remarks.

If the Consular officer is a married man, he must employ either an Amah, *i.e.*, a native female servant, or an European, or perhaps both, and it costs about 100*l.* to get an European female servant from England to Tien-tsin. The northern Amahs, being as a rule unacquainted with European habits and customs, are of little use except as helps to European female servants.

I have arrived at the rate of wages for the indispensable indoor servants, viz.:— house boys, house coolies, and cooks, by adding together the rates paid by myself, the first assistant, the Commissioner of Customs, the medical practitioner, and six merchants, and dividing the three sets of rates by ten.

In these ten establishments the lowest rate of boys' wages was 7 dollars 75 cents, the highest 9 teals, equal to 12 dollars 85 cents; the lowest rate of cooks' wages was

7 dollars, the highest 17 taels, equal to 24 dollars 28 cents; and the lowest rate of coolies' wages was 5 dollars, the highest being 10 dollars.

Besides house boys some people have their own personal boys, and in many establishments there are assistant cooks, and two or more indoor coolies.

The cost of washing is a heavy item, the articles washed being paid for by number not by size, so that the washing of a pocket handkerchief or shirt collar is as expensive as that of a table cloth or dress shirt, and moreover, one's linen is so knocked about at the wash that it is necessary to replace it in China about three times as often as it would be in England.

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Tien-tsin, August 23, 1869.

(No. 4.)—HOUSE-RENT as regards Foreign Houses, and the Estimated Rate of Interest the Rent constitutes on the Original Cost of Building.

The foreign houses in or near this settlement. of which I have been able to ascertain the rent, and the estimated rate of interest which it constitutes on the original cost of building are only four in number, viz.:—

			£	s.	d.	
One at 1,500 taels	at 6*s.* 4*d.* per tael	=	475	0	0	per annum.
One at 1,100 taels	„	=	348	6	8	„
One at 650 taels	„	=	205	16	8	„
One at 500 taels	„	=	158	6	8	„

On three of these houses the estimated rate of interest on the original cost of building, represented by the rent, is about 10 per cent. and on the fourth about $7\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., but this last rate is exceptionally low. It is, I am informed, generally estimated in China that house property should yield from 10 to 12 per cent. interest,

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Tien-tsin, August 23, 1869.

(No. 5.)—THE usual Charges for Medical Attendance and Medicines by Foreign Practitioners.

ATTENDANCE.

		£	s.	d.
For every visit within 5 miles..	5 taels, at 6*s.* 4*d.* per tael =	1	11	8
For every visit beyoud 5 miles	10 taels, „	3	3	4

MEDICINES.

	$	c.		s.	d.
Mixtures	1	0	=	4	3
Draughts	0	25	=	1	$0\frac{3}{4}$
Lotions	0	50	=	2	$1\frac{1}{2}$
Pills, per dozen	1	0	=	4	3

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate Tien-tsin, August 23, 1869.

(No. 6.)—USUAL Charges for Chair and Boat Hire, with a Statement of the necessity of recourse to these at the Port.

Chair Coolies, if hired by the month, may be hired for 5 dollars a piece, if for the day, 25 cents each, or 1 dollar for four Coolies.

Boats may be hired usually at 2 dollars per day, but Boatmen hired by the month get 5 dollars each.

The employment of a Consular boat is necessary at Taku for about nine months out of the year, and the expense of chair hire must be incurred throughout the year at Tien-tsin, especially if the Consul does not keep a pony.

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Tien-tsin, August 23, 1869.

(No. 7.)—The Average Rate of Remuneration to Clerks and Assistants of different grades in Banks and Merchant Houses of different Nationalities.

Merchants, as a rule, object to say what salaries they pay their Clerks and Assistants, but state, generally, that 300*l.* to 400*l.* a-year, with lodging and board, including wine and beer, is their usual remuneration in English and American firms at Tien-tsin.

The Clerk of a bankrupt, who passed through this Consular Court last year, proved his claim against the estate for a balance of salary, and from the account then filed, it appears that his salary was 3,000 teals a-year, equal at 6*s.* 4*d.* per tael to 950*l.* This Clerk was lodged, but not boarded, by the firm in which he had been employed.

The clerks of Shanghae houses, who are acting here as agents, receive, I believe, 3,000 teals, or 950*l.* per annum, with all house expenses paid, and the Customs Clerks of all nationalities, who are of four classes, are paid as follows:—

	£	
1st Class	1,000	per annum.
2nd Class	800	„
3rd Class	600	„
4th Class—1st Grade	400	„
„ 2nd Grade	300	„

The Commissioner of Customs at Tien-tsin is paid 2,000*l.* a-year, and both he and the Customs Clerks are provided with house accommodation at the expense of the Chinese Government.

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Tien-tsin, August 23, 1869.

(No. 8.)—Rates of Freight and Insurance on Oilman's Stores, &c.

At present the rates of freight and insurance, per steamer, from Shanghae to Tien-tsin are:—

Freight, per ton of 40 cubic feet	6 taels = 38*s.*
Insurance	¾ per cent.

Freight, however, is unusually low this year, the general rate hitherto having been 10 taels, or 63*s.* 4*d.* per ton.

The rates of freight, per sailing-vessel, from England to the outer Taku anchorage has ranged this year from 47*s.* 6*d.* to 52*s.* 6*d.* per ton, and the rate of insurance is 2¾ per cent.

It is on bulky articles, such as furniture, rather than on stores or wines, that the cost of transport is so heavy. Thus, for instance, the charges on four cases of furniture, shipped for me from London, viâ Shanghae, and measuring 3 tons 24 feet 1 inch, were:—

	£	*s.*	*d.*
From London to Shanghae	7	16	4
At Shanghae	1	1	3
And from Shanghae to Tien-tsin	13	14	8
Total from London to Tien-tsin	22	12	3

The above cases were sent by steamer from Shanghae to Tien-tsin when freights were high, but in the following instance, the cases were brought up the coast by a sailing-vessel.

Charges on fifteen cases of furniture and wines, measuring 7 tons 6 feet 10 inches, from London to Tien-tsin viâ Shanghae:—

	£	*s.*	*d.*
Freight and insurance to Shanghae	20	10	3
Storing and other charges at Shanghae	4	19	7
Freight and insurance from Shanghae	13	9	1
Total from London to Tien-tsin	38	18	11

The furniture of a foreign house at Tien-tsin must, with the exception of the commonest articles, be procured from England, or the south of China, and I will give one more instance to show what the charges for packing and transport are in the latter case.

In 1866 I paid 70 dollars 41 cents for the packing and transport of some furniture, made for me at Hong Kong, and shipped thence, uninsured, by sailing-vessel to Tien-tsin. The price of the furniture itself at Hong Kong was only 171 dollars, and

thus, the charges incurred added more than 40 per cent. to its original cost, when it was delivered at Tien-tsin.

(Signed) J. MONGAN, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Tien-tsin, August 23, 1869.

No. 8.

Consul Pedder to Mr. Hammond.—(Received December 6.)

Sir, *Amoy, October* 1, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of sundry despatches (with their inclosures), written by me in reply to Circulars (on Accounts) Nos. 9 and 13 from Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, who states that these replies will be referred to in a report on the Consular establishment, which he is about to send to the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Consul Pedder to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Amoy, August* 3, 1869.

IN accordance with your directions, I have the honour to inclose, in duplicate, an account of the expenditure at this Consulate for rent, insurance, &c., during the year 1868.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

ACCOUNT of Rent, Insurances, and Repairs, &c., at the Amoy Consulate, during the Year 1868.

EXPENDITURES.

	£	*s.*	*d.*	£	*s.*	*d.*
Ground rents	40	6	3			
House rent	225	0	0			
Lodging allowance	38	5	0			
				333	11	3
Insurances				Nil.		
Repairs of buildings, repairs and renewals of office furniture, boats and fittings, flagstaff, flags, &c...				36	6	0
Total				369	17	3

Remarks.

The receipts from re-letting part of the ground are 110*l.* 15*s.* 3*d.*, and when the new buildings are erected the expenditure for rent, &c. will be reduced to an amount that the receipts under that head will more than cover.

The expenditures for repairs, &c., in 1868 was exceptionally small; and may be considered as less than a third of the average expenditure. It was owing partly to good fortune (there having been no typhoon during the year); partly to heavy repairs having been made in the preceding year, and partly to good management. A good deal can always be done in the latter way if time can be afforded for it.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Amoy, August 3, 1869.

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Consul Pedder to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Amoy, August* 9, 1869.

REFERRING to your Circular No. 9 of 6th July (on accounts), I have the honour to inclose the returns called for.

Return No. 2, relating to prisoners, would have been so deceptive if made for 1868, that presuming the information wanted was of a general nature, I made a rough average return instead.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. PEDDER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 8.

RETURN of Writers, Linguists, Constables, and other Servants employed at the British Consulate at Amoy.

Designation or Class.	Number employed.	Average Monthly Pay each.			Nationality.	Reference to Remarks.
		Currency.	Rate of Exchange.	Sterling.		
		$	*s. d.*	£ *s. d.*		
Writer	1	30	4 3	6 7 6	Chinese	1
Linguist	1	20	,,	4 5 0	Ditto	2
Constable	1	60	,,	12 15 0	European	3
Gaoler	1	50	,,	10 12 6	Ditto	4
Messenger	2	7	,,	1 9 9	Chinese	5
Coolies	7	4	,,	0 17 0	Ditto	6
Boatmen	8	5	,,	1 1 3	Ditto	7

Remarks.

1. The Writer is not insufficiently paid.

2. The Linguist is underpaid, and should be put on the same footing as the Writer, especially considering the length and faithfulness of his service.

3. Considering that the Constable has no prospect of promotion, the pay is fixed at an insufficient amount to secure the sort of man that it is desirable to have in this position. But it is scarcely worth while to increase the pay, since even then the want of promotion would lead to our losing any really competent man we might obtain, as soon as he got a chance of entering on a career offering better prospects. During the last twenty years the Constables employed at this Consulate have been Europeans of nationalities other than English, with one citizen of the United States.

4. The Gaoler's pay may be considered sufficient for the class of man required. Europeans are employed in this position. But when the new office and gaol are built (as they will be close together), a first-class Chinaman will do for the post, and the pay may be reduced in proportion.

5. The Messengers' pay is now sufficient, as they get two suits of clothing a year.

6. The Coolies are all underpaid, as they do not get sufficient to enable them to dress decently. I am of opinion that 5 dollars a month, with clothing, is the lowest rate of pay that should be given to any class of Chinese employed at the Consulate at this port. The men referred to in this remark, serve as official chair-bearers, porters, watchmen, extra messengers, office keepers, &c. In fact their duties are too numerous and various to be readily enumerated.

7. The Boatmen are underpaid. They should be found in clothing, and the Head Boatman should be paid a dollar a month more. When the new offices are built we shall be able to make different arrangements regarding boats, and dispense with some of the Boatmen.

General Observations.

It is better to provide the lower class of servants with uniform than to pay them an equivalent in money, as in this way a decent appearance is insured. The expense is not great, since only the thin outer garments are supplied to them, as they wear their own old rags underneath for warmth. An allowance of an expenditure not exceeding half a dollar for each man would be sufficient to cover the cost.

An inquiry at the Custom-house as to the rate of wages paid enables me to give the following information on that point:—

		$	c.
Chinese Writers	monthly pay about	31	0
Linguists	„	76	50
Lowest class European Tidewaiters	„	76	50
Coolies	„	6	10
Head Boatmen	„	7	60
Ordinary Boatmen	„	6	10

Boatmen get, in addition, two suits of summer clothing and one of winter clothing every year.

I would again remark that the wages I recommend for the Consular native servants of the classes above named are—

	$	c.
Writer	30	0
Linguist	30	0
Coolies (with clothing found)	5	0
1 Head Boatman (ditto)	6	0
Ordinary Boatmen (ditto)	5	0

I think these wages sufficient, as all men of these classes make money in other ways, (their wives keep little shops, &c.)

It is impossible to state positively, until we have made the trial, what amount we shall be able to save in wages after the new offices and gaol come into use. But I believe it will be not less than 500 dollars a year.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Amoy, August 9, 1869.

Inclosure 5 in No. 8.

RETURN of Average Number and Description of Men Imprisoned at the British Consulate at Amoy, showing the Range and Average Length of Sentences.

Description of Prisoners.	Number per annum.	Shortest Sentence.	Longest Sentence.	Average Length of Sentence.	Reference to Remarks.
White men	26	7 days	1 year	70 days	1
Asiatics	14	7 days	9 months	30 days	2

Remarks.

1. These are principally English, Scotch, or Irish, with a few foreigners on the muster rolls of British vessels.

2. These are nearly all Malays and lascars, with a very small proportion of Manilamen serving on board British vessels.

The foregoing Return only includes men sentenced to imprisonment, and does not include men temporarily locked up for being drunk and disorderly, or on suspicion, or Chinese temporarily held in custody whilst it is ascertained whether or not there is sufficient ground for committing them, before they are sent in to the Chinese authorities for trial. Such cases would swell the Return to a grand total of from seventy to eighty.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Amoy, August 9, 1869.

Inclosure 6 in No. 8.

RETURN of Expenditure for Medical Services, &c., at the British Consulate at Amoy, during the Year ended December 31, 1868.

On what Account paid.	To whom Paid.	Amount. Currency.	Amount. Sterling.
		$ c.	£ s. d.
Medical attendance and medicines for Consular servants and prisoners, post mortem examinations, medical evidence in criminal cases at the prosecution of the Crown, &c.	Messrs. Jones, Carnegie, and Scott	500 0	106 5 0
Hospital expenses of distressed British subjects .	Ditto	29 75	6 6 5
Total	.. .. ..	529 75	112 11 5

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Amoy, August 9, 1869.

Inclosure 7 in No. 8.

Consul Pedder to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Amoy, September* 25, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a Report containing the list of prices, and other information called for in your Circular No. 13 (in accounts) of 12th August last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER.

Inclosure 8 in No. 8.

RETURN of the Average Market Price of some of the Principal Articles of Food, &c., at Amoy, calculated on an Average of about Three Years.

Articles.	Quantity.	Price, at 4*s.* 3*d.* per Dollar.						Short Remarks.	Reference to longer Remarks following.
		£	*s.*	*d.*		£	*s.*	*d.*	
Bread	per lb.	0	0	4	to	0	0	5	Two to three times English price.	
Milk..	per quart	0	0	8		0	0	8	Double English price.	
Butter (salt)	per lb.	0	3	0		0	4	3	Double to treble English price ..	1
Mutton	„	0	1	8		0	2	6	Ditto	2
Fowls	„	0	0	7		0	0	7	Live weight, and very thin ..	3
Pigeons	per pair	0	1	4		0	1	8	Very small and thin.	
Lard	per lb.	0	0	9		0	0	10	A good article.	
Fish	„	0	0	4		0	0	5	Very good.	
Potatoes	per gallon	0	1	0		0	1	6	According to season and supply.	
Cauliflower and broccoli ..	each	0	1	0		0	2	1	Four times English price.	
Cabbages	„	0	0	6		0	1	1	Ditto.	
Green peas (shelled) ..	per lb.	0	0	10		0	1	1		
French beans	„	0	0	10		0	1	1		
Carrots	„	0	0	2		0	0	5		
Spices	per oz.	0	0	6		0	0	6	Double to treble English price.	
Beer (in casks) ..	18 gallons	3	3	9		3	16	6	Ditto.	
Coal (Chinese) ..	per ton	1	18	0		2	12	0	Very dusty and small and burns very quickly, but is otherwise good	4
Wood	per cwt.	0	1	6		0	2	6	Is used for cookhouse firing, and costs a large sum in a year .	5
Charcoal	„	0	5	3		0	7	0		
Lamp oil	per gallon	0	4	3		0	5	9	.. ..	6

Signatures of two British merchants at Amoy:

ROBERT CRAIG.
EDMUND PYE.

Though I have signed the foregoing Return, I must be allowed to add that some of the prices mentioned are considerably below the true rates.

R. C.

Remarks.

1. The Undersigned has lost more money than he has saved in trying to get butter from England, as so much has come out entirely spoiled. He has lost as much as 4*l.* 10*s.* upon a single importation of that article.

2. Mutton is sold only by the "quarter," at a price irrespective of weight, which brings it to the prices mentioned per pound. But sheep are so thin in this place that the proportion of meat to bone is not half what it is with English meat. Making an allowance for this fact, the cost of this article is considerably over the "market" prices quoted.

3. Fowls are sold by live weight, and the vendors moreover resort to various devices to increase the apparent weight. Moreover, poultry is generally extremely thin, so that the concluding part of the remark (No. 2) about mutton applies also to this kind of food. The Undersigned has proved by a careful experiment that a fowl costing (by live weight) 2*s.* 4*d.*, weighed only two pounds when prepared for cooking, and yielded only one pound of uncooked flesh when the bones were removed. This article of food, therefore, really costs about the same as mutton, notwithstanding its lesser nominal price. It may be added that all kinds of poultry are equally thin.

4. The Formosan coal used here makes very good fires. It is, however, very dusty, and there is great loss on that account. It also burns out very quickly. Engineers of the Royal Navy have informed the Undersigned that five tons of Formosan coal last no longer than three tons of English coal. If that proportion holds good with regard to domestic firing, it raises the cost of Formosan coal to from 3*l.* 3*s.* to 4*l.* 7*s.* per ton as compared with the cost of coal in England.

5. The necessary use of wood and charcoal for cooking in this place makes cooking-house fires very expensive here. The Undersigned believes that kitchen firing cost him in England, lately, only about one-fourth of what it costs him in this place; but as the fuel used in England was of the same description for all fires, and the proportion of the whole quantity burned which was used in the kitchen can only be roughly estimated, this belief may be somewhat incorrect. It cannot, however, be very wide of the mark, as it has been partly formed on some other grounds which fully confirm it.

6. Lamp oil is very impure, and of inferior quality otherwise, and there is therefore a good deal of waste in its use. The use of oil lamps is rendered still more expensive on account of the great number of globes and chimneys which are broken through the awkwardness of Chinese servants, who also frequently damage the burners of the lamps in cleaning and trimming them. Globes and chimneys are extremely dear here, whilst they cannot be imported in small quantities to lay down at a less price than that charged by the local storekeepers. The last remark holds good with respect to many other things where packing, freight, and breakages or other damage make up a heavy per-centage on the English prices.

Servants.

The wages of servants in this place vary, as they do in England, according to a great variety of circumstances, amongst which may be mentioned situation, ability, age, character, and perquisites or allowances (such as food, washing, and other clothing).

Indoor servants (house coolies, cooks, boys, nurses, &c.) are partly or entirely found in food, and some of them are partly found in clothing and washing as the only way of keeping them decently tidy and clean.

Outdoor servants (chair coolies, watchmen, boatmen, horse coolies, grasscutters, gardeners, &c.) get fuel and cooking oil; and chair coolies and boatmen are also found in outer clothing.

The following may be looked on as about the medium rate of wages for the respective classes:—

MEDIUM Rates of Servants' Wages.

Classes Employed.	Monthly Wages.					
	£	*s.*	*d.*		£	*s.*	*d.*
Boys	1	14	0	to	2	2	6
Cooks	1	14	0		2	2	6
Nurses	1	5	6		1	14	0
Indoor Coolies	1	0	0		1	5	6
Chair Coolies	0	17	0		1	1	3
Watchmen	0	17	0		1	1	3
Boatmen	0	17	0		1	1	3

As great numbers of boys, cooks, and stewards are employed at high wages on board foreign vessels in the coasting trade, this is gradually raising the wages of servants on shore.

The native price of labour for other kinds of work may be called from 1*l.* 5*s.* 6*d.* to 1*l.* 14*s.* per month for the least skilled masons, bricklayers, &c., up to 3*l.* 4*s.* for good house carpenters and men of that class. But double this rate of wages may sometimes be obtained by skilled workmen possessing some knowledge of the English language.

Cost of Building and Rental of Houses.

Most of the foreign houses in this place are and have always been occupied by the owners. But a few very small houses have been built or bought on speculation; and the following Table contains a list of them with the particulars of cost and rental:—

House.	Cost.	Monthly Rent.	Gross Amount Per-centage on First Cost.
	Dollars.	Dollars.	
1	2,500	60	29 per cent.
2	2,000	70	42 ,,
3	2,000	50	30 ,,
4	2,200	45	24½ ,,
5	1,800	40	26½ ,,

Another house (No. 6) first built for private use, and subsequently let, was sold about a year ago (with a tenant in occupation at 70 dollars a month) for the sum of 3,000 dollars, the investment so far standing to yield 28 per cent. These investments are not really so good as they appear, since white ants, dry rot, and typhoons are always causing great damage, and besides the cost of current repairs a large per-centage should be set aside for depreciation.

There has been some little difficulty in getting at some of the foregoing particulars as to the first cost of the houses, as people are not always willing to give such information about their property. But it is believed that the given cost of Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 6 are quite correct, and that Nos. 4 and 5 are within a hundred dollars of the mark, and their cost is probably overstated. I may mention that the most experienced merchant in this place once told me that he could not afford to build a cheap house on speculation to bring him less than 25 per cent. gross rental.

Medical Attendance.

Upon this subject I copy here a letter received from the medical firm practising at Amoy:—

Sir, *Amoy, September* 13, 1869.

In reply to your letter of this date, we beg to state that your inquiry with regard to our charges is too general to be answered precisely, with regard to all cases, as in some cases they vary according to circumstances. The following, however, are some of the fixed charges, which will perhaps be a sufficient guide to you:—

	Dols.	c.
Professional attendance, per visit	5	0
Each prescription made up .. .. 1 dollar to	1	50
Capital operations	50	0
Lesser ditto	25	0
Reducing dislocations; setting fractures	10	0
Vaccination	10	0
Attendance at confinements with one week's attendance	100	0

We have, &c.

(Signed) JONES, SCOTT, AND MULLER, *Physicians and Surgeons.*

W. H. Pedder, Esq.,
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Amoy.

Boat and Chair Hire.

There are no public boats or chairs for hire fit for the use of Europeans, so that no tariff of charges can be given. Foreigners of all classes have to keep these conveyances for themselves. The wages of boatmen and chair coolies have been mentioned in their proper place. A boat itself will cost from 10*l.* to 15*l.* a year in repairs and depreciation, for itself and the fittings, and even if not hauled up frequently for her bottom to be

dried and painted to prevent her getting wormed, as the *Teredo navalis* (as I believe it is called) gets into unprotected wood very quickly. The repairs and renewals of chairs will not cost above 2*l.* a year for private chairs, and a half more than that for official sedans which cost a great deal more to purchase though they last longer. The total cost of "keeping a chair" may be put down at about 25*l.* a year for a private chair, and double that for an official chair which requires four bearers.

With regard to the necessity of chairs and boats, it may be mentioned that the Consul has to make frequent visits to at least five Mandarins in this place if he is to perform his duties properly; besides the other frequent occasions for moving about on shore on business; and your Excellency's thorough acquaintance with Chinese custom, as well as your knowledge of this sunny place, will show you the necessity for the use of chairs. What you know of this place will equally have shown you the necessity of boats. It should be sufficient to mention that the Consular residences and gaol are on one island, and the Consular Office on another; that ships have to be frequently communicated with; and that the Constable alone has frequently to go afloat half-a-dozen times a day, often to considerable distances (as to the Chinese police magistrates), or to vessels in the outer roads; besides the necessary communication between the Koolangzen Gaol and the one at Amoy. Other circumstances could be mentioned, but it is believed unnecessary to do so, as many of them will occur to yourself.

Mercantile Salaries.

Excluding Copying Clerks, and other untrained men, it may be stated that young men with fair commercial training, come out to China with engagements for three years at salaries of 200*l.*, 300*l.*, and 400*l.*, or of 300*l.*, 400*l.*, and 500*l.* for the term of engagement, with board, lodging, medical attendance, &c., found; or with salaries about 300*l.* a year higher if not found in board, &c. These rates are for young men of the classes of Book-keepers, Accountants, Tea-tasters, &c., in respectable employment. After the expiration of the first engagement, the rate of pay will rise according to circumstances; but the annual rate of increase for efficient men may be considered about 100*l.* a-year, up to 800*l.* and 1,000*l.* a-year, and occasionally more. Your Excellency is well aware that board and lodging, &c., are usually given as well (in fact the Clerks live with the principals more frequently than otherwise); and this must be deemed equal to about 300*l.* a year more, as it would cost a man fully that sum to provide himself with respectable quarters, mess, servants, and medical attendance. After the expiration of the first engagement, and sometimes before that time, permission to trade on private account is usually given, and this is a very great advantage, as those who enjoy it have full use of all the facilities that can be afforded by their employers (such as warehouses, lighters, servants, and everything else required in carrying on a business) without any of the expense of it. They have generally, too, the advantage of all the information possessed by their employers, as well as the advantage to be derived from an acquaintance with the business connections of the firm by whom they are employed. The only condition usually attached to the permission to trade is that they shall let their employers know what they are doing, so that there may be no clashing of interest through mutual ignorance. Your Excellency well knows that such men frequently obtain even greater pay than I have mentioned, especially if placed in charge of branch establishments, or if they show great ability; and it is not unusual for such men to rise to partnerships; or to the position of managers in banks, and other mercantile undertakings.

In reporting upon commercial salaries, as compared with those of Consular servants, it is fitting that only those of the better class of men (who are likely to rise to the better paid appointments) should be taken, since it is presumed that in appointing men to the Consular service in China, Her Majesty's Government appoints only a class of men who will be fitted by training to rise to the superior positions in this branch of the service.

The Undersigned would be permitted to point out very respectfully, in conclusion, that Circular No. 13 (in accounts), of 12th August, calling for the foregoing information, contains no reference to some of the heaviest extra expenses (some of which may amount to 100*l.* each in a year); whilst the aggregate amount of the whole of the extra expenses so left out of sight is probably greater than of those ordered to be reported on. Some of these expenses, moreover, are more unavoidable, or less subject to control than many of those mentioned in the Circular above referred to. On this account a separate and more general report upon the subject will be made in a following despatch.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Amoy, September 25, 1869.

We, the Undersigned, consider that the foregoing Return of prices, rents, commercial salaries, &c., is correct.

(Signed) W. A. STURROCK.
N. MURTON.

Inclosure 9 in No. 8.

Consul Pedder to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Amoy, September* 27, 1869.

THE queries in your Circular (on Accounts) No. 13 of 12th August last, leave out of sight many of the most important matters in which expenses in China are greater than they may be supposed to be by persons in England; and the answers to the questions that are put will only mislead in many cases unless explanation be given with them, *e.g.*, a scale of medical charges will certainly mislead a reader in England who is not reminded how much more frequently medical aid is required in China than in England. Moreover, one observation in your Circular shows an erroneous impression to prevail in England regarding one branch of expenditure which however is declared to be so fully understood that it need not be adverted to except as regards one point. And it is very likely that similar misconceptions prevail at home with regard to many other matters which are there supposed to be understood. For these reasons I would be permitted to point out in the inclosed statement some of the circumstances which make residence in China more expensive than might be supposed by a person without local knowledge who had only a list of prices and charges to guide him.

Some of the circumstances I point out may be new even to your Excellency, as you may not have had to incur some of these expenses (life insurance for instance); whilst your larger means will doubtless have prevented your noticing others that are forced on the notice of people with the insufficient incomes possessed by most of Her Majesty's Consular Service in China during the last ten years.

It cannot be supposed that I have included everything that could have been mentioned on the subject, and many omissions occur to me as I am writing, which, though of little moment singly, are of considerable importance in the whole.

I should perhaps apologize for the familiar style of the inclosure, but it is not altogether the most unsuitable that might have been chosen for the subject; and it was in a measure forced on me by the constant temptation I was under to narrate my own experience in illustration and proof of circumstances which have borne hardly on me for years.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. PEDDER.

Inclosure 10 in No. 8.

Statement of some of the Circumstances which make Residence in China expensive.

Introductory Remarks.—It is a common saying in China that dollars go no further in that country than shillings do in England. This is not a correct statement as regards many branches of expenditure, but in regard to the whole cost of residence in China it is approximately correct, if an English standard of living be taken with such modifications as are rendered necessary by difference of climate, &c. I may perhaps be able to prove further on that even sovereigns would occasionally be necessarily spent in China for what could be done at home at least as satisfactorily for the same number of shillings.

As the foregoing assertions may be considered very bold, I would be allowed to enter very minutely into one or two points as examples of the difference of circumstances, and would beg for a really patient and considerate attention to them. They are not put forward in this detailed manner as examples of our heaviest extra-expenses, but in order to show that in the commonest expenses, which might be supposed to need no special explanation, there are circumstances tending to increase them which would not be guessed at by strangers to this country.

Thereafter I shall endeavour to confine myself to less detailed statements; but I trust it will be understood that I do this only to save the time of those for whose perusal and consideration this statement is made, and that I would readily give details in proof of every general assertion I may make.

As a list of some prices, charges, &c., appears in a Return which was called for lately by circular and goes forward in another despatch, my purpose in the following remarks is to point out some sources of extra-expenditure in China not adverted to in the circular calling for the Return just mentioned; and also to show in what respects and to what extent that Return of nominal prices would mislead a person who did not possess an adequate knowledge of local circumstances.

To save time in arrangement I shall throw my remarks together without much attention to order, only numbering the subjects or paragraph for convenience of reference.

As I am not acquainted with the northern ports in China, some of the circumstances mentioned may only be found at the southern ports. But I have endeavoured to show to what ports or classes of ports the respective disadvantages appertain. It is very likely, however, that the northern ports have expenses peculiar to themselves which I am not aware of.

1. It might naturally be supposed that the market price of meat would show its comparative cost, but the nominal price of that article does not show the real cost of providing it in Amoy.

For instance, poultry is bought by weight, either alive or at least unplucked and undrawn, with sand shaken into its feathers, and other ingenious additions to its real living weight.

Again, when an animal that is sold by the joint is killed the carcass is soaked in water for a long time, and I am told that a very great weight of water is taken up into the vessels and into the very fibre of the meat to the great increase of its weight. At all events such meat loses a proportion of weight in cooking that would astonish an English cook.

Moreover, in the south of China all animals and birds are extremely thin, especially during the eight warm months of the year. There is therefore a much smaller proportion of flesh to bone here than there is in England, and this further increases the disproportion of real cost to nominal price.

Furthermore, a good deal of animal food is lost during some part of the year through getting tainted before it can be used. It is likely that the tricks played with meat by the vendors tend to hasten its decay; and another reason may be found in the fact that the Chinese sell, without scruple, the flesh of animals that have died of any disease. It would take me too long to explain clearly why this occasional loss cannot be avoided.

It is difficult to estimate exactly the extent to which these circumstances increase the nominal (market) price of animal food, as each of them applies in a different degree to each description of that class of food. But I believe they raise the real cost of animal food, all round, to between two and three times its nominal (market) price.

2. It is alleged, in the circular before mentioned, that oilman's stores, &c., can be obtained from England at an extra cost for freight and insurance very little in advance of the English prices. This is a misconception.

In England, groceries, &c., are, as a rule, wrapped in paper for delivery; and even things that are not sold loose, (such as jams) are sold in packages of a cheap kind. All articles paid for are delivered unbroken and in good condition; and as they are purchased in small quantities, are exposed to no risk of spoiling by long keeping after receipt. Any special packages that are necessary and charged for, are returnable, and the charge is refunded; *e.g.*, a wine merchant allows for hampers and bottles returned, and they are taken back by his own people on the delivery of the next purchase; whilst brewers do not charge for casks even in the first instance. And as a rule, all purchases from oilmen, grocers, buttermen, &c., are sent out without packing, in an errand boy's basket.

But when such things have to be sent to this country, the circumstances are greatly altered. The place of paper wrappings is taken by stoppered bottles, expensive jars, hermetically sealed tins, and whatever else is required to protect perishable articles from the heated damp of a ship's hold, or long exposure to the air, and careful packing in expensive cases is necessary in place of the careless arrangement of the errand boy's basket. None of these things are returnable, but their cost is an absolute addition to the cost of the goods.

To these extra expenses must be added the shipping and dock charges at home, freight and insurance to Hong Kong (for the southern ports), landing, storing, reshipping, and agency charges at Hong Kong, freight and insurance to the port of destination, and landing charges there, (the expenses of the last stage of the journey being not far off half those of the first stage). Beyond all this, has to be added the

loss from a proportion of things found broken or spoiled, and a further occasional loss from things getting spoiled after arrival. The last item sometimes swells to a considerable amount; for extreme heat in summer, excessive damp, weevils, white ants musk rats, and a host of other evils, unknown in England, frequently cause an amount of damage in this place that would not be guessed at by people who have only English experience to guide them; whilst the losses on the voyage are sometimes considerable. On one occasion the whole of my butter reached me in an uneatable state, causing me a loss of 4*l.* 10*s.*, and breakages and other losses out of the same lot of things amounted to more than 2*l.* more. This loss was out of an invoice of stores that would have cost about 36*l.* in England. On another occasion I lost thirty-one bottles of sherry out of a three-dozen case in my store-room, through white ants having got at the corks. This mischief must have been done in less than two months. These are extreme cases, but they show the risks that importers run.

I give here the extra expenses, and the losses already ascertained, on some stores just received by me.

	£	*s.*	*d.*
Shipping and dock charges, with freight and insurance to Hong Kong	2	16	6
Charges at Hong Kong and freight to Amoy (without insurance)	1	1	6
Charges in Amoy	0	7	5
Cost of extra cases, tins, jars, &c.	2	10	0
	6	15	5

The English price of the things shipped to me would be 13*l.* 9*s.* 7*d.* But on arrival, things were found broken and spoiled to the value of 9*s.* 9*d.* This amount has to be deducted from the value of the stores, and added to the expenses, when the account will stand as under—

	£	*s.*	*d.*
Stores received (English price)	12	9	10
Extra expenses	7	5	2

But there is reason to believe that three jars of butter are spoilt, though this will not be certainly known till the cool weather, as I am keeping the jars unopened till then to give it a better chance. If it proves to be spoilt, 1*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.* must be deducted from the value of the things, and added to the expenses, when the account will stand as under—

	£	*s.*	*d.*
Stores received (English price)	11	8	4
Extra expenses	8	16	8

Or about 80 per cent. addition to home prices, without allowing anything for things spoilt after receipt. Another invoice shows an addition of more than 70 per cent. on home prices, without any allowance for things broken or spoilt.

Taking everything into consideration, it is an open question whether it is not as well to purchase such things from the local storekeepers at double the English price. Even as it is the storekeepers have often to be resorted to by people who endeavour to get things direct from England, for vessels leave home so irregularly and make passages of such different length, that no amount of forethought will prevent a frequent dearth of many things in a private store-room unless very large supplies are kept. And larger supplies involve longer storage and greater risk of damage.

Before leaving this subject, I may state that some oilmen do not charge separately for the jars, tins, &c., containing articles, which in England are delivered in paper parcels, but include the extra packages in the price of the articles. And I extract from another invoice a few items of this kind, placing opposite them the prices paid by people in England for equal weights of the same articles—

	Export Price.		Home Price.	
	s.	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*
Oatmeal	8	0	4	0
Split peas	9	0	4	8
Currants	11	0	5	10
Pudding raisins	13	0	7	0

From this it will be seen that the way in which many things have to be made up for countries like China, alone doubles their prices, without counting outer packing cases or any of the other numerous expenses previously enumerated.

I now proceed to mention briefly some extra expenses of much more importance.

3. Life insurance costs between two and three times as much in China as in England.

On a policy taken out by me in a Scotch office, the English premium is 1*l.* 19*s.* 11*d.* per cent., and the China premium is 4*l.* 9*s.* 11*d.* per cent. I have not heard of any respectable office that charges less extra premium for China than the office in question. Some charge much more, and I know that the offices charging the lower rates of extra premium reserve the right of raising it to the higher rates charged by other offices. It might be roughly stated that life assurance costs, on the average, nearly three times as much in China as it does in England. It therefore takes a very large outlay by a Consular officer in China to insure a provision for a family equal to the pensions to widows and children of naval and military officers of the same rank. And this heavy expenditure cannot rightly be avoided, since life is at least as precarious amongst European residents in China as it is amongst officers of the two services just mentioned, so that to run the chance of being able to save up a provision for a family is to subject the latter to a great risk of being left more or less unprovided for.

4. Medical attendance generally proves a heavy item of expenditure, especially to married men, not only because the usual charges are very heavy, but also because attendance is so often required. Even the charges are heavier in some cases than they would at first sight appear to be. For instance, the charge here for opening an abscess is 5 dollars (say a guinea); but there would generally have been one or two consultations or visits about the case, which would raise the charge to 2*l.* 2*s.* or 3*l.* 3*s.* A dentist's charge for "stopping" is 5 dollars (or a guinea) for each "stopping," not for each tooth stopped. The stopping of a tooth that in England will cost from 10*s.* 6*d.* to 1*l.* 1*s.* at most, may frequently cost in this part of the world, 2*l.* 2*s.* or 3*l.* 3*s.* Moreover, if residents in this and many other places in China need the services of a surgeon-dentist, they must proceed to Hong Kong for that assistance, at an expense for travelling and hotel expenses of about a 100 dollars. It might thus cost one of this community a total sum of between 20*l.* and 25*l.* to get a single tooth stopped properly. And I may remark that teeth appear to fail in this climate more rapidly than they do at home.

5. Closely connected with the expenses of medical attendance is that for travelling, for medical men frequently find it needful to send patients away for a change; and a few weeks change for a single man may easily cost from 50*l.* to a 100*l.* or more. From this port people are oftenest sent to Che-foo or to Japan, and the mere passage-money to and from those places will cost about 70*l.* with return tickets, besides expenses at Hong Kong or Shanghae (or both places), where passengers will have to change steamers, and hotel expenses at the place they visit, unless they have friends there. These expenses are of little moment to wealthy merchants, or to mercantile clerks, whose expenses are paid by their employers; but they are so enormous to people with the limited incomes of Consular officers, that they practically prohibit changes of this kind except in very rare instances. Last year I myself was ordered to Japan by my doctor, under circumstances of great urgency. I did not go, principally because I could not afford the estimated cost of the trip, and I was laid up and suffered extreme agony for three months, and eventually was in great danger from inability to take food or get sleep. My doctor told me that if I had gone for a change when he directed me to do so, the pain would probably have left me in a day or two, and that after a month's absence there would have been little chance of its recurrence. In England a beneficial change for six weeks can be had at an expense for travelling of from 2*l.* to 5*l.*, and for lodgings of 10*l.* to 12*l.*, or not more than 15*l.* in all. From this part of China travelling expenses alone will cost from three to five times the latter amount, and as lodgings are not to be obtained anywhere, a man must make use of an hotel at China charges, unless he has friends to take him in. In the latter case, he must be prepared to reciprocate the kindness.

6. Loss on furniture is another source of considerable expense. When a man is moved from one post to another, his best plan is to sell his furniture, as so much gets broken and spoiled by removal by ship or steamer. He sells by auction at a heavy loss on the value, and has to repurchase at a higher rate at the new port. Similarly when he goes to England on sick leave, he has to sell his furniture at a cheap rate, and to repurchase at full rates for new things on his return to China. Furniture cannot be stored here, as white ants, rats, and damp, would spoil most things before his return, whilst the cost of storage would be five times what it would be in England. On one occasion, partly from necessity, partly from choice, I tried the experiment of leaving my furniture in my quarters during my absence in England on sick leave. My quarters were the centre set of three suites, the upper portions of which communicated through a verandah running the whole length of the building. On my return I found everything stolen, and I have not been disposed since that to try to avoid loss on the sale of furniture by repeating an experiment which cost me about 250*l.*

7. It is acknowledged to be not only desirable, but absolutely necessary, for

European residents in China to return home for change at intervals of a few years. It may be possible for an assistant in the Consular service to defray travelling expenses to England and back, and his expenses at home, out of his pay, if he is a bachelor and lives with his friends; especially as officers of that class go on full pay. But it is impossible for Consuls to do this, if they are married men, on the reduced pay they get whilst on leave of absence. They must, therefore, be in a position to save money for travelling expenses before their departure, or they will have to contract debts at home which they will have little prospect of paying. It should be borne in mind that a visitor cannot live in England on as favourable terms as a resident. He has to take a furnished house instead of renting an unfurnished one, and in that way pays a heavier rate for the use of furniture than a man who buys his own. He and his family get home in a bad or indifferent state of health, and have to go to greater expenses for medical attendance, &c., than is usual amongst people resident in a healthy climate; and he is placed in an exceptional position in many other respects. From my own experience, I estimate that a man ought to be able to save at least 100*l.* a year whilst in China, to defray the expenses of loss on furniture and travelling expenses to and from England on leave of absence. I may mention that the cost of a passage from a Consular port in China to England is considerably more than the mere fare by the steamers, as there are expenses to be incurred on shore for hotels, &c., at every stage where there is a change of steamers, say at Hong Kong, Point de Galle, and Egypt, as well as at the coaling-stations at other places. These incidental expenses alone would hardly be less than 15*l.* each way for one person. The total cost of travelling from Amoy to London for myself, wife, and one young child, a few years ago, was about 350*l.* I could not afford to take a servant for the child, though our medical attendant said it was "necessary," considering the sickly and disabled state I and my wife were in. Had I taken a servant, the expense would have been at least 100*l.* more, or 450*l.* in all. The travelling allowance towards these expenses would be 120*l.* and 140*l.* respectively, leaving a net expense of 240*l.* or 310*l.* for as small a family as could be found.

8. The necessity that people in China are under of sending children home at a very early age to be separately maintained in England, adds considerably to the expenses of a married resident in China. The mere expense of sending them home is a considerable one, as it involves travelling expenses home and back again for the mother also, and frequently for servant as well on the passage home. And a little experience would prove to any one that the cost of maintaining two or three children at home, away from their parents, is at least double what it would be if they were living with their parents in England. Whilst their absence does not make a corresponding difference to the house expenses of their parents in China, if the latter have another child with them in the latter place.

But I must hasten to a conclusion, as this statement is already beyond a due length. I will shortly enumerate a few things out of a host more that might be mentioned.

9. Washing is expensive, on account of the large number of things needing to be washed in the hot weather, and still more so on account of the rapid destruction of garments through the mode of washing that prevails amongst the washerwomen; who flog a rock with the garments to be cleansed, or pound the articles with a heavy billet of wood.

10. Woollen clothing, necessary during a portion of the year, is expensive to procure from England, and liable to the ravages of a great variety of insects to an extent unknown at home.

11. Lighting is expensive, for reasons that it would take me too long to explain fully. The necessity of using wood and charcoal makes kitchen firing very expensive. My kitchen firing costs me four times as much here as it did in England, when I rented a house in London. Coal for other fires is expensive, because it costs about twice as much as coal costs in England, and burns away more than half as fast again as English coal. I have heard from engineers of the Royal Navy that the proportion is as 5 to 3; that is to say, 5 tons of Formosa coal (used here) lasts no longer than 3 tons of English coal. But in this place English coal is so much higher in price, that it would be still more costly in use. On the other hand, I should mention that in this place fires are not needed for much more than four months out of the year.

12. Servants cost a great deal, on account of the number that must be kept. It is not necessary to keep as many as must be kept by people in India; but, on the other hand, wages are two or three times as high as I understand them to be in India, and some domestics are found in food or in certain portions of it. It may be remarked here, that servants are required for certain duties in China that are unknown in England.

13. Where foreigners have to be dealt with, nearly all miscellaneous and occasional

expenses out here are from three to twelve times what they are in England. For instance, watch-cleaning, which in England cost me 3*s.* 6*d.* or 5*s.*, here costs 1*l.* 1*s.*; a church-sitting in England cost me 18*s.* a year, and I am paying 3*l.* 10*s.* here; the English "pennyworth of tin-tacks" here costs 1*s.* 1*d.* (¼ dollar); local postage is 4*d.* per half-ounce (instead of the English 1*d.*), and if, as is generally the case in communications to and from the Southern ports, a letter is sent *viâ* Hong Kong, the postage is 8*d.* per half-ounce. I might add a hundred instances to these, but those I have adduced are sufficient examples.

14. I have said nothing as yet about expenditures of a kind unknown in England, but very necessary here, on account of the difference of climate and other circumstances. But I cannot enter upon that subject without writing sheets of explanation. It is, moreover, scarcely necessary to mention these; for hardly any educated person in England is ignorant of the fact that there are special expenses of that kind, and Her Majesty's Government will no doubt take the fact into account.

15. All that I have said hitherto relates only to private expenditure. But a Consul at a port in China occupies more than a private position, and is liable to extra expense on that accounts, if he will try to obtain the friendly influence that it is desirable he should have with the people amongst whom he lives. He has business relations, frequently of a delicate nature, with the Consuls of other Powers, with the Custom-house authorities, Chinese authorities, naval officers, and with all his countrymen under his jurisdiction. At most ports in China he will know all these; and the character of his business relations will depend greatly on that of his private relations, for difficulties that could be easily smoothed over and arranged with an intimate acquaintance, would frequently prove insuperable in dealing with a person who felt that he had only an official standing with him, and who would frequently be correspondingly exacting and unaccommodating. But a Consul can only obtain and keep up a friendly influence with the people amongst whom he lives, if he is in a position to keep up a certain amount of social intercourse with them, and take some part in whatever is going on amongst them. If he is so fortunate as to be able to do this, he may easily become a sort of social arbitrator—the mutual friend, and referee of all. But if he is so pinched in his circumstances as to be unable to keep up that social intercourse (maintained by all the rest of the community), he will find himself in the position of a stranger to all, with his influence, and consequently his usefulness, greatly crippled. Your Excellency must know so well the advantages arising in such communities as those at the Treaty ports in China from mutual friendliness and good-will between the officials, as well as between them and the rest of the foreign residents; and you will be able to set this forth so much better than I can do it, that I will say no more on this subject beyond declaring my belief that it is impossible for married Consuls to keep up that social intercourse upon the inadequate pay possessed by most of them, unless they expend for that purpose what should be devoted to making a provision for their families in case of their death.

It would also be better left to your Excellency to set forth the extra expenses to which foreign residents at most, if not all, of the Treaty ports are put, owing to a want of the organization that exists (and can only exist) in the larger communities of civilized countries for the cheap provision of most of the necessities of civilized life. The most graphic description that I have heard of this state of things is the absurd statement that a man has to buy a sheep to get a mutton-chop; for, absurd as this statement is, taken literally, it nevertheless is a fair figurative indication of the inconvenient and expensive circumstances in which we are placed in many respects, owing to the position which we occupy as a few civilized people (with the wants of such people) set down in the midst of an uncivilized race. We have, in hosts of instances, to do, individually, at great expense (or, at best, by co-operation amongst the very limited number of persons who may be interested in the end to be obtained), what in England is done at a comparatively insignificant cost, owing to large numbers of people having similar wants, and an organized service being established to meet their requirements. Much as if a man, having to proceed occasionally by the river from London Bridge to Westminster, had to buy a boat, purchase land, and build a boat-house on it, and hire a crew for that purpose, instead of being able to make the journey by the penny steamboats; or had to establish a soda-water manufactory in order to obtain aërated waters for his own use; or was obliged to purchase a valuable book that he had to refer to, instead of hiring it for a few days from a circulating library. Even what I called the "absurd" statement regarding the mutton-chop has been a sober truth in my experience; for, in hot weather, when my friends have happened to be fully supplied with other kinds of meat, I have more than once or twice had to buy and kill a sheep on my own account

to get for a sick wife the only thing that she could eat, and which the doctor said she must have.

I believe that the cost of many of the Consulates in this country may be reduced; but I do not think that it can be done by a reduction of salaries, with any advantage to the public service. Even in cases where the salaries may appear exceptionally high, it should be borne in mind that these are the prizes and rewards of long and arduous service, in a climate that is trying to most and fatal to many; and that the officers who hold these appointments may, moreover, fairly expect that twenty odd years of service should in itself entitle them to some corresponding advantage over those who have not served half that time, and are probably not involved in as heavy expenses. But for a fear of being considered presumptuous, I could indeed readily show that a regular increase of the salaries of Her Majesty's Consuls confined to this part of the world, starting from a certain limit on first appointment, would not only be the fair rule of payment, but would also be attended with some advantages to the public service.

I may, however, be allowed to refer to my own management of this Consulate in proof of the possibility of reducing the cost of the Consulates, and of the way in which it may be done; for I believe your Excellency is aware that, whilst in charge of this establishment, I have succeeded in curtailing its controllable expenses to an extent considerably greater than would have been effected by any reduction of salaries that can be contemplated by Her Majesty's Government, and that you also know that I shall be able to effect still further reductions, without repairing the efficiency of the establishment, if I am enabled to carry out the measures I have in view.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER.

British Consulate, Amoy, September 27, 1869.

Inclosure 11 in No. 8.

Consul Pedder to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Amoy, September* 29, 1869.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your Circular No. 10 (on Accounts), of 6th July last, I have the honour to inclose a tabular statement, with remarks, containing the information you call for.

The statement shows the whole of the foreign trade, but distinguishes that conducted in British vessels from the portion carried on in the foreign bottoms.

Referring to an observation in your Circular, I may remark that a comparison of items, Nos. 1 and 5 in the statement, will show that the foreign import trade of this place is almost entirely a primary one; whilst a comparison of No. 5 with the aggregate amount of Nos. 8, 9, and 10, will show that this port distributes about twenty times as much as it receives indirectly.

If the British merchants at Amoy, who direct so much of the Takow trade, succeed in the attempt they are making to extend their operations to other ports on the Island of Formosa, the distributing branch of the trade of this port will be greatly increased.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER.

Inclosure 12 in No. 8.

RETURN of the Trade conducted in Foreign Vessels at Amoy, during the Year 1868.

Reference to Remarks.	Description of the Trade.	Value of Merchandize.		Total in Sterling.
		In British Vessels.	In other Vessels.	
		£	£	£
1	Imports from foreign countries, direct	1,002,642	347,705	1,350,347
2	„ Chinese ports, direct	222,451	233,427	455,878
3	Exports to foreign countries, direct	101,423	240,155	341,578
4	„ Chinese ports, direct	113,993	277,017	391,010
5	Imports from foreign countries received as re-exports from Chinese ports	656	9,141	9,797
6	„ Chinese ports, received via Hong Kong ..	89,374	3,167	92,541
7	„ foreign countries, re-exported to foreign countries	13,261	4,617	17,878
8	„ foreign countries, re-exported to Chinese ports	117,827	43,073	160,900
9	„ Chinese ports, re-exported to foreign countries	13,751	7,652	21,403
10	„ Chinese ports, re-exported to Chinese ports ..	74	22,955	23,029
	Total Merchandize	1,675,452	1,188,909	2,864,361
11	Treasure imported from foreign countries	113,244	46,221	159,465
12	„ „ Chinese ports	69,949	26,241	96,190
13	Treasure exported to foreign countries	291,184	27,277	318,461
14	„ „ Chinese ports	227,384	21,276	248,660
	Total Merchandize and Treasure ..	2,377,213	1,309,924	3,687,137

Total, 3,687,137*l.* sterling.

Remarks.

1. This does not include any foreign produce and merchandize received as re-exports from other Chinese ports; the latter being given under a separate heading (No. 5).

2. This is composed solely of Chinese produce, and manufactures received direct from the first ports of export. About 10 per cent. of the whole was received for distribution in about equal portions to foreign countries and other Chinese ports. (See headings Nos. 9 and 10.)

3 and 4. These items are made up solely of the produce and manufactures of this place; re-exports of Chinese merchandize being shown separately under headings 9 and 10. The exports to foreign countries in British vessels show a less proportion than usual, because foreign vessels were taken up for tea on account of there being no British vessels on the berth suitable for that branch of trade at this place.

5. The small amount of this item, as compared with No. 1, shows that this place receives nearly all its foreign imports direct.

6. This is made up almost entirely of merchandize from Canton.

7. This item is composed in great part of opium and piece-goods of qualities and descriptions unsuitable for this market, and returned to the shippers on that account.

8. This is made up mostly of foreign produce and manufactures supplied to Takow and other Formosan ports; the one named having obtained most of its foreign imports last year from this port. The greater part of the trade there, both in imports and exports, seems to be directed by the British firms at this port, who have branch establishments there, and who this year are extending their operations to Tamsuy as well. A portion of items, Nos. 2 and 4, and nearly the whole of Nos. 8, 9, and 10, may probably be put down to this account.

9 and 10 are made up mostly of Formosan produce. (See the latter half of remark No. 8.

11. This treasure was nearly all received from British possessions.

12. Mostly received from Formosa. (See the latter half of remark No. 8.)

13. The whole of this went to British possessions.

14. Nearly the whole of this was sent to Foochow; mainly for the purchase of tea.

The amount of treasure imported and exported has been very imperfectly ascertained, and it is known that at least 50,000*l.* sterling has been left out of this Return. But it seemed better to leave this amount out of the Table, as there was no way of discovering how to class it.

A comparison of items Nos. 1 and 5 in the Table will show that this port receives nearly the whole of its foreign imports direct. In fact, No. 5 properly forms no part of the real import trade, being made up mostly of unsaleable imports of other places, sent here on the chance of their finding a market at this place. And a comparison of this item (No. 5) with the aggregate amount of Nos. 8, 9, and 10, will show that this port distributes about twenty times as much as it receives in this indirect way. These facts show that the trade of this port is properly a primary and not a secondary trade.

(Signed) W. H. PEDDER.

British Consulate, Amoy, September 29, 1869.

Inclosure 13 in No. 8.

Consul Pedder to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Amoy, September* 30, 1869.

IN reply to your Circular No. 11 (on Accounts) of 6th July last, I have to report that a very considerable portion of the foreign trade of this port has been conducted by Chinese for some time past. It would however be almost impossible to ascertain with any approximation to correctness the proportion of the whole trade which is done by Chinese, as there appears to be a great intermixture of interests between natives and foreigners, and I am unwilling to commit myself to any statement upon this point.

I am of opinion, however, that this proportion, whatever it may be, has reached its highest point, and may even be expected to recede before very long. The grounds on which I found this belief are as follows:—

The diversion of foreign trade at this port into Chinese hands is almost entirely owing to the operation of the leking duties, and that principally through the manner in which they are gathered. These duties are divided into several classes, and are farmed out to privileged associations of merchants and dealers for something less than half the sum they should produce; and this gives the members of these associations something approaching to a monopoly of the branches of trade with which they are connected, as having to make up less than half the amount that full duties on the whole trade would produce, they can not only afford to let themselves off free of duty in the first instance, but can also give considerable advantages to those Chinese dealers who do business with them instead of with foreign merchants.

Take the following illustration. A foreign merchant imports a chest of opium in a foreign vessel, paying import duty at the foreign department of the Custom-house. A farmer of the leking duty on opium does the same. The latter being a Chinaman should also pay the leking duty of about 30*l.* sterling, but of course does not so tax himself. One country dealer buys the chest imported by the foreign merchant, and is at once charged the full leking duty. Another dealer buys from the Chinese importer (a farmer of the leking duty), and is let off with a payment of half or a quarter of the above-mentioned duty. Such a case of course never occurs, as a dealer would of course not buy from the foreign importer as long as the other man had any to sell. To show how complete is the monopoly enjoyed by the farmers of these duties, I may state that if a man, unconnected with the leking office, receives an advance (say) for tea to be supplied hereafter—that advance being as usual partly in dollars and partly in opium—he will at once take his delivery order for the opium to a leking farmer, and sell it to him at a considerable loss. The re-sale will in fact have been arranged previously, before he ventured to receive the opium as an advance from the foreign merchant.

But it will be asked how it is that under these circumstances the foreigner can continue to import opium at all. He can do so for many reasons. In the first place the farmers will themselves buy from the foreign merchant at the price that they themselves can import the drug at the time; and as the foreigner can generally import to somewhat greater advantage than the Chinaman this leaves a trifling advantage on the transaction. Even if he gets no profit by the transaction he will however import it as a return in place of treasure. Moreover, if he imports when the market price is low, his greater command of capital enables him to hold his goods for a rise in the market.

But there are reasons for believing that the system above described must have reached its utmost point of mischief. The farmers have to pay heavy bribes to the Provincial and Local Authorities upon every renewal of their privilege, which is granted for only a few months at a time. These functionaries believe that the monopolists make even greater profits than they really obtain, and squeeze them more heavily on each occasion. This reduces the margin of profit, and consequently the proportion of favour

which they can grant to their own constituents, so that the differential duties are not so disproportioned as they were formerly. The margin of profit left on the farming of the duties is still further reduced by a diminution of the regular trade of the port, owing to a considerable smuggling trade conducted with the district through small ports in the neighbourhood by a section of people totally unconnected with the farmers of the duties, who found that the latter would not give them the same advantages that they gave to their own relatives and friends; and who were therefore reduced to the alternative of giving up business or taking to smuggling.

There are good grounds for a hope that a little more squeezing on the part of the authorities and a moderate increase of smuggling will leave the farmers no margin for the creation of differential duties. In this case all Chinese trading at the port must be charged alike, the present monopoly will be at an end, and the foreign merchants will regain the proportion of the trade of the port that they have lost,

But even then the trade of the port will probably continue to diminish, as the smuggling trade just mentioned is pretty certain to continue and to increase so long as the leking duties are continued at the present rates, which range from 5 per cent. to about 90 per cent. *ad valorem.* There would have been more smuggling already than there is had it not been (as before explained) that in effect only about half duties were levied. When the full duties are exacted the trade of the port in many branches may be very seriously affected.

It is of course possible that the present state of things may be prolonged by the monopolists being permitted to retain the collection of the duties upon payment of a lesser contribution to the Treasury. But this is hardly to be expected, for the authorities are not likely to be brought to see the necessity of this, and would probably take the collection of the duties into their own hands rather than consent to a reduction. But even if they did farm the duties out at a lower rate they would see in this a good ground for constantly increasing their private exactions, so that things would soon come again to the dead-lock that I trust they are approaching now.

The monopoly above described, as well as the levy of such enormous duties as those set down in the leking tariff, are respectively in direct violation of the letter of Article V of the Treaty of Nanking and of the spirit of Article X of the same Treaty. But the Provincial and Local Authorities care nothing for such considerations, for neither these nor any other provisions of the Treaties will be observed by them any further than they choose to observe them until they find that Foreign Powers are prepared to guard vigilantly the rights that they have exacted resolutely. When that time comes no wrongs of this nature will be initiated except in ignorance (when they will be excusable) nor persevered in after protest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. PEDDER.

No. 9.

Consul Sinclair to Mr. Hammond.—(Received December 6.)

Sir, *Foo-chow-foo, October 11, 1869.*

OBEDIENTLY to Sir Rutherford Alcock's instructions which reached me on the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Department copies of despatches from this Consulate in reply to his Excellency's Circulars Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12 of 6th July, and No. 13 of 12th of August, all of which bear upon a report on the Consular establishment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Consul Sinclair to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foo-chow-foo, July 23, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in obedience to the instructions conveyed to me in your Circular No. 9 (Accountant's Department) of the 6th instant, a detailed Memorandum of the number of Chinese official servants employed at the Consulate and Vice-Consulate at Foo-chow-foo, the amount of wages or salary paid to each person, and

the nature of their respective duties, also a return showing the numbers of British subjects, distinguishing those of European or Colonial origin from those of Asiatic origin, that have been confined in the lock-ups or gaols of the Foo-chow-foo the Consulate, or Pagoda Island Vice-Consulate during the 1868.

With reference to the account asked for in the extract from Lord Clarendon's despatch, of the money expended during 1868 in medical assistance at this Consulate, I do not find any charge made in the Consular accounts on this head, unless it be the contribution of Her Majesty's Government to the Foo-chow Native Hospital, for which the officers of the Consulate and the Foo-chow Gaol are entitled to medical attendance of the medical officers of the hospital without expense to themselves.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Memorandum on the Number of Chinese Public Servants employed at the Consulate and Vice-Consulate at Foo-chow-foo; the Amount of Wages or Salary paid to each Person; and the Nature of their respective Duties.

At the Consulate.

ONE Writer, a man of letters, has been connected with the Consulate since 1849; salary, 30 dollars per month; low when compared with the pay of the same class of secretaries in the Chinese Yamêns. His duties are those of secretary, namely to compare the official Chinese despatches to the Chinese Authorities under the dictation of the Interpreter, also to aid the latter to make out the meaning of difficult passages in Chinese documents.

One Linguist, a man experienced in Chinese official business, is also an old servant in the Consular service; salary, 25 dollars per month, is one-fifth less than is paid to the Junior Linguists or Copying Clerks in the Chinese Custom-house for work of less importance.

His duties are various, namely, to copy and register all despatches, received from and sent to the Chinese Authorities, to copy all Chinese inclosures in Consul's despatches, to indite notes and carry verbal messages to the Mandarins personally; to interpret from the local into the Mandarin dialect on every occasion, and the evidence of Chinese witnesses in cases tried in the Consular Court; to accompany the Consul on all official business to the Chinese Yamêns, to take note of the substance of the business treated of; to write down the depositions of Chinese made before the Consul; to expend and keep an account of the monthly expenditure on office account for reimbursement at the end of each month after inspection of the account by the Consul; to control and supervise the establishment of official servants, to see that every one of them does his duty. In a word, his services are in constant requisition in a variety of useful ways for the public service.

One Constable, who is also Jailer and Usher of the Court, is a half-caste of Calcutta, dresses in European clothes, and is in every respect like another British subject. Wages 50 dollars per month, is just sufficient pay for an eastern-born subject. For an Englishman the pay of 50 dollars per month would be quite inadequate in an expensive place like this, with his numerous necessities. His duties, as indicated, are to arrest on warrant, to take charge of prisoners in the lock-up, to serve writs of Court and execute them, to attend in Court during the sitting, &c.

Two Consular messengers, wages each 8 dollars per month. Their duties are to carry despatches and messages to the Chinese Yamêns in the city four to five miles from the Consulate at Nantai, and, when necessary, to see the Mandarins personally on business; for this reason they require to be decently and respectably dressed.

When a Chinese subject, a servant in British employ, is required at the desire of the Chinese magistrates to appear before native tribunals to be examined, or to give evidence as a witness, it is usual to depute a Consular messenger to accompany the person summoned to the Yamên to watch the case on behalf of the Consulate, and the merchant whose servant he is, so as to be able on his return to certify to the Consul as to the treatment which the man has been subjected to; this precaution has been considered indispensable, in consequence of the harsh treatment that is frequently exercised by unprincipled bullies of Mandarins towards unoffending men, simply because they "eat" what they call "foreign bread," in other words, take employment in foreign service. A

very glaring case of similar cruelty and injustice has only recently occurred, for no other reason than that the men who were examined by the magistrate were servants in British hongs. These unfortunate men, after a week's repose, are still unable to attend to their work or to walk, from the severity of the blows on their thighs with the large-sized bamboo. The two men were brought back in this condition for restitution to their masters, no guilt whatever having been proved against them. The matter is now in the hands of the Viceroy. The Consular messengers also attend the Consul on his official visits to the Chinese authorities, and are sometimes deputed on distant errands to investigate matters,

It would be difficult to obtain the services of efficient servants of this class at lower wages, foreign service not being a popular one in the city of Foo-chow, for it frequently happens that servants in foreign employment are treated with contumely, and are exposed to insulting epithets at the hands of the Foo-chow people for being in our employment. This disposition of the people towards foreign mercenaries is like to wear off in time.

One Gatekeeper, was 6 dollars per month. A Gatekeeper is a necessary appendage to every establishment, especially if official, in China. His duties are solely to keep the gate from morning till night time, and to be in respectable costume.

One Gatekeeper at Wooshihshan, in the city, wages 5 dollars per month, 1 dollar less than the Nantai Gatekeeper, because not required to be in costume. He has quite enough to do to keep loungers out of the Consular compound, and to keep the premises in order.

Five official Runners, wages 6 dollars each per month. One is kept on duty at Wooshihshan to be in attendance when the Chinese authorities visit the Consul. The remaining four kept on duty at the Nantai Consulate.

Their several duties are to run on messages, to take notifications round the community located on both sides of the river (there being no advertising newspaper in this place), to carry notes and letters on business during the whole day to the Custom-house and merchants' offices and private dwellings, which lie in opposite directions. The foreign community of Foo-chow is not located in one distinct and compact spot; their residences are at considerable distances from each other, ranging from one to two miles, while the missionaries live in the city, at a distance of four miles from the Consular establishments. Then, again, business in Foo-chow is not done as it is in the city of London, and elsewhere in Europe, that is, by personal attendance of clerks at the offices with which they have transactions. In China it is done everywhere by means of letters or chits, the simplest message or query between Consulate and Custom-house and merchant offices being conveyed in writing, and so on during the whole day. Considering that there are over 100 foreign residents in the place, all writing and all more or less sending messages, it may be said that the runners of a public office like the Consulate are constantly on the run with commissions from the Consulate offices. The Runners are required to be respectably dressed, and ready for every emergency, and they sweep and clean the offices.

One Boatkeeper.—Wages 6 dollars per month. He takes charge of the Consul's barge, to keep it clean and ready for use. He keeps watch over it at its anchorage some distance off from the Consultate, lest it be carried away by the floods and strong currents, or at night by robbers. The merchants generally keep up a crew of ten men for the same purpose for which the Consulate employs one Boatman, a crew being engaged instead, on the boat being called into service.

Three Night Watchers.—Two at 6 dollars per month each, and the third at Wooshih-shan at 5 dollars per month wages. It is a Chinese custom for every householder, or for a few shopkeepers to club together in each ward to employ a watchman, and often two when the premises are extensive, to guard the premises against night robbers, who swarm in all Chinese suburbs and cities. No house or tenement would be safe in this place without the protection of a watchman or two, and the Consular Chest at Nantai, and other property, would soon disappear without that protection. The reason of this is that there is no police or paid constabulary to protect property, and that Government leaves every one to guard his own chattels the best way he can against the bands of thieves that infest every place.

I may conclude with the following pertinent remarks, that the wages of the Chinese official servants, described in the foregoing nomenclature, in no way exceed the rates usually paid by foreigners to Chinese for services of less importance, and in a great many cases the rate is lower. And if we compare these wages with those paid to private servants in families and merchant's dwellings, they rank infinitely lower; as for instance, cooks and body servants in merchants' houses are paid from 12 dollars to 14 dollars per month each, besides sundry perquisites; indeed, in my own modest establishment, I do

not pay less than 8 dollars per month each to my private servants, so high have wages risen on the increased cost of living in Foo-chow-foo, which is perhaps the most expensive for living of the Treaty ports.

If the rates of wages of servants in *bonâ fide* Chinese employment is nominally small in comparison, say from 2 dollars to 3 dollars per month for a common coolie, then it must not be forgotten that those servants get besides their rice and daily meals provided for them gratis, and, according to a long-established usage, they derive a rateable share in the annual profits of their masters, called by the name of "commission," which swells their monthly wages to far above 6 dollars per month. And then again the people themselves prefer service in their own native hongs to employment in foreigners' service, for the reasons explained when referring to the Consular messengers.

Another important consideration is that the Chinese, as a rule, marry young, and that every man in service has a wife and children, besides sometimes his aged parents to support out of his fixed monthly income.

Moreover, let it here be remarked that the cost of living in Foo-chow has of late years increased in an astonishing degree, rendering every article of daily consumption particularly expensive, as well for the native consumer as for the English resident. The accession of a money-spending foreign community, with large establishments of servants and with costly habits, some necessitated by the nature of the climate of the south of China, has had the often expressed effect of raising the cost of living, and with it the rate of servants' wages and of labour generally throughout Foo-chow and the neighbourhood.

At the Vice-Consulate on Pagoda Island.

One Linguist.—Salary 15 dollars per month. His duties are those of office clerk, and interpreter from the local into the Mandarin dialect at trials in the Vice Consular Court. The Yamêns of the Mandarins being all up at Foo-chow-foo, there is little Chinese correspondence between the Vice Consulate and the authorities.

One Constable.—A German of Hanover; wages 50 dollars per month; is preferred to an Englishman because more steady and of more sober habits. The class of Englishmen to be got for 50 dollars per month in China can only be seamen from before the mast, few of whom would suit for the situation of Constable, and keep free from the inducements of the bottle. As in the case of the Constable of the Consulate, the Constable of the Vice-Consulate is the Jailer and Usher of the Court, performing the same duties as the former.

One Gatekeeper.—Wages 6 dollars per month; keeps the gate, and acts as office servant to keep the office clean.

Four Boatmen, each at 6 dollars per month, is the ordinary wages of boatmen at Foo-chow. Their duty is to man and pull the gig when the Vice-Consul has business afloat, and to carry messages and letters on shore.

One Night Watchman.—Wages 6 dollars per month. Is indispensable for the safety of Consular property at the anchorage during the night, the same remarks being applicable to him as to the three watchmen necessary for the Consulate premises up the river at Foo-chow-foo.

(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Foo-chow-foo, July 22, 1869.

RETURN showing the numbers of British Subjects, distinguishing those of European or Colonial Origin from those of Asiatic Origin, that have been confined in the Lock-ups or Gaols of the Foo-chow Consulate and the Vice-Consulate on Pagoda Island during the Year 1868.

At the Consulate at Foo-chow.

Nil during the year.

At the Vice-Consulate on Pagoda Island.

Number of Prisoners.	European, Colonial, or Asiatic.	Average Duration of Confinement.
29	European (seamen) ..	15 days to 1 month.
..	Colonial	Nil.
..	Asiatic	Nil.

(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Foo-chow-foo, July 22, 1869.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

Consul Sinclair to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foo-chow-foo, July* 27, 1869.

BELOW is a correct statement taken from the Customs returns of the total value of foreign goods imported from foreign countries in foreign bottoms, chiefly British, during the years 1867 and 1868, and of the total value of foreign goods re-exported in foreign vessels during each of those years, which, I presume, will meet the requirements of your Circular despatch No. 10, Accountant's Department, of the 6th instant:—

1867.

Imported.			Re-exported.		
	Dollars	c.		Dollars	c.
From Hong Kong	5,124,886	0			
Japan	761	0			
Australia	31,785	0			
Great Britain	339	0			
United States	9,042	0			
Total Imported ..	5,163,813	0	Total Re-exported ..	34,408	0

1868.

Imported.			Re-exported.		
	Dollars	c.		Dollars	c.
From Hong Kong	5,052,431	0			
France	25,129	0			
Australia	39,008	0			
Great Britain	..	..			
Paget Sound	50	0			
United States	..	..			
Total Imported ..	5,116.618	0	Total Re-exported ..	27,021	0

The foregoing statement does not include the treasure imported, which for 1867 was 7,940,827 dollars, and for 1868, 9,282,791 dollars, of the whole of which only 1,741,067 dollars was re-exported.

Let it be observed that Hong Kong is the great feeding port of the ports south of Ningpo for cotton and woollen fabrics, for Straits' produce, opium, &c., few home ships loading direct for Foo-chow.

The goods are supplied to us here by steamers under the British flag, which ply regularly twice a month between Hong Kong and this port, taking Swatow and Amoy on their way, and dropping goods there.

With the exception of opium and lead and a small quantity of inferior shirtings, almost all the other foreign goods are imported by Chinese on their own account in foreign vessels from Hong Kong, whither they go to make their purchases, or else employ Chinese agents there to select what they want.

Once the foreign goods, thus Chinese-owned, have passed through the European Custom, they become to all intents and purposes Chinese, and we lose all trace of them. They spread over the neighbouring districts, subjected, even in the port itself to illegal exactions of a variety of denominations, despite the protection guaranteed to them by the Treatics. As for the goods that are carried inland, they are quite beyond Consular protection, and the local Mandarins at the various barriers levy *ad libitum*, and refuse to acknowledge the transit-duty certificate, excepting for the article lead, with which they are averse to interfere.

From the northern ports, Newchwang, Tien-tsin, and Shanghae, British ships find increasing employment in bringing and taking back Chinese cargoes of native origin, the property and investments of Chinese merchants.

In conclusion, Foo-chow has no foreign goods for re-exportation, either north or south, the bulk of the imports being consumed on the spot and neighbourhood; and the nearest Treaty port, Amoy, like Foo-chow, obtains its supplies from the great entrepôt in the south.

That the quantity of imports of foreign imports is not larger, is assignable to the

mountainous character of the Province, the want of easy access into the interior, the heavy exactions at the inland barriers, and the preference of the native population for the northern Nankeen cloths.

But the increasing number of British ships that frequent this port during the course of the year will always require the protection of the Consular authorities, not to speak of the interests of the established resident merchants, there being no dependence on the local authorities for assistance in mercantile difficulties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR.

Inclosure 4 in No. 9.

Consul Sinclair to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foo-chow-foo, July* 28, 1869.

I HAD the honour to receive your despatch Circular (Accountants' Department) of the 6th instant on the 20th of the same month, on the above subject. Since its receipt, I have occupied myself in collecting the information that you call upon me to furnish you upon it.

It will be found that the tendency of the trade to pass out of British into Chinese hands is limited to that part of it which is connected with the distribution of goods over China after they leave the original port of entry. The business of bringing the goods from England and of sending Chinese produce to England remains, as formerly, in foreign hands. The same tendency has been developed gradually in the trade in Chinese and Japanese produce carried in foreign vessels to Chinese ports, until it is almost entirely left to the natives. The causes of this are easily traced, and, while they operate, the tendency will continue.

Let us first examine the reasons why natives have the power of distributing goods over China at so low a cost as to preclude competition.

1. The saving in the hire of coolies and boats by natives as compared with foreigners.

2. The much smaller expenses of their trading establishments.

3. The jealousy of the native trade guilds towards any foreigner who attempts to enter the market of which they consider they have the monopoly, and the influence, at all times great, which they exert against him.

4. The disadvantage under which foreigners labour from not speaking the language, and having therefore to make their contracts (whether of sale or purchase) through compradores or other middle men, who exact a commission or discount from the person with whom the business is transacted. Business worked quietly for the sake of a small profit cannot support this burthen, and hence it is that in such cases as the opening of a new port, where foreign enterprise has to lead the way, the trade passes to the natives as soon as they begin to compete.

It is for these reasons that the trade by foreigners in foreign productions is becoming more and more restricted to the sale, at the great centres of import, to the natives, who, availing themselves of foreign vessels, carry them coastwise, often taking them, in small quantities, to ports where the original importers have branches for the sale of the same goods, but cannot afford to sell them at the same price as their native competitors.

Two branches of the import trade at this port remain in the hands of foreigners, namely, opium and lead; but this arises from exceptional circumstances, which leave unassailed the original proposition of the superior power of the Chinese in distributing produce cheaply.

Opium.—The British firms who deal in opium in Foo-chow are almost invariably branches of firms in Hong Kong, who, importing regularly large quantities from India, are much interested in supporting the Hong Kong market, at the same time that they are anxious to diminish their stocks, which it would be difficult to do there without reducing the price. On this account they send up drug to the coast ports, with instructions to sell as quickly as possible at a bare equivalent of the Hong Kong price, or even at a loss if the market is weak. This prevents the trade from being remunerative to local importers, who purchase in Hong Kong with a hope of a profit to be obtained in the sale here. A large capital is also required to be invested in such a business, and in the power of procuring money at low rates of interest the foreigner has a great advantage over the native.

Lead is imported entirely by foreigners, because the privilege of sending it up

country under transit certificate has been frequently fought for successfully by the British Consular authorities, until now the right is generally respected. The transit duty is 1 mace 2 candarines 2 cash, with 10 per cent. added for sycee, 1 mace 8 candarines 7 cash, while the inland taxes on unprotected lead (*i. e.*, imported by natives) are 3 mace 5 candarines.

Here is an instance of how much good may arise from Consular protection.

The trade in goods from home and tea from China continues to be carried on by foreigners for the following reasons:—

1. The power of getting the requisite capital for so long a trade at a much lower rate than the natives. It may be reckoned as costing the English merchant 6 or 7 per cent., while to the native it is worth at least double. (During the last two months from 2 to 3 per cent. per mensem has been readily paid by teamen.)

2. The necessity for natives who wish to enter the trade (and avail themselves of the usual banking facilities for obtaining increased capital at foreign rates) of employing an English firm to act for them, and thereby incurring commissions, and part at least of the disadvantages which are found attaching to foreigners in the Chinese local trade.

Regarding the carrying trade, we find that there is an increase in the amount of tonnage employed in carrying timber from this to Shanghae and Ningpo during the north-east monsoon, when junks cannot beat up the coast, and that, contrary to old usage, foreign vessels are now sometimes employed for this purpose, in preference to junks, even in the south-west monsoon.

There is an increase also in the amount of cargo belonging to natives carried in steamers between this and the southern ports, chiefly in imports.

Until the Chinese language is more generally known by British traders in China, and the compradore system destroyed, it is better policy for importers of manufactures to sell at the port to which the goods are originally brought, and leave the distribution to be done by natives. But, as stated in my Trade Report of 1868, the trade in cotton and woollen goods is considered of such slight importance by the English merchant at Foo-chow, that he hardly thinks it worth his while to import these goods; this branch of business is left almost entirely to the native dealers, who supply themselves at Hong Kong piecemeal, according to the quantities and colours they require to suit the Foo-chow market.

The opening of ports along the coast would have a very beneficial effect on trade, as the native can then employ foreign bottoms to carry to such ports. The opening of the whole coast, under certain restrictions, would be of great benefit generally, and, as regards the distribution of goods in the interior, any protection afforded whereby the inland taxes are reduced must tend to increased consumption.

Adverting to that passage in the extract from Lord Clarendon's despatch anent trade in the Levant, there does not appear to me to be such an analogy between the Greek and Chinese character as to lead to the supposition that the latter people will supplant Europeans here, as the former have done to a great extent in the Levant. The Greek is essentially a citizen of the world, and it seems a matter of perfect indifference to him where he goes to live; while, on the other hand, the Chinese of the better class, such as would be likely to engage in external trade, are not inclined to leave their native land,—and they must therefore do their business through European agency.

Having exhausted the information that I have been enabled to collect from friendly and experienced merchants on this interesting subject, I remain, &c.

(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR.

Inclosure 5 in No. 9.

Consul Sinclair to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir,

Foo-chow-foo, July 21, 1869.

IN compliance with the instructions with which you favoured me in Circular No. 12 of the 6th instant, I beg to transmit herewith a statement of the expenditure incurred at this Consulate during the year 1868, on account of rent and insurance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR.

Inclosure 6 in No. 9.

Statement of Sums paid on Account of Rents and Insurance at the Foo-chow-foo Consulate, during the Year 1868.

March Quarter.

	Dols.	c.
Ground-rent for Consular buildings	93	75
Bungalow for two assistants	300	0
House-rent for bungalow for Vice-Consul at Pagoda Island	135	0
Rent of Wooshishan premises in the city	60	0
	588	75

June Quarter.

Ground-rent for Consular buildings	93	75
Bungalow for the Interpreter and family	300	0
Rent of gaol premises on Pagoda Island	12	50
Bungalow for assistants	300	0
Bungalow on Pagoda Island for Vice-Consul	135	0
Rent of Wooshihshan premises in the city	60	0
	901	25

September Quarter.

Ground rent of Consular lot	93	75
Ditto, ditto (for extra intercalary moons)	31	25
Rent of gaol premises on Pagoda Island	12	50
Rent of Vice-Consul's offices on Pagoda Island	60	0
Bungalow for Interpreter and family	300	0
Bungalow for the assistants	300	0
Rent of Wooshihshan premises in the city	60	0
Bungalow for Vice-Consul on Pagoda Island	135	0
	992	50

December Quarter.

Ground-rent for Consular lot	93	75
Bungalow for Vice-Consul at Pagoda Island (one month)	45	0
Rent of gaol premises at Pagoda Island	12	50
Bungalow for Interpreter and family (two months)	200	0
Bungalow for the assistants	300	0
Rent of Wooshihshan premises in the city	60	0
	711	25

Summary of the above Rents.

	Dols.	c.
March quarter	588	75
June quarter	901	25
September quarter	992	50
December quarter	711	25
Total for the Year 1868	3,193	75

Memorandum.—The rents at this date are as follows:—

	Dols.	c.	
Ground-rent of Consular lot	93	75	per quarter.
Gaol premises at Pagoda Island	12	50	„
Wooshihshan premises	60	0	„
	166	25	„

Or, 665 dollars per annum.

Insurance.

Insurance of offices and assistants' quarters contained in one building called the "Blockhouse," for one year, from November 1868 to November 1869, 75 dollars.

Total Insurance during 1868.

No outlay has been incurred at this Consulate on account of furniture on Government account. The expenditure on Consular buildings is in Major Crossman's hands, and is unknown to me.

(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR, *Consul.*

Foo-chow-foo, July 21, 1869.

Inclosure 7 in No. 9.

Consul Sinclair to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foo-chow-foo, September* 20, 1869.

OBEDIENTLY to the instructions conveyed to me in your Circular No. 13 of the 12th ultimo, I have the honour to make the following report, in reply to the questions upon which information is desired, namely :—

Q. 1. The average market price of the principal articles of food ?—A. Beef, 8 cents per lb. ; mutton, 40 cents per lb. ; fish, at various prices, from 130 to 450 cash per catty (at Foo-chow equal to an English lb.) according to season; fowls, 200 to 350 cash each, or 130 cash per catty ; geese, 700 to 800 cash each ; ducks, 500 to 600 cash each ; bread, 8 cents per lb.-loaf ; tea, 50 cents per lb.

Remarks.—The above are the rates as obtained from the Chinese, Europeans generally not knowing the prices of table provisions, and paying a lump sum for table and house expenses at the end of each month.

The Chinese market price of provisions will hardly be a fair criterion of the cost of European living at Foo-chow ; it is, on the contrary, apt to lead Her Majesty's Government to a wrong conclusion. One single instance will suffice to elucidate what is here meant—the poultry that is bought in the market is barely eatable ; the fowls are thin and unpalatable ; sand is thrust down their gullets to give them weight. It costs twice or thrice their cost price to feed them up, and make them fit for the table. And so it is with the rest of the poultry.

Persons in England have little idea of the cheating propensities of Chinese servants, nor have they the least conception of the daily waste of provision that goes on in a hot climate, which at Foo-chow may be said to endure for seven months of the year.

Persons, too, are mistaken who imagine that provisions are of the same good quality at Foo-chow as in England. This is far from being the case. The beef in particular is of coarse fibre, and is very nearly only fit for boiling down to soup. Perhaps they imagine at home that at Foo-chow we have, as in London and in other English towns, plenty of butchers' shops to supply us with meat. The fact is, there is only one butcher for the whole community (the Chinese themselves, excepting the poorest, not consuming beef, and that of a disgusting kind). Residents are very much at the mercy of this one butcher, and must take whatever quantity he may serve them, always in excess of their wants, or else go without.

These are only some of the difficulties of living in Foo-chow, which make living expensive, and which are not known in England.

As for groceries, with the exception of tea, they are all imported. Flour, potatoes, butter at 1 dollar per lb., hams, tongues, jams, jellies, preserved fruits, biscuits, sugar, salt, pepper, mustard, wines, liquors, &c., in short, almost everything for table use has to be imported in large quantities, and at heavy cost.

Q. 2. The average market price of fuel, coal, wood, charcoal, and of oil ?—A. Formosa coal, 9 dollars to 10 dollars per ton ; wood, 44 cash per bundle ; charcoal, 250 cash per basket ; oil, 92 cash per catty.

Remarks.—Kerosene oil is imported, and costs 3½ dollars per tin.

Q. 3. Of servants' wages, and native price of labour in other kind of work ?—A. In foreign employment—house boys, 6 dollars to 8 dollars per month ; butlers, 12 dollars to 15 dollars per month (besides perquisites) ; godown keepers, 30 dollars per month.

Price of Native Labour :—Carpenter, from 10 A.M. to 6 P.M., 200 cash per diem, with one meal, tobacco and tea ; bricklayer, same as carpenter ; stonemason, 280 cash per diem, with one meal, tobacco, and tea ; journeyman tailor, 160 cash per diem, with four meals, tobacco, and tea ; field labourers, 100 cash per diem, with meals provided, &c. ; chairbearer, 250 cash per diem ; Chinese native cooks, from 240 to 400 cash per diem, with meals included, &c.

Q. 4. Of house-rent as regards foreign houses, and the estimated rate of interest the rent constitutes on the original cost of building ?—A. Bungalows, from 100 dollars

to 120 dollars per month. Houses with upper floor, at 200 dollars and upwards per month. Banks and merchants' houses, with offices, range from 900*l.* to 1,000*l.* per annum for rent, the rate of interest being about 12 per cent. on the original cost.

Q. 5. The usual charges for medical attendance and medicines by foreign practitioners?—A. For a firm with only one person, the usual charge for medical attendance is 250 dollars per annum. Where there are two or more persons the charge is 300 dollars per annum. When a medical practitioner is not retained, the charge is 5 dollars a visit. Medicines are an extra, and are paid for by individuals themselves. There is no fixed charge for medicines. After an illness a debit-note for a lump-sum "for medicines supplied" is usually sent in by the practitioner. Accouchements are charged separately, and cost 100 dollars each.

Q. 6. Of chair and boat hire, with a statement of the necessity of recourse to these at the port?—A. There are no other means of locomotion at Foo-chow except by chair; walking is out of the question during the heat; moreover, the distances to be got over are great. Sedans are of first necessity. Every clerk in a merchant's house is, on arrival, allowed three chair-bearers for his sole use. The wages are from 4 dollars 50 cents to 5 dollars per month for each bearer. Boats are not much used, excepting for communicating with the anchorage, or for pleasure trips. Wages of boatmen are 6 dollars per man, and the boats carry crews, ranging from eight to twelve men each.

Q. 7. The average rate of remuneration to clerks and assistants of different grades in banks and merchants' houses of different nationalities.—A. In the banks at Foo-chow: the accountants 1,000*l.* per annum, house-rent free, and furniture found. There are no assistants in the banks here, In the merchants' houses: in addition to board and lodging, medical attendance and chair-bearer allowance. Tea-tasters of standing—men of three or four years' China experience—get from 500*l.* to 600*l.* a-year. The lowest is 250*l.*, and the highest 700*l.*, as a rule, with liberty to trade, which they are well able to do with their salaries, since they are found in almost everything else. The usual terms for tea-tasters or assistants, arranged in London for China are a free passage out, with 250*l.* a-year for the first, and 50*l.* up for five years.

Remarks.—It may be useful here to add the following:—

Agents conducting the business, salary from 900*l.* to 1,200*l.* per annum, in addition to board and lodging, with right to trade, which they avail themselves of largely. Many men who have been out here long, look upon their salary as a minor consideration, and would perhaps refuse double what they get, were they prohibited from trading.

Managers of banks (three) at Foo-chow, salary 1,500*l.* a-year; house-rent free, with furniture for house provided by the bank.

Q. 8. Cost of freight on shipments from England to Foo-chow?—A. As there are hardly ever ships direct from London to Foo-chow, the stores have to be unshipped at Hong Kong, and sent on by steamer to Foo-chow. Freights: London to Hong Kong, 40*s.* to 45*s.* per ton weight; 30*s.* to 35*s.* per ton measurement per steamer from Hong Kong to Foo-chow. Five dollars per ton, of 40 feet, for measurement goods, and 40 cents per picul dead weight. Very little cargo is carried by sailing-ships between these ports, and there is nothing approaching a fixed rate.

Remarks.—To the above should be added the agents' charges in London, ditto in Hong Kong, the various shipping and landing charges, dock charges, &c., (besides the freight and insurance) may be put down at 8 to 10 per cent.

Q. 9. Cost of insurance on shipments to Foo-chow?—A. London to Hong Kong: bale goods, with average, 60*s.*; cases, with average, 40*s.* Hong Kong to Foo-chow, October to April, 1½ per cent., with average; April to October, 1 per cent., with average.

Having replied as well as I am able to the questions put by the Circular, I shall take the liberty of concluding with a few remarks that bear upon the general subject.

Her Majesty's Government ought not to lose sight that Europeans in China are perforce subjected to a hundred and one expenses which, if enumerated, would not be understood by persons in England. As for junior officers on 300*l.*, or even 400*l.*, being able to remit money home for the purchase of stores it is hardly practicable. Their salaries

just suffice them to live from hand to mouth. Indeed I hardly think it possible for an officer to get on at Foo-chow on a salary of 300*l.*, or even 400*l.* a-year, without allowances, unless he deprive himself of absolute necessaries (and wine and ale are absolute necessaries in this climate), or else run into debt. Consular officers are in some respects at a disadvantage, as compared with the assistants in merchants' houses. Consular officers have to provide furniture for their houses at immense expense, and when they are removed from their posts, their furniture generally sells at a loss on the cost price, for the place getting so filled with furniture since a few years, there are barely buyers for it. The packing-cases alone of furniture out from London come to from 4*l.* 10*s.* to 5*l.* each, and it is a pure loss to the officer.

This is a hardship to which the agents and assistants of banks and merchants' houses are not exposed. They are found in furniture to whatever port they go, and find a home and a mess immediately on arrival.

It is sincerely hoped that when Her Majesty's Government come to revise the expenses of the Consular establishments in China, they may be pleased to treat its officers with liberality, in consideration of the value of the labour performed, of the distance from home, and the trying climate in which officers spend the best days of their existence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAS. A. SINCLAIR.

No. 10.

Acting Consul King to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 13.)

My Lord, *Newchwang, October* 7, 1869.

IN obedience to instructions from Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, I send you copies of my despatches to his Excellency, Accountant's Department, Nos. 13, 14, 16, and 17 of the 20th, 23rd, and 26th July, and No. 20 of 30th August, being replies to Legation Circulars Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12 of 6th July, and No. 13 of 12th August.

All these despatches bear upon a report upon the Consular Establishment which his Excellency is about to make, and to which he will refer in a despatch to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WALTER ED. KING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Acting Consul King to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Newchwang, July* 20, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your Excellency's despatch of the 6th instant.

There are now employed at this Consulate :—

	Dollars.	
1 Constable, English	70	a-month.
1 Writer, Chinese	40	„
1 Head Servant	15	„
1 Second Servant	12	„
2 Ditto	9	each, a-month.
3 Night Watchmen	10	„

The duties of the Writer are those of a Chinese Clerk, with whose assistance I draft, and who himself copies all letters and despatches that I address to the Mandarins. He has also charge of the Chinese archives. The pay attached to this post is undoubtedly large, and to a native of this locality I should not give more than half the sum, both for the reason of his being a native, and because education as it is understood in China is at such a low ebb in this province that it would be impossible (as indeed it has been found) to find a person whose services are worth more. The present Writer, indifferently qualified for the work, was expressly sent from the Province of Shantung for the late Consul, and I, on assuming charge, wrote to Mr. Adkins, the Acting Chinese Secretary of the Legation, requesting him to engage a fit person in Peking, whom I am still anxiously looking for. I doubt if the pay will be found more than sufficient to induce

a highly educated person, which a Consular Writer should be, to come to so unpopular a place.

The duties of the four servants now employed are to clean and attend upon the office, carry letters and messages, assist the Constable in charge of Chinese, whom on occasions it is found necessary to take into custody, and arrest and convey to the Chinese authorities, to attend the Consul in his official visits to the Mandarins, and to be present to receive Mandarins coming to visit the Consul. The head servant, besides these duties, makes all the petty purchases, shroffs or inspects money and silver paid into the Consulate, controls the other servants, and has many duties to perform in gaining information for the Consul.

Five servants are sanctioned for the Consulate. Your Excellency is aware that I have since February employed but four, having found it possible to perform the work with that number. I trust that this care for the public expenditure will obtain from your Excellency some reliance on my judgment in this matter. With discretion left to employ a servant in case of emergency, I am of opinion that it would be even possible to conduct the work with a permanent staff of three servants, without that discretion it would not be possible. I have intended making the experiment, and should have done so had misconduct caused the dismissal of any servant. They are all excellent servants, and I thought the public service would lose more by dismissing a man without fault than it would gain by the actual amount saved. I have, therefore, remitted the experiment until an opportunity shall occur. For the same reason I have not reduced the wages of the head servant, which are too high, and on the first occasion of a vacancy or dismissal, I recommend that the present second post, with wages of 12 dollars, be left as the first. Your Excellency must be well aware that a Consular servant, even a domestic, and much more an official one, is looked upon not without odium by the native public, and that he is constantly exposed to be browbeaten or tampered with by the native officials, and that to obtain and maintain the confidence of the servants employed by us is a matter of the greatest moment.

The three night watchmen keep watch all night against fire and theft, and in the daytime act as gatekeepers. Two keep watch every night; the Consular premises are too intricate and too extensive for one man's supervision; the third, who has all night in every other night in his turn, is gatekeeper for the day. No reduction could be effected here, the post of night watchman being a very hard one in winter.

Only one Constable, an Englishman, is employed. Less pay would necessitate a lower class of man. On the establishment of the Consulate 45 dollars was given, and until the pay was raised to 70 dollars three Constables in the course of four years were dismissed for incompetency or drunkenness.

With regard to the expenditure, under the head of contingencies, little remark is called for from the Consul. The annual allotment did not commence with this year 1868. during which the contingency account was some 30 dollars under the amount, and will I hope be still less this year.

During the year 1868, two Europeans were in gaol for two days each; in 1867, 15 Europeans, at an average of over seven days each

A medical man is retained by Her Majesty's Government at a pay of 200*l.* a year.

Speaking generally of Newchwang, it is by no means the cheap place it is generally reported to be. For myself, I find it as dear if not more so than Hankow, and persons who have resided at Shanghae tell me that article for article they find it so as compared with that place. Food is cheap, but nothing else; labour is dear, all foreign articles are especially so; while the expense of house-firing is enormous, as for three and a half months every room used requires a fire night and day. How this affects foreigners your Excellency will at once see, and any cheapness of living results from the remoteness of Newchwang, and the small number of foreigners there offering but little inducement or opportunity of spending money on anything but necessaries. As to the natives, the land and water are ice-bound for four months; idleness is enforced on the bulk of the population, who in the eight months of work have to gain livelihood for twelve; the rate of daily wages is high; the rate of the numerically insignificant permanent services follow suit.

Your, &c.
(Signed) WALTER ED. KING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Acting Consul King to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Newchwang, July* 23, 1869.

IN reply to your Excellency's Circular No. 10 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to send you the following information.

Last year the import trade of this port was, according to the returns made by this Consulate, as follows:—

	Taels.	£
Total foreign import trade	2,934,710	= 978,236
From Hong Kong	272,591	
From ports in China	2,654,705	
	2.927,296	

The remainder came from Siam. Some of this is Straits produce, but all the Indian and British manufactured goods are included in this. The Customs returns agree with this, but show further that Shanghae is the Chinese port from which Newchwang derives its supplies.

	Taels.
Total foreign imports..	2,784,887
Shanghae	2,441,502
Other ports	213,203
Foreign countries	275,442

The Customs returns from Shanghae give the value of foreign imports there at 50,500,000 taels, of which 30,500,000 were re-exported to Chinese ports; so that as Lord Clarendon surmised, nine-tenths of the foreign goods imported here have already appeared as imported in Shanghae. Whether or not the returns sent from Shanghae eliminate subsequently the re-exports, I have no means of judging. As regards this Consulate that information was not supplied, the amount re-exported being insignificant, 145,260 taels, as the imports are for *bonâ fide* consumption, and the re-export was caused entirely by the overstocked condition of the market.

At least one direct shipment of British manufactured goods has been ordered, and is expected in the autumn. I am told that next year the direct trade with Great Britain will most probably be much larger.

Your, &c.
(Signed) WALTER ED. KING.

Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

Acting Consul King to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Newchwang, July* 26, 1869.

IN reply to your Circular No. 11 of the 6th instant, inquiring about the tendency of trade to pass from British into Chinese hands, the probable further extent of this, and the effect it may have, eventually, on our Consular establishment, I have the honour to lay the following facts and views before your Excellency.

That the trade of the port is very much in the hands of Chinese merchants may be gathered from two facts. First, that of the British tonnage visiting this port, about 63 per cent. are under Chinese charter and consigned to Chinese firms. Secondly, that Chinese merchants pay about two-thirds of the total duties collected here. The Commissioner of Customs has obligingly given me the following figures.

		Taels.
1868.	Total duties paid by Chinese	159,141
	Ditto by foreigners	56,708
1869 (to June 30).	Total duties paid by Chinese	77,569
	Ditto by foreigners	24,026

There is, however, another and a pleasing fact to be noticed, that in the carrying trade of this port British shipping is decidedly gaining on the only serious rival, North Germany. In 1867 North German tonnage was in the proportion of 103 to 100 of

British; in 1868, in that of 93 to 100, and this year, up to date, only 89 to 100. In former years it exceeded ours 35 and 55 per cent.

By far the greatest portion of the *bonâ fide* foreign trade at this port belongs to British merchants, not only considering the firms established here, but still more the interests they represent.

Whether the trade in China will pass still more from British hands or not is a very difficult question to answer. The causes that have led to the present state on the part of the British merchant are in my opinion chiefly four. Ignorance of the language, which prevents their dealing first hand with the native merchants; ignorance and consequent distrust of the purely native commerce, closing to them an enormous trade between the different points of the empire; want of sufficient capital, in many instances, for this Chinese trade; and lastly, the more expensive nature of the foreign merchants' establishments, which enables the Chinese to undersell him as an agent. On the other hand, one cause at least comes from the Chinese Government, which puts such difficulty in the way of free movement, carriage of goods, and residence in the interior.

If these are the causes, or some of the causes of the slipping of trade from the hands of British merchants—and I think they are—the restoration of trade to their hands lies with themselves and time; with themselves to learn, and with time to break down the present determination of the Chinese Government to restrict foreigners to the Treaty ports. During the last four or five years I have observed a few instances of a recognition of the necessity of free and direct communication with the native traders, and both here and at Hankow there are merchants who can speak, or are learning the language. Once this necessity is recognized, the numbers of those who learn cannot but increase rapidly, and with knowledge of the language will come knowledge of Chinese commerce and participation in it.

As to the removal of barriers between us and the interior of China, however long delayed, time will surely effect it, and the necessity of the continuation of our trade with China once admitted (of which there can be no doubt) I am of opinion that the restoration of a fair share of that trade to our hands is a question of time and time only.

I have in a former letter had occasion to allude to the fact that direct shipments of British goods have been ordered for this port, and it remains to be seen whether this will not be a means of restoring trade in that branch (a large one here) to our own merchants.

Were the trade, however, to pass still more from our hands, leaving us only interested in it as carriers by our shipping, the effect on the Consulate establishment would of course, as far as that trade was concerned, be to render the Consul little but a police magistrate in charge of a shipping office, having to carry out the Merchant Shipping Act and the Board of Trade Instructions. This effect will in the case now spoken of have come under Lord Clarendon's consideration, but it may be that as a consequence of this effect there may have suggested itself to his Lordship the advisability of suppressing or altering the nature of some of Her Majesty's Consulates in China, and creating in some ports Consular Agents instead of Consuls. If such a course has suggested itself I think its effect would, if adopted, be most disastrous. It would either hasten or render permanent the regretted state of things which led to its adoption. Besides the instinctive dread shown by the mercantile body to this change whenever it has been mooted, the Chinese Government would, I feel sure, object most strongly to the step. Wherever I have been placed I have not only been directly told by officials of their dislike of having much dealings with Commercial Consular Agents, but have seen undoubted instances of this dislike where such dealings were necessary. In many cases the withdrawal of the British Consul would entail the appointments of inferior Chinese officials in charge of foreign affairs. Here that would undoubtedly be the case. The Taoutae, whose post was created as your Excellency knows by foreign influence, and that chiefly your own, would either not be replaced on the expiration of his term of office or the Moukden Authorities could easily and securely have a creature of their own appointed, their strong anti-foreign policy, which is still as marked as ever, would place as much difficulty as heretofore in the way of foreign trade and intercourse; the regiment of foreign-drilled Tartars would be recalled or would become useless or disaffected, and the lawlessness, from which the province has been with such difficulty rescued, might be again looked for. Were your Excellency not aware of the original state of this province and how much the late Consul, Mr. Meadows, had to say with all these reforms, the picture, I should fear, would be thought overdrawn, but I address one who knows better than myself the early history of this port, and the anxiety and trouble it caused at head-quarters.

The removal of Consuls would have another and most serious effect. It is to be hoped—nay, it is certain—that the anti-progress policy, not to say retrogression in China will at some future time be borne down, and the most important foreign interests will be

those connected with scientific engineering operations. These interests could not but suffer by the change in the Consular establishments—the possible contemplation of which I am now supposing.

Regarding as I do the passing of trade out of British hands as only temporary, and looking forward, as all must, to a time when our intercourse with China will include a commerce wider and more varied than the mere exchange of Chinese for British productions and the employment of British shipping—important as these are to both countries—I am of opinion that Her Majesty's Consuls will be called upon, and must be prepared to protect weightier and higher interests than have hitherto been committed to them, and that the Consular establishments must ever be in a state at once to accept the trust.

Your, &c.
(Signed) WALTER ED. KING.

Inclosur 4 in No. 10.

Acting Consul King to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Newchwang, July* 20, 1869.

IN obedience to the instructions conveyed in your Excellency's Circular of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inclose an account of the sums expended during 1868 at this Consulate on rent, insurance, lodgings, buildings, and furniture.

Your, &c.
(Signed) WALTER ED. KING.

Inclosure 5 in No. 10.

STATEMENT showing Sums expended during 1868 at the Newchwang Consulate, on account of Rent, Insurance, Lodging, Buildings, and Furniture.

	Taels.	Dols. c.	£ s. d.
Rent	670	930 53	177 1 6
Insurance	..	..	..
Lodging	..	..	..
Building	..	336 0	71 8 0
Furniture	..	432 22	91 19 2

Remarks.—Rent of Consulate from 27th of October, 1867 to 10th Ma , 1869, one and a-half year, and rent of Eastern compound for the past seven years.

Building—this comprises building and repairs to buildings.

Furniture—this is the furniture bought by Her Majesty's Government from the late Consul.

Inclosure 6 in No. 10.

Acting Consul King to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Newchwang, August* 30, 1869.

IN reply to the queries in your Excellency's Circular of the 12th instant, I attach lists of prices of food, fuel, labour, house-rent, medical attendance, chair and boat hire, and freight on oilmen's stores from England. The lists are attested by two resident merchants.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WALTER ED. KING.

(No. 1.)—STATEMENT showing Price of Food at Newchwang.

		Sterling.				Sterling.
		s.	*d.*			*s.*	*d.*
Beef	per lb.	0	2¾	Butter	per lb.	3	4
Mutton	„	0	3⅓	Flour, American ..	bag of 50 lbs.	14	6
Bacon	„	0	10	Bread	1 lb. loaf	0	5
Fowls	each	1	0	Sugar (native) ..	per lb.	0	6
Fish (average of all fish) ..	per lb.	0	2	Potatoes	„	0	1½
Eggs	per doz.	0	7	Water	by month	8/6 to	12/9
Milk	per pint	0	7	Ice	per lb.	0	1

Remarks.—With reference to the prices of meat, it must be observed that the Chinese butchers kill for the shipping, and hardly take the residents into account at all on account of their little number. So much is this the case that when the winter closes up the river, the butchers return home and leave the insignificant resident business to their assistant (left in charge of the shop) if he care to attend to it. The ships buy in gross, and residents though not buying in such large quantities have to take the meat in the same rough untrimmed way, good and coarse together. For instance, it is impossible here to buy a few "mutton chops" or "a shoulder of mutton" as in England or Shanghae; for the first the butcher sells much weight of ribs from back-bone to breast, and for the second a shoulder including shank and neck. What waste this causes in a batchelor's establishment with Chinese servants can hardly be calculated. I compute it to add a third to the cost—in mutton nearly double. My servant, a native of Hankow, from the first asserted that meat was really cheaper there than here.

Certified correct:
(Signed) E. AURBACH.
F. P. KNIGHT.

(No. 2.)—PRICE of Fuel at Newchwang.

Coal (native), 2*l.* to 2*l.* 5*s.* per ton.
Coal (foreign), average price, 3*l.* 13*s.* to 4*l.* 5*s.* per ton (is sometimes over 6*l.*).
Wood.
Charcoal, 3*s.* 9*d.* per 100 lbs.
Oil, 3*s.* 9*d.*
Firing for servants, 14*s.* to 20*s.* per month.

It is to be remembered with reference to the cost of living at Newchwang, that for three and a-half months every room used requires a fire night and day. The quality of the native coal is such, that except for kitchen purposes, it cannot be used alone as it fills the rooms full of ash dust.

Certified correct:
(Signed) E. AURBACH.
F. P. KNIGHT.

(No. 3.)—STATEMENT showing Cost of Labour at Newchwang.

Servants' Wages.

In foreign employ—
Boy or head servant, 10 to 14 dollars a-month.
Cook, 12 to 16 dollars a-month.
Grooms, coolies, 7 to 9 dollars a-month.
In families, amah or nurse, 15 dollars a-month with food.

Price of Labour in Native Market.

Carpenters, 12 to 14 cents. a-day, with food.
Masons and blacksmiths, 15 to 18 cents a-day with food.
Agricultural labourers, about 4*l.* with keep, for 9 months' labour (3 winter months excluded).
Street porters or coolies can earn in good times 30 to 40 cents; when labour is cheap, 21 to 25 cents, without food.

Certified correct:
(Signed) E. AURBACH.
F. P. KNIGHT.

(No. 4.)—COST of House Rent at Newchwang.

	£
House of Commissioner of Customs	117
House of a missionary	35
House of a merchant	140
Ditto	70
House of a pilot.	

By "houses" must not be understood dwellings similar at all to those occupied by persons of the same means or position in England. The houses of the Commissioner of Customs, an official receiving a salary of 1,600*l.* a-year, and that of a merchant at a rental of 70*l.* are both low unstoried buildings of native style and construction, resting on the ground without any space for ventilation. The corners of the house and the external surface of the walls of brick, all the rest, internal surface of walls, entire division walls, and roof is of mud. The Commissioner's house is larger, and with a greater amount of brickwork. The other very small and a large proportion of mud.

Certified correct:
(Signed) E. AURBACH.
F. P. KNIGHT.

(No. 5.)—TERMS for Medical Attendance at Newchwang.

5 taels a visit, or 50 taels yearly subscription, equivalent to 1*l.* 10*s.* per visit, or 15*l.* yearly subscription. Medicines extra.

Certified correct:
(Signed) E. AURBACH.
F. P. KNIGHT.

(No. 6.)—CHAIR, Boat, and Horse hire at Newchwang.

Chair Coolies, 7 dollars a-month each (4 Coolies required to carry a sedan).
Horse-hire, 50 cents to 1 dollar a mount.

Certified correct:
(Signed) E. AURBACH.
F. P. KNIGHT.

Remarks.—The purport of this inquiry I do not understand. Expenditure of this kind I have only known charged when boats or chairs are used for official purposes, and they are then charged as part of the office contingencies.

At Newchwang chairs are not used by the natives, and consequently there is no such class as that of chair coolies plying for occasional hire. Hitherto official visits have been paid by the Consul on horseback, or in a cart, according to the custom of the country.

(No. 7.)—CLERKS Salaries at Newchwang.

	£
British Managing Clerk (with house)	2,000
British (Indian) Jew Managing Clerk (all expenses paid, and permission and assistance given to trade)	650
American Clerk (all expenses paid)	600
Customs First Clerk (with house and furnished mess-room)	800
Customs Second Clerk (with house and furnished mess-room)	400

Certified correct:
(Signed) E. AURBACH.
F. P. KNIGHT.

(No. 8.)—FREIGHT on Oilmen's Stores from England to Newchwang.

These are shipped first from England to Shanghae, and then transhipped to this port. This last shipment has been generally found to be equal to the first, though it is sometimes greater in spite of the disparity of the distance carried. These double freights and insurances, and the cost amount at Newchwang to from 30 to 35 per cent. on the price of the stores.

It is to be hoped that Her Majesty's Government will remember that the sudden movement of officers, especially juniors, to and from distant ports, makes the provision impossible from uncertainty, or useless from breakage in frequent removals.

(Signed) WALTER ED. KING.

No. 11.

Acting Consul Cooper to Mr. Hammond.—(Received December 13.)

Sir, *Taiwan, October* 18, 1869.

IN accordance with instructions received from Her Majesty's Minister at Peking I have the honour to forward copies of my replies, with their inclosures, to five Circular despatches from the Legation, all bearing on the subject of the Consular establishment in China.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. M. COOPER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

Acting Consul Cooper to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Taiwan, September* 16, 1869.

IN reply to Accounts Circular of 6th July, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that at the combined Consulates of Taiwan and Takow, finding it desirable to take up my residence at the latter port, for reasons detailed in my despatch, Accounts, No. 4, of 25th July, I have employed the services of two educated Chinese. The Writer, who has been for some time in the Consulate, remains at Taiwan, where he was stationed by my predecessor. He is in charge of the Chinese records; all official communications in Chinese are written by him. He helps the Assistant in Charge in preparing himself, by a previous discussion of the business in hand, for interviews with the Authorities, and writes for him the semi-official letters with which business of small importance is transacted with the Chinese Authorities. The Second Writer, who is entered in the wages abstract as Linguist, and was engaged by me in place of an overseer ("Munchwang," qy. "Munshang") and a porter, whom I considered less necessary, is required by me to interpret from local to Mandarin, my knowledge of the Amoy dialect being very limited; to assist me in drafting the Chinese versions of my official communications to the Authorities, and to communicate when a message or note is to be sent with the Mandarins of the place, or the Magistrate of the district in which Takow is situated.

The salary the Writer receives is 30 dollars, and the Linguist 15 dollars a month. Neither are paid at all above the ruling rate, the former holding as he does a sort of confidential position. Should the employment of the two not be approved, I shall have no alternative but to deprive the Assistant in Charge at Taiwan of the services of the Writer, and by so doing shall injure his present usefulness as my deputy there; and, as he employs much of his leisure in studying Chinese, having the Writer for a teacher, who is a much better instructor than he could otherwise afford, affect his future efficiency as a Consular Interpreter.

The Constable here receives 40 dollars a month as wages, and 5 dollars as rent allowance. He is a native of Manilla. He speaks English well, and has a smattering of the local dialect. Though, doubtless, the services of an European might be engaged on similar terms, I think it more than questionable whether any competent man after a short residence at the port would consent to remain. The character of the people, the trying nature of the climate, the bad quality of the food, the want of companionship, and the discovery that his whole pay was barely sufficient to provide for the necessities of a wretched state of existence, would tend quickly to disgust him with his situation. The remainder of the servants are Chinese. Their duties well occupy their time. They are sufficiently paid, and the checks employed to prevent their abusing their position in any way, are, I believe, perfectly effectual.

No British subject was under arrest here in 1868. A Spanish subject, to save him from the horrors of a Chinese prison, was confined for nearly a month, till he could be sent over to the Spanish Consul at Amoy. During the year ten Chinese were locked up, preparatory to their being handed over to their own authorities. Two of these were kept in prison for three months, as it was suspected they, in their attempt to murder a British subject, were instigated by the Mandarins. I need scarcely mention that here, as elsewhere, the existence of a Constable and gaol exerts a very salutary influence over the crews of vessels frequenting this port, and does much to restrain them from ill-treating or quarrelling with the people of the place.

I do not comprehend whether your Excellency desires from this Consulate a return of the establishment maintained, or if such an annual return is to be prepared, at what date it is to be forwarded.

For the salary of 100*l.* per annum received by the medical officer, he attends all persons at this Consulate, including the prisoners; his only exception being for his services to shipwrecked men, for which the Board of Trade is chargeable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. M. COOPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Acting Consul Cooper to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Taiwan, September* 16, 1869.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in Accounts Circular of 6th July, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the ports of Taiwan and Takow are, as far as foreigners are concerned, entirely subsidiary to Amoy, and are the recipients of nearly all the foreign re-exports from that port.

The foreign business here is transacted by salaried agents for their principals in Amoy, and imports of foreign goods is mainly in their hands. The goods themselves consist of opium, British manufactures and produce from Singapore. This trade is an increasing one, the apparent diminution of last year being due to much of the Chinese imported opium being brought in at other ports than those opened to foreign trade, in order to avoid the high local duties which were there levied. The following Table, taken from the Customs Returns, shows the value of foreign goods imported for the last three years:—

From.	1866.	1867.	1868.
	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.
Amoy	788,042	860,619	697,897
Other Chinese ports	93,226	89,746	94,764
Hong Kong..	57,752	211,862	72,536

No fuller or more reliable information on the subject of Lord Clarendon's inquiry is attainable by me than that to be found in the Returns and Reports on Trade in China in 1866, 1867, 1868, published at Shanghae by order of the Inspector-General. The information therein furnished is so concise and well collocated, and the statistics so connected and complete, that to summarize them would be a very unsatisfactory task, and not one likely in any way to prove serviceable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. M. COOPER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 11.

Acting Consul Cooper to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Taiwan, September* 16, 1869.

YOUR Excellency's Circular dated 6th of July, owing to there being no vessel bound hither from Amoy for more than a month, did not reach me till the 29th ultimo, since when pressing business and sickness have prevented my replying to it. The paragraph therein quoted from the Earl of Clarendon's despatch refers to a subject that has for many years engaged the attention of all foreigners interested in the Chinese trade, and is one on which you will, before this reaches you, have doubtless obtained many an able and exhaustive essay. The tendency of the trade to pass from the hands of British subjects has been attributed to so many causes and the attendant symptoms have been so minutely observed and investigated, that it has become a theme on which a fluent writer may, without needless prolixity, fill many a sheet. Therefore, to avoid troubling your Excellency with repetitions of those arguments which I can but suppose have been more clearly expressed than they could be by myself, by officers of greater experience in their replies to your Circular despatch, I shall strictly confine myself to a narration of my personal observations at the four ports at which I have been stationed during the last three years.

At Swatow, during the seven years that I passed there, foreigners participated in the trade of the place to a very small extent compared with that of any other port in China. This was due to the facilities of communication with the neighbouring port of Houg Kong offered to Chinese by rival lines of steamers, to competing foreign firms at that port, to a superior knowledge of the trade and of the wants of the then newly-opened northern ports, and to a powerful combination of native brokers and merchants, who debarred foreigners from access to the markets of which Swatow is the port. These men have of late years been submitting to extensive losses with the sole object of retaining their "connection," and preventing the enterprise of the foreign merchant stepping in.

On the first opening of Kiu-kiang as a port for foreign trade, there was a rush there of youthful foreigners, expectant of rapidly-made fortunes. Their knowledge of the market rates ruling in the commercial world being superior to that of the local merchants, many an opportunity presented itself to them for very lucrative operations. These lured them on to over-trading and bankruptcy; meanwhile, Chinese, well acquainted with the interior markets, visited Shanghae, purchased foreign goods at that great depôt, and, by underselling them, ousted them from the import trade of Kiu-kiang. But when a large importing firm like that of Mesrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co., purchasing direct from the British manufacturer, maintains an establishment there, supplied with goods suitable to the requirements of the port, dealers and retailers quickly resort thither, and the Chinese wholesale traders discover other investments for their capital, preferable to the importation of foreign goods from Shanghae.

In the country about Chin-kiang, now so rapidly recovering from the effects of the devastations that swept over it during the rebellion, there is so much urgent need for capital, that the Chinese are able to employ theirs very profitably in land, mulberry-planting, and other speculations, to the great advantage of late of the British firms at that port. In the course of four years, the proportion of the trade of the port in foreign hands has risen from one-tenth part to one-fourth.

Here, in the south of Formosa, the tendency of the trade has been altogether to pass into foreigners' hands. In the report of trade by Mr. Commissioner White of the Customs for 1866, a very careful analysis of both import and export trade in foreign vessels is given "to evince how rapidly the trade is passing into native hands to the exclusion of foreigners." I give the quotation to show how apt a person is to be led by the ideas of those about him. The merchants at that time were seeking to account for causes that menaced them with ruin; causes that I need not now enter on further than to mention that they were connected with those failures which were then occurring all over the world. They seemed too, unable to comprehend that the improved means of communication retarded the acquirement of those fortunes they had been accustomed to see so rapidly made, and lessened the opportunities for speculations whereby an unlucky merchant being but once successful, frequently retrieved his losses. Business, to pay, has at present to be carried on by a totally different method to that which answered a dozen years ago.

By the Tables drawn up by Mr. White it is shown that but a small share of imports were consigned to foreigners, and a minute fraction of the exports were shipped by them, at present they almost monopolize the import, and have quite half a share of the export trade.

My short residence at this port hardly justifies me in offering any explanation of these facts. I am told, however, that it is owing to this not being a port where foreign vessels ever come seeking, all cargo shipped here by Chinese in foreign bottoms being consequently in vessels that have been chartered in Amoy; and to the constant demand to be found in foreign hongs for produce, and the readiness with which payment for it is forthcoming. Producers are thereby attracted and grow accustomed to a regular disposal of their crops to the foreign merchant.

I am unacquainted with the peculiarities of the Levant trade, and have no books to which I can refer for information regarding the means whereby the Greeks have there superseded British merchants. Germans and Parsees have met with but little success in China.

The sharp practice and grasping way of doing business, proverbial of the Greeks, and not unknown in China, are not appreciated by Chinamen, who, in their transactions with foreigners, in the way of trade, have shown themselves very appreciative of fair and honourable treatment.

It has often been said that the inexpensiveness of a Chinese mercantile establishment, in comparison with a British, gives the former a superiority. This is to a certain extent undeniable, but the advantage is not for a moment to be compared to that obtained by the foreign merchant in the facilities available by the modern system of credit, enabling him to seize on the most favourable opportunities, at times when the Chinese are destitute of funds; and to dispose of the proceeds of a speculation while the neighbouring hong is obliged to retain theirs in hand till the market permits of an investment.

The trade is of such magnitude that the commission on profits of foreign merchants conducting it is a charge that is easily borne by it, now that the profuse expenditure which characterized the mercantile establishments of old times is abandoned, and has succumbed to a spirit of economy.

Every one at all acquainted with China knows how ready the mandarin is to kill

the goose that lays the golden egg, whenever he sees a likelihood of it being to the advantage either of his pocket or his official credit. For so long as it is made the aim and interest of every holder of an office to squeeze the utmost he can from those under his jurisdiction, during his three years tenure, for so long will the conduits of trade between the importing foreign merchant and the consumer, and the industrious producer and the exporter be subject to periodic chokings.

A new barrier will be set up, or a new tax instituted, in order that some petty official along the line may, under the pretext of the need of Government, collect a sum which may be required for defraying the expenses of a local Government, or may be applied towards enriching the Authorities themselves. Many a new route of commerce, many a struggling trade, has in its infancy been effectually put an end to by this failing in the Chinese system of Government.

There is an abuse of power on the part of mandarins at barriers of which foreign merchants frequently sadly complain. I refer to the system of compounding for the legal amount of duties. By arriving at an understanding with the official,—who whether farming the barrier, or only in charge of it, is generally but too ready to jump at an offer made for an indulgent permission for goods to pass it, the nearer the expiration of his term, the easier grow his conditions, and the more inclined he becomes to oblige his friends,—the Chinese merchants pass through large quantities of foreign goods. The foreign merchant is kept in ignorance till after the mischief is done; his calculations are upset, his goods hang on his hands, and he has the vexation of seeing his loss enriching his favoured competitors.

In thwarting and preventing by well-timed arguments and vigorous protests these impediments in the way of the trade between the open ports and the districts of the interior, and in advancing its extension, active Consuls have found scope for their best efforts. The late development and present satisfactory state of British trade in China, both as regards the sale of British manufactures and the purchase of Chinese produce for British consumption, are in a great measure attributable to the influence of the Consuls, ably supported and well directed as it has been by your Excellency.

My experience being such as narrated in the commencement of this despatch, the result is that I do not hesitate to affirm that a tendency of the British trade in China at the present time to pass into Chinese hands can hardly be said to exist, and that it is my belief that if the British Consulate staff were removed from China the trade would diminish in nearly the same ratio as that in which during the last few years it has increased. Restrictions would quickly be imposed on the inland traffic, and, consequently, numerous Chinese would soon be replacing by native manufactures, imported goods. These, in parts not very remote from the ports, the people are only now discovering to be superior to and cheaper than their own, and are daily substituting them for those coarse textures which have hitherto sufficed to content them.

Unless any change occurs, it is probable that the inland trade will absorb much more than it now does of the Chinese capital invested in the trade of Hong Kong and Shanghae with the other Treaty ports, and that the Chinese engaged in it will turn their attention more and more towards providing for the supply and demand of foreign commerce in preference to competing with foreign merchants, either in the direct trade with foreign countries or in the coasting trade of their own; the attendant conditions being the immunity of the Empire from war or rebellion, and a free access afforded to every part of it for the ramifications of trade.

Your, &c.
(Signed) WM. M. COOPER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 11.

Acting Consul Cooper to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Taiwan, September* 6, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to forward, in duplicate, Lists of Expenditure at this Consulate, during 1868, on account of rent, in accordance with the instructions contained in Accounts Circular No. 12.

No money was expended on Consular buildings during the year.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. M. COOPER.

Inclosure 5 in No. 11.

LIST of Expenditure at the Taiwan and Takow Consulates on account of Rent, and Rent Allowance during the Year 1868.

			£	c.
January	31.	Rent allowance to Constable, 1 month	5	0
June	30.	Ditto ditto 5 months	25	0
June	30.	Ditto, to Temporary Clerk, 1 month	10	0
September	30.	Ditto, to Constable, 3 months	15	0
September	30.	Ditto to Temporary Clerk, June 4 to September 30 ..	38	66
December	31.	Ditto, to Constable, 3 months	15	0
December	31.	Ditto, to Temporary Clerk, 3 months	30	0
			138	66

Rent of Consulate at Takow, January 1 to December 31, deducted from debt due from estate of Mc Phail and Co., bankrupts, for money deposited with them 2,400 0

(Signed) WM. M. COOPER, *Acting Consul.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 11.

Acting Consul Cooper to Sir R. Alcock:

Sir, *Taiwan, September* 26, 1869.

IN reply to Circular of the 12th ultimo, calling for information bearing on the cost of living at the several ports of China, I beg to submit the following relative to Takow.

Increased facilities of communication have been the means of introducing during latter years some of the comforts of civilized life among the foreign communities in China, that they had formerly been content to live without, and a stricter observance of the conventionalities of society, and a consequent greater demand for its attendant requirements have, in my time, added wonderfully to the expenses of a household.

While in a large port these bear more heavily on an officer, and his outgoings are augmented by the position that becomes obligatory on him to assume among a more numerous acquaintance, in a small port he has to put up with very many inconveniences and discomforts that he otherwise would be free from, and obtains as a rule much less value for his money.

The list of provisions I inclose is a short one, but it includes, I believe, everything that is to be found for sale in the market here, except fruit and vegetables.

The former is good and abundant at all seasons, but the native vegetables, sweet potato, a coarse sort of cabbage, and a kind of ropy bean, are not very palatable to an English taste.

Living, as we are, on a spit of salt sand, we are unable to raise vegetables from home seed as at other ports. The want of garden ground is much felt, and the tinned peas, &c., to which we have to resort, are but a poor substitute for the fresh vegetables enjoyed by residents at other ports, though they make a considerable item in one's expenses. Meat is not always to be had, and at times there is a dearth of fish. Oysters and home-fed fowls are the provisions on which for the summer half of the year we most depend. The oysters, owing to the care with which the Chinese cultivate them, are abundant, fat, small, and of excellent flavour. Soft sugar and rice, the staples of the port, of the quality consumed by the foreign merchants, cost 3*d.* and 1*d.* a pound respectively. Cheese, butter, potatoes, and biscuits are more expensive luxuries, and less frequently of good quality here than the same articles are obtainable at any other port.

For servants, the rascality of the Chinese here is such, foreigners are obliged to seek on the mainland. Missionaries and others conversant with the Amoy dialect are now selecting their domestics from the Pei-po-huans, or civilized aborigines of Formosa, and with these, I believe, they are satisfied. English or mandarin-speaking servants will not come hither without an increase of wages. I brought with me two servants, a table-boy and a nurse, who had lived with me in Swatow. The wages of both had to be raised, that of the nurse by one-third, to induce them to accompany me. Wages of domestic servants may be fairly estimated at 25 per cent. above the Amoy rates. The wages of working men generally is higher here than on the mainland. A common coolie wants his 200 cash for a poor day's work; and a man with any pretensions to be

an artificer is not content unless that sum be doubled. A carpenter is paid at the rate of 50 cents a day; a tailor at 33.

The building of foreign houses at Takow, compared with that of Amoy, is very costly, as all the materials, and even the skilled labour required, has to be imported. The rent of the houses that are let here, inclusive of the Consulate, is estimated at 20 per cent. on the original outlay. With an average freedom from typhoons and earthquakes, a person building calculates at the end of six years on having his capital back and the property on which he expended it, in a good state of repair; one year's rent in six being the usual estimation for ordinary and extraordinary repairs during that time.

With regard to the usual charges for medical attendance and medicines here, I cannot do better to convey an idea of the cost and responsibilities undertaken by the various establishments here in order to secure the benefits of medical aid than to detail the sources of the income of the present practitioner, the more especially as Dr. Manson came from Europe on a guarantee from Mr. Consul Swinhoe of an annual salary of 100*l.* The Customs pay him 200*l.* a year; and each of the three mercantile houses 300 dollars; vessels where he is engaged to attend, 25 dollars a month. His charge for a single visit is 5 dollars. In all cases, medicines are an extra. In the Consulate and Customs they are paid for by the patients: in the "houses," by the firm. His certain income is therefore barely 600*l.* a year. His uncertain may be 200*l.* or so more. This is, as your Excellency is aware, a very small income for a professional man in the East. The grounds on which the Government allowance is made are detailed by Mr. Swinhoe in despatch No. 40 of 1864, and there is now undoubtedly as good reason for continuing it as was then found for granting it.

The water being brackish in all the wells in the vicinity, that required for drinking and cooking has to be fetched from a small stream at the foot of the Ape's Hill, across the harbour. A sampan is necessary for this purpose, as well as for carrying letters or conveying the constable to the vessels. The cost of this is but 50 cents a month. It is manned by the Consular gigmen. By hiring, all expenses for painting, caulking, and repairs are avoided, and in case of its becoming unserviceable, the use of another is obtained while it is mending. During the winter, when vessels lie in the roadstead off Taiwanfoo, whenever it is necessary to communicate with them, the hire of a catamaran has to be incurred. The amount varies from a few hundred cash to a dollar, according as the strength of the monsoon is greater or less, and the distance the vessel may be anchored from the shore. Unless there be exceptional circumstances, the expenditure for chairs, under the arrangement lately made by me, will not exceed 16 dollars a month for journeys made between Taiwanfoo and Takow. For visiting the mandarins the amount paid bearers should be the same as that at other ports, where the Consulate and the Yamêns are in the same city, and depends much on the quantity of current business.

The agents of the three firms who maintain agencies at Takow and Taiwanfoo are paid as follows:—

Messrs. Tait and Co. give their agent the use of a furnished house, boat and boat's crew, a trip to Amoy and back once a year, an overland passage to Europe after five years' service, 250 dollars per mensem for salary and mess, and an annual bonus of from 200 to 800 dollars. Their sub-agent is under an engagement for five years for 150*l.* a year, annually increasing by 50*l.*, and an overland passage to Europe on its expiration. He has free quarters and mess. These gentlemen have received a plain English education, but have little pretensions to accomplishments or much refinement. They were engaged by Mr. Tait from advocates' offices in Edinburgh. Messrs. Ellis and Co. give their agent, a master mariner, 2,000 dollars a year, and pay all expenses, including servants' wages and washing. His assistant receives 1,200 dollars a year, besides his expenses. The sub-agent has a furnished house and 150 dollars per mensem. Messrs. Brown and Co.'s agent, a Portuguese, is on the same terms as the foregoing. The three firms pay for the medical expenses of all in their employ, and they give them all permission to trade on their own account, so long as the house operations are not interfered with; and usually a compromise is effected, advantageous to both parties, by the agent participating in all speculations in which he engages on account of the "house."

In summary, the remuneration for passing a certain portion of their lives, exiled in this dreary place and trying climate, and transacting the business of their principals, looked for by the mercantile agents at these two ports is, that they shall be as comfortably sheltered, fed, and provided for, as the means of the place will admit of, and have the opportunity of enriching themselves (the agents) by a clear sum of from 500*l.* to

800*l.* a year; and the sub-agents, 200*l.* to 500*l.*, according as the year is a profitable one or otherwise. The British schooner "Eliza Mary" is the only regular communication that exists between this and the mainland, and by her all things required by the foreign residents are brought. I forward a list of the charges for passage and freight by her.

Your, &c.
(Signed) WM. M. COOPER.

Inclosure 7 in No. 11.

STATEMENT of Average Market Price of Provisions and Fuel at the Port of Takow.

	$ c.		$ c.
Beef, per lb.	0 9	Oysters, shelled	0 6
Goats' flesh, per lb. . ..	0 14	Fowls, each	0 30 to 0 50
Eggs, 60 for	1 0	Geese, each, about	1 0
Milk, per bottle	0 10	Oil, per lb.	0 9
Flour (foreign), per lb. ..	0 10 to 0 12	Charcoal, per picul	1 0 to 1 20
Fish, per lb.	0 8 0 12	Firewood, per load (80 lbs.) ..	0 30

We, two of the principal merchants at the Port of Takow, certify the usual market rates to be as above.

(Signed) W. H. TAYLOR.
J. C. MASSON.

Inclosure 8 in No. 11.

ORDINARY RATES of Passage and Freight by British Schooner "Eliza Mary," Beattie, Master, trading between Amoy and the Ports of Formosa.

Between Amoy, and Taiwan or Takow.

	$ c.
Cabin passage, for Europeans	25 0
Deck ditto, for Chinese	6 0
Opium, per chest	7 0
Ordinary good, per picul	0 25
Parcels, each	1 0
Ditto, small	0 25

(Signed) ELLIS AND CO., *Owners.*
W. H. TAYLOR.

No. 12.

Vice-Consul Gregory to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received December* 13.)

Sir, *Tamsuy* (*Formosa*), *October* 30, 1869.

IN pursuance of instructions received from Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of despatches addressed by me to his Excellency, as follows:—

(1.) No. 11 of 25th September.—Employés and servants, medical expenditure, &c.

(2.) No. 13 of 4th instant.—Direct and indirect trade.

(3.) No. 14 of 21st instant.—Supposed tendency of trade to pass into Chinese hands.

(4) and (5.) No. 15 of 22nd instant.—Covering despatch, and statement of expenditure on rents, &c., during 1868.

These being replies to four circulars from Her Majesty's Minister, my reply to a fifth circular is in course of preparation, and a copy of it will shortly be forwarded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. GREGORY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Vice-Consul Gregory to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Tamsuy, September* 25, 1869.

IN reply to your Excellency's Circular of the 6th July, I have the honour to state as follows:—

One Writer is employed at this Vice-Consulate. The present occupant of the post is a Foo-chow man. His salary is 76*l.* 10*s.* a year (*i.e.*, 30 dollars a month). No quarters are at present provided for him, nor for the Linguist, nor for some of the servants. I have lately made him a small allowance, to be continued at least during the summer, for chair hire to and from the office, as the Vice-Consulate is at some distance from the town in which he resides. His duties are to assist in reading and translating Chinese despatches, notes, petitions, &c., which come into the office; to assist in making Chinese versions of despatches, &c., sent from the office; to do the Chinese copying and other clerk's work of the office; also, if so requested, to discuss and arrange matters with mandarins or others, and to act as informant and adviser upon Chinese matters. He speaks Chinese only. A Writer's position is unquestionably that of a gentleman; he would, for instance, be a suitable guest at my table, or at that of a mandarin. In view of what has been said, and of the various advantages which a clever literary man may get in the Chinese official service, I see no place for any reduction in the pay of the writership here. The two highest secretaries of the Tamsuy-Ting (a neighbouring mandarin), are said to receive from him respectively 510*l.* (*i.e.* 2,400 dollars), and 425*l.* (*i.e.*, 2,000 dollars), or thereabouts, as yearly salary, besides some further allowances for mess, &c. Another secretary of the same mandarin receives about 125*l.* (*i e.*, 400 taels), and messes at his employer's table; others, doubtless, receive less; and the pay of some in minor positions, on the mainland, living at or near their own homes, is comparatively small. It is to be understood that a Chinese Secretary or Writer expects higher pay when he comes across the sea to Formosa than he would expect if employed at his native place.

One Linguist is employed here. His name is Ung Pock Chuan. He is a British subject, a native of Penang. His salary is 102*l.* per annum (*i.e.* 40 dollars a month). He belongs to the higher class of Linguists, who read and write English. They are much employed in the Maritime Customs Service, and are often very useful men. My Linguist is at present chiefly employed as a copying clerk (in English), but also assists as interpreter of the local colloquial Chinese dialect, and of Malay. He, moreover, is is employed in various minor matters of business; and has assisted in the preparation of trade returns. He knows very little of the written Chinese language. The salary given seems good, but I fear it is hardly adequate to the securing of a really superior Linguist; for such a one, at once a Chinaman and a British subject, able to use both languages in speaking and writing, can obtain a good remuneration for his servives.

There was a clever Linguist whom I engaged in August 1866, under peculiar circumstances, at the above-mentioned rate of pay. Under date 29th November, 1867, in my absence, he applied for an increase, stating that his salary was hardly sufficient for his expenses, and mentioning the expensiveness of food and clothing at this place, and at the end of the year he appears to have left.

If there were an Assistant permanently stationed here, and only one port or office to attend to, the Linguist might, I think, be dispensed with, as the Assistant would do most of the copying, &c.; and other things might be done by servants or otherwise. But as the port of Kelung—more than a day's journey distant—is in the district of this Vice-Consulate, and a branch office is now about to be established there, so that the assistant will usually be away from the Vice-Consul, it will be necessary to retain the Linguist.

One Constable is employed at 127*l.* 10*s.* a year (*i.e.*, 50 dollars a month). He is a British subject, a native of England, named George John Freeth, formerly a petty officer in the Navy. The main usual functions of a Constable, at such an office as this, may be described as follows:—(1.) Acting as summoning officer and police-officer of the Court, and as gaoler when necessary. (2.) Looking after seamen ashore; also looking after and providing for shipwrecked and other distressed seamen. (3.) Various kinds of out-of-door work, such as attending to boats and flagstaff, attending to repairs, boarding vessels with or for letters, &c. To this may be added that he is an addition to the physical force of the Vice-Consulate, and of the community, in defence against robbery or tumult. Considering the need of having a respectable, intelligent, and responsible man as Constable, and the higher remuneration and better career which are enjoyed by a Constable's natural associates, the subordinate Custom-house officers, the pay at present given is quite small enough.

The following Chinese servants are also employed:—

	Annual Amount of Pay in Sterling.	Actual Monthly Wages, in Dollars.
	£ s. d.	Dollars.
1 Upper Messenger	15 6 0	6
1 Under ditto	12 15 0	5
Crew of gig—		
1 Boatman	10 4 0	4
1 Ditto	10 4 0	4
1 Ditto	10 4 0	4
1 Ditto	10 4 0	4
1 Porter at outer gate	12 15 0	5
1 Night Watchman	12 15 0	5
1 Ditto	12 15 0	5

The Upper Messenger at least should be an intelligent and well-behaved man, able to take a message to a Mandarin or to attend his master in a Mandarin's presence. Both the Messengers attend also at the office, there being no office boy. Two Messengers are hardly enough, considering the chance of one being away on business, or at his home, or disabled by sickness. I should have found much difficulty during the hot and sickly summer which is now coming to an end, but for the aid of an extra Messenger whom I engaged with the idea of employing him at Kelung, and whom I have hitherto paid from my own funds. I shall however endeavour to make an arrangement by which the night-watchman shall assist to some extent in the Messengers' business. As regards the four Boatmen who form the gig's crew, I observe that a four-oared gig is a swifter as well as a smarter boat than a small Chinese boat (sampan), and is probably better adapted for crossing the bar than an ordinary river-sampan. By the use of such a gig time may be economized in the journeys to Bangka, or to Kelung, which are occasionally necessary. Four or six-oared gigs are kept by the other principal residents here, and, I believe, by the Consuls at other sea-side ports. The Boatmen, when not wanted for the boat, can be made useful occasionally for other work. Whether the usefulness of a gig at this Vice-Consulate is such as to make it necessary to have one, is a matter of individual opinion, or almost of taste. Formerly a Chinese boat (sampan) with two men was made to serve here (though it is true that the Vice-Consulate was then more centrally situated than it now is). The present gig will be worn out before long, and I am much disposed thereupon to revert to the old and cheaper plan, at least for a time. On the details of the servants' wages I have nothing particular to say. Your Excellency will see that they are moderate.

As regards prisoners it appears that during the year 1868 one man, a European, was imprisoned for twenty-eight days, but I find no charge for his subsistence.

The official medical expenditure of this Vice-Consulate during the year 1868 was 63*l.* 15*s.* (*i.e.*, 300 dollars), being payments at the rate of 25 dollars per month to a medical practitioner for attendance on the officers and employés of the Vice-Consulate. This gentleman left Tamsuy about the end of last year, and we have since been without any resident Doctor; but an effort has been made to get one, and I have personally promised to contribute 21*l.* 5*s.* (*i.e.*, 100 dollars) towards defraying his passage expenses from home. A regular Government subscription to a Doctor at this place is very desirable, for in the first place some regular subscriptions are necessary, as a Doctor here can no more depend upon chance fees than a Doctor on board ship could do so; and further, supposing that at any given time the Vice-Consul and his subordinates were able and willing to make up a sufficient subscription, such subscription would not be certain and permanent, as an officer may at any time be removed, and his successor may be unable or unwilling to pay the same amount.

A Doctor may be needed for distressed seamen, or for prisoners, as well as for the Consular staff. In a space of nine months, ending in July 1866, the crews of three wrecked British vessels were thrown on my hands at this port.

As regards the liability to sickness at this place, especially in summer, I observe that the Assistant of this Vice-Consulate has been laid up with fever for a week past, that the upper Messenger has been similarly disabled for six weeks or more, and that the Writer, Linguist, Constable, and others have also suffered.

On the general subject of the number of persons employed at this Vice-Consulate I may remark (though scarcely for your Excellency's information), that the maintenance in efficiency of a British Judicial and Administrative Office in a remote, non-European, semi-civilized place, is a matter of some difficulty, and that such an office needs to be as far as possible complete and well provided in itself.

Some addition to the staff of servants will be needed when the branch office at

Kelung is established, which will be, as I hope, in ten days or a fortnight from this time. My estimate of servants for Kelung is as follows:—

One Upper Messenger at 15*l.* 6*s.* per annum (*i.e.*, 6 dollars a month).
One Boatman at 12*l.* 15*s.* per annum (*i.e.*, 5 dollars a month).
One ditto at 12*l.* 15*s.* „ (*i.e.*, 5 dollars a month).
One Night-watchman at 12*l.* 15*s.* per annum (*i.e.*, 5 dollars a month). And probably one Under-Constable (an Asiatic of European or mixed descent) at about 63*l.* 15*s.* per annum (*i.e.*, 25 dollars a month).

I allow extra wages for the Boatmen, in order to provide for their assisting also as Messengers, &c. I do not think that a Linguist or Writer will be necessary there for the present, especially as the Upper Messenger whom I purpose employing there is able to assist in writing Chinese in case of need.

Your, &c.
(Signed) WM. GREGORY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

Vice-Consul Gregory to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Tamsuy, October* 4, 1869.

IN reply to your Excellency's Circular No. 10, calling for information in regard to direct and indirect trade at this port, I have the honour to report as follows:—

The port of Tamsuy (in which term I include Kelung), is a port of ultimate import for foreign goods. What I mean is, that foreign goods once imported here are not (except to a very trifling extent) sent away again to other ports of trade, but are consumed in the region of which this is the port. The Custom-house returns for 1868 show that less than 2 per cent. of the total import of foreign goods was re-exported.

Such direct British import trade as this port has, is all from Hong Kong. Opium does not come to Tamsuy direct from India, nor woven stuffs from the United Kingdom. They arrive from Hong Kong or from Chinese ports.

I give the following statements from information obtained from the Custom-house. They refer to goods of foreign (*i.e.*, non-Chinese) production, imported in British vessels, during the year 1868.

	£
Total from foreign countries (*i. e.*, from Hong Kong) value	67,600
Total from Chinese ports	31,890
Which imports may be classified thus:—	
(A.) Opium, from Hong Kong	55,500
Ditto, from Chinese ports	21,300
(B.) Woven stuffs and metals, from Hong Kong	12,100
Ditto, from Chinese ports	9,565
(C.) Sundries, chiefly Oriental; also, American ginseng:—	
From Hong Kong	None
From Chinese ports	1,025

I may add that the Custom-house returns for 1868 give the total imports of foreign (*i.e.*, non-Chinese) goods in foreign vessels of all flags, as follows:—

	£
Imports from foreign countries	97,540
Ditto, from Chinese ports	58,710

These amounts are converted into sterling at the exchange of 4*s.* 2*d.* to the dollar.

Of the exports I may observe that they are all, with trifling exceptions, original exports, the produce of this part of Formosa. From the Custom-house returns it appears that the exports under all foreign flags in the year 1868 amounted to 85,785*l.*, which was divided as follows:—

	£
To Hong Kong and other "foreign countries"	30,195
To Chinese ports	55,590

Your, &c.
(Signed) WM. GREGORY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 12.

Vice-Consul Gregory to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Tamsuy, October* 21, 1869.

IN reply to your Excellency's Circular of 6th July, calling for information in regard to the tendency of trade to pass from British into Chinese hands, I observe that I do not think that the trade of Tamsuy shows this tendency, but rather the reverse.

Let me premise that the Taiwan Vice-Consulate (or Consulate) was established under Mr. Swinhoe, at the city of Taiwan in July 1861, and was removed in December 1861 to this port, where it has been succeeded by the Tamsuy Vice-Consulate. Of the trade of Tamsuy previous to 1861 or thereabouts, I have no history. A gleam of light is indeed thrown upon it by the report made at the Foo-chow Consulate by the master of the schooner "Vixen," wrecked here in the typhoon of 3rd and 4th September, 1857 (a copy of which report has been courteously given me by Mr. Consul Sinclair). This shows that there were then ten foreign vessels (British and others) in this harbour, which is far more than have ever been in this harbour at one time during my residence. We have here indication of at least an occasional brisk trade, in which foreign vessels were employed, but not of the merchants who conducted it.

I commence then with the establishment of the Consulate.

As regards camphor, I find Mr. Swinhoe, under date 1st January, 1862, reporting to Sir Frederic Bruce that "almost the whole trade in it falls to the lucky individual whose Chinese agents can secure the monopoly," and mentioning the name of a European firm of Hong Kong, which "held the monopoly" for the preceding year; and of another British firm which was said to have purchased one-third of the monopoly for that year. Mr. Braune, writing on the 7th February, 1863, mentions a rumour of a similar arrangement having been made by another British subject. Here then we find the trade in European hands. But a change took place. Since my arrival, in June 1864, I am not aware that any of these arrangements, by which Europeans purchased the benefit of the monopoly, have been in existence. About the beginning of 1865, the Chinese holders of the monopoly, or Chinese merchants in connection with them, began to ship camphor themselves to Hong Kong (in European vessels). This continued for a time. In 1866, the camphor was almost all sent away by the Chinese. But in 1867 European merchants again turned their attention to camphor, and made efforts to establish a free trade, in opposition to the monopoly. Ultimately, in 1868, the monopoly was overthrown. The trade is now in the hands of Europeans, who purchase of Chinese merchants or of small country dealers, and often go into the country to obtain the camphor. From information kindly furnished me by the Customs, it appears that during the six months ending the 30th ultimo, only about 5 per cent. of the shipments of camphor were made by Chinese.

I turn to the coal trade of Kelung. Four years ago there was no resident European engaged in this trade. In 1866, and still more in 1868, the trade received a remarkable development. Two or three European houses began to establish themselves. Preparations were made for a brisk trade for the present year; but the neighbouring markets having been flooded with coal from home and Australia, the Kelung coal trade is at present dull. The export for the six months from April to September last, is given as follows:—

	Tons.
Shipped by foreigners, including a house of doubtful nationality, employing foreign agents	4,785
Shipped by Chinese	4,221

In tea there is a noticeable and increasing little trade, sprung up within the last four years, in the hands of Europeans.

Of the imports, opium is by far the greatest, being in 1868 about three-fourths of the whole. It appears that full four-fifths of the opium imported in the last six months came to foreigners (non-Chinese).

I should observe that the above remarks refer only to the trade in European vessels, and not at all to the junk trade. The latter is very considerable, and is, so far as I know, entirely in Chinese hands.

To turn to general considerations, Mr. Swinhoe's and Mr. Braune's despatches show that the resident community in 1862 and 1863 was very small. During the earliest part of my own residence, commencing in 1864, there was only one resident who could be described as a merchant or merchant's clerk (not that he transacted all the foreign trade, for some of it was done by masters of vessels or other visitors). Now there are six or

seven mercantile residents, and we have also had several mercantile visitors on business.

A noticeable feature in the trade between Europeans and Chinese at this port is that Europeans are to a considerable extent the capitalists, giving credit when they sell, and making advances when they buy. This was noticed by Mr. Braune in his report for 1862. I am disposed to attribute it, not altogether to poverty on the Chinese side, but to the high rates of interest which (from whatever cause) prevail among the Chinese, as compared with the rates prevailing in Europe or even among Europeans in China. Regarding it so, we merely find that capital is obtained in the cheaper market and employed in the dearer one. The merchants doubtless do not give credit for nothing, but find a remuneration in the rates of price at which they buy or sell.

It may be right to observe that, if Chinese merchants get a share of the foreign trade (namely, of the import of foreign produce and the export of things destined for foreign consumption), foreign merchants on the other hand, get a share of the Chinese coast trade. From this port rice and sugar have been sent by foreign merchants to other Chinese ports, though perhaps not to a large amount. And I suspect that in the important sugar trade of Swatow and of Taiwan or Takow, this phenomenon of coast trade conducted by foreigners, occurs largely.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. GREGORY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 12.

Vice-Consul Gregory to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Tamsuy, October* 22, 1869.

IN pursuance of your Excellency's instructions conveyed in Circular No. 12 of 6th July, I have the honour to inclose herewith a statement of the amounts expended for rents, insurance, buildings, &c., at the Vice-Consulate during the year 1868.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. GREGORY.

Inclosure 5 in No. 12.

STATEMENT of Expenditure on Rent, Insurance, Buildings, &c., during the Year 1868, at the Tamsuy Vice-Consulate.

	$ c.	£ s. d.
I. Rent:—		
Former Vice-Consular premises, for March quarter ..	141 0	or 29 19 3
New Vice-Consular site, including Dutch fort, used as temporary Vice-Consulate for year commencing November 1	15 55	3 6 1
Total	156 55	33 5 4
II. Insurance.—Nil.		
III. Allowances for lodgings.—Nil.		
IV. Buildings, as charged in Consular accounts (not including loans to, or payments on account of, Major Crossman's account); constructing a well; rethatching servants' quarters; and various repairs and improvements in and about buildings	75 11	15 19 3
V. Furniture:—		
Furniture proper	0 42	0 1 10
Purchase of boat and appurtenances; repairs thereto; and mending flag	61 20	13 0 1
Total	61 62	13 1 11
VI. Expenditure on building account, on account of Major Crossman's office:—viz., alterations and repairs to Dutch fort, to fit it for temporary Vice-Consulate; expenditure on servants' quarters; making paths, &c.	548 24	116 10 0
Alterations to jetty	19 36	4 2 4
Freight, and boat and coolie hire, for bricks and other materials for new buildings; digging foundations, &c. ..	570 26	121 3 7
Total	1,137 86	241 15 11
Grand total	1,431 14	304 2 5

(Signed) WM. GREGORY, *Vice-Consul.*

British Vice-Consulate, Tamsuy, October 22, 1869.

No. 13.

Acting Consul Lay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received December* 17.)

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, October* 13, 1869.

UNDER instructions from Her Majesty's Minister I have the honour to forward copies of five despatches I have addressed to his Excellency as under:—

Inclosure 1. On the subject of rent and insurance.
Inclosure 2. Employers' rate of pay.
Inclosure 3. Direct and indirect trade.
Inclosure 4. Trade passing into the hands of the Chinese.
Inclosure 5. Price of food, &c.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. LAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

Acting Consul Lay to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, July* 21, 1869.

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch, Circular, Accountant's Department, of the 6th instant, I have the honour to forward an account of the rents and insurances paid at this Consulate during 1868, and also the sums expended on Consular building and furniture.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. LAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

ACCOUNT of Expenditure for Rents, Insurances, Consular Buildings, and Furniture for the Kiu-kiang Consulate, during the Year 1868.

	Currency.		Sterling.		
	$	c.	£	s.	d.
Rent, including ground-rent of concession paid to the Chinese authorities	744	2	158	2	1
Insurance of Consular buildings	104	16	22	2	8
Consular buildings, repairs to, sanctioned by Major Crossman	238	50	50	13	1½
Furniture, including 50 dollars for a new sedan-chair for the Consul	153	4	32	10	5

(Signed) W. H. LAY, *Acting Consul.*

Kiu-kiang Consulate, July 21, 1869.

Inclosure 3 in No. 13.

Acting Consul Lay to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, July* 29, 1869.

I HAVE the honour, in reply to Circular, Accountant's Department, of 5th instant, to inclose to your Excellency a statement showing the duties performed by the servants of this Consulate, and the rates of pay, with my remarks thereon.

I also inclose a nil return of persons confined in this gaol during 1868, and a nil return of money expended on account of medical assistance during the same period.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. LAY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 13.

RETURN of Number of Persons employed in the Kiu-kiang Consulate, with Rate of Pay.

Class.	Nationality.	Wages in Currency, per Month.	Sterling.
		$	£ s. d.
1. Writer	Chinese	30	6 7 6
2. Constable	English	60	12 15 0
3. Messenger	Chinese	7	1 9 9
4. Ditto	Ditto	6	1 5 6
5. Gatekeeper	Ditto	6	1 5 6
6. Office Coolie	Ditto	6	1 5 6
7. Watchman .. .	Ditto	6	1 5 6

1. *Writer.*—The pay of the Chinese writer seems large; but we cannot obtain the services of any man competent to do the work for this sum. Last year, when I was in Tien-tsin, I tried to engage a native, a man who had had experience in the Chinese Yamêns, but the pay was too small, and he refused to come as far as Kiu-kiang unless I would allow him to do outside work, whereby his pay would be increased 50 per cent. This I refused, and for the last twelve months I have been obliged to put up with our present native Writer, unless I chose to send to the north, and pay out of my own pocket the difference between the sum allowed by Her Majesty's Government and the wages demanded.

The rate of pay is below the amount we actually require to obtain a good man accustomed to official work.

The pay given to Writer in the Customs here is: northern Writer, 42 dollars; native Writer, 28 dollars.

2. *Constable.*—It would appear from the figures that this man is in receipt of a large salary, 153*l.* per annum, and that he has much more pay in proportion than the other servants. The reverse is the case. While they by clubbing together are able to live on their pay, keep themselves neat, and save a dollar or two at the end of the year, the Constable barely manages to make both ends meet.

The expenses of a man at one of the small ports, living alone, are high, and from my own knowledge the Constable, who has to find everything, including coals and candles, saves nothing.

At the large shipping ports there are perquisites; here there are none, and it is quite impossible to obtain a respectable man for less wages than those now given.

As regards the remainder of the servants, their pay is sufficient, although less than what is given by others. With the exception of the Head Messenger all the men are extremely common, and barely able for the work they have to do; but, unless we pay current wages, we cannot of course expect to get good men. The Government gets its servants cheaply, and whilst it secures the services of a man like our Messenger for 7 dollars, I have to pay 10 dollars for a man exactly similar, who acts as my private servant, and who has far less work to do.

The average rate of pay given to coolies is 7 dollars 50 cents per month.

The duties performed by each class are as under:—

1. *Writer.*—The medium of all written communications between the Chinese authorities and the Consulate; the Chinese work could not be carried on without the aid of a Writer.

2. *Constable.*—His services are absolutely necessary. The peace has to be preserved not only on shore, but on board the vessels and lorchas visiting this port.

3. *Messenger.*—Is like the Yamên Runners; takes all letters and messages to the Authorities, as well as cards. Is the head man amongst the Chinese servants, and has to guarantee their faithfulness and honesty, also to see that each man does his daily work.

4. *Messenger.*—Delivers letters, &c. This man has more than he can do, and is assisted by the gatekeeper.

5. *Gatekeeper.*—Has charge of the gate and grounds of the Consulate, and assists the messenger.

6. *Office Coolie.*—Has charge of the offices, keeps them clean and in order, and looks after the gate when the keeper is away.

7. *Watchman.*—Watches the Consulate at night.

(Signed) W. H. LAY, *Acting Consul.*

British Consulate, Kiu-kiang, July 21, 1869.

Inclosure 5 in No. 13.

Acting Consul Lay to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, August* 6, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Circular of the 6th ultimo requesting information as to the direct and indirect trade at Kiu-kiang.

So far as this port is concerned there is no direct trade with England—except in one or two cases of a few packages of tea—all our trade is indirect, and comes through Shanghae. It would be wrong, therefore, to add the value of the trade here to that of Shanghae trade; it forms part of the Shanghae trade, and it is entered in the Shanghae returns.

It appears to me that a simple plan would be to make each port, including Shanghae, give the value of its imports less re-exports. These amounts added together would make the total of the British trade at the ports north of and supplied through Shanghae, and should agree with the total value of the Shanghae trade as now given in the Reports.

I notice in the Blue Book for 1867 the total value of the trade of Shanghae for that year is given as 43,757,656 taels. I turn, however, to the Custom-house Returns, and I find that of this amount 34,042,598 taels were re-exported. Thus the trade at Shanghae was not worth, as was stated, 43,751,656 taels, but only 9,715,038. It should have been called the total trade of the north of China. The following Table will show the trade for 1867:—

	Taels.	Taels.
Total value of the trade at the ports in China, north of Amoy, received through and in Shanghae, wrongly called the value of Shanghae trade	..	43,757,656
The Shanghae trade, less re-exports, *i.e.*, the actual and *bonâ fide* trade, was	9,715,058	
Hankow, ditto	10,294,656	
Kiu-kiang, ditto	2,636,381	
Chin-kiang, ditto	3,336,618	
Che-foo, ditto	2,278,979	
Tien-tsin, ditto	8,235,476	
Newchwang, ditto	1,650,000	
Ningpo, ditto	3,824,969	
Other ports, ditto	1,785,519	
Total	..	43,757,656

The total amount of trade as given in the above Table for 1867 at the ports, added together, deduction of all re-exports having been made, ought to give the total value of trade, and the figures would agree with the total value of British imports as given in the Shanghae Returns.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. LAY.

Inclosure 6 in No. 13.

Acting Consul Lay to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, August* 6, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Circular of the 6th instant, relative to foreign trade passing into the hands of the Chinese.

In the paragraph which your Excellency quotes from a despatch from Lord Clarendon, his Lordship wishes to know to what extent this change has proceeded and is likely to proceed, and draws a parallel between the change in the Levant trade and that in the China trade, comparing the present position of the Greeks in the former to that of the Chinese in the latter.

In reply, I would, with all respect, say that I cannot see any comparison between the position of the Greeks in the Levant trade and the Chinese in the China trade. The Greeks have established themselves in England, and they now conduct a direct trade between Great Britain and the Levant, which was formerly carried on by British subjects. The Chinese have not established themselves in England, and though

they carry on a direct trade between China and Great Britain, this trade forms a very small portion of the entire direct trade between the two countries, and it is done through the medium of foreign houses.

At some future period probably, Chinese will go to England and set up houses there as the Greeks have done, and then a comparison may be made, but at present all the trade is foreign and in foreign hands, with the small exception noted above.

The direct trade between Great Britain and China has passed out of the hands of British subjects to some extent, but it has passed into the hands of Germans, Americans, and other nationalities, including Greeks, but not Chinese.

The indirect trade at this port has passed to a considerable extent into the hands of the Chinese since its opening. The reason of the change is ascribed by merchants to many advantages being contracted, and they mention—1st, not being allowed to reside in the interior; 2nd, restrictions placed on the movements of steamers; and 3rd, abrogation of the transit duties as the more permanent of the causes which have depressed British trade, and thrown the internal trade into the hands of the Chinese driving back the foreigner to the Coast.

The trade in China has increased, and greatly, during the last ten years, but when it is considered that the Chinese population forms one-third of the world, the wonder is that it takes so small a proportion of British goods—only one-thirty-third of the total British exports.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. LAY.

Inclosure 7 in No. 13.

Acting Consul Lay to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, September* 3, 1869.

IN reply to your Excellency's Circular of 12th ultimo, I have the honour t forward the Returns therein called for, being as under:—

1. Average market price of principal articles of food.
2. Of fuel and of oil.
3. Of servants' wages and native price of labour.
4. Of house-rent.
5. Usual charges for medical attendance and medicines.
6. Of chair and boat hire—with statement of the necessity of recourse to these at this port.
7. Average rate of remuneration to clerks and assistants in banks and merchants' houses here.
8. Cost of oilman's stores.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. LAY.

(No. 1.)—AVERAGE Price of the Principal Articles of Food at Kiu-kiang.

	Per Pound.	Sterling. Per Pound.
	Cents.	*s.* *d.*
Mutton	24	1 0½
Beef	10	0 5
Pork	10	0 5
Fowls	12	0 6
Bread	12	0 6
Butter	65	2 9
Cheese	70	3 0
Milk, 1 dozen tins 1*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.*; a month's consumption costs .	..	16 4
Potatoes (other vegetables not procurable, except in tins from home)	5	0 2
Sugar	25	1 1

Dollars at Government rate of 4*s.* 3*d.* per dollar.

We, the undersigned British merchants, resident at Kiu-kiang hereby certify the above statement to be correct.

(Signed) ROBERT ANDERSON.
E. G. HAMILTON.

Kiu-kiang, September 3, 1869.

(No. 2.)—AVERAGE Price of Fuel and Oil at Kiu-kiang.

		Sterling.		
	$ c.	£	s.	d.
Coals foreign, per ton	16 0	3	8	0
Ditto, native, ditto	6 to 7 (say)	1	7	0
Charcoal, per 100 lbs.	1 25	0	5	4
Wood, ditto	0 25	0	1	1
Oil, per pound	0 11	0	0	6

Dollars at Government rate, of 4*s.* 3*d.* per dollar.

We, the undersigned British merchants, resident at Kiu-kiang, hereby certify the above statement to be correct.

(Signed) ROBERT ANDERSON.
E. G. HAMILTON.

Kiu-kiang, September 3, 1869.

(No. 3.)—WAGES of Servants and Native Price of Labour at Kiu-kiang.

List of Consulate Servants.	Wages Paid by Merchants.	Wages Paid by Government.	Difference.
	$ c.	$	$
Messenger, per month	16 0	7	9
Ditto	13 0	6	7
Gatekeeper Office coolie	8 0	6	2
Watchman	4 25	6	..

From this Table it will be seen that Government pays less for its servants than the merchants. The messengers have been compared with men having charge of offices and godowns, and of the same stamp and class:—the watchman with hong watchmen. The latter gets less than we pay, but we only employ one man, the merchants two and more.

The native price for coolie labour is as under :—

	Per Day. Cash.
Chair coolies	300
Boat ditto	250
Carpenters, First Class, with food	250 to 300
Ditto, Second Class, ditto	200 250
Bricklayers	150 200

Calculated at 1,150 cash the dollar, these men get from 5 to 7 dollars a month; the wages paid to the Consulate servants is therefore certainly not in excess of what is given by the Chinese themselves for labour.

(Signed) W. H. LAY, *Acting Consul.*

British Consulate, Kiu-kiang, September 3, 1869.

(No. 4.)—RENT of Foreign Houses at Kiu-kiang.

In this settlement there are at present only three houses rented; they are as under:—

	Per Month. $
Assistants' quarters, rented by Her Majesty's Government (Original cost of this house, formerly Dent and Co.'s, unknown. No agent at the port).	65
1 house, rent about 8 per cent. interest	70
1 house, ditto	83

(Signed) W. H. LAY, *Acting Consul.*

British Consulate, Kiu-kiang, September 3, 1869.

(No. 5.)—Charges for Medical Attendance and Medicines at Kiu-kiang.

	Taels.	Sterling. £	s.	d.
Doctor's charge for visit	5	1	10	0
Ditto, per annum (each person by contract)	50	15	0	0
Confinements, each	50	15	0	0
Medicines, which are always extra, per bottle	1	0	6	0

Exchange at 6*s.* per tael.

I have paid more that this:—viz., 7 taels for five bottles of medicine, but I believe the above to be the usual charge for physic.

(Signed) W. H. LAY, *Acting Consul.*

British Consulate, Kiu-kiang, September 3, 1869.

(No. 6.)—Chair and Boat Hire.

The charges for chair hire during the eight months of this year have been as follows:—

	Currency. $ c.	Sterling. s.	d.
Month of January	0 50	2	2
February	..	..	
March	1 30	5	6
April	1 52	6	5
May	2 0	8	6
June	0 18	0	9
July	..	..	
August	..	..	

Government exchange 4*s.* 3*d.* per dollar.

These items for the most part are for chair coolie hire when the Consul visited the Chinese authorities. In July and August there is no charge, the roads and streets being impassible in consequence of the rise of the river, some 4 feet above the highest level known by Europeans.

The charges for boat hire during the same period were as under:—

	$ c.		s.	d.
January	0 2	=	0	1
February	0 15		0	8
March	0 40		1	8
April	..		..	
May	0 36		1	6
June	0 25		1	1
July	3 60		15	0
August	3 0		12	6

The last two months the rise of water to several feet in the roads and streets of the settlement has necessitated the constant use of boats, in fact whenever a letter or message has been sent out a boat has been hired; the demand for boats being very great the charge was high, but I succeeded in keeping the charges down to the small sums stated above.

(Signed) W. H. LAY, *Acting Consul.*

British Consulate, Kiu-kiang, September 3, 1869.

(No. 7.)—Average Rate of Remuneration to Clerks and Assistants in Banks and Merchants' Houses.

There are no banks in Kiu-kiang.

The rate of remuneration to agents of houses and clerks here is as under:—

Clerks in charge of houses.—Salary per annum, 500*l.* to 800*l.*, the latter after six years' service; besides everything found, including mess, beer, wine, spirits, stores, &c., medical attendance and all wages except one personal attendant and washing.

Other clerks as under:—

Tea-tasters, on four or five years' agreement, 300*l.* for the first two years, and then 400*l.* to 500*l.* for the remainder. Everything found them as above.

Ordinary Clerks.—About 10 to 20 per cent. below these rates. Everything found them as above.

All clerks and agents here enjoy the liberty of trading on their own account.

(Signed) W. H. LAY, *Acting Consul.*

British Consulate, Kiu-kiang, September 3, 1869.

(No. 8.)—Cost of Oilmen's Stores.

Oilmen's stores are most expensive here, nearly 25 per cent. above Shanghae prices.

I order all my stores and wines from Shanghae, and I find it as cheap to do so so as to get them myself from home.

The prices, therefore, that I pay are as under:—

	$ c.	Sterling. £ s. d.
Sherry, per dozen	10 0	2 2 6
Port, ditto	11 0	2 6 9
Brandy, ditto	11 0	2 6 9
Beer, per cask of 4 dozen	11 0	2 6 9
Ditto, draught, per kilderkin	16 0	3 8 0
Ditto, per barrel	26 0	5 10 6
English vegetables, 2 lb. tins, per doz.	8 0	1 14 0
Bacon, per lb.	0 60	0 2 6½
Butter, ditto	0 65	0 2 9
Ham, ditto	0 60	0 2 6½
Cheese, ditto	0 70	0 3 0
Blacking, per jar	0 50	0 2 2
Salt, ditto	0 33	0 1 5
Pepper, mustard, &c., per bottle	0 50	0 2 2

Government rate, 4*s.* 3*d.* per dollar.

(Signed) W. H. LAY, *Acting Consul.*

British Consulate, Kiu-kiang, September 3, 1869.

No. 14.

Acting Consul Solbé to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 17.)

My Lord, *Che-foo, October* 10, 1869.

I HAVE the honour, under instructions from his Excellency Sir Rutherford Alcock, to forward to your Lordship the following inclosures, being copies of despatches forwarded to his Excellency:—

Inclosure 1.—Regarding the number of the servants in the Che-foo Consulate, and the rates of wages, together with a Return of prisoners confined in Her Majesty's Consular gaol, and the amount of medical attendance supplied to the Consulate during 1868.

Inclosure 2.—Regarding the direct trade of this port with England and its Colonies.

Inclosure 3.—A Return of amounts paid for house-rent, insurance, and furniture during 1868.

Inclosure 4.—A statement of the cost of living, &c., in Che-foo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD SOLBE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

Consul Markham to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Che-foo, July* 20. 1869.

I HAVE the honour to forward the following replies, in detail, to the two paragraphs from a despatch of Lord Clarendon, embodied in your Circular despatch of the 6th instant:—

1. *Writers and Linguists.*—There is but one Writer at this office at a monthly remuneration of 30 dollars. The duties of this servant are many and multifarious. He has under his charge the Chinese archives. He has, from dictation of the Interpreter, to write the letters and despatches between the Consul and the Chinese authorities. He has also (being a Southerner) continually to act as Interpreter in cases where Chinese of the South (of whom the Chinese mercantile community at this port is principally composed) are parties. Besides these, there are many other incidental duties attaching to his office, although the Chinese correspondence is alone sufficient to keep him well employed.

The Writers in the Customs get the same, while the Linguists receive from two to three times the remuneration; and, as it is absolutely necessary for a man to hold this post, that he be well qualified in official routine, I think it fortunate that we have been able to procure one of such education and good capacity who is willing to do the work at so low a remuneration; but, at the same time, I can only account for his being willing to retain his post on the assumption that he is paid by Chinese, who come to this Court for legal assistance to take up their cases. This is, however, merely an assumption of my own, based on my knowledge that 30 dollars per month is barely sufficient to keep a man of the Writer's position decently, and also on Chinese custom generally.

2. *Gaolers and Constables.*—There is one servant attached to this Consulate, who embodies in himself the two offices. Considering the number of prisoners that are confined in Her Majesty's Consular gaol during the year, these double duties are too much for one man to perform fairly.

The office of issuing summonses, warrants, &c., of captures, &c., belong to him, while, at the same time, he has to watch over the prisoners confined in the gaol. The consequence of this has been the escape of several prisoners, one of whom was never recaptured. Beyond these duties, there is that of providing for and housing distressed seamen.

The remuneration for these offices is 40 dollars per mensem, and no European will accept the post for less; in point of fact, the present incumbent, an Irishman, has on several occasions applied for an increase to his wages, stating his inability to live at this port for the sum allotted to him. I know, from my own experience, that he has had on several occasions to draw from a bank in Shanghae, where he has some small savings, to meet his expenditure here; and my impression is that he is a moderate man in all his wants.

Clothes, foreign necessaries, and, in fact, everything, except mere bazaar articles, are at such exorbitant rates, that I am surprised that any decent man, not absolutely in want, should undertake such an onerous post for such trifling remuneration; and, besides this, at small ports, where there are only two officers stationed, a Constable should be a man of sufficient education to fairly copy correspondence when a pressure of work arises. But, of course, for such wages it is impossible to procure a man with these requisite qualifications.

3. *Watchmen, Boatmen, Porters, Coolies, &c.*—There are two watchmen permanently engaged at the Consulate. The wages for whom are 6 dollars per month each. There are also two watchmen provisionally engaged for the due custody of the Island at Kung-tung-too. Their wages are also 6 dollars per mensen each. The boatmen attached to the Consulate are four, at the same rate of wages. There are besides two messengers or office-servants, one gaol coolie, and one gatekeeper, all at the same rate of wages. These rates of wages are somewhat lower than those given by one or two of the mercantile firms, and considerably lower than those given by the Customs for the same class of men.

These make up the full establishment of the Consulate at this port; and, with the exception of the two watchmen temporarily engaged at the Island, the work could not be carried on with less.

The duties of the watchmen require no explanation.

The boatmen I have now, after great difficulties and many changes, got to attend to and look after the Consular grounds, beyond their own immediate duties. They are also employed in procuring water for the Consulate, which is removed from the settlement about a quarter of a mile, situated on a steep rising hill, and has no well. This alone takes up no small portion of their time.

One office-servant or messenger is attached to the Consul's and the other to the Assistant's office. Their duties are to carry messages, receive callers, and attend to the office generally.

The gaol coolie attends on the prisoners, &c.

The gatekeeper performs the usual duties of such a post.

I have now the honour to inclose a return of the number of men locked up in the Consular gaol from 14th July, 1868, to the present date. No prisoners'-book appears to have been kept previously to this date, and the constable who was here during the earlier part of 1868 has left. I have therefore continued the Return up to the 14th July of this year, to enable your Excellency to get a fair idea of the number of prisoners confined in the Consular gaol in one year.

I have also the honour to inclose a Return of medical assistance supplied during the last year.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

RETURN of Number of Prisoners confined in Her Majesty's Gaol at Che-foo, distinguishing their different Nationalities, from July 14, 1868 to July 14, 1869.

Nationalities.	Number of Men.	Total Number of Days.	Average Number of Days per Man.
English	32	496	11 days for each man.
American	2		
German	3		
Chinese	7		
Italian	1		
	45		

[NOTE.—No regular "Prisoners' Return Book" appears to have been kept in Her Majesty's gaol till July 14, 1868, and only an approximation of the number of days prisoners were in gaol anterior to that period could have been made from the Consular accounts and record of criminal cases.]

Besides those men who were imprisoned by the Consul, the gaol has to receive prisoners from the men-of-war stationed at this port.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Che-foo, July 20, 1869,

Inclosure 3 in No. 14.

RETURN of Amounts expended on Medical Assistance at the Che-foo Consulate during the Year ended December 31, 1868.

		$	£ s. d.
1868.	To Drs. Carmichael and Dunscombe, for one post-mortem examination	35	= 7 8 9
	To ditto, on account of Board of Trade	29	6 3 3
		64	13 12 0

In all 64 dollars; equivalent, at 4*s.* 3*d.* the dollar, to 13*l.* 12*s.*

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Che-foo, July 20, 1869.

Inclosure 4 in No. 14.

Consul Markham to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Che-foo, July* 18, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your two Circulars, quoting for my information paragraphs from despatches addressed to your Excellency by Lord Clarendon: the first, requesting information as to the direct and indirect trade at the ports in China; and the second relative to the tendency of trade to pass from the hands of British subjects into the hands of Chinese, and instructing me in compliance therewith to forward to you the most detailed information and statistics in my power.

In compliance with your instructions, therefore, I hasten to reply, and I do so at some length, as I think it advisable that you should be in possession of the history of the trade, as far as this port is concerned, from the beginning.

As regards the trade of the North of China, of which Che-foo forms an integral part,

the observation that it had a tendency to pass out of British into Chinese hands was unhappily only too true for a few years previous to 1867. At present this tendency has been checked, and, judging from the progress of the effort made to restore the trade into British hands, there is every probability of it eventually resuming its legitimate channel, unless exceptional circumstances, which shall be mentioned presently, should occur.

Looking back at the commencement of British commercial intercourse with the North of China in 1861, the prospect seemed then altogether favourable for British merchants resorting thither, conducting exclusively the bulk of the trade in manufactured goods. The mercantile firms of Shanghae and Hong Kong established branch houses or special agencies at the northern ports, and other merchants settled there as commission agents for the sale of goods belonging to such houses in Shanghae and other places in China as did not care to open houses of their own. Shipments of cotton goods from Shanghae and elsewhere in China were freely made to the northern ports, and they were sold there to Chinese on the spot by the British merchants, to whose care they were sent. At that time there were only two small steamers running between Shanghae and the North; the bulk of the goods were sent in sailing-craft, and there was a difficulty in chartering suitable vessels to go in that direction. Freights were high, and there was no facilities for the Northern Chinese dealers to go to Shanghae or elsewhere to buy goods and return quickly with them to their own markets. The junks were beginning to feel the competition of the foreign ships, and made less frequent voyages between the North and other ports.

The carrying trade of the North thus fell to the lot of the foreign sailing-vessel seeking employment on the coast, and the Northern dealers, unable or unwilling to charter or send cargo by them, were excluded for the time from going to the foreign markets of Central China as before. They were obliged by these circumstances to be contented with buying their goods from the British mercantile firms established at the Northern ports, and it is possible that this state of things might have continued for a longer period than it did if the American Civil War had not broken out, and had not several steamers entered the lists to contest the carrying trade with the sailing vessels that had so successfully embarked in it.

One of the effects of the American Civil War was to greatly diminish the quantity of British cotton goods previously sent to China, and to raise the prices of what little did reach this country. The stocks of goods at Shanghae and other ports were not large enough to allow shipments to the North. The Northern markets, instead of being able to offer to the native dealers large assortments of goods as previously, could only secure few goods, and dispose of those at high prices. The steamers meanwhile running regularly between Shanghae and the North, making the round trip in ten days, induced the Northern dealers to travel south and see whether they could not get their required goods at Shanghae on better terms and in greater variety than they could do in the scantily furnished Northern markets. Foreign vessels were now more easily chartered by natives, and the pulse trade carried in them facilitated the trade in piece goods by Chinese. The result was that the majority of the Shanghae firms entirely withdrew their branch houses and special agencies from the North, and the commission agents who had built premises and invested capital at the Northern ports alone remained to transact the business. The Northern Chinese having special facilities in the steamers for coming to Shanghae, resorted there and bought all they wanted, and the Shanghae firms, seeing the Northern dealers come to their doors and buying on the spot, found that they need no longer send goods to the North to the commission agents for sale, and, in fact, they had more in hand beyond what they could sell at their own places of business.

By the end of 1865 the trade in British manufactured goods at the Northern ports had almost entirely ceased to be transacted through British agents there. The majority of Chinese dealers went to Shanghae, and having bought goods, returned with them by the steamer; and so strongly felt was this decline in the prosperity of the British firms remaining in the Northern ports that it was currently stated as a matter of boast by the Northern Chinese that in a few years the foreign hongs there would be all closed. It was even reported in commercial circles in 1866 that the Chinese Government had proposed to close the Northern ports to foreign trade on the plea that there were no British interests to be hurt by the closure, seeing that the British merchants transacted no business there, or if they did, it was only as agents for steamers wholly freighted by Chinese, and that the claim to have these ports opened had been proved by experience to be valueless. Had the question been actually discussed there would have been an appearance of truth in the Chinese Mandarin statements, yet the carrying trade at that time being in the hands of British shipowners the interests of those at least would have had to be protected and the ports kept open.

It is not to be supposed, however, that during this serious change in the business of the Northern ports the resident British merchants were tamely acquiescing in such a ruinous state of affairs to themselves, or that they accepted as final a position brought about by exceptional circumstances and entirely at variance with the objects proposed by the British Government in opening the Northern ports to British commerce.

In a report on the trade of North China, forming part of Her Majesty's Consul's report on the trade of Che-foo, for 1865, published in the Blue Book, this matter has been remarked on in the following terms:—

"The temporary inconvenience hitherto caused by native competition to British merchants in the northern ports, will show them more clearly the difficulties they have to overcome, and the means they must employ for success, and their own perseverance and energy will surely command a reaction in their favour. British commerce in the north of China is as yet, however, deficient in one essential element of success, and this is equally applicable to the trade of the neighbouring ports of Tien-tsin and Newchwang as to the trade of Che-foo. One thing alone is wanted to establish British trade at these ports on a solid basis—the receipt of all descriptions of manufactured goods, suited to the local wants, in vessels coming direct from England to these ports." Never was there a more unfounded conclusion more hastily arrived at than the judgments of the Chinese, that they would have all the northern trade to themselves. It certainly seemed at one time as if the worst views of the opponents of British trade in the north would be realized; but no despondency had taken hold of those British merchants who were settled at the northern ports; they were at work to remedy the evil under which they laboured; but the current of trade was not to be turned in a day, nor in a year, and it was difficult even to see any way towards its accomplishment.

The Shanghae houses had no motive to help in building up a direct trade between the North and England that would direct a larger portion of business from their own hands. They naturally preferred to see the Northern dealers flocking down to Shanghae to buy all their goods; and they could not look favourably on an attempt to keep those dealers from leaving the Northern ports, by supplying their wants through imports by vessels direct from England. The steamer owners also were opposed to any change in a trade that brought in such profitable returns for transporting vast quantities of goods from Shanghae to the North.

To open the direct trade with the north of China, and thus check the tendency of the trade to pass from British into Chinese hands was a hard task. It required an immediate command of large capital, such as it could hardly be expected they had accumulated since 1861; and also the co-operation of mercantile persons in England to bring about such a result. There could be no doubt of the legitimacy of the direct North trade, from the vast extent of goods sold annually at these ports. Nevertheless, owing to circumstances already noted, no assistance from any British merchants, either at other ports of China or in England, could be obtained to start the affair.

It is a curious circumstance, that the credit of relieving the British trade in the north of China from the competition of Chinese, and the commencement of restoring the business into the hands of British merchants, was entirely due to the intelligent liberality of the French bank—the "Comptoir d'Escompte," established in China,—the director of which, seeing the importance and legitimacy of a business in manufactured goods direct from England to the north of China, afforded ample facilities to begin the trade.

The result has been most satisfactory for the trade of north China. Since 1867 several vessels have arrived direct from England loaded with piece goods, iron, coal, &c., and the British merchant having the sale of the same, and disposing of them at prices slightly over those of Shanghae, but considerably under what the same goods would cost here when freight from Shanghae, insurance, and other charges are added, have supplied the wants of northern dealers, and checked the importation of the same by Chinese, which threatened to destroy their business.

The stream of direct importation continues, and is likely to increase. Already the number of dealers going to Shanghae is less than it was last year; as soon as they can be supplied with all they want direct from England there will be no necessity to go south, and the import business of the north will revert to the hands of British and foreign merchants instead of being taken out of their hands by Chinese.

The credit of forming this direct trade is due entirely to the enterprise of the British firm of Fergusson and Co., who, despite the opposition from Shanghae, steadily persevered, and have ultimately succeeded. Others have followed in their footsteps, and this year the head partner of another British firm has gone home to make arrangements for the shipment of goods direct to this port.

It is satisfactory to know that this change has been effected without diminishing the trade of Shanghae. During the half-year from 1st January to 30th June, 1869, in which time, owing to the arrival of direct shipments, the northern dealers did not derive their usual supplies from Shanghae, and the trans-shipment of goods thence to the northern ports was thereby diminished, the total transhipment of goods from Shanghae to all the out-ports of Central and Northern China showed an increase of business over the corresponding portion of 1868. The aggregate trade of British goods has actually increased by their direct importation to the north of China, and there is every probability of this new feature in the China trade resulting in a still further increase of consumption of British cloths throughout the entire country.

While thus endeavouring to explain the cause of the circumstances which led to the observation that there was a tendency of the trade to pass out of British into Chinese hands, and also to show how the impediment in the way of British commerce has begun to disappear, it remains only to remark that the onward progress of the work rests with the merchants themselves, and that perseverance in the way commenced must ultimately place the business of the northern ports in the position which the opening of them was intended to effect.

As comparison has been made in Lord Clarendon's despatch of the competition between British and Greek merchants in the Levant, and the competition between British and Chinese merchants in this country, it may be remarked that the Greeks have settled in England, and have there bought British manufactures and sent them on their own account to the Levant, and they have taken primarily the place of the former exporter of goods from England, and consequently the place of the agents of those houses abroad. They also receive from the Levant Eastern products for sale in England.

A parallel case between British and Chinese merchants will arise when Chinese settle in England, and there buy goods destined to be sold in China by their own representatives. It is quite possible that this may take place; but the comparative distance between China and England is much greater than between the Levant and England; and, as yet, the Chinese do not seem inclined to take such a line, and it is very doubtful whether Chinese settled in England, selling their own tea and silk, and buying their own goods, would not get less for the former, and pay more for the latter, than they now do under the great competition amongst British merchants settled in China.

If it does happen that Chinese imitate the Greeks, and become buyers and sellers in England of articles used and produced in their own country, the trade must, to a great extent, fall from British into Chinese hands, and the scale be turned in the favour of the latter. When this does occur, British merchants will doubtless have found some other source of business to compensate them for such a change.

The inclosed Table, showing the quantities and value of British goods imported direct since September 1867, will give a correct notion of the value of the direct trade.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 5 in No. 14.

STATEMENT of Direct Import Trade from Great Britain and the Colonies to Che-foo, from September 1867 to June 30, 1869.

Description of Goods.	Classifier.	Quantities from Great Britain.	Quantities from Straits.	Quantities from Australia.	Value.
					Taels.
Biche de mar, black	Piculs ..	..	..	3 39	81
" white	" ..	..	..	2 39	27
Betel nuts	" ..	..	549 37	..	2,197
Brushes	Pieces ..	388	..	..	50
Carraway seeds	Piculs ..	..	4 60	..	36
Canvas	Bolts ..	34	..	..	272
Coals	Tons ..	7,372	..	4,389	179,398
Coffee	Piculs ..	..	3 50	..	51
Cloves, mother	" ..	..	1 65	..	15
Cotton yarn	" ..	18 7	..	..	632
Cotton piece goods—					
Turkey red cloths	Pieces ..	1,000	..	..	2,500
T cloths	" ..	32,500	..	..	682,500
Drills	" ..	15	..	..	65

Description of Goods.	Classifier.	Quantities from Great Britain.	Quantities from Straits.	Quantities from Australia	Value.
					Taels.
Shirtings, grey	Pieces	132,800	..	..	358,560
,, dyed	,,	600	..	..	1,896
,, white	,,	6,200	..		17,360
,, spotted	,,	3,000	..	..	8,100
Brocades, dyed	,,	2,000	..	..	6,400
,, white	,,	4,000	..	..	10,800
Chintzes	,,	450	..	..	945
Dyes, assorted	,,	15	..	..	300
Elastics	Yards	105	..	..	20
Glass windows	Sq. feet	155,400	..	..	6,216
Lamps	Pieces	18	..	..	60
Matches	Gross	2,875	..	..	3,830
Metals—					
Iron bar	Piculs	2,012	..	..	5,533
Nail rod iron	,,	11,635	..	..	34,905
Lead	,,	740	..	..	4,440
Iron wire	,,	100	..	..	448
Manufactured iron	,,	400	..	..	1,240
Iron nails	,,	7 56	..	..	76
Iron ware	,,	2 50	..	..	45
Needles	Pieces	6,500,000	..	..	725
Paint	Piculs	114 44	..	..	746
Paint oil	,,	10 38	..	..	175
Pearl barley	,,	40 0	..	..	260
Pepper, black	,,	..	877 60	..	4,827
,, white	,,	..	1 70	..	15
Pictures	Pieces	16	..	..	120
Rattans	Piculs	..	839 0	..	2,097
Rice	,,	..	36 0	..	83
Rope, Europe	,,	18 60	..	..	210
Seaweed	,,	..	147 0	..	338
Sugar, brown	,,	..	8,339 0	..	25,017
,, white	,,	..	315 0	..	1,811
Tar	,,	89 50	..	..	225
Timber planks	Pieces	..	3,136	1,000	124
Tin plates	Piculs	84	..	..	756
Tinder	,,	..	7 0	..	70
Turpentine	Gallons	60	.	..	50
Twine	Piculs	40 31	..	..	590
Ultramarine	,,	30 0	..	..	420
Wood, red	,,	41 66	..	..	123
Woollens—					
Figured lustres	Pieces	4,200	..	..	15,960
Long ells	,,	80	..	..	560
Camlets, English	,,	90	..	..	1,035
Total	..	..	..	..	771,085

Equal, at 6*s.*, to 231,325*l.* 10*s.*

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Che-foo, July, 24, 1869.

Note, July 1869.—During this month have arrived six ships direct from Great Britain, three of them with general cargo, and three with coals; and one ship from Australia, with coals. These ships are now discharging in port, and the value of their cargoes is not included in the above Return.

J. M.

Inclosure 6 in No. 14.

Consul Markham to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Che-foo, July* 20, 1869.

IN reply to your Circular of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inclose a statement of this Consulate's expenditure on house-rent, Consular buildings, and furniture during 1868. The Consular buildings at this port are not insured.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

Inclosure 7 in No. 14.

RETURN of Amounts expended on House Rent, Repairs, &c., to Consular Buildings, an d Furniture for Offices during the Year ended December 31, 1868

		$ c.	£ s. d.
1868.	Rent of cottage for Assistant	490 0	= 104 2 6
	Repairs to Consular buildings, paid by Major Crossman	673 16	143 0 11
		$ c.	
	Furniture for offices	169 96	
	Ditto, for gaol	21 0	
		190 96	40 11 7
		1,354 12	287 15 0

In all, 1,354 dollars 12 cents, equivalent, at 4*s.* 3*d.* the dollar, to 287*l.* 15*s.*

(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM, *Consul.*

British Consulate, Che-foo, July 20, 1869.

Inclosure 8 in No. 14.

Consul Markham to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Che-foo, August* 25, 1869.

I TAKE the earliest opportunity to apply myself to the hard task conveyed in your Excellency's Circular despatch of the 12th instant. A hard task, because I cannot see how I can equitably deal with myself and the officers under me by merely confining myself to bare prices of bazaar articles, without taking their relative value as compared with those at home, and their quality at home; and hard also because in this event I shall have to trespass on your Excellency's patience, by writing at length what might be so easily answered were merely the cost of necessary articles the standard of the costliness of living in China. And, again, were I to leave this question alone, and allow the prices of bazaar articles to rest simply on their own merits, I should be allowing an idea of extreme cheapness to be promulgated, whereas it is a fact that China is far more costly to live in than England, even on these articles, and Che-foo is not behind the rest of China.

1. I append a list of prices of the principal articles of food. By this it will be seen that beef is 6 cents a pound, mutton from 12 to 14 cents, or about half the cost of the same article in England. Bread about the same as in England. Beef is always, and goat mutton generally, procurable at this port. Sheep mutton, for some months in the year, is not. But here comes the question of quality. These articles are more than inferior to the same articles at home; the appliances for rendering eatable are fewer, and the native cooks, as a rule, are simply villainous. The consequence is, that where, as at home, a beefsteak or a leg of mutton would constitute a fair meal, here, one is obliged to have three times the number of dishes on the chance of getting one eatable; and this applies to every article of food procurable at this port. Quantity is absolutely necessary therefore on account of the quality. This is the experience of every port in China, and even more so at this, and especially during the summer, as ice—that great necessity of a hot climate—is not to be procured.

The market price of articles of food is not therefore a criterion of the costliness or otherwise of living in China. And here I may remark upon the great calls on a Consul's purse at this port in the way of entertainment. One British man-of-war is stationed here throughout the year; not a month elapses without at least one or two visits of larger British men-of-war from the South. A French man-of-war is generally in harbour, and large ships of war of every nationality are continually coming up for a short stay. I can safely say that, on an average, we are not one week without the visit of some large ship of war, whether British or foreign; and courtesy demands that the officers be entertained by the only civil officials stationed here, more especially as there are only two mercantile houses of any standing. Beyond this, Che-foo has now become the watering-place of China.

	Cents.		$
Beef, per lb.	6	Eggs (200)	1
Mutton, ditto	12 to 14		Cents.
Bread, ditto	8	Fowl, each	12 to 13
Potatoes, ditto	2 to 3	Geese, ditto	50 60
Vegetables, ditto	2 3	Milk, per bottle	9 10

These two last articles are only fowl and geese in name.

2. Coal:—

	Taels.
English	13
Australian	11 to 12
Japan	7

(English and Australian coal are equivalent to more than a ton and a half of Japan. The tael runs about three to the £ sterling.

	£ c.
Charcoal, per picul of 133 lbs.	1 10
Wood, ditto	0 38
Oil, bean (cannot be used for lamps), per bottle	0 7
Oil, kerosine, per tin of 5 gallons	5 0

The expense of lamp oil during the summer months, using three lamps a night, would be between 4 and 5 dollars per month.

3. With regard to wages of servants, I may remark that as in India, where each man has his own peculiar work to perform, and nothing will persuade him to go beyond it, as a consequence the very least number of servants that even a junior can have, who has to keep a mess of his own, is three—a cook, a boy or man servant, and a coolie. The native servants are quite useless and untrained; in fact they are mere coolies; few if any of the mercantile residents here employ them, except in this last capacity; and the lowest wages at which they would be willing to fill the posts above-mentioned would be 19 dollars per month, or about 60*l.* per annum. One maid of all work at home would do the work far more satisfactorily for 10*l.* a year.

Southern Servants.

	Dollars.
Boy	10 to 15
Cook	10 15
Coolie	8 10

These are low rates.

Native Servants.

	Dollars.
Boy	9 to 7
Cook	7
Coolie	5 to 6
Watchman	6

Rate of coolie-hire per day, 200 cash, or about 19 cents each man.

4. *House Rent.*—There is no house leased at this port beyond the cottage rented by Mr. Solbé. This is the poorest little place imaginable, somewhat similar to a peasant's cottage at home. It has five rooms, 12 feet by 14 each, with kitchens detached, and its rental is 50 dollars per annum. The house and land cost originally about 1,800 dollars; this shows a per-centage of 33 dollars; but, of course, no estimate can be made of what would be a fair per-centage on original cost; as, owing to the demand for house room, any rent can be asked for and got. As an instance of the cost of living and house rent for strangers coming up here, I may mention that at a Mr. Pignatel's boarding-house the charge per diem for each person is taels 4, or about 1*l.* 6*s.*

5. *Medical attendance, &c.*—The charge for medical attendance varies according to circumstances. The usual custom is, however, to make a contract for attendance of 50 taels per year. It a contract is not made the charge is 7 dollars per visit. Medicines are extra. It is impossible to give a scale of charges of medicines supplied; it may, however, be sufficient to mention that 1 dollar per bottle of eight ounces of any ordinary mixture is the lowest charged.

6. *Chair and Boat-hire.*—There would be no great need for chair-hire, except on extraordinary occasions, were all the Consular officers' quarters near one another. Chairs are not on hire in Che-foo. Each person keeps his own. Foreign boats are not on hire. Chinese sampans, sculled by one man, may be procured at the rate of 45 cents per diem.

7. There is only one house engaging an English Clerk. I believe his pay is 150*l.* per annum with everything, even washing (a large item of expenditure), found him. This leaves him a clear 150*l.* per annum for dress, and he is, compared with those at Shanghae, a poorly-paid Clerk. I know that Clerks in that port for the first three years get 200*l.*, 250*l.*, and 300*l.* per annum, with everything found except a boy and washing, or else their food is commuted by a payment of 70 to 80 taels per month, or from 270*l.* to 320*l.* per annum. A Portuguese Clerk here is getting 75 dollars per month, or about

200*l.* per annum with a house. Tidewaiters receive from 200*l.* to 600*l.* per annum. Customs Clerk commence on 400*l.* per annum; a Customs First Clerk gets 1,000*l.* a year, or 100*l.* more than the Consul at this port.

And now while forwarding the charges to this for freight and insurance, I trust your Excellency will excuse my making one or two remarks on the last paragraph of your despatch regarding wines, oilmen's stores, &c. Where an officer on taking up his appointment starts fair with the world, I admit that the necessity of buying these articles from storekeepers, charging advanced rates of 100, 200, and even 300 per cent. is done away with; but where, and I have known several instances of this kind, the officer has to borrow to get his necessary outfit, it takes all his time on the salary that he receives on coming out to China to recover himself, and then on his appointment to a post he has to furnish, paying for each article exorbitant rates, selling them when he leaves on promotion at frightful loss, or taking them with him at enormous rates of transport: this cramps him for a long period. He has also in most cases to live by himself, and he is obliged either to get at these stores the few things he requires as he requires them, or be indebted to friends at home for their sending out. I think there are few instances in the first five or six years of a man's life in the Consular service that he is enabled to lay by 50*l.* or so to procure from home at different times the necessaries that he requires, and this applies equally well to clothing as to oilmen's stores.

Freight from England to Che-foo from 3*l.* to 3*l.* 15*s.* per ton; insurance do., 4*l.* 40*s.* per ton.

I shall now close this report with two statements, one an average of my own expenses for the year, and the other a statement of Mr. Solbé's expenses. It must also be remembered that my wife and family are at home on account of ill health, and that I have to keep a separate establishment for them there. Mr. Solbé is a married man. His expenses as a single man might be some 50*l.* a year less by reducing the items for his servants and clothing.

Mr. Markam's (Consul) Expenses.	£	*s.*	*d.*
Insurance	32	0	0
Medical, about 75 taels	25	0	0
Clothing	80	0	0
Bazaar expenses, coal, fuel, oil, stores, wines, &c., about 140 dollars per month	357	0	0
Wages, 600 dollars per year	127	10	0
Income tax	22	10	0
	644	0	0

This leaves a balance of 256*l.* out of a salary of 900*l.* to provide for a family at home, education, expenses of governess, and all other exigencies.

Mr. Solbé's Expenses.	£	*s.*	*d.*
Insurance	27	13	6
Servants	89	5	0
Bazaar account, 40 dollars; stores, including wines, coal, oil, &c., 27 dollars; washing, for Mr. Solbé alone, 8 dollars, or 75 dollars per month	191	5	0
Income-tax on 350*l.* per annum	8	15	0
Clothing	50	0	0
Medical attendance, not including medicines, 50 taels per annum	16	0	0
	382	18	6

This is 32*l.* 18*s.* 6*d.* over Mr. Solbé's salary as Second Assistant put down at the lowest rates at which he could live, and not taking into account the numerous extraordinary claims on his purse.

A question will arise as to what provision is, under ordinary circumstances, being made for the future for a return home for sickness. It is a question I have frequently asked myself without any solution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MARKHAM.

No. 15.

Consul Alabaster to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received December* 17.)

Sir, *Swatow, October* 30, 1869.

IN accordance with Sir R. Alcock's Circular No. 14, of 15th September, I have the honour to inclose copies of my replies to his Excellency's Circulars Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12 of 6th July, and No. 13 of 12th August.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

RETURN of Persons employed for the Public Service at Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate at Swatow and Chao-chow-foo.

Situation.	No.	Nationality.	Monthly Wages.	Yearly Wages.
			$	$
Constable	1	English ..	50	600
Deputy Constable	1	Ditto ..	30	360
Writer	1	Chinese ..	30	360
Linguist	1	Ditto ..	25	360
Messenger	1	Ditto ..	7	300
Porters	2	Ditto ..	12	84
Office boys	2	Ditto ..	12	144
Office coolies	2	Ditto ..	10	144
Coolie	1	Ditto ..	5	120
Watchman	1	Ditto ..	4	60
Boatmen	6	Ditto ..	37	444
Total	19	.. ..	222	2,664

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Swatow, August* 2, 1869.

I HAVE to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's Circular of July 6.

As far as Swatow is concerned the return of imports given in my trade report, fairly represent the import trade of the port.

Being entirely supplied from Hong Kong and Singapore, European goods represented therein, cannot previously figure in other Consular returns, and from the peculiar conditions of the trade of the port, the supply being entirely regulated by the demand, they are rarely if ever re-exported.

Lately a certain amount of sugar has been brought here from Hainan and Cochin China, for the purposes of re-export, but this indirect trade has only lately arisen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 15.

Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Swatow, August* 16, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter calling for a report on the reasons to be assigned for the trade passing from foreign into Chinese hands.

One great reason is undoubtedly the superior information native importers are able to obtain with regard to the inland markets; and two other legitimate advantages they possess are the greater economy of living, and the natural preference consumers feel for dealing with their own countrymen. And did foreigners now conduct their business in the manner holding some years back, these three reasons alone would be sufficient to account for their being unable to compete with their native rivals.

But foreigners have of late years been driven to the study of the language, to careful inquiry into the state of the inland markets, and to very great reduction of expenditure, and having better knowledge of the home markets, greater command of capital, and far superior powers of calculation and scientific knowledge of trade, they would still be able to hold their own or even to obtain a larger share of the trade, but for certain, to my mind, unfair disadvantages to which they are subjected.

First of these I consider the high rates of duty they are compelled to pay at the Treaty ports compared with those levied at the various native ports in the neighbourhood, through which the consuming districts can be nearly equally conveniently supplied, or even in some instances by the native Custom-house at the treaty port itself.

With the competition that now exists, every item in the cost of laying down goods becomes of vital importance, and where the profit to be looked for is so small as it is generally here, a foreign merchant paying full duties is necessarily unable to compete with a Chinese who only pays one-half the amount.

Thus in the opium trade, which requiring large capital, was at one time entirely in foreign hands, and under a fair and equal system of taxation, would in great measure still continue so, the foreigner is rapidly being driven out of the market; the opium imported here by foreigners paying 40 taels per chest (30 taels import duty and 10 taels leking), while Chinese merchants can bring their goods into the market on payments varying from 10 taels to 30 taels.

And in the goods trade so soon as certain advantages I have hitherto been able to assert on behalf of European importers are overthrown, the like result may certainly be looked for.

Nor is there much hope of remedy, for since the Treaty and the new state of things then brought into force, the foreign merchant is unable to imitate his native *confrère* by compounding for the duties here, or resorting to other ports where lesser rates prevail; and powerful as the foreign Custom-house has proved in confining foreigners to strict conformity with the letter of the Treaty, its efforts have hitherto been absolutely ineffectual as regards the general equalization of the taxes on trade, with a view to attaining which it obtained support at its institution.

Another grave disadvantage under which foreigners lie is the insecurity of all contracts and engagements with Chinese; in the impotence or unwillingness of the mandarins to enforce foreign claims against native debtors, &c.

If a Chinese has a claim against a foreigner, every remedy existing in our Courts is freely and fairly offered him; indeed it is generally the rule for Consuls to overstep their strict line of duty in affording him advice and assistance; but if the case is reversed a lengthy correspondence is, as a rule, necessary before a hearing even can be obtained, and unless the Consul, who is forced to be his countryman's advocate, is extraordinarily energetic and persevering, no attempt even is made to do justice; even then the full measure is rarely if ever obtained.

In itself this is sufficient to account for the ruin of foreign trade, for the cautious man is led to contract his operations to the narrowest limits, and with others what, in a civilized country, would be a safe venture becomes a hazardous speculation, while his native rival is, through the protection afforded by the guilds, the foreign assistance he is always, when it is likely to be availing, able to obtain and the irregular remedies he is able to resort to, enabled to conduct his business with a fair, if not perfect, security. And a third disadvantage under which a foreigner lies, is the imposition of excessive imposts, under the name of leking, or war taxes, at every port to which he has access. Imposts put on by the provincial authorities to recoup them the share of the import duties the institution of the foreign Custom-house has diverted into the Emperor's privy purse, and which are levied with far greater strictness on goods imported by foreigners than on those brought into the market by Chinese, the mandarins having through the foreign Customs more exact information regarding them, being able to watch the foreign hongs with greater ease, and proceeding to the levy with far less chance of objection than when dealing with their countrymen; and it is to this, and the inability of obtaining the commutation readily allowed his rivals, that we must look for explanation of the trade in goods which pass through the foreign Custom-house; and which therefore, whether European or Chinese imported, pay alike; being chiefly in native hands, the protection the foreign Custom-house gives the foreigner, being necessitated by the new imposition and the inequality of taxation being merely shifted from duties to leking.

Beyond these there are other minor difficulties in the way of the conduct of the trade by foreigners, in the want of protection afforded him when travelling, and the petty persecutions, annoyances, and squeezes to which persons dealing with him are exposed, which prevents his getting into relations with the actual consumers, and render

these chary of seeking direct intercourse with him, and the watchful repression by the mandarins, of every attempt at new or further development of trade; but neither of these need continue if the position attained here by persistent efforts, during a number of years, is allowed to be maintained, but if a different policy to that hitherto holding be adopted it is certain that they will rapidly rise again into importance, for there can be no doubt that the present policy of the mandarins is one of active aggression on foreign trade and influence, and that in the numerical weakness of foreigners passive resistance is equivalent to utter defeat; either left entirely to himself as before the Treaty, which is a course not unattended with danger, or efficiently supported and encouraged, the British merchant is perfectly capable of holding his own against all competitors, but denied the help he asks for, and prevented helping himself, it is naturally perfectly impossible for him to maintain his position, and but for the ties of property, in which most of the old residents have largely invested, and the lingering hope that matters must mend, and a change of policy occur, the field would ere this have been in great measure abandoned.

Nor can this abandonment take place without injury to the interests of our manufacturers at home, for their largest market, China, would soon be closed to them but for the watchful protection of their goods against mandarin exactions, a protection which can only be afforded while they are imported in foreign hands, and without which, as at different times has been seen at Che-foo, Chin-kiang, and here, the native manufacturers would once more mainly supply the country, the difference between the actual cost being so small that differential taxation is sufficient to turn the scale.

In the Levant there are no native goods to come into competition with us, but in China the native cotton cloth is preferred for every quality, save cheapness, to that made in England, and the imports may always be observed varying as squeezes are imposed in defiance, or taken off through the influence, of the Consul.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 15.

ACCOUNT of Rent and Insurance paid at Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate, Swatow, during the Year 1868.

	£	c.
Rent of Consulate at Chao-chow-foo	206	25
Insurance on Consular buildings	188	23
Total	394	48

Inclosure 5 in No. 15.

RETURN of Sums expended on Medical Assistance at Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate, Swatow, during the Year 1868.

	£	c.
Medical officer's salary	470	52
Medical assistance to distressed British subjects	405	6
Total	875	58

Inclosure 6 in No. 15.

ACCOUNT of Sums expended on Furniture and Building at Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate at Swatow and Chao-chow-foo during the Year 1868.

	£	c.
Furniture, &c.	278	0
Building and repairs	731	54
Total	1,009	54

Inclosure 7 in No. 15.

RETURN of British Subjects confined in Swatow Consular Gaol during 1868.

	No.	Aggregate Length of Sentences.	Average Length of Confinement.
		Days.	Days.
English	35	654	19
Asiatic	8	71	9
Paraguayan	1	14	14
Total	44	739	17

Inclosure 8 in No. 15.

Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Swatow, October* 12, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a list of the cost of the chief articles of food at th port, as directed in Circular No. 13.

From this it will probably appear that Swatow is one of the dearest ports in China, and although I have omitted to insert the exorbitant rates of foreign stores charged by the stores here, they must be borne in mind, if a fair estimate is to be made of the expenses to which a Consul here is placed, as, speaking from experience, it is perfectly impossible, under the present system of acting appointments, and uncertainty where you may in a few months be, for any one, save the occupants of the highest posts, to make arrangements for obtaining supplies from home without certainty of confusion and loss.

And there must also be added the expense of the double establishment the Consul is forced to keep up, in consequence of the double residence at Swatow and Chaó-chow-foo, thirty miles, or thirty hours' journey, distant.

But, notwithstanding this, I must, to be honest, admit that, in my opinion, next to Peking and Newchwang, and perhaps Ningpo, it is one of the cheapest ports; the small size of the community, the simplicity of its tastes, and certain other peculiarities, enabling the Consul to make an approach to maintaining the position of one of the leaders of the place, it is impossible for him to attempt at other ports.

But, even here, the Consul finds it difficult to avoid the alternative of neglecting the studies necessary to the attainment of the various knowledge, linguistal, legal, &c., required of him, for the cares of housekeeping, of trusting everything to his butler, and getting into debt, or of being spoken of as an eccentric, unsocial man, neglecting the duties of his position; and his difficulties are increased, that the Commissioner of Customs, his official colleague, receives twice his pay, and that the least flourishing merchant can afford to spend more than even him. Indeed, the appeals for allowances, and the impression your Excellency notes in every Consul's mind that his is the dearest port in China, are, truly considered, but the evidence of the truth, that nowhere is the Consul's pay sufficient to enable him to take the position in society to which he is entitled and which he is supposed to occupy. Actual living cannot be expensive in a country where the people can live well for 10*s.* a month, and where foreign missionaries have lived on 120 dollars a year; but, living in the society of any port save those where the missionary element is in the predominance is a problem, if not an impossibility, on the present salaries.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Consular service no longer offers the prizes by which my contemporaries were induced to enter it; fifteen years ago, I counted that I should now be in receipt of 1,200*l.* or so per annum, that I should be able to afford to marry and insure my life as a provision for my widow should I leave one, and that, in ten years more, I should be able, did my health require it, to retire on a sufficient pension. Now, there is but one post, that of Chinese Secretary, that offers more than bare expenses—frequently not even that—followed by a pension less in amount than that sum on which young people at the outset of their career, with prospects of rapid increase may not with prudence marry.

The traditions of the service have, to a certain extent, so far, kept up the tone of its members, but it is impossible that it can continue, exposed, on the one hand, to continual temptation, and on the other, pressed by enduring insufficiency of means, without even-

tually succumbing, for a bare living is attainable by one possessing half the qualifications required of us elsewhere, without the necessity of foregoing the pleasures of home, friends, and family, to all of which we are here condemned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAL. ALABASTER.

Inclosure 9 in No. 15.

List of Prices at Swatow.

Beef, per lb.	8 to 10 cents.
Mutton, goat, ditto	25 cents.
„ sheep, ditto	35 cents.
Fowls, each	25 cents.
Coffee, per lb.	20 cents.
Eggs, each	5 cash.
Butter, in bottles, per lb.	1 dollar.
Cheese, per lb.	65 cents.
Potatoes, per picul	6 dollars.
Vegetables, Chinese, flavourless and unwholesome, per lb.	3 cents.
Turkeys, each	3 to 6 dollars.
Geese, ditto	80 cents to 1 dollar
Foreign vegetables have to be cultivated, and cost, per month, about.	10 to 12 dollars.
Bread, per lb.	10 cents.
Wages—	
Boys	6 to 10 dollars.
Cooks (good)	15 to 20 dollars.
„ (usual)	8 to 12 dollars.
Coolies, (trained)	6 to 7 dollars.
„ (ordinary)	4 to 5 dollars.
Washing for a bachelor, per mensem	4 to 6 dollars.
Medical attendance, per annum	50 dollars.
Medicines extra, per 2 oz. bottle	2 dollars.
Rentals.—No data, each man living on his own property. The Customs pay 140 dollars per mensem for a house for their Tide-waiters; and rooms were obtained from the Tide Surveyor at 50 dollars per month.	
Firewood, per lb.	5 cash
Charcoal, ditto	12 cash.
Candles, ditto	34 cents.
Clerks' wages, with liberty to trade, and expectations of ultimate partnership, 150*l.*, and all expenses paid, to commence with. In the Customs, 400*l.* to 1,000*l.*, with a bonus of one year's pay, after two years' service.	

No. 16.

Acting Consul King to the Earl of Clarendon—(*Received December* 27.)

My Lord, *New-chwang, October* 12, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch to Sir Rutherford Alcock, forming a supplementary reply to his Excellency's Circular No. 18 of 14th August (Accountant's Department), and which should have accompanied the series forwarded in my despatch No. 53 of the 7th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WALTER ED. KING.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Acting Consul King to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *New-chwang, September 3, 1869.*

YOUR despatches of the 14th instant have both been received.

In the latter you inform me, with reference to my despatch of 20th July, that a question will doubtless arise next year as to the necessity of paying an annual salary to the medical man at this Consulate. Had I conceived it possible for such a contingency to occur, I should in that despatch have urged what I could, not to prevent indeed inquiry into the necessity of continuing the salary, but simply by pointing out the real and altogether exceptional circumstances under which Dr. Watson receives his salary (and I think no other argument will be required), to endeavour to deter Her Majesty's Government from making any alteration in the existing arrangements.

On the establishment of Her Majesty's Consulate at Newchwang, a medical officer belonging to Her Majesty's Navy was temporarily attached to it. On his withdrawal, another doctor was invited to practise here. Sir Frederick Bruce recognizing the necessity of the presence of a medical man, admitting the responsibility of the Government not to expose Her Majesty's servants employed at so distant a station to unnecessary danger of life, and recognizing that the paucity of numbers at this port was such as to render the employment of a doctor a very heavy tax on each member of the community (a tax which, however heavy, was legitimately one which the merchants must prepare to undergo for themselves, but one which it would not be fair to impose on the limited salaries of Consular officers), temporarily sanctioned a subscription for this purpose; and not only so, but advocated and obtained from Her Majesty's Government a permanent subscription not exceeding 200*l.*, subject only to the condition that private subscriptions of an equal amount should be furnished by the residents.

On the strength of this grant Mr. Meadows, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, and the residents each for himself, entered into a written agreement between themselves, each to each, and again to a medical man, engaging to secure to the latter a yearly payment of stipulated sums amounting to a total of 400*l.* sterling. This document was sent home, and a physician and surgeon, Dr. Watson, was specially selected by Sir James Simpson to fill the offered post.

The stipulated amount for which Her Majesty's Consul signed was 200*l.* It is possible that Her Majesty's Government may consider that this subsidy was one necessary perhaps during the infancy of the port, but that now New-chwang has been some years established it can run alone. Perhaps even it is thought that while increasing numbers have lightened the private subscriptions of the residents, that of the Government remains the same. But neither of these are the case. The number of mercantile establishments is fewer; the number of residents (excluding infants) is smaller than formerly, and the private subscribers have been obliged to raise their subscriptions a third. This they have done from a feeling that a medical man is no luxury but a necessity, and that they are still willing to abide by their part of the agreement, though its fulfilment has become more onerous. If Her Majesty's Government should cease to perform its share, the burden will not only become still heavier to private persons,—a matter of no concern to it,—but we, its servants, shall have our incomes reduced of necessity by at least 25*l.* a year. In my despatch I have given 15*l.* as the yearly subscription, but that is under the present circumstances; the withdrawal of the Consular subsidy will raise the subscriptions at the least 10*l.* a head.

To return to the agreement which was entered into with Dr. Watson. At the time he accepted the post, he (already attached to the Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh) held, and consequently had to resign, a public appointment of that city which he had then lately obtained by contest, a post coveted by much older members of the profession for the status which it gave, and the obtainment of which at the outset of his career made him a marked and rising man. If Dr. Watson was able, in the event of losing the Government salary, to recoup himself by exacting heavier fees from the residents the matter would be one of little difference to him, though of great concern to the Consulate officers; but should the residents not be able to meet the demand, he would have just cause of complaint at having been induced to leave a promising career at home for one in China that seemed, but was not, permanent.

I have another reason for thinking that Her Majesty's Government will not seek to touch Dr. Watson's salary when the matter is fairly represented. Sir F. Bruce, in his despatch of 6th June, 1862, speaking of this permanent salary says, " I have recommended it strongly, and I trust it may be allowed as it is coupled with a reduction

in the fixed establishment." That reduction was made, and another has since followed the first, and as the provision of medical attendance was a complement of, and in some sort a set-off for the reduction, Her Majesty's Government will not now, I presume, withdraw this set-off, unless indeed it is in contemplation to restore the fixed establishment to its original footing.

I trust that the continuance of the existing arrangements will find an advocate in your Excellency, both as regards the agreement entered into by Mr. Meadows on behalf of the Government with the physician at present drawing the salary, and the hardship that will be entailed on officers if they have to pay out of reduced salaries for that which Government reduced those salaries in order to give gratuitously.

Your, &c.
(Signed) WALTER ED. KING.

No. 17.

Mr. Holt to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received January* 8, 1870.)

Sir, *Ningpo, October* 30, 1869.

IN obedience to the instructions conveyed in Circular No. 14 of Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, dated 15th September, 1869, I have the honour to forward direct to the Foreign Office, copies of the replies sent from Her Majesty's Consul at this port, to Circulars Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12, of 6th July, and No. 13 of 12th August, all of which bear upon the Report which his Excellency is preparing on the Consular Establishment, and which will be referred to in his despatch to Lord Clarendon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY F. HOLT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 17.

Consul Fittock to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Ningpo, July* 30, 1869.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your despatch as above, I have the honour to furnish the information called for as regards the persons employed on this establishment:—

1. The Chinese Writer, salary 30 dollars per month, or 76*l.* 10*s.* per annum, and no other emolument; he is especially attached to the Chinese Department of the Consulate; his duty being to assist the Interpreter to transpose into Chinese the English text of despatches sent to the native authorities, the writing of notes, &c., on official business, and the general arrangement of the Chinese Department of the Consulate under the Interpreter's supervision. He must necessarily be a man of education; and the salary of the Writer on this establishment is the minimum rate at which a qualified person could be engaged.

2. The Linguist, salary 12 dollars a-month, or 30*l.* 12*s.* per annum. This person is the head of the staff of native servants; he acts as Interpreter in all cases where native witnesses, speaking only the local patois, have to be examined; he has to see to the petty expenditure of the offices, under the instructions of the Consul; and in every respect he is a very necessary public servant. The present holder of the place at Ningpo has been attached to the Consulate over six years, and he is under, rather than over paid.

The rest of the establishment consists of:—

The Constable, wages 50 dollars per month, or 127*l.* 10*s.* per annum. The present incumbent is a British subject, born in Penang, but of Portuguese extraction; he has held the post over six years; he is a married man, steady and sober; he has to perform the functions of Gaoler in addition to those of Constable; and the only emoluments he gets in addition to his pay and quarters, are an occasional dollar for service of a civil process; but as there is very little litigation at the port, his profits from this source are trifling in the extreme.

Three Office Messengers, wages 9 dollars 50 cents, 6 dollars 25 cents, and 6 dollars respectively. These servants wear the native official dress, without which they would not obtain ready access to the different yamêns (native bureaus). With the exception of the summer and winter cap, they find their own dresses. Their employment is to attend the

Consul when paying official visits; attend the office during office hours, and to do the outside business of the Consulate, taking out notifications, despatches to the authorities, &c. Their position as employés of the Consulate is recognized by natives and foreigners; and their rate of wages is the minimum at which persons of their class can be hired.

The Office Coolie, employed also as occasional Messenger, wages, 5 dollars per mensem; Garden Coolie, employed to keep premises free from weeds, attend to plants, &c., wages also 5 dollars a-month; a Porter, two Watchmen, and two Boatmen, at 5 dollars each a-month, complete the list of official servants; and I have no hesitation in saying, that the number is as small as is consistent with the requirements of the public service at the port.

The following particulars will enable the Accountant of Her Majesty's Legation to furnish the Return called for by Lord Clarendon, so far as this port is concerned, showing the number of British subjects, &c., confined in the Consulate gaol during the year year 1868:—

No. of Prisoners.	Class.	No. of Days.
8	Europeans ..	115 (Average, 14)

In conclusion, I believe it only remains for me to state, in order to complete the information called for, that with the exception of the 70*l.* paid to Dr. Meadows as Consular Surgeon, no public money was expended at this Consulate for medical assistance during the year 1868.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. FITTOCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 17.

Consul Fittock to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Ningpo, July* 30, 1869.

WITH reference to your Circular despatch of the 6th instant, I have the honour to furnish the information called for relative to the direct and indirect British trade at this port.

Ningpo has no direct trade with Great Britain, her supplies of British goods being obtained chiefly from Shanghae, which is, as you are aware, as much the depôt for the receipt and distribution of British merchandize to the northern ports, for circulation in the interior, as Hong Kong is the depôt whence the southern ports, as far as Foo-chow, draw their supplies.

As regards Ningpo I find, on referring to the Returns of Trade of last year, that the trade (*i.e.*, with Hong Kong and other Colonies) in imports, amounted to 604,471 taels, Chinese goods to 1,808,661 taels, whilst the whole imports are valued at 6,528,724 taels and I believe, of the total amount in round numbers, 4,000,000 taels may be taken as the representative value of British merchandize. Now, as with the exception of the 604,471 taels above referred to, being the estimated value of the British direct trade with Hong Kong and other British Colonies, the remainder must be taken as the approximate value of the British goods supplied to this market from the Shanghae depôt; and a corresponding amount therefore should, of course, be shown in the Table of British goods reshipped from that port during the past year.

Of the British merchandize received at Ningpo, the quantity re-exported is insignificant, the goods being required for actual consumption in the province of Che-kiang, or other districts in the interior.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. FITTOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 17.

Consul Fittock to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Ningpo, August* 10, 1869.

WITH reference to your Circular despatch of the 16th ultimo, I have the honour to furnish, as far as I am able, the information required by Lord Clarendon, as

regards the tendency of foreign trade in China to pass from the hands of British subjects into the hands of Chinese, my personal experience being confined to Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghae, and this port.

In the first place, I would respectfully submit that both before and since the time the exclusive rights of the East India Company ceased to exist in 1834, with the exception of the direct imports and exports between China and foreign countries, the trade has virtually been in the hands of the Chinese; consequently it cannot well be assumed that it has only recently been passing into native control, that there appears to be no great analogy between the Greeks who have acquired the conduct of the trade in the Levant and the native merchants of this country, as the former would appear to be almost as much foreigners in Turkey as the British are here.

From 1844 to 1848 I was at Hong Kong or Canton, and the mode of conducting business there was much the same as I believe it is now; ships arrived laden with merchandize, they discharged at Hong Kong or Whampoa, and the goods were stored either in the Colony or in the native hongs at Honan (opposite to Canton): the first holders of the goods would be almost always British or foreign merchants, but directly a sale was effected to Chinese the further control of the goods vested in the native merchant. Up to the time of the destruction of the factories, Canton and Shanghae may be said to have been the chief depôts for the reception and distribution of foreign merchandize in China; since that event Hong Kong has become the principal depôt.

From 1850 to 1860 I was at Shanghae; the mercantile firms at that port were without exception, I believe, offshoots of the British and American establishments at Hong Kong and Canton, and the mode of conducting business was nearly identical in all three places: the transactions of the firm were negotiated through the Compradores; and to the expansion of this compradoric element, I believe, may be traced the present idiosyncracy of the trade to which Lord Clarendon's attention has been drawn.

So long as the foreign trade with China remained in the hands of the limited number of firms who succeeded the East India Company, the influence exercised upon trade by these compradores was not very remarkable, although it was always growing in importance; but from the time of the opening of the new ports, and the establishment of new firms in consequence, the compradoric system expanded enormously, and many of the new firms, in order to enable them to cope with the old-established ones, were induced to afford great facilities to their compradores; and to such an extent were these facilities afforded, that in some cases the nominal servants of firms have been known to carry on a larger business than their employers. Then, again, the expansion of trade at Hong Kong, Shanghae, &c., brought into existence a host of native brokers, who at first acted simply as agents, but in time these also developed into traders on their own account, and in my opinion at the present day there exists a most perniciously intimate alliance between these two classes of natives to the prejudice of foreign merchants.

For the past five years I have been at this port, and I have had several opportunities of noticing the intimate relation subsisting between compradores and their employers; the connection is frequently so close as to make it difficult to say where it ceases, as between master and servant, and either commences on the equality of partners, or the foreign merchant becomes the constituent of his compradore, by making shipments to Shanghae, Hong Kong, and other ports in China, and even to England on his own account and risk.

It was a rarity in former days for foreign merchants to enter into joint ventures with natives, but I believe at present throughout China the practice is quite common, and it is equally the custom for the native dealer to make shipments as above on his own account; and in this respect I think there can be no doubt of the growing tendency of the export trade to pass from foreign merchants into the hands of Chinese, but I do not consider there is a similar tendency as regards imports from foreign countries.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. FITTOCK.

Inclosure 4 in No. 17.

Consul Fittock to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Ningpo, July* 30, 1869.

WITH reference to your Circular despatch of the 6th instant, I have the honour to furnish the information called for as follows:—

Rent paid at Ningpo during the year 1868:—

	$	c.
Temporary Consulate	500	0
Bungalow, Interpreter's residence	840	0
Allowance for lodging, during occupation of bungalow as offices	135	0
Special, on account of Mr. Porter, while at Peking	9	0
	1,484	0
Insurance	Nil	
Repairs to buildings, incidental on temporary Consulate, paid by Major Crossman	224	95
From Consulate chest	15	40
	240	35
Furniture:—6 rattan chairs for office, at 1 dollar 50 cents	9	0

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. FITTOCK.

Inclosure 5 in No. 17.

Consul Fittock to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Ningpo, August* 20, 1869.

HAVING reference to your Circular despatch of the 12th instant, relative to the expenses of living, and the cost of necessaries, &c., at this port, I have the honour to furnish the following information in answer to various questions as directed.

1. As to the average market price of the principal articles of food:—

	$	c.		$	c.
Bread, per lb.	0	11	Flour, per lb.	0	9
Beef, ditto	0	10	Lard, ditto	0	35
Mutton, ditto	0	15	Fish, ditto	0	20
Rice, ditto	0	3	Butter, ditto	0	60
Potatoes, ditto	0	5	Salt, ditto	0	20
Vegetables, ditto	0	3	Mustard, ditto	0	50

2. Of fuel, coal, wood, charcoal, oil:—

	$	c.		$	c.
Coal, per ton	15	0	Oil, per lb. or pint	0	15
Wood, per 30 bundles	1	0	Charcoal, per 50 small baskets ..	10	0

3. Of servants' wages, and the native price of labour in other kinds of work:—

	$		$		$		$
Head servants	9	to	12	Horse boys	8	to	12
House servants	6		8	House coolies	5		7
Ohmahs	6		14	Gardeners	7		9
Washerman	8		20	Coolies	5		6
Cooks	8		12	House carpenters	30 c. a-day.		

Of house-rent, as regards foreign houses and the estimated rate of interest on cost. From 50 dollars to 150 dollars per mensem, probably 10 to 12 per cent. would be about the rate of interest on cost.

5. The usual charges for medical attendance and medicines by foreign practitioners, ordinarily 100 dollars per annum for married people; 50 dollars per annum for individuals, exclusive of medicines, which are always very expensive, say 25 dollars a year for each person.

6. Of chair and boat-hire, with a statement of the necessity of recourse to these at Ningpo.

Both are indispensable; the Consulate being situated about two miles from the Custom-house and foreign hongs in one direction, and about an equal distance from the official residence of the native authorities in the city in the other, and to get to the latter the river must be crossed.

7. The average rate of remuneration to clerks or assistants of different grades in banks and merchants houses, &c. The Customs establishment furnishes the best criterion at the port, as in all the other establishments, the assistants are boarded as well as lodged. The Commissioner of Customs receives 1,600*l.* a year, and is provided with a commodious house for his exclusive use; the assistants, 1,000*l.*, 800*l.*, 600*l.*, and 400*l.* a year, I believe, according to their class, with ample furnished quarters. Few clerks in mercantile houses at Ningpo depend solely upon their salaries, nearly all having a pecuniary interest in the business of the firm to which they belong; and, as these firms are only twelve in number,

and the export and import trade last year amounted to 16,000,000 dollars, their emoluments are no doubt considerable.

As to the importation of foreign stores, wine, beer, &c. This can no doubt be accomplished with advantage by those who reside at ports having direct trade with England; but I can answer, from personal experience, that where transhipments have to be made it scarcely pays; the second transport has to be effected in steamers, and the short journey from Shanghae to Ningpo costs half as much for freight as the transport from England to Shanghae, and the loss by breakage is sometimes more than doubled, without one being able to get any redress, as it is impossible to indicate exactly where or when the damage occurred. The storekeepers are able to avoid the steam-boat freight as they have luggers of their own running between the two ports, but it is not to their interest to carry stores, &c., for individuals whom they would otherwise supply. As a rule, oilmen's stores in Ningpo can be obtained at about the same rates as at Shanghae.

Having thus briefly answered the various questions contained in your Excellency's despatch, I think I cannot do better than furnish you with a specimen of the actual cost of living at the present day in Ningpo; as shown in my own household, which consists of myself, wife, and one child (three other children in England have to be provided for separately), and I believe my establishment is conducted on as economical a scale as is consistent with the social position I hold, and the requirements of foreigners in this country.

	Per Month. $
I employ a butler or head servant, at	14
Cook and assistant	14
Native nurse	12
House coolie	11
Groom stable boy	12
2 chair coolies, 10 dollars; washerman, 8 dollars	18
Total wages	81
And for maintenance, an average—	
Bread (3 loaves a-day) 10 dollars; meat, 35 dollars	45
Fish, poultry, milk, eggs, &c.	25
Potatoes, and other vegetables	10
Oilmen's stores, and other condiments	20
Wine, beer, &c.	50
Coals, firewood, and charcoal	25
Oil and candles, 15 dollars; cost of 2 ponies, 12 dollars	27
Medicines	5
	288

The above averages include cost of ordinary entertaining of residents or visitors, but do not of course embrace the cost of any special entertainments; nor is medical attendance included, this being provided for by Government.

I will now respectfully submit a few figures which, I think, will convince your Excellency that Her Majesty's Consul at this port would not be overpaid if the 100*l.* a year he now receives as a special allowance were added to the permanent salary of 900*l.* a year, even if the next incumbent of the post happened to be either a bachelor or a married man with a small family, as what he might be able to save would only very inadequately enable him to provide for the future, should he be without private means.

The figures to which I would refer are these:—

	Per Annum. £	£
Monthly expenditure, as shown above, 287 dollars per month, or 3,444 dollars per annum, which, at the Government rate of 4*s.* 3*d.* (and exchange seldom ranges above it at Ningpo), amounts to		732
Consul's salary	900	
Special allowance	100	
	1,000	
Less income tax	25	
		975
		243

Which amount, in my case, represents the yearly sum at my disposal to provide for the maintenance and education of three children in England (where they must of necessity be kept, there being no schools in this country at which they could be placed); furniture, dress, and all other necessaries. A portion of this sum should also be set aside as a provision (by insurance or otherwise) for my wife and family in case of my death; for, as

your Excellency is aware, if a Consular officer dies, either in or out of harness, after any length of service, the Superannuation Act makes no provision for widow or children, or orphan children, and if the officer is in receipt of a pension at the time of his death, it dies with him, cases being of frequent occurrence where the widow and children are left all but destitute.

I could myself cite several such cases, but deem it needless to intrude them on your notice. I may further remark, that so far as I know, members of the Civil Service possess far fewer facilities for getting their children educated at a moderate cost than either naval, military, or professional men; and this, I submit, should also be taken into consideration in fixing the salaries of the former, as well as the actual cost of living, and of the necessaries of life in the country in which they may be stationed, together with the probable climatic effects on health, and the privations to which every one is subjected by a lengthened residence abroad.

I trust the foregoing statement of facts will enable your Excellency to furnish Her Majesty's Government with the requisite information as regards the cost of living at this port. For my own part, I respectfully submit that, as the cost of maintenance and servants is never likely to be less than at present, it is more a question of salaries than of special and exceptional allowances, both as regards the Consul and the Consular staff.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. FITTOCK.

No. 18.

Vice-Consul Gregory to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received January 16, 1870.*)

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Tamsuy, Formosa, November 17, 1869.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 6 of the 30th ultimo, I have now the honour to inclose copy of a despatch addressed by me to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, No. 16, dated the 15th instant, conveying information regarding the cost of living at this port, and being in reply to a Circular from the Minister.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. GREGORY.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Vice-Consul Gregory to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Tamsuy, November 15, 1869.*

I HAVE now the honour to reply to your Excellency's Circular of the 12th of August last, calling for information concerning the cost of living at this port.

1. *Articles of Food.*—The following have been given me by my Linguist as an average or ordinary prices:—

Article.	Price.	The same in British denomination.
	$ c.	s. d.
Rice	2 20 per bag	5 7½ per cwt.
Wheaten flour (Chinese)	5 0 per picul	18 7 „
Sweet potatoes	0 45 „	1 8 „
Beef	0 7 per lb.	0 3¾ per lb.
Pork (fat)	0 10 per catty	0 4 „
Goat, mutton	0 12 „	0 5 „
Geese	0 50 each	2 1½ each
Ducks	0 25 „	1 0¾ „
Fowls	0 10 per catty	0 4 per lb.
Hen's eggs	1 0 for 105	4 0½ per 100
Fish (soles)	0 11 per catty	0 4½ per lb.
„ (other)	0 9 „	0 3½ „
„ „	0 7½ „	0 3 „
Sugar candy (used for white sugar)	11 50 per picul	0 4½ „

The following is a list of prices at which a Chinese ship's Compradore offered to supply vessels under date 1st January, 1867:—

Article.	Price.	The same in British denomination.
	$ c.	s. d.
Buffalo beef	0 4½ per lb.	0 2 per lb.
Goat mutton	0 8 „	0 4 „
Pork	0 10 „	0 5 „
Fish	0 7 „	0 3½ „
Geese	0 8 „	0 4 „
Ducks	0 10 „	0 5 „
Fowls	2 60 per doz.	11 0½ per doz.
Eggs	1 0 per 100	4 3 per 100
Fruit	0 2 per lb.	0 1 per lb.
Vegetables	0 2 „	0 1 „

The following are prices at which a European offered to supply provisions to a vessel of war in June last:—

Article.	Price.	The same in British denomination.
	$ c.	s. d.
Bread	0 8½ per lb.	0 4½ per lb.
Beef	0 8 „	0 4 „
Pork	0 9 „	0 4½ „
Vegetables	0 2½ „	0 1¼ „
Fish	0 8 „	0 4 „
Fruit	0 4 „	0 2 „
	Cash	
Hen's eggs	14 each	4 11½ per 100
Duck's eggs	11 „	3 11 „
	$ c.	
Fowls*	1 0 per 9 lbs.	0 5¾ per lb.
Ducks*	1 0 „	0 5¾ „
Geese*	0 50 each	2 1½ each

For American flour I pay slightly over 3*d.* per lb. The bread-making and baking is done by my own people.

The European, or rather American, potato, is not for sale in the market. We get potatoes from ships or otherwise, as chance may serve. What I have now in consumption, which are very poor, are reported to have cost 3 dollars 50 cents for 155 catties, or about 8*s.* 4*d.* per cwt.

Milk (not an article of Chinese consumption), is supplied at about 9*d.* per quart.

2. *Fuel, &c.*—Coal (superior native, excellent for a parlour fire), 27 cents per picul, or about 1*l.* per ton. Cheaper at Kelung.

Firewood, 20 cents per picul, or about 9*d.* per cwt.

Charcoal, 62½ cents per picul, or 2*s.* 4*d.* per cwt.

Lamp-oil (from the ground-nut, or pea-nut), about 8⅓ cents per catty, or 2*s.* 6*d.* per gallon.

3. *Servants' Wages.*—I pay as follows:—

	Month. $		Year. £ s.
Head boy, or "Butler"	10	or	25 10
Little boy	2		5 2
Cook	7		17 17
Coolie	5		12 15
Ditto	5		12 15
Gardener	5		12 15

These are board-wages; they are suppo-ed to provide their own food. I regard the rates as liberal, but not extravagant; they are more than servants would get in a poor or middle-class Chinese household; but probably less on the average than they would get in a considerable Mandarin's establishment.

For washing I pay a composition of 40 dollars a-month (10*l.* 4*s.* a-year).

For occasional work (bricklayers, &c.), the following rates have become customary:—For an artisan, 33⅓ cents, or 1*s.* 5*d.* per day. For a labourer or assistant, 25 cents, or 1*s.* 0¾*d.* per day. The Chinese obtain workmen at somewhat cheaper rates.

* Either alive, or plucked and dressed.

4. *House Rent* as regards foreign houses. No foreign houses are rented here. As regards Chinese houses rented to foreigners, the rent is high, considering the poorness of the houses; and in some cases, no doubt, foreigners have been greatly overcharged. I cannot give any estimate of the proportion which such rent bears to the cost of building. It would unavoidably be high, because of (1) the high rate of interest, and (2) the short duration of the house, resulting from the poorness of its construction, and from the liability to fire, earthquakes, typhoons, white ants, &c.

5. *Medical Attendance and Medicines.*—We have at present no resident practitioner; but a medical gentleman has been engaged from home, and will probably arrive before the end of this month. (He has been very much needed here of late. Of the Vice-Consular staff, and my own servants, at least five or six are either sick at present, and have been so, more or less, within the last few days.) A mercantile resident has guaranteed him 2,500 dollars (531*l.* 5*s.*), as minimum of gross annual receipts for three years. There was also an advance for passage expenses. I shall aid with a regular contribution, officially or privately: I do not yet know the amount. In the summer of 1867, a medical practitioner was here for a few weeks. I paid him a subscription of 5*l.* 6*s.* 3*d.* (*i.e.* 25 dollars) per month. In 1868, in my absence, a similar subscription was paid on Government account to another practitioner, who was here for about a year; this was for "medical attendance on the officers and employés," not including, apparently, prisoners or distressed seamen; and not including charges for medicines supplied. I do not know what the charge for medicines supplied to patients would be. The following are the charges for some medicines which a naval surgeon kindly obtained for me from a practitioner af Foo-chow:—

	$	£	*s.*	*d.*
1 oz. bottle of quinine	5	or 1	1	3
1 bottle (about 1½ pint) of castor oil	1	0	4	3

6. *Chair and Boat Hire.*—A few rates have become in a manner established. We pay 12*s.* 9*d.* (3 dollars) for a boat (with two boatmen, taking two or three passengers and baggage, if required), from this place up the river to Liang-kha, the landing-place for Kelung; the distance may be estimated at thirty-five miles; the time taken may average fifteen or sixteen hours. The return journey, down the river, costs 8*s.* 6*d.* (2 dollars), and is done in about twelve hours. I have heard of boats being got at cheaper rates, but my information on this subject is somewhat conflicting. A chair with three men, too or from Kelung, costs 12*s.* 9*d.* (3 dollars) in fine weather, and the journey takes about twelve hours. A boat to Bangka and back, say twenty miles, costs 4*s.* 3*d.* (1 dollar). My office writer pays 17*s.* (4 dollars) per month for a chair and two bearers to and from office daily; the distance from his residence is rather over half a mile of bad road.

The necessity of recourse to boats and chairs at this port, in the ordinary routine of life as it goes on at present, is, I think, less than at other ports with which I am acquainted. I do not myself keep chair-coolies, nor do I often use a chair. The hiring of boats for ordinary purposes about the harbour is usually rendered unnecessary by the existence of the office boat and crew. There are, however, occasional cases, as journeys to Kelung or to Bangka, when boat or chair hire is needed on perhaps a larger scale than at most ports.

As regards the uncertainty of travelling here, if one trusts to occasional or hired conveyances, the following incidents may have some interest:—Late in the afternoon of the 19th of July last, I had occasion to leave for Kelung. The wind (a strong south-easter) being very unfavourable for boats, I endeavoured to get a chair to Sikkow, but was informed that coolies were not to be obtained,—they declined to start in such a wind. I, therefore, started on foot, taking an attendant and two coolies with baggage and provisions. Having slept at the house of a Chinese gentleman at Pa-chie-na, and thence proceeded in a boat without difficulty to Chuy-tang-kha, where the rapids begin, I there tried to get a chair with three bearers to Kelung, but was told by my attendant that 3 dollars (12*s.* 9*d.*) was demanded, since I was to be the passenger, though he himself would have been conveyed for about a third of the sum. I declined to pay; went on some distance in the boat, then (to avoid delay with the rapids) walked on in the heat of a July day to Liang-ka, and there got a chair to Kelung, arriving much exhausted and considerably after my time.

7. *The Rate of Remuneration to Clerks in Mercantile Houses, &c.*—Of this I can give no information. In so small a community the matter is too personal for inquiry, indeed, there is scarcely a regularly trained mercantile clerk here.

8. *Freight and Insurance on Stores, Liquors, &c., from Home.*—I give the following instance:—Of twelve packages shipped for me in London, per "Falcon" for Hong Kong, in November, 1868. The goods were as follows:—

		£	s.	d.
9 cases and 2 casks	Wine, oilman's stores, &c., invoice value	45	7	10
	With which were packed stationery, &c., value . ..	2	10	0
	Mineralogical collection	5	5	0
1 case	Harmonium, value	7	14	6
Total 12 packages	Total	60	17	4

My London agent's charges on the above were as follows :—

	£	s.	d.
Customs charges, dock dues, &c.	0	6	6
Cartage to docks, for 1 case	0	4	6
Freight (to Hong Kong) 3*l.* 1*s.* 2*d.*; primage, 3*s.* 1*d.*	3	4	3
Insurance to Tamsuy, 80*l.* at 50*s.*, 2*l.*; stamp, 3*d.*	2	0	3
Bill of lading and postages	0	10	0
Commission on 45*l.* 7*s.* 10*d.*, at 5 per cent.	2	5	5
	8	10	11
And the freight per steamer from Hong Kong to Tamsuy (including Hong Kong charges, if any) was 13 dollars 25 cents, or	2	16	4

Striking out the doubtful item of "cartage," this gives us 11*l.* 2*s.* 9*d.* charges on a value of 60*l.* 17*s.* 4*d.*, or rather over 18 per cent. To this must be added something for petty purloinings of liquor on board ship or elsewhere, consequent loosening of packing and breakage of bottles, possible spoiling of some articles, &c.

But a greater evil is that which arises from the purchaser not being on the spot, and not being able to select the precise thing that he wants, and to see for himself that his business is done properly. Some years ago I got out some books (writing direct to a book-selling house); I ordered them to be bound or half-bound in russia; this was done, but the lettering of the titles on many of the volumes war blundered in an annoying way; Mrs. Browning's poems, for instance, appeared as "Browning's" poems, and there were even more glaring errors. In regard to miscellaneous articles the same trouble may arise, though perhaps not so conspiciously.

Where good local stores or shops exist, they are likely to be used to some extent, though their prices may be high. When a man sees ready to hand the exact thing that he wants, he is very likely to buy it at once, rather than save a few shillings by writing home for it, at the cost of half a year's delay and of some uncertainty as to getting the exact thing.

I beg permission to add a few general remarks.

The prices which I have mentioned for articles of food, &c., may seem (notwithstanding some notable exceptions) to be on the whole rather cheap than dear. Yet Tamsuy is not found to be a cheap place of residence for a Consular officer. The same thing probably occurs at other ports. I venture to suggest the following considerations as aids to an explanation.

(1.) The inferior quality of some articles as compared with the articles known in *England* under the same names. Tamsuy native pork is not approved by Europeans. To get good pork one must keep pigs, and they should be of foreign or mixed breed. Mutton (of sheep) is not to be bought; nor are sheep kept here; but one may import sheep from the North, or perhaps buy them from a vessel. Indeed, few of the articles of the market, except fish, poultry, rice, and fruit, are very acceptable to Europeans.

(2.) There is a want of domestic economy, which is to a large extent unavoidable. In most houses there is no housewife.

(3.) We live in our own way, not in that of the people around us. Such a course must be expensive; yet it must for various reasons be continued.

(4.) Certain expenses not included in housekeeping are heavy. Let me instance newspapers.

	£	s.	d.
The "Overland Mail" costs, per annum	1	19	0
The "London and China Express," ditto	2	14	0
The "Hong Kong Daily Press," ditto, 30 dollars, or	6	7	6

Travelling too is expensive. To be carried in a chair by two or more men along rough and tortuous paths, is a costly as well as slow mode of progression. From this place to the city of Taiwan is about as far as from London to York; the journey takes about eight or nine days, and the cost, merely for a chair with three bearers and one coolie carrying baggage, would be about 5*l.* 10*s.* or 6*l.* (*i.e.*, 26 or 28 dollars), or perhaps more. Passages by the coast-steamers are dear, doubtless not without reason; 6*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.* (*i.e.*, 30 dollars)

was charged in 1866 for a cabin passage from here to Foo-chow, about 140 miles. From Hongkong to Foo-chow, rather more than 500 miles, the charge is, or was lately, 12*l.* 15*s.* (*i.e.*, 60 dollars). These rates indeed include liquors, &c., but the payment still is large.

(5.) There is our inability, especially at the smallest ports, to use the practice of association, by which so much is done at home; and there is the further impossibility of getting things when they are wanted. A resident in London, if he wants to see a book, can get it from a circulating library, or see it at the Museum. A resident at Tamsuy must purchase it for himself, or rather, ought to have it ready in his library, for he cannot get it from home without four or five months' delay.

Various other items of expense might be mentioned, such as interchange of civilities with Mandarins, and relief to the distressed (seamen or others), beyond the necessarily narrow limits of public alms. But I will not further trespass on your Excellency's attention.

Your, &c.
(Signed) WM. GREGORY.

No. 19.

Consul Fittock to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received January* 16, 1870.)

Sir, *Ningpo, November* 5, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an extract of my Report on the subject of direct trade between this port and Great Britain, and a copy of my covering despatch to his Excellency, explanatory of the documents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. FITTOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 19.

Consul Fittock to Sir R. Alcock.

(Extract.) *Ningpo, July* 30, 1869.

NINGPO has no direct trade with Great Britain, her supplies of British goods being obtained chiefly from Shanghae, which is, as you are aware, as much the depôt for the receipt and distribution of British merchandize to the northern ports, for circulation in the interior, as Hong Kong is the depôt whence the southern ports as far as Foo-chow draws their supplies.

As regards Ningpo, I find, on referring to the Returns of trade of last year, that the direct trade (*i.e.*, with Hong Kong and other Colonies) in imports amounted to 604,471 taels. Chinese goods to 1,808,661 taels, whilst the whole imports are valued at 6,528,724 taels; and, I believe, of the total amount in round numbers, 4,000,000 taels may be taken as the representative value of British merchandize. Now, as with the exception of the 604,471 taels above referred to, being the estimated value of the direct trade with Hong Kong and other British Colonies, the remainder must be taken as the approximate value of the British goods supplied to this market from the Shanghae depôt, and a corresponding amount, therefore, should of course be shown in the Table of British goods re-shipped from that port during the past year.

Of the British merchandize received at Ningpo, the quantity re-exported is insignificant, the goods being required for actual consumption in the province of Che-kiang and other districts in the interior.

Inclosure 2 in No. 19.

Consul Fittock to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Ningpo, November* 5, 1869.

IN accordance with your instructions conveyed in despatch of 27th September, I have the honour to transmit herewith the Return called for of fees received at this Consulate during the years 1859 to 1868, and the number of British subjects who were registered during the same period.

Ningpo has no direct trade with Great Britain, but sends tea, silk, and other produce to Shanghae to be shipped. The province also draws its supplies of British manufacture chiefly from the Shanghae market, as set forth in the extract from a special Report on the subject attached to Return now furnished.

According to the Customs Return of the annual value of the whole trade of each port in foreign goods, and in Chinese produce carried in foreign vessels for four years, the proportion appertaining to Ningpo is given thus:—

		Taels.	Taels.
1865.	Foreign goods imported	3,947,270	
	Chinese, ditto	2,242,363	
	Exports	5,081,457	
			11,271,090
1866.	Foreign goods imported	3,891,446	
	Chinese, ditto	2,262,419	
	Exports	6,432,297	
			12,586,162
1867.	Foreign goods imported	4,746,215	
	Chinese, ditto	1,984,741	
	Exports	5,832,585	
			12,563,541
1868.	Foreign goods imported	4,720,063	
	Chinese, ditto	1,808,661	
	Exports	6,070,721	
			12,599,445

Or, an average total annual value of about 4,000,000*l.* sterling, in round numbers.

Of this amount I consider that about 1,250,000*l.* may be taken as the approximate value of the British goods brought into port, and consumed in the province and other districts in the interior.

Of the 2,000,000*l.* sterling estimated value of the tea, silk, and other produce sent hence to Shanghae, I have no means of ascertaining how much finds its way to Great Britain from that port.

As directed, a copy of this despatch and its inclosures will be sent direct to the Foreign Office. My temporary absence on sick leave must be my excuse for not replying to your despatch earlier, as it arrived whilst I was away in the North.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. FITTOCK.

No. 20.

Consul Hughes to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received January* 24, 1870.)

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, November* 24, 1869.

IN conformity with verbal instructions received to-day from Sir Rutherford Alcock, I have the honour to forward copy of my despatch dated the 22nd instant, on the subject of the extra allowance to the Consul at this port.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. J. HUGHES.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Consul Hughes to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Kiu-kiang, November* 22, 1869.

REFERRING to your Excellency's despatches of the 6th July and of the 11th September, and Mr. Lay's replies of the 13th August and of the 25th September (Accountant's Department), I have the honour to lay before you the following brief statement, by way of appeal against the proposed withdrawal of the extra allowance granted to the Consul at this port.

In the first place, I beg to remind you that, in my case, the extra allowance, which is only 150*l.* a year, was not granted till April 1867, though for several years previously the cost of living here had been higher than at either Shanghae or Hankow, where extra allowance had been in force.

Personally, therefore, I have been in the receipt of such allowance for little more than one year, from April 1867 to the date of my departure for Europe on leave, 14th May, 1868.

Mr. Lay states in his despatch above referred to, that he having limited expenses, keeping the smallest establishment possible, and entertaining only when necessary, has been able to live on his acting pay, together with the allowance. And he thinks that, consequently, the salary given to the Consul is sufficient to meet his expenses. When there is no extra allowance, the officer holding a temporary appointment is expected to live on his acting pay. If Mr. Lay had been able to state that he had been able to do without the allowance, this might perhaps have been some argument against its continuance; but I respectfully submit that it is a mistake to suppose that the extra allowance is more required in the case of a *locum tenens*, who, knowing the temporary nature of his position, naturally avoids expenses which he would otherwise be forced to incur, than it is in the case of the actual incumbent. The pay of the one is almost invariably less than that of the other, but the fact that the junior can manage to live on the lower rate of pay is not a reason for reducing the proper salary attached to the office.

It is nearly nine years since I have been placed in charge of this port, and I venture to hope that I may be thought to have some claim for a higher rate of remuneration than that which was deemed sufficient for a Consul at a time when the cost of living was much less than it is at present. Mr. Lay, in his despatch mentions the fact that provisions such as beef, mutton, &c., are dearer here than at Hankow. Your Excellency is aware that all wines and all oilman's stores such as hams, cheese, butter, table salt, sauces, sugar, &c., have to be purchased either at Shanghae or in England, and that they are dearer than the cost of such articles at Shanghae by the charge for freight and other expenses from that port to Kiu-Kiang; so that, whether the position of the Consul here, in respect to his expenses, is compared with Shanghae or Hankow, my petition for a continuance of the extra allowance is one which I am sure your Excellency will regard as reasonable and deserving of your favourable consideration and support.

Your, &c.

(Signed) P. J. HUGHES.

CHINA. No. 3 (1870).

Reports on Consular Establishments in China: 1869.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1870.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CHINA. No. 1 (1872).

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

CIRCULAR OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

OF

FEBRUARY 9, 1871,

RELATING TO

MISSIONARIES.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1872.

LONDON:
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Correspondence respecting the Circular of the Chinese Government of February 9, 1871, relating to Missionaries.

No. 1.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, June 27, 1871.*

IN an interview which I yesterday had with the French Chargé d'Affaires, he spoke about the questions pending with the Chinese Government, and expressed a wish to know what were the opinions of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the late Chinese Circular respecting missionaries.

M. Gavard told me that, just as the United States had done, the French Government took great exception to that Circular, and that the pretensions put forward in it were inadmissible. He said that he feared from the conversation he had had with Mr. Hammond, that we took a favourable view of it.

I told M. Gavard that I could not pretend to think that the conduct of the French missionaries, stimulated by the highest and most laudable object, had been prudent in the interest of Christianity itself, and that the support which had been given by the Representatives of France to their pretensions was dangerous to the future relations of Europe with China; that I had always frankly communicated to the Government of France all the information I received from China on this subject; and that I certainly trusted that the French Government would consider what was to be done with calmness and moderation, and only after communication with other Governments; that I should be ready to go into the question of the Circular, as soon as he was able to tell me what were the views of his Government.

M. Gavard assented to the principle which I had laid down; but he denied that the facts justified the accusations. If they did so, the French Government would be the first to condemn them.

I asked M. Gavard whether he knew what had passed between his Government and the Chinese Envoy; but he said that he had received no information on the point.

No. 2.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 1, 1871.*

ON the 27th ultimo I informed your Excellency of what had passed at an interview which I had on the previous day with the French Chargé d'Affaires on the questions pending with the Chinese Government, and particularly with reference to the Chinese Circular respecting missionaries.

M. Gavard called upon me again yesterday when the same subject was touched upon. I observed to him that it was unnecessary to repeat what I had said on the previous occasion as to the importance which Her Majesty's Government attached to the French Government restraining their missionaries from doing things which, on account of the important objects which they had in view, appeared justifiable, but which seriously

endangered the relations of European Powers with China. But I said there were objectionable details in the Circular, and that I should be ready to communicate to him the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting the different Articles, if he received instructions from his Government to communicate theirs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 3.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(*Received July* 8.)

(Extract.) *Versailles, July* 6, 1871.

M. JULES FAVRE told me this afternoon that he thought the best mode of dealing with the late Chinese Circular respecting missionaries would be, that a collective answer, pointing out the particulars in which it was open to objection, should be made to it by the Powers to whom it had been addressed.

No. 4.

*Earl Granville to Mr. Pakenham.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 10, 1871.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, and for communication to the United States' Government, a draft of a despatch which Her Majesty's Government propose to address to Mr. Wade respecting the Circular of the Chinese Government on the subject of religious missions in China.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 5.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1871.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 6th of July, Her Majesty's Government will always be ready to join the Government of France in any representations which may conduce to the better regulation of the intercourse between China and the Treaty Powers, but on the present occasion it appears to them that, from the different nature of the Treaty provisions as affects the position of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries in China, it would be better that each nation should return a separate reply to the Circular; and they mean to address a despatch to Mr. Wade, of which the draft is inclosed for communication to the French Government.†

No. 6.

Mr. Wade to Earl Granville.—(*Received August* 15.)

(Extract.) *Peking, June* 8, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward your Lordship translations of a note or Memorandum addressed by the T'sung-li Yamên, in the first instance, to all foreign Representatives resident in Peking, and subsequently to those of all foreign Treaty Powers, of eight propositions appended to the Memorandum, and of a note addressed by the Minister Wensiang to Sir R. Alcock shortly before he left Peking in 1869.

The last was doubtless submitted by Sir R. Alcock to Lord Clarendon; but as I have been unable to find a translation of it in the archives, and as the Minister, Wên Siang, has again drawn attention to it, I have had a fresh translation of it made.

* Similar despatches were addressed to Mr. Petre and Sir A. Buchanan.

† See No. 9.

The note or Memorandum is, in the main, an expansion of the note to Sir R. Alcock.

Admitting that, so far as trade is concerned, the Treaties work well enough, the writer complains that their provisions fail entirely in the regulation of the missionary question; and that, through the unsatisfactory position of this, the whole question of foreign relations is affected.

The promiscuous enlistment of evil men as well as good by the Romish missionaries, and their advocacy of the claims advanced by these ill-conditioned converts, has made Romanism most unpopular; and the people at large do not distinguish between Romanist and Protestant, nor between foreigner and foreigner: not that Government has made no effort to instruct the people, but China is a large Empire.

The growing feeling against propagandism had long rendered the Government anxious before the Tien-tsin massacre; and now, although mandarins have been exiled, criminals executed, indemnities paid, Government still continues anxious, feeling that, if there are to be more such outbreaks, recurrence to such measures will be in each instance more difficult. How then about the future?

First, as to the past. The high officers both of China and of foreign countries have been sadly to blame for a hand-to-mouth policy in dealing with the missionary question. Foreigners ask and China concedes what will make things smooth for the moment. Foreigners also ask what is impracticable in order to place China in an *impasse*. The Chinese Government would have the missionaries all brought under the same control, as in other countries, amenable to the laws of the land, restrained from undue assumption of status and authority, and from acts that produce scandal (see Article II). There should be no mystery in what they do (this refers to the Orphelinats), and their conduct should in all respects conform to the doctrine they teach.

At present they constitute in China an *imperium in imperio;* and it is to be apprehended that their followers, seeing how the Tien-tsin massacre has been punished, will presume more than heretofore, and that of this will come an uprising of the people beyond the power of Government to control. The responsibility of foreign Governments will be great if they do not join China in devising precautionary measures.

This is the sum of the note. Appended to it is a Memorandum containing eight Articles, in which are set-forth various griefs, each Article being supplemented by a note purporting to supply evidence in support of the charge preferred.

Article 1 recommends the entire suppression of the foreign Orphelinats; if this be impossible, the exclusion of all but Christian children, in any case registration of the children, and free admission of their friends. The present secrecy of proceedings in the asylums provokes suspicion. The common people still believe in the removal of the children's hearts and eyes. These Orphelinats besides are really not wanted, for similar asylums abound in China.

Article 2 protests against the appearance of women in the same chapels as the men, and against the employment of female missionaries.

Article 3 assails the missionaries' independence of the laws, their assumption of power and position, their oppression of the people not Christian, their abuse of Confucianism, by which they exasperate the people.

It complains equally of the assumption of independence by the Christian congregations, their refusal to render certain service as subjects of the Empire, to pay revenue to Government, to pay rents to individuals. In all such refusals they are supported by their missionaries, who interfere in suits before the Courts. Betrothals also are repudiated by Christians, and their alienation of property produces family feuds.

Article 4 complains of the demands made for indemnity over and above the punishment of offenders, while Christians offending are withheld from justice by missionaries. Missionaries so offending should be required to undergo the same punishment as the offender, otherwise to leave the country. (See the note following this Article.)

Article 5 would regulate the use of their passports by the missionaries, prevent their transfer, and limit the area of the holder's movements, the penalty of disobedience being deportation.

Article 6 condemns the reception as converts of men whose characters cannot be guaranteed. Bad Christians should be expelled, and a return of all Christians should be periodically made.

In the note to this Article some instances are given of the admission of rebel leaders and other disreputable people into the Church, and of their subsequent lawless conduct, in one case quoted, apparently under missionary protection.

Article 7 denounces the abrogation by missionaries of official attributions in intercourse and correspondence. They should accept, it urges, the status of Chinese

literati in both. Cases are cited in the note of their assuming the use of seals, or titles, or forms of correspondence to which they had no right.

Article 8 and last deals with the restitution of property formerly belonging to Christians (and now claimed by the Church under Article VI of the Convention of 1860). Buildings are demanded back without reference to popular sympathies or prejudices; some that have passed through many hands since the Christians, the original proprietors, sold them; some that their purchasers have greatly improved. The missionaries will pay nothing, but, on the other hand, when a house they claim is in ruins, they seek to exact money for the repair of it.

Had it not been for the strong resemblance between the note addressed to Sir Rutherford Alcock and the memorandum now under review, I should have been disposed to regard the latter, to a certain extent, in the light of a defensive document, put forward in deprecation of any further demands that might be made on the score of the Tien-tsin massacre. This is, to a certain extent, its aim, but not, I am satisfied, its only aim. It is intended to be an exposé of a state of things that is sorely irritating the educated class who govern China, and an appeal to foreign Governments to unite in effecting some arrangements by which the causes that provoke this irritation may be controlled.

The papers, especially the supplement, are very badly put together. They contain some statements which will be easily contradicted, and some imputations which cannot be sustained; but, taken with the matter of many a long conversation on the same subject, to which I have listened in the last eight years, they strengthen my conviction that, to secure the missionary against the hostility of the lettered class, one of two courses must be pursued,—either the missionary must be supported, out and out, by the sword of the protecting Powers, or he must be placed by the protecting Powers under restrictions which, whilst leaving him always as much latitude of action as, if simply intent on Christianizing China, he is justified in desiring, will yet enable the Chinese Government to declare to those whose conservatism chafes at the present pretensions of the missionary that he, the missionary, is not authorized by the Power protecting him to put forward the pretensions objected to.

That the appeal of the Yamên is feebly drawn up I have already admitted, and I cannot say much for its candour. Its incompleteness, in my eyes, will be seen from the rejoinder I have drafted to the Grand Secretary Wên Siang, copy of which I inclose. In this I am obliged to impugn the correctness of some of his information, and especially to reject as insufficient the explanation attempted of the Tien-tsin massacre.

The passage, to my taste, the most offensive in the whole paper is that in which credit is taken for the decision of that case as satisfactory, so much too satisfactory that Christians may be emboldened by it to go greater lengths than heretofore.

The papers when first circulated appeared to the French exceedingly aggressive. I am not a convert to this view. The Chinese keep back, as might be expected of them, all reference to the barbarous persecution of converts and missionaries in various places, if not at the instigation of the mandarins, at any rate with their full knowledge of what was passing, and they have scanty data for some of their charges of missionary intervention and pretentiousness. But I do not believe that this appeal is an excuse for some blow that they know is about to be struck.

It is fair to add that, by the testimony of Romish missionaries in all directions, the Government is doing its best to prevent any collision with Christians. Three-fourths of the Romish missionaries in China, in all, between 400 and 500 persons, are French; and Romanism in the mouths of non-Christian Chinese, is as popularly termed the religion of the French as the religion of the Lord of Heaven.

A dread of Romish ascendancy, as I have more than once reported, I have heard very frequently allowed; and the fear that the ranks of the Romanists, recruited by all who wish to set their own Government at nought, will presently outnumber the well affected, or that the Romish community, without attaining such proportions, will throw itself for support upon the French, although it is not avowed in the Memorandum, is, in my belief, the suggesting cause of its production.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Memorandum of the Tsung-li Yamên upon the Missionary Question, circulated February 9, 1871.

(Translation.)

WHEN the Treaties between China and foreign countries were concluded, it was hoped that their provisions would prove of advantage to both parties, and of disadvantage to neither, and this for evermore. The experience of a series of years, however, has shown

not only that these provisions will not avail for all time, but that even now there are difficulties which they will not solve.

In trade, indeed, there is no cause of serious quarrel between native and foreigner, but connected with the missionary question there is a vast amount of mischief on the increase, the fact being that while propagandism* starts with the announcement that its object is the exhortation of people to virtue, Romanism† as propagated in China, has the effect of setting the people against it; and inasmuch as this is entirely the result of the unsuitableness of the *modus operandi* now in vogue, it is essential that there be devised, without loss of time, such remedial measures as will bring things back to a satisfactory condition.

The missionary question affects the whole question of pacific relations with foreign powers—the whole question of their trade. As the Minister addressed cannot but be well aware, wherever missionaries of the Romish profession appear, ill-feeling begins between them and the people, and for years past, in one case or another, points of all kinds on which they are at issue, have been presenting themselves. In earlier times when the Romish missionaries first came to China, styled, as they were, "Si Ju," the Scholars of the West, their converts no doubt for the most part were persons of good character; but, since the exchange of ratifications in 1860, the converts have in general not been of a moral class. The result has been that the religion that professes to exhort men to virtue has come to be thought lightly of; it is, in consequence, unpopular, and its unpopularity is greatly increased by the conduct of the converts who, relying on the influence of the the missionaries, oppress and take advantage of the common people (the non-Christians): and yet more by the conduct of the missionaries themselves, who, when collisions between Christians and the people occur, and the authorities are engaged in dealing with them, take part with the Christians, and uphold them in their opposition to the authorities. This undiscriminating enlistment of proselytes has gone so far that rebels and criminals of China, pettifoggers and mischief-makers, and such like, take refuge in the profession of Christianity, and covered by this position, create disorder. This has deeply dissatisfied the people, and their dissatisfaction long felt grows into animosity, and their animosity into deadly hostility. The populations of different localities are not aware that Protestantism and Romanism are distinct. They include both under the latter denomination. They do not know that there is any distinction between the nations of the West. They include them all under the one denomination of foreigners, and thus any serious collision that occurs equally compromises all foreigners in China. Even in the provinces not concerned, doubt and misgiving are certain to be largely generated. Under such circumstances, how is it possible but that there should be irritation, and that this should show itself in serious outbreaks? That creed is distinct from creed, and nationality from nationality, is a truth, and it is not that this truth has not been again and again the subject of injunction and exposition, but the inculcation of the truth of such things upon every one, house by house, and family by family, is scarcely possible.

During the ten years that the Prince and the Ministers have held office‡ the apprehension (that something of this sort would happen) has been to them a subject of anxiety from night to morning; and now, this year, at a moment's notice, did come this outbreak at Tien-tsin. The condemnation of the local authorities, the decapitation of the principals, and the payments for indemnity and reparation, have all been nearly arranged, but they cannot help continuing anxious, because, if measures like these are all that one can rely on for (the disposing of) quarrels between the people and the Christians, the oftener they are resorted to the greater will be the difficulty (of resorting to them), and outbreaks like this (of Tien-tsin) will recur, each more terrible than the preceding. While things present the aspect they now wear, how is it possible that there should be no future misunderstandings? Be it that the troubles connected with propagandism come of the resentment of the people roused at last to wrath? It is not the less a fact that the Christians have given them cause of exasperation. Allowing again that, with cases of the kind in the provinces, the local authorities have not always succeeded in dealing satisfactorily, it is not the less a fact that their failure is due to the course pursued by the high authorities, native and foreign, administering (international) questions. They well know that, in the arrangements affecting the missionaries and the Christians, there is much of incongruity (much that does not go smoothly); but they do not choose to take steps for the remedying of this; and when, one day or other, an affair comes suddenly upon them, all the foreign Government thinks of is the moment's comfort (some arrangement that will do for the time being); no regard is had to the question whether the people's feelings are for or against (what is required); the one thing to be done is to constrain them by force.

* "Chuan-chiao," propagation of the doctrine.

† "Tien-chu-chi," the doctrine of the Lord of Heaven.

‡ That is, since the establishment of the Yamên of Foreign Affairs in 1860.

The Chinese authorities, on their side, looking only to settlement somehow or other, are without an alternative.

Thus, both parties alike being set upon the adjustment *pro tempore* of what is before them, no thought on either side is bestowed upon (measures that will continue effectual) any length of time; and when a foreign Government is applied to, as on occasion it is, to inquire (with that of China) into the source and origin (of these misunderstandings), to the end that some means may be discovered of preventing them for all time to come, there is, alas, no disposition to discuss the matter in a spirit of equity. If there be a discussion, something utterly impracticable is proposed; and this is urged with violence in order that its non-adoption may be made an excuse for a dead-lock.

This is not that spirit of honesty in which international Agents should treat affairs.

The Prince and the Ministers are taking thought for the common interest in all its bearings. Greatly desiring that China and foreign nations should be well with each other, that peace should endure for evermore, they are bound to consider maturely what course it may be best to pursue. They humbly conceive that to enable the teachers of religion in the States of the West to live as they do in each other's countries without misunderstanding ever arising (between them and the natives of the country they adopt), there must be some suitable arrangement in virtue of which neither the teacher nor follower of the religion has it in his power to give trouble. They have been told that the teacher of religion, no matter what his nationality, if residing in a country not his own, conforms to the laws and usages of that country, and that he is not allowed to assume a status of independence, that he is strictly interdicted disobedience of the laws of the State, or the commands of the authorities, usurpation of power not belonging to him, or excessive use of power that does belong to him; injury of people's characters (or, creation of scandal) and tyrannical treatment of people; for that by such acts the suspicion of the people is provoked, and their animosity excited; all lawless doings, in short. Were this the course pursued in China, if before building religious establishments, and beginning to preach [the missionary] was to make certain of not producing a feeling of aversion and odium on the part of the gentry and people, there would be confidence (between the two parties), instead of suspicion; steps would then be taken that would make a long endurance of friendly understanding a possibility, and would prevent the destruction of establishments, and the abuse of the religion. And if the teachers of religion were to make the public well understand what they are engaged about as the business of their vocation; if they did nothing that was at issue with the doctrine they teach; if, farther, they would not let their converts instigate them to meddle with the public business of the locality, and to do acts of violence and oppression on the strength of their position, acts such as move the gentry and people to wrath and hatred; if missionaries would conduct themselves in this manner, the people would be on good terms with them, the authorities could protect them. The course pursued by the missionaries who now come to China is at variance in every particular with any that the Prince and Ministers have ever understood (to be sanctioned by their religion); and being, as they are, just like an infinite number of independent rival States in the heart of another State, is it possible that, however much they may desire it, peace should be kept for ever unbroken between them (and the people among whom they may be), or that the authorities and people should be prevented uniting in feelings of anger and hatred against them?

The Prince and Ministers would guard against mischief before it becomes a fact, and what they seriously apprehend is this: that when the Tien-tsin case is closed, the Christians in different places, knowing no better, will be emboldened by it, and (so far from taking warning by what has occurred, will), on the contrary, allow themselves to swagger and bluster *ad libitum*; the dislike of the people will be intensified, and after due accumulation their wrath will burst forth at a day's warning; a great catastrophe will be the consequence of the effervescence; it will be beyond the control of the the local authorities, presently beyond the control of the Provincial Governments, and the Yamên of Foreign Affairs will be equally powerless. And if there be an unanimous rising of the Chinese people, His Majesty our Emperor may send Special Commissioners, or may set troops in motion in all parts of the Empire; but the whole population cannot be put to death. Their anger, besides, once roused, we must be prepared for the refusal of the people to bow the head and submit to death. But when it comes to this that the damage is past help, and the Governments, Chinese and foreign, notwithstanding their desire, in that they are at peace, to preserve the common interest from harm, are without a means to that end, a charge will lie at the door of the international agents of both, from which they cannot excuse themselves.

To sum up: whether in China or in any other country, it is essential that action taken be in accord with popular feeling. If it be not so in accord, and the popular feeling be

violently overborne, there is sure to be in the long run a popular convulsion. There are occasions in which orders, though they be the orders of the Government, will not be obeyed.

If the Diplomatic Agents of China and foreign countries, upon whom the responsibility rests, are utterly without [counsels that may] supply [what is wanting], and rescue [what is imperilled from danger]; if they are to sit still looking on at the people of China and the mercantile communities of different nations in a most critical position, unable to suggest any course of action that shall serve its purpose [in the matter under discussion], it will come to pass by-and-by that in no public matter of common interest will a satisfactory course of action be possible. The Prince and the Ministers desiring to preserve inviolate the friendly relations of China with other nations, are earnestly set upon discovering some means of remedying [the mischief here considered], and to this end they have drawn up eight Articles (or Rules), copy of which they forward for the perusal of the Minister addressed.

They are sending a copy to each of the Representatives. This is addressed to Mr. Wade, who they hope will examine it.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Eight Propositions appended to the Yamên's Memorandum on the Missionary Question.

(Translation.)

1. THE practice of taking young children into the missionary (or Christian) "yü-ying-t'ang" (infant asylums) without giving notice to the authorities has invested the proceeding with an air of mystery, the result of which is the generation of suspicion, out of the fermentation consequent on which come acts (or feelings) of hostility. It would be best to break up all these foreign asylums in order to the prevention of misgiving; but if their suppression be impossible, the admissions into the Christian asylums might be limited to the children of Christian parents unable to take care of them. Notice ought in any case to be given to the authorities, that they might place it on record on what day [any child] was taken in, who the child was, and when it was taken away again; also what person, if any, was authorized, on giving security, to adopt it; so that a means might be known to exist of ascertaining the facts. Children not belonging to Christian families it will be the duty of the Provincial Governments of China to direct the local authorities of their jurisdictions to choose members of the lettered class to deal with.

Thus each party (the Christian and the non-Christian) would do its own good work, and beginnings of suspicion would be prevented.

[*Original note on the above.*]—By the rule affecting Chinese infant asylums, the history of every child as it comes in and goes out of the asylum is known; it is reported to the authorities. After the child is admitted, its parents are enabled to visit it. As it grows up it may either be adopted by some childless person, security being given, or the family which entered it may take it back. Whatever may be the persuasion [in which it was born] to that persuasion it returns. The children being, withal, charitably taken care of in the asylums their reception into them is consequently a charitable work.

The way of managing children's asylums in foreign countries is understood to be much the same as that under the Chinese system: but the peculiar system under which, in China, foreign asylums are managed, the admission of children without inquiry as to their history, the absence of all notice to the authorities, the refusal of permission to persons to adopt the children or to take them back, or to their families to visit them, inevitably produce suspicion on the part of the people.

Thus, in the Tien-tsin affair, it has been represented to the Throne, no doubt, that the hearts or eyes of children had not in any case been taken out (as was alleged), but the people's doubts are not for all that entirely removed. Their mouths may be closed, but they do not surrender their convictions, and there is no saying that their misgivings may not at some future time again be productive of hostility. If all the foreign infant asylums were broken up, and [the foreigner] were to do his work of charity in his own country, the saving and bringing up of Chinese children, whether Christians or not, would devolve upon China. There is a large number of establishments for this purpose in every province of China. What occasion is there, then, for the intervention of foreign nations in a fashion which renders a proceeding in the interest of charity a cause of suspicion and indignation? It were far better that each party should do its own work of charity. This would be the surest way of preventing mischief for all time to come.

2. Women should under no circumstances be admitted into the chapels (or establishments), nor should female missionaries be allowed in China: this to show a sense of decorum on the part of the Christians, and to prevent criticism of their proceedings as extraordinary, on the part of the Chinese.

[*Original Note.*]—To China the highest importance is attached to good fame (or, to the decorum which insures it), and to modest deportment. The men and women have no immediate intercourse with each other; their apartments are separated, and the line of demarcation between them is very strictly observed (or, insisted upon). Since the relaxation of the restrictions affecting Romanism, people have heard, to their surprise, that women go into the chapels, and the fact that the sexes are not kept apart, and that they remain a long time in the chapels, produces a tendency on the part of the people to hold them cheap, and to suspect that their religion is a pretence to cover indecorous (or immoral) practices.

3. Missionaries residing in China should be amenable to Chinese law and usages. They should not be allowed an independent position. They should not be allowed to disobey the laws of the State, or the orders of the officials; to assume authority that does not belong to them, or to overstep the limits of the authority that does belong to them; to cause scandal to reputations, or to oppress the people, thereby producing suspicion, and provoking the multitude to anger. Neither should they exasperate the people by reviling Confucianism. All missionaries ought to be under the control of the local authorities; and Chinese Christians should in every respect be on the same footing as ordinary Chinese. They should be exempted, according to the rules [in force] from contributing to theatrical entertainments, and processions (or gatherings); but they ought not to be more exempt [than any other Chinese], from corvées, or the public obligations of the locality. Still less should they presume upon their religious profession to evade full payment either of the regular revenue, or of rent due to the landlords of their holdings; neither should they be upheld by their missionaries in their refusal to pay.

The administration of justice, in cases in which Christians and non-Christians are both interested, should be always left to the local authorities; the missionaries should not put themselves forward to fight their battles, neither should they keep Christians, whether plaintiff or defendant, from appearing in the Courts, to the embarrassment of the parties in the case.

When a missionary takes on himself to interfere, the local authorities should send up the letter of the missionary, or report his language, if his appeal was made in person, to the high authorities of the province, and these should communicate with the Yamên; and the missionary should be sent back to his own country. Chinese Christians [on the other hand], if, in law-suits affecting marriages, land questions, or the like, they attempt to take advantage of their status [as Christians], and try to get the missionaries to plead for them, should be severely punished by the local authorities.

[*Original Note.*]—In China there are adherents to the doctrine of Confucius, also to that of Buddha, and to that of Tao, [but all are alike obedient to the law of the land]. The Lamas, for instance, although not Chinese, in all cases conform obediently to the laws of China. The local authorities dispose of all questions and cases [in which they are parties].

It is understood that [abroad] foreign missionaries when residing in other countries than their own, are in every case amenable to the laws and customs of that country. They are not permitted to assume a status of independence, and to violate the laws of the country and commands of the constituted authorities; to arrogate to themselves the authority [of officials], or to overstep the limits of their own powers; to cause scandal to reputations, and tyrannize over and ill-treat the people, thereby exciting popular suspicions, and calling forth general hatred and indignation.

Missionaries in China ought in like manner, when in the practice of their calling, to submit to the jurisdiction of the local authorities. Instead of doing so they go beyond all bounds in assuming an attitude of arrogant importance, and of overbearing resistance to the authorities.

Native Christians again are Chinese subjects, and it is still more incumbent on them to be well-behaved, and to be in every respect like the ordinary subjects of the country. Whether in the towns or in the country they ought to be on good terms and act in harmony with their neighbours. But far from doing so, when [for instance] a district is called on to contribute [either money or services] for a public purpose, or when a fund has to be collected in a neighbourhood for a common object, they seek to excuse themselves from contributing by pleading their religion. When they thus take the lead in isolating themselves, how can others help regarding them as isolated? They even go so far as to

refuse the payment of taxes, and to resist the officers of justice. They coerce the authorities, and cheat and oppress the people. And the foreign missionaries, without inquiring into facts, conceal in every case the Christian evil-doer, and refuse to surrender him to the authorities for punishment. It has even occurred that malefactors who have been guilty of the gravest crimes have thrown themselves into the profession of Christianity, and have been at once accepted and screened [from justice]. In every province do the foreign missionaries interfere at the offices of the local authorities in lawsuits in which native Christians are concerned. For example, in a case that occurred in Sze-chuen in which some native Christian women defrauded certain persons [non-Christians] of the rent owing to them, and actually had these persons wounded and killed, the French Bishop took on himself to write in official form [to the authorities] pleading in their favour. None of these women were sentenced to forfeit life for life taken, and the resentment of the people of Sze-chuen in consequence remains unabated.

In Kwei-chow, native Christians, whenever they have a law-suit, of whatever kind it may be, invariably state in their plaint that they are Christians; and they do so in the hope of thereby gaining their case. The evils that result from such a practice are easily seen.

It happens frequently in the provinces that, if after a betrothal has taken place between two families, one of the families becomes Christian, while the other remains non-Christian, the non-Christian family is at once compelled to break off the marriage engagement.

Again, it may happen that the father or elder brother in a family becomes a Christian, while the sons or younger brothers remain non-Christians. The father or elder brother will at once file a petition in the courts, charging the son or younger brother with disobedience, and will be supported and assisted in this action by the missionary. These, and numberless proceedings of the same kind, have roused the deepest popular resentment.

4. Where Chinese and foreigners live together in the same locality, the law must be impartially administered.

In cases of homicide, the penalty being a life for a life, Chinese subjects ought to be dealt with according to Chinese law, and foreigners according to foreign law.* This would satisfy popular feeling.

In every case, whether dealt with by Chinese or foreign officials, the penalty to be undergone should be awarded with reference to the case itself, and no claim for pecuniary compensation over and above the punishment of the criminal concerned should be brought forward. Still less should it be permitted the [missionaries] to go beyond the criminals concerned; and by insisting on the complicity of members of the gentry, or of the mercantile class, to compel innocent persons to pay indemnity. In cases between converts and non-converts that come before the local authorities, whichever party may be found to be the aggressors, in awarding the punishment to be inflicted there ought to be no undue severity on either side.

Should the character of a convert be of a generally lawless character, and the knowledge of his conduct reach the local authorities, whether by special inquiry or by a complaint lodged [said convert] should submit to be arrested, and dealt with according to law. His missionary should not be permitted to protect or conceal him. Should there be attempts to protect him, or to resist the summons of the local authority, the offender must still be punished as the law lays down; and, in addition, the missionary attempting to protect and to resist the local authority, should be required to undergo the same penalty as the offender himself, or in default of submission be withdrawn [from China] to his own country.

[*Original Note.*]—In the case of the missionary Fêng-Pi-Lo (Mabileau), killed in a collision in Sze-chuen in 1867, one Yan Lao-wu was arrested, tried, and executed; but the missionary Mei (Mihières) persisted in asserting that the gentry were the chief instigators [of the outrage], and forced the payment of 80,000 taels as compensation. The men engaged in that disturbance were all ignorant, indigent, common people. It was an affair which came to a head and broke out suddenly. But the proceedings of the missionaries, in requiring the payment by respectable, wealthy, well-behaved people, of a sum of money by way of compensation, has caused the deepest indignation.

Again, take the case of the missionary Li Kao (Rigaud) who was killed in a collision in Sze-chuen in 1869. The real cause of the affair was the repudiation of a betrothal at the instance of a native Christian, who insisted upon its repudiation. The Tartar General

* The writer means that the foreigner ought to be put to death.

Ch'ung, and the Governor-General, Li, were associated in dealing with the case. They arrested and executed Ho Ts'ai, a Chinese non-Christian, the principal in the murder of the missionary and native Christians, and sentenced one Liu-Fu to death by strangulation. But as regards the native Christians, Wang Hsiao-ting, Ch'ang Tien-hsing, and others, who have murdered poor non-Christians, and who are well known to be the leaders of a gang of evil-doers, who for years have been committing acts of extortion, rape, abduction, arson, and murder, though sentence has been passed upon them, they have never delivered themselves up.

Again, in the case of the Seu-to (sacristan), T'an Fu-Ch'ên, who at the head of a band [of assassins] killed Chao Yung-lin, and over 200 others, members of the local militia, the missionary Mei (Mihières), asserts that this offender has gone abroad, and that there are no means of punishing him; and the indignation and hatred of the people of Sze-chuen have been greatly increased in consequence.

5. The passports taken out by French missionaries, [authorizing them] to proceed to any province to preach and teach, should state distinctly and precisely the province and prefecture they propose going to. If the passport of a missionary states that he is to pursue his calling in a particular province, he should not be permitted on any false pretext to repair clandestinely to another province.

The name of the holder of a passport should be set forth thereon and he should not be permitted to transfer it at pleasure to another person.

The missionary should not be permitted to defraud the revenue by carrying dutiable goods through the barriers and Customs stations he may pass *en route*. On arrival in the province and prefecture for which he is bound, he should deliver up his passport for inspection at the yamên of the local authority. If, on examination, it be found that the holder and the locality do not correspond [with what is stated on the passport], or if the passport has been transferred to a native Christian who assumes therewith the status of a missionary, the passport should be cancelled; and if the transfer has been corruptly made for a money consideration, or if there are any other circumstances of illegality connected with the affair, the native who has illegally assumed the missionary status will be punished with severity, and the missionary should himself be expelled the country.

In regard to the names of the missionaries inserted in the passports, the name, as written in Chinese, must be taken as the real name, in order that the local [authorities] may be able to distinguish one from another. On the death of a missionary, or if he return to his native country, or if he change his calling and cease to be a missionary, his passport should be delivered up at once to be cancelled. In order to show the genuine desire [of the Chinese Government] to extend an efficient protection [to missionaries, it should be laid down that] no holder of passports will be permitted to go to districts in any province where there are rebels, and no passports issued for any province in which military operations are being carried on.

[*Original Note.*]—In a missionary case in Kwei-chow, there was mentioned one Chao, a missionary, but in the Missionary Passport Register for Kwei-chow, no such name was found. M. Deveria, the Interpreter [of the French Legation], wrote to say that he found, on reference to the old foreign register, that Chao Seu-to (sacristan) who had died of wounds he had received, had been called Chao by mistake, and was in reality the person who, under the name of Jui Lo-ssu, had taken out a passport on the 25th day of the 6th moon of the 4th year of T'ung Chih (16th August, 1865). Now it appears from the records that one Jui Lo-ssu did take out passport No. 325 on August 16, 1865, but he was proceeding to Sze-chuen, and in the Passport Register for Kwei-chow neither the name Chao nor Jui Lo-ssu occur. If such discrepancies and such interchanging of places and names as the foregoing is allowed, how is it possible to arrive at that knowledge of the truth which is necessary to the rendering of due protection? Again take the case of the missionary Lin Fu-chên (Paul Splingaert) who killed the Russian. Lin Fu-chên was at first a missionary, and afterwards became a servant in the Prussian Legation, but his passport was never returned to be cancelled. Should the document be transferred to another person, or should it fall into other hands, not only would the irregularity of falsely assuming an improper status unavoidably take place, but should it eventually reach the hands of a rebel, the resulting injury to the Government would be very serious, and it may be asked, "would the good name of the Christian Society not also be compromised?"

6. Since the missionaries have for their object the exhortation of men to virtue, it is their duty, before receiving any person into their society, to ascertain whether he has or has not been an offender against the law, [or whether he is a person] of bad character. [If he is found to be such as] can be received, let them receive them; if not, they ought

ot to receive him. In accordance with the law of China, providing that a return [of he inmates] of all temples shall be sent in to the headman of the district [to be entered by him] in a register [which he shall keep] for reference. A separate report ought to be made to the local authorities within a given time, of every man received into their sect, stating the year, month, and day of his reception, the place he comes from, and his means of subsistence up to that date. [They ought] further to [guarantee that the man is not an offender against the law, and that he has not changed his name, [that a note may be made of the same] for [future] reference; and if any man so received die or go away, they should in all cases immediately report. If, when a man is received into a sect, there be nothing against him, but if after his reception he commit a breach of the law; he should at once be expelled and, as in other cases [above detailed], a report be made.

Every month and every quarter a general return should be sent in to the local authorities for inspection, and those officers, in accordance with the law of China, [authorizing] the inspection of Buddhist nunneries and temples, the Taoist establishments should in the same manner pay a visit of inspection to the missionary establishments monthly and quarterly.

By this means the [good] name of the sect will be preserved unharmed, and peace will be preserved [between Christian and non-Christian].

[*Original Note*].—In the 5th year of T'ung Chih (1866), the Governor of Kwei-chow reported [the following] case:—

At Kuei-ting-hsien, Jan Shih-pao and others, followers of the rebels, had joined a society established by Yüan yü-hsiang and Hsia Chen-hsing, converts, and had made their Christianity a pretext for getting together a number of men, joined with whom they murdered two men, Wang-chiang-pao and Tso yin-shu, and wounded three others, taking all their money, household property, oxen, and horses.

Again, in the 8th year of T'ung Chih (1869), the Governor of Kwei-chow reported [the following] case:—

The whole prefecture of Tsun-i had sent in a petition complaining that Sung Yü-shan, T'ang Shen-hsien, T'an Yuan-shuai, and Chien Yüan-shai, *soi-disant* rebel generalissimos, had been received as converts, and that innumerable people in the towns and villages [of the Prefecture] had suffered injury at their hands.

Again: Yang Hsi-po, Liu K'ai-wên, Ch'ing Hsiao-ming, Ho Wen-chiu, Chao Wên-an, and others, all of whom were converts and people of disreputable families in the jurisdiction of Tsun-i, employed in the business of the religious establishments, were tyrannising over the orphans and the weak, and oppressing and extorting money from the simple villagers. They went in and out of the courts [as they pleased] and engrossed the management of [all] lawsuits. If any converts were non-suited (or lost their cause) Yang Hsi-po and the rest at once forced their way into the magistracy with a crowd of [their fellow-] converts and compelled the magistrate to alter his decision. If any convert was taken into custody they went at once with the foreign missionary's card, and requested his immediate release. They were very many cases of unlawful possession of men's wives and daughters and of property, and murder, and all such crimes.

7. Missionaries should obey the established laws (or respect the dignity) of China; in this they ought not to transgress, be it ever so little. They have no right to use official seals or to attempt official correspondence with Yamêns, large or small, in the form arguing equality of position. If a case occurs in which they have to appeal in their own behalf to the authorities, the case not being connected with other lawsuits, their application to the authorities ought to be in the form which, in accordance with Chinese usage is employed by the literati, a ping (petition). If they visit Chinese high officials they ought to observe the same ceremonies as those laid down by Chinese law to be observed by Chinese literates when visiting high officers; and when they have to request an interview with the local authorities they ought also to observe the same rule. They have no business to come straight (unceremoniously) into a public office to the confusion and disturbance of public business.

[*Original Note.*]—In the spring of the 6th year of T'ung Chih (1867), the General at Ch'eng-tu wrote to report that the French bishop [by name] Hung (Pinchon) had, when writing to the official Committee (most likely that charged with raising funds for the suppression of rebellion) in Sze-chuen, made use of a [Chinese] official seal which he had had cast.

In the 7th year of T'ung Chih (1868) Hu Fu-li (Fawrie), Bishop of Kwei-chow, took upon himself to address the Yamên a communication in the form "chao hui," which he sent by the Government post couriers, commending To-wên, the former Taoutae and others, and requesting that extraordinary marks of favour might be bestowed upon them.

A case occurred of a missionary in Shantung assuming the title of Sinn-fu (Governor of a province).* Both in Sze-chuen and Kwei-chow missionaries have held such language as that in consequence of cases affecting the religion they were obliged to request the withdrawal of the local authorities. This is not only encroachment upon the authority of the local officials but usurpation of the authority of the Chinese Government. How is it possible that all these improprieties should not arouse general indignation?

8. In the interest of peace it will not do for missionaries to be demanding restitution of any chapel they may please to indicate. When Christians wish to buy land for the erection of religious establishments, or to rent public places, they should, first, in conjunction with the real owner of the property, lay the matter before the local authority, that he may ascertain whether the fêng shui† will be interfered with. If he allows the sale, after inquiry, and if, moreover, the people of the place are not hostile to it, authority can be given to proceed in accordance with the Agreement of the 4th year of Tung Chih (1865), that is, it ought to be stated on the title-deed that the land belongs to the Chinese Christians as their common property. It should not be permitted in buying property to effect the transfer by making use of some other name [than that of the real purchaser]; nor should it be permitted to effect the transfer irregularly (otherwise than as the law requires) upon the deceitful representations of dishonest people.‡

[*Original Note.*]—As missionaries have to reside permanently in China, it is, of course, desirable that they should be on good terms with the Chinese, and that they should not provoke the irritation and dislike of the Chinese. They would then be able to live in harmony with them without exciting suspicion. At the present time much of the conduct [the people] are unwilling to allow the missionary to remain in any place that he goes to. of Christians clashes against the feelings of the Chinese people. To take claims for the restitution of chapels as an instance:—During the last few years the restitution of chapels in different places in every province has been insisted upon without any regard for the feeling of the masses, the missionaries obstinately persisting in their claims. They have also pointed out fine handsome houses [belonging to, or occupied by] the gentry or others as buildings once used as churches, and these they have compelled the people to give up. Places even [the surrender of which] was a question of dignity improper,§ with meeting-halls, clubs, temples, all such being places held in high respect by the gentry and people of the whole neighbourhood, they have forced from them for the benefit of the Church, in lieu [of other lands or buildings].‖

A farther consideration is this:—Buildings which were once used as chapels have been in some cases sold years ago by Christians; and having been sold and re-sold by one of the people to another, have passed through the hands of several proprietors. There is also a large number of buildings which have been newly repaired at very considerable expense of which the missionaries have insisted on the restitution, refusing at the same time to pay anything for them. On the other hand there are some houses which have accidentally become dilapidated, and the missionaries put in a claim for the necessary repairs. Their conduct excites the indignation of the people whenever they come in contact with each other, till they appear to be at feud with each other, and it becomes impossible for them to live quietly together.

The grievances detailed in this Memorandum are only a few instances cited to show the impropriety of missionary proceedings, and the [consequent] impossibility of a good understanding between the Christians and the people. No time should be lost in looking for a remedy suited to the disease, one that may so avail both parties as to prevent the missionary question injuriously affecting friendly relations between China and foreign countries. There are other cases, too, in every province too numerous to mention.

There are good men as well as bad; by the removal of the tares the wheat is strengthened. Thus, in trade, by dealing severely with fraudulent merchants, the interests of the upright are secured. Now, if the missionaries make no distinction between good and bad men, but receive all men alike that come forward into their church, then the wicked who become their converts will use their religion to compass the ruin of the good.

* The words literally mean, "to go the rounds comforting or consoling;" used as a title they designate a provincial Governor.

† The "fêng shui," air and water influence, is one of the great pests of China. In the aspect of a house, choice of a grave, opening of a door or window, planting of a chimney, this influence has to be consulted, and to the neglect of it most direful consequences are attributed.

‡ To avoid discussions, the missionary, I believe, occasionally endeavours to acquire the ground needed by putting forward this or that particular Christian. There can be no real objection to this proceeding.

§ Probably Yamêns are meant.

‖ Other lands, &c., restoration of which they could not obtain.

Extreme indeed would be the danger if, popular indignation having been once seriously aroused by this opposition to the authorities, the hatred of the whole population of China were excited like that of the people of Tien-tsin against foreigners, and orders, though issued by the Government, could not be for all that put in force.

In the propositions here enumerated, the Chinese Government, while making every effort to assure the security [of the foreigner], is adhering, on the other hand, to a policy of liberal treatment. If the missionaries will faithfully endeavour to abide by what is laid down, peace can be maintained between them and the Chinese; but if they consider themselves [too much] restricted by it, or if they regard it as at issue with the tenets of their religion, they had best not proselytize in China. Native Christians will, of course, be treated as favourably as non-converts. No distinction will be made. The meaning of this is not that China is laying a prohibition on missionary preaching, but that by not attending peaceably to their proper work, and by allowing themselves to be made tools of by native Christians, missionaries will for certain provoke an amount of popular indignation that there will be no facing, [and that on this will follow] a universal catastrophe.* It is better, therefore, now to explain [what the danger is] beforehand than to prove unable to give due protection when the moment arrives.

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Note addressed by the Minister Wên Siang to Sir R. Alcock.

(Translation.)

THE writer again addresses [Sir R. Alcock].

The object of foreigners who enter the interior to propagate their doctrines is the exhortation of men to virtue. But among their converts there are men evil disposed and well disposed; [the latter] relying on their creed as a sort of magic spell which shall protect them, by their conduct bring the preaching of Christianity into such discredit that Add to this, that the missionary thinks only of the number of converts he can make; he makes no inquiry into private character, but receives and enrols all [who come]. Having entered the [Christian] society, the good are bent no doubt on being good, but on the other hand the evil make [their religion] a pretext for defrauding and oppressing unoffending people, till by degrees indignation and rage reach a point at which the relations [of the two parties] become as those of fire and water. At the present time, as the British Minister must doubtless be well aware, case after case of murder has occurred, the consequence of feuds between Christians and non-Christians. Although the creeds of the various foreign countries differ in their origin and development from each other, the natives of China are unable to see the distinction between them. In their eyes all [teachers of religion] are "missionaries from the West," and directly they hear a lying story [about any of these missionaries] without making further and minute inquiry [into its truth], they rise in a body to molest him. The Yang-chow affair is plain evidence of this.

Now if no preventive measures are adopted some great catastrophe will inevitably arise.

Regulations ought, therefore, to be drawn up, with such care as shall enable them to prevent native Christians from making their religion a pretext for extorting money from honest people, or the non-Christians from taking advantage of their numerical superiority to defraud and oppress the Christians; which shall besides bring missionaries, even as the priests of the Buddhist and Taouist sects, under the jurisdiction of the local authorities. Seeing that missionaries wish to reside in China, that their doctrines may gradually be propagated far and wide, they cannot wish the Chinese to look upon them as differing from themselves. They ought, therefore, to put themselves on the same footing as Chinese subjects. Buddhism is also a creed of Western origin, but the reason why its followers have so long been at peace with the Chinese, each party adhering to his own religion, is this, that although there is a difference of religion, the propagators of this creed are, as well as the others, under the control of the local authorities. And so in Confucianism, the system most esteemed in China, when such men as Chin shih and Han lin (those who have taken the highest degrees), after having filled official positions return home, or become the heads of schools, they become subordinate as they were before [they took office] to the local authorities. This is always the rule. At the present time foreign missionaries, as a general rule, adopt the Chinese dress, but they do not [at the same time]

* *Lit.*, a grand smash in every place.

submit to Chinese law. They thus begin by holding themselves as outside [the pale of the law], and show to others that they are not to be treated as ordinary people. And the native Christians go farther: they defraud and oppress ordinary subjects of the country, or withstand and disobey the authorities. [Such being the case] it is not to be wondered at that men become indignant, and that surprise is everywhere manifested.'

But let only this change be made, viz., that [missionaries] be placed under the control of the local authorities (who must not be allowed to be vexatious in their treatment of them), and the result will be that Christians and non-Christians will be placed on a just level *vis-à-vis* with each other, and no troubles will arise from unexpected sources.

The missionary question, moreover, gravely affects the whole question of commercial relations. Some measure must, therefore, be devised in time that shall insure the maintenance of everlasting and sincere friendship.

The writer hopes for a reply.

8th year, 5th moon, 17th day (June 26, 1869).

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

Mr. Wade to the Minister Wên Siang.

Sir, *Peking, June* , 1871.

IN accordance with the promise I made your Excellency when I had the pleasure of meeting you at the Yamên of Foreign Affairs a few days ago, I beg to submit to you some observations on the papers relating to the missionary question which were forwarded me by yourself and the President Shên on the 9th of February last.

It will be in your recollection that, when they were sent me, I made an effort to have their circulation postponed until portions of them which seemed to me open to criticism could be revised; and, in my note of the 11th February, I proposed to lay before you a statement in writing of my views on the subject. I was engaged on a Memorandum to be submitted to you when I received your subsequent note of the 13th, urging dispatch, as you wished to address all the Legations at the same moment. I rode to the Yamên the following afternoon for the purpose of tendering my explanations in person, but I was not so fortunate as to see your Excellency; and, on inquiry, I learned that the papers had already been circulated the evening before.

I had been anxious to prevent their issue unrevised, for two reasons in particular: in the first place, on account of the prominence given to the name of France and to the Roman Catholic religion, which I thought might be offensive not only to France but to other Powers whose nationals are also engaged in missionary enterprise in China; in the next place, because the review of the difficulties of the missionary question, more especially in those parts which attempt an explanation of the Tien-tsin massacre is by no means calculated to insure the Chinese Government that sympathy and support on the part of foreign nations for which these papers are ostensibly an appeal. It was with no small regret, therefore, that I found them in circulation; and my silence up to the present time must be attributed, among other reasons, in no small part to the discouragement I have felt at discovering, in this instance, as so frequently before, that my advice, even when asked for, has little chance of being attended to.

However, as your Excellency has once more expressed a wish to hear what I have to say, I address myself to the task.

Reversing the order of the documents under review, I begin with the eight Articles appended to the covering note.

Article 1 relates to the infant asylums. Protestant missionaries have not, to my knowledge, established any such asylums, but I am assured that, in those of the Roman Catholics, no objection is ever made to the visits of the parents or friends of an infant. Many of these, at the same time, have neither friend nor parent. They are children who have been abandoned by all. It would be difficult to find any one who would become security for unfortunate outcasts who have been left by the wayside to die.

As I have above stated there are no Protestant asylums in China, and I have, of course, some delicacy in expressing an opinion upon the expediency of this or that course to be pursued by those not of my own persuasion; but I shall concede that, as these children are undoubtedly Chinese subjects, it is not unreasonable to require that a register of the admissions should be kept for the inspection of the Chinese authorities; that they should be free from time to time to visit the asylums; and that the deaths of the infants should in all cases be reported to the authorities.

Article 2 lays down that no Chinese woman should be admitted into the chapels, and that female missionaries should be prohibited in China.

The usage now in force, it is alleged, produces an impression unfavourable to the repute of Christian women, and consequently discredits Christians altogether.

I cannot imagine that any Government, Protestant or Romanist, will consent to the exclusion of its female subjects from China, or that in the face of the various Treaties allowing freedom to natives and foreigners to preach and practise Christianity, they will attempt to interdict their female subjects any more than their male subjects from imparting the truth they prize as professing Christians to others.

Confucius teaches that, while we are not to fail in the practice of virtue ourselves, we are not either to weary in the correction of others, and this is surely not less the duty of woman than of man.

As to the question of decorum, your Excellency is evidently not aware; in the first place, that during service Christian chapels, Protestant and Romanish alike, are open to all, non-Christians as well as Christians, who will conduct themselves so as not to interrupt the service; that there are no doings in either that any outsider is not free to observe; and that in the Romish places of worship in China the sexes, out of deference to Chinese feeling on the subject, are generally, if not always separated. I have seen this with my own eyes at Shanghae, and I believe that it is the rule in their chapels elsewhere.

Article 3 complains of the position arrogated by the missionaries in China in their relations with the authorities of the land, and of various proceedings on their part which irritate both authorities and people, in particular of their interference between the native Christians and the law. The instances given of the offences complained of are not numerous, and the venue is laid in the remote provinces of Kwei-chow and Sze-chuen. The cases brought forward again only affect Roman Catholics. I am assured by the Representative of France that although he considers it most desirable that the Romish Bishops and their missionaries should have such access to the chief authorities of jurisdictions as will enable them to represent any wrong done to their congregations in the matter of religious freedom, the French Legation does not recognize the claim of the same ecclesiastics to interfere between the Chinese Christian and his official in any question in which the free exercise of his religion is not affected.

If, as it is alleged, foreign missionaries are in the habit of interposing in suits, civil or criminal, or of forcing themselves, either in person or correspondence, upon the authorities in a manner disrespectful or offensive, the remedy, it appears to me, is in the hands of the latter. The authority outraged has but to complain to the nearest Consul, or, through the Yamên, to the Legation of the country to which the missionary belongs. I can, of course, answer for no Government but my own, but I am satisfied that Her Majesty's Government would not uphold any British missionary either in an interference in suits, or in the support of a Chinese in his opposition to the laws of China.

In the matter of subscriptions for public purposes, it seems to me that there may be some confusion between the classes of contributions. His conversion to Christianity does not, in the opinion of foreign Governments, in any way affect the Chinese proselyte's subordination to the officers of his Government, or to the laws of the land. It will certainly not be held to exempt him from taxation, But from certain contributions which his fellow-countrymen impose upon themselves he cannot but be exempted, and the Chinese Government is bound to secure his exemption, because, by Treaties with foreign Powers, it has engaged to secure to any person practising or preaching Christianity within its dominions the free exercise of his religion. The Chinese have faith in much that the Christian does not believe in, and when they compel a Christian to take part in ceremonies condemned by his religion, or to subscribe funds in aid of the celebration of such ceremonies, they are interfering with the free exercise of his religion, and against such interference he is entitled to the protection of the Chinese Government.

Take, for instance, the case of prayer for rain, difference of usage in respect of which has been the occasion, as I am informed, of more than one misunderstanding between Chinese Christians and non-Christians. Prayer for rain or for other blessings, or for relief from drought, or for other calamities, is not peculiar to China. But in England, where we have Protestants, Romanists, Jews, and other persuasions, no one denomination is ever allowed to compel another denomination to offer up prayers except in its own way, or to subscribe funds except for the building of its own chapels, or the liquidation of expenses required for the celebration of the ceremonies prescribed by its own ritual. And the same tolerance is stipulated for on behalf of Chinese Christians, whether Greek, Romish, or Protestant in the Treaties with foreign Powers.

Article 4 lays down that, where Chinese and foreigners live together, the law must be impartially administered. This without doubt. But it further seems to imply that, in cases of homicide, popular feeling will not be satisfied unless a life be given for a life.

Under English law this is by no means so possible, as under the law of China.

Experience has shown that, in many cases, the latter will condemn a prisoner to death, where the law of England would be satisfied by a penalty far less severe, if, indeed, it were possible to punish the man at all. It is to be deplored that misunderstandings should arise from a difference in our codes; but I see no remedy for this until China shall see fit to revise the process of investigation now common in her Courts. So long as evidence is wrung from witnesses by torture, it is scarcely possible for the authorities of a foreign Power to associate themselves with those of China in the trial of a criminal case; and unless the authorities of both nationalities are present, there will always be a suspicion of unfairness on one side or the other. This difficulty surmounted, there would be none in the way of providing a code of laws to affect mixed cases; none, certainly, on the part of England; none, in my belief, either, on the part of any other Power.

As to the complicity of persons other than those directly charged with an offence, and by whom it can be shown that the latter were instigated to commit it, I do not see why they should be allowed to escape either punishment or indemnity. But the charge of investigation, again, is very differently understood by the Chinese and the foreigner; and on this point I equally despair of a better understanding until the international code before suggested shall have been agreed to.

The Article closes with the remarkable proposition, that if a missionary protect a Chinese wrong-doer against his authorities, he, the missionary, must be punished as the law would punish the Chinese, or expelled the country.

I am at a loss to understand how any missionary can prevent the arrest of a Chinese charged with an offence against the law. Should a missionary really attempt such intervention, the proper course, as I have before observed, would be an immediate appeal to the Consul or Minister of his nationality.

5. The passport question referred to in this Article, does not seem to me to need any particular remark. The instances cited of exchange of passports, or confusion of the names of persons holding them, are but two or three in all. I cannot think that when mistakes of the kind do occur, the Legation concerned will be unable to furnish satisfactory explanation, or that, if a passport were unduly obtained or transferred by any person, missionary, or other, the authorities of his nation would refuse to take notice of it. I should be glad to think that every question between China and foreign Powers could be as easily disposed of.

In Article 6 it is proposed that no Chinese of bad character should be allowed to embrace Christianity; and instances are given of persons in the far-west provinces, who, after entering the profession, continued to commit the gravest offences. If this be the fact, why were the offenders not seized, and tried by the district authorities? It is vain to lay the blame of their inaction upon the few missionaries in their jurisdictions. They have not hesitated on occasion to lay violent hands upon the missionaries themselves. In Kwei-chow, only the year before last, three Romish missionaries were seized by the authorities, and one of them died of the ill-treatment he received. I do not understand how the power of the mandarins can be less over their own countrymen.

As to the exclusion of all but good men from the profession, the Christian religion, as every Treaty sets forth, is for the teaching of men to become virtuous. Is it not then the duty of its teachers, like the philosopher Mencius, to turn away none who desire to be converted, "not to scan the past, neither to reject those who tender themselves?"

If Chinese break the law once more, their profession as Christians will not screen them from the penalty of the law; and so with reference to registration, if the Chinese Government chooses to oblige all its subjects professing Christianity to register themselves in any special fashion, it has, no doubt, the power to do this. But I do not see that it can expect the foreign missionary to become its registering officer, and while I do not see either that by registration it would greatly further any legitimate object of good government, it might expose itself to the suspicion that some action against Christians was contemplated that would alarm the foreign Powers in relations with it.

The population of China was estimated before the Tae-ping rebellion at some 400,000,000. It is alleged by some people that this total is now reduced by one-half. Well, of the 200,000,000 that remain, there may be 500,000 of Christians, not more, of whom certainly a large number are as well ordered and as well affected as any other Chinese. I am at a loss to see that the Chinese Government would gain much by insisting on a return which would very probably prove vexatious, and which, if it did, would invite the remonstrance of all the Treaty Powers.

Article 7 prescribes the forms which should regulate intercourse between the missionary and the authorities. Speaking for our own missionaries, I see no objection to these. The British Government draws no distinction between the missionary and any other of its non-official subjects, and by Article XI of the Treaty of Nanking, "ping"

(representation) is the form in which subjects not holding official positions are required to address the Chinese authorities.

Article 8, and last, treats of the restoration of buildings formerly belonging to Christians.

This question, which arises out of the engagement contracted by the Chinese Government in Article VI of the French Convention of the 25th October, 1860, affects none but the Romanists, and it is one, the solution of which would seem to rest so exclusively with the Government of France that I do not feel free to discuss it. I shall only add, therefore, that if in this particular the Chinese Government finds its engagements difficult to discharge, it should avail itself of the presence of its Minister in France to obtain a relaxation of the conditions to which it agreed in 1860.

And this brings me to what I have so frequently pressed upon the Yamên as the one means of securing an escape from difficulty where a misunderstanding has commenced between the Government of China and a foreign Government. It is quite impossible that China should ever attain to a just appreciation of what foreign Powers expect of her, or that she should insure from foreign Powers what she conceives due to her, until she have honestly accepted the conditions of official intercourse which are the sole guarantees against international differences. The chief of these is an interchange of Representatives. I do not say that it is a panacea for all evil; but it is incontestable that without it wars would be of far more frequent recurrence, and till China is represented in the West, I see no hope of our ever having done with the incessant recriminations and bickerings between the Yamên and foreign Legations, by which the lives of Diplomatic Agents in Peking are made weary. If China is wronged, she must make herself heard; and, on the other hand, if she would abstain from giving offence, she must learn what is passing in the world beyond her.

I shall add to this long commentary but two observations. In the opening of your Excellency's note you remark that, in trade, there is little to object to. If this be so it is matter of regret that so many commercial questions have to be referred from the ports to Peking; and that, even after reference, when settlement is obtained at all, months, if not years, must first be allowed to elapse.

Foreign Governments will be by no means disposed to admit that our commercial relations are all that they could desire.

Again, referring to the Tien-tsin massacre, your Excellency explains that it was the result of the people's exasperation against Romanism; and you express a fear lest, after the severe punishment inflicted, and the ample indemnities awarded, Christians should be emboldened to go greater lengths than heretofore in the direction which is unpopular.

I have communicated to the Prince of Kung the expression of my Government's dissatisfaction at the tardiness and incompleteness with which that fearful crime was disposed of. I am persuaded that no foreign Government has thought otherwise of the action of the Chinese Government; and that, so far from sharing your Excellency's belief in the encouragement of Christians to greater boldness, the evil for which all Powers alike are on the watch, is the molestation of those who, it has been shown, can be molested with so little risk of consequences to the aggressor.

It is vain to attempt to trace the evil deed to its authors; to discover who primarily commenced the agitation against the Romanists; to whom it occurred, while not a child was missing, to revive the horrible calumny that the Romanists were kidnapping children for hateful purposes. It is sufficient for my present purpose to repeat what I had the honour to observe to the Prince of Kung in my despatch of the 9th of July last, that the Government is responsible for that ignorance of the people which alone can render possible their perpetration of an act so barbarous upon a pretext so ridiculous; and the fact that the people's continuance in such darkness is due to a want of enlightenment on the part of the Government, will not be held to excuse the Government when foreign life and property are jeopardized by the simple people whom the Government is not wise enough to teach.

(Compliments.)

(Signed) THOMAS FRANCIS WADE.

No. 7.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 19.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 18, 1871.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a note with which, in obedience to the instruction conveyed to me by your Lordship's despatch of the 11th instant, I have transmitted to M. de Rémusat a copy of the despatch which your Lordship proposes to

address to Mr. Wade respecting the Circular of the Government of China on the subject of religious missions in that country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Lord Lyons to M. de Rémusat.

(Extract.) *Paris, August* 18, 1871.

HER Majesty's Government will always be ready to join the Government of France in any representations which may conduce to the better regulation of the intercourse between China and the Treaty Powers; but, on the present occasion, it appears to them that, from the different nature of the Treaty provisions, as affecting the position of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries in China, it would be better that each nation should return a separate reply to the Circular; and they propose to address a despatch to Mr. Wade.

Lord Lyons has the honour to transmit herewith to M. de Rémusat a draft of the proposed despatch to Mr. Wade, and at the same time, &c.

No. 8.

Mr. Petre to Earl Granville.—(*Received August* 21.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 19, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I communicated yesterday to M. de Thile the draft of the despatch which your Lordship proposes to address to Mr. Wade respecting the Circular of the Chinese Government on the subject of Christian missionaries in China.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE PETRE.

No. 9.

Earl Granville to Mr. Wade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 21, 1871.

HER Majesty's Government have hitherto abstained from offering any observations upon the Circular of the Chinese Government on the subject of religious missions, of which a translation has been communicated to them by the French Chargé d'Affaires, in the expectation that they might have received some Reports from you regarding it. As, however, they learn from your telegraphic despatches that it will be some time before they will be in possession of your views, they consider that they cannot allow this important paper to remain longer unnoticed, and I have accordingly now to state to you the impression which has been made by it upon Her Majesty's Government.

Her Majesty's Government must, in the first place, protest against the general assertions contained in the Circular and accompanying regulations with regard to missionary enterprise in China, no distinction being made between the proceedings of missionaries over whom Her Majesty's Government have no control, and of the British missionaries, for whose actions alone can Great Britain be held responsible. They must, moreover, remark that, of the instances of alleged abuses cited, there is not one which is in any way connected with any British missionary establishment.

Her Majesty's Government might accordingly have contented themselves with replying to the Chinese Government that the Circular did not allege any complaints against British subjects, and that they could not enter into a discussion of matters not directly affecting the relations between Great Britain and China.

Her Majesty's Government do not, however, desire to lay too much stress upon this point. They believe it to be the common interest and desire of all the Governments having Treaties with China to co-operate with the Government of the Empire in maintaining the relations between China and their respective countries on the most friendly footing, and Her Majesty's Government will always be ready to consider any representations which the Government of China may have to offer with that object.

On the particular question to which the Circular relates, the policy and practice of the Government of Great Britain have been unmistakable. They have uniformly declared, and now repeat, that they do not claim to afford any species of protection to Chinese Christians which may be construed as withdrawing them from their native allegiance, nor do they desire to secure to British missionaries any privileges or immunities beyond those granted by Treaty to other British subjects.

The Bishop of Victoria was requested to intimate this to the Protestant Missionary Societies in the letter addressed to him by Mr. Hammond by the Earl of Clarendon's direction on the 13th of November, 1869,* and to point out that they would "do well to warn converts that although the Chinese Government may be bound by Treaty not to persecute, on account of their conversion, Chinese subjects who may embrace Christianity, there is no provision in the Treaty by which a claim can be made on behalf of converts for exemption from the obligations of their natural allegiance, and from the jurisdiction of the local authorities. Under the creed of their adoption, as under that of their birth, Chinese converts to Christianity still owe obedience to the law of China, and if they assume to set themselves above those laws, in reliance upon foreign protection, they must take the consequence of their own indiscretion, for no British authority, at all events, can interfere to save them."

On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government cannot forget that the free exercise of the Christian religion in China is stipulated for by the VIIIth Article of the Treaty of the 20th June, 1858, which states that "the Christian religion, as professed by Protestants or Roman Catholics, inculcates the practice of virtue, and teaches man to do as he would be done by. Persons teaching or professing it, therefore, shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities; nor shall any such peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the laws, be persecuted or interfered with." Her Majesty's Government, therefore, although they have given it to be most distinctly understood that conversion to Christianity gives no title to British protection against the operation of the laws of the land, could not be indifferent to the persecution of Christians for professing the Christian faith.

The impracticable nature of the Regulations proposed by the Chinese Government has been so convincingly shown in the note from Mr. Low, the Representative of the United States, to the Yamên, of the 20th of March last, that it is unnecessary for Her Majesty's Government to do more than refer to some of the principal objections to their acceptance.

The 1st Regulation does not apply to the British Missionary Societies, as they do not support any orphanages in China. Her Majesty's Government could not obviously accede to Regulations which they had no power to enforce. If the missionaries of other countries have conducted such institutions in a manner to give just cause of suspicion to the people of China, Her Majesty's Government feel no doubt that, on a proper representation being made of the facts, the cause of complaint will be removed; but they cannot admit that such an atrocious crime as the massacre at Tien-tsin can be excused by ascribing it to the prejudices of the ignorant.

The 2nd Regulation requires that women ought no longer to enter the churches, nor should Sisters of Charity live in China to teach religion. The objection to women frequenting Christian churches has, Her Majesty's Government understand, been met at Fatshan and elsewhere by a screen having been erected to divide the sexes. To prevent women altogether from attending Divine worship would be in violation of the freedom of religion provided in the Treaty, and would be contrary to the fundamental principles of Christianity. As the Chinese Government are most probably aware that there are no Sisters of Charity attached to the British Missionary Societies, but Her Majesty's Government could not countenance any Regulation which would cast a slur upon a sisterhood whose blameless lives and noble acts of devotion in the cause of humanity are known throughout the world.

The 3rd and 4th Articles, as respects Chinese Christians, have already been dealt with in the preceding part of this despatch; but Her Majesty's Government cannot allow the claim that the missionaries residing in China must conform to the laws and customs of China to pass unchallenged.

It is the duty of a missionary, as of every other British subject, to avoid giving offence as far as possible to the Chinese authorities or people, but he does not forfeit the rights to which he is entitled under the Treaty as a British subject because of his missionary character.

The 5th Article seems to be directed against French missionaries. The IXth Article

* Parliamentary Papers, "China, No. 9, 1870," p. 13.

of the British Treaty contains provisions to prevent any abuses of passports borne by British subjects; and no passports are granted by British Diplomatic or Consular authorities to persons not of British nationality.

In this Regulation, as in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, mention is made of occurrences in Sze-chuen. Her Majesty's Government have urged upon the Chinese Government the expediency of their opening this province to foreign trade, and establishing a port there it which foreign Consuls should reside. If the statements which have been made to the Government of Peking with regard to the irregular proceedings of foreign missionaries and their converts are well founded, the Chinese Government would do well to consider whether the presence of foreign Consular authorities is not required to control the improper or ill-directed exercise of the Treaty privileges conferred on their countrymen. Her Majesty's Government believe that there are no British Protestant missionary establishments in Sze-chuen, but it is impossible to prevent enterprising persons penetrating through a country. Sooner or later they will find their way; and the true interest of China is to facilitate rather than to restrict the flow of foreign enterprise, and to direct it in the manner most advantageous to that mutually beneficial commercial intercourse on which the prosperity and happiness of nations so largely depend.

Besides showing, as Mr. Low has pointed out, a complete misconception of the nature of the Christian religion, the 6th Regulation is open to the objection that, by constituting the Christians in China a class separated from the rest of the population, it would lead to the very evil of which it is the desire of the Chinese Government to get rid, as the Christians would inevitably regard that separation as conferring on them privileges, for the maintenance of which they must trust to the protection of the Powers in whose Treaties with China the freedom of the Christian religion is provided for.

The 7th Regulation calls for no special observation.

The 8th Regulation does not apply to British missionaries, who have no ecclesiastical property in China to reclaim, and seems to refer to misunderstandings with regard to the operation of the VIth Article of the Treaty with France of the 25th of October, 1860.

Her Majesty's Government trust that the Chinese Government will not suppose that, in withholding their assent to these Regulations they are actuated by any other motive than the wish to avoid embarrassing a question, already of sufficient difficulty, by cumbrous and impracticable regulations.

The remedy for the alleged assumption by missionaries of a protective jurisdiction over native Christians, which constitutes the gist of the accusations brought forward in the Circular and Regulations, appears to Her Majesty's Government to be sufficiently afforded by the Treaties.

If British missionaries behave improperly, they should "be handed over to the nearest Consul for punishment," like other British subjects, as provided in the IXth Article of the Treaty of Tien-tsin. If the local authorities consider that Her Majesty's Consuls do not in any instance afford redress for their complaints, they can appeal through the Government at Peking to Her Majesty's Minister, in the ordinary course of international usage. Both Her Majesty's Minister and Consuls have extensive powers for maintaining the peace, order, and good government of Her Majesty's subjects in China; and if those powers should be proved to be inadequate, Her Majesty's Government would readily increase them; but until it can be proved that Her Majesty's Minister and Consuls are unable to control Her Majesty's subjects in China by the exercise of the powers confided to them, Her Majesty's Government must decline to supplement the existing Treaties by regulations which, although only intended to deal with a particular class of British subjects, would undoubtedly subject the whole British community in China, to a constant interference in their intercourse with the native population of a most vexatious description.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 10.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(*Received August* 28.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 23, 1871.

IN conformity with your Lordship's instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatch of the 10th instant, I have communicated to M. de Westmann the draft of an instruction which your Lordship proposed to address to Her Majesty's Minister in China,

in reply to the Circular of the Chinese Government, proposing to establish exceptional rules for regulating the proceedings and conduct of foreign missionaries visiting the Chinese Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 11.

Mr. Petre to Earl Granville.—(*Received August* 28.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 26, 1871.

M. DE THILE has requested me to thank your Lordship for the communication of the draft of the despatch which you propose to address to Mr. Wade on the subject of religious missions in China, and to inform you that the views of the German Government on this question entirely coincide with those expressed in your Lordship's despatch.

The Prussian Minister at Peking will shortly arrive at Berlin, and the German Government are anxious to hear his report and to consult with him before replying to the Circular of the Chinese Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE PETRE.

No. 12.

Earl Granville to Mr. Wade.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1871.

HER Majesty's Government approve the note, of which a copy was inclosed in your despatch of the 8th of June, which you proposed to address to the Minister Wên Siang in reply to the Circular of the Chinese Government upon the missionary question.

The draft of my despatch to you of the 21st instant on this subject had been communicated to the French, North German, Russian, and American Governments before your despatch of the 8th of June had been received.

No. 13.

Mr. Wade to Earl Granville.—(*Received September* 2.)

My Lord, *Peking, June* 22, 1871.

IN my despatch of the 8th June I had the honour to forward your Lordship the text of a note which I had prepared in answer to that of the Grand Secretary, Wên Siang, upon the missionary question. When sending it in I added the inclosed postscript, which speaks for itself. I am sorry to think that it should be necessary to recur so frequently to so disagreeable a subject, but I had had a very long conversation with the Grand Secretary while the note was being translated, upon this particular question and upon foreign policy in general; and his tendency throughout was undoubtedly to maintain, not exactly that there was excuse for the massacre, but that foreigners have been far too hard in their judgment of the action of the Chinese Government in relation to the massacre; hence that there is really no need for modification of the Treaties in force, or for a more careful observance of them.

It is fair to add that, notwithstanding the tone assumed in debate, the Yamên does appear to be inculcating more prompt attention to the claims of foreigners at the ports, and, to judge from the reports of the Romish missionaries residing inland, the Government has certainly been more zealous of their security since the massacre than at any time for some years past.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOMAS FRANCIS WADE.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Mr. Wade to the Minister Wén Siang.

Postscript.

Peking, June 21, 1871.

THE foregoing paper was written many days since, but it has taken so long to translate that its transmission has been unavoidably postponed.

I avail myself of the delay to insist once more upon an important point in which, I think, the Chinese Government appears likely to deceive itself—I mean the wide difference between the impressions produced on native and foreigner by the Tien-tsin massacre, its antecedent history, the atrocity itself, and the sequel.

No. 14.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 6.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 5, 1871.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 11th ultimo, and to my despatch of the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a note or memorandum which was sent to me by M. de Rémusat the day before yesterday. It contains observations on the draft of your Lordship's despatch to Mr. Wade respecting the Chinese Circular concerning missionaries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 14.

M. de Rémusat to Lord Lyons.

Versailles, le 31 *Août*, 1871.

LE Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a reçu la note que son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 18 de ce mois, et qui était accompagnée d'un projet de dépêche destinée à faire connaître à M. Wade l'opinion du Cabinet de Londres au sujet du memorandum Chinois sur l'exercice de la religion en Chine.

Il était d'un intérêt particulier dans la pensée du Gouvernement Français que les Puissances représentées à Péking fussent unanimes à repousser la tentative du Gouvernement Chinois de s'affranchir des engagements qu'il a contractés, en cherchant dans de prétendus abus la justification de règlements nouveaux. Le Gouvernement Francais se félicite à ce titre du sens dans lequel le Cabinet de Londres se propose de répondre au memorandum Chinois, et il comprend parfaitement que la nature différente des clauses insérées dans les Traités concernant la position des missionnaires Catholiques ou Protestants ait porté le Cabinet de Londres à considérer comme préférable à une démarche collective une réponse individuelle de chacune des Puissances au document émanant des Ministres Chinois.

M. de Rémusat a l'honneur de remercier Lord Lyons de la communication qu'il a bien voulu lui faire, et il le prie d'agréer, &c.

(Translation.)

Versailles, August 31, 1871.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has received the note which his Excellency the English Ambassador did him the honour to address to him on the 18th instant, and which was accompanied by a draft destined to inform Mr. Wade of the opinion of the Cabinet of London on the subject of the Chinese Memorandum on the exercise of religion in China.

It was of special interest, in the opinion of the French Government, that the Powers represented at Peking should be unanimous in repelling the attempt of the Chinese Government to free itself from the engagements which it has contracted, by seeking in pretended abuses justification for new regulations. The French Government, in this respect, congratulate themselves at the sense in which the Cabinet of London propose to reply to the Chinese Memorandum, and understand perfectly that the different nature of the clauses inserted in the Treaties, with regard to the position of the Catholic or Protestant missionaries, has led the Cabinet of London to consider a separate answer from

each of the Powers to the document emanating from the Chinese Ministers as preferable to collective action.

M. de Rémusat has the honour to thank Lord Lyons for the communication he has been good enough to make to him, and begs, &c.

No. 15.

General Schenck to Earl Granville.—(Received November 29.)

Legation of the United States, London,
My Lord, *November 29, 1871.*

UNDER instructions from the Secretary of State of the United States, I have the honour to transmit, herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government a copy of a correspondence between Mr. Low, the Minister of the United States at Peking, and the Department of State at Washington.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBT. C. SCHENCK.

Inclosure No. 15.

Correspondence between Mr. Low and the Foreign Department, Washington.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.

(No. 56.) *Legation of the United States, Peking,*
Sir, *March 20, 1871.*

IN my No. 52, of February 20, reference was made to a communication I had received from the Foreign Office, in relation to the missionary question. I have now the honouf to inclose a translation of that document, together with my reply. The Memorandum was drawn up by Wan Tsiang, one of the oldest and by far the ablest of all the Chinese Ministers. He has had more to do with, and therefore understands better, the actual relations of China with foreign nations, than any of his colleagues, and is, I feel sure, anxious to prevent disturbances that may lead to international troubles. That he is sincere in his professed anxiety about the future, no one well acquainted with the real condition of affairs here will question; although it is not impossible that his fears are overstated for the effect such declarations may exert upon the foreign legations, and thus tend to bring about some kind of a compromise which will be useful in the future management of the missionary matter. My opinion that these apprehensions of future danger are genuine, and that this paper is not put forth at this time simply to try and protect themselves against further demands that the French Government may make in the Treaty revision which is soon to take place, is confirmed by the fact that about two years ago, this same Chinese Minister addressed a private note of a similar character to the British Minister. A copy of that note I have just now obtained, a translation of which I beg to send herewith. The answer of Her Majesty's Minister to the note I am not able to give, as it was made verbally and not in writing. A careful reading of the Memorandum clearly proves that the great, if not only, cause of complaint against the missionaries, comes from the action of the Roman Catholic priests and the native Christians of that faith; although the rules proposed for the government of missionaries apply equally to Protestants and Catholics. What reply to make, in view of the complication of the question, and the circumstances with which it was surrounded, did not seem quite clear. I would have preferred to have taken the President's instructions before sending an answer, could they have been obtained within any reasonable time. To simply acknowledge the receipt of their note, and say that instructions had been asked for which would involve a delay of four or five months, and this delay would perhaps raise a hope which could not be otherwise than illusive, that some at least of their propositions would prove acceptable; to reply and admit what I really believed to be true, that the Chinese have some ground of complaint, without being able to suggest a practicable remedy, would only do harm, and render the situation still more insecure; to simply say that, as their complaints are against the Roman Catholics, it is a matter which concerns the French alone, with which other nations have nothing to do, would have the effect to defeat what the other Treaty Powers have been anxious to bring about, viz., that when the Chinese have difficulties with one foreign nation, which are likely to involve

all in trouble, they should frankly state their case to be judged by all, and in this way bring the force of an enlightened public opinion to bear upon the action of any Government that attempts to oppress or deal unfairly. After carefully considering the whole question in all its bearings, I deemed it my duty to reply, without waiting for specific instructions. This I have done at some length, reviewing somewhat in detail the several points presented, reasserting the intention of the Government of the United States to claim for all its citizens entire exemption from the operation of Chinese law, and disclaiming any intention of screening natives from the obligations which they are under to their own laws and officials, pointing out the impracticability of many of the proposed rules, and suggesting personal discussion of this as well as of all other matters of dispute. Had they stated their complaints in brief, without circumlocution, and stripped of all useless verbiage, they would have charged that the Roman Catholic missionaries, when residing away from the open ports, claim to occupy a semi-official position, which places them on an equality with the provincial officer; that they deny the authority of the Chinese officials over native Christians, which practically removes this class from the jurisdiction of their own rulers; that their action in this regard shields the native Christians from the penalties of the law, and thus holds out inducements for the lawless to join the Catholic Church, which is largely taken advantage of; that orphan asylums are filled with children, by the use of improper means; against the will of the people; and when parents, guardians, and friends visit these institutions for the purpose of reclaiming children, their requests for examination and restitution are denied; and lastly, that the French Government, while it does not claim for its missionaries any rights of this nature by virtue of Treaty, its agents and reprsentatives wink at these unlawful acts, and secretly uphold the missionaries. If the opinions of the Chinese officials could be stated in a direct and courageous way, instead of proposing rules for the governance of missionaries, they would demand a revision of the Treaties by which the right of exterritoriality would be withdrawn from missionaries when they go beyond the places open to trade where foreign Consuls reside. This is really what they mean, although they do not state it specifically.

I do not believe, and therefore I cannot affirm, that all the complaints made against Catholic missionaries are founded in truth, reason, or justice; at the same time, I believe that there is foundation for some of their charges. My opinions, as expressed in former despatches touching this matter, are confirmed by further investigation. But while I see clearly the difficulties and dangers, candour compels me to say that the remedy seems to lie outside and beyond the scope of affirmative diplomatic action. Neither will sound policy, nor the moral and religious sentiments of Christian nations, sanction any retrogression, although trade and commerce might be promoted thereby; nor will the dictates of humanity permit the renunciation of the right for all foreigners that they shall be governed and punished by their own laws. But, while insisting firmly upon these rights, all foreign Governments should see to it that no claim be made by their officers, agents, or subjects, for the extension of their laws over the Chinese. They should also see that their Treaties are honestly and fairly construed; claiming no rights which come of fraud, and conceding nothing that a just construction will grant. That a strict non-interference between native Christians and their rulers will subject the former to persecutions is possible, and even probable; but whether this course will not in the end subserve the cause the missionaries are labouring to promote better than the opposite one, is the question. I think it will. One has the sanction of Treaty and law; the other is in violation of both. The remedy, so far as it lies in the power of foreign Governments, is with France alone; and it behoves that Power, for the sake of its own interests, as well as for the welfare of all foreign residents, to remove all just causes of complaint of the Chinese. Whether this can reasonably be expected depends upon the form and composition of the new Government of France, and also upon the character of the Representative which that Goverment may send here.

Trusting that my action as herein detailed may meet with the approval of the President, I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK F. LOW.

(Inclosure 1.)

Wan Tsiang and Shin Kwei-fan to Mr. Low.

February 13, 1871.
Sir, (*Tungchi, 9th year, 12th moon, 24th day*).

IN relation to the missionary question, the members of the Foreign Office are apprehensive lest, in their efforts to manage the various points connected with it, they shall interrupt the good relations existing between this and other Governments, and have, therefore, drawn up several rules upon the subject.* These are now inclosed, with an explanatory Minute for your examination, and we hope that you will take them into careful consideration.

With compliments, &c.
(Signed) WAN TSIANG.
SHIN KWEI-FAN.

His Excellency Frederick F. Low,
&c. &c. &c.

(Inclosure 2.)

Legation of the United States, Peking,
March 20, 1871.
Gentlemen,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 13th ultimo, to which was appended a Memorandum setting forth somewhat in detail the causes of discontent among the people, and their ill-will towards the missionaries, and appealing to the Representatives of all the Treaty Powers to take the subject into consideration, with a view of devising measures which will have a tendency to remove the difficulties and assure a continuance of peace between China and foreign nations. To accomplish this, eight rules are proposed by you for the better-regulation of missionary enterprises. These rules have been drawn up by you in consultation with all the members of the Foreign Office, and will, if accepted and adopted by the western nations, in your opinion, remedy the evils complained of. By way of illustrating your position, showing that foreign missionaries are responsible for much of the ill-will of the Chinese, and proving that additional safeguards are necessary to preserve peace, instances are cited of illegal and unwise action on the part of the missionaries.

I have read with attention all the papers you sent, and have given to their contents the most careful consideration.

It is a noticeable fact, that among all the cases cited there does not appear to be one in which Protestant missionaries are charged with violating Treaty, law, or custom. So far as I can ascertain, your complaints are chiefly against the action and attitude of the missionaries of the Roman Catholic faith; and, as these are under the exclusive protection and control of the Government of France, I might with great propriety decline to discuss a matter with which the Government of the United States has no direct interest or concern, for the reason that none of its citizens are charged with violating Treaty or local law, and thus causing trouble. But, fully appreciating the force and gravity of your observations when you affirm that involved in this question are the interests of all foreign residents in China, and upon its proper management and solution depend, in a greater or less degree, the safety and well-being of all, whether merchants or missionaries, without regard to nationality or religion, I feel justified in complying with your expressed desire, that all the Representatives of the Treaty Powers will consult upon these grave questions. I shall, therefore, with entire frankness, give you my opinions upon the several points raised by you.

I cordially reciprocate the sentiment when you say that it is the earnest desire of the Prince and his associates to maintain peace between China and all foreign nations, and entirely concur in the opinion that, when apprehensions of trouble arise, which may, if not averted, impair friendly relations, it is the part of wisdom and prudence to state frankly the disturbing causes, and, together with the foreign Representatives, discuss, with a view to adoption, suitable measures for remedying the evils. Such discussions can do no harm, and may lead to the best results.

Of the truth or justice of the complaints made to you by the provincial officers against the Roman Catholic bishops and priest, the Undersigned cannot presume to judge. It is, however, not impossible or hardly improbable that the local officials, who think that their authority has been improperly resisted and themselves insulted, may have overstated the discontent of the people, and have reported isolated cases of misconduct as the rule of missionary action.

* See *ante*, Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

It is also a noteworthy fact, that substantially all the instances mentioned, where trouble has occurred through the alleged evil practices of the priests and Christians, are confined to the provinces of Szechuen and Kweichau—provinces far remote from the residence of Consuls, merchants, and foreigners generally—which renders it difficult to obtain evidence as to the actual facts, except from the principals and their adherents on either side.

In this view, it is unfortunate that merchants are not allowed to reside there also, and that these places are not open to the residence of foreign Consuls, who could look after and arrange such difficulties as they arise; and I would suggest that you take into careful consideration what has so often been urged upon the attention of the Government, and see whether the opening of these disturbed districts to trade and the residence of foreign Consuls would not be the best means you could adopt to prevent missionary troubles.

But, conceding that the charges you make are substantially correct, and the troubles as great as you represent, the remedy, it appears to me, is quite simple, requiring no extraordinary rules or regulations. You say that the trouble arises chiefly from the illegal acts of the native Christians, and the attempt on the part of the missionaries to shield these people from the just punishment for their crimes. In reply, I have to say that the Government of the United States, while it claims to exercise, under and by virtue of the stipulations of Treaty, the exclusive right of judging of the wrongful acts of its citizens resident in China, and of punishing them when found guilty according to its own laws, does not assume to claim or exercise any authority or control over the natives of China. This rule applies equally to merchants and missionaries, and, so far as I know, all foreign Governments having Treaties with China adhere strictly to this rule. In case, however, missionaries see that native Christians are being persecuted by the local officials on account of their religious opinions, in violation of the letter and spirit of the XXIXth Article of the Treaty between the United States and China, it would be proper, and entirely in accordance with the principles of humanity and the teachings of their religion, to make respectful representation of the facts in such cases to the local authorities direct, or through their Diplomatic Representative to the Foreign Office; for it cannot be presumed that the Imperial Government would sanction any violation of Treaty engagement, or that the local officials would allow persecutions for opinion's sake, when once the facts are made known to them. In doing this the missionaries should conform to Chinese custom and etiquette, so far as it can be done without assuming an attitude that would be humiliating and degrading to themselves.

With reference to Rule 1, as proposed, the Undersigned is not prepared to speak. The American missionaries have no establishments of the kind alluded to, and he cannot assent to or dissent from a proposition which has for its object the regulation and government of asylums of a distinct religious sect, under the special protection of another nation. He would, however, observe in this connection, that there are Roman Catholic orphan asylums in all parts of the United States, over which the Government exercises no surveillance or control; and, instead of arousing suspicion and hatred, these charities are so well and favourably known that they merit praise and commendation, and receive contributions for their support from both Government and people, irrespective of religious creed, wherever they are located. It would, I think, be well for the Government of China to expend its energies in the more weighty concerns of Administration, and allow charities of all kinds, which have for their object the amelioration of the condition of children or adults, the largest freedom compatible with the safety and well-being of the people.

Rule 2 is without apparent reason and unjust. Among all western nations females attend churches in common with the males, and their religious teachings conduce to the highest good. Their attending church in company with parents, husbands, and friends, should in no manner give rise to suspicions. On the contrary, their presence in such places is a guarantee against illegal combinations or plots against the State or individuals. In western lands it is considered of the highest importance that females be educated in literature and religion, so that they may be fitted to rear families who will become useful and honest members of society. So fixed has this principle become in all Christian countries that a proposition of this character will be regarded as an unfriendly interference, to prevent the carrying into effect, in its proper sense, Article XXIX of the Treaty before alluded to. I deeply regret that such a rule should have been proposed. Instead of being accepted by the Treaty Powers, the mere mention of it will, I fear, cause some to doubt the good faith of the Government and people of China in their profession of a desire to observe all Treaty stipulations.

Rules 3 and 4 appear to me entirely unnecessary. Missionaries have no right under the Treaty to do the things complained of; hence any additional regulations to prevent such acts are superfluous.

When native Christians offend, they are subject to, and under the control of, the laws

and officials of their own country; nor do I see how it is possible for the missionaries to oppress the people in any way. In the United States every person is allowed the largest liberty in the discussion of all subjects pertaining to government or religion. In this way the people hear all sides, and are the better able to judge between the true and the false. If the Buddhist, Taoish, Confucian, and Christian faiths could all be explained without hindrance, the people will judge of the merits of each, and adhere to the one that seems to be the most reasonable and true. Each sect will find adherents and followers; but there need not on this account arise ill-will, jealousy, or hatred between the followers of these sects. It would be well, I think, for the Government to make further inquiries into the customs of foreign nations, and see whether it would not promote a better understanding between natives and foreigners, without weakening the Government or lessening the respect of the people for their rulers, if greater freedom were allowed in the worship of all religions, and the adherence to any sect the people choose without interference on the part of the Government.

If native Christians are exempted from the payment of contributions for theatrical plays and processions it shows a spirit of justice on the part of their rulers, and should in no way cause them to evade the payment of their proportion of other proper taxes and assessments, nor should missionaries uphold them in such acts. But foreign missionaries, while it is their duty to refrain from any interference between natives and the officials, except to explain cases when explanations will be of service to enable justice to be done, and which the officials will, without doubt, always be glad to have if they are honest, cannot be held subject to Chinese law, except in the way of arrest and delivery to the Consular officers of their own country, according to the rule laid down in the Treaties. In the cases cited which occurred in Szchuen, where it is charged that the Christian culprit ran away and evaded justice, the proper officers are, it seems to me, alone responsible for all this. The missionaries had no right to shield, screen, or secrete these people, nor should they be censured if they refuse to act the part of police officers in the arrest of Christians. This all belongs to the local officials to do. If the men were guilty, I fail to see any good reason why they were not arrested and punished the same as Ho Tsai and Liuh Fuh, if the officers had done their duty.

Rule 5 seems to me proper enough, except that portion authorizing a refusal of passports for provinces where rebellion may exist. If consented to, this might practically nullify the whole passport system provided for in the Treaties. Missionaries will hardly take the risk of going into districts where rebellion is rife; and if they do, on them will fall the penalty of such rash acts. In the last ten years, during which passports have been granted, no cases have been reported in which the holders have gone among rebels to aid them in any way.

Rule 6. I fail to see what practical good would come from a registry of the members of each church, were it assented to. It is not to be supposed that all enrolled as members of the Buddhist, Taoish, Confucian, or Christian sects are pure and honest men; nor should the fact of their being so enrolled exempt them from arrest and punishment in case they commit offences against the laws.

In the cases mentioned that happened in Kweichau in 1866 and 1869, instead of making these a ground of general complaint to the Foreign Office, why did not the Governor cause the arrest and punishment of the brigands? Their profession of Christianity certainly did not exempt them from the just consequences of their evil deeds. It would seem that the officers, instead of attending to their own proper duties in the administration and due execution of the laws, chose to allow these people to escape for the purpose of reporting these cases, and on them founding a general charge against Christianity and the missionaries. If lawless people, whether Christians or non-Christians, are allowed to oppress the orphans and the helpless, deceive and exact from the villagers, and assume improper positions in the Courts, instead of listening to such complaints from those whose duty it is to prevent and punish such outrages, the officials should, it seems to me, be summarily deprived of their rank, and severely punished for allowing these things to go on.

Rules 7 and 8. If the missionaries assume to exercise powers unauthorized by Treaty and regulations, use seals, or adopt a style in addressing the officials in any way unbecoming, the Representative of the Government to which they belong, upon a proper statement of the facts, would issue such orders as would prevent a repetition of such improprieties. In case of any gross breach of etiquette by an American missionary, I should, upon the fact being made known to me, take steps to prevent such occurrences in the future. It is the custom of the American missionaries to use caution when they go to a new place to rent rooms or houses, and they endeavour by all means to so manage as to gain the good-will of the people.

Instances have occurred where they have been prevented from renting or buying property for no other reason, apparently, than a disposition to embarrass and hinder them in their preaching. Many cases of this kind have occurred which would have formed just grounds for complaint to the Foreign Office. I have, however, refrained from making complaints of this character, as I felt sure that, as soon as the real purposes of the missionaries became better understood, there would be less and less opposition to them on the part of the people. With reference to the restoration of property which was confiscated many years ago, and of the use of which its proper owners have been deprived, that is a matter which concerns the missionaries of the Roman Catholic faith alone, and must be arranged with the Representative of France. It is, perhaps, but natural that disputes and difficulties should occur in the settlement of such a question. No fixed rule is possible which will apply in all cases of this nature. Nothing but mutual forbearance, and a desire to settle amicably, in a spirit of justice, these questions, will be likely to accomplish a satisfactory result. The experience gained in the solution of these questions will, undoubtedly, prove a useful lesson to both officials and people. It will clearly demonstrate that unjust and unlawful persecutions and confiscations will require reparation sooner or later, and prove that the best way to avoid the difficulties that have caused so much anxiety and trouble during the past ten years is to act justly towards all people and all religious sects; then foreign nations will have no claims of this nature to urge.

To assure peace in the future, the people must be better informed of the purposes of foreigners. They must be taught that merchants are engaged in trade which cannot but be beneficial to both native and foreigner, and that missionaries seek only the welfare of the people, and are engaged in no political plots or intrigues against the Government. Whenever cases occur in which the missionaries overstep the bounds of decorum, or interfere in matters with which they have no proper concern, let each case be reported promptly to the Minister of the country to which it belongs. Such isolated instances should not produce prejudice or engender hatred against those who observe their obligations, nor should sweeping complaints be made against all on this account. Those from the United States sincerely desire the reformation of those whom they teach, and to do this they urge the examination of the Holy Scriptures, wherein the great doctrines of the present and a future state, and also the resurrection of the soul, are set forth, with the obligation of repentance, belief in the Saviour, and the duties of man to himself and others. It is owing, in a great degree, to the prevalence of a belief in the truth of the Scriptures that Western nations have attained their power and prosperity. To enlighten the people is a duty which the officials owe to the people, to foreigners, and themselves; for if, in consequence of ignorance, the people grow discontented, and insurrection and riots occur, and the lives and property of foreigners are destroyed or imperilled, the Government cannnot escape its responsibility for these unlawful acts.

If the danger is as great as the contents of your communication would appear to indicate, and that, owing to the ignorance of the common people, all will be likely to suffer, irrespective of nationality or religious belief, then it certainly is a matter of great concern to all foreign Governments, which should lead them to consult and seek means to prevent, if possible, such a catastrophe, and also adopt measures for defending their rights under the several Treaties.

If I have failed to comprehend fully the difficulties and dangers which surround the situation which you have endeavoured to point out, or if I have omitted noticing any point of importance, I am quite ready and willing to meet you and the other members of the Foreign Office, and discuss these as well as other questions of difference between your country and foreign nations, in a spirit of forbearance, with an earnest desire to arrange and settle all questions that peace and mutual confidence may long continue.

With renewed assurance of regard and consideration, I have, &c.,

(Signed) FREDERICK F. LOW.

Their Excellencies Shin Kwei-fan and Wan Tsiang.

(Inclosure 3.)

Note from Wan Tsiang to Sir R. Alcock, June 26, 1869.

[See *ante*, Inclosure 3 in No. 6.]

Mr. Davis to Mr. Low.

(No. 57.)

Sir, *Department of State, Washington, October* 19, 1871.

THE delay in answering your No. 56 has not been caused by a disposition to disapprove of your reply to the Foreign Office note on the subject of missions. On the contrary, the President regards it as wise and judicious.

Two versions of these regulations have found their way to the Department—the translation inclosed in your No. 56, and a translation, apparently made from a French version, presented to the houses of Parliament in Great Britain, in June or July last, and printed in British Blue Book entitled "China, No. 3, 1871." These versions differ widely in form and expression, and, to some extent, in sense.

The version presented to Parliament has been or will be made the subject of instructions by Her Majesty's Government to Mr. Wade.* A copy of these proposed instructions was communicated to this Department by Her Majesty's Chargé at Washington in August last. A copy is herewith inclosed, and also a copy of the version to which they relate.

The most material variance between the two versions is in the designation of the missionaries against whom the Chinese Foreign Office complain. Your version limits the complaints to missionaries of the Roman Church. The British translation, following the French version, represents the complaints against "Christians." For instance, the British version renders the beginning of the first Article or Rule as follows: "The Christians, when they found an Orphanage, give no notice to the authorities, and appear to act with mystery." Your translation of the same sentence reads, "The establishment of asylums for training up children by the Romanists has hitherto not been reported to the authorities, and, as these institutions are carefully kept private," &c., &c. From the English version of the accompanying note from the Yamên, it is evident that the Chinese Foreign Office recognizes that there are in China Christian missionaries of different faiths; for they say that "the people in general, unaware of the difference which exists between Protestantism and Catholicism, confound these two religions under this latter denomination." Your version is to the same effect.

Under these circumstances it may be well to re-examine the original, and ascertain which version is correct. Both, however, agree in the statement that the Government of China is apprehensive of a popular outbreak which may endanger the peace of the country and its relations with the United States and the European Powers, and that therefore it has determined to submit to the Representatives of the foreign Powers a plan for regulating the condition of Christians in China. Your prompt and able answer to these propositions leaves little to be said by the Department.

The rights of citizens of the United States in China are well defined by Treaty. So long as they attend peaceably to their affairs they are to be placed on a common footing of amity and good-will with subjects of China; and are to receive and enjoy for themselves, and everything appertaining to them, protection and defence from all insults and injuries. They have the right to reside at any of the ports open to foreign commerce, to rent houses and places of business, or to build such upon sites which they have the right to hire. They have secured to them the right to build churches and cemeteries, and they may teach or worship in those churches without being harassed, persecuted, interfered with, or molested. These are some of the rights which are expressly and in terms granted to the United States, for their citizens, by the Treaty of 1858. If I rightly apprehend the spirit of the note of the Foreign Office, and of the regulations which accompany it, there is, to state it in the least objectionable form, an apprehension in the Yamên that it may become necessary to curtail some of these rights, in consequence of the alleged conduct of French missionaries. This idea cannot be entertained for one moment by the United States.

The President will see with deep regret any attempt to place a foreign ecclesiastic, as such, on a different footing from other foreigners residing in China. It is a fundamental principle in the United States that all persons, of every sect, faith, or race, are equal before the law. They make no distinction in favour of any ecclesiastical organization. Prelates, priests, and ministers can claim equal protection here, and enjoy equal rank in the eye of the civil law. The United States ask no more in China than they confer at home. Should the peace of the Empire be disturbed by efforts from any quarter to induce or compel the Government to confer unusual civil rights on foreign ecclesiastics, you will make it plain that the United States have no sympathy with such a movement, and regard it as outside of the Treaty rights which have been conferred upon the western nations. Should these demands, however, be complied with, this Government will then consider whether, under the Thirtieth Article of the Treaty of 1858, a similar right will not at once inure to the benefit of all the public officers, merchants, and citizens of the United States.

* See *ante*, No. 9.

The President would look with equal regret upon any attempt to withdraw the native Christians from the jurisdiction of the Emperor without his free consent, or to convert the churches founded by the missionaries into asylums. He can well conceive that the enjoyment of such a right might, as intimated by the Yamên, operate for the nominal and apparent conversion of desperadoes and criminals, who need a place of refuge to escape from punishment. On the other hand, he is mindful that the faith of the Empire is pledged to the United States that not only citizens of the United States, but Chinese converts, who peaceably teach and practise the principles of Christianity, shall in no case be interfered with or molested. He feels confident, therefore, and expects that whatever may be the disposition of the turbulent and evil-disposed among the subjects of the Emperor, the native converts to Christianity will enjoy the full measure of protection guaranteed to them by the Treaty of 1858. Except so far as the guarantee of that Treaty extends, the President cannot permit the officials of the United States to participate in any attempt to disturb the natural relations between the Emperor and his Christian subjects. He particularly desires it to be understood that the profession of the Christian faith is not regarded by the officers of the United States as a protection against punishment for crime. Ecclesiastical asylums for criminals have never existed in this country, nor will they be planted elsewhere through its agency.

This Government has studiously and stedfastly observed its Treaty engagements with China. The policy of the President and of his Administration was elaborately set forth in the despatch of August 31, 1869, to Mr. Bancroft, a copy of which was inclosed in Mr. Fish's No. 2 to you. The President has no reason to change that policy. On the contrary, the events which have occurred since that despatch was written have the more convinced him of its justice. We stand upon our Treaty rights; we ask no more, we expect no less. If other nations demand more, if they advance pretensions inconsistent with the dignity of China as an independent Power, we are no parties to such acts. Our influence, so far as it may be legitimately and peacefully exerted, will be used to prevent such demands or pretensions, should there be serious reason to apprehend that they will be put forth. We feel that the Government of the Emperor is actuated by friendly feelings towards the United States. We recognize the existence, to a limited extent, of the popular feeling and danger of outbreak which are set forth in the note of the Foreign Office. As far as we can, consistently with the duty which the Government owes to those who have the right to claim its protection, we desire to aid the Government of the Emperor in calming that feeling and in preventing such outbreak.

Should other nations seek our advice, or counsel with us on this subject, we shall not fail to urge these views. But, in order to urge them with success, we must be in a position to say that the Chinese Government is able and anxious to perform all its international duties, whether founded upon Treaty or on well-settled principles of public law. We could speak with still greater force if we could give an assurance that it is disposed to enlarge its intercourse with the West, and to revise its Treaties in that spirit. The guarantees for peace lie in this direction rather than in the revival of a restrictive policy.

With these general principles stated, it is not necessary to refer in detail to the note of the Foreign Office, or to the rules. Your reply to them has anticipated much that I should have otherwise said. I content myself with saying that as no complaint is made against the American missionaries, so there is no necessity to make such rules for their observance.

A copy of these instructions will be sent to the various Treaty Powers. You will communicate the substance of them to Prince Kung.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. C. B. DAVIS, *Acting Secretary.*

Frederick F. Low, Esq.

Mr. Pakenham to Mr. Fish.

Sir, *Washington, August* 24, 1871.

IN compliance with instructions which I have received from Earl Granville, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a draft of a despatch which Her Majesty's Government propose to address to Mr. Wade, Her Majesty's Minister in China,* respecting the Circular of the Chinese Government on the subject of religious missions in that empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. J. PAKENHAM.

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* See *ante*, No. 9.

CHINA. No. 1 (1872).

CORRESPONDENCE respecting the Circular of the Chinese Government of February 9, 1871, relating to Missionaries.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1872.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CHINA. No. 9 (1870).

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

INLAND RESIDENCE

OF

ENGLISH MISSIONARIES

IN

CHINA.

Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their Address dated April 6, 1870.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

[C.—89.] *Price 6d.*

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BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated April 6, 1870;
for—

"A Copy or Extracts of Correspondence with English Missionary Societies or Missionaries on Inland Residence in China."

No. 1.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1868.

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter from the Baptist Missionary Society, stating the circumstances in which they request to be informed whether British subjects have a right by Treaty to hire, purchase, or receive as a gift, land or buildings in China, if natives were disposed to let, sell, or give either; and I have to instruct you to furnish me with a report upon this subject.

I inclose a copy of the answer I have caused to be addressed to the above application.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

The Rev. F. Trestrail to Lord Stanley.

Baptist Mission House, 2, John Street, Bedford Row,
My Lord, *London, December* 8, 1868.

I AM directed by the Committee of the Baptist Missionary Society to inquire of your Lordship whether British subjects have a right by Treaty to hire, purchase, or receive as a gift, land or buildings in China, if natives were disposed to let, sell, or give.

The facts on which this request is founded are briefly these:—

The Chang family, residing at Che-Hia-Hien, of whom the Chief and several others had received Christian baptism—the former as long ago as 1862—desired to give a temple belonging to the family, known as the Sheie-Ma-Kung, to the Rev. Frederick Laughton, our missionary at Che-foo, to be used by him for the general objects of the mission. Part of this temple has been used for some time as a place of worship. At a general meeting of the family it was unanimously resolved by them to give this property to the Society.

Mr. Laughton despatched two native assistants to make diligent inquiry into the matter. They met the family on the 3rd of the first month of the present Chinese year, and to prevent undue haste, and to be sure that the proposal met with the concurrence of all the family, they suggested that the deed should not be drawn and executed until the following afternoon, so that if any one objected it might be known. At this second meeting, to which all the family were summoned, no one offered any objection. The deed was therefore drawn at the request of the family, and signed by Chang Hio, the head of it, and some others most responsible, and representing the various branches.

Mr. Laughton, acting under the advice of Her Majesty's Consul, handed the deed to him, that it might be stamped and registered in the usual manner. Shortly after this, the District Magistrate of Chi Hia called Tsoo-Tsiang before him, to inquire why he had done this. Several of the parties summoned were in Che-foo. With these Mr. Laughton left for Chi Hia, and on arrival there he found that the Chief of the clan had been examined by the District Magistrate, who heard from him that the act was that of the family. He was sentenced to receive 400 blows, and two others were punished by 300 and 200 blows respectively.

Mr. Laughton returned to Che-foo, and laid the case before Her Majesty's Consul. This gentleman had previously handed the deed of gift to the Taoutae, the chief official at

the port, and he refused to set his seal to the deed, stating that foreigners had no right to hold property in the interior.

It is to this point I am more particularly directed to call your Lordship's attention. It is not necessary that I should detail the subsequent proceedings in the case which took place before the chief official at Che-foo, nor attempt to describe his mode of dealing with it, nor his insolence to Her Majesty's Consul, who was present at the examination, and of whom Mr. Laughton speaks in the highest terms for his kind and patient attention to the whole affair, as such details would unnecessarily occupy your Lordship's time, and throw no additional light on the transaction. Suffice it to say that the Chief Magistrate terminated the inquiry most hastily, sent back the men who had been brought as prisoners to Che-foo for fresh punishment, and pronounced against the whole transaction. Her Majesty's Consul returned the deed to Mr. Laughton, intimating that though he deemed the deed good and valid, notwithstanding that two who had signed it had, through fear of the District Magistrate, disowned their signature, as already described, he had informed the Taoutae that it was not his intention to prosecute the claim any further.

As Christian missions are extending in China, the inquiry I have been directed to make of your Lordship is one of great importance, more especially on account of the events which have happened to the members of the American mission at Hang-chow. As Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" was called up by the Consul, your Lordship must have received full particulars of the affair, and the steps taken by the British authorities in that district in regard to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRED. TRESTRAIL, *Clerical Secretary.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Mr. Hammond to the Rev. F. Trestrail.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 17, 1868.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to acknowledge the receipt of your Memorial of the 8th instant, inquiring whether British subjects have a right by Treaty to hire, purchase, or receive as a gift, land or buildings in China, if natives are disposed to let, sell, or give.

I am to state to you in reply, that as it appears from your Memorial that the special point which has given rise to your inquiry has already been submitted on behalf of the Society to Her Majesty's Consul at Che-foo, from whom, however, no report has yet been received, Lord Clarendon must defer returning an answer until he shall have communicated with Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, to whom your Memorial will be referred by the outgoing mail.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 2.

Sir R. Alcock to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 16.)

(Extract.) *Peking, March* 12, 1869.

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch of the 18th of December last, I have to submit the following particulars, which I think will afford all the information desired:—

The right by Treaty to hire, purchase, or receive as a gift, land or buildings in China, for missionary or any other purposes, away from the open ports, does not exist for British subjects, save in so far as it can be shown to be a right secured to French missionaries by the Convention with France signed at Peking on the 25th October, 1860.

A right of residence and a right of acquiring land or houses in the interior, both appear to rest on no better foundation than a clause added to the Chinese version of the Convention which has no counterpart in the French text; and as Article III of the French Treaty of 1858 stipulates that the French text shall in all cases govern,—"En cas de dissidence ce sera toujours le texte original, et non la traduction, qui fera foi,"—whatever is not found in the French text cannot be held binding on either Contracting Party.

This interpolation in the Chinese text of the IIIrd Article is to the following effect, and forms the last sentence:—"It is, in addition, permitted to French missionaries to rent and purchase land in all the provinces, and to erect buildings thereon at pleasure."

Under these circumstances, what the Chinese authorities have done appears to be this:—they have not contested either the right of residence or of acquiring land and houses by the French missionaries, but stipulated, through the provincial authorities, that no property should be acquired or held by individual missionaries, but only for the Church; in other words, in the name and on the behalf of any Chinese convents constituting a Christian community or Church established in the interior. And they have farther stipulated, as Tsêng Kwo-fan stated in his instructions to the magistrate of Chin-kiang, that no land or houses should be either leased or rented, or otherwise transferred, for missionary purposes until after report to the proper local authorities, and under their seal and sanction.

A kind of prescriptive or permissive right has been allowed to grow up, by which land and houses in the interior may be acquired either by hire, purchase, or gift, for missionary purposes in a certain way, and under certain conditions; conditions which, it may be remarked, carry with them something very like a prohibitive power on the part of the local authorities, if they are inimical. For it is perfectly well known that the power and influence of the local magistracy is so great over the lives and property of Chinese subjects as to preclude any individual venturing to let or to give either land or houses to missionaries or other foreigners, if warned that such act would be disapproved.

Under such conditions as these, the only answer I can give to your Lordship's inquiry whether British subjects have a right by Treaty to hire, purchase, or otherwise acquire land for missionary purposes in the interior, is that a conditional right appears to have been admitted, under protest, by the Chinese Government; and that what the French missionaries enjoy cannot, according to Treaty, be denied by the Chinese authorities to the British. But, in both cases, the conditions of enjoyment are such as to make it entirely contingent on the disposition of the Chinese local authority to promote or oppose it, and the acquisition of any place of residence by missionaries in the face of such opposition would be impossible without the direct interference of a foreign Power. The recent occurrences in the district of Che-foo, at Wu-chang, opposite Han-kow, Yang-chow, Chin-kiang, in the Min, and in Formosa, all prove how active is the opposition to any assertion of this right, and to what dangerous extremities both authorities and people proceed in order to frustrate any attempt of missionaries to establish a new domicile in the interior. Even in the older fields of missionary labour, such as the Romanist missions for the most part occupy, their presence is a continual source of danger. These are untoward results of proselytizing labours, and tend greatly to complicate relations both political and commercial. The effect is to retard all progress. And whatever the force or character of the right of residence derived from the tolerance of the Chinese in the case of the French, it remains a serious question for Her Majesty's Government to decide, whether they will demand for British missionaries the same facilities and privileges that are claimed by the French Government for the Romish missions in the interior. Because certain terms have been conceded to these, it does not follow that the British Government must of necessity accept the same, with all their consequences of grave complications and national responsibilities. It is, I conceive, a matter in which Her Majesty's Government may exercise a free option, and accept or decline as they see fit.

Whatever the attendant evils of a religious propaganda in the interior of China may be, it is not in the power of Her Majesty's Government to avert them altogether by declining to claim any right of residence for missionaries in the interior, though it may cease to be responsible for the acts of British missions, and refuse them all claim to protection. Certain pretensions of the missionaries to supersede the civil power would either cease to exist or be less boldly pushed, knowing that they were no longer backed by any foreign Power, and although a few of the less temperate or more zealous missionaries might invite martyrdom, the bulk of them would, I am inclined to believe, escape serious molestation; while their converts, learning wisdom and moderation from their religious teachers, would no longer provoke the hostility of surrounding populations, and be exposed to persecutions. I do not believe the progress of truth and religion would suffer; but the hazard to the preacher, and the danger of social convulsions and political disturbances, would be less. All the Treaty Powers have followed our example, and claimed religious toleration. The Imperial Government, I believe, has no wish to withdraw the right conceded—certainly not on any religious grounds. If what is now asserted as a right were to become permissive only, and therefore at the option of the Chinese Government, I think we might count upon the influence of the foreign Representatives for the power not being exercised oppressively and in an intolerant spirit, but only for the removal of intemperate missionaries, who, by their conduct or pretensions, might endanger the peace of any locality. I think the position of inland

missions, instead of being deteriorated or imperilled, would, upon the whole, be made more secure and less liable to hostility and serious molestation.

No. 3.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 19, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 12th of March in regard to the residence of missionaries in the interior of China, and I have to acquaint you in reply that I have read your clear and conclusive despatch with great interest.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government agree with you that it is not incumbent on them to insist in favour of British missionaries on the privileges conceded to Roman Catholic missionaries, and brave the consequences of doing so. But still less would they feel disposed to do so, when, as appears to be the case, the privileges claimed for the Roman Catholic missionaries rest on no sound foundation, but on an interpolation of words in the Chinese version alone of the French Treaty with China.

You will, therefore, not allow British missionaries to suppose that, in virtue of that interpolation, Her Majesty's Government can support their pretensions to any other privilege of residence and locomotion in China than British subjects in general may enjoy, and should it be necessary, you will warn them that if they seek to assert greater privileges they will do so at their own risk and responsibility, and must not expect any action or forcible interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government for their relief.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 4.

Sir R. Alcock to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

My Lord, *Peking, July* 31, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a letter addressed to me by the Rev. Joseph Edkins and others, British missionaries resident in Peking, together with my reply, in which I have declined entering into any controversy concerning the views I have thought it my duty to submit to Her Majesty's Government on matters of public policy.

I doubt not this course will meet with approval, more especially as your Lordship's despatch of the 19th of May last decides the main question raised by Mr. Edkins and his colleagues as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government claiming a right of domicile in the interior of China for Protestant missionaries.

Since the writers of the inclosed letters, however, impugn the correctness of many of the statements and opinions on the subject of missionary operations in China conveyed in my despatches, I have thought it right to place on record, and for reference if necessary, side by side with the charges of inaccuracy and error, the refutation and grounds of justification, in a Memorandum which I shall have the honour to transmit to your Lordship by the next mail.

I have adopted this course in preference to attempting any review of the arguments employed by those who object to my conclusions, because the whole document is long, and the arguments so discursive that to have followed them seriatim would have entailed a despatch nearly as lengthy.

I will only farther add that I see no reason to modify the views submitted to your Lordship in my despatch on this subject of the 12th March last. I am still of opinion that, if the course there indicated could be followed, the position of the Protestant missions would be improved instead of deteriorated, and their sphere of usefulness enlarged. The missionaries would work in greater security, and a perpetual source of danger to both nations would be avoided. Christianity might then take root in the soil, and be regarded with as little ill-will or jealousy as either Buddhism or Mahommedanism, both importations from the West, and left undisturbed side by side, although each counting their millions of votaries, simply because both are subject to the law, and neither have any pretensions, either in their teachers or converts, to set themselves above it, and create an *imperium in imperio*, and a foreign influence subversive of the territorial authority.

Such a course might demand more patience and great moderation, but, rightly considered, I am firmly persuaded it would tend to allay all existing jealousy and enmity, and in the end prove anything but restrictive; while it would remove many obstacles which now prevent any extended sphere of operations in the interior. As it is, the men in office, equally with the gentry, or those that have retired, and the literati, who are the

aspirants, thus comprising three generations, as it were, of educated Chinese, see in missionaries agents of a revolutionary propaganda, and view them far more in the light of political instruments of encroachment than as teachers of religion. For the latter they would care little, and would leave them unopposed; but the bare suspicion of the former unites them as one man against the whole race of missionaries,—Roman Catholic and Protestant, English, French, and American.

Since writing the above, I have received a memorandum from the Tsungli Yamên, of which I inclose a translation, on the subject of missionaries. I think your Lordship will see in this official opinion of the Yamên full confirmation of nearly all I have stated in reference to inland missions, and the disadvantages attending them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

The Rev. J. Edkins and others to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Peking, July* 14, 1869.

IN recent despatches to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, quoted by Lord Clarendon in the House of Lords, and commented on by the leading English newspapers. you have entered somewhat at length into the subject of Protestant missions in China, and we, Protestant missionaries resident in Peking, desire to address you, and through you Her Majesty's Government on some of the points brought forward by you.

These despatches, copious extracts from which you have courteously furnished us with, strongly advocate a restrictive polic with reference to Protestant missionary operations in the interior of China, principall on the ground of the "implacable hostility entertained by the Chinese authorities and the official class in China towards all missionaries," and also because of the injury that will accrue to our commercial relations in China, if missionaries are permitted to domicile themselves in the interior. If Lord Clarendon's speech in the House of Lords on the 5th of April last is rightly reported in the "London and China Express," he states it as his opinion that "it is absolutely necessary that the missionaries should not establish themselves in the interior," and again that "it is expedient that the missionaries should confine themselves to the Treaty ports, exercising even there great judgment."

In regard to the first point you have represented the arrogant pretensions of the Roman Catholic missionaries as one cause of hostility to all missionary labours. It is no doubt one cause, and we are as conscious of the mischief of such arrogance as your Excellency can be. But in giving the hostility of the Chinese to missionaries as a reason why Protestant missionaries should be restrained in their operations, the nature of that hostility and the principal causes of it should be distinctly mentioned.

It is well-known and understood in China, that the hostility entertained by the Chinese to Protestant missionaries is not directed against them as a class, but as foreigners. And the causes of that hostility are the hatred of other races which the Chinese have always had, the repeated defeats inflicted on the Chinese Government by England, and the evils connected with the opium trade.

The Chinese look on missionaries as representatives of all foreigners, and all foreigners they believe to be encroachers on the rights of others, seekers after money and territory, or opium-sellers. Almost every abusive placard that has been issued against Protestant missionaries, has charged them either with secret designs of conquest or with being engaged in the coolie and opium trades, and making the teaching of virtue a cloak for these abominations. A missionary was not long ago driven out of a large city in the Province of Honan by a mob, led on by the native gentry, the cause of whose hatred to him was given in these words shouted after him as he left the city, "You burned our palace, you killed our Emperor, you sell poison to the people, and now you come professing to teach us virtue!" These charges sufficiently indicate other and deeper, and to the Chinese more generally understood causes of hostility than the pretensions of some Roman Catholic Bishops, or even the well-known and much to be deplored Protectorate of Chinese Christians by France. Such charges show beyond a doubt that the Protestant missionary suffers not as a missionary, but as a foreigner. He suffers from a hostility which he has had no share in provoking. Mr. Taylor's expulsion from Yang-chow is a proof of this, inasmuch as the attack was made on him and his party before he had had time to commence missionary operations. No general argument

then against the establishment of Protestant missions in the interior, can be founded on the troubles which Protestant missionaries have recently met with in certain inland towns.

You have directed Lord Clarendon's special attention to a placard that was posted towards the end of last year on the gates of Shanghae, which you think showed unmistakeably "what are the prevailing opinions of the educated and official classes respecting Christianity, as it has presented itself to their minds, and through them been conveyed to the common people whom they lead." "It is only indeed," you further say, "by the light of such documents that we can see how it may be true, as has been said, that the minds of the Chinese are 'set like the nether-millstone' against the teaching of missionaries." The contents of the placard will, we think, hardly bear out such a statement as this. It was directed principally against the Roman Catholics, and accused them of eating babies' flesh and gouging out the eyes of the dying. This mode of attacking the Romish religion has become common on the part of the Heathen Chinese for many years, and was by no means a new charge when the placard in question was issued. The same thing might occur in any city at any time. The ignorance of the native population leads to the belief of such stories. They have arisen from a misunderstanding of the rites of baptism, the Sacrament of the Host, and extreme unction. The Protestant missionaries are of course classed with the Roman Catholics, and hence these foolish charges against us. The ruling classes know that these charges are false, but they invent them for the purpose of deluding the common people and stirring up their hatred to foreigners. They are of a piece with the notion held by some of the common people, and put forth some years ago in an anonymous placard posted on the walls of Ningpo and Hang-chow, that foreign opium is made by pounding the bones and flesh and blood of coolies who had been stolen from China for this purpose, and are equally unworthy of grave consideration.

The injury that will accrue to our "material interests" in China, if missionaries are permitted to domicile themselves in the interior, you give as another reason for restraining them from doing so. "Commerce," you say, "its extension and free development was, the first great object of the Treaty of Tien-tsin." "It is futile to graft on to a Treaty of Commerce a proselytizing agency for the conversion of the nation to Christianity." You entertain strong opinions against "the wisdom of present efforts for the establishment of Protestant missions beyond the circle of the ports." You "have no doubt whatever as to the risk incurred, and the evil consequences to be anticipated from persistent efforts in this direction upon all material interests and progressive improvements in our relations with the rules and people of China."

As commerce is thus put into the foreground as the one only object of Great Britain in China, it is impossible to refrain from asking what has been the nature of that commerce which we have forced upon the Chinese? Has it been such as only to benefit the people, or has it been such as to demoralize them? We fear that the result of British commerce in China has rather had the latter effect than the former. The main branch of British commerce in China is opium, an article which the Chinese believe to have been the cause of our first war with China, and which, however eagerly it may be sought after, they regard as injurious to them mentally, morally, and physically. Now, how does the trade in opium compare with that in tea and silk? It cannot surely be subject for self-congratulation on the matter of our commerce with China, that there is very little difference annually between the total value of the opium imported from India into China, and that of all the tea and silk exported from China to England, and elsewhere. Let the following statistics speak for themselves:—

	Taels.
In 1867 the total amount of Indian opium imported into China was 88,148 piculs, 25,582 piculs of which were smuggled into China from Hong Kong. In silver the total value of this opium was	45,071,357
In the same year (1867) the total amount of tea exported to all countries from China was 1,122,384 piculs, the value of which in silver was	33,754,009
The total amount of silk exported to all countries from China during the same year was 39,299 piculs, the value of which in silver was	15,724,380
Total value of tea and silk exported in 1867	49,478,389

This shows that the total value of the tea and silk exported from China to all countries in 1867, exceeded the total value of the one article of opium imported from India into China, chiefly by British merchants, during the same year, only by about 4,500,000 taels. Opium then may be considered as the main branch of British commerce in China; and, however opinions may differ as to the amount of injury inflicted

by this drug on those who use it, no one will defend it on the ground of its being in any sense beneficial to the people. The Chinese themselves, whether they use it or not, regard it as injurious. The enormous advance of the amount imported from India since the early years of its introduction, is a cause, far more than a result, of the immense demand for it. It has given an impetus to the growth of native opium which, as in Szechuen, is gradually superseding the foreign article. Since the opening of the Yang-tsze, the native drug in the interior has become one-half cheaper, and the number of smokers has been trebled. "The cultivation of the poppy," said one of the censors in a Memorial recently addressed to the Emperor on this subject, "has been substituted for cereal productions over vast tracts of the Western and Northern provinces, so as in some parts to occasion a rise in the price of food." For this, and all the other injuries entailed by opium, British commerce is responsible, and yet it is in the interests of British commerce that Protestant missionaries are to be restrained from penetrating into the interior. Missionary operations are represented as almost the one obstacle to "progressive improvements," while it is implied that commerce, if once freed from its connection with these operations, would only advance the cause of progress.

In opposition to this, we maintain that honourable commerce has nothing to fear from Protestant missionaries, but everything to gain. Merchants, as a rule, cannot make themselves understood among the people, as they but rarely learn their language; British officials, if they do know the language, mix but little among the native population. Protestant missionaries learn the language, mix with the people, and throw their influence all on the side of morality, peace, and good-will. They go about, not as represented, merely to proselytize to a certain "set of dogmas," but to teach all whom they can reach the first great principles of morality, and to explain the desires and aims of the better portion of the English in coming among them. They have opened hospitals for the healing of the sick; and they frequently spend time, and health, and strength, in ministering to the physical wants of the poor. They live among the Chinese on a friendly footing, diffuse information, receive the Chinese cheerfully in their houses, and constantly inculcate in them the practice of virtue and religion. The native women are visited by the wives of the missionaries; kindly intercourse is maintained, the hearts of the people are won, and England, both in its lawful commerce, and its political interests, is only a gainer, never a loser, by the residence among the Chinese of the missionary families. The more there is of this sort of influence, the better it will be both for Chinese and English; and this will be especially the case in inland towns, where foreigners are only known as "devils," or "barbarians." To have Protestant mission hospitals and schools established in such cities under the care of general and medical missionaries, well qualified by education, such as you have known during your long residence in China, would work well—if it might not be shown to be almost the only practical method—for the removal of prejudice, and the spread of knowledge.

But we shall be told, that however beneficial the presence of missionaries might be in the interior, it almost inevitably brings with it complications between the native and foreign Governments. But this is not, as we have shown, because of the way in which missionaries propagate Christianity, nor is it on religious grounds at all, but simply because they are foreigners. The same troubles would have arisen had a body of merchants or scientific men attempted to domicile themselves in those places out of which missionaries have recently been driven. Our merchants are urging freer access to the interior, and even permission to reside in inland towns for purposes of trade; and these demands cannot be put off much longer. When complications arise between merchants penetrating into the interior, and the proud, ignorant, ruling class, will the British Minister of that day argue that British commerce leads only to the embroiling of the two Governments, and advise that the merchants be confined again to the open ports?

Complications must arise from time to time in the opening up of this country to foreigners, and it rather becomes Her Majesty's Representatives in China to meet those difficulties, and to try every moral means to overcome them, than to advise retrogression in order to get rid of them. And they could not have a better opportunity of making this attempt, than in dealing with the settling of missionaries in the interior. Protestant missionaries ask for neither gun-boats nor soldiers to protect them. The use of force, in connection with missionary operations, is most abhorrent to their feelings. All they ask for is, that their authorities—Minister in Peking, and Consuls in the ports—will exert a friendly influence, so far as they possibly can, on the Chinese rulers to insist on protection being given to all British subjects travelling or residing in the interior, so long as they comply with the conditions of their passports. Sometimes this has been tried, and tried with success. A case in point occurred not far from Peking, about two years ago, in

connection with the persecution of some native converts made by English Protestant missionaries. The British Consul at Tien-tsin asked Chung How, the Imperial Superintendent of Foreign Trade in North China, to check the local magistrate, the Governor of Lau Ling, a city distant 170 miles from Tien-tsin, in his persecution of the native converts at that place. The mission there was in very flourishing state previous to this persecution, which was carried on by the magistrate at the instigation of the native gentry. A Proclamation was very kindly sent to the neighbourhood by Chung How, and the grievance ceased. If this can be done in the case of native converts, who might be persecuted in such a variety of ways without being able to appeal to law, we think that, if perseveringly and earnestly tried in the case of British subjects, the same plan might also prove successful. At all events, if such means fail, missionaries generally, we feel confident, would rather retire to some other place than entail the horrors of war on any town. It is unjust to speak of missionaries as anxious to fall back on Her Majesty's naval and military forces to help them in their work.

We must demur to your Excellency's statement, that "the British authorities rule, are neither consulted nor even advised by the missionaries of the steps the s independent members or bodies of diverse missions decide upon." Missionarie rule, never travel without a passport, and this has always to be applied for at th sulates. The Consuls, therefore, have every opportunity of inquiring into the mov of missionaries on applying for their passports, and acquainting themselves, if the fit, with the steps these missionaries intend to take. This system gives to Her M Government all the "direct control" that is necessary over their proceedings.

If it be asked on what grounds the Protestant missionaries claim the rig residence in the interior, and ask the British Minister and Consuls to help them to this in the way already indicated, we reply :—

1. The Chinese Government has, as a matter of fact, conceded to the Roman Catholic missionaries the right to go into the interior, and to settle themselves there for the purpose of teaching their religion; and, by the "favoured-nation" clause in the English Treaty, the same right is ceded to the English missionaries. Although this concession is not found in the French text of the French Treaty, and although for political reasons the Chinese Government would, as is well known, be glad if it could be withdrawn, it is a fact that the French missionaries are allowed this privilege, and you have yourself argued that, "what the French missionaries enjoy cannot, according to Treaty, be denied by the Chinese authorities to the British."

2. It is well known that the present policy of the Chinese Government during the remainder of the Emperor's minority is neither to recede nor to advance. Anxious to leave the responsibility of new changes with the Emperor himself, they wish to persuade the Treaty Powers to wait a few years before introducing any new principles into the relations of the countries. Hence you have said to Lord Clarendon that the Imperial Government has no wish to withdraw, at least on religious grounds, the right conceded to missionaries.

3. The Chinese Government, by their Ambassador, the Honourable Anson Burlingame, has announced to the different Western Powers the principle of entire reciprocity as that on which they desire henceforth to conduct their intercourse with friendly foreign nations. This certainly implies as much liberty to the foreigner in China as is granted to the Chinese in the West. Mr. Burlingame further explained and illustrated this new Chinese policy in his famous New York speech, in which, so far as missionaries are concerned, he said that "China invited Protestant missionaries to plant the shining Cross on every hill and in every valley." As this and similar assertions by the Chinese Envoy have produced fruit in the action of the British Government towards its subjects in China, we are entitled either to ask the Chinese Government to repudiate Mr. Burlingame's Treaties and speeches or to claim from them the benefit of his public declarations.

We would gladly stop here, believing that we have sufficiently vindicated the beneficial nature of Protestant missions and their right, in accordance with the existing condition of things in China, to establishment in the interior. But you have thought good in enforcing your "opinion of the necessary connection of missionary labours with commercial interests as an obstacle to progress and improved political relations," to allude to several points in connection with Protestant missionaries—their faulty mode of procedure, their imperfections, their disputes with each other and with the Roman Catholic missionaries, their sympathy with the Taeping rebels, and the revolutionary nature of the doctrines which they teach—as proofs that "no good can come out of such instrumentality." You cannot be surprised that we entirely disagree with you in this conclusion; and we think we can show that your premises, on which you ground your conclusion, cannot be sustained.

You have conveyed the impression to Her Majesty's Government that Protestant missionaries make no attempt to reach the ruling class in China. This is an opinion that has been dwelt upon lately in certain circles, until it has come to be accepted almost as an undoubted fact. We assert, on the other hand, that it is not a fact, and mention in proof of our assertion, that nearly 100 works on science, medicine, history and geography, law, and miscellaneous subjects, have been published in China by Protestant missionaries. These works have been composed in a style so acceptable to the learned class, that men belonging to this class, when acting as Governors and Viceroys, have reprinted at their own expense not a few of them, thus adding them to the permanent literature of the country. The missionaries then have not neglected the higher classes, but have already succeeded in interesting no small number among them in various departments of knowledge. In the translation of works adapted to this end, the object has been to inform the minds of the Chinese, so as to remove their prejudices, to induce them to think with candour, and thus pave the way for presenting Christianity to their attention.

In connection with the above charge, we have often heard of late that missionaries are only half-educated men. You yourself have spoken of missionaries in terms that would suggest such a charge as this when you speak of "the human instruments brought to bear upon the Chinese people for their conversion," as "seemingly ill-adapted to secure the end proposed." "It is vain to hope," you continue, "for the conversion of a shrewd, rationalistic, and sceptical nation like the Chinese by instrumentality so imperfect." Whether you intended this to convey the impression that these "human instruments" were "imperfectly educated" or not, is not very clear; but it is a fact that, from this and similar statements, the whole Protestant missionary body has been so represented in the "Times," the "Pall Mall Gazette," and other newspapers. Will the following facts bear out this charge? All the Chinese dictionaries yet made for English students of Chinese are the work of Protestant missionaries; the conductors and principal writers in the Chinese Repository, an invaluable mine of information on almost every Chinese subject, highly prized by all who wish to become acquainted with this country, were Protestant missionaries; the author of one of the best works on China, "The Middle Kingdom," taken as a text-book among the Student Interpreters of the British Legation, was a Protestant missionary; the translator of the Chinese classics is a Protestant missionary; the translator into Chinese of "Wheaton's International Law," whose work was printed at the expense of the Chinese Government, is a Protestant missionary. One of the principal professorships in the New University which the Chinese Government are said to be desirous of establishing in Peking, is filled by a Protestant missionary. The only writers in Chinese on subjects that will elevate this people, morally and intellectually, are missionaries. Is this class of men worthy to be branded in the House of Lords as "rascals or enthusiasts," and in the leading English newspapers as ignorant, or at best half-educated men?

Lord Clarendon has represented you as stating that there are grave "differences" (by which we suppose disputes and bickerings are meant) between the Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries, and he refers to certain "unseemly instances" of these "differences" which you have given in your despatches.

We know of no such disputes between Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries. Mr. Wylie in his memorials of the Protestant missionaries, recently published, gives a list of nearly 700 publications in China by those missionaries, living and dead. Among them there is none directed specially against the Roman Catholic missionaries. The "instances" given do not bear out the charge of disputes.

The first is that an objection was made by M. Simon, French Vice-Consul at Ningpo, to the "Pilgrim's Progress," translated some years ago into Chinese by the Rev. W. C. Burns, now deceased. This work of Bunyan, teaching Christianity by means of an allegory, being a remarkable work of genius, and a highly useful exponent of Christianity, has been translated into a large number of languages, and it has never been thought necessary to expunge those passages, few and brief, which refer to the Roman Catholics. M. Simon thought that one passage spoke disrespectfully of the Pope, and made an official complaint to the British authorities on this account. Surely this is no proof of bickerings between Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries. Sensible Roman Catholics themselves would ridicule such a complaint as foolish and paltry, for which M. Simon is alone responsible.

The "second instance" was a denunciation of Protestant books by Roman Catholic authority in China. It was stated that the books of the Protestants were "obscene," and that the readers and authors were all in danger of damnation. This again is rather an instance of intemperate language used by an individual provoked apparently by the rapid

spread of Protestant Christianity in his neighbourhood than a proof of disputes between Protestants and Romanists. Such injudicious persons are to be found everywhere, and it is most unfair on their account to involve both bodies in one sweeping condemnation, when you say that the above immoderate language "justifies the conclusion that sectarian hatreds rather than Christianity must be the result of such teaching on either side," as if this was the constant teaching of one or of both sides!

With reference to the disputes of missionaries as to the best term by which to express the name of God in China, we can only record our surprise at finding such an argument brought forward at all against missionaries. We have much that we could say on the subject, but we refrain from entering on it, as we do not see what the British Government can have to do with our discussions on a purely philological question.

You have further alluded, in strong terms of condemnation, to the sympathy which many of the Protestant missionaries manifested towards the Taeping rebels. But British naval officers and British Consuls, and even the then Governor of Hong Kong, are involved in the same condemnation. The profession of Christianity by a body of men who marched through the country from Canton to Nanking without one single check, and gave out as their object the subversion of the reigning dynasty, was enough to startle all foreign residents into inquiry into the meaning of such profession. And it did so. Naval officers, Consuls, the British Government, the general public were all interested, and more or less sympathized at first with the movement. It would have been strange indeed had missionaries stood aloof from it. It was principally through missionaries that information respecting the self-styled Christian views of the Taepings was looked for and obtained, and it will be in your recollection that Lord Clarendon sent his thanks to Dr. Medhurst for his translation of certain tracts and papers issued by the insurgents. When the nature of the movement became more plain, comparatively few of the missionaries hoped anything from it, and but one allied himself with it. Is the whole body to be held responsible for any want of judgment in one, or at most, in two or three of its members? It is utterly unfair to speak of the whole body of Protestant missionaries as "hailing the Taepings as heralds of Christianity;" or as men who will render "sympathy to the first band of pirates and robbers who can gather elements of disturbance about them." Such a sweeping condemnation condemns itself.

In your despatch of the 8th December you dwell much on the political and revolutionary tendencies of Christianity, and argue that, as the missionary, from the very nature of the doctrines he teaches, must of necessity teach revolution, he ought to be restrained from going into the interior, and you leave the impression on the reader of your despatch that you think it would be decidedly for the peace of China if Christianity and its emissaries were excluded altogether from the country.

It is an old accusation against Christianity on the part of the heathen, that it teaches revolution—but by this they mean only one aspect of revolution, namely, sedition. Christ Himself was accused of "stirring up sedition." His apostles also had to meet the charge, although we find in their writings the enforcement on their converts, in the strongest possible way, of obedience to the "Powers that be." When the Chinese accuse Christianity of being revolutionary, they also mean that it teaches sedition. Now we know this is untrue. Christianity may be revolutionary of customs and opinions, but it is not seditious. The heathen have made this mistake because of their ignorance of responsibility to a Divine Power, and their inability to comprehend the principle that "God must be obeyed before men." But the ignorance of the heathen on this point constitutes the very ground of missions. Men must be taught that there is a Divine Power in the world and that all, without exception, are responsible to it. Surely no Christian man or Christian Government can be opposed to this, or forbid missionaries to preach Christianity because the heathen entertain an ignorant objection to it, which has no foundation in fact. And yet from your despatch you seem to think it a valid objection.

But whilst we contend that the Chinese view of Christianity, being revolutionary, is wrong, and therefore no argument against missions, we are free to acknowledge that Christianity does produce revolutions. It would be worth very little if it did not revolutionize the countries which accept it. But the very presence of Anglo-Saxons in the East is revolutionary, and therefore we are warranted in arguing that if Christianity is to be banished because of its tendency to produce changes, the British and American Governments ought to recall every Anglo-Saxon in China.

Whether it arises from his religion, or his civilization, or from something inherent in his race, the Anglo-Saxon wherever he goes among the semi-civilized Pagan nations of the East is sure, sooner or later, to produce a revolution. This has been seen in India, in China, and in Japan, and in each case the revolution, whether complete or

partial, has been unconnected with missionaries. The East India Company zealously excluded missionaries from India at first, and yet were the means of subverting every native Government. In Japan missionaries have not been allowed to propagate Christianity since its recent opening to foreign intercourse, and yet it is a significant fact that within ten years of this event a great revolution has taken place in the Government of that country. In China changes have been made that are equivalent to a revolution. The reigning dynasty was at one time all but overturned, and if it has now any strength, it is all owing to the influence of those very foreign Powers that had well nigh caused its overthrow.

If the despotic Governments of the East are to be left unimpaired, if nothing must be done which is at all likely to interfere with the ideas on which they are founded, then we have no right to bring to China the laws or the commerce of Christendom, and force the Chinese to accept them. Both are revolutionary in such countries as China and Japan. Both break up the established order of things. Both introduce elements of Western progress, utterly uncongenial with, or rather hostile to, the stagnation of Eastern Pagan despotisms. The settlement in Peking of a British Minister at the point of the bayonet, and the demand that he shall be treated as Ambassadors in the West are treated, are far more subversive of all the Chinese ideas of government than the teaching of missionaries.

Are we wrong then in having come to China? Must we apologize to the Chinese for all the defeats we have inflicted on them, and the changes we have made amongst them socially and politically, and forthwith take our departure? Are the British Government likely to repent of all the injury they have done to Chinese exclusiveness and pride, and to withdraw all their officials and their subjects from China on the ground that our presence here is revolutionary? Shall we not rather be told that it is too late now even to moot the question, whether Western nations ought or ought not to force their intercourse on an unwilling heathen people? The thing has been done, is being done, and will continue to be done. The nations of the West seem to be brought hither by a necessity over which they have no control. They bring their commerce, their civilization, and their religion with them, and it is beating the air to argue against the introduction of them simply because they will produce revolutions.

China, it is admitted on all hands, needs a revolution. Its ignorance, its superstitions, its pride, its exclusiveness,—all require to be changed. Until this is done, foreign intercourse of any kind will be a perpetual source of danger to individuals, of complication between the Governments. The Christian religion is the only means by which such a change can be brought about, and in due time it will effect this change in China, as it has done in the nations of the West. Its propagators, so long as they cannot be proved to be breaking the laws of China, ask only that no hindrance shall be thrown in the way of Christianity, and in the long run it will be found that even the "material interests" of Great Britain in China will by this course be advanced.

We are, &c.

(Signed) JOSEPH EDKINS, *Missionary of the London Missionary Society.*
JOHN S. BURDON, *Missionary of the Church Missionary Society.*
WILLIAM H. COLLINS, *Missionary of the Church Missionary Society.*
JOHN DUDGEON, *Medical Missionary, London Missionary Society.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Sir R. Alcock to the Rev. J. Edkins and others.

Gentlemen, *Peking, July* 18, 1869.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant on the subject of Protestant missions in China, and, according to your desire, a copy shall be forwarded to Her Majesty's Secretary of State by the next mail, accompanied by such comments as may seem necessary to correct errors of statement and prevent misapprehension as to my views.

This is the more necessary, as you have, in not a few instances, confounded together opinions and views conveyed in despatches to Her Majesty's Government as mine, with others for which I am not in any way responsible, while you have at the same time drawn

inferences supposed to be based on the former, which, even when they are separated from their context, they do not justify. As such a process is eminently calculated to mislead, I think it right to notify the fact in anticipation of your giving publicity to your letter.

If Lord Clarendon should think it either necessary or expedient, he will no doubt direct an answer to be returned; and in the meantime I cannot, as Her Majesty's Minister here, enter into a controversy as to the opinions I may consider it my duty to submit to Her Majesty's Government for their information in mattersof national interest and policy. If you think them erroneous, in so far as they are known to you, in matters nearly touching your own interests and mission, I am glad that you should have an opportunity of expressing your opinions, but I cannot discuss them with you.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

Memorandum from the Tsung-li Yamen to Sir R. Alcock.

(Translation.)

THE object of the missionary, no matter where he comes from, is to inculcate virtue. But their converts are not all alike; they are good and bad. The bad constantly look to their creed for protection, so as to compromise the good name of missions and render them universally unacceptable. But in addition to this the missionaries, desirous only of a large number of proselytes, make no inquiries into the every-day behaviour of their converts, but accept whoever chooses to come. Once they are members of the church, the good men among them will doubtless continue the practice of virtue; but the vicious ones will merely use their position to oppress their fellow-people. By degrees dislike and suspicion accumulate and result in a condition of complete antagonism.* The feuds between the Christians and the populace which are now constantly occurring in various parts are doubtless well known to his Excellency the British Minister.

Although the creeds and sects of foreign nations are various, the people having no means of discriminating, know only one general term, "the foreign missionary," and an unfounded tale, into which the people will not stop to inquire, will raise a tumult against any of them. The occurrences at Yang-chow are a proof of this.

If complete and effective precautions are not taken a great calamity must be aroused. It will be right, then, to draw up regulations which will prevent the Christian converts from making protests against their fellow people, and will also prevent the non-Christian part of the community from bullying the Christians.

Moreover, as is the case with the Taorist and Buddhist consistories, the missionaries themselves should be under the superintendence of the local authority. For as the missionary is desirous to make his home in China and extend his operations, and would be considered as a Chinese by the Chinese, he should take the native standpoint.

There is a case *à propos* in Buddhism, which came also from the West. Its votaries and the Chinese, each respecting their own creed, have ever harmonized together; for though the creeds are dissimilar, the preachers are alike under Government control.

Even in the case of Confucianism, the most venerable of all the creeds in China, a person whose degree of Han Lin, or Doctor, would confer official rank, if he return home and take neophytes under his tuition, would again come under official control. This is an invariable rule.

Many missionaries have adopted the Chinese habit without obeying Chinese laws. They thus separate themselves from the people and manifest a superiority, Their converts, improving on this, oppress and insult those who are not of their faith, and learn to oppose the Government. It is not to be wondered at if men's minds accumulate ill-feeling and if there be a prevalent feeling of alarm. It only remains to put them (missionaries and converts) under the direct control of local officials; but these should be prevented from being oppressive: then each party having its measure of justice, there need be no fear of accidents.

The matter is one which seriously affects the interests of commerce, and it is necessary, therefore, to take measures of precaution, to the end that friendly relations may be strengthened and endure.

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* Lit., the condition of fire and water.

No. 5.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 27, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 31st July, inclosing a copy of a letter you had received from certain British missionaries in Peking on the subject of Protestant missions in China; and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the reply you returned to that letter, a copy of which is also inclosed in your despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 6.

Mr. Hammond to the Bishop of Victoria.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1869.

SINCE I had the honour of seeing your Lordship, in company with Mr. Matheson and another gentleman, a despatch has been received from Sir Rutherford Alcock on the subject of the attack on the native Christians at Loyuen, a place not very far distant from Foo-chow-foo, to which you had called my attention.

Having at this time reported to the Earl of Clarendon what passed in that interview, I have now received his directions to acquaint your Lordship that Sir Rutherford Alcock proposed to call on the Chinese Government to cause a searching and impartial inquiry to be made into the matter, with a view to justice being done.

But I am to take this opportunity of stating to your Lordship that there is good reason to suppose that the animosity which has lately been more intensely shown towards missionaries on the part of the ruling authorities in China, is in a great measure to be attributed to the injudicious conduct of the native converts to Christianity. Without attempting to determine whether such conduct is shown in a greater or less degree by one class of converts or another, there seems sufficient reason to believe that converts assume, and have acted on the assumption, that by embracing Christianity they released themselves from the obligations of obedience to the local authorities, and from the discharge of their duties as subjects of the Emperor, and acquired a right to be protected by the European Power whose religious tenets they had adopted.

It can scarcely be matter of surprise, therefore, that the local authorities do not view the converts with friendly sentiments; and it is not to be supposed that they should discriminate between them, according to the doctrines of Christianity which they may profess to hold.

Lord Clarendon therefore thinks that your Lordship, if willing to undertake the task, would render valuable service to the missionary cause, if you would point out to the Protestant Societies interested in it, that they will do well to warn converts that although the Chinese Government may be bound by Treaty not to persecute, on account of their conversion, Chinese subjects who may embrace Christianity, there is no provision in the Treaty by which a claim can be made on behalf of converts for exemption from the obligations of their natural allegiance, and from the jurisdiction of the local authorities. Under the creed of their adoption, as under that of their birth, Chinese converts to Christianity still owe obedience to the law of China, and if they assume to set themselves above those laws, in reliance upon foreign protection, they must take the consequence of their own indiscretion; for no British authority, at all events, can interfere to save them.

Lord Clarendon fully appreciates the zeal and devotedness which British missionaries in China display in the prosecution of the work they have undertaken; but the limits within which the protection of British authority can be extended to their labours are defined by Treaty; and the VIIIth Article of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, of the 26th June, 1858, merely says that "the Christian religion, as professed by Protestants or Roman Catholics, inculcates the practice of virtue, and teaches man to do as he would be done by. Persons teaching or professing it, therefore, shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities; nor shall any such, peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the laws, be persecuted or interfered with." And although, independently of the work in which they are engaged, British missionaries

can claim any rights which British subjects in general may be entitled to enjoy, yet Lord Clarendon cannot too earnestly recommend to them to use the utmost caution in the prosecution of their labours, and more especially to confine their operations, until circumstances are more favourable, within the limits where Consular protection and intervention can be rightfully and successfully exerted in their favour.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 7.

Sir R. Alcock to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

My Lord, *Peking, October* 1, 1869.

REFERRING to my despatch of the 31st July last, I now forward a printed copy of the letter of the missionaries, with my comments in the margin, which should have formed its inclosure, and I avail myself of the opportunity to transmit similar comments on the Rev. J. S. Burdon's covering letter.

The subject has now been discussed so often, and, if not exhaustively, at such length, that there ought to be little for me or for the missionaries to add of any great importance. Whether viewed in a religious or a political light, the missionary question is one respecting which it is essential to arrive at a right conclusion. On the policy to be adopted in protecting or discouraging the missionary work in the interior of China much in the future must depend, both as regards foreign relations and the internal state of the country.

I have given great offence, I believe, to the missionary body, by the views which I have expressed; but it has been in the discharge of a duty quite as imperative upon me as they consider the obligations laid upon them to preach the Gospel in all places, and under all circumstances, whatever may be the consequences. I believe they feel more aggrieved by my distrust in the efficacy of the means which the preaching of the Gospel affords of converting the Chinese, and entirely changing the whole nature and habits of some 400,000,000 of Chinese and Mongols, than by any reluctance on my part to recommend a policy of active interference and protection, which they must know can only be made efficacious by a resort to force, and with a contingency of war. I cannot, without a total disregard of history, hope that missionaries will accomplish more with the Chinese race in this nineteenth century than has been effected with far more ample means, and under more favourable conditions, in the West during the preceding eighteen. What 30,000 pulpits and preachers cannot do in Great Britain at the present day, is not likely, as far as human means are concerned, to be accomplished by 200 or 300 teachers of an alien race, and of different and conflicting sects and rival churches, however earnest and devoted may be the men. And on the chance of this, or some miraculous intervention, a Government may well be permitted to hesitate before it sacrifices a vast commerce on which the greatness and power of the nation mainly depends, and with it the influence of all the material elements of civilization which follow in its train. If even they were undeterred by the risk of incurring all the responsibilities of a political revolution in the country, and a foreign war, they might still shrink from committing themselves and the country,

An article on "Romanism in Szechuen," in the "London and China Express," put side by side with a statement on Protestant missions, contained in Mr. Alabaster's Trade Report, speaking of the district round Swatow, present a fair summary of disadvantages and advantages, proved by experience, to attend the labours of Romanist and Protestant missionaries in China under existing conditions, and for facility of reference I inclose them both, only observing that, as regards Mr. Alabaster's statement, it is incomplete, as no account is taken *per contra* of all the complications daily resulting from popular tumults, destruction of chapels, and attacks or outrages on both missionaries and converts all over the provinces with increasing frequency where missions, Protestant or Roman Catholic, seek to establish themselves. This is in part supplied, however, by a subsequent despatch and inclosure from Swatow, reporting a new instance of popular violence and official supineness while a Protestant mission was being attacked; copy of which I inclose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Letter of British Protestant Missionaries in Peking to Sir R. Alcock.

Remarks.

Sir, *Peking, July* 14, 1869.

IN recent despatches to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, quoted by Lord Clarendon in the House of Lords, and commented on by the leading English newspapers, you have entered somewhat at length into the subject of Protestant missions in China, and we, Protestant missionaries resident in Peking, desire to address you, and through you Her Majesty's Government, on some of the points brought forward by you.

These despatches, copious extracts from which you have courteously furnished us with, strongly advocate a restrictive policy with reference to Protestant missionary operations in the interior of China, principally on the ground of the "implacable hostility entertained by the Chinese authorities and the official class in China towards all missionaries," and also because of the injury that will accrue to our commercial relations with China, if missionaries are permitted to domicile themselves in the interior. If Lord Clarendon's speech in the House of Lords, on the 15th of April last, is rightly reported in the "London and China Express," he states it as your opinion that "it is absolutely necessary that the missionaries should not establish themselvss in the interior," and again that "it is expedient that the missionaries should confine themselves to the Treaty Ports, exercising even there great judgment."

1. Restrictive in a certain sense, and with reference to existing conditions.

Hence the report quoted is not correct, which makes it appear that I had stated as my opinion that "it is absolutely necessary that the missionaries should not establish themselves in the interior."

In regard to the first point, you have represented the arrogant pretensions of the Roman Catholic missionaries as one cause of hostility to all missionary labours. It is no doubt one cause, and we are as conscious of the mischief of such arrogance as your Excellency can be. But in giving the hostility of the Chinese to missionaries as a reason why Protestant missionaries should be restrained in their operations, the nature of that hostility and the principal causes of it should be destinctly mentioned.

It is well known and understood in China that the hostility entertained by the Chinese to Protestant missionaries, is not directed against them as a class, but as foreigners. And the causes of that hostility are the hatred of other races which the Chinese have always had, the repeated defects

In regard to the implacable "hostility" entertained by the "Chinese authorities and the official classes in China towards all missionaries," the writers contend "that it is well known and understood in China, that the hostility is not directed against them as a class, but as foreigners." To

inflicted on the Chinese Government by England, and the evils connected with the opium trade.

The Chinese look on missionaries as representatives of all foreigners, and all foreigners they believe to be encroachers on the rights of others, seekers after money and territory, or opium sellers. Almost every abusive placard that has been issued against Protestant missionaries, has charged them either with secret designs of conquest, or with being engaged in the coolie and opium trades, and making the teaching of virtue a cloak for these abominations. A missionary was not long ago driven out of a large city in the Province of Honan by a mob, led on by the native gentry, the cause of whose hatred to him was given in these words, shouted after him as he left the city: "You burned our palace, you killed our Emperor, you sell poison to the people, and now you come professing to teach us virtue." These charges sufficiently indicate other and deeper, and to the Chinese, more generally understood causes of hostility than the pretensions of some Roman Catholic Bishops, or even the well known and much to be deplored Protectorate of Chinese Christians by France. Such charges show beyond a doubt that the Protestant missionary suffers not as a missionary, but as a foreigner. He suffers from a hostility which he has had no share in provoking. Mr. Taylor's expulsion from Yang-chow is a proof of this, inasmuch as the attack was made on him and his party before he had had time to commence missionary operations. No general argument then, against the establishment of Protestant missions in the interior, can be founded on the troubles which Protestant missionaries have recently met with in certain inland towns.

You have directed Lord Clarendon's special attention to a placard that was posted towards the end of last year, on the gates of Shanghae, which you think showed unmistakeably "what are the prevailing opinions of the educated and official classes respecting Christianity, as it has presented itself to their minds, and through them been conveyed to the common people, whom they lead." "It is only indeed," you further say, "by the light of such documents that we can see how it may be true, as has been said, that the minds of the Chinese are 'set like the nether-millstone' against the teaching of missionaries." The contents of the placard will, we think, hardly bear out such a statement as this. It was directed principally against the Roman Catholics, and accused them of eating

which I reply that of the existence of a hostile feeling towards them as missionaries, teachers of a new religion, and of doctrines subversive of all established order and institutions, the evidences are so abundant and indisputable that I am surprised their production should be challenged.

The following may be cited as furnishing conclusive proofs:—

The expulsion of Mr. Taylor and his party was on purely missionary grounds. They were known as missionaries; they were plotted against, placarded, reviled, and assailed in that character, not as foreigners. The charge of killing children, taking out their eyes, &c., is one only brought against missionaries, and it was by that cry the populace was raised against them when their expulsion was effected.

The placard objected to as being directed principally against Roman Catholics (a very questionable assumption) is only one of a hundred issued in every province wherever missionaries, Protestant or Roman Catholic attempt to locate themselves, and this during a long succession of years. In most, if not all of these, no distinction is made between the two, and they are indiscriminately reviled.

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babies' flesh and gouging out the eyes of the dying. This mode of attacking the Romish religion has become common on the part of the heathen Chinese for many years, and was by no means a new chrrge when the placard in question was issued. The same thing might occur in any city at any time. The ignorance of the native population leads to the belief of such stories. They have arisen from a misunderstanding of the rites of baptism, the Sacrament of the Host, and extreme unction. The Protestant missionaries are of course classed with the Roman Catholics, and hence these foolish charges against us. The ruling classes know that these charges are false, but they invent them for the purpose of deluding the common people, and stirring up their hatred to foreigners. They are of a piece with the notion, held by some of the common people, and put forth some years ago in an anonymous placard posted on the walls of Ning-po and Hang-chow, that foreign opium is made by pounding the bones and flesh of coolies who had been stolen from China for this purpose; and are equally unworthy of grave consideration.

The injury that will accrue to our "material interests" in China, if missionaries are permitted to domicile themselves in the interior, you give as another reason for restraining them from doing so." "Commerce," you say, "its extension and free development was the first great object of the Treaty of Tien-tsin." "It is futile to graft on to a Treaty of Commerce a proselytizing agency for the conversion of the nation to Christianity." You entertain strong opinions against "the wisdom of present efforts for the establishment of Protestant missions beyond the circle of the ports." You "have no doubt whatever as to the risk incurred, and the evil consequences to be anticipated from persistent efforts in this direction, upon all material interests and progressive improvements in our relations with the rulers and people of China."

As commerce is thus put into the foreground as the one only object of Great Britain in China, it is impossible to refrain from asking what has been the nature of that commerce which we have forced upon the Chinese? Has it been such as only to benefit the people or as it been such as to demoralize them? We fear that the result of British commerce in China has rather had the latter effect than the former. The main branch of the British commerce in China is opium, an article which the Chinese believe to have been the

Remarks.

That injury does accrue to our commerce and material interests in China from the attempts to establish inland missions in all the jealousies and fears they excite and the tumults that result, is vouched for by the note of the Yamên of July 18, 1869.* The Ministers declare that the matter is one which seriously affects the interests of commerce, inasmuch as it tends to excite jealousies, and fears, and enmities, and popular tumults; it must, one would think, injuriously affect material interests dependent on peace and good-will. They may dislike the merchant, but the missionary they fear; and where the former might trade or travel peacefully, the latter is not allowed to preach or settle himself. The one they regard as a trafficker, more or less intrusive, whose presence in the interior, with his exterritoriality, they could well dispense with; but the other as creating an *imperium in imperio* fatal to the authority of the Emperor. And are they so far wrong in their conclusion?

* Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

cause of our first war with China, and which, however eagerly it may be sought after, they regard as injurious to them mentally, morally, and physically. Now, how does the trade in opium compare with that in tea and silk? It cannot surely be subject of self-congratulation in the matter of our commerce with China, that there is very little difference annually between the total value of the opium imported from India into China, and that of all the tea and silk exported from China to England and elsewhere. Let the following statistics speak for themselves :—

	Taels.
In 1867 the total amount of Indian opium imported into China was 88,148 piculs, 25,582 piculs of which were smuggled into China from Hong Kong. In silver the total value of this opium was ..	45,071,357
In the same year (1867) the total amount of tea exported to all countries from China was 1,122,384 piculs, the value of which in silver was	33,754,009
The total amount of silk exported to all countries from China, during the same year, was 39,299 piculs, the value of which in silver was..	15,724,380
Total value of tea and silk exported in 1867	49,478,389

This shows that the total value of the tea and silk exported from China to all countries, in 1867, exceeded the total value of the one article of opium imported from India into China, chiefly by British merchants, during the same year, only by about 4,500,000 taels. Opium, then, may be considered as the main branch of British commerce in China, and however opinions may differ as to the amount of injury inflicted by this drug on those who use it, no one will defend it on the ground of its being in any sense beneficial to the people. The Chinese themselves, whether they use it or not, regard it as injurious. The enormous advance of the amount imported from India, since the early years of its introduction, is a cause, far more than a result, of the immense demand for it. It has given an impetus to the growth of native opium, which, as in Szechuen, is gradually superseding the foreign article. Since the opening of the Yang-tsze, the native drug in the interior has become one-half cheaper, and the number of smokers has been trebled. "The cultivation of the poppy," said one of the censors, in a Memorial recently addressed to the Emperor on this subject, "has been substituted for cereal productions on vast tracts of the Western and Northern Provinces, so as in some parts to occasion a rise in the price of food." For this and all the other injuries entailed by opium, British com-

I am not concerned to disprove any assertions as to the immorality of commerce or the evils attending the consumption of opium. But the whole argument is scarcely relevant; for if the commerce denounced were the most moral and beneficent, missionary labours inland, while China is constituted as it is, would be adverse in various ways to its development. It was not commerce, good or bad, that drove the missionaries out of China in the eighteenth century, and trade to a single port at the farthest limit of the Empire.

If the same thing does not happen again, it will be because commerce and its interests will keep the doors open; as it was these alone, in the present century, that forced them open and allowed the missionary to enter.

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merce is responsible; and yet it is in the interests of British commerce that Protestant missionaries are to be restrained from penetrating into the interior. Missionary operations are represented as almost the one obstacle to "progressive improvements," while it is implied that commerce, if once freed from its connection with these operations, would only advance the cause of progress.

In opposition to this, we maintain that honourable commerce has nothing to fear from Protestant missionaries, but everything to gain. Merchants, as a rule, cannot make themselves understood among the people, as they but rarely learn their language. "British officials," if they do know the language, mix but little among the native population. Protestant missionaries learn the language, mix with the people, and throw their influence all on the side of morality, peace, and good-will. They go about not, as represented, merely to proselytize to a certain "set of dogmas," but to teach all whom they can reach the first great principles of morality, and to explain the desires and aims of the better portion of the English in coming among them. They have opened hospitals for the healing of the sick, and they frequently spend time, and health, and strength, in ministering to the physical wants of the poor. They live among the Chinese on a friendly footing, diffuse information, receive the Chinese cheerfully in their houses, and constantly inculcate on them the practice of virtue and religion. The native women are visited by the wives of the missionaries, kindly intercourse is maintained, the hearts of the people are won, and England, both in its lawful commerce and its political interests, is only a gainer, never a loser, by the residence among the Chinese of the missionary families. The more there is of this sort of influence the better it will be both for Chinese and English, and this will be especially the case in inland towns, "where foreigners are only known as devils," or "barbarians." To have Protestant mission hospitals and schools established in such cities, under the care of general and medical missionaries, well qualified by education, such as you have known during your long residence in China, would work well—if it might not be shown to be almost the only practical method—for the removal of prejudice and the spread of knowledge.

But we shall be told that, however beneficial the presence of missionaries might be in the interior, it almost inevitably brings with it complications between the native

Remarks.

That "honourable commerce has nothing to fear," &c., is a very doubtful assertion, as has been already shown.

They do all this, no doubt, and many more good works; but that "they do not go about to proselytize to a certain set of dogmas," as well as "teach the first great principles of morality," seems to me a bold assertion. Dogmas are inseparable from all religious systems. Creeds must have a dogmatic and exclusive character; how else can they be distinctive? Is it not perfectly true that "both practical experience and sound reasoning show every form of religion which is to exercise any real influence over the human mind must be dogmatic; that is to say, it must form a positive system composed of propositions mutually supporting each other, and believed to be true, jointly and severally by those who possess them. It must also be exclusive; that is, it must teach not only its own truth, but the falsehood of every other creed, in so far as it differs from itself?" An attempt to teach a religion in general which is no religion in particular,—can this realize a missionary's idea?

Great as may be the evil of rival sects and churches teaching conflicting doctrines to the Chinese, and thus planting the seeds of future wars and contentions, will any of these several teachers feel satisfied only to impart those general notions of religious duty and worship for which any general basis of agreement can be found?

So experience proves.

If not because of the way in which they propagate Christianity—because of the fact—and on political grounds, as I have shown,

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and foreign Governments; but this is not as we have shown, because of the way in which missionaries propagate Christianity; nor is it on religious grounds at all, but simply because they are foreigners. The same troubles would have arisen had a body of merchants or scientific men attempted to domicile themselves in those places out of which missionaries have recently been driven. Our merchants are urging freer access to the interior, and even permission to reside in inland towns for purposes of trade, and these demands cannot be put off much longer. When complications arise between merchants penetrating into the interior and the proud, ignorant ruling class, will the British Minister of that day argue that British commerce leads only to the embroiling of the two Governments, and advise that the merchants be confined again to the open ports?

Complications must arise from time to time in the opening up of this country to foreigners, and it rather becomes Her Majesty's Representatives in China to meet those difficulties, and to try every moral means to overcome them, than to advise retrogression in order to get rid of them. And they could not have a better opportunity of making this attempt than in dealing with the settling of missionaries in the interior. Protestant missionaries ask for neither "gun-boats" nor soldiers to protect them. The use of force in connection with missionary operations is most abhorrent to their feelings. All they ask for is that their authorities—Minister in Peking and Consuls in the ports—will exert a friendly influence, so far as they possibly can, on the Chinese rulers, to insist on protection being given to all British subjects travelling or residing in the interior, so long as they comply with the conditions of their passports. Sometimes this has been tried, and tried with success. A case in point occurred not far from Peking, about two years ago, in connection with the prosecution of some native converts, made by English Protestant missionaries. The British Consul at Tien-tsin asked Chung-How, the Imperial Superintendent of Foreign Trade in North China, to check the local Magistrate, the Governor of Lau-ling, a city distant 170 miles from Tien-tsin, in his persecution of the native converts at that place. The mission there was in a very flourishing state previous to this persecution, which was carried on by the Magistrate at the instigation of the native gentry. A Proclamation was very kindly sent to the neighbourhood by Chung-How, and the grievance ceased. If this can

not altogether without just foundation; not, certainly, as alleged, "because they are foreigners."

The British Government of the present day declines to claim a right of inland residence for merchants and missionaries alike, because of the complications that might arise.

Moral means are of singularly little avail, as a general rule, when dealing with such difficulties either at Peking or in the provinces.

Missionaries ask to be protected wherever they may be, as they have a perfect right to do; but beyond the circuit of the ports it is impossible to give them efficacious protection, even if Her Majesty's Government were as willing, as they are averse, to the employment of force. Therefore, if a resort to it be abhorrent to missionaries, are they not bound to avoid giving rise to any necessity for such measures?

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be done in the case of native converts, who might be persecuted in such a variety of ways, without being able to appeal to law, we think that if perseveringly and earnestly tried in the case of British subjects, the same plan might also prove successful. At all events, if such means fail, missionaries generally, we feel confident, would rather retire to some other place than entail the horrors of war on any town. It is unjust to speak of missionaries as anxious to fall back on Her Majesty's naval and military forces to help them in their work.

We must demur to your Excellency's statement that "the British Authorities, as a rule, are neither consulted nor even advised by the missionaries, of the steps the several independent members or bodies of diverse missions decide upon." Missionaries, as a rule, never travel without a passport, and this has always to be applied for at the Consulates. The Consuls, therefore, have every opportunity of inquiring into the movements of missionaries on applying for their passports, and acquainting themselves, if they think fit, with the steps these missionaries intend to take. This system gives to Her Majesty's Government all the "direct control" that is necessary over their proceedings.

If it be asked on what ground the Protestant missionaries claim the right of residence in the interior, and ask the British Minister and Consuls to help them to this in the way already indicated, we reply:—

1. The Chinese Government has, as a matter of fact, conceded to the Roman Catholic missionaries the right to go into the interior, and to settle themselves there for the purpose of teaching their religion; and by the "favoured-nation" clause, in the English Treaty, the same right is ceded to the English missionaries. Although this concession is not found in the French text of the French Treaty, and although, for political reasons, the Chinese Government would, as is well known, be glad if it could

Remarks.

I maintain the accuracy of my statement that the British authorities, as a rule, are neither consulted nor advised by the missionaries of the steps they decide upon.

Many examples might be cited, but one may suffice. Mr. Maxwell, in Formosa, refused even to listen to the counsel of the Consul, three years ago, when the former first arrived, as to an inland mission there; and persisted, after his place had been twice sacked, and serious complications resulted. He is, in part, responsible for all the trouble and bloodshed there has been at Taiwan.

The application for a passport to travel into a province neither gives sufficient information nor affords means of obtaining it; still less any efficient control over the ulterior proceedings of isolated members of independent missions; and I maintain both to be necessary in the interests of peace.

If their proceedings are to entail political troubles and grave responsibilities on the country, it has a right which cannot reasonably be disputed to exercise control and fix limits beyond which these shall not extend. No Government will be disposed to accept the one without the other. Where there is no power to govern or control, there can be no legitimate responsibility.

The right of residence in the interior rests upon a very insecure foundation—partly derived from French Treaties in relation to Roman Catholic missions for the restoration of property in land and houses, conferred by former Emperors upon them and subsequently confiscated—a condition of things having no parallel in Protestant missions—and partly on actual residence, sanctioned or unopposed by Chinese authorities.

Letter of British Protestant Missionaries. *Remarks.*

be withdrawn, it is a fact that the French missionaries are allowed this privilege, and you have yourself argued that what the French missionaries enjoy, cannot, according to Treaty, be denied by the Chinese authorities to the British.

2. It is well known that the present policy of the Chinese Government, during the remainder of the Emperor's minority, is neither to recede nor to advance. Anxious to leave the responsibility of new changes with the Emperor himself, they wish to persuade the Treaty Powers to wait a few years before introducing any new principles into the relations of the countries. Hence, you have said to Lord Clarendon that the Imperial Government has no wish to withdraw, at least on religious grounds, the right conceded to missionaries.

3. The Chinese Government by their Ambassador, the Honourable Anson Burlingame, has announced to the different western Powers, the principle of entire reciprocity as that on which they desire, henceforth, to conduct their intercourse with friendly foreign nations. This certainly implies as much liberty to the foreigner in China as is granted to the Chinese in the West. Mr. Burlingame further explained and illustrated this new Chinese policy in his famous New York speech, in which, so far as missionaries are concerned, he said that "China invited Protestant missionaries to plant the shining Cross on every hill and in every valley." As this and similar assertions by the Chinese Envoy have produced fruit in the action of the British Government towards its subjects in China, we are entitled either to ask the Chinese Government to repudiate Mr. Burlingame's Treaties and speeches, or to claim from them the benefit of his public declarations.

As to Mr. Burlingame's high-flown speeches, and the expediency of calling upon the Chinese Government either to repudiate these promises or fulfil them, this has already been done, and the disavowal quickly followed.

We would gladly stop here, believing that we have sufficiently vindicated the beneficial nature of Protestant missions, and their right, in accordance with the existing condition of things in China, to establishment in the interior. But you have thought good, in enforcing your "opinion of the necessary connection of missionary labours with commercial interests as an obstacle to progress, and improved political relations," to allude to several points in connection with Protestant missionaries—their faulty mode of procedure, their imperfections, their disputes with each other and with the Roman Catholic missionaries, their sympathy with the Taeping rebels, and the revolutionary nature of the doctrines which they teach—as proofs that "no good can come out of

The beneficial nature of Protestant missions under wise guidance has never been called in question. Their object is good, but that does not preclude doubts or comments as to the means adopted.

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such instrumentality." You cannot be surprised that we entirely disagree with you in this conclusion, and we think we can show that your premises, on which you ground your conclusion, cannot be sustained.

You have conveyed the impression to Her Majesty's Government that Protestant missionaries make no attempt to reach the ruling class in China. This is an opinion that has been dwelt upon lately in certain circles until it has come to be accepted almost as an undoubted fact. We assert on the other hand that it is not a fact, and mention in proof of our assertion that nearly 100 works on science, medicine, history, geography, law, and miscellaneous subjects have been published in China by Protestant missionaries. These works have been composed in a style so acceptable to the learned class, that men belonging to this class when acting as Governors and Viceroys, have reprinted at their own expense not a few of them, thus adding them to the permanent literature of the country. The missionaries then have not neglected the higher classes, but have already succeeded in interesting no small number among them, in various departments of knowledge. In the translation of works adapted to this end, the object has been to inform the minds of the Chinese so as to remove their prejudices, to induce them to think with candour, and thus pave the way for presenting Christianity to their attention.

In connection with the above charge, we have often heard of late that missionaries were only half-educated men. You yourself have spoken of missionaries in terms that would suggest such a charge as this, when you speak of the "human instruments brought to bear upon the Chinese people for their conversion" as "seemingly ill-adapted to secure the end proposed." "It is vain to hope," you continue, "for the conversion of a shrewd, rationalistic, and sceptical nation like the Chinese, by instrumentality so imperfect." Whether you intended this to convey the impression that these "human instruments" were "imperfectly" educated, or not, is not very clear, but it is a fact that from this and similar statements, the whole Protestant missionary body has been so represented in the "Times," the "Pall Mall Gazette," and other newspapers. Will the following facts bear out this charge? All the Chinese dictionaries yet made for English students of Chinese are the work of Protestant missionaries; the conductors

Remarks.

I have never said, or "conveyed the impresssion," to "Her Majesty's Government, that "Protestant missionaries make no attempt to reach the ruling class in China." I have contended that their main efforts were not in this direction, and suggested, as a layman's view, whether this might not be the better course.

I do not think that I have suggested such a charge. The human instruments, as distinct from supernatural Agencies, I thought imperfect in some respects, if not manifestly inadequate to the end, and I think so still. But where have I spoken of the missionaries as "half-educated men?" "From this and similar statements" (a rather vague kind of reference), I am apparently held responsible for all the "Times," "Pall Mall Gazette," and other newspapers, may have seen fit to publish on the subject, and for which I am no more responsible than the missionaries themselves.

As I have never written of the missionaries otherwise than as a class entitled to the highest praise, the question at the close of this paragraph is not appropriately addressed to me.

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and principal writers in the Chinese repository,—an invaluable mine of information on almost every Chinese subject, highly prized by all who wish to become acquainted with this country,—were Protestant missionaries; the author of one of the best works on China, the "Middle Kingdom," taken as a text-book among the student Interpreters of the British Legation, was a Protestant missionary; the translator of the Chinese classics is a Protestant missionary; the translator into Chinese of Wheaton's International Law, whose work was printed at the expense of the Chinese Government, is a Protestant missionary, one of the principal professorships in the new University which the Chinese Government are said to be desirous of establishing in Peking, is filled by a Protestant missionary. The only writers in Chinese on subjects that will elèvate this people morally and intellectually, are missionaries. Is this class of men worthy to be branded in the House of Lords as "rascals or enthusiasts," and in the leading newspapers as ignorant or at best half-educated men?

Lord Clarendon has represented you as stating that there are "grave differences" (by which we suppose disputes and bickerings are meant) between the Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries, and he refers to certain "unseemly instances" of these "differences" which you have given in your despatches.

We know of no such disputes between Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries. Mr. Wylie, in his Memorials of the Protestant missionaries, recently published, gives a list of 700 publications in China by those missionaries, living and dead. Among them there is none directed specially against the Roman Catholic missionaries. The "instances" given do not bear out the charge of disputes.

The first is, that an objection was made by M. Simon, French Vice-Consul at Ningpo,

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In quoting from Lord Clarendon's speeches in the House of Lords, and my own despatches, there must have been a good deal of misapprehension and confusion, apparently, in the minds of the writers. The only place in my despatches where "unseemly instances" (or "unseemly disputes" rather) appears, is in a quotation from a historian speaking of early Christians in the Roman Empire. "Grave differences" I have certainly asserted to exist, and said they were such as to be apparent to Chinese, both between Protestants and Roman Catholics and among the Protestant sects—but I did not refer to these in the sense attributed, of "bickerings and disputes," which would imply something of a personal character.

And are there not grave differences on matters of faith and practice? on all that constitutes distinctive forms of religion and worship?

Do not the quasi-edict of Monseigneur de Besi, denouncing Protestant books, and M. Simon's more recent protest against the Protestant missionaries' works, sufficiently prove the fact as between Protestants and Roman Catholics? These are isolated cases, I am told, and prove nothing but the folly or intemperate language of an individual. I maintain, on the contrary, that they are typical, and speak the sentiments of Roman Catholics generally in regard to Protestant doctrines and teaching; and, if the Pope

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to the "Pilgrim's Progress," translated some years ago into Chinese by the Rev. W. C. Burns, now deceased. This work of Bunyan, teaching Christianity by means of an allegory, being a remarkable work of genius, and a highly useful exponent of Christianity, has been translated into a large number of languages, and it has never been thought necessary to expunge those passages, few and brief, which refer to the Roman Catholics. M. Simon thought that one passage spoke disrespectfully of the Pope, and made an official complaint to the British authorities on this account. Surely this is no proof of bickerings between Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries. Sensible Roman Catholics themselves would ridicule such a complaint as foolish and paltry, for which M. Simon is alone responsible.

The second instance, was a denunciation of Protestant books by Roman Catholic authority in China. It was stated that the books of the Protestants were "obscene," and that the readers and authors were all in danger of damnation. This again is rather an instance of intemperate language used by an individual, provoked apparently by the rapid spread of Protestant Christianity in his neighbourhood, than a proof of disputes between Protestants and Romanists. Such injudicious persons are to be found everywhere; and it is most unfair on their account to involve both bodies in one sweeping condemnation, when you say that the above immoderate language "justifies the conclusion that sectarian hatred, rather than Christianity, must be the result of such teaching on either side"—as if this was the constant teaching of one or of both sides!

With reference to the disputes of missionaries, as to the best term by which to express the name of God in Chinese, we can only record our surprise at finding such an argument brought forward at all against missionaries. We have much that we could say on the subject, but we refrain from entering on it, as we do not see what the British Government can have to do with our discussions on a purely philological question.

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be Antichrist with the latter, the Protestan is to the former a teacher of "damnable heresy and error, which it is a deadly sin to hold."

The differences of creed which divide the Church of England and the Congregationalists, and Presbyterians, and these from the Roman Catholics, are they slight or unimportant? Or are they not held sufficient, in the belief of each, to justify their standing apart? What are the Chinese to make of these multiform varieties of tenets and worship?

As to the philological question, I merely cited that as another instance of a want of unity and accord in matters connected with missionary labours. As to the true bearing or importance of a difference about the terms for rendering the word "God" in a Chinese version of the Scriptures, I differ entirely from the missionaries; but that may be a matter of opinion,—the difference is a fact.

Then, as to the other fact, that these differences, sectarian and others, are noticed by the Chinese, and give them a plausible excuse for scoffing at missionaries as teachers of error rather than of truth,—of dissentient doctrines and divers forms of worship. Why, this constitutes one of the most common charges of the literati and officials, for an example of which see a denunciatory placard posted extensively in

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You have further alluded, in strong terms of condemnation, to the sympathy which many of the Protestant missionaries manifested towards the Taeping rebels. But British Naval Officers and British Consuls, and even the then Governor of Hong Kong are involved in the same condemnation. The profession of Christianity by a body of men who marched through the country, from Canton to Nanking, without one single check, and gave out as their object the subversion of the reigning dynasty, was enough to startle all foreign residents into inquiry into the meaning of such profession. And it did so. Naval Officers, Consuls, the British Government, the general public were all interested, and, more or less, sympathized with the movement. It would have been strange indeed, had missionaries stood aloof from it. It was principally through missionaries that information respecting the self-styled Christian views of the Taepings was looked for and obtained, and it will be in your recollection that Lord Clarendon sent his thanks to Dr. Medhurst for his translation of certain tracts and papers issued by the insurgents. When the nature of the movement became more plain, comparatively few of the missionaries hoped anything from it, and but one allied himself with it. Is the whole body to be held responsible for any want of judgment in one or at most in two or three of its members? It is utterly unfair to speak of the whole body of Protestant missionaries as "hailing the Taepings as heralds of Christianity," or as men who will render "sympathy to the first band of pirates and robbers who can gather elements of disturbance about them." Such a sweeping condemnation condemns itself.

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Honan, a translation of which was published in the Shanghae papers in 1866, wherein will be found the following passage:—

"Although the adherents of the religion only worship Jesus, yet being divided into the two sections of Roman Catholics and Protestants, these are continually railing at each other, so that we have no means of determining which is right and which is wrong."

That there was a considerable amount of interest and sympathy with the Taeping rebels manifested by missionaries in the first years can be proved by numerous facts. This may have been wise or otherwise—blameworthy or the reverse—all I insisted upon was the fact of such open manifestation of interest and its consequences. That the leader was himself a pupil of a Protestant missionary, and publicly proclaimed what he supposed to be the Protestant religion, was in itself sufficient to make the whole body of missionaries suspected and obnoxious.

I entirely concur in this opinion, but if there be any unfairness of statement, it is on the part of the writers who have misrepresented, very unintentionally I doubt not, my opinion as expressed in the despatches. What I stated as to the sympathy of missionaries and merchants alike with the Taepings, and their supposed readiness to show similar sympathy with the leaders of any insurrections having for their object the overthrow of the existing Government or religious reform, had reference simply to the impressions made upon Chinese Government officials in relation to such matters, as these are recorded in numerous official documents, of which I cited one example circulated in the "Peking Gazette."

The correctness—the justice or injustice of such opinions on the part of the officials—

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In your despatch of 4th December, you dwell much on the political and revolutionary tendencies of Christianity, and argue that as the missionary, from the very nature of the doctrines he teaches, must of necessity teach revolution, he ought to be restrained from going into the interior; and you leave the impression on the readers of your despatch that you think it would be decidedly for the peace of China, if Christianity and its emissaries were excluded altogether from the country.

It is an old accusation against Christianity on the part of the heathen that it teaches revolution, but by this they mean only one aspect of revolution, namely sedition. Christ Himself was accused of "stirring up sedition." His apostles also had to meet the charge, although we find in their writings the enforcement on their converts, in the strongest possible way, of obedience to the "Powers that be." When the Chinese accuse Christianity of being revolutionary, they also mean that it teaches sedition. Now we know this is untrue. Christianity may be revolutionary of customs and opinions, but it is not seditious. The heathen have made this mistake because of their ignorance of responsibility to a Divine Power, and their inability to comprehend the principle that "God must be obeyed before men." But the ignorance of the heathen on this point constitutes the very ground of missions. Men must be taught that there is a Divine Power in the world, and that all, without exception, are responsible to it. Surely no Christian man or Christian Government can be opposed to this, or forbid missionaries to preach Christianity because the heathen entertain an ignorant objection to it, which has no foundation in fact. And yet from your despatch you seem to think it a valid objection.

But whilst we contend that the Chinese view of Christianity being revolutionary is wrong, and therefore no argument against missions, we are free to acknowledge that Christianity does produce revolutions. It would be worth very little if it did not revolutionize the countries which accept it.

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was not the question, but their existence and influence in rendering the whole class hostile to missionaries and opposed to their domiciliation in the interior.

I have "dwelt much on the political and revolutionary tendencies of Christianity" undeniably, and I think with good reason, since these lie at the root of the matter at issue—the compatibility of missionary work and establishments in the interior, with other and primary objects of Treaties, such as commerce and amicable relations with the people and their rulers. If I am right in attributing to political causes, and the fear of revolution or disturbances, the hatred of Chinese officials and Government to missionaries, how could I fail to insist upon the leading causes of hostility? Unless this hostility can be surmounted, I quite "think it would be decidedly for the peace of China if Christianity and its emissaries were, for the present at least, excluded altogether."

It is unnecessary to justify my opinion that Christianity is essentially revolutionary in a Pagan country, because the writers of the letter have spared me the trouble, and end by fully admitting the fact. In saying that they "acknowledge that Christianity does produce revolutions," and that it would be worth very little if it did not revolutionize the countries which accept it," they admit all I have maintained. Their opinion is mine. But the belief in its revolutionary tendencies being also that of the ruling classes in China—and being, as it is here admitted, a well-founded belief —how can the missionaries doubt that it is a cause of implacable hostility to them, and to their work, on the part of those rulers?

As far as the distinction between its being erroneously supposed revolutionary in a seditious sense, and hence alone this hostility; to the Chinese it is assuredly, so far as they are concerned, a distinction without a difference. What matters it to them whether missionaries sow broadcast

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But the very presence of Anglo-Saxons in the East is revolutionary, and therefore we are warranted in arguing that if Christianity is to be banished because of its tendency to produce changes, the British and American Governments ought to recall every Anglo-Saxon in China.

Whether it arises from his religion, or his civilization, or from something inherent in his race, the Anglo-Saxon, wherever he goes among the semi-civilized Pagan nations of the East, is sure, sooner or later, to produce a revolution. This has been seen in India, in China, and in Japan, and in each case the revolution, whether complete or partial, has been unconnected with missionaries. The East India Company zealously excluded missionaries from India at first, and yet were the means of subverting every native Government. In Japan, missionaries have not been allowed to propagate Christianity since its recent opening to foreign intercourse, and yet it is a significant fact that within ten years of this event, a great revolution has taken place in the Government of that country. In China, changes have been made that are equivalent to a revolution. The reigning dynasty was at one time all but overturned, and if it has now any strength, it is all owing to the influence of those very Foreign Powers that had well-nigh caused its overthrow.

If the despotic Governments of the East are to be left unimpaired, if nothing must be done which is at all likely to interfere with the ideas on which they are founded, then we have no right to bring to China the laws or the commerce of Christendom, and force the Chinese to accept them. Both are revolutionary in such countries as China

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seeds of revolution and insurrection throughout the Empire, by enlightening and purifying the people, and so making a Pagan and vicious Government an object of hatred and insupportable; or by preaching sedition? The result is what they look to, and this alone concerns or influences their action in regard to missionaries.

No doubt the Anglo-Saxon carries elements of disturbance about with him whenever he appears among a heathen race, or one of inferior powers and civilization. And this probably is one of many reasons why he is never popular with them, nor his presence desired by the rulers. When they are strong enough they resist his entrance by force, as did the Chinese and the Japanese as long as they were able; and when strength fails them, they oppose him and his processes of civilization and theories of progress by craft and duplicity, the weapons of the weak.

The later experience of the Japanese, and their present state, fully justify the fears which dictated their desire for isolation. We have produced revolution without the aid of missionaries this time. But 200 years ago the missionaries were the principal agents, and left a legacy of hatred and implacable hostility to the merchants who only succeeded them ten years ago.

So also about the same time in China it was the missionaries who produced revolutionary and violent measures in the rulers for their expulsion and the destruction of their converts, not merchants or commerce, though there was nothing to boast of in these at the time.

So I think it is possible to understand why the Chinese rulers, loving neither class, hate the missionary more especially, because they fear him more. The foreigner, simply as such, is an object of hostility because he is looked upon as a source of possible danger to the rulers and a promoter of disturbing influences and discontent among the people, —aiding and abetting insurgents by the sale of arms and munitions of war for the sake of the profits. The missionary is not only so much additional trouble, but brings a new and more potent element of revolution, and is hated accordingly with greater intensity, and opposed with more continuity of effort.

Very true in the main, although it may be questioned whether the settlement of foreign Ministers at Peking is "far more subversive of all the Chinese ideas of Government than the teaching of missionaries,"

I doubt the fact being so; but I still more doubt this being the opinion of the Chinese

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and Japan. Both break up the established order of things. Both introduce elements of Western progress, utterly uncongenial with, or rather hostile to, the stagnation of Eastern Pagan despotisms. The settlement in Peking of a British Minister at the point of the bayonet, and the demand that he shall be treated, as Ambassadors in the West are treated, are far more subversive of all the Chinese ideas of Government than the teaching of missionaries.

Are we wrong, then, in having come to China? Must we apologize to the Chinese for all the defeats we have inflicted on them, and the changes we have made among them socially and politically, and forthwith take our departure? Is the British Government likely to repent of all the injury done to Chinese exclusiveness and pride and to withdraw all its officials and subjects from China on the ground that our presence here is revolutionary? Shall we not rather be told that it is too late now even to moot the question whether Western nations ought or ought not to force their intercourse on an unwilling heathen people? The thing has been done, is being done, and will continue to be done. The nations of the West seem to be brought hither by a necessity over which they have no control. They bring their commerce, their civilization, and their religion with them, and it is beating the air to argue against the introduction of them simply because they will produce revolutions.

China, it is admitted on all hands, needs a revolution. Its ignorance, its superstitions, its pride, its exclusiveness,—all require to be changed. Until this is done,

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Government and officials; little as it may be to their taste to be bearded by foreign Ministers in their capital.

Missionaries may be perfectly right in coming to China and yet not at liberty to do what they please; not altogether right in seeking to prosecute their work in a way eminently calculated to produce disturbances and grave political complications, and rendering resort to force or to war in the end all but inevitable. At least even Christian States may fitly have something to say in the way of objection. They may have forced their commerce on an unwilling nation, as it is alleged, and yet refuse to accept either the responsibilities or the obligation of forcing their religion also. And even if willing to accept both, they may not unfitly or unreasonably claim the right to decide for themselves under what conditions they will undertake such responsibilities and incur the cost of meeting them.

This the missionaries seem to contest, and to be disposed to repudiate as an attempt to impose on religious work a secular control and authority. Whether China needs a revolution or not, and whether revolution with its attendant consequences of anarchy and violence and bloodshed be the only or most fitting mode of arriving at the desired end of civilizing and Christianizing some 400,000,000 of Chinese and Mongols, are questions of such grave import that Governments may well decline to leave it entirely with missionaries to determine, however satisfied they may be of the good intentions of the latter.

And if it is not to be so left in the hands of irresponsible missionaries, whose duty it is "to obey God rather than man," in other words, to follow out, irrespectively of Governments and national or material interests, or any dictates of worldly wisdom what they conceive to be their duty as missionaries solely, then is there, in my opinion, an obvious and imperative necessity for State intervention, and what may, fitly enough, be termed by them "a restrictive policy."

Whether the "Christian religion," as taught by Roman Catholic or Protestant, "is the only means by which such a change can be brought about,"—a general reformation

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foreign intercourse of any kind will be a perpetual source of danger to individuals, of complications between the Governments. The Christian religion is the only means by which such a change can be brought about, and in due time it will effect this change in China as it has done in the nations of the West. Its propagators, so long as they cannot be proved to be breaking the laws of China, ask only that no hindrance shall be thrown in the way of Christianity, and in the long run it will be found that even the "material interests of Great Britain in China will, by this course, be advanced.

We are, &c.

(Signed) JOSEPH EDKINS, *Missionary of the London Missionary Society.*
JOHN S. BURDON, *Missionary of the Church Missionary Society.*
WILLIAM H. COLLINS, *Missionary of the Church Missionary Society.*
JOHN DUDGEON, *Medical Missionary of the London Missionary Society.*

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of rulers and people,—and whether "in due time it will effect this change, as it has done in the nations of the West," finally, whether it will be found that Christianity, in the long run, if no hindrance be thrown in the way, will "advance even the material interests of Great Britain in China," are all three propositions open to serious question and doubt.

In the first place Christianity has not very completely effected this end for the nations of the West in eighteen centuries; and if it does not succeed better in China it is scarcely worth while risking a revolution or a foreign war to promote the experiment. There are abuses and vices, crimes and heathenism enough still in the masses of European populations, corruption and misrule scarcely less than we find in China at this day.

Moreover, if Christianity were the only means of raising the moral tone of a nation and improving the human race generally, it is difficult to believe that the Almighty, in His goodness and wisdom would have left three-fourths of the whole human race without its benefits to this day. We are promised a millenium, but it seems as far as ever from realization in this nineteenth century and in Christian Europe. God in His own good time will no doubt provide the means and secure the end: but the history of the past does not encourage hopes of a speedy issue, either in China or elsewhere, whatever may be the efforts of good and pious men to spread a knowledge of the Gospel; and a layman may be pardoned if he has not the same robust faith as a missionary as to its prompt and sure advent, or the efficacy of such measures as are now in operation for the regeneration and conversion of the Chinese millions to a better state and a purer faith.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Mr. Burdon's Letter to the "North China Herald," Peking, July 23, 1869.

Remarks.

THE following letter has been called forth by certain despatches sent home by Sir Rutherford Alcock last winter to Her Majesty's Government. As these despatches have not been published, an explanation of the circumstances under which the letter was written seems necessary.

Lord Clarendon, in speaking on the Chinese missionary question in the House of Lords on the 5th of April last, professed to give the opinion of Sir R. Alcock on this subject, "as the result of his great experience in China." The "opinion" seemed to embrace a variety of topics; but the two principal points of it were, that the Chinese were hostile to missionaries, and that "the missionaries should confine themselves to the Treaty ports, exercising even there great judgment." In the vaguest way possible Lord Clarendon alluded to the French protectorate of Roman Catholic converts, the differences between the Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries, and the fear of the authorities that the missionaries would so influence the lower classes as to interfere with their local supremacy, as causes, in Sir Rutherford's opinion, of the hostility to missionaries. The restriction of Protestant missionaries was therefore absolutely necessary, to prevent our Government being involved in a protectorate of them and their converts. According to Lord Clarendon, Sir Rutherford "doubted whether any prospect of success which the Missionaries were entitled to entertain would compensate the dangers they incurred in disregarding not only the laws of the country, and the prejudices of the people, but the advice of their own Government." Thus the British Minister was made to accuse the Protestant missionaries of "disregarding the laws of China!"

So loosely did Lord Clarendon give the substance of Sir R. Alcock's despatches, that the "Pall Mall Gazette," in an article written just after the above debate, makes a ludicrous mistake with reference to one of the statements made in the House of Lords. Lord Clarendon had said that "quite recently a most offensive placard against the Roman Catholic religion had appeared on the walls of Shanghae." He does not say who issued it, or what it contained. But the "Pall Mall Gazette," without any hesitation, asserts that Sir Rutherford points to the Protestant missionaries as the issuers of the placard in question. "It is easy to see," says the writer of the article,

The writer in the "Pall Mall Gazette" has made an absurd mistake as to a material fact. But the opinion here expressed is just and true.

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"that with converts of bad character, the consideration of protection by a foreign Government may sometimes be of more weight than any purely theological motive, and the knowledge of this is not likely to dispose the local authorities to do anything to check the fanaticism occasionally provoked by some more than usually injudicious attack on the native religion [*sic*]. How certain it is that such attacks will from time to time be made, may be gathered from one significant fact. 'Quite recently,' says Sir R. Alcock, 'a most offensive placard against the Roman Catholic religion appeared on the walls of Shanghae.' If the British Protestant cannot suppress his characteristic instincts even in the presence of a common adversary, he is not likely to show more decency in dealing with another form of Christianity." The "Pall Mall Gazette" certainly showed its "characteristic instincts" in attributing this placard to Protestant missionaries.

The above use of Sir R. Alcock's opinions and statements, both in the House of Lords and in the newspapers, seemed to call for some notice from those immediately concerned, and accordingly the English Protestant missionaries in Peking sent a private note to Sir Rutherford, requesting him to allow them a perusal of his recent despatches on the missionary question, that they might be able to judge for themselves as to the views and statements sent home by him officially to Her Majesty's Government. We, at the same time, told him that we did this with a view to probably addressing him officially on the subject of Protestant missions. In reply, Sir Rutherford most courteously forwarded copious extracts from his despatches of December 4, 1868, January 23 and February 10, 1869. In forwarding them he said that we were not at liberty to publish them, but that he "had no objection whatever to our freely quoting anything he had said as the expression of opinions officially given by him to Her Majesty's Government, if we thought it necessary to combat them in communication with our friends at home or in any statement which might be made to the Government."

We read these extracts with care, and though we were unable to find any passage accusing us of "disregarding the laws of China," or of "issuing placards against the Roman Catholic religion," we were astonished to find various arguments brought forward to show that Christian missions are an obstacle to trade and peaceable intercourse with the Chinese, and that they ought by all means to be discouraged and restrained. We felt it would not be right

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I suppose it will not be denied that Protestant missionaries do attack and denounce all existing forms of idolatry and error, which they see perverting the minds of the Chinese?

It would be very strange if they did not, for they must not only teach the truth of their own creed, but the falsehood of every other with which they come in contact. And the latter not always, perhaps, in terms acceptable to Chinese literati or others—disciples of Buddha or Confucius.

This is not a fair rendering of the contents. I have certainly said that Christian missions and missionary work, as at present conducted, are obstacles to trade and peaceable relations with the Chinese. And I maintain it to be matter of demonstration. But I have nowhere said or implied that "they ought by all means to be discouraged and restrained." I think they should be under some efficient control, and I have said so.

Mr. Burdon's Letter. *Remarks.*

to be silent under such a representation of Christian missions, officially sent to his Government by Her Majesty's Minister, and hence the letter which we have addressed to him, and which we now lay before the public.

Sir Rutherford has sent us a brief official reply, in which he declines to discuss the matter with us, but promises to forward a copy of our letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, "accompanied by such comments as may seem necessary to correct errors of statement, and prevent misapprehension as to my views." "This is the more necessary," he adds, "as you have in not a few instances confounded together opinions and views conveyed in despatches to Her Majesty's Government as mine, with others for which I am not in any way responsible, while you have at the same time drawn inferences supposed to be based on the former, which, even when separated from their context, they do not justify. As such a process is eminently calculated to mislead, I think it right to notify the fact in anticipation of your giving publicity to your letter."

We are glad to give as much publicity to this assertion of Sir Rutherford's, as we do to our letter, though we cannot of course accept it until substantiated by proofs. We hope that if ever Sir Rutherford favours us with proofs of the truth of this charge, he will obtain for us from Lord Clarendon, or give to us himself, if in his power, permission to publish in full the extracts from his despatches, to which in the main our letter is an answer.

In the following letter we may seem to condemn all the forcible measures that have recently been taken in connection with missionaries in Yang-chow and elsewhere. This is not the case. In common with almost every foreign resident in China, we feel largely indebted to Sir R. Alcock for his prompt and decisive action, especially in the Yang-chow affair. It taught a lesson to unprincipled men which they would probably never have learnt in any other way, and it effectually advanced the cause of foreign intercourse with China. It was rendered absolutely necessary by the hatred of the Chinese literati to foreigners (not to missionaries particularly), the impossibility of securing redress without force, and the safety of foreigners generally throughout China. What we object to is that missionaries, when they meet with outrages and report them, as in duty bound, at the Consulates, should be told that they are applying for gun-boats to help in carrying on their work, and that if they would cease

In proof of the correctness of these affirmations, see marginal notes to the collective letter.

By their hatred to missionaries particularly, as the history of all the recent missionary troubles and disturbances abundantly proves, confirmed by a long series of placards in every town and locality where these have taken place, and elsewhere, by memorials to the Throne, and by official notes from the Tsungli Yamên to foreign Ministers farther cited in notes to collective letter.

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going into the interior, the necessity for a gun-boat would cease also. The outrages were perpetrated on them as foreigners, and had nothing to do with their peculiar calling. The missionaries, as such, are neither responsible for the outrages, nor for the necessity of punishing them.

They will do anything to avoid these troubles, short of relinquishing their Treaty right to settle in the interior.

The question now at issue is not how the missionary is to be kept out of China, or at least out of inland towns in order that trade may prosper and be enlarged, but one of two alternatives: either, how may foreign nations be kept in check altogether, and be induced to prevent their subjects from intruding into the interior of China?—or, what means must be employed to induce the local Mandarins and the native gentry to respect the Treaties into which their Government has entered with other countries, and to allow peaceable foreigners engaged in a lawful calling to reside among them? When it comes to be understood by Lord Clarendon, as it will be by-and-by, that the Chinese Government is half, if not wholly, in sympathy with those local Mandarins and native gentry in their opposition to foreigners, and that the authority of the general Government over their subordinates and the literati, is, at best, a very questionable thing, it will then be seen that in certain extreme cases, such as that of Yang-chow, Sir Rutherford Alcock's action is of more avail towards bringing the problem of foreign intercourse with China to a peaceable solution, than all his theorizings about restricting missionaries to the Treaty ports.

(Signed) J. S. BURDON.

Peking, July 23, 1869.

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Are they not responsible in some sense if their action or presence is the exciting cause of outrages and tumults? Does not their voluntary action in establishing themselves inland and at distant localities beyond the reach of Consular authority or assistance, both create the danger and the necessity for the use of force to punish their assailants? "Not missionaries, but the officials and literati are the causes of disturbances," it has been said; and in a certain sense that is quite true, but still it is the presence and the teaching of the former that is the immediate cause, since but for this no trouble would ensue. Is such presence and action on the part of missionaries so imperative or unavoidable that they cease to be responsible agents n so carrying on their work?

"They will do anything to avoid these troubles, short of relinquishing," &c.—that is, they will do anything but the one thing necessary to avert such troubles and political complications. As to the Treaty right to settle in the interior, it is not quite so clear as has been assumed; and Her Majesty's Government do not feel it incumbent upon them to claim it, with all the responsibilities it entails.

The question now at issue is how amicable relations with the Rulers of China can be maintained, while the primary objects for which wars have been waged and Treaties signed are at the same time insisted upon. How best "local Mandarins and native gentry" can be constrained or induced to respect the Treaties into which their Government has entered, and to allow peaceable foreigners engaged in a lawful calling to reside among them or travel freely through the interior for business or pleasure, without a rupture of those friendly relations, and a resort to war, or acts of war, as often as those Treaties are infringed — is the problem; and a very difficult one it proves to be. Beyond all question, the missionary element plays a very prominent part in the difficulty, and is the greatest obstacle to any peaceful solution. The missionaries disclaim all responsibility. Our right, they say in effect, is to go and reside where we please—our business is to teach and preach the Gospel in season and out of season—that is our duty, as well as our privilege,

the rest concerns us not—let the Government look to it, that is their business, and whatever follows, they are bound to see we are not molested or interfered with.

This sort of unlimited liability in a partnership the Government may object to, with at least some show of reason. To the missionary, all liberty, and to the Government all the cost and responsibility, seems scarcely a fair division. In any case, neither individuals nor Government can be justly called upon to accept responsibilities without any power of control. And it is precisely this claim to control or restrict that the missionaries so vehemently repudiate. All this arises, I conceive, from too exclusive a view of the claims of religion in connection with duties of States, and an unpractical habit of regarding the obligations imposed by the whole in respect of the part.

Religion and the work of the missionary in heathen lands make a far stronger appeal to the sympathies of Christian men than any of the pursuits by which money is gained. The object is higher and more worthy; those engaged in the work more disinterested; and the result, if attained, is of infinitely more worth than all the gold or commerce of the world.

But sympathies are not the best guides to practical wisdom or statesmanship, in the conduct of affairs, more especially, where the destinies of nations are in the scales. Granting that even a great commercial people like the British, whose national existence and power are intimately connected with commerce and the wealth it accumulates should have other and higher objects before it than mere pecuniary interests or the protection of trade: either the means adopted for the attainment of the first must be compatible with those necessary for the second, or the one must be subordinated to the other. Failing this, they will conflict, and both objects will be endangered, if not, in all probability, sacrificed. This is the danger to be guarded against in the present state of our relations in China in connection with the missionary question, and it is the subject of my despatches.

As a matter of policy, if not of political necessity, I have suggested one of two courses. Either to abstain from Government interference for the protection of missionaries and their converts in the interior when too remote from the Treaty Ports for any efficacious intervention, except by a resort to force,—in which case it would be a plain duty to discourage, and as far as possible restrict, the operations of British missionaries within the circuit of the ports;

or to insist upon the Treaty rights of these, as defined by Article VIII, which stipulates that "persons teaching it, or professing it" (and therefore converts) "shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities, nor shall any such, peaceably pursuing their calling and not offending against the Laws, be persecuted or interfered with."

To insist upon a Treaty stipulation being faithfully and strictly observed involves, on the part of a Western Power in China, a readiness to enforce such observance by whatever means may be found necessary to secure the end. And it is only necessary to read carefully the words of this Article to be aware, that, in the whole range of the Treaty from the Ist to the LVIth Article, there is nothing stipulated for so difficult to secure as the fulfilment in its integrity of this one clause. Let us analyze it. "Peaceably pursuing their calling." This includes both missionaries and their catechist converts, who are Chinese subjects. Who is to determine when any of these three classes, but more especially the latter, are accused of offending against the laws, that they have done nothing in contravention of Chinese laws? How is false or conflicting evidence to be sifted, in a case occurring in the heart of one of the provinces far removed from any Consular authority? And supposing a Consul could proceed to the spot, how is such an officer to go behind the judgment of a Chinese magistrate and establish by unquestionable evidence that the witnesses have borne false testimony, and that the Judge has been guilty of an unrighteous judgment? And to what would such attempts to secure justice between Chinese Christians and their own authorities lead, or where could they end, save in perpetual and forcible intervention between authorities and subjects fatal to any native executive powers if successful, and fraught with infinite wrong and mischief to those whom it was desired to protect if the reverse.

Again, the Article stipulates for all these three classes that "they shall not be persecuted or interfered with." Who is to trace the limits between what is persecution for religion's sake and the rightful assumption of the territorial authorities to pursue crime and maintain order, repressing all causes of tumult and disturbance amongst a teeming population of Chinese throughout the provinces? or discover with certainty when the action of the Magistrate is dictated by the one or the other motive?

These are so many practical impossi-

bilities in the great majority of cases. The attempt to get over difficulties of this nature could only lead to failure, and probably end in war, or the armed possession of the country by foreign Powers without it.

The missionaries have spoken of "moral means" to overcome all missionary difficulties in the interior, as if these might prove sufficient. But all experience in China tends to establish the fact that moral means are only effective in so far as they are sustained by force, latent or manifest, and known to be available, to give them efficacy.

In the end, therefore, the whole question of missionary difficulties resolves itself into one of peace or war; the propagation of Christianity under the menace of forcible intervention by one or more foreign Powers against the will of the rulers, in defiance of the moral convictions of the nation—that is to say, of its educated men,—all who form and guide public opinion, not merely of the office-holders, but, as has been truly remarked, "of the millions who are saturated with a knowledge of the history and philosophy of their country. To one and all of the class, the appearance in China of Christian missionaries, backed by the power or the prestige of their respective Governments, must be simply as offensive as an invasion, similarly supported, of Buddhist or Confucian teachers would be to ourselves; and we must be prepared for their determined opposition, secret or overt, as oppor tunity may present itself."

The words are not mine, but I entirely concur in the opinions they express. The hope of establishing Christianity in China, without first enlisting on its side the sympathies and good-will of the higher and educated classes—to enlist whom is to enlist all—is, I fear, entirely chimerical This, however, is a layman's opinion, which is certainly not concurred in by missionaries, and is given for what it may be worth, without claiming any authority for it beyond what careful study of the facts, and an honest conviction, may fairly entitle it to when weighed against opposite conclusions,—and, I may add, the past history of China. For evidence, showing the grounds for a hostility quite as implacable as I have shown to exist on the part of the official and educated classes towards missionaries, see a paper in the September number of the "Chinese Recorder," describing the long struggle in former ages between Confucianism and Buddhism in China. The two following passages, more especially,

bear conclusively on the subject as it presents itself now:—

"Among the men of previous periods, and even among some of recent times, weightier objections have been set forth with earnestness of mind and vigour of language. On political, on moral, and on philosophical grounds, the professed followers of Confucius have opposed the introduction and toleration of Buddhism. The State and its miniature, the family, have long been to the Chinese the embodiment of all that is precious, and the completion of human life and duty. Hence any doctrine or course of conduct which seemed to cause injury to either or both of these has always been hateful in their eyes. Now one of the first political objections brought against Buddhism was that it was a barbarian system of doctrine."

Again:—

"But much more serious than the material injury which this heresy inflicts on the country is the moral detriment which it works. It teaches its followers to set at naught the three great relations of life—namely, those between father and son, prince and subject, husband and wife; and by doing so it saps the foundations of civil life. The son or daughter who professes religion parts for ever from his or her parents, and ceases to have any regard for them; and there is the great authority of Mencius for saying that such persons are like birds and beasts.. Buddhism also confuses the minds of the simple, by inventing a heaven as a reward for those who do well, and a hell as a punishment for those who do ill, according to Buddhist conceptions of good and evil. Now an undutiful child is the worst conceivable character, and yet heaven is offered even to such on the fulfilment of certain conditions. Unfilial sons become disloyal subjects, and thus a tendency to anarchy is produced. Sons cease to respect their natural parents, and transfer their affections and duty to strangers. So they transfer also the allegiance due to their Sovereign to their chief in religion, and thus they become unfilial and disloyal."

But whatever may be the diversity of opinions on so large a subject, and one of such momentous importance, the conviction in my own mind is too clear to admit of any question as to the utter impracticability, by such means as are at present employed, of protecting missionaries and their converts in the interior efficaciously.

My conviction is equally strong that, without more efficacious protection than it has hitherto been possible to afford, the large extension of missions in the interior

Mr. Burdon's Letter. *Remarks.*

will not be practicable, although persevering attempts to attain that end may involve the most serious consequences, and can hardly fail to entail grave complications in the relations of the Empire with foreign Powers.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Extract from the "London and China Express."

ROMANISM IN SZECHUEN.—SOME further particulars have lately been received of the recent massacre of the native Christians in Western China, and form the subject of an article in the "Globe" of yesterday. It seems that for a long time a good deal of ill-feeling has existed between the native Christians and the mandarins, having its rise in the very natural jealousy felt by the latter at the great power and influence possessed by the Christians, whom they accuse of being virtually rebels against the Government. Some trifling matter of dispute between the Christians and their unconverted countrymen fanned the smouldering quarrel into a flame. A foreign priest, with more zeal than discretion, undertook to advocate the Christians' part before the mandarins, and not getting the assistance he expected, armed his converts; upon which the mandarin washed his hands of the whole affair, telling them, that as they had taken the law into their own hands, they must look not for protection from the authorities. The Christians, perceiving the mistake they had made, immediately disarmed, and again threw themselves on the protection of the magistrate. But it was too late—the ball had been set rolling. Suddenly one night the church, in which were some of the Christians, was attacked, and burnt to the ground. Thirty-nine bodies were taken from amidst the ruins, among them that of M. Rigault, fearfully mutilated, and without head or limbs. This occurred in January, and since that time a constant warfare has been kept up between the two parties. And as yet all efforts to establish peace have failed. There is no doubt that the native Christians do in a great measure bring these evils upon themselves, by their overbearing and insolent behaviour to their fellow-countrymen and mandarins. And there is much reason to believe that many profess Christianity with the idea that by so doing they transfer their allegiance from the native authorities to a foreign Power, which is both able and willing to protect them against the exactions of their legitimate rulers. It is even said that lately, in Szechuen, 10,000 Chinamen have, with unquestionable loyalty, declared themselves converts to the Roman Catholic faith, with the avowed purpose of thereby purchasing the protection afforded by the Christian society. It is impossible to speak too highly of the devotion and zeal of the Roman Catholic missionaries in China, and great allowances are to be made for the difficulties of their position. Yet, it must be confessed, that in a great many instances, they help to foster in the minds of the natives the idea that they hold powers beyond those of teachers of the Gospel. As long as their Bishops and dignitaries assume to themselves the titles and paraphernalia of temporal authority, so long will discontented and unruly Chinamen flock to their standard to rid themselves, as they believe, of their obligations to the Emperor's Government; and so long will the mandarins entertain a deep and not unnatural jealousy of the missionaries and their converts.

On the subject of missions Mr. Alabaster writes:—

"I have a word to say regarding the English, or rather Scotch, mission established here, as its progress and prosperity are largely, although indirectly, bound up with our commercial interests. Established some ten years ago, its agent, Mr. Smith, even then, notwithstanding the irritation against foreigners, maintained his position at Swatow, and the mission stations have since spread to all the districts round, and at great personal risk the footing of the mission has gradually been made good. Nor has this been done by constant appeal to a protecting gun-boat; the Consul and authorities have from time to time been called on to extend protection; but it has ever been rather to prevent recurrence of violence than to obtain redress—the missionaries seeking but the opportunity of being heard rather than of obtaining the punishment of those who, rather

from ignorance than anything else, had offered them insult or injury. By these means they have in many places obtained the good feeling of the people, who, led away by inconsiderate excitement, naturally expected to suffer the consequences of their violence; and in many of their chapels they are far more secure than they would have been had an army marched in to exact satisfaction for the opposition offered to their entry. And in another way they have obtained powerful support, in their careful abstaining from interference in the temporal concerns of their converts; for although, had they always been ready to take up the case of a professing Christian with the Consuls and authorities, they would probably have numbered many more nominal converts, they would have had no security for the sincerity of their followers, and would have been regarded with jealousy and resentment by the mandarins, instead of, as at present, with toleration and even friendship. From two labourers their number has been increased to four; and while one is always present at the hospital and head-quarters in Swatow, the others visit the out-stations, and make tours through the country, preaching and distributing Bibles and tracts; and, although it is impossible to rightly estimate the extent of their work by a statement of the number of their chapels and congregations, its effects can be and are felt by the community generally in the spread of the good report of foreigners, and the accustoming of the people to them in a favourable light in places heretofore inaccessible to us, and which, had less judicious agents visited them first, might still have remained closed to us. So long as the missionaries devote themselves to the preaching of the Gospel they must succeed; and the merchant, the traveller, and the official, will always find the way smoother before him where an honest missionary has gone before."

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Swatow, September* 9, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter just received from the Head of the Protestant mission here relative to an attack on a chapel in the interior.

The district is notoriously turbulent, and there was some difficulty in establishing the station a year ago, which was overcome, as already reported, by my action through the Taoutae, and the present disturbance, which I imagine to be chiefly attributable to the fortuitous coincidence of a Sabbath and market-day, would scarcely deserve being brought to your Excellency's notice but for the additional instance it affords of the disinclination of the authorities to act when foreigners are concerned unless compelled, in the refusal of the mandarin, who was appealed to to check the riot, to interfere, though it was clearly his duty to repress the disturbance whether foreign interests were involved or not.

I shall endeavour to settle this matter quietly, as I am of opinion that too severe a prosecution of aggressors, and the ill-feeling generated thereby, militates more against the interests of missions than the occasional tolerance of insult, and trust I shall be as successful in preventing the repetition of attack from the Miow people as I have been in obtaining the toleration of the chapel by the people of the place itself.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CHALONER ALABASTER.

Inclosure 5 in No. 7.

The Rev. G. Smith to Consul Alabaster.

Sir, *Swatow, September* 8, 1869.

WE have just received information from our mission station at Sin-chang that, on Sabbath last, when the church members and other interested hearers had met together for Divine worship, a crowd of people from Miow gathered about the door. Gradually they came inside and began to disturb those who had assembled, and to insult and annoy the Chinese assistants. From petty insults they proceeded to more violent measures, till all present, nearly thirty persons, were compelled to disperse. Some of the congregation were rudely treated, had their umbrellas, &c., taken from them. One of the assistants

especially was roughly handled. The meeting was broken up before the morning service had commenced; but the crowd still continued outside abusing those who had met for worship, and throwing missiles on the roof. The Ti-po, who lives close by, shouted to the rioters to leave the place; but no attention was paid to him, nor did he take any other means to put down the disturbance. The assistants at his request shut the door; but soon after three or four men got on the top of the house and made their way through the roof to the inside. Forthwith they unbarred one of the doors, and let in the crowd. A scene of confusion ensued, and all the moveable property that could be got was carried off. Every kind of filthy language was employed to describe the purposes for which the chapel had been rented and was used. It seemed as if the object of the crowd was to put an end to the mission work in that locality.

The uproar began between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning, and lasted till between 5 and 6 in the evening.

The rioters were from Miow, a town under the jurisdiction of Kit-yang, but in local connection with Sin-chay, which belongs to Pou-seng. The measures taken by the Taôutae, in conjunction with the district Magistrate, through your representation last year, have been so far successful as to keep the Sin-chay people from giving us any annoyance. What seems to be now required for the peace and freedom of those who meet in Sin-chay for worship is that the inhabitants of Miow, and of the neighbouring villages who go there for market, be effectually restrained from violence and disorderly conduct. On this occasion the Miow Yamên was applied to for help; but our people were told that without special authority from the Pou-seng Magistrate to interfere in Sin-chay affairs the application could not be entertained.

Such being the facts of the case, we beg to lay them before you, feeling assured that you will adopt such measures as the Treaty warrants for the protection of native Christians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE SMITH.

P.S.—The names of those who took a leading part in the riot are unknown to our assistants, who belong to other parts of the Department. The Sin-chay Tipo could doubtless give them if compelled to do so officially.

G. S.

No. 8.

The Bishop of Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 7.)

My Lord, *St. Leonard's-on-Sea, December 6, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's communication dated the 13th November last.

Your Lordship is pleased to inform me that Sir Rutherford Alcock proposed to call on the Chinese Government to cause a searching and impartial investigation to be made concerning the late outrage at Loyuen, with a view to justice being done.

But, my Lord, the outrage in question was committed by the local Government officials themselves. It was the Yamên police and the soldiery who, on the 20th June last, demolished the mission premises and outraged the Christians. "The people took no part in the attack. Many of them cried 'Shame,' and tried to persuade the soldiers to withdraw. The magistrate himself also appeared upon the scene and took no step to prevent the church being pulled down. The only direction he was heard to give was a permission to pull down the Church, but not to injure the houses that surrounded it."

To call, therefore, on the Chinese Government to make "the searching and impartial inquiry" now proposed, instead of demanding reparation for the outrage enacted by the Government itself, would be to weaken the force of the demand by seeming to doubt whether a wrong had been really committed.

Whether we appeal to the Imperial authorities in Peking or to the local authorities in Loyuen, they are one in temper and design, viz., to expel the foreigner, both merchant and missionary, and this, it may be feared, in order that the mandarins and their subordinates may live upon the people. And, according to the known habit of the Imperial Government, were the offending mandarin removed from his yamên at Loyuen as a result of Imperial investigation, he would, in all probability, be immediately promoted to a more lucrative appointment elsewhere.

But if we suppose that the Central Government are sincere in any profession they might make in favour of "justice," that Government is helpless. Even if good intentions could be assumed, it is unable, as Mr. Ross Browne, the late American Minister at Peking, has clearly shown, to "preserve order, enforce the execution of Treaties, restrain the corrupt practices of provincial officers, and render prompt redress to grievances complained of."

In point of fact, the policy of the Imperial Government is to perpetuate a course of exaction upon the people under a system of bribery prevalent everywhere. The presence of the merchant or of the missionary is, to some extent, a protection to the people. Hence, in Loyuen, the attack made upon the property of the mission and the persons of the Christians.

"The Yamên officials in Loyuen gained their living by unjust 'squeezes' upon the people in all cases of law-suits, &c." But the Christians regarded it as their duty to abstain from all law-suits and to settle their differences among themselves. For this reason, and this reason alone, was the outrage planned and perpetrated by the local Government. And now to call upon the Chinese Government to investigate "with a searching and impartial inquiry" with a view to justice being done seems to show so little sense on our part of the heinousness of the crime that it is difficult to see how British authority can escape contempt on the part of the astute Chinaman.

My Lord, to do justice in such a case as that now under notice there must be prompt redress, and the means of such redress must be lodged in the hands of Her Britannic Majesty's Consuls upon the spot. I admit this is to entrust great responsibility to the Consulate Body in China. But it is a necessity. And it remains yet to be shown that such power so intrusted either has been or is likely to be abused. An appeal to Peking is, in effect, to abandon the case. It is not only a failure of justice toward the parties aggrieved, but such an exhibition of weakness before the Chinese local authorities as to endanger the personal safety of our countrymen in China, and almost invite the local Governors to despise and assault us, and at length (unless the English be prepared to withdraw from China) to necessitate war, with all its expenditure of treasure, loss of life, and commercial disaster. Existing Treaties, however equitable, have only been yielded by China from a fear of our power, and can only be maintained at least by its exhibition. The ports now open would be closed immediately could the Chinese Government drive away the foreigner. Diplomatic representation at Peking would be abolished by the Imperial Government to-morrow, had they the opportunity. Communication with foreigners has, from the beginning, been disliked and resisted on their part, and is no less so now than ever. The Chinese Government is a Pagan Government, and to expect from it the recognition of international principles that regulate the action of Christian Powers, is to entertain a delusive hope.

Notwithstanding some superficial appearances to the contrary, the Chinese Government is uncivilized, and incapable of maintaining confidential relations with foreigners. And for Great Britain to attempt to sustain its relations with a Government of such a character as with a mutual Christian power, is to proceed upon false premises, the result of which, sooner or later, must be disastrous.

Your Lordship, in the letter before me, asserts that there is sufficient reason for believing that Christian converts have assumed and acted on the assumption that, by embracing Christianity, they have released thsmselves from the obligations of obedience to the local authorities and from the discharge of their duties as subjects of the Emperor of China; and your Lordship thinks I should render valuable service to the missionary cause by pointing out to the Protestant societies interested in it that they will do well to warn their converts to the contrary.

I trust, my Lord, there is no apprehension on your part that Protestant missionaries have encouraged or even permitted any such assumption or action on the part of their converts. If such misapprehension unfortunately exists, allow me to assure you that you do Protestant missionaries an injustice, and I am satisfied that the charge you have made against the converts is without foundation. With the practice of the Roman Catholic missionaries and their converts I do not profess to be acquainted; but with the opinions and practice of the Church of England missionaries and their converts I am personally familiar. And, in their defence, and in defence of other Protestant missionary bodies, both European and American, with whom I have the honour of extensive personal acquaintance in their missions, and at their work, I confidently testify that the injunctions of the missionaries and the practice of their converts is the reverse of what your Lordship appears to suppose. The missionaries would be false both to apostolic precept and example if they failed to inculcate upon their native converts the plain command of Holy Scripture (Rom. xiii, 1)—"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there

is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God." It is only an act of justice towards them on my part publicly to declare that I am satisfied both Protestant missionaries and their converts are innocent of the charge in question.

Possibly, my Lord, the practice of the native Christians at Loyuen in settling their differences among themselves, without bringing them unnecessarily before the Mandarin, may have suggested the accusation I am meeting. But, in this respect, I trust your Lordship will not, upon consideration, hold them guilty of insubordination against the local authorities. The same apostle who so clearly inculcated subjection to the powers that be, peremptorily enforced the practice of the converts now under consideration (1 Cor. vi, 1)—"Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not before the saints?" In this respect I vindicate and admire the conduct of the Loyuen converts, though it brought upon them the outrage an "unjust" Government has inflicted. Nor in such conduct can I for a moment admit they can be fairly charged with any violation of that subjection to the higher powers, as ordained of God, which Protestant missionaries in China universally inculcate, and their Christian converts universally render.

Your Lordship concludes your important communication with the earnest recommendation that the missionaries use the utmost caution in the prosecution of their labours, and more especially confine their operations within the limits where Consular protection and intervention may be rightfully and successfully exerted in their favour until circumstances are more favourable.

My Lord, I have travelled with the missionaries to distant stations connected with the Foochow and Ningpo missions. Last year I was at Loyuen, and confirmed in the mission church now destroyed; I visited Kucheng also, about 130 miles distant from Foo-chow in another direction. And I have visited some of the stations of the Ningpo mission, and Hang-chow, about 306 miles distant from the Consular port of Ningpo. I desire to testify to the caution and discretion of the missionaries, whom I found welcome everywhere.

The idea seems prevalent among some classes in England that the missionary forces himself upon the people, and enters Chinese cities and sets up his abode there uninvited and unwelcome. But, as a rule, Christianity takes root in a town or village through native agency. A convert returns to his home after receiving the gospel elsewhere, or he changes his abode and takes his Christianity with him. Pressing messages are sent to the missionary to visit the place and to provide a teacher, and such messages are often many times repeated with much entreaty before the invitation is accepted. And when accepted, the missionary is scrupulous in conforming to Chinese regulations as to residence within a city. I am bold to say, on authority I cannot question, that in the late Yang-chow case all that a foreigner was required to do by Chinese law or custom had been scrupulously fulfilled by the missionary, and that no alternative was left between abandoning our Treaty rights and reinstating him at Yang-chow. I bear testimony not only to the remarkable caution of the missionary body in China, but also to the friendly feelings entertained toward them by the people, and that such friendliness is particularly manifest in districts distant from the Treaty ports, so that the missionary is sometimes safer far away in the interior than in nearer proximity to native authorities upon whom he might have claim for personal protection.

Your Lordship earnestly recommends that missionary operations should, for the present at least, be confined within Consular limits. But allow me to observe that the out-stations of our missions both at Foo-chow and at Ningpo form the principal scene of successful labour in China. When, last year, I visited the Foo-chow Mission, the out-stations, some of them long distances from the city, numbered 16; and for 15 native communicants of our church at Foo-chow the missionaries numbered 75 in the out-stations; and for 44 native communicants in Ningpo, they numbered 95 in the 11 out-stations of that mission, including 15 at Hang-chow, 300 miles beyond the limits of Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate.

My Lord, to abandon the out-stations "until circumstances are more favourable" would be to paralyze mission work in the two principal missions of the Church of England in China. Nor could I deem it the duty of Christian missionaries to desert the converts they have gained. To abandon the out-stations would appear to the Chinese authorities so manifest a retreat we should soon have to contend for our position in the Consular ports; and the same reasons which would appear to justify withdrawal from the former would soon be urged for withdrawal from the latter; or, in other words, the entire abandonment of missionary work in China.

With the policy of Great Britain in China, in a commercial view, it is not my province to interfere. But in the missionary aspect of the case I am sure your Lord-

ship will bear with me when I suggest, if Roman Catholic missionaries have penetrated to the far West, and reside there under French protection, is it fair or just that the missionary of the Church of England should be prohibited advancing into the interior?

But, my Lord, forgive me if I add, the Christian missionary has a commission from his Heavenly Master,—"Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature" (Mark xvi, 15). Under this Divine commission the missionary must in faithfulness and love carry his message into the interior of China as into every part of the globe. And, even if the English Government should shrink from giving him that protection which the French Government effectually afford the missionaries of the Church of Rome (not that the Protestant missionary asks a like protection for himself or for his converts, though he would respectfully protest against prohibitory restrictions contrary to the spirit of his Divine Lord's plain command), it will be found the faithful messenger of the gospel will still go wherever an opening, in providence, presents itself, though it be at the risk of his own life. But, my Lord, the record of Christian missions attests that the Protestant missionary will open China to the honourable enterprise of British merchants; for Christianity has always been the pioneer of civilization and commerce. Therefore, let me entreat your Lordship, as you would further the mutual interest of Great Britain and China, to speed the missionary on his philanthropic errand. And let the desire to impart civilization and morality, and to promote justice, religion, and piety, characterize the intercourse of Great Britain with the 444,000,000 of the human race in China.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES R. VICTORIA.

No. 9.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Bishop of Victoria.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 6th of December, having reference to a communication made to you by Mr. Hammond, by my direction, on the 13th of November, respecting missionaries in China and their converts.

I beg to state to your Lordship, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government regret that they cannot extend to missionary operations in China the degree of support which I gather from your letter is sought by those who are interested in them. I can only refer your Lordship to the correspondence on these matters which was laid before Parliament in the last Session, and to Mr. Hammond's letter of the 13th of November, as setting forth the course which Her Majesty's Government consider it to be their duty, as it is their intention, to pursue in regard to such matters; being convinced that any other course would tend to endanger the maintenance of peace between this country and China, and to put in jeopardy the vast commercial interests of Her Majesty's subjects in that country, which can only be secured by a policy of forbearance and conciliation on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

CHINA. No. 9 (1870)

Correspondence respecting Inland Residence of English Missionaries in China.

Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their Address dated the 6th April, 1870.

LONDON:
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CHINA. No. 8 (1869).

CORRESPONDENCE

WITH

SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK

RESPECTING

MISSIONARIES AT HANKOW,

AND

STATE OF AFFAIRS

AT

VARIOUS PORTS IN CHINA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1869.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Correspondence with Sir Rutherford Alcock respecting Missionaries at Hankow, and State of Affairs at various Ports in China.

No. 1.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received March 22.)

My Lord, *Peking, January* 13, 1869.

I INCLOSE correspondence between Her Majesty's Consul at Hankow, the Senior Naval Officer, and myself.

The Yang-chow affair has been satisfactorily brought to a close not without trouble and serious effort, but I am yet waiting for information as to the result of measures to be taken in Formosa for the protection of British interests, and the redress of injuries chiefly inflicted upon missionaries. And as both authorities and Chinese colonists there are less under the control of the Central or even the Provincial Government, and a plot was discovered to waylay and attack both the Consul and the naval escort he was expected to have with him, it cannot be matter of surprise if there should be some serious collision.

In my despatch to Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Keppel, copy of which is herewith inclosed, I have referred to the terms in which your Lordship answered Mr. Lockhart and others when they addressed you last year, praying for greater facilities of access to the interior, and the inference I drew therefrom as to the views of Her Majesty's Government on the subject of missionary labours away from the ports.

If I have rightly interpreted these, your Lordship will, I have no doubt, approve the tenor of my despatches both to the Consul and the Naval Commander-in-chief. But the difficulties created by these outbreaks are so serious, and may be followed at any moment by such disastrous consequences to our interests in this country and to themselves, that I think it right to put Her Majesty's Government in possession of all the circumstances as they arise, in order that special instructions may be given if these should seem required.

So far as the Protestant Missions are concerned, it may well be matter of doubt whether they are justified, by any existing prospects of success, in provoking the dangers resulting from their attempts to establish missions in the interior, and away from the Treaty ports where alone they can be efficiently protected. It becomes undoubtedly matter for serious consideration how far Her Majesty's Government will be disposed to go in efforts to extend that protection beyond the circle of the ports, in the event of missionaries persevering in their present course of extending operations into the interior on their own responsibility and without much regard of consequences to themselves or to others.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Consul Caine to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Hankow, December* 1, 1868.

IT appears to me that the naval authorities consider that this port does not require the presence of a vessel of war, except at irregular intervals and for short periods.

There was no gun-boat here on my arrival in the middle of July. The "Dove" arrived on the 30th of July, and left again on the 9th of October; since when we have had no vessel here.

On the 29th of October I applied to the Senior Naval Officer at Shanghae for protection, as in consequence of the inflammatory placards which were then appearing at Wuchang, I considered a breach of the peace very probable. No answer was received till

15th of November, and this stated it was out of the Senior Officer's power to detach a vessel. The "Opossum" would, however, be sent after her arrival at Shanghae. This vessel I am told has to be docked first and otherwise repaired. So that in from two to three months' time from the date of my requisition for immediate aid, it may be possible to have a vessel of war at this port.

The protection of Hankow over 600 miles up the Yang-tsze, and with, at least, a from 3- to 4-knot current always running out, makes it, in my opinion, absolutely necessary that a vessel of war should always be present at the port, and should not when ordered away take her departure till the relief arrives.

The "Havoc" gun-boat could make no way against the current, and had to be towed up by one of the river steamers. The "Dove" was over a month on the passage.

These facts speak for themselves, and show that if the navy are to afford any protection, a vessel of war must be always stationed here.

Should the necessity arise for such aid it would take at least from ten to fourteen days after the despatch of a requisition for the fastest vessel the navy possess to reach Hankow.

I trust your Excellency will see the justice of my remarks, and prevail on the Naval Commander-in-chief to keep a vessel of war of some sort always on this station.

Your, &c.
(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Consul Caine to Captain Heneage.

Sir, *Hankow, October* 29, 1868

FOR the last few days the people of Wuchang have shown great hostility towards the missionaries resident in the city, brought out I have no doubt by the Yang-chow affair, of which they only heard a short time since.

The Magistrate declines to help, and though I am doing my utmost to afford the missionaries every assistance through the Chinese officials, I fear my efforts may be unsuccessful unless supported by the presence of a British vessel of war.

Placards have appeared to-day threatening those people who rent buildings to the missionaries, and these latter have in consequence received from their landlords notice to quit.

This state of things must be stopped; and I have accordingly the honour to request that a vessel of war may be dispatched as speedily as possibly to render assistance. I need scarcely inform you that a gun-boat could not get here under a month unless towed by one of the river steamers; the assistance I require is immediate, and there is no vessel of war nearer than Chin-kiang.

Missionaries are constantly being stoned when passing along Wuchang streets in the evening.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. W. CAINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Captain Heneage to Consul Caine.

Sir, *"Rodney," off Nanking, November* 8, 1868.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, respecting the disturbed state of affairs at Hankow, and requesting that a vessel of war may be dispatched to render assistance.

In reply, I beg to inform you that at present I am unable to comply with your request as I have neither a vessel nor a gun-boat at my disposal; but the gun-boat "Opossum" is daily expected at Shanghae and shall be sent to Hankow as soon after her arrival as possible.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. HENEAGE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Caine.

Sir, *Peking, January* 12, 1869.

WITH reference to your despatch of December last and its inclosures, I will communicate with the Naval Commander-in-chief on the subject. I may observe, however, that I do not consider it either necessary or possible for Her Majesty's Government to provide a gun-boat to be permanently stationed at every port, or at any one of the fourteen where Consular Establishments are maintained.

It should be possible, in ordinary circumstances, for Her Majesty's Consuls to conduct the business of their respective Consulates without the material support which might be afforded by the constant presence of a ship-of-war, otherwise there can be little advantage in a Treaty of Amity and Commerce. As an appeal to force by a Consul at any time could only be justified by some great emergency threatening danger to life and property, and for their protection, it may fairly be assumed that such occasions are exceptional and can only arise at long intervals. To meet such exceptional occasions it cannot be necessary to attach to each port a ship-of-war. That a force shall be always in the China Seas capable of affording effective aid whenever there should be necessity for an appeal from the Consuls, is all that can be looked for under existing relations.

I observe that you refer to the difficulty of gun-boats steaming up the Yang-tsze against a strong current as a reason for keeping one always on the spot. But at the same time you indicate how this disadvantage might be met in any case of emergency by the aid of one of the river steamers. If there were any obvious necessity, it is to be assumed no hesitation would be felt by the Senior Naval Officer at Shanghae in adopting this alternative.

In the particular instance to which you refer, the Senior Officer probably concluded that the result of the operations in which he was engaged with the squadron under his orders in the same river would be better calculated to afford efficient protection to British interests at Hankow from such danger as the placards at Wuchang might create, than any single vessel on the spot, even if one had been at his disposal; and I should have agreed with him.

With disturbances of a very serious nature at Formosa requiring the immediate presence of more than one ship-of-war, and the necessity of so distributing the force available for all exigencies from Singapore to Hakodate, it is quite obvious such distribution must be made as will best cover the whole ground. The best mode of doing this can only be determined by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, who alone knows what the means at his disposal will enable him to effect.

For these reasons, among others, I cannot make any request for a vessel to be permanently stationed at Hankow; but I will suggest that one, or if possible two, should be stationed in the Yang-tsze to meet the demands of the three ports, making Hankow the chief station, in view of the necessary delay in ascending the river against the current.

I will only add that if the missionaries cannot carry on their labours at Wuchang peaceably, and without an appeal to force for their protection, it seems very doubtful how far Her Majesty's Government will hold themselves justified in resorting to measures of a warlike character for their protection away from the ports.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Sir R. Alcock to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Peking, January* 13, 1869.

MR. CAINE, Her Majesty's Consul at Hankow, has forwarded to me a correspondence with the Senior Naval Officer at Shanghae, which no doubt is already in your hands, respecting the permanent stationing of a vessel-of-war at his port.

I do not altogether agree with the Consul as to the necessity of the case, and doubt the possibility of your meeting such demands. I have, therefore, written a despatch for Mr. Caine's guidance, copy of which I beg to inclose.

That some danger existed at Wuchang of the same character as that lately incurred by the missionaries at Yang-chow and from precisely similar causes. I have no doubt. But, as you will see, I am not so clear as to the necessity for the missionaries fixing their

quarters in places where so much enmity is shown as to expose them to imminent danger, while it may entail upon Her Majesty's Government the obligation of adopting both coercive and hostile measures for their protection or the redress of their grievances. The inclosed copy of a despatch received some months ago from Lord Stanley is certainly written in this sense.

In the meantime, to guard, as far as possible, against any disastrous consequences, and serve as some check on the authorities so little disposed to prevent, if they do not excite, popular outbreaks against the missionaries at the ports or in their vicinity, I should be glad if it were in your power to station one, if not two, of Her Majesty's ships in the Yang-tsze, so that both Chin-kiang and Hankow might seldom be without a gun-boat or other ship so long as the turbulent spirit continues to be displayed, in order to secure to the Consul such material support as the presence of a vessel would afford.

In order that Her Majesty's Government may be fully informed on all points connected with these frequently-renewed missionary troubles and popular outbreaks, I purpose forwarding a copy of the correspondence to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that his Lordship may, if he see fit, send instructions as to the best mode of dealing with existing difficulties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 2.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 30, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 13th of January, inclosing copies of your correspondence with Her Majesty's Consul at Hankow and Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Keppel, in regard to the suggestion of Mr. Consul Caine that one of Her Majesty's gun-boats should be permanently stationed at Hankow; and, in reply, I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the instructions you addressed to Mr. Caine in answer to his application, as well as the letter you addressed to Sir H. Keppel upon this subject, which are in accordance with the spirit of the different instructions which have been recently sent to you from this office.

I have to add that I communicated your despatch to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and their Lordships have informed me that, with reference to your letter of the 13th of January to Sir H. Keppel, they doubt the expediency of stationing two ships of war in the Yang-tsze River, unless merely for a temporary purpose.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 3.

Mr. Murray to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a copy of a despatch which his Lordship has addressed to Her Majesty's Minister in China,* in regard to a suggestion made by Her Majesty's Consul at Hankow, that one of Her Majesty's gun-boats should be permanently stationed at that port.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JAMES MURRAY.

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* No. 2.

No. 4.

Mr. Otway to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 5, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and with reference to Mr. Hammond's letter of the 31st ultimo, a copy of Sir R. Alcock's despatch relative to Mr. Consul Caine's application for a gun-boat to be stationed at Hankow.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. OTWAY.

No. 5.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Otway.—(Received April 12.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 10, 1869.

I HAVE laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 5th instant, transmitting copies of a correspondence which has taken place between Sir Rutherford Alcock, Her Majesty's Consul at Hankow and the Senior Officer at Shanghae, relative to an application from the Consul for a gun-boat to be stationed at Hankow.

With reference to the suggestion made by Sir Rutherford Alcock that two vessels of war should be stationed in the Yang-tsze River, I am commanded by my Lords to acquaint you, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, that they doubt the expediency of taking such a step, except for a temporary purpose.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

No. 6.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 19, 1869.

IT was a great relief to Her Majesty's Government to receive on the 31st of March your telegram sent from Kiachta on the previous day, announcing that the accounts received by you from all the ports showed that peace and order had been restored; that at Yang-chow-foo and Swatow, and in Formosa, entire security and an improved position had been obtained; that there was no more cause for anxiety at any point; that the best understanding existed with the foreign body at Peking; and that the relations with China had never been more satisfactory.

The injudicious proceedings of missionaries in China, the violence engendered by them on the part of the Chinese authorities and people, and the excessive and unauthorized acts of retaliation to which British Consular and, at their requisition, the naval authorities had resorted, were indeed sufficient to cause Her Majesty's Government to look forward with apprehension to the intelligence which each succeeding mail might bring.

The various instructions which I have addressed to you on these matters will show you in how serious a light such transactions were looked upon by Her Majesty's Government, and the account that you will have read in the public papers of the debates in Parliament will leave no doubt on your mind, and it is to be hoped on the minds of all British subjects in China, whether in the public service or in a private capacity, that it is the intention and desire of this country that the intercourse with China should be maintained by friendly means, and should not be subject to interruption by injudicious and rash proceedings on the part of British subjects.

You have, as the Delegate of Her Majesty's Government, full power and authority to control the conduct of Consular Officers; the Board of Admiralty will take care that the policy of Her Majesty's Government shall not be thwarted or overborne by excessive zeal on the part of Her Majesty's navy; and if the powers which you possess under Order in Council for the maintenance of peace, order, and good government among British subjects resident in or resorting to China, and for the enforcement upon them of the observance of the stipulations of Treaties and of rules and regulations made in that behalf, and for the maintenance of friendly relations between British subjects and Chinese authorities and subjects, are insufficient for that purpose, Her Majesty's Government will at any time be ready to consider any representations that you may make as to the inadequacy of your powers, with a view of enlarging them to the full extent admitted by law.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 1.

CHINA. No. 8 (1869).

Correspondence with Sir Rutherford Alcock respecting Missionaries at Hankow, and State of Affairs at various Ports in China.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1869.

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CHINA. No. 3 (1869).

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MISSIONARY DISTURBANCES

AT

CHE-FOO,

AND

TAIWAN (FORMOSA).

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of
1869.

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Correspondence respecting Missionary Disturbances at Che-foo, and Taiwan (Formosa).

No. 1.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received July 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, May* 21, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of two despatches I have received, one from the officer in charge at Taiwan, in Formosa, and the other from Che-foo, both referring to certain popular outbreaks directed against missionaries.

Fortunately there has been no serious injury to life and limb, and some property alone has been destroyed. But I would draw attention to these incidents as showing the precarious tenure on which all residence in the interior is held, and more especially the facility with which superstition and ignorance combined may be brought to bear against the missionaries, of whatever nation or creed. In Formosa it is clear the people were made to believe in the most monstrous stories, such as have prevailed in former times in Europe against the Jews, and later still in Italy against Protestants, of evil practices in poisoning converts or scooping out the eyes or children.

While memorialists are expressing the general desire of the foreign communities to have unlimited access to every part of the Empire, and right of residence in the interior, facts such as these must not be overlooked, as bearing upon the questions both of policy and practicability.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Mr. Jamieson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Taiwan, Takoo Office, April* 24, 1868.

I REGRET to have to report a slight disturbance of the public peace which has occurred within this district in connection with the missionaries. The cause of the disturbance was a report which had become current among the Chinese that the missionaries were using some sort of poisonous drug and administering it in secret doses to the people to induce them to become converts, and the result has been that the mob has attacked and burnt or destroyed the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches in Feng-shan-hsien, a district city about six miles from this port. Fortunately no foreigners were stationed there at the time, and the individual upon whom they have pitched as the grand aggressor is one Kao-chang, a native Protestant preacher, who has now been for some time a convert, and is, as far as I can learn, a man of unblameable character.

This man was dragged before the magistrate during the first excitement of the moment by the mob, who demanded his immediate punishment, but the magistrate succeeded in repressing this violence, and simply detained him for further investigation. He is still confined in the yamên.

The first report of the disturbance reached this place about twelve days ago, and I was immediately applied to by the Rev. H. Retchie to go and obtain the release of his imprisoned convert Kao-chang. I refused to do this, as the quarrel was purely a Chinese one, but told him that as the church property had been destroyed I should go and pay the magistrate a visit (a thing I had been purposing for some time previously at any rate), and endeavour to settle the matter quietly. I accordingly wrote a note to the magistrate, stating my intention to go and see him about this matter, but on the following morning,

just as I was starting, a note in reply was put into my hands, begging me to defer my visit for some time as the people were all in a state of great excitement, and implying that he was powerless to assist me in case any violence were attempted.

I had no difficulty in complying with his request, and I found afterwards that it was well this note reached me in time, as a band of several hundred men were then assembled outside the gate, on the road leading to Takow, ready to prevent any attempt at entrance on the part of foreigners. I should also mention that the day previously one of the Roman Catholic missionaries stationed here, the Abbé Chin-chou, hearing of the disturbance, and, like myself, not knowing at the time the true state of affairs, had entered the city and was immediately mobbed. He had to seek refuge in the magistrate's yamên, and remained there two days, when he was finally escorted outside the city in the early morning by a troop of soldiers, the crowd meanwhile lying in wait for him and openly professing their intention of putting him to death.

Since that time I have received several despatches from the high authorities of the island on the subject, and, contrary to expectation, I find they all regard the poisoning matter as an undoubted fact, and request me to investigate whether it was done at the instigation of Dr. Maxwell (who being the oldest missionary here is always quoted as the chief) or whether it was done by Kao-chang on his own responsibility, and to give strict orders that nothing of the kind be attempted for the future.

To these I have endeavoured to reply in the manner I considered best calculated to allay the excitement, namely, that after full investigation I am firmly convinced that this poisoning exists only in imagination; that Dr. Maxwell is a man of the highest respectability, as can be attested by the foreigners in this place, and is utterly incapable of such a thing; that his convert Kao-chang has also borne a very respectable character for several years past since foreigners have known him, and besides that he has never had anything to do with the dispensing of foreign medicines, Dr. Maxwell having always kept that in his own hands; moreover, that Dr. Maxwell himself has for over two months been absent in Hong Kong, and cannot well be implicated in the present disturbance.

I have also added that riots of this kind cannot be permitted to take place with impunity, and request that orders be given to the Feng-shan-hsien magistrate to find out the ringleaders and have them punished; as also that I consider the people ought to be made to pay for the property destroyed.

To the missionaries, both English and French, who have applied to me for assistance, I have replied that their only course is to remain quiet, and avoid the disturbed districts for a time; that the opinions of the people cannot be altered by any mandates of the authorities, and that they must either live down these reports, as has been done in other places, or quit the island for a district where there their labours would be more thankfully received.

Various reports have from time to time reached us of an impending attack on the foreign settlement itself, but, while taking all necessary precaution against a surprise, I cannot but regard such a thing as improbable in the extreme. Latest accounts report the country as tolerably quiet, and I have little doubt but that things will soon settle down into their ordinary channels.

Trusting my action in this matter may be approved, I have, &c.

(Signed) G. JAMIESON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Acting Consul Alabaster to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Che-foo, May* 9, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to report a small outburst of popular feeling against Christian missions, and the steps I have taken to obtain redress.

Some two months ago the Rev. Mr. Laughton, desiring a chapel in a market town two miles from this, instructed his servant to procure a suitable building.

Although cautioned by his master to avoid misrepresentation, the agent employed appears to have been guilty of a direct falsehood, as he stated to the owners of the property that he wanted the house for a shop.

A house was accordingly leased to him for a year; 5 dollars were paid on account of rent, and a lock was placed on the door.

On Mr. Laughton's going some six weeks ago to fit up the place as a chapel, the owners of the property at once declared, as they would appear to have had certain reason

for doing, that the lease was void, and tendering the return of the 5 dollars, demanded possession of the house.

Hoping to overcome their objections, Mr. Laughton declined either accepting the 5 dollars or giving up the house; and they at once, instead of appealing either to their own authorities or myself, seized the property, pulled off the roof, and walled up the door.

The matter was now reported to me, and although I should have been perfectly ready to consider their case had they laid it properly before me, I could not allow such violent action to be taken by the villagers against a foreigner without notice.

I therefore sent for the ringleaders, and happily succeeded in convincing them of the impropriety of their course by mingled arguments and threats with reference to the Taoutae; and on their submission agreed to accept the restoration of the house and its lease to Mr. Laughton for the period originally agreed on as compensation for the affront.

This has now been done, and I have at the same time required Mr. Laughton to publicly dismiss his servant, as evidence that we cannot be parties to underhand dealings, and requested him in future to acquire any buildings he may need for mission purposes through the Consulate.

As the act of the villagers, although outrageous, has been so promptly atoned for, and apparently proceeded from inconsiderate haste rather than reckless disregard for foreign rights, I trust your Excellency will consider that I have exacted sufficient satisfaction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. ALABASTER.

No. 2.

Mr. Egerton to the Secretary to the London Missionary Society.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1868.

I AM directed by Lord Stanley to transmit to you, for the information of the London Missionary Society, copies of a despatch and its inclosures from Her Majesty's Minister at Peking,* relative to disturbances directed against Christian missionaries at Che-foo and Taiwan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. C. EGERTON.

No. 3.

The Secretary to the London Missionary Society to Mr. Egerton.—(Received August 10.)

London Missionary Society, Blomfield Street Finsbury,
Sir, *August* 7, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, with inclosures, detailing certain disturbances which have recently occurred in China affecting the interests of Christian missions. The London Missionary Society has at the present time no missionary labouring either in Che-foo or Taiwan; but I am instructed by the Directors to convey to Lord Stanley and yourself, their best thanks for your obliging information.

2. Dr. Mullens being at present out of town, your communication of the 1st instant, respecting the proposed recommencement of the Mission in New Caledonia, has been forwarded to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT ROBINSON.

No. 4.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received December 7.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December* 5, 1868.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you herewith, for the information of Lord Stanley, copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir H. Keppel, dated 16th of October, relative to the unsatisfactory state

* No. 1.

of affairs in the Island of Formosa, where outrages have been committed upon British subjects, and no protection afforded by the local authorities.

The inclosures to Sir Henry Keppel's letter it is presumed have been already received at the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *"Princess Charlotte," Hong Kong, October* 16, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,* the copy of a letter addressed to me by Her Majesty's Minister in China requesting the dispatch of a gun-boat to Takow, in Formosa, where British subjects have been maltreated by the authorities and our Treaty rights ignored.

2. In reference to this letter I have further to report that Mr. Gibson, Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Taiwan, having failed to obtain redress for the outrages alluded to, placed the case in the hands of Commander Lord Charles Scott of the "Icarus."

3. The inclosed letter reports the demands made by his Lordship on the Taoutae of Taiwan.

4. On the 5th September the Taoutae notified his compliance with them, except that of granting 6,000 dollars demanded as compensation for camphor seized from Messrs. Ellis and Co.

5. But this seeming compliance was only the beginning of a fresh course of evasion and cunning; not one of the promises made has been fulfilled.

6. More recently the District Magistrate of Pi-toa, evidently acting under the instructions of the Taoutae, accused Dr. Maxwell, a British subject, of murder, and, further, refused to meet Her Majesty's Consul when he offered to bring Dr. Maxwell to Pi-toa to confront his accusers.

7. The Consul, being determined to see the District Magistrate, ascertains that three ambuscades were prepared to attack him on the road.

8. The accompanying copy of a letter from Dr. Maxwell will acquaint their Lordships with the nature of the cunning plot, the result of which has rendered affairs even more serious than before.

9. The Consul, who has had much experience in Formosa, represents to Her Majesty's Minister that any course will be futile except a march on Pi-toa and Taiwan, with a view to the arrest of the Taoutae and District Magistrate, in order that they may be sent to Peking.

10. As Her Majesty's Minister is now in possession of the state of affairs in Formosa, it is not my intention to sanction coercive measures except on his requisition.

11. In the meantime, with a view to strengthening just demands, I have ordered Commander Lord Charles Scott to proceed to Takow in the "Rinaldo," taking the "Slaney" and "Bustard" under his orders.

12. Should Sir Rutherford Alcock approve of the views of Her Majesty's Consul, I shall take care that they are carried into effect by an ample force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Sir R. Alcock to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Peking, August* 14, 1868.

I HAVE for some time been receiving unsatisfactory accounts from the southern ports of Formosa concerning outrages offered to the Protestant and Catholic missionaries in the Taiwan district, property destroyed, catechists imprisoned, with a total denial of justice or protection by the local authorities.

More recently a British subject, a mercantile resident at Takow, has been stabbed in the street by a soldier in the employment of the Leking tax collectors.

* See "China Papers, No. 2 (1869)," Inclosure 8 in No. 14.

The officer in charge of the Consulate, Mr. Gibson, informs me that the small community at Takow have now for some time been cooped-up in the place itself, it being unsafe to proceed, in any direction, two or three miles from the Settlement.

Under these circumstances, I have written to the Prince of Kung calling upon the Chinese Government to take immediate steps to compel the local authorities to do justice for the past outrages, and afford protection from any repetition of such aggressions.

I think it very desirable, at the same time, that a gun-boat should, if possible, be on the station to support the Consular authority, and continue there for a period, until the Chinese local officials have been made to feel the necessity of doing justice and preventing injury to foreigners.

I do not contemplate the necessity of having recourse to force, or any measures of retortion, to compel attention to just demands; but, doubtless, it will much promote the success of the Consul's representations on the spot if the Chinese officials see that means are at hand for exacting redress, if persistently refused to more peaceable efforts.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

Commander Lord C. Scott to the Taoutae of Taiwan-foo.

Sir, *Taiwan-foo, August* 21, 1868.

I CAME to visit you to-day to give you the following subject to consider and answer upon; you suddenly left the yamên, and so the conversation ceased.

I now request that you will definitely answer the following subjects:—

1. Will you either restore Elles and Co.'s camphor, or pay an equivalent of 6,000 dollars, and try Tan-a-yung for robbery? (Articles XVI and XVIII of the Treaty.)

2. Will you release the son of Ellis and Co.'s compradore at Gawchai? (Article XIII.)

3. Will you try Lin Hai who stabbed Mr. Hardy? (Article XVI.)

4. Will you try Hwang Hsi for murdering the Christian catechist? (Articles VIII and XVII.)

5. Will you try the people who destroyed Dr. Maxwell's dispensary chapel and private houses? (Articles VIII and XVIII.)

6. Will you try the villagers who destroyed the Roman Catholic missions? (Articles VIII and XVIII.)

7. Will you issue a Proclamation that the Christian religion be respected and Missions protected by the Local Magistrates? (Article VIII.)

8. Will you write a letter to Mr. Gibson, saying that foreigners shall not be interfered with in the camphor trade? (Articles IX, XII, XIII, XIV.)

9. Will you acknowledge in a despatch that Mr. Gibson is Her Majesty's Consul at Taiwan-foo, and will you respect his passports? (Articles VII and IX.)

Should the answers to these subjects be unsatisfactory, you (the Taoutae) have the whole responsibility of breaking nine Articles of the Treaty, and will be answerable for the consequences.

I request you will send the answer to this letter on board Her Majesty's ship "Icarus," by 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES T. SCOTT.

No. 5.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received January 15.)

Sir, *Admiralty, January* 14, 1869.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, extracts of a letter from Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel, dated the 6th December, relating to the state of affairs in Formosa.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JOHN HENRY BRIGGS.

Inclosure in No. 5.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

(Extract.) *December* 6, 1868.

AT Banca two merchants,* Messrs. Kerr and Bird, of the firm of Dodd and Co., were attacked by the mob and severely injured.

These gentlemen had proceeded to the town to occupy a house leased by them the previous year; but the native authorities, being most anxious to drive English merchants from the place, in order to resume a monopoly of the camphor trade, rather encourage than deter the mob in their lawless proceedings. Her Majesty's Consul was, therefore, compelled to make demands for ample redress, embracing a pecuniary compensation for the injuries inflicted on Messrs. Kerr and Bird, an acknowledgment of the right to reside at Banca, the establishment of proper protection, the restoration of their house, and the severe punishment of all who were implicated in the attack, as well as a fine to be imposed on the clans to which they belong.

The opportune arrival of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Janus," and the United States' gun-boat "Aroostook," was followed by a full compliance on the part of the authorities with the demands made upon them by Her Majesty's Consul.

At Takow, in Formosa, English and other foreign residents continue to be molested by persons acting under the authority of the Taoutae at Taiwan.

The house of Dr. Maxwell, a medical missionary, has been burnt down, while the numerous demands made for redress by Her Majesty's Consul have been treated with contempt.

I have ordered Captain Ross to proceed to Formosa in the "Pearl" and assume charge of British interests in that island. It is my intention to proceed without delay to the same neighbourhood, when I have arranged that a competent force shall be assembled, with a view to exacting a compliance with our Treaty rights, if called upon to act by Her Majesty's Minister.

At Nanking the stoppage of the salt trade, by establishing a blockade of the Grand Canal, would at once be followed by a full compliance with our demands; but, in Formosa, more active measures appear to be indispensable: the force at my command is, however, ample for the purpose.

No. 6.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received February 20.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February* 17, 1869.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of a letter from Commodore Jones, dated the 28th December, with its inclosures in original, detailing the circumstances under which Fort Zelandia and the town of Amping in the Island of Formosa were seized by a force under the command of Lieutenant Gurdon, of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine."

My Lords request to be informed whether Lord Clarendon approves of the unusual proceedings described in these papers, and which appear to have been undertaken by Lieutenant Gurdon on the requisition of Mr. Gibson, the Acting British Consul at Takow.

Considering that a force sufficient to have prevented all opposition and consequent bloodshed was at hand (having been dispatched by the Admiral on this service), my Lords cannot but think that the necessity for these acts of so-called "reprisals," accompanied as they were by serious loss of life and property, should be established, or that they should be emphatically condemned.

My Lords observe that Acting Consul Gibson disapproves of some of the proceedings of Lieutenant Gurdon. They will be glad to know Lord Clarendon's opinion of the Lieutenant's demanding the guarantee of 40,000 dollars, the indemnity of 5,000 dollars, and the prize-money of 5,000 dollars; and they would inquire whether the latter sums should be retained or returned to the Chinese authorities. So far as the discipline of the navy is concerned, my Lords view with extreme disapproval these pecuniary demands, and

* See "China Papers, No. 6 (1869)."

a reference to my letter of the 24th November last* will show that they have ordered commanding officers of Her Majesty's ships not to receive sums of money from Chinese of any class without the sanction of the Commander-in-chief or Board of Admiralty.

My Lords are anxious that no unnecessary delay should take place in communicating to Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Keppel the judgment of Her Majesty's Government on these proceedings.

Whether they were or were not justifiable, there can be no doubt that the operations at Fort Zelandia and Amping were carried out by Lieutenant Gurdon and the officers and men under his command with great skill and gallantry; but my Lords will postpone any expression of opinion on this point until they are in possession of Lord Clarendon's judgment on the whole matter, and have received despatches from the Commander-in-chief as to the operations themselves.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Commodore Jones to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *"Princess Charlotte," Hong Kong, December* 28, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to forward you copies of despatches, the originals of which are awaiting here the arrival of the Commander-in-chief, that relate to the steps taken to gain redress for a series of insults and outrages which have been committed by the Taoutae, officials, and people of Taiwan-foo (in the Island of Formosa) and its neighbourhood, upon Her Majesty's Consul, Her Majesty's Naval Officers, the merchants, missionaries, &c., and their dependants.

In despatch No. 1 from Lieutenant Thornhaugh Philip Gurdon, commanding Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine," dated the 2nd December, 1868, is the account of the most daring and successful night attack by him and the crew of the "Algerine" on the fortified village of Amping and Fort Zelandia, held by about 500 soldiers, and of his repulse of a large force sent to recapture the place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) OLIVER J. JONES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Commodore Jones to Lieutenant Gurdon.

Sir, *"Princess Charlotte," Hong Kong, December* 20, 1868.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 2nd December, with its inclosures, detailing the various operations conducted by you at Fort Zelandia and the town of Amping, and shall have great pleasure in submitting it to the Commander-in-chief whose arrival here is shortly expected.

I beg you to accept my congratulations at your having performed the most brilliant exploit which I have heard of in these seas, an exploit which could only have been accomplished by the great daring and judgment you displayed, which gave such confidence to the small body of men you commanded as to raise their courage and determination to a pitch equal to your own.

I have, &c.
(Signed) OLIVER J. JONES.

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Acting Consul Gibson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Taiwan, Takow Office, December* 14, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to state in detail our proceedings, &c., at Takow and Taiwan, from the landing of Tseng Ta-jin, the Amoy Taoutae, High Commissioner Ma, and Governor-General of Fukien, on the 8th ultimo, until the final conclusion of our difficulties. The

* "China Papers, No. 5 (1869)," No. 3.

facts which constitute those proceedings that I am about to narrate, are undoubtedly complicated, and it is desirable to reduce them to something like method, as follows; viz. :—

In the first place, from the landing at Amping of Tseng Ta-jin on the 8th, until our first conference at Takow on the 17th ultimo; in the second place, from the first conference on the 17th, till our second conference at Takow on the 24th ultimo; in the third place, from the Senior Naval Officer's operations at Amping, from the 21st, the day we took military possesion of the Fort of Zelandia and the ramparts of the village, till the 27th ultimo, the day of my second arrival at Amping; in the fourth place, from my second arrival at Amping on the 27th ultimo, till the third conference at Amping on the 29th ultimo; in the fifth place from the third conference at Amping on the 29th ultimo, till the final adjustment of our complications.

In the first place, from the landing at Amping of Tseng Ta-jin on the 8th till our first conference at Takow on the 17th ultimo.

Lord Scott, Commander of Her Majesty's ship "Icarus" informed me before his departure from Amoy, as nearly as I can recollect, some ten weeks ago, that Ma, the Governor-General of Fukien, had appointed Tseng, the Amoy Taoutae, to come over to Formosa and settle our complications. I was also informed that Tseng Ta-jin did not like the mission, alleging, as an excuse, that his mother, an old lady, was sick, and that he must stay at home to attend her.

At length, however, Tseng Ta-jin arrived at Amping, landed on the 8th ultimo, and proceeded to Taiwan, where he remained a week, discussing matters with the local officials. When he had satisfied himself with their information he came down to Pitow, the district city of Tung-shan, where he saw the District Magistrate and held a meeting of the graduates to inquire into the difficulties connected with the Protestant Mission there. On the 16th ultimo he arrived at Takow. He had the day before sent the Prefect of Taiwan to Takow. This gentleman paid me a visit on the 16th, and and had just departed to receive Tseng Ta-jin, when Tseng, a few minutes after he landed, sent me his card, requesting an interview at once as he wished to be off to Amoy in a day or two. Thinking this conduct peculiarly strange, I declined to concede an interview only a few minutes after his arrival, in this hurried and precipitate fashion, informing him that our complications were so great, so outstanding, and had gone so far, that, to my certain knowledge, it would take him fully a week to understand my side of the question, but I was willing to appoint next day, the 17th, at 3 o'clock for a conference. On the 17th, at 3 o'clock, we met. I asked him what powers he had received, and he, without answering my question, asserted before Lieutenant Gurdon, Lieutenant Johnson, Dr. Maxwell, Dr. Manson, the agent of Messrs. Ellis and Co., and the agent of Messrs. Tait and Co., that he had discovered that the Formosa difficulties were of no importance; that in a day or two he should start back to Amoy; and when I informed him that it was impossible to mend matters, unimportant as he considered them to be, without suspending Taoutae Liang's commission, he laughed off the whole affair. He even seemed delicately to insinuate that it was contrary to my duty to indulge in urging on those old complaints, asserting that they were trifling and of no moment. I asked him if my charges, with which he was already acquainted, against Liang Taoutae were of no importance. He rejoined that I had not alleged any proof as evidence of the charges I had laid down. Again and again he reiterated, down to the conclusion of the conference, that he was about to start back for Amoy in a day or two. I then inquired if he had power to suspend Liang Taoutae and his two subordinates, and he absolutely said that he had got no such power, and affirmed that our difficulties were of no weight or importance at all.

I derived the following important lessons from this conference :—

1. That Tseng Ta-jin considered our difficulties of the most trifling moment.
2. That Tseng Ta-jin wished to turn his back on Formosa and all its concerns.
3. That he absolutely concealed from me his powers, which from private information I knew he possessed, in the hope of bluffing me off.

In the second place, from the first conference on the 17th, till our second conference at Takow on the 24th ultimo.

The day after our very unsatisfactory conference of the 17th, I paid Tseng Ta-jin a visit; and although we discussed in a general manner our embarrassments, I consider that I made extremely little impression upon his prejudiced mind as to the urgency and importance of our difficulties; while I saw that if Tseng Ta-jin started back to Amoy in "a day or two"—an expression he was very fond of repeating—our negotiations would come to an end immediately, and the crying wrongs which have been showered upon Europeans by the local Government of Formosa increased tenfold. If Commissioner

Tseng withdrew from the island in a state of dudgeon, I could only apply material force to the local officials; and I at once foresaw when that material force had been successfully applied, I should still be in this predicament, either, first, of raising a native rebellion in the island; or, second, of having nobody with whom to settle our embarrassments; but perhaps both.

I returned to the Consulate, and prepared a despatch for transmission to Tseng Ta-jin, which I beg to inclose.

The gravity of the circumstances, the risk of failure, and the responsibility attaching to future proceedings, naturally abridged by your Excellency's despatch of the 9th of October; and I came to the conclusion that I was bound to insist upon the necessary steps being taken to the full enjoyment of our Treaty rights. I determined to take military possession of the Fort of Zelandia, and the ramparts of the village of Amping, not only as a material guarantee in the shape of a reprisal, but a basis for action, Amping being the key to the capital of Taiwan. I applied to Lieutenant Gordon, Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer, who approved of my plan of proceedings. I wrote him a despatch on the 20th, which I beg to inclose.

We were off the Fort of Zelandia on the 21st ultimo. We landed about 3 o'clock P.M. on the same day, and we reconnoitred the fort and the ramparts of the village. We found the doors on the magazines on the fort locked; and from information which I received, the soldiers and their commandant had all removed. The reconnoitring party took military possession of the fort and the ramparts of the village without opposition. I requested, verbally, Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer not to interfere with the civil government of the village, to allow the native merchants to trade as usual, and to protect the foreign Custom-house; all which, as I afterwards ascertained, he had performed. I posted Proclamations over the village of Amping, enjoining the people not to leave home, but to proceed with their different occupations as hitherto; and I transmitted another set of Proclamations to Taiwan-foo, announcing to the inhabitants that if they molested Her Majesty's Consulate, or the foreign houses, the city should be bombarded.

The Senior Naval Officer informed me that he considered it more prudent to hold the fort and the ramparts of the village from the ship, and to this I instantly assented.

I returned to Takow in Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard," on the 22nd, late in the evening.

On the 23rd I informed Tseng Ta-jin, in a despatch, of our proceedings at Amping, inclosing him the Proclamations I had published. He immediately claimed an interview. I appointed next day, the 24th, at 11 o'clock A.M. From reliable information I had received, I knew that Tseng Ta-jin would assent to every proposition I should lay down.

Lieutenant-Commander Johnson of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard," Dr. Maxwell, Dr. Manson, the agent of Messrs. Ellis and Co., and the agent of Messrs. Tait and Co., were present at the conference.

After a great deal of argument, which lasted from 11 till 3 o'clock, Tseng Ta-jin assented to my conditions. These conditions are in the Inclosure No. 1 of this despatch. Tseng Ta-jin agreed to everything in these conditions, except Messrs. Ellis and Co.'s compradore's case. He said, the local officials ought to have asked my permission before they tried to arrest him, or broke into his house; that he was very sorry that such an event had occurred; that in his opinion the compradore was amenable to the laws of China; but that when I came to Taiwan he and I should settle the matter equitably. To this I assented.

It was further agreed between Tseng Ta-jin, the Prefect, and myself, before the five gentlemen who attended the conference, that the British forces were to hold Fort Zelandia and the ramparts of the village of Amping in their military possession, till my conditions were fulfilled, and Liang Taoutae and his subordinates removed.

Next morning, the 25th, about 9 o'clock, I sent Lieutenant-Commander Gurdon, Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer, holding the fort and ramparts of the village of Amping, a note—I being afraid that a despatch would be intercepted by the officials at Taiwan—informing him of the agreement that I had come to with Tseng Ta-jin, and requesting him to continue to hold the fort and the ramparts of the village until my conditions were satisfactorily fulfilled, and till Liang Taoutae and his two subordinates were removed, as, judging from Tseng's complying with my conditions so readily, it was the reprisal, and nothing but the reprisal, that led him to make the promise he did.

The Prefect, who accompanied Tseng Ta-jin to Takow, left for Taiwan on the 25th about 5 o'clock A.M.; so ended the proceedings of our second conference.

In the third place, the Senior Naval Officer's operations at Amping from the 21st, the day we took military possession of the Fort of Zelandia and the ramparts of the village, till the 27th ultimo, the day of my second arrival at Amping.

Under this division I beg to submit to your Excellency the Senior Naval Officer's letter of proceedings, and my reply to that letter.

The Senior Naval Officer's operations took place on the 25th and morning of the 26th. What was the cause of his operations? It was either that Tseng Ta-jin was afraid of "losing face" with the Taiwan officials, by informing them of his agreement to the condition that the British forces were to hold military possession of the fort and ramparts of Amping, or that having informed the Taiwan officials—which I understand is the case—they paid no attention to our agreement.

I informed Tseng Ta-jin on the 24th about 3 o'clock that he ought to write to the Taiwan officials as to our agreement. He answered me twice with a distinct affirmative assurance that he would do so. Moreover, I had got reliable information about 12 o'clock on the 23rd, the day Tseng Ta-jin received my despatch detailing to him that we held the fort and the rampart of the village of Amping in our military possession as a reprisal, that he would agree to-morrow to all my conditions. From his assent to my proposition on the 27th, coupled with private information, which I found to be correct, that I received on the 23rd, I necessarily inferred that a despatch had been written. Further still, on the 25th, about 9 o'clock, a courier started with my note to the Senior Naval Officer, and at 7 o'clock P.M. of the same day the Senior Naval Officer, being then six or seven miles further off than Taiwan, received my letter, although it was delayed three hours; so that the Chinese authorities cannot plead insufficient time to gain a knowledge of the agreement made with Tseng Ta-jin even on the 24th. The Prefect who accompanied Tseng Ta-jin to Takow went very early on the morning of the 25th up to Taiwan, and he was there in abundance of time to stop the Chentai's (General's) soldiers from advancing on Amping.

The Chentai (the General of Division) at Taiwan, and the Chentai alone, is responsible for this infringement of our agreement; for advancing with his forces upon Amping; and for maliciously persecuting and defaming Tseng Ta-jin, the Commissioner of the Governor-General of Fukien. The Chentai Lin has been removed, and an officer named Tang has been appointed, who received the Chentai's seals on the 8th instant.

During the shelling of the water batteries, on which the native soldiers were busy mounting guns, not a private house in the village was injured, not a private person either killed or wounded; and the same may be said when the village was stormed early on the morning of the 26th. No private house was entered, nobody outraged by the sailors or marines; and this fact not only proves how well Lieutenant Gurdon and his officers kept their men in hand, but is also evidence that the men were imbued with a manly, honest, English character. For the gallant, dauntless, and unprecedented success in storming the Fort of Zelandia and the ramparts of Amping in the face of overwhelming numbers, I think I can claim for Lieutenant Gurdon, his officers, and men, your Excellency's well merited approbation. It was a brave action, and I have no hesitation in affirming that if Lieutenant Gurdon had been unsuccessful, my conditions would have been thrown with disdain in my face, and instead of twenty-one native soldiers killed, and about the same number wounded, it might have been hundreds, not on one side only, before my position at Taiwan could have been secured.

The local officials brought the unfortunate catastrophe of the 25th and 26th upon their own heads, and they have paid a dear price for their project; as Tseng Ta-jin, the Commissioner, has removed the Chentai, suspended Liang Taoutae, the Prefect, and seven other officials, civil and military. This overturn of officials I look upon in the light of a special providence sent to Formosa. If their successors are just men, even taking a Chinese view of justice, the island will rapidly prosper; but if not a chronic state of rebellion will be set alight in every clan, village, and family; and this special Providence shall have come in vain.

There is another subject to which I would invite your Excellency's attention as it gives me great discomfort. Before I had arrived the second time at Amping Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer had accepted an agreement from the native merchants 40,000 dollars. That agreement was as follows:—that this sum was to be held by the Senior Naval Officer as a guarantee that my conditions should be fulfilled by the local authorities, and Liang and his subordinates should be removed by the Governor-General of Fukien, and that the British forces should not advance upon Taiwan, if they did, this money to be previously returned to the merchants.

This agreement was a mistake, in as much as (1) it led the Chinese to believe we came in quest of money, not of justice; (2) as a matter of fact it belonged to the native merchants, and the property of the merchants can make no impression upon the feelings of the officials in China; (3) it would have been a very great hindrance if the British forces

had been obliged to advance on Taiwan; and (4), it was not in my request of the 20th ultimo. The Senior Naval Officer, however, on my representation, gave the 40,000 dollars back to the native merchants, as also 200 dollars which he had accepted under an agreement from the captain of a man-of-war junk. Lieutenant-Commander Gurdon accepted both these sums of money under a *bonâ fide* agreement; but however our agreement may sound to English ears, to the Chinese it is viewed as a bribe—as a squeeze—which neither Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer nor I have the least desire to recognize.

In the fourth place, from my second arrival at Amping on the 27th till the third conference at Amping on the 29th ultimo.

On the 26th I received a note from Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer informing me that he had been obliged to storm Amping, which I communicated to Tseng Ta-jin, inviting him to go up to Amping with me in Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard." This invitation he declined to accept, and it was only through the influence of Mr. Mann, Commissioner of Customs, who had arrived three or four days before, who very kindly went at my request for the purpose of inducing Tseng Ta-jin to come up overland to Taiwan in order to put a stop to further slaughter.

On landing at Amping on the 27th I went over the village. About a third of the usual number of inhabitants were present, on the 28th about one-half, and on the 29th nearly the whole. The market was well supplied. The magazines had been blown up on the fort, and the two military yamêns, in which there were great quantities of guns, small arms, powder, &c., lying about, were occupied by our men destroying those stores. The furniture of both yamêns had been removed on the 24th by the proprietors.

On the 29th, at about 11 o'clock, Tseng Ta-jin, the senior naval officer, and I met at head-quarters. I asked Tseng Ta-jin if he still adhered to my conditions, and especially the proposition that the British forces were to hold military possession of the fort and ramparts of the village of Amping until all my conditions were fulfilled, and Liang Taoutae and his two subordinates removed? He replied, "I adhere." He, however, requested that the senior naval officer should re-embark his men, which I promised him should be done at once, but on these conditions:—1. That he write me a despatch as Commissioner of the Governor-General of Fukien that Liang Taoutae and his two subordinates be removed immediately: 2. That he shall guarantee no Chinese military or naval force should occupy the village of Amping until all my conditions were fulfilled, and Liang Taoutae and his two subordinate officers removed; 3. That he should consent to see Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard" anchored off the Custom-house pier, so as to lay the fort and ramparts of the village of Amping within 400 or 500 yards from her guns.

These conditions having been all agreed to by Tseng Ta-jin, I then asked Her Majesty's senior naval officer if he had any demand to make. He demanded 10,000 dollars; 5,000 dollars for the British Government on account of coals, ammunition, &c., expended, and 5,000 dollars as a ransom for a store of guns that he captured in the fort.

The Chinese Local Government ought to pay for the coals, ammunition, &c., that have been expended, but I maintain that stores, guns, &c., captured, we were not at liberty to seize; we were not at war with China, not even with the local Government of Fukien. I disapproved of the demand, and would have nothing to do with the money, leaving it to your Excellency's and the Admiral's better judgment. The powder in the magazines and in the yamêns was very properly blown up, the muskets, gingalls—all loaded,—and the small arms were destroyed. There was no rice in the granaries. The guns were all iron ones, but British guns marked "B. & Co.," and I don't believe if we were at war with China would have sold for any very large sum.

In the fifth place, from the third conference at Amping on the 29th ultimo till the final adjustment of our complications.

On the 2nd instant I arrived in Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine," Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard" remaining in military possession of the fort of Zelandia and of the ramparts of the village until my conditions are fulfilled, and Liang Taoutae and his two subordinates removed.

The indemnity came down to Takow on the 4th instant, *i. e.*, 6,000 dollars for Messrs. Ellis and Co., 1,167 dollars for the Protestant Mission, and 2,000 dollars for the Catholic fathers. I inclose the copies of these receipts.

From the officials that brought the money down I learnt that Tseng Ta-jin, the Commissioner, had suspended the commissions of Liang Taoutae, Yeh, the Prefect, Ling, the District Magistrate of Tung-shan-Kuo, the Ling of Lo-chiang and seven other officials, who had been mixed up with foreign difficulties.

On the 6th instant Tseng Ta-jin sent down two Proclamations, which were in accord-

ance with the conditions. The Camphor Proclamation abolished the monopoly, gave foreign merchants permission to buy camphor not only at the coast ports, but in the interior; allowed compradores and other Chinese agents of foreign merchants to buy, and natives freely to sell, camphor; and brought the traffic in this article under the Tien-tsin Treaty and Custom-house regulations. I inclose the Camphor Proclamation. The second proclamation which the Commissioner sent down had reference to Christianity. It permits the greatest latitude to the missionaries, Protestant and Catholic. They can heal, preach, teach, and build mission-houses. They can travel anywhere under a passport. The falsehoods which the yamêns promulgated, such as poisoning water and giving noxious drugs to women, against the missionaries are all rebutted; in fact, the Commissioner says that these gross and malevolent reports are untrue. Native converts shall not be persecuted. I inclose this Proclamation.

In the second Proclamation, Mixed Courts in this island are instituted. The benefit of Mixed Courts in Formosa will be inexpressibly great. Any dispute between British subjects, their agents, and domestic servants, with the natives will be tried by a Mixed Court. For two or three years past justice and right have been made a laughing-stock of by the local officials, bribes and squeezes have been in their opinion all in all.

On the 11th instant Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," Lord Charles Scott, Commander, arrived, having Mr. Consul Swinhoe on board. Mr. Consul Swinhoe, after reading the various despatches, and taking the opinion of Lord Charles Scott and Major Crossman on the subject, declined to accept his post, and he ordered me to carry out the proceedings, which he entirely approved of, that I had commenced. For this favour I am exceedingly obliged to Mr. Consul Swinhoe.

The naval forces now are Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine" and Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard;" the latter has military possession of Fort Zelandia and the ramparts of the village of Amping. Her Majesty's ships "Perseus" and "Pearl" may arrive at any moment.

The rascals who pulled down Dr. Maxwell's dispensary, mission-house, and private houses in the town of Pitow are arrested. The murderers of the catechist have been apprehended. Dr. Maxwell's accusers are in gaol. Tin-hai, the person who stabbed Mr. Hardie, the agent for Messrs. Tait and Co., in Taiwan, has been in prison for five months; and in a few days Tseng Ta-jin, the Commissioner, is coming to Pitow to have them all separately punished; while Tan-a-yung, the man who illegally removed the camphor at Wuchai, under Liang Taoutae's orders, will be punished at Taiwan.

I intend to hold military possession of Fort Zelandia and the ramparts of the village of Amping (and Mr. Consul Swinhoe and Lord Charles Scott, the senior naval officer at Takow, are of that opinion), until all the individuals I have enumerated are most severely punished, and until Liang Taoutae, Ting, the District Magistrate of Tung-shan, and the Ting of Lo-chiang, who are just now suspended, are removed.

In conclusion, I humbly but sincerely beg your Excellency to bestow a high measure of your approbation upon Lieutenant Commander Gurdon, of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine;" without him I could have done nothing. If he had failed in his great risk, the Chinese officials, and Tseng Ta-jin himself, would have snapped their fingers at my conditions; but, as soon as he got my letter, he saw what an immense responsibility was upon his shoulders, and he did not falter; the boats were called away; he stormed the fort and the ramparts of the village of Amping, had a severe struggle to prevent the recapture of the place, and conducted himself throughout with resolution and determined gallantry. For his negotiations I can only say they were arranged by an officer who took a higher view of the Chinese national character than I do; he laid down a contract in a legal sense, and an Englishman contracting with another Englishman knows very well what a contract means. Lieutenant Gurdon was, as a fact, contracting with Chinese. This was his only misfortune. But nevertheless his negotiations were one thing, his gallantry decidedly another; and I beg your Excellency to give him your entire approbation.

Lieutenant-Commander Johnson, of Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard," has remained here for four months. In all Lieutenant Johnson's intercourse with me he has shown himself to be a brave and obliging officer. I beg from your Excellency the bestowal of your approbation upon him.

Mr. Mann, the Commissioner of Customs, at my request, visited Tseng Ta-jin at Takow twice or thrice; he afterwards, on my persuasion, accompanied Tseng to Taiwan, and at both places gave Tseng Ta-jin good advice. As I informed him, it was for the best interests of the Central Government that I laid down those conditions, and that the Senior Naval Officer stormed the fort; and that advice and much other beneficial advice was given to Tseng by one of the foreign officials of the Central Government itself.

I beg of your Excellency to approve of Mr. Mann's merits to the Inspector-General of Maritime Customs at Peking.

I will write your Excellency whenever the criminals are punished.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN GIBSON.

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

Acting Consul Gibson to Lieutenant Gurdon.

Sir, *Takow Office, November* 20, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to state that I consider it necessary, for the bare existence and interests of British subjects in Taiwan, that Her Majesty's ships under your command should make reprisals; and I request you to seize and to hold Fort Zelandia and the town of Amping till the local Government of Fukien will settle the just and important conditions with which you are already acquainted, which for nearly five months I have been urging on them to perform.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN GIBSON.

P.S.—I request you will not permit any naval or military force to enter at Amping.
J. G.

Inclosure 5 in No. 6.

Lieutenant Gurdon to Commodore Jones.

Sir, *"Algerine," Takow, Formosa, December* 2, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I took command of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine," from Commander Domvile, on November 1st, at Swatow, and proceeded to Takow, Formosa, in execution of my sailing orders the next day, viz., the 2nd ultimo.

I found the weather so bad outside that I had to run into Hope Bay for shelter for that day, but the weather moderating during the night I put to sea next morning, and after a very bad passage across, it blowing very hard from the north-eastward and east-north-eastward, and a very heavy sea running, I arrived at Takow at daylight of the 5th ultimo. I found Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard" lying here, which vessel I have taken under my orders. I regret to state that I found, on arrival at Takow, that 450 lbs. of biscuit, stowed on the lower-deck and in the fore-hold, had deteriorated to such an extent from sea-water as to be unfit for service.

I beg to inclose the report of survey concerning the same, also the receipt for warrant officers' and engineers' stores of Her Majesty's ship "Bustard," conveyed to her by this ship.

On arrival here, Dr. MacCarthy, Assistant Surgeon in charge, addressed to me a communication recommending that certain cases should be sent on shore to sick quarters, which recommendation I approved of and have acted on.

The Taoutae of Amoy arrived at Takow by land from Taiwan-foo on the 16th ultimo, he having been sent by the Viceroy of Fukien (in whose province this island is situated) to settle the existing difficulties between the Acting Taoutae of Taiwan and Mr. Gibson, the British Consul at Takow. The Taoutae requested, and Mr. Gibson granted him, an audience on the afternoon of the 17th instant, at which ceremony Mr. Gibson requested Lieutenant Johnson, of Her Majesty's ship "Bustard," and myself to attend.

On discussing the powers that had been granted to him by the Viceroy of Fukien, it was ascertained that he had not power granted him to dismiss the Acting Taoutae of Taiwan and the other officials implicated in the late disturbances, which demand of Mr. Gibson has been approved of by Sir Rutherford Alcock; consequently no diplomatic relations could be entered into with the Taoutae of Amoy, but Mr. Gibson has furnished him with all his correspondence.

On November the 20th, finding that the Taoutae of Amoy had not the power to accede to his demands, Mr. Gibson addressed to me a letter, of which I inclose a copy. The British Consul having come on board the same evening I weighed, in company with Her Majesty's ship "Bustard," and arrived off Amping early the next morning. During

the day I landed the Marines and the boats' crews of the two vessels, leaving them at the pier. I proceeded with Mr. Gibson and Lieutenant Johnson to reconnoitre the place, but found Fort Zelandia in such an utter state of ruin that it would not have been prudent, with the limited force at my disposal, to occupy it permanently: the buildings of the village affording also wretched accommodation for the men I informed Mr. Gibson of the same, and told him that I thought a Proclamation to the effect that we held the village of Amping and Fort Zelandia (the same being within reach of my pivot gun), obliging the Military Mandarin in charge of Amping to quit the place, and allowing no naval or military force to enter it, would answer the same end, which course accordingly was decided upon, the forces being re-embarked.

Mr. Gibson returned to Takow on the 22nd ultimo in Her Majesty's ship "Bustard," I remaining at this place to carry out the measures decided upon.

Mr. Gibson wishing a man-of-war lorcha that was laying inside of the bar to move outside, I accordingly boarded her and informed her that she must move outside the bar before 6 o'clock that night, or I should have to take possession of her.

I then proceeded on shore and visited the Heptai, informing him that we had taken possession of Amping, and that consequently he must leave the town within the space of twenty-four hours.

The Heptai at first declined to listen to any arrangement of the sort; but on my informing him that if he did not evacuate the town within the time named by me I should have to take him prisoner, he said that he would go to Taiwan-foo for orders, and let me know the result next morning.

The same evening a furious gale set in from the northward, preventing any communication with the shore until Tuesday forenoon.

On Tuesday, at 11 A.M., I proceeded inside the bar, and informed the man-of-war lorcha that unless she was outside the bar by 3 P.M. I should take her as a prize. The lorcha not having moved at the time named I sent my boats in manned and armed, took possession of her, and moved her outside the bar, anchoring her close to me, sending all her crew on shore, retaining only the captain and two men on board, placing a guard in charge of her at the same time.

During the afternoon a deputation of merchants from Taiwan-foo came on board to request me to allow the Heptai to remain in Amping, but I informed them that, unless they would deposit a sum of 35,000 dollars with me as a guarantee that all Mr. Gibson's conditions with Tsung Taoutae were carried out, my orders would not allow of it; they then left, saying that they would inform me next morning if they would deposit with me the sum required.

The next day at noon I received trustworthy intelligence that 500 men had been poured into Amping that morning, and that the Chinese officials were busy at work mounting guns on the fortifications. I immediately sent a despatch to the Heptai, stating that, unless he sent the troops out of the town and ceased mounting guns on the fortifications within an hour of the receipt by him of my despatch, I should be compelled to open fire on the town, at the same time sending notice to the inhabitants to abandon the town, as I intended to open fire at 3 P.M.

No answer having come at 4 o'clock I weighed, and commenced a slow fire from my pivot gun with shot and shell at 2,000 yards, confining my fire as much as possible to the batteries that were being armed.

At 5·20 P.M. I ceased firing and anchored. At about 7 P.M. I received a despatch from Mr. Gibson at Takow, informing me that he had arrived at an agreement with Tsung Taoutae solely on account of my holding Amping, and that the British forces were to continue to occupy Amping until the agreement was ratified by the Vice-Regal Government of Fukien.

I immediately saw of what consequence it was that I should be in actual possession of Amping, and the disastrous effect it would have on the negotiations pending if the Chinese put Amping in such a state of defence as might defy the small force at my disposal.

I accordingly came to the conclusion to storm the town of Amping the same night.

At 10·30 P.M. I left the ship in the gig and cutter, the gig containing one officer and eleven men, the cutter one officer and thirteen men, making a total of two officers and twenty-three men.

I landed on the beach about two miles below the town through a heavy surf, in which, notwithstanding every precaution, the gig was swamped and sunk.

After forming on the beach I advanced on the town, feeling my way with great caution, throwing out skirmishers and taking advantage of every inequality of the ground to conceal my advance; when I got within 800 yards of the fortifications, seeing that the

enemy was on the alert, I took advantage of a steep bank, making the men lie down behind it, and determined to wait until the moon had gone down.

At 2.40 A.M., the moon having gone down, I advanced again, and succeeded in penetrating into the heart of the town without being discovered.

I then managed to obtain a guide, and made for the Heptai's yamên.

On breaking into the Heptai's yamên we discovered a guard-room full of soldiers, in number about fifty, who immediately barricaded the door, and extinguished the lights; however, port-fires being at hand, they were immediately lighted, the door was burst in, when, notwithstanding all my personal endeavours and those of an interpreter I had with me, who assured them their lives would be spared, and they themselves allowed to go free if they laid down their arms, they would not, and reluctantly, in self-defence, I was obliged to give the order to fire.

The Chinese scldiers succeeded in breaking down a door in their rear, and escaped; suffering, however, a serious loss of eleven killed and about six wounded.

I then marched to the Custom-house, halting there till daylight before I advanced further, posting sentries on Fort Zelandia commanding the town, and also in the neighbouring streets. I managed to write a despatch here, informing the British Consul at Takow of what had taken place, and requested him to proceed to Amping in Her Majesty's ship "Bustard," which I ordered up to reinforce me immediately.

This despatch I succeeded in getting conveyed to the Consul by offering a heavy bribe to a native courier.

Directly it was daylight I concentrated my men, and advanced to take possession of the lines facing towards Taiwan-foo. I had only just reached the lines when I observed a large body of the enemy advancing to the attack, led on by a Mandarin carrying a yellow flag.

I immediately lined the embankment, and opened a heavy fire on the enemy, who stood and returned the fire for about five minutes, when they broke and fled towards Taiwan-foo, sustaining a loss, as I have since ascertained, of six killed and about ten wounded.

I posted sentries and established guards round the entrenchments, barricading the gate leading to Taiwan-foo, and withdrawing the planks of it.

During the afternoon a deputation of the chief merchants of Taiwan-foo arrived, informing me that they had been sent by Liang Taoutae of Taiwan, and requesting to know what my terms were, as they were empowered by Liang to grant any demand I preferred.

I informed them that I required a sum of 40,000 dollars to be paid over to me before noon the next day, as a guarantee that all Mr. Gibson's demands were fulfilled, the sum in question not to be returned until his agreement was ratified by the Vice-Regal Government of Fukien.

In case this demand of mine was not complied with, I informed the deputation that I should advance on Taiwan-foo.

During the night I was informed that my demand of a guarantee of 40,000 dollars would be complied with, they being guaranteed to arrive at my head-quarters not later than 4 P.M. that day, viz., the 27th instant. At daybreak on Friday morning Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard" arrived, with Mr. Gibson the Consul on board, and about 10 A.M. Lieutenant Johnson and thirteen men from her landed to reinforce me.

During the day I employed the force in destroying all stores of arms that I could discover, blowing up the magazine in Fort Zelandia to prevent any accident happening from the large quantity of powder stored there, and which was stowed in a very dangerous and careless manner.

The 40,000 dollars arrived at head-quarters from Taiwan-foo about 4 o'clock, and were sent off to Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine" for safe custody, I giving a receipt and guarantee to the persons bringing it that it would be restored on the fulfilment of Mr. Gibson's demands by the Vice-Regal Government of Fukien. On Sunday, the 29th instant, at about 11 A.M., Tsung, Taoutae of Amoy, arrived for a conference, and was received with all due honours.

The Consul requested me as senior naval officer to make any demands that I required from the Chinese authorities, when I requested from them, before Her Majesty's forces under my command re-embarked, the payment of the sum of 10,000 dollars, to be applied as follows: the sum of 5,000 dollars for repayment to the British Government of any expense incurred by them in the present expedition; also a further sum of 5,000 dollars, to be paid to me for a ransom for all guns and other Government stores remaining in the town of Amping, the sum in question to be distributed as prize-money to the officers and men under my command. This demand was complied with, when I on my part agreed to return the sum of 40,000 dollars deposited as a guarantee with me, to restore the man-of-

war lorcha, taken by Her Majesty's ship under my command, and to embark the forces under my command, at that time in possession of Amping; these promises being conditional on Tsung Taoutae's fulfilling the following requests:—

That he should send Mr. Gibson a despatch guaranteeing the dismissal of Liang Taoutae and other officials implicated in the late disturbances in Formosa;

That Tseng Taoutae should guarantee that no Chinese military force should attempt to occupy Amping until the ratification by the Vice-regal Government of Fukien of the British Consul's requests; the town of Amping in the meantime being held by us from a gun-boat;

That all indemnity money demanded from Mr. Gibson should be paid immediately, and delinquents concerned in the late outrages brought to trial and punished forthwith.

These requests were all complied with; the Taoutae of Amoy returning to Taiwan-foo about 2 P.M.

On Tuesday the 1st of December the Tsien of Taiwan-foo arrived with the sum of 10,000 dollars, the indemnity required by me before the embarkation of Her Majesty's forces under my command, for which I gave him a receipt, and handed over to him in return the 40,000 dollars in my possession as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the Consul's demands. The man-of-war lorcha had been restored to the Chinese officials on the previous day.

An arrangement was also made with the Tsien to receive over civil possession of the town from me at 10 o'clock the following morning, Her Majesty's forces under my command embarking immediately after the ceremony.

At noon on Wednesday, the 2nd instant, the Tsien of Taiwan-foo arrived, and was received with all due honours at the main guard, where I handed over officially to him the Civil Government of Amping; Her Majesty's forces then marched down to their boats, and embarked without delay, after having held Amping since Thursday the 26th of November.

I have the honour to state for your information that when captured by me the town of Amping had mounted on its fortifications forty-one guns, and there were in store ready for mounting no less than 101. The above-mentioned guns varied in size, but the greater number consisted of 18- and 12-pounders.

I also destroyed whilst in possession of Amping about 4,000 stand of arms, consisting of gingalls, matchlocks, bows and arrows, swords and spears. I weighed at 2 P.M., with the Consul on board, and proceeded to Takow, leaving the "Bustard" at Amping inside the Bar to see that no breach of the negotiations were attempted by the Chinese authorities.

I must beg leave to bring to your notice, for the information of the Commander-in-chief, the admirable conduct of the men, not one single complaint having been made by the inhabitants of a case of plunder.

On the Surgeon's recommendation I issued extra rations of coffee and spirits during the night whilst landing.

I beg that you will be pleased to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-chief the case of Mr. Walker, boatswain, third class, who has been six years in that rank. Mr. Walker proved invaluable to me whilst on shore, and his certificates are all remarkably good.

I hope that you will be pleased to approve of all my proceedings which have brought to an end all the claims that have been now pending for the last nine months.

Being very short of coal I have written to Messrs. Tait and Co., Amoy, the Naval Contractor, for coal, to send me, per next trip of the "Eliza Mary," thirty-five tons of Welsh coal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THORNHAUGH P. GURDON.

P.S.—I omitted to state in the due course of my letter that on December 1, I returned to the Tsien Taiwan-foo the sum of 200 dollars, the same having been paid by agreement by the Captain of the lorcha, for smashing my boats when towing her out, as I considered the sum of 5,000 dollars paid for expenses incurred by the British Government would cover all expenses.

I beg to inclose the British Consul's original acknowledgment of my letter of proceedings to him.

T. P. G.

Inclosure 6 in No. 6.

Acting Consul Gibson to the Senior Naval Officer, Taiwan.

Sir, *Taiwan, Takao Office, December* 3, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your despatch of the 2nd instant, informing me of your distinguished success in capturing Fort Zelandia and the town of Amping, which the local Government put into a state of defence, notwithstanding that Tseng Ta-jin and myself agreed upon Tuesday the 24th ultimo should remain in our military possession until all my conditions had been fulfilled, and Liang Taoutae and his subordinates removed. For your gallant and noble action, as well as in your subsequent affair, I offer you my cordial congratulations. In taking upon yourself the risk and the responsibility of this unprecedented and decided success, I consider that the bravery of your spirit was only subordinate to the firm determination of your will in performing the deed.

The Chinese local officials brought this misfortune upon themselves, as Tseng Ta-jin in our conference at Amping admitted. If not decidedly uncalled for, I beg to thank your officers and men for behaving so gallantly.

There are, however, three adverse remarks which I would make. In the first place, respecting the 40,000 dollars. In all negotiations whether entered into by a naval, military, or civil officer, one must contemplate facts. The 40,000 dollars belonged, as a fact, to the native merchants, and your judgment will clearly perceive that this sum could be no guarantee to me that my conditions should be carried out by the local authorities even under the agreement which you lay down. In China the relative ranks of the merchants and the local officials are so diverse that the property of the former can make no impression upon the latter. In the second place, regarding the 200 dollars which you mention in your despatch, I am fully persuaded that in restoring this money you did well. In the third place, respecting the 10,000 dollars: although this sum had nearly brought the negotiations to a dead lock, I have no objection to find with this, provided the Admiral approves of the justice of your proceeding.

I have replied to your despatch in an honest and straightforward manner, as I am sure you desire me to do; but no adverse remark of mine can diminish that distinguished and dauntless action of yours in capturing Fort Zelandia and the town of Amping by your gallant crew.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN GIBSON.

Inclosure 7 in No. 6.

Commodore Jones to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *"Princess Charlotte," Hong Kong, December* 21, 1868.

IN submitting this letter from Lieutenant Thornhaugh Philip Gurdon, then Senior Officer at Takao, I cannot withhold the expression of my admiration at the brilliant exploit he records, and at the wise manner he, in conjunction with Mr. Consul Gibson, have brought all the matters in question between them and the Chinese authorities in Taiwan-foo to so satisfactory a conclusion.

I would also bring to your favourable notice his recommendation of Mr. James Walker, boatswain, third class.

I have, &c.
(Signed) OLIVER J. JONES.

No. 7.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received February 22.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February* 22, 1869.

WITH reference to my letter of the 17th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Henry Keppel, dated the 6th of January, with its inclosures in original, relating to the proceedings of Lieutenant Gurdon, of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine," in capturing Fort Zelandia and the fortifications of the village of Amping in Formosa, and stating that he has requested

Mr. Gibson, Acting Consul at Takow, to restore to the local authorities the sum of 10,000 dollars, demanded by Lieutenant Gurdon; half to cover the cost of coal and ammunition expended; the other half as a ransom for guns captured in the fort.

My Lords request that the inclosures to Sir H. Keppel's letter, as well as those forwarded in my letter of the 17th instant, may be returned when done with.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *"Princess Charlotte," Hong Kong, January* 6, 1869.

WITH reference to Commodore Jones' letter to you of the 28th December, 1868, giving cover to Lieutenant T. P. Gurdon's report of the capture, by the crew of the "Algerine," under his command, of Fort Zelandia and the defences of the town of Amping in Formosa,

2. Their Lordships will observe by the annexed copy of a letter addressed by me to Her Majesty's Minister that I had made arrangements to assemble a force at Takow competent to occupy, if necessary, the town of Taiwan-foo, with a view to exacting the redress for outrages which had been denied to more peaceable efforts.

3. The prompt and gallant action of Lieutenant Gurdon has, however, anticipated the more extensive operations contemplated by me, and it only remains to be seen how far circumstances justified the action of that officer.

4. Mr. Gibson, Her Majesty's Acting Consul, having made a requisition to Lieutenant Gurdon, in which he stated that, "for the bare existence and interests of British subjects in Taiwan," it was necessary to seize and hold Fort Zelandia and the town of Amping as a guarantee for the settlement of the claims evaded by the Fukien Government during the previous five months, it appears that Lieutenant Gurdon was justified in complying with the urgent requisition of Her Majesty's Consul, who, in making it, assumed a grave responsibility; events, however, proved the wisdom of the course suggested by him, acting on which a settlement has been brought about by Lieutenant Gurdon of the just claims so long and contemptuously denied.

5. The Fort of Zelandia and defences of Amping form the key to the town of Taiwan-foo, from which it is distant about 3,000 yards.

6. As the Consul's negotiations started from the point that this key to Taiwan should be held by Her Majesty's forces as a guarantee for the fulfilment of his demands, the Chinese authorities committed a breach of faith in preparing for resistance by fortifying the defences.

7. The shoal water rendered it impossible for the "Algerine" to retain command of the town from the ship; she was distant about 2,000 yards from the forts, and could not have prevented the construction of earth-works at night. Forty-one guns had already been placed in position, 101 were found ready in store; a delay would have seen these guns in position, and Her Majesty's naval forces then at Formosa could not, with any hope of success, have attempted to storm so formidable a defence.

8. Lieutenant Gurdon, therefore, merits praise for the promptitude and gallantry with which he surprised the place at night, being alive to the importance of preventing the authorities further strengthening their position, as it was apparent that the means of defence at their command, if properly employed, would have enabled them to view with contempt the small force opposed to them, thus exposing British subjects in the district of Taiwan to the risk of fatal outrage.

9. Bearing in mind the brilliant success which marked Lieutenant Gurdon's operations, it is not my intention to reflect on the apparent inadequacy of the force with which they were undertaken. The men were in admirable discipline; the rapidity of their fire with the Snider rifle led the Chinese to believe that a much larger force was opposed to them. The judicious attack by night, combined with Lieutenant Gurdon's precaution to conceal his men until the moon had gone down, struck terror in the hearts of the native troops, leaving Lieutenant Gurdon master of a position to effect which peaceful diplomacy had exhausted every effort.

10. This review of Lieutenant Gurdon's proceedings enables me to warmly solicit their Lordships' favourable consideration of his gallant and judicious services. I trust also that their Lordships will be pleased to appreciate the important assistance rendered by

Mr. James Walker (B), Boatswain, an exemplary officer who has served six years in the Third Class. Their Lordships cannot fail to be gratified with the creditable and steady discipline of the "Algerine's" landing-party when fighting against twenty times their number.

11. Lieutenant Gurdon has brought about a result which appeared to me to require a force of 600 men. Had the Chinese authorities placed Taiwan-foo and Amping in a state of defence with the means at their command, the force I have named would have been indispensable, as the native garrison consists, I am informed, of 3,000 well-armed troops.

12. With reference to Lieutenant Gurdon's demands that 40,000 dollars should be handed over as a material guarantee to be returned when all the questions at issue were satisfactorily settled,—this sum was at once returned on Her Majesty's Consul expressing an opinion that the money being subscribed by the native merchants could not be viewed as a guarantee proceeding from the local authorities.

13. Finding, however, that Her Majesty's Consul still retains the sum of 10,000 dollars demanded by Lieutenant Gurdon, half to cover the cost of coal and ammunition expended, the remainder to be received as a ransom for the store of guns captured in the fort, I have requested Mr. Gibson to restore this sum to the local authorities, concurring with him in the belief that, otherwise, the impression might be formed that we were "in quest of money, not of justice."

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *"Salamis," at Singapore, December* 10, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 29th October, informing me that you had brought the conduct of the Taoutae of Taiwan to the notice of the Tsungli Yamên, and that you had received the assurance of the Minister that it had been determined to remove him from his post.

With reference to your instructions to Mr. Consul Swinhoe to proceed to Taiwan, and prosecute further inquiries, in concert with the Senior Naval Officer, to enforce a full measure of justice for the injuries inflicted on British subjects both as regards persons and property, in reply, I have the honour to express my conviction that in Formosa it appears to be especially requisite to convince the authorities of our ability to enforce a due respect for our Treaty rights.

The copy of a Memorandum I have had occasion to address to Lieutenant Johnson of the "Bustard" will assure you of my disapproval of coercive threats being employed without ample means being at hand to carry them out.

To provide such means, I have directed Captain Ross to proceed to Formosa in the "Pearl," where he will take the "Perseus," "Rinaldo," "Dwarf," "Gnat," "Slaney," "Janus," and "Bustard" under his orders.

Your Excellency will further observe by the accompanying Memorandum that I disapprove of any coercive measures being adopted except such as cannot fail to be successful.

It appears to me that the addition of the "Rodney" to the force enumerated would provide a landing-party thoroughly competent to carry out operations; the first of which would probably be the capture and occupation of the town of Taiwan.

I have therefore instructed the Senior Officer on the coast of Formosa in accordance with these views, and as I hope to reach Shanghae early in January, where the "Rodney" awaits me, I shall be in a position to join the force off Takow a few days later should circumstances demand my presence.

The Senior Officer at Takow has been instructed to act with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Consul, to whom he is to afford a cordial and effective support.

I have furnished Mr. Swinhoe with a copy of this letter and its inclosures.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Orders issued by Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Memo. *"Salamis," at Sarawak, November* 23, 1868.

WITH reference to a letter from Lieutenant C. Johnson of the "Bustard," dated 3rd November, reporting that a Mandarin at Takow, attended by several of the Taoutae's soldiers, sent on the night of the 30th October for a Chinese in the employ of Messrs. Ellis and Co., and attempted to interrogate him in an unofficial and peremptory manner on matters connected with Messrs. Ellis and Co.'s affairs; and it appearing that Lieutenant Johnson landed, with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Consul, an armed force to compel the Mandarin to give up all claim to right in such behaviour, and further that Lieutenant Johnson addressed a letter to the Chintai at Taiwan, stating that he would make prisoners of any person or persons whom the Taoutae may send in an unofficial manner to interfere with British subjects or their servants,

I disapprove of the course adopted by Lieutenant Johnson, principally because the threats he holds out are likely to be impracticable with the force at his disposal, and consequently undignified.

The Formosa difficulty is one easily solved. Certain demands have been made for redress; if persistently denied, they will be enforced: but the authority to commence hostilities rests with Her Majesty's Representative in China.

Threats and expostulations are thrown away on the Taoutae at Taiwan: it is apparent that a severe punishment should be inflicted by a competent force. I have expressed to Her Majesty's Minister my readiness to execute this service with the force at my command. Her Majesty's Acting Consul and British subjects in Formosa may therefore be assured that satisfaction will be exacted in every case that it appears justly due, and ample redress secured for the breaches of Treaty rights of which British subjects have been the victims.

In the meantime, Her Majesty's Consul at Takow has no right to appeal to, or encourage, one of Her Majesty's officers to commit a directly hostile act towards the Chinese authorities. The present duty of Her Majesty's ships is to protect British life. If British subjects find they are not adequately protected on shore, they should embark in Her Majesty's ships.

To facilitate impending operations, I request that you will apply to Her Majesty's Consul for any information he can afford as to the number and nature of the force to be encountered at Taiwan, accompanied by a plan of the walls of that town, showing their height and accessibility; also the position of the gates, especially with reference to the official quarter, stating the number of guns in position, and whether the nature of the country will admit of field-batteries being brought up.

(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL,
Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-chief.

To the Senior Officer of Her Majesty's Ships,
Takow.

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

Orders issued by Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Memo. *"Salamis," at Singapore, December* 10, 1868.

I INCLOSE, for your information and guidance, the copy of a letter from Her Majesty's Minister in China, giving cover to his letter of instructions to Mr. Consul Swinhoe, directing him to proceed to Formosa, where he is to demand full redress for the injuries inflicted on British subjects, both as regards persons and property. Should the authorities fail to afford full compliance with our demands, Mr. Swinhoe will place the matter in your hands.

You will wait my instructions before you adopt any coercive measures, except such as cannot possibly fail to be successful, such as the establishment of a blockade, or the seizure of vessels of the local Government, as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of our demands.

In all your proceedings you are to act with the concurrence of Mr. Swinhoe, to whom you will render a cordial and effective support.

You will promptly acquaint me with your proceedings, sending the duplicate of your letter under flying seal, to the Commodore, and the original to Shanghae, to wait my arrival.

Should further denial of our demands render it necessary to occupy the town of Taiwan, it is my intention to join you, without delay, in the " Rodney," accompanied by such additional force for operations on shore as your reports may appear to render necessary.

The following vessels are already either on the coast of Formosa, or are under orders for that destination, where they will be available for active operations in Takao and its neighbourhood :—" Pearl," "Perseus," "Rinaldo," "Dwarf," " Gnat," " Slaney," "Janus," and " Bustard."

(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL,
Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-chief.

The Senior Officer of Her Majesty's Ships,
Takow.

No. 8.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1869.

I HAVE laid before the Earl of Clarendon your letter of the 17th instant, inclosing papers respecting the proceedings of Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Taiwan, in Formosa, and the Commander of Her Majesty's gun-vessel " Algerine " and expressing the wish of the Board of Admiralty to be informed whether his Lordship approves of those proceedings.

I am to request that you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that although no official reports of these transactions have as yet reached this office directly from any of Her Majesty's servants in China who are under the control of this office, yet as among the papers inclosed in your letter is found Mr. Gibson's Report of the 18th of December, to Sir Rutherford Alcock on the subject, Lord Clarendon considers that he is sufficiently well informed to admit of his at once making known to their Lordships his opinion, and he is compelled with regret to say that it is wholly unfavourable, whether as regards the conduct of the Acting Consul or that of the Naval Officer, save as regards the operations of the latter considered in a professional point of view, the appreciation of which he must leave to the Board of Admiralty.

There was clearly no occasion for these two subordinate authorities to commit any acts of hostility whatever ; any danger to life or property was, for the time at least, at an end, and had been so for many weeks ; the question at issue was the amount of reparation which might be due, to be ascertained by local inquiry; and any remissness on the part of the authorities to afford adequate reparation was a matter for discussion between Her Majesty's Minister and the Chinese Government at Peking, and not one to be adjusted by a precipitate recourse to reprisals by a subordinate Civil or Naval Officer.

Lord Clarendon will convey this opinion to Sir Rutherford Alcock by the next mail. The Lords of the Admiralty will see that his Lordship strongly disapproves of the proceedings on the part of the British officers concerned, and he sincerely trusts that the instructions recently sent to China by their Lordships and by himself will prevent the recurrence of these unnecessary acts of violence.

Equally reprehensible, in Lord Clarendon's view, are the many particulars stated in the correspondence, and to which his Lordship's attention is pointedly called in your letter, whether as regards the guarantee of 40,000 dollars demanded by the Commander of the " Algerine " and afterwards returned by him, or the two sums of 5,000 dollars each, one under the title of indemnity for expenditure of warlike stores in attacking the Chinese fort, the other under that of prize-money, which were exacted from the Chinese authorities.

Lord Clarendon considers that these last sums should be immediately returned to the Chinese authorities ; and Sir Rutherford Alcock will be instructed to apprize the Chinese Government that the conduct of the British officers in exacting them is regretted and disavowed, and that orders have been given for the restitution of the money.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

P.S.—I inclose a copy of Lord Clarendon's instruction to Sir Rutherford Alcock, referred to in this letter.*

E. H.

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* No. 9.

No. 9.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1869.

I HAVE received from the Board of Admiralty a copy of Mr. Acting Consul Gibson's despatch to you of the 18th of December, reporting the measures of coercion which on his application had been applied to the Chinese authorities in the neighbourhood of Taiwan by Lieutenant Gurdon, of Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine," in order to obtain redress for wrongs done to British subjects, missionaries and others. I have received no official report of these transactions from any other quarter; but as Mr. Gibson's report to you speaks for itself, there is no occasion for me to delay making known to you the impression produced on Her Majesty's Government by the transactions of which he gives an account.

I conclude the grievances at Taiwan are those to which the Inclosures No. 4 to No. 15 in your despatch of the 29th of October relate,* and as I find no other despatch from you to Mr. Gibson than that of the 29th of October, I presume that it is the despatch which Mr. Gibson erroneously quotes as bearing date the 9th of that month. I wish, for Mr. Gibson's sake, that such may not be the case; for I find in the copy of the despatch to him, which you have sent home, under date of the 29th of October, the following passage: "Until Mr. Swinhoe takes charge, you will continue to maintain, to the best of your ability, and with such means as are at your disposal, the Treaty rights so flagrantly violated, but avoiding any offensive measures, which, if found necessary, will be better undertaken when the force the Admiral proposes sending arrives with the Consul."

Rash and inexcusable as Mr. Gibson's proceedings would, under any circumstances, have been, they would be doubly so if your despatch was in his hands when, on the 20th of November, he called upon the Lieutenant commanding Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine" to make reprisals, by seizing and holding Fort Zelandia and the town of Amping.

You will learn from the inclosed copies of correspondence between this office and the Admiralty† the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the measures by which Mr. Gibson's requisition was carried into effect. The Board of Admiralty will, of course, deal with their own officers; but as regards Mr. Gibson, I have to instruct you to convey to him my unqualified disapproval of his conduct, whether acting without having received your instructions of the 29th of October, or in neglect of them.

It is quite clear that Mr. Gibson is wholly unfit to be entrusted with any discretionary power, or to be placed in any other than a situation where he will be constantly under the superintendence and control of a superior Consular officer on the spot. His proper office is that of Interpreter, and you will be careful not to place under his charge the superintendence, even temporary, of a Consulate or Vice-Consulate, for the duties of which judgment, tact, discretion, and moderation are essential requisites.

I need scarcely say that under no circumstances must he be allowed to remain in Formosa; and I only hope that the judgment thus passed on his conduct will produce a salutary impression throughout the Consular service in China, and serve as a warning to all persons employed in it, that Her Majesty's Government will visit with the severest condemnation acts of violence wantonly undertaken and carried out without the express sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 10.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received February 27.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February* 26, 1869.

WITH reference to your letter of the 23rd instant, expressing the disapproval of the Earl of Clarendon of the capture of Fort Zelandia and other operations carried out by Lieutenant Gurdon, commanding Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine," in conjunction with Acting Consul Gibson, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of Lord Clarendon, a copy of a letter which has been addressed by their Lordships' desire to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

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* See "China No. 2 (1869)," Inclosures 4 to 15 in No. 14.

† Nos. 6 and 8.

Inclosure in No. 10.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Admiralty, February* 26, 1869.

I HAVE laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 6th January, and its inclosures, giving an account of the capture of Fort Zelandia and Amping in Taiwan, Formosa, by Lieutenant Gurdon, commanding Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine," a report of which had already been received in a letter from Commodore Jones of 28th December.

Their Lordships having communicated with the Earl of Clarendon, regret that they must take an entirely different view of these transactions from that adopted by you.

A copy of the letter which was addressed by the Admiralty to the Foreign Office on the 17th instant, together with copy of Lord Clarendon's reply to the same, are trasnmitted herewith for your information.*

In conveying their Lordships' judgment in this unmistakeable manner, they desire me to state that they will not make any further remark on portions of your letter which they would otherwise have noticed at greater length.

With reference, however, to the manner in which the operations themselves were conducted (irrespective altogether of the propriety or wisdom of undertaking the same), my Lords desire me to express their appreciation of the great gallantry and skill displayed by Lieutenant Gurdon and the officers and men under his command; and, in conformity with your wish, Mr. James Walker the boatswain recommended in your despatch, will receive a special promotion to the Second Class of Warrant Officers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

No. 11.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 1.)

Sir, *Admiralty, March* 31, 1869.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, dated 27th January, stating the complete fulfilment of all demands made by the British authorities on the Taiwan Government, Formosa.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *"Rodney," at Hong Kong, January* 27, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the copy of a letter addressed to me by Mr. Consul Swinhoe, referring to the recent successful proceedings of Lieutenant Thornhaugh P. Gurdon at Amping, in the Taiwan district of Formosa, together with the copy of an order I had addressed to the Senior Officer of this division, previous to the receipt of Mr. Swinhoe's letter.

2. I have also the honour to forward the copy of a letter from Mr. Gibson, Acting Consul at Taiwan, reporting the complete fulfilment of all his demands,—a result brought about by the prompt steps taken by Lieutenant Gurdon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

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* Nos. 6 and 8.

No. 12.

Mr. Matheson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 1.)

My Lord, *The Holmwood, Dorking, March* 31, 1869.

IN order that a correct view may be obtained by your Lordship of the position of the Protestant Mission in Formosa, in relation to the late events in that island, I take the liberty of offering the following information :—

That Mission is a branch of one whose head-quarters are at Amoy on the mainland, and which is maintained by the English Presbyterian Church.

It has now been in existence for twenty-one years, and in that time 550 Chinese have been gathered into the Christian Church, scattered in little groups over a wide extent of country. There are few of these Chinese converts who have not suffered more or less persecution for the sake of the Gospel.

There are now ten missionaries on the staff, all of them men of intelligence, prudence, and piety, and who have had a college training of from seven to eight years before leaving this country. One of their number, who died lately, was the Rev. W. C. Burns, whose name is honoured wherever foreigners are known in China, and who was consulted by Lord Elgin on his first going to that country.

Another, Dr. Maxwell, commenced the Mission in Formosa in 1865, by taking a house in Taiwan-foo, the capital of the island. The people were most friendly; and Dr. Maxwell being a medical missionary at once won his way. But some literary students stirred up a mob and he was compelled to retire, and took up his quarters at Takow, a neighbouring seaport. Here he built a hospital, and, with several native Christians as evangelists, he has been engaged during the last three years in healing the sick and preaching the gospel in the surrounding country.

As one result of these labours, there are now eighteen baptized converts, chiefly belonging to a town called Pitow, about seven miles inland.

It was soon found that the Chinese authorities entertained an inveterate hatred of all foreigners, whether missionaries or merchants; and nearly all the late troubles have been traceable to officials connected with the local Government.

Last summer, inflammatory placards were widely circulated, stating that the conversions were effected by poisoning the food of the people, the populace became excited, the chapel at Pitow was attacked by a mob, and destroyed; one of the evangelists was imprisoned, and the native Christians and their families had to flee for their lives. Soon after this, one of the most remarkable of the converts was brutally murdered when visiting a neighbouring village on his own private affairs; and after being stoned to death, his heart was torn out, and eaten by the most savage of his murderers.

As a Mission we deprecate the idea of seeking the support of an armed force in carrying on our work, and our missionaries are prepared to meet dangers and opposition in the conflict of Christianity with heathenism; but as native Christians are entitled to protection under the Treaty, and it was wholly denied them by their own Government, Dr. Maxwell sent a Memorial to Her Majesty's Representative at Peking, praying for the redress of these grievances.

On some previous occasions the happiest results have been attained by the timely intervention of the Consular authorities; and it has always been felt to be a graceful act on the part of a Christian Government. Perhaps I may be permitted to state, after an experience of China, extending over thirty years, first as a merchant and partner in the firm of Jardine, Matheson, and Co., of Hong Kong, and afterwards in connection with missionary operations, that the wise and vigorous action of the Consular authorities in meeting the artifice and duplicity of the Chinese officials has repeatedly produced the most beneficial results, I will not say in the cause of missions merely, but in the cause of peace and order.

Personally I feel deeply grateful for the deliverance effected in Formosa by the Consul and the naval officers who were engaged in the settlement of these difficulties; and I trust that our Mission will be exonerated from any blame in regard to them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DOND. MATHESON,

One of the Committee for Foreign Missions of the English Presbyterian Church.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Statistics of the Presbyterian Church Mission.

CHINA.

Missionaries.

The Rev. W. C. Burns	arrived in China	1847,	now at	New-chwang.
„ C. Douglas	„	1855,	„	Amoy.
„ George Smith	„	1857,	„	Swatow.
„ W. S. Swanson (returning to)	„	1860,	„	Amoy.
„ H. L. Mackenzie.. ..	„	1860,	„	Swatow.
„ Hugh Cowie	„	1863,	„	Amoy.
„ W. Macgregor	„	1864,	„	Amoy.
„ Hugh Ritchie	„	1867,	„	Formosa.
William Gauld, M.D.	„	1863,	„	Swatow.
James Maxwell, M.D.	„	1863,	„	Formosa.

Native Evangelists.—18 at Amoy, 8 at Swatow, and 6 at Formosa.
Students at Amoy, 9.

Stations.

District of Amoy.—E-mung-kang, Pechuia, Bay-pay, Khi-boey, Liong-bun-see, Yu-boey-kio, Anhai, Chin-chew, Peh-chioh, Yu-bu-siu.

District of Swatow.—Swatow, Tat-hau-po, Yam-tsau, Ching-chung, Ampow, Ung-kung, Toa-soa-thau, Kway-tham, Saipow, Hoo city.

District of Formosa.—Ta-kow, Petaou or Pitow.

Account of Cheng-hong, who was murdered.

Chen-hong had been an officer on board a junk, and one of the sailors having met with an accident, Chen-hong had him conveyed to Amoy hospital, and watched him for two successive nights. The hospital-keeper, an aged Christian, conversed with Cheng-hong on the subject of religion. The truth took hold of him, and on returning to his native place in the north of Formosa, he at once destroyed the idols in his house; but finding no spiritual rest, and hearing of a Christian mission in the south of the island, he left part of his property in charge of a relative, and taking some money concealed in a girdle, he set out on a nine days' journey on foot, in search of the mission chapel. He reached Takow on a Saturday, dusty and foot-sore, and told his tale. The following day he heard the Gospel preached, listened with intense earnestness, and at once embraced the truth. After his baptism, he set up in business at Takow, and has since then been most useful in assisting to spread the knowledge of salvation.

No. 13.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Matheson.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 5, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, containing information as to the position of the Protestant mission in Formosa in relation to the late events in that island; and, in reply, I am to state to you that Her Majesty's Government regret very much that missionaries and their converts should be exposed to persecution, but that they cannot depart from the view expressed in Mr. Hammond's letter to the Missionary Society of the 10th of February, and in Lord Stanley's despatch of December 1 to Sir R. Alcock, as to the course that missionaries should pursue in China, both of which documents have been laid before Parliament, and are to be found in the Blue Book, China No. 2 (1869.)

I am at the same time to observe to you that Her Majesty's Government cannot approve of the conduct of Her Majesty's Acting Consul in Formosa, with reference to the events in that island to which you have called Lord Clarendon's attention.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. OTWAY.

No. 14.

Mr. Matheson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 9.)

My Lord, *The Holmwood, Dorking, April* 8, 1869.

WHILE tendering my sincere thanks for your Lordship's courteous reply to a previous communication, I trust that I shall not be thought presumptuous in again addressing your Lordship on the same subject, as the deepest anxiety is felt in some quarters as to the effect that may be produced in China by the reversal of the settlement effected in Formosa, and the removal of the Vice-Consul as stated by your Lordship in the Upper House.

Fearing that no connected narrative of the Formosa difficulties has as yet reached your Lordship, I take the liberty of inclosing one which may be relied on as thoroughly trustworthy, and I venture to hope that it may tend to modify at least the severe punishment to be inflicted on an able and faithful public servant, as well as to induce your Lordship to reconsider the probable consequences of tendering an apology to men utterly unable to appreciate it, and for conduct which, although open to censure in the light of the new instructions, has nevertheless, in connection with the firm attitude of Her Majesty's Minister in Peking, contributed to the gratifying fact stated by your Lordship that our relations with China have never been more satisfactory.

At the same time let me assure your Lordship that it will be the constant aim of the Presbyterian Mission to endeavour to act in the spirit of the arrangements lately concluded between Her Majesty's Government and the Court of Peking, so as to avoid to the utmost of our power any possible cause of irritation between the two countries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DOND. MATHESON.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Narrative of Events in the Island of Formosa, 1868.

WE are now, I believe, so near to a thorough and satisfactory termination of the various difficulties which had brought to a deadlock the relation between the Consular Representatives of foreign Powers and the local Government of Formosa, that it is possible briefly to review the position from the commencement of the present crisis, and so enable your readers to understand the value of the results which have been obtained. I do not pledge myself, however, that Chinese duplicity, and Formosa Chinese duplicity in particular, shall not again show itself in some form or other before the terms now agreed upon are fully performed. The present crisis was preceded by a long tale of difficulties in the relations between foreign residents and the local government, dating from the time of the establishment of the foreign Customs in the island. Distance from the mainland, a peculiar and absurd pride, on the part of the aristocracy of the Foo City, resting on the fact of some terrible outrages on foreigners in bygone years, which had remained unpunished, and some specialities of corruption in the form of the local government, all combined to render the position of foreigners in the island anything but agreeable, and to make the chance of justice, in cases in which foreigners were involved, exceedingly shadowy. Our more immediate difficulties, however, date from the beginning of April of the present year. About that date a considerable purchase of camphor had been made for the hong by the compradore of Messrs. Ellis and Co. This purchase amounted to the value of 6,000 dollars, and was accomplished in Wu-chai, a place considerably to the north of Taiwan-foo; this camphor was bought in thorough consistency with the terms of the Treaty, which expressly stipulates camphor as one of the articles of legal trade. In spite of this, however, it was suddenly laid hold of at Wu-chai, and forcibly carried off by the agents of the Taoutae, whose authority extends throughout the whole Chinese portion of the island.

On the news of this procedure, the United States' gun-boat "Aroostook," with M. le Gendre, the United States' Consul at Amoy, who was then visiting the southern portion of Formosa, and Mr. Jamieson, the Acting British Consul at Takow, visited the Taoutae at his yamên in Taiwan-foo, and remonstrated with him on the illegality of this procedure. In answer, he claimed all camphor in the island as Imperial property—a most atrocious claim, inasmuch as no part of it is found on Imperial ground—and denied to foreigners any right to trade in it without his own special permission. At the same time, however, he came to a distinct agreement with the two Consuls that the camphor in

question should be released or a money indemnity paid in its stead. Up to the hour at which I write, neither camphor nor money have been forthcoming, and if now it is about to be paid it is only under the pressure of a force which had become necessary when all the moral force had failed.

Following up the policy of his predecessors, who had succeeded in expelling the Protestant missionaries from Taiwan-foo, Liang Taoutae, in the beginning of the present year, refused to ratify a purchase within the walls in Taiwan-foo, on the part of the Roman Catholic Mission in Formosa, or to take any notice of an outrage upon their premises, an outrage, doubtless, which was not carried out without the cognizance of the Yamên officials. They allowed and encouraged most infamous reports, regarding the proceedings of both Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries and their converts, to spread unchecked throughout the whole South of Formosa, until the underlings of the various Yamêns, seeing that the popular mind was sufficiently excited, were able, without fear, to lead parties to the destruction of all the chapels within their reach.

In the beginning of April they sacked and burnt a Roman Catholic Chapel at Koè-kan; on the 11th of the same month, they sacked and tore down the Protestant chapel at Pitow, the district city. On the same day, they (the Yamên underlings) brutually assaulted a Protestant Catechist in the streets of Pitow, who barely succeeded in escaping their knives, and reaching the District Mandarin, coolly shut him up in prison, and he was not released for seven weeks. On the 24th of April, another Protestant Catechist was set upon in a village, only five miles from the Consulate at Takow, was murdered in open day and on the public street, his body cut in pieces, and his heart eaten by some of the bolder of his murderers, at the north gate of the old city, close by. In Pitow, the houses of the adherents of the Protestant Church were broken into and sacked, the women driven out to the streets and the males of the party compelled to flee for their lives to Takow. The Roman Catholics in Taiwan-foo were, in the beginning of May, once more outraged, their premises again destroyed, and one of their number bambooed and imprisoned by the district magistrate of Taiwan-foo. The remonstrances of Mr. Acting Consul Jamieson were utterly without avail, nor was a visit of that gentleman, accompanied by Lieutenant-Commander Keppel, and a party of men from Her Majesty's gun-boat "Janus," to the district magistrate of Pitow, of any further value in securing the release of the imprisoned Protestant Catechist.

In the end of June, Mr. Hardie, the agent of Messrs. Tait and Co., at Taiwan-foo, was suddenly, and on the most frivolous pretext, attacked by one of the official servants of the Leking office, while on his way from Takow to Taiwan-foo. This man, unobserved by Mr. Hardie, suddenly came behind him and stabbed him forcibly in the side of the chest with a knife. Fortunately it impinged on a rib, and except the loss of blood, and a severe pleurisy which afterwards followed, no great evil resulted. At the time, however, Mr. Hardie had to defend himself from several attacks of this man with the knife, assisted by another, and only with great difficulty succeeded in saving his life. Until this hour this man remains unpunished. So gross was the case, however, that the authorities, on the urgent instance of Mr. Gibson, the Acting British Consul, who had just at that time arrived, did make a show of seizing the man, and sent a special deputy that he might be punished before Mr. Gibson at the place were the outrage occurred. So manifestly, however, was the professed infliction of punishment an utter sham and deception, that, on the one hand, the bystanders laughed, and, on the other, Her Majesty's Acting-Consul declared publicly to the deputy that he could not look on the proceedings as other than additional insult, and left the place in disgust. Mr. Gibson took the place of Mr. Jamieson on the 1st of July, and immediately forwarded despatches to the various yamêns, announcing his assumption of the Taiwan Consulate. On the 14th of July, a despatch was received at the Consulate from the Taoutae, refusing to recognize Mr. Gibson as Acting British Consul, and it was not until Lord Charles Scott arrived with Her Majesty's ship "Icarus," about the end of August, that the Taoutae would humble himself to recognize the new Acting Consul. Mr. Gibson describes this despatch of Taoutae's as a standing insult to Lord Charles Scott and himself.

During the month of August another episode was being transacted at Cou-chai. Mr. Pickering, of Messrs. Elles and Co., had proceeded thither, under the permission of Mr. Jamieson, to inquire after the camphor, which, in spite of the Taoutae's promise, was not forthcoming. For this journey Mr. Pickering had only the Consular passport, the Taoutae refusing to grant or sign any passport to foreigners to any place outside of Takow or Taiwan. The Taoutae no sooner knew of Mr. Pickering's having gone to Cou-chai than he gave orders to have him destroyed. The Ting of Lok-kang tried to carry out this order by means of his soldiers, but Mr. Pickering happening to be a man of peculiar courage and resolution, and being well acquainted also with the character of the Formosa

militia, held his ground firmly, defended resolutely with fire-arms the place where he was lodged, routed his assailants again and again, but finally had to make his way with great difficulty to the sea-shore, and was then driven in a small boat by a storm to Tamsuy, in the north of the island. During all this time the Taoutae never once attempted to complain to the Consul of Mr. Pickering, or to discuss with him the legality of his proceeding.

On the 29th of August, Lord Charles Scott and the Consul had an interview with the Taoutae of Taiwan-foo, according to express agreement with the latter. During this interview the Taoutae behaved in a most extraordinary manner, becoming enraged, and with his fan sharply striking Mr. Gibson over the hands, and thereupon contemptuously leaving the room. After waiting in vain for the space of three-quarters of an hour for his return, Lord Charles Scott and Mr. Gibson left. They continued their negotiations, however, in writing with the Taoutae, and finally succeeded in eliciting from him a despatch complying with Mr. Gibson's conditions, and promising that justice should be done. I have omitted to mention above that on the 30th of July the Protestant chapel at Pitow, being, under the Consul's advice, in process of rebuilding, was again attacked by the Pitow soldiery, all the new materials carried off, and the remainder of the building destroyed. Mr. Gibson had counselled the rebuilding of the chapel, in the hope that the authorities, having had so many remonstrances, might of themselves see fit to act differently than in the past. He was mistaken, as it was again destroyed.

The despatch to Lord Charles Scott seemed to promise so fair that it was hoped all would soon be put right. Our hopes were doomed to disappointment. Not only was nothing remedied, but not even the faintest attempt was made to try to remedy the outstanding grievances. New threats were made against the merchants; a demand was made that leking should be paid by their goods which were still in the hongs, although they had already paid Customs dues. Mast dues were asked for the ships, besides the Customs dues, and to try to ruin one hong which was more obnoxious than another, a double leking was placed upon goods proceeding from that hong into Chinese hands. On the 2nd of September, the British Consul, wishing to elicit whether the Taoutae had had the slightest good faith in making the promises he had made a month before to Lord Charles Scott, wrote to the Pitow magistrate, in whose district most of the criminal cases had occurred, that on a certain day he would pay him a visit with the Lieutenant Commander of the "Bustard," at his yamên in Pitow. He received for answer an injunction not to come to Pitow; that as the Taoutae had not given him, the District Magistrate, any orders concerning any criminals, he really had nothing to discuss with him, and that the people would be much enraged if he came. This despatch showed what reliance was to be placed on any statement, oral or written, of the present Taoutae of Taiwan. Mr. Gibson, however, was very much dissatisfied with the evident desire of the Pitow Magistrate to prevent his visiting that city, distant only eight miles from the Consulate, and so wrote back insisting that he should come on the day which he had previously fixed. Next day brought another despatch from the Pitow Magistrate, stating that on the afternoon of the day before, a large collection of bones had been found under the ruins of the Protestant chapel; that the bones, including three skulls and other bones, were evidently fresh, and that they clearly enough showed that Dr. Maxwell, a Protestant missionary physician, and his associates, had been guilty of murder, and of secreting the bones of their victims. This rather serious charge by a District Magistrate was followed by an injunction to the Consul to seize Dr. Maxwell and have him tried, and to send a certain Chinese Protestant into Pitow, that he might meet with his due punishment for such diabolical crimes in the district city. The Consul replied, that on the following day he would bring Dr. Maxwell and the Chinese to Pitow, to be tried there before a Joint Court. The District Magistrate, seeing no other escape from exposure in connection with this abominable conspiracy to which he had lent himself, at once wrote back that he positively refused to see the Consul, and that if he came he would find that his way would be stopped by force.

This refusal of the Magistrate to meet Mr. Gibson necessarily put a stop to his visit; but diligent inquiry was made as to the intended opposition, and it was found beyond all question that the Yamên had put forth its strength, had gathered in armed people in large numbers into Pitow, and outside had planted three ambuscades of very considerable strength on the way, by which the Consul and his party should have to pass. The Consul, writing to Taiwan-foo of this, and complaining at once of the faithlessness of the Taoutae and the hardihood of his subordinates, was met with an insolent and derisive answer.

Things remained at this pass, when at the end of October two events occurred which showed that all hope of carrying on any relations with Liang Taoutae was at an end. One event was the receipt by the Consul of a despatch from the Taoutae informing him that,

having referred the mercantile questions in dispute to the Viceroy, he had been answered that he (the Taoutae) had erred only by over-much leniency towards the foreigners, and that it behoved him to act much more sharply. This was followed in a few days by the sacking in Taiwan-foo of the house of Ellis and Co.'s compradore, and the carrying off of money and property to the value of many thousand dollars.

Not content with this high-handed proceeding, they had the hardihood, in the belief that the compradore himself had escaped to Takow, to send down a Mandarin and soldiers to that port to seize him, the person sought being the compradore of a British merchant, and all this without one word of reference to the British Consul.

At this juncture the "Algerine" arrived, followed a day or two later, in a Chinese gun-boat, by the Taoutae of Amoy, who had been empowered by the Vice-regal Government at Foo-chow to come over and settle the various questions in dispute. After a week's delay in Taiwan-foo, this official, along with the Prefect of the Taiwan-foo, appeared in Takow, and on the following day had a conference with Mr. Gibson, in the presence of the naval officers of the "Algerine" and "Bustard," and some of the foreign residents. It was found at once that the Amoy Taoutae had no power to remove any of the offending officials; and as anything short of this would have been the merest farce after the eight months' patient waiting on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, Mr. Gibson simply refused to discuss individual matters of detail with him. At the same time he gave him full access to all the sources of information regarding the state of affairs in Taiwan, so far as the British Consulate could afford, and prepared a full statement of the wrongs and misdoings of the officials for his careful examination.

Finding that Tseng, the Amoy Taoutae, was unprepared to act as he desired, Mr. Gibson, in conjunction with the naval officers, now took a step which instantly altered the whole aspect of affairs. On the 20th of November he started with the "Algerine" and "Bustard" for Amping, the sea-port of Taiwan-foo; arrived there on the morning of the 21st, landed with a party and reconnoitred the place, and without opposition took possession of it, and of Fort Zelandia, to be held thenceforth as a material guarantee until all existing claims and grievances should be settled. Placing the position in charge of Lieutenant-Commander Gurdon, of the "Algerine," and having by proclamation warned the inhabitants of the Amping and Taiwan-foo, and the official of the latter city of his proceedings, he returned in the "Bustard" to Takow. He arrived in Takow on Sunday night, the 22nd of November, and on Monday informed the Amoy Taoutae of the proceedings at Amping, and on Tuesday, the 24th of November, had an audience with that gentleman, when all his (Mr. Gibson's) demands were granted; the removal of the Taoutae of Taiwan, of the District Magistrate of Pitow, and of the Ting of Lokkang, to be effected by the Amoy Taoutae taking his steamer to Foo-chow, and there securing the instant dismissal of the offenders by the Viceroy. At the same time it was agreed that the British gun-boat should hold military possession of Amping until the Governor and his associates were removed from office. This was eminently satisfactory, and there could be no doubt at all of the intentions of the Amoy Taoutae. On the day following this conference, however, the Taiwan-foo authorities, stung by the thought of the ignoring of their position, shut out from their sea-port by a single British gun-boat, determined to retake Amping. It is not quite certain how much the Taiwan-foo authorities knew of the result of the preceding day's conference at Takow. It is shrewdly suspected that they knew all, but were keen to be delivered from the insult of the gun-boat. I should say, that after the first formal taking possession of the place, Lieutenant Gurdon had re-embarked his men, not a large number in all by any means, expecting to command the place by the guns of his vessel. On Wednesday, the 25th of November, the Taiwan-foo authorities sent down 500 men to re-occupy the place. This they did, and began actively to mount guns to defend the place. Lieutenant Gurdon having been informed of this, sent a letter to the Chinese military commander in the place, that if within an hour he had not evacuated the fort and town, he, Lieutenant Gurdon, must proceed to shell it. At the same hour he warned the inhabitants to clear out. His remonstrance was in vain, so for an hour and a-half before night-fall, he cautiously and slowly poured in shot and shell into the fort. In the evening Lieutenant Gurdon received Mr. Gibson's letter, detailing the conference of the previous day and its results, and showing how much their speedy fulfilment must depend on his keeping fast hold of Amping. Lieutenant Gurdon seeing, however, he was being shut out of the place altogether, determined to storm it. About midnight he landed with a party of volunteers, twenty-five in all, passing through the surf in safety themselves, but losing one of their boats in it, lay in wait behind a bank on the shore, until the moon was fairly down, and then, all undiscovered, sallied right into the place. Making their way to the Hep-tai's yamên, they found it filled with soldiers. The Lieutenant invited them, by an interpreter, to lay down their arms, but they refused and showed fight, and

in self-defence the assaulting party was compelled to fire. They did so, killing eleven men and wounding six others; the rest of the garrison took to flight. A few hours later, in the dim light of morning, Lieutenant Gurdon, while examining the approaches from Taiwan-foo, heard the noise of a large body of men in the distance, and having planted his men, they shortly descried a party, which was afterwards ascertained to be composed of 250 Honan braves. When at about 200 yards, the "Algerines" with their Sniders opened on the advancing braves, who stood for about five minutes returning the fire. After losing six men killed and ten wounded, however, they turned tail and fled to Taiwan-foo, leaving Lieutenant Gurdon and his blue jackets in possession of the prize. This very brave and very determined action on the part of Lieutenant Gurdon has put the seal on the previous set of conditions agreed to, and again at Amping re-agreed to by the Amoy Taoutae for the Vice-regal Government. The consternation at Taiwan-foo was very great. A guarantee of 40,000 dollars was paid down at once to Lieutenant Gurdon by the merchants of Taiwan-foo, who were professedly acting for the local Government, that the conditions should be fulfilled. This money has since been returned, as a guarantee of no value, but a claim of 10,000 dollars against the local Government has been enforced by Lieutenant Gurdon :—5,000 dollars to pay expenses of British Government in the expedition, and 5,000 dollars as prize-money for the officers and men of the "Algerine." This has been paid up, and the other conditions of agreement, as detailed below, are now in process of being carried out:—

1. The abolition of the camphor monopoly, with proclamations declaring the right of foreigners and their employés to go and buy freely.

2. The issuing of passports by the Taoutae to merchants and others to travel, for business or pleasure, within the Island of Taiwan.

3. Payment of 6,000 dollars, indemnity for loss of camphor by Ellis and Co.

4. Payment of 1,167 dollars, indemnity for loss of property by Protestant Mission.

5. Payment of 2,000 dollars, indemnity for loss of property by Catholic Mission.

6. Payment of all claims of Ellis and Co's compradore, for losses in the sacking of his house.

7. The punishment of the various criminals connected with the various outrages, to the satisfaction of the British Consul.

8. The issuing of proclamations everywhere, acknowledging the injustice of the slanders hitherto circulated against Christianity and Christians, and protecting them thoroughly against the renewal of such.

9. The right of residence and of work, to missionaries in the island.

10. Proclamations recognizing the propriety of joint courts in mingled cases, and intimating such in the future.

11. The removal of Liang Taoutae, of the district magistrate of Pitow, and of the Ting of Lokang.

The various indemnities are already paid to the Consul; the criminals are in process of being seized; and it is fully expected that ere many weeks, with a new set of magistrates who shall have had the advantage of this recent lesson, the foreign residents in Formosa shall enjoy equal privileges with their fellows on the mainland, and an amount of freedom in moving about in the island which shall be a very great boon. Meanwhile, military possession is retained of Amping, until all conditions are fully carried out. As one of the oldest residents in Formosa, I feel thankful for the atmosphere of freedom, which these recent events have secured for us, and for this we have to thank, under God, the patient tenacity and admirable sharp decision of our admirable Consul, the distinguished courage of our naval officers and men, and the cordial support which, I understand, has been accorded by his Excellency the British Ambassador to the proceedings of the British Consul. Inclosing my card, I beg to subscribe myself,

(Signed) AN OLD RESIDENT.

Takow, Formosa, December 4, 1868.

No. 15.

Mr. Murray to Mr. Matheson.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 12, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, inclosing a printed account of the events which have recently taken place in the Island of Formosa.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JAMES MURRAY.

No. 16.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received April 22.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 22, 1869.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, dated the 23rd February, covering copies of a correspondence relative to the recent capture of the defences of Amping and Fort Zelandia, in the Taiwan district of Formosa, by Her Majesty's gun-vessel "Algerine," on the requisition of Mr. Consul Gibson.

Should Lord Clarendon concur, my Lords propose to inform Sir H. Keppel that having already communicated to him the views of Her Majesty's Government on these transactions my Lords have only now to observe that they are glad to notice by the concluding sentence of Sir Henry Keppel's letter to Sir R. Alcock that he had become aware of the undue precipitancy and excess of zeal displayed by Lieutenant Gurdon. They make no doubt that he will, before the receipt of the letter my Lords propose to address to him, have impressed upon the officers under his command the necessity of well weighing the responsibility which they incur in complying with the demands of Consular officers that they should commit acts of violence against the subjects of a Sovereign at peace with Her Majesty.

It is presumed that the inclosures to Sir Henry Keppel's letter have already been received at the Foreign Office, and it is requested they may be returned when done with.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, "*Salamis,*" *at Shanghae, February* 23, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of two letters addressed to me by Her Majesty's Minister in China in reference to the recent capture of the defences of Amping and Fort Zelandia, in the Taiwan district of Formosa, on the requisition of Mr. Consul Gibson, together with a copy of my reply to the same.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Sir R. Alcock to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Peking, January* 28, 1869.

I AM in receipt of an official letter from His Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung,* stating that a Memorial had been received from the Viceroy of Fukien and Che-kiang and the Governor of Fukien, to the following effect :—

* See Inclosure 13 in No. 18.

It is reported that on the 23rd of November, after a settlement of pending differences in Formosa had been effected by Mr. Gibson and a special Commissioner sent from the mainland for that purpose, in accordance with instructions from the Tsungli Yamên, two gun-boats had proceeded to Amping, the port of Taiwan, and bombarded Fort Zelandia. Subsequently, a supply-vessel belonging to the Pescadore's squadron had been towed away about midnight of the same day, the commander and two soldiers on board being made prisoners; and the same night the commanding officer of the gun-boat, whose name is given as "Chie-tang," supposed to be Lieutenant Gurdon, landed some men and took the fort, killing and wounding the soldiers defending it; upon which the officer in command, Chung-kuo-chen, being overpowered and wounded, committed suicide.

The Memorial proceeds to state that one soldier and ten braves were killed and thirteen others wounded, and that the military stores and powder magazines were set on fire and destroyed. Later, the naval officer demanded and received 40,000 dollars as the condition of a cessation of hostilities, and under threat of bombarding the city of Amping if not paid into his hands at once.

The Special Commissioner having subsequently proceeded from Takow to Amping, he had a conference with Mr. Gibson and the said naval officer on the 29th of November, when it was agreed that the 40,000 dollars should be returned to the gentry and merchants; but in the end, that officer insisted on either deducting 10,000 dollars from the sum he held, "to make good his expenses," or receiving that amount from the authorities.

This sum was then handed to him and his receipt taken, when the captured vessel and men were restored, with the previous 40,000 dollars, which had been held as a guarantee.

This is the substance of the Memorial made to the Throne by the Viceroy and Governor; and as I have only received a short despatch from Mr. Gibson, dated the 25th November, stating that he had "nominally taken possession of Fort Zelandia and the town of Amping, as a reprisal on the 22nd, and on the 24th, as a consequence, he had come to a settlement of outstanding claims with the Special Commissioner," promising to furnish all the details shortly. I have no official information of the facts as they really occurred.

Under these circumstances, I could only state to the Prince, in my reply, that until in possession of further information and the official report of the proceedings referred to, which I daily expected from Mr. Gibson, it was out of my power to enter into any discussion as to the particulars. But, in the meantime, Mr. Gibson having no authority from me to commit acts of hostility, if the facts should prove to be as represented by the High Authorities of Fukien in their Memorial, both Mr. Gibson and the naval officer in question would be held responsible by Her Majesty's Government for their action. As regarded the money said to have been exacted for "expenses," if any such course had been followed, the amount taken should certainly be returned.

That your Excellency may more fully understand the position of affairs and the necessity for promptly disavowing any unauthorized acts of war, I inclose a copy of my letter in reply to the Prince. You will see that although I readily gave the assurance of my willingness to examine into the whole matter in a spirit of justice, and expressed my desire to act in accordance with international law and usage, I pointed out to His Imperial Highness that the High Authorities of Fukien were themselves chiefly responsible for any untoward collision that may have taken place by their persistent neglect in affording redress or putting a stop to continuous acts of violence and spoliation perpetrated on British subjects and their property by the local authorities and natives under their orders and jurisdiction.

It cannot be denied, nevertheless, that any actual hostilities entered into by Mr. Gibson and the Commander of the gun-boat leading to loss of life are greatly to be regretted, and can hardly be defended under any conceivable circumstances. The precipitation of the officers temporarily in charge, the one of the Consulate and the other of the gun-boat, has rendered unavailing all the care and the concerted measures agreed upon between your Excellency and myself to bring matters to a satisfactory settlement without the necessity of any recourse to force by the appearance of a squadron, under a Senior Officer of high rank, supporting the demands of Mr. Swinhoe, confirmed and approved from Peking after conference with the Foreign Board on the subject.

I had every reason to calculate with certainty on the mere presence of an imposing and effective force, sufficing, as in the Yang-chow affair, to secure the result without any collision, or the adoption of measures constituting an act of war. An embargo of vessels, or a simple blockade of a very partial and temporary kind, was the utmost stretch of coercive power that I contemplated as likely to be needful under the most adverse circum-

stances, and these are measures recognized by international law as acts of retortion *viâ facti*, that States may legitimately resort to under given circumstances, and which, nevertheless, fall short of war, and are not considered acts of hostility. Property, even if wrongly seized under embargo, may be restored, and redress afforded by negotiation or civil process, but acts of hostility involving loss of life are not so easily repaired or defended, and fall under a totally different law.

At present I wait for more ample information before I can pronounce any judgment or decide upon the course it may be necessary to follow with the Chinese Government. But if, as I infer, there is no doubt that a sum of money has been exacted by the Senior Naval Officer of the gun-boats, on the untenable ground of ransom or "expenses," it is quite clear that it must be refunded at once.

Indeed, I feel assured, that as soon as it may have come to your knowledge, the necessary orders will have been given. Of the character of the act itself, and the responsibility that the exaction of money under the circumstances may entail on all concerned, I reserve my opinion until in possession of all the facts of the case, which I trust to receive from your Excellency, to whom, no doubt, a full report was transmitted by the naval officer in command.

The Prince of Kung writes to me, not unnaturally, to make a very indignant protest; for apart from the feelings with which a sudden act of war (such as the Memorialists describe, where life is lost, and an insult is offered at the same time to the sovereignty of an independent Power), would be regarded by any Government, the course followed by the Viceroy of Fukien in addressing his Memorial direct to the Throne, has no doubt placed, as it was intended, the Prince and his Foreign Board, of which he is President, in a very unpleasant position, as being answerable for the foreign relations maintained, and in some degree therefore held responsible for the humiliation thus inflicted by two subaltern officers of a foreign Power.

The Prince concludes his communication by an intimation that, having appealed to me in the first instance, he was in no haste to inform the Chinese Envoy of this case, that it might be communicated to the British Government; nor did he notify it to the several foreign Ministers, because "his Excellency, in his Ministerial capacity, whenever international questions have arisen at the ports, has always dealt justly by them." They are making progress in their diplomatic education, it is very obvious; and for my part I am quite quite ready to admit, that if a Minister on the spot will not, to do them justice, they are perfectly entitled to refer the matter in question direct, by their own mission, to the Home Government, and to notify to other Courts the steps taken. It affords the best security, perhaps, the Chinese can have, for the abstinence from wrongful acts of any one foreign Representative or Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 16.

Sir R. Alcock to the Prince of Kung, January 28, 1869.

[See Inclosure 14 in No. 18.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 16.

Sir R. Alcock to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Peking, January* 28, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 10th ultimo, with its inclosures, and can only regret that so much pains and care to prevent precipitate action, and the premature adoption of measures of coercion, should have been thrown away and made of no avail by the unauthorized proceedings of those temporarily in charge of affairs at Taiwan and Takow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 5 in No. 16.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, "*Salamis*," *at Shanghae, February* 23, 1869.

THE anticipations expressed in your Excellency's letters of the 28th January, to the effect that you felt assured I should direct the return of the ransom obtained from the Taiwan authorities by Lieutenant Gurdon, you will find to be realized by my despatch of the 6th ultimo.

Your Excellency will further have observed, by the copy of my Report to the Admiralty, that I was not disposed to condemn Lieutenant Gurdon's proceedings.

During the protracted correspondence resulting from Chinese outrages on British subjects in Formosa, I understood by your Excellency's letters that diplomacy had almost exhausted every effort to bring about a settlement of just claims. I therefore lost no time in assembling a considerable force in the southern portion of Formosa, to act solely on your requisition, under my personal command, if events proved that active measures were demanded.

The Yang-chow crisis proved that a display of force would probably have been sufficient to also secure us justice in Formosa. I therefore share in your Excellency's regret that the urgent requisition of Her Majesty's Consul should have required an act of war when the end could have been gained by a milder form of coercion.

I forward, for your Excellency's information, a copy of Mr. Consul Swinhoe's letter to me, praising Lieutenant Gurdon's prompt action on Mr. Gibson's requisition, and describing the salutary results likely to follow it.

I regret to find that Mr. Gibson was not acting on confidential instructions from your Excellency when he assumed the grave responsibility of urging Lieutenant Gurdon to seize the defences of Amping and Fort of Zelandia as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of our claims.

Most naval officers would have acted as Lieutenant Gurdon did; their general instructions are to cordially co-operate with Her Majesty's Consuls. A requisition plainly stating that the bare existence of British subjects depended on the seizure of the defences of Amping appears to have been eagerly welcomed by a young officer, who considered that the opportunity was afforded him of winning his promotion by a brilliant exploit.

A mistake has been committed,—it would be well to prevent all prospect of its repetition.

Since I assumed this command Her Majesty's Consuls more than once have made requisitions to Lieutenants of gun-boats inconsistent with strict international law towards the Chinese.

On a station where a considerable interval may elapse before reference can be made to your Excellency or myself, it appears desirable that a clearly defined restriction should be placed on the power of Her Majesty's Consuls to request a naval officer to commit an act of war.

May I, therefore, request an expression of your Excellency's views on this subject, stating the limits within which commanding officers should act on Consular requisitions; and you may rely on my taking measures to prevent precipitate action on the part of over zealous officers who rejoice in being associated with Consuls full of fight.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

No. 17.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 23, 1869.

I HAVE laid before the Earl of Clarendon your letter of yesterday, inclosing copies of a despatch from Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Keppel, with his correspondence with Sir Rutherford Alcock, respecting the late affair at Taiwan in Formosa, and stating the substance of an instruction which, with Lord Clarendon's concurrence, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty propose to address to Sir Henry Keppel in reply; and I am to request that you will acquaint their Lordships that Lord Clarendon concurs in the proposed instruction.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 18.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received April 23.)

My Lord, *Peking, February 5, 1869.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 29th of October,* and the progress of negotiations for the arrangement of differences at Taiwan, I have now the honour to inclose copies of farther despatches from Mr. Gibson in charge, and also of a correspondence with the Prince of Kung on the subject.

The difficulties in Formosa with the local authorities seem to have very summarily terminated by Mr. Gibson requiring Lieutenant Commander Gurdon, as the Senior Officer present, with two gun-boats only, to seize and hold Fort Zelandia at Amping, which is the port of Taiwan, on the 21st of October, as "necessary to the very existence of British life and interests;" as an immediate consequence of which, it seems, full and satisfactory measures of redress were formally acceded to by the Imperial Commissioner on the 24th, although four days previously he had treated all Mr. Gibson's complaints as matters of no consequence, and positively refused to take any step whatever.

As far as I can gather from Mr. Gibson's despatches, the cause for his precipitate action was the announcement of the Commissioner that he was about to return to the mainland in a day or two, without removing the Taoutae, or otherwise providing for the security of the foreign community, whose lives and property had alike been exposed to great danger from the action of the local authorities themselves.

I had not contemplated, as your Lordship will have seen by the instructions forwarded to Mr. Gibson, and my correspondence with the Admiral and Mr. Swinhoe, copies of which were inclosed in my despatch, the necessity for acts of open hostility, and certainly had given no authority to the officer in charge to take any such measures. On the contrary, I was desirous that an imposing squadron of at least four or five vessels should be sent as the certain means of averting any collision, satisfied in my own mind that the mere presence of such a force would suffice to secure a prompt and satisfactory settlement of our just demands for redress. The effect for such a demonstration at Nanking had abundantly proved the efficacy of this mode of attaining results without any actual employment of force, and fully warranted my calculating on an equally satisfactory end at Formosa.

Mr. Gibson's precipitation prevented the combination agreed upon with the Admiral, with a view to an equally complete but more peaceable solution of our difficulties, taking effect. And it is the more to be deplored as life has been lost in the collision that ensued with the crew of the gun-boats, several Chinese soldiers having been killed and wounded; and fresh complications have arisen from this cause, and the equally unauthorized act of Lieutenant Gurdon in demanding 10,000 dollars for expenses and prize-money as a ransom for the port, after the destruction of all the arms and munitions of war found in the fort, by his order, and the blowing up of the magazines.

I am naturally very reluctant to pronounce a harsh judgment against junior officers, either civil or military, who have erred by the excess of zeal and impatience rather than any deliberate design of exceeding their powers. Nor have I yet learned, in answer to my despatch to Mr. Swinhoe, what Mr. Gibson may be able to state in further justification of his apparently rash and unauthorized proceedings. It is possible there may have been reasons not yet before me, and imminent danger to life and property, which suggested the steps taken as the only ones available for security. Mr. Gibson's strange phraseology may cover some such peril. But so far as any statement of facts yet received goes, I am bound to say this conclusion is not borne out.

At the same time, it must be borne in mind that in Formosa, an island peopled by aborigines, who to this day both kill and eat their enemies, with thousands of Chinese colonists only a few degrees more civilized or less savage, under the government of local officials who are so little above a state of barbarism themselves that they had no scruple in placing an ambuscade of armed men to intercept and kill a Consul and naval officer proceeding to the Magistrate's place of residence on a peaceful mission, and thought the best mode of preventing a merchant from recovering property of which he had been despoiled, was to send people to shoot him down—there is enough in such conditions to demoralize all diplomacy, if not to justify a resort to reprisals and acts of hostility not contemplated by Vattel. The tension of mind produced by such exceptional relations, under constant menace of danger from the lawless action of Chinese officials, bound by no obligations of international comity or Treaty, is eminently calculated to mislead a junior officer and throw him off his balance; and it would be hard, and scarcely just, to visit upon his head the whole responsibility of the consequences.

These are considerations not likely to suggest themselves to Chinese authorities at

* See "China Papers, No. 2 (1869)," No. 14.

Peking; and I was not much surprised therefore, under these circumstances, to receive from the Prince of Kung a strongly-worded remonstrance, in which he protested against all Mr. Gibson's proceedings, and demanded satisfaction and redress for acts of hostility committed on the territory of a friendly power in time of peace. Nor could I fittingly take umbrage at the scarcely veiled threat, conveyed in the concluding paragraph, of an appeal to Her Majesty's Government direct, through the Chinese Mission now in Europe, and to the other Treaty Powers through the Foreign Representatives at Peking, if full satisfaction were denied.

Accordingly, in my reply, I did not hesitate to inform the Prince that, if I did not at once disavow Mr. Gibson's acts, seeing that I had not received any despatches giving the details or reasons he might allege in his justification, I had no difficulty in stating that my instructions to press for a settlement had not authorized any acts of hostility, and that he and the naval officer would alike be held responsible for what they had done.

I also added that if the statement made by the Viceroy of Fukien and Chekiang and the Governor of Fukien, in their joint Memorial to the Throne, that Lieutenant Gurdon had exacted a sum of 10,000 dollars, for war expenses and prize money, proved to be correct, I would undertake that the money should be promptly returned.

I answered in this sense the more readily that I was aware the Ministers of the Tsungli Yamên, with the Prince at its head, were themselves on their trial, in a certain sense, before the Court and the other Boards, from the course taken by the High Authorities of Fukien in addressing their Memorial complaining of these acts direct to the Throne.

It was necessary that the Prince should at once be able to show that, if any wrong had really been committed by subordinate officers of a foreign Power, in violation of Treaty or international law and usage among civilized States, Her Majesty's Representative here would be prepared, after due investigation, to give satisfaction, and, as far as possible, to afford redress for any injury inflicted.

At the same time I deemed it right to point out to his Highness, for the information of the Emperor and his Council, that, however I might deplore any action which had led to a serious loss of life, the chief blame, if not all the responsibility, rested on those who, by a persistent violation of Treaties, repeated acts of violence, and denial of justice, making life and property insecure, had rendered a collision almost inevitable; and that the real authors of this regrettable occurrence were the High Officers of Fukien and Chekiang, in not carrying out their instructions received from the Yamên to remove the Taoutae and afford redress. Had they done so, no collision or conflict would have taken place.

It is my purpose, when in a position to answer these complaints more fully, to return to this feature of the case, and fix them with the responsibility of disobeying their orders, and thus provoking a conflict which might and would otherwise undoubtedly have been averted.

The charge against the local authorities can be fully sustained by evidence of violence and injustice of the most flagrant character on the part of the Chinese officials, which the last nine months preceding has continuously supplied; and, in addition, it will be easy to show that, whatever may be the desire of the two Governments to live in peace and maintain none but the most friendly relations with each other, such results are not possible if the Provincial Authorities are allowed not only systematically to violate the most important of Treaty rights and palpably connive at acts of spoliation and murder, such as have characterized the course of affairs at Formosa almost from the beginning, and with increasing frequency and atrocity during the past year, but to disregard the orders sent to them from Peking after engagements have been entered into with a Foreign Minister. It is, in truth, clear that the Central Government must find means to compel a greater respect for their own orders on the part of their local Authorities throughout the Provinces, wherever foreigners are found, or foreign Powers will be driven to one of two alternatives in self-defence. They must either devise such local means of pressure as shall control and coerce malfaisant and corrupt officials into good behaviour, or hold the Imperial Government responsible for unredressed wrongs at the ports and elsewhere in a much more direct and stringent manner than has yet been the practice as a general rule. The action, consequent upon the conduct of local authorities at Canton and Takow, which led to the three wars, were exceptions; and as regards the last, what took place at Takow could not be considered the act of any local officer, but of the Government itself.

The last alternative is, no doubt, more consonant with Treaty relations and international law than the first; but it is also more damaging to the Emperor's power to govern the Empire, and more costly to the foreign Power resorting to it. Some shorter and less disastrous mode of settling local wrongs and disputes at distant ports is as much to be desired in the interest of the Chinese nation and Government as in that of foreigners; even

though it should be less strictly accordant with international law and usage. Against the disadvantages that attach to local action, even after appeal shall have been made in vain to the Government at Peking, and the objections in principle to which all such extreme courses must be open, both Chinese and foreign Powers may, wisely perhaps, set as a counterbalance the avoidance of accumulative wrong, leading to the necessity of a war, and entailing costly expenditure on the one side, and a perilous loss of authority and prestige on the other.

We need not look to Vattel or Grotius for any sanction to such exceptional action, for the simple reason that they and all other writers on international law deal with principles in their application to civilized States, recognizing a mutual obligation, and governed by similar, or at least analogous, systems of jurisprudence and polity. But, when dealing with Oriental races and States, ignorant of all the conditions and principles of European polity, a special adaptation of those principles is required to meet the wholly exceptional character of the situation caused by a forced intercourse between races holding totally different views of moral obligation and national policy. The broad principles of justice, of right and wrong which underlie the international code of nations, must be respected everywhere by civilized States; but an over-scrupulous pedantry in adherence to the rules deduced from these, and forming the system known in Europe as the Law of Nations, in dealing with an Asiatic race like the Chinese, is only calculated to do mischief, and bring on the very evils it is intended to avert.

Some special modification of rules and principles of international law, as this is understood and recognized by European States, is required in the interest of peace and justice. Local authorities must not be allowed by persistent misrule and violation of Treaties to bring on their country the horrors of war as the sole means of redressing the wrong. And the only effective means of preventing this, in default of a Central Government with adequate power, is to make them feel a personal responsibility for their acts such as their own Government ought, but under present conditions seems quite unable to enforce. The knowledge that sooner or later, if justice is denied, and instructions from Peking disregarded, to the injury of foreigners, they will have themselves to deal with a foreign Power they can neither defy nor resist, will soon lead to a radical reform in the course of action, and teach them to respect Treaty obligations for their own sake, if they care nothing either for Treaties or the orders of their own Government. Such a policy, if carried out with judgment and moderation by the Treaty Powers, will act beneficially at both ends of the line. The Peking Government will be disposed to take more stringent measures than they otherwise would with their provincial officers to enforce respect for the rights and interests of foreigners, while the officials themselves will become more circumspect not to provoke the inevitable issue of conflict with a foreign Power; and all parties will gain largely thereby.

Hitherto the course of affairs has been only too truly described by the Memorialists from the ports. When any wrong or injustice is suffered by a foreigner, for which there is no appeal to a public court of justice and a written code of laws—if the Chinese local authorities are not moved, as is too often the case, by the Consul's representations—the only recourse is a reference to the Minister at Peking; and then commences an interminable series of references backwards and forwards,—a seesaw of correspondence on both sides between the ports and the capital, and no final solution is ever arrived at. It may safely be affirmed that such is the common experience of all the foreign Representatives. I am assured there is no one of these who cannot point to numerous cases which have been so treated for a succession of years, despite their best efforts to secure a better result.

Such experience leads infallibly to conviction that where Treaties have been imposed by force upon an unwilling Government, as all with China have been, they can only be upheld by similar means. The diplomatic instrument has no binding power with Chinese rulers when its stipulations may be evaded with impunity, or whenever it is believed that the force that imposed them is no longer extant or available. Diplomacy in such circumstances means "armed reason." As Carlyle in his quaint style remarks, "Diplomacy is clouds; beating your enemies is sea and land," and the only evidence of power, or title to respect, a true Oriental freely recognizes. And in order that foreign Powers may not have to resort to such rude instruments for proving their title, it behoves them to find means of preventing accumulative violations of Treaty, since continued impunity brings with it a conviction of weakness. For, as I have said on a former occasion, "it is weakness, or the suspicion of it, which invariably provokes aggression, and, with Eastern races, is a far more fruitful cause of bad faith and danger than either force or the abuse of it." The desire to avoid complications and wars in the far East should suggest, not an unreasoning recoil from the assertion of Treaty rights from fear of the troubles it may bring, but a stedfast

adherence to such conditions of intercourse as experience has proved to be best calculated in the end to insure respect for engagements. This, at least, is the lesson which a life spent in these regions has most strongly impressed on my mind. And, apart from the question of policy as a means to an end, necessity imposes a duty of self-preservation on the principle recognized by the laws of man, which were certainly designed for Eastern races, where it is said, "Let an indolent monarch cease to punish, and the stronger would end by wasting the weaker."

It was with these convictions, and my past experience of the hopelessness of obtaining any real redress from the authorities at Nanking—even after a perfectly satisfactory understanding was come to with the Tsungli Yamên, and the assurance that the necessary instructions should be sent to the Viceroy—and with the farther conviction that continued impunity to those concerned in the outrages at Yang-chow and Chin-kiang would be full of peril to life and property at other places as well as to all our interests in China, that I determined to take such measures, in concert with the Naval Commander-in-chief, as should leave the Viceroy no choice, and very little inclination to disregard his orders from Peking to do prompt justice.

The result, which was never doubtful, went far to confirm the correctness of my views. And a similar result, with the same tactics, would as unquestionably have been attained at Taiwan, had the officers in charge there been less impatient and waited for the presence of a Senior Officer and a squadron.

Two conclusions, I think, are to be drawn from the history of the transactions at each place. First, that well-combined measures of pressure, showing by unmistakeable signs both the will and the immediate power to enforce, if need be, demands for redress persistently denied, after reference to Peking and promise of action from the Government there, will never fail, if brought to bear judiciously against the local authorities, however high their position. His Excellency Tsêng Kwo-fan, the Viceroy of Nanking, furnished a signal example of the efficacy of such means; for not only is his influence great, but, in his now celebrated Memorial to the Throne, he was the first to recommend resistance to the foreign Powers if they pressed any unpalatable demands, and, therefore, had every motive which an officer in high position could have for making a show at least of the virtue of that resistance he was so ready to recommend to his Government; but he made no sign, and succumbed without an effort to save his personal credit.

The course of affairs at Taiwan proves quite as strikingly, perhaps, if not more so, the efficacy of such means, because here one of the essential conditions of success was wanting,—the presence of a force practically irresistible. But untoward collision and loss of life was the penalty of a disregard of such condition, and leads to the second conclusion, namely, the danger of unauthorized action, and the necessity of strictly prohibiting all action of this nature by Consular officers on their own responsibility, and without specific instructions from the Minister.

Thus guarded, there is little to fear from any abuse of power, and much to hope from its discretionary exercise being entrusted to the Representative at Peking, should necessity arise. A reference to the Home Government demands nearly six months, and, with large interests at stake, such a delay might, in many cases, be disastrous, if not altogether fatal, to the position and security of foreigners in China.

I am not sorry, with these views, to profit by the present conjuncture to request definitive instructions, or some expression of opinion, for my guidance in any future contingency of similar character. And, in the meantime, I defer any final report on Mr. Gibson's responsibility until I can receive his reply to my despatch of the 29th of January, addressed to Mr. Swinhoe, who was directed to return to his post, and by so doing supersede Mr. Gibson, and relieve him of his charge.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

Acting Consul Gibson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Taiwan, Takow Office, November* 25, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have nominally taken possession of Fort Zelandia, and the town of Amping, as a reprisal, on the 22nd; and as a consequence, upon Tuesday the 24th, our complications were settled, that is, as far as a promise can go. I shall hold Amping till the Taoutae Liang, the district magistrate of Fung-shan, and the Ting of Lo-chiang is dismissed, and my conditions are settled. The criminal cases, civil

cases, and political cases, with the camphor case, will all be performed according to promise, by Tseng Ta-jin, the Amoy Taoutae, who has been sent over here as a Commissioner by the Governor-General of Fukien. Ellis and Co. are indemnified in 6,000 dollars, Dr. Maxwell in 1,167 dollars, the Catholic Fathers in 2,000 dollars, and Ellis and Co.'s compradore in the value of his property. The camphor monopoly is abolished in the Island of Formosa, and British subjects and their Chinese agents can buy that article, store it, and do whatever they like with it, in accordance with the Treaty of Tien-tsin, the native authorities placing no obstacles in their way in the interior, or in any of the ports forbidden to foreign vessels. The missionaries have power to teach, heal, preach, and build mission-houses, and their converts shall not be interfered with. Dr. Maxwell goes up to Taiwan at once; Mr. Ritchie to Pitow; Dr. Maxwell's accusers shall be tried before Tseng Ta-jin and me; three criminals, the three men who stand at the head of the district magistrate's office of Fung-shan, are arrested, and they will be punished before some one appointed by me. All the other criminal cases are being taken up. These matters, and the whole of the matters in my despatch, are settled, but simply on the promise of Tseng Ta-jin, and that promise must be performed before I can announce to your Excellency that the affairs are definitely settled. I inclose the despatch I gave Tseng Ta-jin, for your perusal.

Tseng Ta-jin landed at Amping on the 8th instant, and spent a week with Liang Taoutae. He came down to Takow on Monday the 16th, and I gave him a conference on Tuesday the 17th. Dr. Maxwell, Dr. Manson, the agents of Messrs. Ellis and Co., and of Messrs. Tait and Co., and the Senior Naval Officer, accompanied by Lieutenant Johnson, R.N., were present. Tseng Ta-jin evidently thought our embarrassments as of no moment. I asked him for the removal of the Taoutae, the District Magistrate, and the Ting of Lo-chiang, and he simply laughed off the whole matter. He seemed to be without any definite power to settle our embarrassments; said that they were of no importance, and even hinted that it was contrary to my duty to bring forward the charges and conditions which I have laid before your Excellency.

I then considered what it was best to do; and I came to the conclusion that it was absolutely necessary nominally to take and hold the Fort of Zelandia, and the town of Amping, in order to bring Tseng Ta-jin to understand the urgent importance of our complications, and as a basis of any further advance upon Taiwan.

I, therefore, requested the Senior Naval Officer to take action. He was off Amping on Saturday morning the 21st. We landed at 3 o'clock; walked over the fortress, and found the doors all locked; the soldiers and their commandant had all removed; and we took possession of the fort and the ramparts of the town without any opposition.

I returned on the 22nd; and on the 23rd informed Tseng Ta-jin of what I had done. He requested a conference on Tuesday the 24th, at 11 o'clock A.M. We discussed the whole matter up till 3 o'clock P.M., and finally settled everything. He promised to fulfil all my conditions; to run up to Foo-chow, return with letters of recall for the Taoutae, the district magistrate, and the Ting of Lo-chiang, I to hold the fort till they were removed and my conditions fulfilled. At this conference Dr. Maxwell, Dr. Manson, the agents of Messrs. Tait and Co., and of Messrs. Ellis and Co., were present, and also Lieutenant Johnson, commanding Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard."

I humbly beg your Excellency to approve of my proceedings, as these are of a very responsible character.

I would not have taken these steps unless I had conceived them to be absolutely necessary.

At our first conference all my charges and conditions, which were clearly just, were scouted at by Tseng Ta-jin, and I failed to get him to understand their importance and their justice. The taking of Amping, though only in fact ostensible, was enough to cause him to promise to settle everything.

This despatch is a mere outline, and in a day or two I will write your Excellency at length.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN GIBSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 18.

Acting Consul Gibson to Sir R. Alcock, December 14, 1868.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 6.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 18.

Acting Consul Gibson to Tseng, Taoutae of Amoy.

Sir, *Taiwan, Takow Office, November* 18, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to lay before you an abstract of the crimes and wrongs of Liang Taoutae and his subordinates, on which their removal is demanded, and the conditions I request, in accordance with the Treaty, from the local Government of Taiwan.

First. The crimes and wrongs of Liang Taoutae.

1. The abrogation of the last sentence of the VIIth Article of the Treaty. (Insert the sentence.)

I subjoin an outline of proof, but the full evidence is either in despatches with which you are already acquainted, or based upon the statements of indubitable witnesses.

(1.) When I arrived here on the 12th day of the 5th moon (July 1), I sent Liang Taoutae a despatch announcing my arrival as Consul, and on the 25th day of the same moon (14th July) I received a despatch from the Taoutae, refusing to recognize me as Consul; and it was not till Lord Charles Scott, commanding Her Majesty's ship "Icarus," came over that Liang Taoutae recognized me; but the despatch in which he recognizes me I consider is a standing insult both to Lord Charles Scott and to me.

(2.) I, in company with Lord Charles Scott, waited on the Taoutae on the 12th day of the 7th moon (29th August) in his office; Liang Taoutae put a question to me, I immediately answered it, and my answer seemed to excite a strange rage in the Taoutae's bosom, as he assaulted me twice, and then, in a boiling passion, withdrew without ever apologizing to Lord Charles Scott, who was his guest, to his private apartments.

(3.) The District Magistrate of Fung-shan refused, notwithstanding my request upon every principle of justice, to receive or to see me; and Liang Taoutae approves and upholds his determination.

(4.) The Taoutae's despatches are couched in the most insulting and offensive terms.

2. The abrogation of the whole of the VIIIth Article. (Insert the VIIIth Article.)

(1) The Christian religion, Protestant and Catholic, is persecuted; (2) British missionaries' lives are endangered; (3) converts are murdered; (4) converts are stoned; (5) their houses destroyed; (6) their property plundered; (7) the mission houses are pulled down.

I have asked Liang Taoutae again and again to put a stop to those evils and wrongs; but up to this time he has refused.

3. The abrogation of the first paragraph of the IXth Article. (Insert the paragraph.)

(1.) The Taoutae will not countersign a single passport in the same manner as Wu Taoutae did.

(2.) He refuses to grant passports to trade out of the two Treaty ports.

4. The abrogation of the whole of the XIth Article. (Insert the Article.)

(1.) The local Government have attempted to levy local taxes (leking) upon merchandize while still in foreigners' hands.

(2.) British merchants cannot proceed to and fro at pleasure with their vessels and merchandize, as the officials want (1) a mast duty; and (2) are intent upon levying local taxes on goods that have already paid Tariff rates; and (3) a British subject was forced away from Taiwan for no fault of his, to the great detriment of his occupation.

5. The abrogation of the whole of the XIIIth Article. (Insert the Article.)

(1.) The local Government places restrictions upon Chinese subjects lawfully serving British subjects.

(2.) The local Government persecutes Messrs. Ellis and Co.'s and Messrs. Tait and Co.'s compradores.

(3.) The local Government persecutes Messrs. Ellis and Co.'s people at Wu-chai.

(4.) The local Government does all this without ever applying to the Consul under whose jurisdiction the agents of British firms are.

6. The abrogation of the whole of the XIVth Article. (Insert the Article.)

(1.) British subjects, the local Government declares, shall not hire whatever boats they please for the transport of goods.

(2.) That the number of boats shall not only be limited, but that there shall not be one.

(3.) The same with regard to coolies engaged in the carrying of goods.

7. The abrogation of the first sentence and the last of the XVIth Article. (Insert the Article.)

The Chinese criminals have not been apprehended and punished according to the laws of China.

8. The abrogation of the last sentence of the XVIIth Article. (Insert the sentence.)

A very great number of crimes and disputes have taken place in the Taiwan Consular District. The Consul had no means of settling amicably these disputes. Over and over again the Consul requested the Chinese local authorities to give him their assistance, and over and over again they have refused.

9. The abrogation of the whole of the XVIIIth Article. (Insert the Article.)

Insult, violence, robbery, and wrongs have been perpetrated upon British subjects. The Consul has over and over again requested the Taoutae to apprehend and punish the guilty parties, but he has never received any satisfactory answer.

10. The abrogation of the whole of the XXIVth Article. (Insert the Article.)

I may prove this charge by a reference to the XIth Article under the 4th charge.

11. The abrogation of the last sentence of the LIInd Article. (Insert the sentence.)

(1) Lord Charles Scott, Commander of Her Majesty's ship "Icarus," was greviously insulted by the Taoutae two or three times; (2) Lieutenant Johnson, commanding Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard," was grossly insulted by the Chentai and by the District Magistrate of Fung-shan, which insults the Taoutae upholds.

12. The abrogation of the whole of the LIVth Article.

This Article has been abrogated by the Taoutae altogether.

I append a list of proceedings, pursued by the local government, of which the Taoutae is at the head, which not only infringe the Articles of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, but which are thoroughly aggressive:—

(1.) Insults to Lord Charles Scott.
(2.) Assaults upon and insults to the Acting Consul.
(3.) Insults to Lieutenant Johnson.
(4.) Orders for the native boats at Amping not to land the guard.
(5.) Orders for the chair bearers not to fulfil their engagements.
(6.) Planting an armed party inside and outside the city of Pitow.
(7.) Making malicious, scandalous, impudent, and mendacious charges against British subjects.
(8.) Shooting on Mr. Pickering, a British subject, a Malay, and Messrs. Ellis and Co.'s people.
(9.) Illegally confiscating the property in Taiwan of Messrs. Ellis and Co.'s compradore without applying to the Consul under whose jurisdiction that compradore, belonging to a British firm, is.

Second. The crimes and wrongs of Liang Taoutae's subordinates.

(1.) Lin, the District Magistrate of Fung-shan.

On the 6th day of the 8th moon (21st September) the District Magistrate of Fung-shan filled the city of Pitow with an armed force, and planted ambuscades outside the city to prevent the Senior Naval Officer and the Consul visiting him. The object I had in visiting him originally was this:—

Liang Taoutae explicitly promised to Lord Charles Scott and to me nearly four weeks before that he would give orders that the Chinese criminals under the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate of Fung-shan should instantly be arrested, and I, knowing the unveracity of most of the Taoutae's promises and assertions, proposed to go to Pitow and ask the District Magistrate whether Liang Taoutae had ever given him such orders. I wrote a letter on the 2nd of the 8th moon (17th September), I think, informing the District Magistrate that, in company with the Senior Naval Officer, I should visit him on the 6th day of the same moon (21st September); and on the 4th day (19th September) I received a letter from him, dissuading me from coming. I also received two despatches on the two following days from him, containing charges, which he himself indorsed, against Dr. Maxwell, a good man, and Kao-chang, of the most horrid and barbarous crime of murder; and when I was going to fetch Dr. Maxwell and Kao-chang up to his office to confront their accusers, and that we might examine the matter clearly and decidedly, the District Magistrate filled the city of Pitow with an armed force, and planted ambuscades outside, to prevent the Senior Naval Officer, me, and our guard from entering the city.

(2.) The crimes and wrongs of Kuo, the Lo-chiang Ting.

The Lo-chiang Ting virulently persecuted Ellis and Co.'s people at Wu-chai; came down with an armed force to arrest the proprietor of Ellis and Co.'s hired house at Wu-chai, and, when he could not find him, apprehended his boy at school. He fired upon Mr. Pickering, a British subject, who had been sent to Wu-chai by the directions of the late Acting

Consul, a Malay in the employ of Ellis and Co., and Ellis and Co.'s agents and servants at Wu-chai.

Now I demand, in the name of every principle of justice, that these three Officers, viz., Liang Taoutae, Lin, the District Magistrate of Fung-shan, and Kuo, the Lo-chiang Ting be dismissed with disgrace. I might add more proofs and extend them at much greater length; but as you are anxious to get away I have merely given you an outline of the most important.

I add three lists of cases for your information:—

Criminal Cases.—1. That Lin-Hai be severely punished before a person appointed by me.

2. That (1) (2) (3) (4) and (5) Hwang-Hsi, if proved guilty, should suffer death; and their abettors should be severely punished, before a person appointed by me.

3. That Jan-a-yung should be severely punished before a person appointed by me.

4. That (1) Wang-Ming, (2) Lu-Feng, and (3) Wang-ko or Wang-ugan should be severely punished before a person appointed by me; and that their abettors (1) Hwang-nan, (2) Hwang-su, (3) Wang-si, (4) Hsii-Tsai, (5) the son of Ping-Hang the Ti-pao, (6) Chan-ma-Kwan, (7) Tien-Tai, (8) Chin-Sin, (9) Sin-tzu-chwang, (10) Wang-Tung, (11) Wang-Tzu, (12) Chau-Chuan, (13) Kan-Tioa, (14) Tsu the leper, (15) Hsiao-shi-sheng, (16) Chang-Wang-tzu, (17) Lin-Pau, (18) Lin-sheng, (19) Lin-Hwang, (20) a partner of Chien-Chuang who keeps a rice shop, (21) Wang-Pau, (22) Miao-Li, should be bambooed and cangued.

5. That the accusers of Dr. Maxwell and Kao-Chang be tried, and, if found guilty, be most severely punished before a person appointed by me. I have already asked for the degradation of the Chi-Hsien of Fung-shan, who, I believe, knows that such an accusation is a falsehood; but I also demand that the persons who made the charges be punished with the utmost rigour of the Law.

Civil Cases.—1. That 6,000 dollars be paid within the space of 24 hours, as indemnity for the camphor officially and illegally removed from Messrs. Ellis and Co.'s hired house at Wu-chai, or 6,000 dollars worth of camphor be restored to Messrs. Ellis and Co.

2. That 1,167 dollars be paid within the space of twenty-four hours to Dr. Maxwell, as indemnity for the destruction of the Mission property.

3. That 2,000 dollars be paid within the space of twenty-four hours as indemnity to Catholic fathers for the destruction of their property.

4. That Messrs. Ellis and Co.'s compradore have his property returned as it was before his house was broken into, or damages given him within the space of twenty-four hours to the exact amount of money and other property removed.

Political Cases.—1. That a suitable number (say 25) of Proclamations be issued, embodying the first paragraph of the IXth Article of the Treaty, the whole of the XIth Article, the whole of the XIIIth, and the whole of the XIVth. That these Proclamations should guarantee to British merchants travelling under passports, which passports are to be countersigned by the Taoutae and respected, and the Chinese agents of British merchants, liberty to trade in camphor both in the interior of this Island, and at coast ports forbidden to foreign vessels; and that these Proclamations should abolish any notifications issued hitherto, ordering natives under the most severe punishment; viz., death, not to sell camphor to foreign merchants.

2. That a suitable number (say 25) of Proclamations be issued in favour of the Christian religion, Protestant and Catholic, embodying the VIIIth Article of the Treaty; these Proclamations to involve—

(1.) That the poisonous or noxious drugs which idle report states that the missionaries used, is but a piece of mendacious gossip;

(2.) That the authorities will very severely punish any person who utters such lying affirmations; and

(3.) That converted natives, not offending against the laws, are not to be persecuted or interfered with.

3. That a suitable number (say 10) of Proclamations to be issued embodying the XVIIth Article of the Treaty, and stating that whenever such cases arise between a British subject or their agents and a Chinese subject, so that the Consul cannot settle them amicably, he shall request the assistance of the Chinese authorities, and that these authorities shall come.

All these conditions are fair and just. Liang Taoutae and his subordinates simply laugh at them. I think you, as an honest, intelligent and straightforward officer, will very

much regret their procedure, and I request you to report the gross malfeasance of the local Government of Formosa.

I shall conclude by four remarks—

1. I have written this despatch to you, and will show you all the documents that I have in my possession upon this subject simply for your information, but you have come over here with very defective powers, utterly incapable of suspending even for a moment the Taoutae's or any other officer's commission. It was on account of your defective powers that I refused to discuss with you subsidiary affairs, not on account of your requiring proof of Liang Taoutae's misdeeds. Your desiring evidence of those wrongs of which I accuse Liang Taoutae, I consider as very fair and impartial; and I beg to submit this despatch, the office despatches, and a host of witnesses, as indisputable proof.

2. By writing you this despatch, and showing you all my other despatches simply for your information, you are not to assume that I have made any promise, or will fail to carry out my intentions.

3. The wrongs inflicted by Liang Taoutae on British subjects are of eight or nine months' duration. I have been very patient under these afflictions; but those proceedings must come to an end very shortly. Can you not on your own responsibility suspend Liang's commission?

4. I must inform you of one error that you made in our conference yesterday. You seemed to assert that British subjects are involved in quarrels with the people generally. Nothing could be further from the fact. British subjects have no complaints to make against the people generally, but they have loud complaints to make against Liang Taoutae and the rest of the officials, their servants, their soldiers, their militia, and their hangers-on.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN GIBSON.

Inclosure 4 in No. 18.

Acting Consul Gibson to the Senior Naval Officer at Taiwan, November 20, 1868.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 6.]

Inclosure 5 in No. 18.

Lieutenant and Commander Gurdon to Acting Consul Gibson.

Sir, *"Algerine," Amping, November* 22, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, having received your despatch of the 20th instant, you having come on board, I weighed the same night at 10·30 P.M., in company with Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard," and arrived off Fort Zelandia the next morning. During the day I landed the marines and the boats' crews of the two vessels. Leaving them at the pier, I proceeded, with Lieutenant Johnson and yourself, to reconnoitre the place, but I found Fort Zelandia in such an utter state of ruin that it would not have been prudent, with the limited force at my disposal, to occupy it permanently; the buildings of the village affording also wretched accommodation for the men, I informed you of the same, and it was determined that we should hold Amping from the ship (the town being within easy range of my pivot-gun), giving notice, at the same time, to the military mandarin to leave the place. The forces accordingly were re-embarked, you leaving for Takow, next morning, in Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard," leaving me here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. GURDON.

Inclosure 6 in No. 18.

Acting Consul Gibson to Lieutenant and Commander Gurdon.

Sir, *Taiwan, Takow Office, December* 3, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your despatch of the 22nd ultimo, and beg to inform you that I quite approve of your determination to hold Fort Zelandia and the town of Amping from the ship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN GIBSON.

Inclosure 7 in No. 18.

Lieutenant and Commander Gurdon to Acting Consul Gibson.

Sir, *"Algerine," Amping, December* 2, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, according to your wishes, I boarded the man-of-war lorcha, lying inside of the bar, on Sunday afternoon, and informed her that she must move outside the bar before 6 o'clock that night, or I should have to take possession of her. I then proceeded on shore and visited the Heptai, informing him that we had taken possession of Amping, and that, consequently, he must leave the town within the space of twenty-four hours.

The Heptai at first declined to listen to any arrangement of the sort; but on my informing him that if he did not evacuate the town within the time named by me, I should have to take him prisoner, he said that he would go to Taiwan-foo for orders, and let me know the result next morning.

The same morning a furious gale from the northward set in, preventing my communication with the shore until Tuesday forenoon.

On Tuesday, at 11 A.M., I proceeded inside the bar and informed the man-of-war lorcha that, unless she was outside the bar by 3 P.M., I should take possession of her as a prize.

The lorcha not having moved at the time named, I sent my boats in, manned and armed, took possession of her and moved her outside the bar, anchoring her close to me, sending all her crew on shore, retaining only the captain, and two men to attend on him, on board, placing a guard on board her at the same time.

During the afternoon a deputation of merchants from Taiwan-foo came on board to request me to allow the Heptai to remain in Amping; but I informed them that unless they would deposit a sum of 35,000 dollars with me, as a guarantee that all your conditions with Tseng Taoutae were carried out, by my orders, I should be compelled to take possession of Amping the next afternoon: they left, saying that they would inform me next morning if they could deposit with me the sum required.

The next day at noon I received trustworthy intelligence that 500 men had been poured into Amping that morning, and that the Chinese officials were busy at work mounting guns on the fortifications.

I immediately sent a despatch to the Heptai stating that, unless he sent the troops out of the town and ceased mounting guns on the fortifications within an hour of the receipt by him of my despatch, that I should be compelled to open fire on the town; at the same time sending notice to the inhabitants to abandon the town, as I intended to open fire at 3 P.M.

No answer having come, at 4 o'clock I weighed and commenced a slow fire from my pivot-gun of shot and shells, confining my fire as much as possible to the batteries that were being armed. At 5·20 P.M. I ceased firing and anchored. At about 7 P.M. I received a despatch from you, informing me that you had arrived at an arrangement with Tseng Taoutae, solely on account of my holding Amping, and that the British forces were to continue to occupy Amping until the agreement were ratified by Vice-Royal Government of Fukien.

I immediately saw of what consequence it was that I should be in actual possession of Amping, and the disastrous effects it would have on the negotiations pending if the Chinese put Amping in such a state of defence, as might defy the small force at my disposal. I accordingly came to the conclusion to storm the town of Amping the same night.

At 10·30 P.M. I left the ship in the gig and cutter, the gig containing one officer and eleven men, the cutter, one officer and twelve men, making a total of two officers and twenty-three men.

I landed on the beach about two miles below the town, through a heavy surf, in which, notwithstanding every precaution, the gig was swamped and sunk.

After forming on the beach I advanced on the town, feeling my way with great caution, throwing out skirmishers, and taking advantage of every inequality of the ground to conceal my advance until I got within 800 yards of the fortifications, when, seeing that the enemy was on the alert, I took advantage of a steep bank and determined to wait until the moon had gone down.

At 2·40 A.M., the moon having gone down, I advanced again and succeeded in penetrating into the heart of the town without being discovered, I then managed to obtain a guide, and made for the Heptai's yamên. On breaking into the Heptai's yamên we discovered a guard-room full of soldiers, in number about fifty, who immediately barricaded the door and extinguished the lights; however, port-fires being at hand they were immediately lighted; the door was burst in, when, notwithstanding all my personal endeavours, and those of an interpreter I had with me, assuring them that their lives would be spared, and they would be allowed to go free if they laid down their arms, they would not, and reluctantly, in self-defence, I was obliged to give the order to fire. The Chinese soldiers succeeded in breaking down a door in their rear, and escaped, suffering, however, a severe loss of eleven killed and about six wounded.

I then marched to the Custom-house, halting there till daylight before I advanced further, posting sentries on Fort Zelandia commanding the town, and in the neighbouring streets.

I managed to write a despatch here informing you of what had taken place, requesting you to proceed here in Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard," whom I ordered up from Takow immediately to reinforce me; this despatch I succeeded in getting conveyed to you by offering a heavy bribe to a native courier.

Directly it was daylight I concentrated my men and advanced to take possession of the lines—facing toward Taiwan-foo.

I had only just reached the lines, when I observed a large body of the enemy advancing to the attack, led on by a Mandarin carrying a yellow flag.

I immediately lined the embankment and opened a heavy fire on the enemy, who stood and returned the fire for about five minutes, when they broke and fled towards Taiwan-foo, sustaining a loss, as I have since ascertained, of six killed and about ten wounded. I posted sentries and established guards round the entrenchments, barricading the gate leading to Taiwan-foo, and withdrawing the planks of it. During the afternoon, a deputation of the chief merchants of Taiwan-foo arrived, informing me that they had been sent by Liang Taoutae of Taiwan, and requesting to know what my terms were, as they were empowered by Liang to grant any demand I preferred.

I informed them that I required a sum of 40,000 Mexican dollars, to be paid over to me before noon the next day, as a guarantee that all your demands were fulfilled, the sum in question not to be returned until your agreement was ratified by the Vice-Royal Government of Fukien; in case this demand of mine was not complied with, I informed the deputation that I should advance on Taiwan-foo.

During the night I was informed that my demand of a guarantee of 40,000 dollars would be complied with, they being guaranteed to be deposited at my head-quarters not latter than 4 P.M. on Friday the 27th instant.

At daylight on Friday morning, Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard" arrived from Takow with you on board. At about 10 o'clock A.M., Lieutenant Johnson and thirteen men from Her Majesty's gun-boat "Bustard" landed to reinforce me.

During the day I employed the force in destroying all stores of arms that I could discover, blowing up the magazine in Fort Zelandia, to prevent any accident happening from the large quantity of gunpowder stowed there, and which was stored in a very careless and dangerous manner.

The 40,000 dollars arrived at head-quarters from Taiwan-foo about 4 o'clock, and were sent off to Her Majesty's gun-boat "Algerine" for safe custody, I giving a receipt and guarantee to the persons bringing it that it would be restored on the fulfilment of your demand by the Vice-Royal Government of Fukien. On Tuesday, the 29th instant, at about 11 A.M., Tseng, Taoutae of Amoy, arrived for a conference, and was received with all due honours.

You requested me, as Senior Naval Officer, to make any demands that I required from the Chinese authorities, when I requested from them, before Her Majesty's forces under my command re-embarked, the payment of a sum of 10,000 Mexican dollars, to be applied as follows:—

A sum of 5,000 dollars for repayment to the British Government of any expense incurred by them in the present expedition: also, a further sum of 5,000 dollars to be paid

to me for ransom of all guns and the Government stores remaining in the town of Amping, the sum in question to be distributed as prize money to the officers and men under my command.

This demand was complied with, I, on my part, agreeing to return the sum of 40,000 dollars deposited as a guarantee with me; to restore the man-of-war lorcha, taken by Her Majesty's ship under my command; and to evacuate the town of Amping.

These promises being conditional on Tseng Taoutae fulfilling the following requests:—

That he should send you a despatch guaranteeing the dismissal of Liang Taoutae and other officials implicated in the late disturbances at Formosa;

That Tseng Taoutae should guarantee that no Chinese military force should attempt to occupy Amping until the ratification of the Vice-Royal Government of Fukien of all your requests, the town of Amping, in the meantime, being held by us from a gun-boat.

These requests were all complied with, the Taoutae of Amoy returning to Taiwan-foo about 2 P.M.

On Tuesday the 1st of December, about 11·30 A.M., the Tsien of Taiwan-foo arrived with the sum of 10,000 dollars, the indemnity required by me before the embarkation of Her Majesty's forces under my command, for which I gave him a receipt, and handed over to him in return the 40,000 dollars in my possession as a guarantee for the fulfilment of your demands. The man-of-war lorcha had been restored to the Chinese officials on the previous day.

An arrangement was also entered into with the Tsien to receive over civil possession of the town from me at 10 o'clock the following morning, Her Majesty's forces under my command embarking immediately after the ceremony.

At the same time a sum of 200 dollars, that had been paid by the captain of the man-of-war lorcha, by previous arrangement, for damages sustained by the boats of Her Majesty's ship "Algerine" in boarding and towing her out, was given back to the Tsien; I taking a receipt for the same from Mr. Mann, Commissioner of Customs.

At noon on Wednesday, the 2nd instant, the Tsien of Taiwan-foo arrived, and was received with all due honours at the main guard, when I handed over to him officially the civil government of the town of Amping. Her Majesty's forces were then marched down to their boats, and embarked without delay, after having held Amping since Thursday the 26th of November.

I have the honour to state, for your information, that, when captured by me, the town of Amping had, mounted on its fortifications, forty-one guns, and that there were in store, ready for mounting, no less than 101.

The above-mentioned guns varied in calibre, but the greater number consisted of 16 and 12-pounders.

I also destroyed, whilst in possession of Amping, about 4,000 stand of arms, consisting of gingalls, matchlocks, bows and arrows, swords and spears.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. GURDON.

Inclosure 8 in No. 18.

Acting Consul Gibson to the Senior Naval Officer, Taiwan, December 3, 1868.

[See Inclosure 6 in No. 6.]

Inclosure 9 in No. 18.

Messrs. Ellis and Co. to Acting Consul Gibson.

Sir, *Takow, December* 7, 1868.

WE are in receipt of your letter of the 5th current, together with the sum of 6,000 dollars, being the indemnity for camphor stolen and illegally detained at Guo-chay. The amount is correct, but we find there are 18 bad dollars, which we return.

We note that the trade in camphor is to be opened, and that proclamations to this effect will be posted at the camphor-producing districts.

We have, &c.
For Ellis and Co.,
(Signed) W. H. TAYLOR.

Inclosure 10 in No. 18.

Dr. Maxwell to Acting Consul Gibson.

English Presbyterian Mission House, Takow,
December 8, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE much pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your communication of date 5th December, informing me that Tseng Ta-jin, the Commissioner of the Governor-General of Fukien had assented to your conditions and had sent down 1,167 Mexican dollars as as indemnity for the destruction of Protestant property. I beg further to acknowledge the receipt of the above money.

I am very glad to hear that, as a further result of your persevering efforts in our behalf, the Commissioner is about to issue proclamations in favour of Christianity. I shall be careful to attend to your injunction to await the due publications of such proclamations before recommencing work in other places than Takow.

My colleague, Mr. Ritchie, unites with me in most hearty thanks to you for your vigorous assertion of our Treaty rights as British subjects and as Protestant missionaries in this island.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES L. MAXWELL, M.D.

Inclosure 11 in No. 18.

Mr. Sainz to Acting Consul Gibson.

Catholic Mission Provincial Vicarage, Chung-kun.

Sir,

I RECEIVED your letter of the 5th instant, in which you communicate to us both the assent of Tseng Ta-jin, the Commissioner of the Governor-General of Fukien to your just conditions, and the indemnity of 2,000 Mexican dollars as damages for the destruction of the Catholic property, which dollars we have received.

What can I do for such a favour? I cannot express my gratefulness, but it will be of great pleasure for me to say I thank you, I thank British force, and the Vice-Consul for France.

I am very glad for your firm attitude with the Chinese; without it all other means will be for ceremony only, but for nothing else. If somebody will be of a different opinion I respect it.

I desire to see the proclamation in favour of Christianity by Tseng Ta-jin, and would to God they are as they ought to be.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. T. SAIREZ,
Provincial Vicar of Catholic Mission.

Inclosure 12 in No. 18.

Proclamation.

(Translation.)

A Proclamation by Tseng, Taoutae of Amoy, having rank of Provincial Judge and Commissioner for certain Affairs in Formosa.

WHEREAS, their Excellencies the Viceroy and Governor of Fukien, deputed me to visit Taiwan, as Special Commissioner to settle in conjunction with the local authorities, all foreign matters awaiting adjustment, and to consider a reduction in the price of camphor sold at the Government depôt. On my arrival in Formosa, I proceeded, together with Liang, Taoutae of Taiwan, and Yeh the Prefect, to examine the original documents, from which it appeared that hitherto all the camphor produced in the various districts of Formosa was bought in and resold by a contractor who was officially installed in the depôt established for the purpose at Taiwan by the Taoutae. A certain proportion of the profits accruing from the sale was required to be paid to Government by the contractor, and was applied to the expenses of Government works. An officer was deputed with a body of military as a preventive service to suppress disturbances and hinder private sales. These measures were taken in consideration of the importance of raising funds for the expenses of the Government yards, and they have been in vogue several years.

When, however, the port of Taiwan was opened to trade, the foreign merchants finding the Government prices too high, went into the market on their own account. On several occasions seizures were made of camphor thus surreptitiously purchased at Wu-chi-chiang, a place not opened to trade; and many disturbances have resulted: the merchants alleging that such action was in breach of Treaty, and the prohibition unauthorized. Meanwhile, independent trade in camphor increased to such an extent that the contractor resigned his post, and the camphor office was in abeyance.

These events were duly reported to his superiors by the Taoutae of Taiwan.

By careful investigation we now find that the Government camphor was produced at great expense, and when to this is added the cost of its carriage to the depôt and the loss occasioned by the discount, the capital employed was in excess of that necessary for the private production of camphor. The selling prices were higher in consequence, and it could not compete with the camphor of the private producer.

Further, camphor is made an article of trade by Treaty. It has a rate of duty fixed by Tariff, and can be exported. It is not one of the prohibited articles. If the foreign merchant were compelled to buy of the Government contractor, and should be dissatisfied with the high rates charged, he could not be forced to purchase, while such a measure would in effect be a monopoly and fail to carry out the principle of liberality to foreigners. Should, on the other hand, the native merchants alone be made to buy of Government, complaints of partiality would inevitably arise. This course, therefore, is impracticable.

After mature consideration, I concluded that the only course left was to propose the permanent abolition of the Government depôt, and that in accordance with the terms of the Supplementary Treaty, the foreign merchant, having applied to the Superintendent of Customs for the necessary transit pass and duty receipt, might either go into the interior himself, or send his agent to buy at a fair rate from the native producer. He might then convey it in native boats to the Custom-house for inspection, and ship it for exportation on payment of export and transit duties, and that there was no necessity to establish any inland Customs barrier. These measures it was hoped would prove satisfactory, and lead to the establishment of mutual concord between foreigners and natives, and remove all causes of complaint.

I accordingly sent the Prefect of Taiwan to Chi-hou to consult on their expediency with Mr. Gibson, British Consul at Taiwan, and Acting-Consul in the interests of the French, Prussians, and Danes, and he signified his approval of the measures. Having then referred the whole case to the authorities in Fukien for their approval, I received hei r sanction to the scheme.

I have transmitted a copy of the sections of the Treaty which refer to the camphor trade to Mr. Consul Gibson, requesting an answer in detail, on the receipt of which I shall send my Report to the Viceroy and Governor of Fukien, and issue instructions to the magistrates in Taiwan.

It remains for me to issue this Proclamation.

Let the producers and merchants of camphor know that the Government depôt is hereby declared to be abolished, and the official purchases and sales in camphor are at an end. Native and foreign merchants are henceforth at liberty to trade in camphor at will and without hindrance.

The original Proclamation of the Taoutae prohibiting the native merchants and producers of camphor from trading independently under pain of being punished in like manner as the contraband traders in camphor wood and sulphur, is hereby declared to be annulled and waste paper.

Hereafter, ye producers of camphor are permitted as of old to make your camphor and trade with native or foreign merchants on fair terms and ready money payment, without official supervision.

Let not any suspicions lead you to suspend the operations of your trade. Should any of the military or Government employés, under pretence of being sent out by the camphor depôt authorities to watch against contraband trade, illegally continue to hinder your trade or exact fines, ye are to give immediate information to the local authorities; and they and the Yamên will severally cause the offenders to be arrested, tried, and punished with the utmost rigour.

This is to show them clearly what they have to avoid, and to alleviate the difficulties of the merchants.

Let this Proclamation be strictly obeyed.

Tung-chih, 7th year 10th moon 27th day (December 10, 1868).

Inclosure 13 in No. 18.

The Prince of Kung to Sir R. Alcock.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, &c., makes a communication.

On the 11th instant a Memorial was received from the Viceroy of Fukien and Che-kiang, Ying, and the Governor of Fukien, Pien, to the effect that "the Intendant of the Hsing, Chüen, Yung Circuit, Tseng Tsien-tih (the Amoy Taoutae), was directed to proceed to the district capital (Taiwan-foo) as a Special Commissioner (bearing his seal), there to examine the archives and settle promptly and satisfactorily the several matters requiring adjustment in Formosa. As regards visits to the interior by foreign merchants and native vagabonds acting in collusion, the prevention by the Camphor Committee of the opening at Wuchi, and other places not being Treaty ports, of establishments for the private purchase of camphor for export, the burning and destruction of the religious establishments, the quarrel between a native and a foreigner, and the murders of Christian converts; in all these cases the criminals, having been apprehended by the sub-prefects and magistrates acting under orders from the Intendant of Formosa and the Prefect of Taiwan, were sentenced, some to exposure in the cangue, and some to flogging. Five points were thus disposed of, and two left unsettled. There also remained the regulations for the camphor trade, which it was necessary to settle with the English Consul personally. Mr. Gibson having repeatedly expressed his desire to send for vessels of war and extort an indemnity, the Amoy Taoutae and Acting Prefect of Taiwan, Jê Tsung-Yuen, proceeded together to Takow (Chi-how) to confer with that gentleman, who, however, repeatedly pleading illness, would not see them.

"All at once, on the 21st November, these officers became aware that Consul Gibson himself, and the naval officers, Chie-tang and Yung-shêng, had gone to Amping (Fort Zelandia) with two men-of-war and had bombarded the place, firing seven shots. The enraged populace, who wished to fight, were restrained and subordinated by the officials sent by the Lieutenant-General, Liu Ming-têng, and others, in conjunction with the civil authority, who would not allow them to be impatient or disorderly. At last, on the 24th November, the Amoy Taoutae and Acting Prefect of Taiwan had an interview with Mr. Gibson. They repeatedly set the right before him, and quoted the Treaty in condemnation of his acts. He was in the wrong, and was at a loss how to reply, expressing his willingness to confer on the several points. Accordingly, a course of action for immediate adoption was decided upon for each. Mr. Gibson's reply to the Amoy Taoutae differs in no respect from this statement.

"Unexpectedly, during the 25th of November, the naval officer, Chie-tang, towed off a supply vessel belonging to the Pescadores squadron, taking also her Commander, Sun Kuang-tsai, and two soldiers. Then, about midnight of that same day, the same officer stealthily brought on shore, by an unfrequented channel, a number of foreign soldiers. They burst into the quarters of the Brigadier commanding at Amping, killing and wounding his men. That officer, by name Chiang Kuo-chen, being too much outnumbered to resist, and being wounded, destroyed himself by poison. There were also killed 1 soldier and 10 braves, while 13 others were wounded, and the stores and powder magazines of all three brigades were set on fire and destroyed. Chie-tang said that he had been ordered to make the attack; that if a cessation of hostilities was desired, 40,000 dollars must be handed over at once, and that if there was any delay he would bombard the city. On this the gentry and merchants raised the sum of 40,000 dollars, which was handed to Chie-tang to be held as a guarantee.

"The Amoy Taoutae sent Man San-têh (Mr. Man, the Commissioner of Customs at Takow) to Mr. Gibson to protest against such violation of the engagements already entered into, by the employment of armed force. Mr. Gibson declared that he had directed the gun-boat to anchor off Fort Zelandia, but had given no order to commence an attack; and that Chie-tang had landed and caused the disturbance in disobedience of orders and without the knowledge of the Consul; while Chie-tang as positively asserted that he was not to blame, having acted under orders. Each held to his own statement and disputed the point. On the 29th November the Amoy Taoutae and Acting Prefect of Taiwan went to Amping, and having invited the attendance of the various foreign officers, strictly inquired of them as to their various breaches of Treaty. Mr. Gibson ordered Chie-tang to return to the gentry and merchants the 40,000 dollars held in guarantee; and the arrangements previously made were to be carried out as at first decided. But when the fault of Chie-tang, in committing an act of war of his own motion, came under discussion, that officer, unexpectedly adhering to his previous statement, would deduct 10,000 dollars from the sum he held to make good his expenses. He insisted that this

must be paid by the local authorities, who, thereupon, having been furnished with the amount by the gentry and merchants, handed it to Gibson and Chie-tang. An English receipt, sealed by them, was given to the Magistrate of Taiwan, and Chie-tang returned the 40,000 dollars received by him as a guarantee to the gentry and merchants; he also restored the vessel and the officer and men detained by him, and the residence of the Brigadier, and having embarked his men returned to Takow. The vessel of Jung Shêng still remained anchored at Amping, &c., &c."

In this matter of the camphor trade by British merchants, and missionary troubles in Formosa, the reiterated communications of his Excellency the British Minister were each and all succeeded by orders from the Prince to the high provincial authorities of Chekiang and Fukien to send a high official across to Formosa to do justice in conjunction with all parties.

It appears from the memorial of the Viceroy that the Amoy Taoutae had reported that at an interview with Mr. Consul Gibson the various questions remaining unsettled in Formosa had been discussed and decided *seriatim*, with a view to an immediate settlement accordingly; and that Consul Gibson in a despatch in reply to the Amoy Taoutae raised no objections.

There should have been no further differences over a matter once so discussed; but Consul Gibson, the discussion on the points having closed, all at once, in contravention of the agreement which had been come to, permits Chie-tang to commence a bombardment, to seize a vessel, to take possession of a barrack, to cause the death of a Brigadier, to wound and kill soldiers and braves, to burn down a store and magazine, and to extort an indemnity. All these acts are in breach of Treaty, and he undertook them having undoubtedly a wilful desire to quarrel.

During the reign of His late Majesty, and before the exchange of Treaties, it often happened that foreign nations having differences with the local officials had recourse to ships of war. But since the conclusion of the Treaties there have been resident foreign Ministers to discuss in a spirit of amity all questions with the Foreign Board. There have been instances of even-handed justice, of redress granted, and of protection afforded; each side has placed confidence in the other. A Consul, then, who has a difficulty has his appeal to his Minister in the capital, and should no longer on all occasions call for naval assistance to the detriment of friendly relations.

In the present instance, Mr. Gibson, if not satisfied with what was proposed, might have discussed his argument with the local authorities, or, having reported his course of action, might have awaited your Excellency's instructions. But instead of either, he takes upon himself to commit an act of war, and raise a most serious question.

The Prince and his Excellency the British Minister regard good faith, and would preserve friendly relations; each desires that amicable relations may perpetually increase; but this Consul and the military officers engaged on the other hand have dared, following their own inclinations, and having no fear of the law, to insult China, and recklessly make war. It was not the intention of his Excellency the British Minister that they should so act; he cannot support the action of the Consul and his colleagues; while the Prince, as Administrator-General of Foreign Affairs, cannot tolerate such anarchy between the two countries, when it is brought to his notice.

Moreover, the disposition of the populace of Formosa is fierce and excitable, differing greatly from that of the people of China. On the present occasion the Lieutenant-General commanding, and the Intendant, having supreme regard for the Treaty, would not allow the populace to fight. Had the people been as irritable as Mr. Gibson, their united rage being irresistible would have greatly endangered mercantile interests generally.

Already, a short time ago, the Prince wrote to request the British Minister to caution Mr. Medhurst for taking soldiers to Yang-chow. But Consul Gibson's offence is of a more glaring nature. If it is not severely punished, how will the authority of his Excellency the British Minister to control the Consuls at the other ports appear? In the time to come such acts of war will be everywhere improved upon, and what will be the end?

The Prince has made no haste to inform the Chinese Envoy of this case, that it might be communicated to the British Government, nor did he notify it to the several foreign Ministers, because his Excellency in his ministerial capacity, whenever international questions have arisen at the ports, has always dealt justly by them. The Prince, therefore, in the first instance, solicits the action of his Excellency the British Minister. He trusts that the wrong doing of Consul Gibson and of the officer Chie-tang will be thoroughly inquired into and punished, and that they will be ordered to refund the 10,000 dollars they have extorted; that, as a warning, and insure to the friendly relations of the two countries, his Excellency will memorialize Her Majesty the Queen to dismiss Consul Gibson and his colleague (Lieutenant Gurdon) from her service and punish them. On no account should

any consideration be shown them. As to the murder of a high official of the second grade, the killing and wounding of soldiers and braves, the burning of the store and magazines, the Prince hopes to learn in reply how his Excellency proposes to deal with these cases.

On receipt of the full details of these cases from the Provincial authorities, the matter can be further considered and dealt with. Meanwhile, the Prince addresses his Excellency the British Minister as above.

A necessary communication to Sir R. Alcock, &c.

7th year, 12th montl 4th dav (16th January, 1869).

Inclosure 14 in No. 18.

Sir R. Alcock to the Prince of Kung.

January 28, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from your Imperial Highness dated the 16th of January.

I had hoped before this to have received from Taiwan a detailed report of the occurrences referred to in the memorial of the Viceroy of Fukien and Che-kiang, Ying, and the Governor of the Fukien Provinces, and to have been enabled to reply with a full knowledge of the facts.

As up to the present time, however, nothing has arrived but a short despatch of Mr. Gibson, very briefly stating in outline the arrangements entered into with Tseng Ta-jin, the Amoy Taoutae dispatched to Taiwan for that purpose, and the events which preceded immediately the settlement made on the 24th of November, I am unwilling any longer to defer acknowledging the communication of your Imperial Highness.

In the absence of the detailed report which Mr. Gibson announced his intention of forwarding by the earliest opportunity, I cannot enter into any discussion of the particular facts, but I may at once inform your Imperial Highness that no act of hostility having been authorized by me, Mr. Gibson will be held responsible for whatever may have been done under his orders of the nature; and if the facts should prove, on due inquiry, to be such as the Viceroy of Fukien and Chekiang and the Governor of Fukien represent in their Memorial, both Mr. Gibson and the naval officer in question will be held answerable for any hostile measures leading to a loss of life, which in common with your Imperial Highness I sincerely deplore.

If any sums have been exacted for war expenses, or for any other purpose than a just compensation for losses and injuries inflicted on British subjects, and for which indemnity had already been claimed, I will take immediate steps for their reimbursement.

I had already two months ago taken steps to supersede Mr. Gibson in charge of the Consulate, and Mr. Swinhoe, the Consul of Taiwan, will long ere this have arrived at his post. I had also in communication with his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-chief, made arrangements with the Senior Naval Officer of superior rank to proceed to Taiwan, and in concert with Mr. Swinhoe, endeavour to secure a satisfactory settlement of all pending differences with the local authorities.

Unfortunately, the length of time required for the transmission of orders, and the uncertainty in all means of communication, have prevented these arrangements taking effect in time to avert the evil that was feared from the long continuance of the contentions and differences.

As soon as I receive more detailed information from the spot, I will again address your Imperial Highness on the subject, when all matters connected therewith can be further considered and decided upon in accordance with Treaty rights. Meanwhile, I forward these few lines in acknowledgment.

In the meantime, it will be evident to your Imperial Highness that so long as provincial high officers at Foo-chow, and their subordinate local officers in Formosa either do not know or will not give effect to the engagements entered into by the Imperial Government at Peking with the Representatives of foreign Powers, such untoward complications as these are only too likely to arise, whatever may be the desire of these to maintain none but the most friendly relations, and to conduct international affairs on the strictest principles of justice and good faith. Had the long-standing grievances of foreigners in Formosa been earlier attended to and redressed by Fukien High Authorities, the present collision and loss of life would certainly not have occurred.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 15 in No. 18.

Sir R. Alcock to the Prince of Kung.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Peking, February* 4, 1869.

I HAVE just received a despatch from Admiral Keppel informing me that immediately it had been reported to him that a sum of 10,000 dollars had been demanded by Lieutenant Gurdon for war expenses, he ordered that it should be returned to the Local Authorities at Taiwan, having thus anticipated my wishes and your Imperial Highness' request.

With reference to the injuries sustained by missionaries at the hands of the populace at Yang-chow, medical evidence of unimpeachable character having satisfied me that the injuries received by Mr. Rudland, Mrs. Taylor, and Miss Blatchley are all of so serious a character as to entail some permanent disability, I have felt bound to instruct Mr. Medhurst to demand of the Local Authorities a further sum of 1,500 taels to be divided among the sufferers as a very moderate compensation for the injuries received. By the inclosed document your Highness will perceive that Mr. Medhurst holds the sum of 6,000 taels as a guarantee for the arrest of the man Koh; and when that officer claimed in compensation for the injured missionaries 500 taels he distinctly made the demand subject to my approval as to the amount. It will save trouble and expedite a satisfactory settlement, therefore, if Mr. Medhurst deducts from this sum the amounts now to be paid to the missionaries; and it will be for the High Provincial Authorities to compel the Yang-chow officials, through whose fault it is that the missionaries were injured, to make good the amount to the Imperial Treasury.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 19.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received April 23.)

(Extract.) *Peking, February* 11, 1869.

I WAS glad to be able to communicate to the Prince the fact that, previous to any action on my part becoming known to the Admiral, Sir Henry Keppel, he had, by anticipation caused the refund, to the local authorities, of the 10,000 dollars, indemnity claimed by Lieutenant Gurdon at Taiwan.

It may be necessary if, in the future, similar cases are to occur, to insist upon the repayment of all expenses to which Her Majesty's Government may be put when compelled to adopt measures of coercion with the local authorities to compel redress not otherwise attainable for wrongs suffered by British subjects; but for the present, as in the Yangchow case, I believe, it was more important to avoid all possible misconception of our motives for action, and demonstrate that redress and justice, not money for Her Majesty's Government, were the sole objects contemplated.

I have received, but too late to forward copies by this packet, further reports and despatches, both from Mr. Swinhoe and Mr. Gibson. From these I learn that Mr. Swinhoe who did not arrive until the 10th of December off Taiwan, when the engagements entered into by the local authorities and Commissioners from Amoy, were being actively carried out, hesitated to take charge in accordance with my instructions, and thus supersede Mr. Gibson, fearing that it might be construed into a censure and disapproval of that officer's action, and interfere with the progress of a satisfactory settlement.

Under the circumstances, I think Mr. Swinhoe exercised a wise discretion, upon the whole, and I have not felt disposed to take serious exception to the course adopted, as will be seen by my despatch of this date, a copy of which I inclose, as also of one to Mr. Gibson directing him to continue in charge for the present.

Mr. Gibson's continuance in charge is, nevertheless, a cause of some embarrassment to me. Having already announced to the Prince of Kung the despatch of Mr. Swinhoe, and Mr. Gibson's anticipated relief by the presence of the Consul of the port, it will be impossible to leave the latter permanently there. And as Mr. Swinhoe's health appears to too precarious to enable him to remain at his own post in a tropical climate, and will probably compel him, at no distant date, to apply for sick leave to return to England, I must shortly make some other arrangements for removing Mr. Gibson. If the acts of hostility cannot be ultimately approved and defended, it will be necessary to take some steps in satisfaction of the demands made by the Prince. In any case, I should not feel justified

in leaving Mr. Gibson in sole charge, nor do I think, in any point of view, it would be expedient. The local authorities, whose removal I had demanded, either have already been displaced, or the assurance received that they shall be so promptly. Until this takes effect I have good ground for hesitating to remove Mr. Gibson, whether the final judgment on his conduct be one of condemnation or approval. But I think there will be a better chance of friendly relations being established and maintained with the new Chinese authorities if, on both sides, a change in the administrative officers can be effected.

I ought to mention, that up to the date of the last despatches from Formosa, the 6th of January, Mr. Swinhoe was still at Takow, giving his advice and assistance to Mr. Gibson, although he had declined taking charge. Everything seemed to be proceeding very satisfactorily. The chief criminal in the murder of the catechist had been executed; various other offenders had been identified and punished; all the sums claimed in compensation for the merchants and missionaries had been paid into Mr. Gibson's hands in full; and a satisfactory Proclamation, denouncing all offenders against the missionaries or foreigners generally, had been issued; as also another, distinctly relinquishing all right to continue a camphor monopoly. On one point alone did there seem any question in carrying out the engagements entered into, and that was the removal of Ling Shuh-tseun, the Chehien, who had been inculpated in the past mal-administration of affairs.

If the means adopted by Mr. Gibson were somewhat sharp and unauthorized, it would seem that they were, at all events, eminently successful, and brought all our difficulties, with both authorities and people, to a very swift and satisfactory termination, while nine months had been wasted in previous futile efforts by negotiation and remonstrance.

Inclosure 1 in No. 19.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Swinhoe.

(Extract.) *Peking, February* 12, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatches of 15th, 26th, and 28th of December last, and under the circumstances stated in your despatch of December 15th, I am not disposed to take exception to the discretionary power you assumed in not giving effect to your instructions. At the same time, as you were simply a Consul returning to your own post, and therefore necessarily superseding any Junior Officer acting in your place and absence, I do not see in the same strong light that you seem to have done, the liability of misconstruction on the part of the local authorities, still less of the Commissioner sent from Amoy, who must have known very well what your actual rank and position are.

Looking, however, to the state of your health, and the probability of your not being able to take up your post permanently, it is not essential that you should now remain there.

Inclosure 2 in No. 19.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Swinhoe.

Sir, *Peking, January* 29, 1869.

WITH reference to Mr. Gibson's despatch of the 25th of November, and its inclosures, I have to instruct you to call upon that officer for a detailed report—if not already forwarded—giving his reasons for a commencement of hostilities on Chinese territory by his requisition to the Senior Naval Officer to take possession of the fort of Zelandia and the town of Amping. You will desire him to state specifically why he considered it necessary "for the bare existence and interests of British subjects" to proceed to this act of war, and what he meant by the "bare existence of British subjects?" In what way were these or their immediate interests imperilled?

I inclose you a copy of an official communication received from the Prince of Kung, recapitulating the contents of a Memorial to the Emperor from the Viceroy of Fukien and Che-kiang and the Governor of Fukien, and to every one of the allegations and statements of the writers, bearing upon the management of affairs, I have to desire a categorical reply may be furnished by Mr. Gibson.

I presume that officer will have already forwarded the detailed statement announced in his despatch of the 25th of November, and that this will supply the information required to enable me to form a correct judgment as to the whole of his proceedings

before and after the 20th of November. He will, however, do well to add, without delay whatever he may deem necessary in further vindication of measures of hostility against which the Chinese Government have protested, and for which he had no authority or sanction in any of my despatches. Such acts are far beyond the powers vested in a Consul, unless in some great and unforeseen emergency where the lives of British subjects are in immediate and imminent peril, and no other means of protection or safety can be made available.

You will also desire Mr. Gibson to furnish the Chinese version of his communication to Tseng, the Taoutae of Amoy, of which he only inclosed the English in his despatch of the 25th of November, and inform me distinctly whether he mentioned, or in any way authorized, a demand for 10,000 dollars, or any other sums, by the Senior Naval Officer for expenses, ransom or prize-money; and if not, whether, to his knowledge, any was received, under what circumstances, and with, or without, a protest on his part against the proceeding.

Mr. Gibson states that, at the conference he had with Tseng Ta-jin on the 17th of November, at Takow, Dr. Maxwell, Dr. Manson, the agents for Messrs. Ellis and Co. and Messrs. Tait and Co., were present, and again at the conference of the 24th. I am at loss to know why these members of the community, having no official position, should have been present on either occasion, although there are many obvious reasons why they should not. I desire, therefore, to know upon what grounds they were intruded on the Chinese authorities in an official interview with the officer in charge of British interests, and whether they were further allowed to take any part in the proceedings?

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 19.

Sir R. Alcock to Acting Consul Gibson.

Sir, *Peking, February* 12, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 14th of December, and also Mr. Swinhoe's of the 15th, 26th, and 28th of December, and, as I have some reason to anticipate that this officer has already left in bad health, I have to instruct you to continue in charge until you hear farther from me. I defer expressing any final opinion on the serious responsibilities you have incurred, in seeking redress by actual hostilities with considerable loss of life, until I receive your answer to my despatch of the 29th of January, which I inclose in duplicate, to guard against any miscarriage.

I trust it is quite unnecessary to reiterate the instructions contained in my despatch of the 2nd of December, and to enjoin you to abstain from any active measures of coercion or hostility without express orders from me.

Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Keppel informs me that he has already authorized you to refund to the proper authorities the 10,000 dollars exacted by Lieutenant Gurdon for expenses of war, &c., an act which I entirely approve, and I trust you lost no time in giving effect to the order of the Naval Commander-in-chief.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 4 in No. 19.

Sir R. Alcock to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Peking, February* 12, 1869.

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of the 8th ultimo, informing me that in the event of Mr. Swinhoe being enabled to carry out my previous instructions, Her Majesty's ship "Dove" would be held available to convey him up the Yang-tsze, I have to state that if that officer's health will enable him to pursue his exploration, I have written to direct him to do so, and to avail himself of your Excellency's arrangements to facilitate his objects.

I should be glad, if you saw no objection, that the gun-boat might not only try to convey him up to the farther end of the Poyang Lake, but as high above Hankow as it could safely go towards Ching-king-foo in Szechuen. And, in the event of much progress being made in that direction, it would be very desirable if careful hydrographic observations

could be made for general information, as well as to determine how far the river in its course upwards is navigable for steamers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 20.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 26, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 5th of February respecting the late occurrences at Taiwan in Formosa.

The instructions which I have addressed to you within the last four months, and, as regards Formosa more particularly, my despatch of the 23rd of February, will have fully explained to you the views of Her Majesty's Government on the general question raised in this able despatch, and the particular incidents referred to in it.

You will lose no opportunity of pressing on the Chinese Government, with special reference to my correspondence with Mr. Burlingame, of which copies have been sent to you, that Her Majesty's Government look to it, and it alone, for redress of wrongs of any kind, and under any circumstances, done to British subjects, and earnestly trust that they will not look in vain. They hold the Government at Peking alone responsible for the observance of Treaties which are contracted with it alone, and they look to it to enforce on the local authorities a full observance of them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

CHINA. No. 3 (1869).

Correspondence respecting Missionary Disturbances at Che-foo, and Taiwan (Formosa).

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1869.

[*Price 7½d.*]

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CHINA. No. 10 (1869).

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

ATTACK

ON

BRITISH PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES

AT

YANG-CHOW-FOO, AUGUST 1868.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1869.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

LONDON:
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No. 1.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 11, 1869.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 15th ultimo, I transmit to you herewith, for your information, an extract of a letter from the London Missionary Society respecting missionary privileges in China, together with a copy of the reply which I have caused to be returned thereto.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 2.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received February 21, 1869.)

My Lord, *Peking, December* 11, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch addressed to Mr. Consul Medhurst respecting the proceedings taken under my instructions at Yang-chow-foo, for the redress of the injuries inflicted on British subjects both at that place, the barrier above, and at Chin-kiang. Copies of Mr. Medhurst's despatches to me have already been forwarded, I understand, direct to the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERPORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Peking, December* 11, 1868.

I HAVE received your despatches of the 20th and 21st of November, with their inclosures, and learn with great satisfaction that you have been enabled to carry out my instructions respecting the Yang-chow outrage, and the exactions at the Huai-kuan barrier.

With reference to the reparation made to the missionaries, it seems complete, so far as their losses and expenses are concerned; but now that the medical certificate is before me, I see that three of the party, Mr. Taylor, Miss Blatchley, and Mr. Rudland, have suffered permanent and serious injury. Money, unfortunately, can afford no adequate compensation for injuries which cause permanent and disabling effects; but the sufferers are entitled to liberal consideration of the disabilities so contracted. I do not think 500 taels at all adequate, therefore, from this point of view, and have to instruct you to make a demand of 2,000 taels, to be equally divided among the three already named; and I trust, according to the distinct understanding on this head with the Commissioner and Viceroy, that you will have no difficulty in securing the prompt payment of the balance of 1,500 taels. You will take care to make it distinctly understood that this increased demand

* See "China No. 2 (1869)," Nos. 25 and 26.

is the consequence of undoubted evidence that each of these individuals has suffered in a way to entail permanent injury, tending to impair health and usefulness for the rest of their lives.

On one other point the result appears to leave something to regret. The literary graduate signalized by name by Messrs. Taylor, Duncan, &c., in their deposition before you, and described as having appeared before the house creating a disturbance, and to Mr. Taylor's face charging him with scooping out people's eyes and other atrocities,—described, too, as a man well known to the Tepao of the district,—should at least have been traced and confronted with Mr. Taylor, to whom he must have been known by sight, having reviled him in open day.

I am at a loss to know what Mr. Taylor means when he says in his letter to you of the 19th of November, "that there was no tangible evidence against the belted gentry." Was there not his own direct evidence against this one of their number, ready to be produced on oath and in open court? Chinese evidence, of course, in such a case, could never have been counted upon. Nor do I gather from your despatch of the 2nd whether any or what efforts were made to produce the accused and confront him with his accuser. To have secured the conviction of one of these gentry, if what Mr. Taylor alleges has any foundation in fact, that they were the real instigators of the whole disturbance, would have been more effective as a deterrent probably than all the other measures put together. As you yourself most probably shared this conviction, I conclude there must be some explanation more than you have yet given to account for total failure in this particular.

With reference to the settlement effected in the case of exactions at Huai-kuan barriers, I consider you exercised good judgment in not refusing to receive the compensation offered by Ying Taoutae, although it might, in some respects, have been more satisfactory had it been possible to exact redress on the spot Under the circumstances, as detailed in your despatch, and the practical difficulties in the way of any navigation of the canal by the gun-boats to the barriers, however, I entirely approve the course adopted, as offering the best solution attainable. As to the punishment of the subordinates engaged in the affair, you were right still to insist on their punishment, and I will take steps here to press the investigation of the late Superintendent's conduct; I understand he is in Peking at this time. I will not fail also to bring under the favourable notice of the Prince of Kung, as you desire, the assistance rendered by his Excellency Ying, the Taoutae, in arriving at a prompt and satisfactory settlement.

You have not made any reference to the difficulties at Chin-kiang, both as regarded the outbreak against the missionaries, the distribution of inflammatory placards, and interference with the sale of opium by foreigners. I shall wait anxiously to hear that, before you left the vicinity, and while you had the support of the squadron, you were enabled to place all these matters on a proper footing; and, with that, I shall, no doubt, receive such reports from you of effective assistance from the Senior Naval Officer as will enable me to express my thanks, and bring the services rendered, together with your own exertions, under the notice of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 3.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received February* 23.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February* 22, 1869.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a duplicate of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, dated the 10th December, together with its inclosures, relative to the settlement of the claims made on the Viceroy at Nanking in reference to outrages on British subjects at Yang-chow.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, "*Salamis*," *at Singapore, December* 10, 1868.

IN my letter of the 5th November I had the honour to acquaint their Lordships with the particulars of outrages committed on British subjects at Yang-chow and Chin-kiang, and the consequent dispatch of Her Majesty's ship "Rodney," accompanied by the "Rinaldo," "Icarus," and "Slaney" to Nanking, with a view to affording a moral support to Mr. Consul Medhurst in the demands he was instructed to make on the Viceroy for redress.

2. In the concluding portion of that letter I expressed an opinion that the authorities at Nanking, seeing we were in earnest, would at once concede on the appearance of such an unusual force as had been dispatched to their neighbourhood.

3. By the inclosed copy of a letter from Captain Heneage, their Lordships will observe that these anticipations have been fully realized.

4. As it was apparent that the Viceroy Tseng Kuo-fan rested his faith on diplomatic fencing to clear himself of the difficulty in which he was involved, it became indispensable to obtain a material guarantee for the full fulfilment of the demands detailed in Mr. Consul Medhurst's letter to the Viceroy, of which a copy is inclosed.

5. Captain Heneage, acting in concurrence with Her Majesty's Consul, demanded that the Chinese gun-boat "Tien-chi" should be handed over with this object. The effect of this step was immediate. The Viceroy Tseng Kwo-fan gave his entire and unqualified assent to all the demands Mr. Medhurst had previously made. The wisdom of this prompt act of Captain Heneage is proved by the result, and meets with my full approval.

6. Tseng Kwo-fan has been superseded as Viceroy at Nanking; and his Excellency the Viceroy Ma, who succeeds him, appears disposed to fully allow our Treaty rights.

7. Mr. Consul Medhurst, accompanied by the "Slaney" and "Dove," will proceed to Yang-chow in order to see that his demands are all strictly enforced; in the meantime, the "Tien-chi" will be retained as a guarantee.

8. The judgment which marked the prompt action of Captain Heneage during these difficulties will, I trust, meet with some mark of their Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Captain Heneage to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, "*Rodney*," *Yang-tsze-kiang, off the Grand Canal, November* 13, 1868.

IN accordance with my intention as expressed in letter of the 27th ultimo, on the 2nd instant, I had made every arrangement for proceeding in company with Her Majesty's ships "Rinaldo" and "Slaney," up the Yang-tsze-kiang, for the purpose of affording Her Majesty's Consul efficient support in obtaining proper redress for the outrage committed upon British missionaries in August last.

2. About noon, Her Majesty's ship "Icarus" arrived at Woo-sung, and, deeming it advisable to detain her until the duty I was about to commence should be completed, I ordered her to proceed to Shanghae, complete with coal, &c., and join my pennant up the Yang-tsze.

3. I left Woo-sung with Her Majesty's ships under my orders about 1·30 P.M. the same day; and the "Icarus" joined me on the morning of the 5th. We arrived and anchored off Chin-kiang on the evening of the 6th, where I found the "Dove."

4. On the 8th I left the "Dove" at Chin-kiang, for the purpose of sounding the Grand Canal, with the view of taking the "Slaney" and "Dove" off the city of Yang-chow on my return, and proceeded with Mr. Consul Medhurst on to Nanking, where I arrived the same day with Her Majesty's ships under my command, and found there the Chinese ship-of-war "Tien-chi," a handsome new paddle-wheel steamer.

5. With the object of having in our hands a guarantee for the proper adjustment of the negotiations, and the fulfilment of the Viceroy's pledges, should he engage to comply with the demands made upon him by Mr. Medhurst in his letter of the 6th instant, I deemed it advisable to send an officer on board with a letter addressed to the Commanding Officer, directing him not to attempt to move his vessel from the anchorage she then

occupied; at the same time informing him that forcible measures would be taken to detain her should he attempt to leave. I may add, that Her Majesty's Consul concurred in my action in this matter.

6. The Commander of the "Tien-chi" having reported what had happened, returned about 11 P.M., bringing with him an official despatch from the Viceroy, in which his Excellency pledged himself to accede to all the Consul's terms, which he now admitted just and reasonable.

7. On the 9th, I, in company with Mr. Medhurst, and attended by a guard of Marines, waited on Tseng Kwo-fan, who was supported by Ting Futai of Kiangsu. Both the Viceroy and Ting were induced to promise that a Proclamation should be issued under their seals, detailing the circumstances under which the Yang-chow outrage had been committed, and the manner in which redress had been granted with reference to the subject of a material guarantee being given for the proper fulfilment of their pledges. Ting strongly opposed any such proceeding, and finally refused to grant the request. On taking leave, I intimated that I should take charge of the "Tien-chi," unless an order under the Viceroy's seal for the temporary transfer of the vessel were received on board the "Rodney" by 5 P.M. that day. I need scarcely add, that at the hour named the requisite order was received.

8. We then called on Ma, the mandarin appointed to succeed Tseng Kwo-fan as Viceroy, &c., who received us courteously, and, on the 12th, his Excellency, who had in the meantime superseded Tseng Kwo-fan, paid an official visit to the "Rodney," and on leaving he was saluted with nineteen guns.

9. Two mandarins of high rank, the late Commissioner of the province of Kiangsu and the Taoutae of Shanghae, having been appointed to hold a formal inquiry at Yang-chow, in conjunction with Mr. Medhurst and myself, as demanded in paragraph 4 of inclosure, Her Majesty's ships under my command, with the "Tien-chi" under escort, left Nanking on the 13th, and anchored in line of battle off the Grand Canal.

10. In thus diverting Her Majesty's ships "Rinaldo," "Icarus," and "Slaney" from carrying out their respective orders, I have acted on the conviction that a large demonstration of force was absolutely necessary to secure success to the Mission, and I am happy to be able to state that the ready compliance which our demands have met with up to the present date is doubtless in a great measure attributable to the presence of so many ships of war off Nanking.

11. I now anticipate an early settlement of the difficulties, and I shall make it my duty to dispatch the various ships in execution of their respective orders as soon as possible.

12. I have addressed an official letter to Commodore Jones, informing him that I shall probably be enabled to dispatch the "Rinaldo" and "Slaney" about the latter part of this month.

13. From Hankow I have received from Mr. Consul Caine a despatch stating that affairs at that port are in rather a disturbed state, that the missionaries are being stoned, and that the presence of a ship-of-war was urgently required. In reply I informed him that I was then unable to send any ship to Hankow, but that Her Majesty's gun-boat "Opossum" was daily expected at Shanghae, and should be sent on as soon after her arrival as possible.

14. Her Majesty's ship "Zebra" arrived at Shanghae on the 7th instant, and I directed Commander Trollope to join me at Nanking with Her Majesty's ship under his command.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. HENEAGE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Consul Medhurst to the Viceroy Tseng Kwo-fan.

Sir, *"Rodney," November 6, 1868.*

ON the 31st ultimo I had the honour to inform your Excellency that I was on the point of proceeding for the second time to Nanking, charged with special instructions from Her Majesty's Minister in reference to the treatment of the Yang-chow difficulty.

2. I have now to acquaint you that I have arrived off your city, in company with Captain Heneage, commanding Her Majesty's ship "Rodney" and other vessels of war, and that we propose to wait upon your Excellency with a suitable number of officers at 1 o'clock on the 9th instant.

3. In order to save both your Excellency and myself any useless discussion, I beg to lay before you in writing the propositions which I contemplate presenting for your acceptance.

4. In the first place I propose to request you to appoint an officer of suitable rank, as promised by his Highness Prince Kung to Her Majesty's Minister, to proceed in my company to Yang-chow, and there to hold, in concert with myself, a formal Court of Inquiry into the charges which I have made against the official authorities and gentry of Yang-chow, of having aided and abetted in the outrage committed upon the missionaries in August last. I shall expect that the officer so appointed will have authority to summon before him, and if necessary detain for further trial and punishment any person, whether a member of the literary class or commoner, whom circumstances may render it expedient to examine publicly before the Court.

5. In the second place I desire to procure from your Excellency an admission of the justice of the demands which I have advanced in my several letters to the authorities of Yang-chow and yourself, as well as a distinct pledge under the Viceroy's seal that instructions shall be given to the proper authorities to see them all carried into effect forthwith.

6. As regards the amount of compensation which I have to require for the personal injuries sustained, I am instructed by Her Majesty's Minister that save where any permanent hurt can be shown to have been sustained by any of the missionary party, I am not to claim for anything beyond actual losses and expenses incurred, but I am authorized to see that proper indemnification is granted to the native proprietors of the mission premises or any other natives connected with their mission who may have suffered in person or property by the violence of the mob, or the unjustifiable action of the authorities. This is a point which I have yet to decide after further investigation, the result of which shall be duly communicated to you. I need scarcely add that it is essential that the above-mentioned concession on your Excellency's part should be made before I can consent to proceed with the proposed inquiry at Yang-chow.

7. I propose further to claim your attention to questions pending in connection with Chin-kiang and the Haikwan barriers. At the former place the missionary Taylor continues to experience obstructions in the way of a peaceful occupation of the premises which have been let to him in the city of Hsia In-chih, and I have to lodge a most serious complaint against the Superintendent of Inland Customs at the last named locality for having more than once vexatiously and illegally detained property belonging to a British subject whilst being conveyed under transit pass and certificate, and for having tortured and punished the native servants in charge.

8. The above constitute the principal questions which I propose submitting to your Excellency's notice; and I have to request that you will be prepared with positive replies in reference to each one, so that any further misapprehension or delay may be obviated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 4.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 25, 1869.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, inclosing a duplicate of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Keppel, relative to the settlement of the claims made on the Viceroy at Nanking with reference to the outrages committed on British subjects at Yang-chow-foo; and, in reply, I am to state to you that Lord Clarendon concludes that Sir H. Keppel will have been put in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government on this matter as expressed in the despatch to Sir R. Alcock,* a copy of which was transmitted to the Board of Admiralty in my letter of the 28th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

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* See "China Papers, No. 2 (1869)," No. 24.

No. 5.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received February* 25.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February* 24, 1869.

WITH reference to former correspondence, I am commanded by my Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, dated the 4th January, with its inclosure in original, reporting the final settlement of the demands made on the Viceroy at Nanking for redress on account of the outrages committed on British missionaries at Yang-chow.

The inclosures to Sir Henry Keppel's letter being sent in original, it is requested they may be returned when done with.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *"Princess Charlotte," Hong Kong, January* 4, 1869.

IN my letter of the 13th December, I had the honour of informing their Lordships that the Viceroy of Nanking, Tseng Kwo-fan, had given his unqualified assent to the demands of Mr. Consul Medhurst for redress in reference to the outrages committed on British missionaries at Yang-chow, and that it was the intention of the Consul to proceed to that town accompanied with a naval force to see that his demands were strictly enforced.

2. I have now the honour to inclose, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the copy of a letter from Captain Algernon C. F. Heneage, of Her Majesty's ship "Rodney," announcing the final compliance of the native authorities with the demands referred to, and the consequent embarkation of the seamen and marines landed as an escort at Yang-chow during the negotiations.

3. I have already directed their Lordships' attention to the cordial co-operation of Captain Heneage with Her Majesty's Consul, and to his prompt action in securing a material guarantee to ensure a full compliance with our claims, which at once made him master of the position, and was followed by immediate satisfaction.

4. The accompanying copy of a letter from Her Majesty's Minister in China, expressing his cordial thanks to Captain Heneage will, I trust, further assure their Lordships of the good services rendered by that officer, and I trust that the creditable behaviour and discipline of the officers, seamen, and marines, landed for a period of fourteen days (to which Her Majesty's Consul bears warm testimony), will be as gratifying to their Lordships as to myself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Captain Heneage to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *"Rodney," off Chin-kiang, November* 30, 1868.

IN my despatch dated the 13th of November I had the honour to inform you that Her Majesty's ships under my command had anchored off the Grand Canal with the Chinese steamer "Tien-chi" in charge, and that Li, the Salt Commissioner of Kiang-su and Ting, Taoutae, of Shanghae had been appointed to form, in concert with Mr. Medhurst and myself, a Court of Inquiry at Yang-chow.

2. I left Her Majesty's ship "Rodney" on the morning of the 14th of November with Her Majesty's Consul and an armed force of about 300 officers and men, selected from Her Majesty's ships "Rodney," "Rinaldo," and "Icarus," and half a field battery from the "Rodney," and proceeded up the Grand Canal in the gun-vessels "Slaney" and "Dove," attended by the "Rodney's" steam-launch and the "Faust," a small steamer kindly placed at my disposal by Messrs. Jardine and Matheson and Company of Shanghae. Our course up the canal was somewhat retarded by the frequent groundings of the

"Dove," owing to the intricacy of the navigation, I therefore landed the brigade about six miles from the city of Yang-chow, bivouacked there for the night, and on the following morning marched into the city, where we found the authorities had prepared for our reception a commodious temple (called Hsing Chiao-sze), which afforded ample accommodation for all.

3. The day following our arrival was occupied in the interchange of visits between the two Commissioners and Yang-chow authorities and ourselves, and we were everywhere treated with marked courtesy.

4. After the opening of the formal inquiry we were soon enabled to arrive at a perfect understanding as to the necessary arrangements to be made. We were assured that both the Chih-fu (or Prefect) and Chih-hsien had been degraded and dismissed from office. Three men from among the lower classes were handed over to the local Magistrate for trial and punishment, and active measures are now being taken to apprehend a fourth person, a literary graduate called K'o, who was one of the chief leaders in the riot, and who personally assaulted several of the missionaries. This man K'o is, however, the only member of the literary class against whom proof exists of having aided and abetted the rioters. The amount claimed for compensation to the missionaries for losses, &c., was agreed to without demur, and 500 taels were granted for permanent injuries sustained by some of them, while 150 dollars were awarded to two Chinese for a similar reason, and Mr. Taylor's expense in renting another house at Chin-kiang, amounting to 120 dollars, has been made good. A satisfactory Proclamation has been issued under the seals of the two Commissioners, detailing the true nature of the outrage which had been committed, and the punishment and redress which had followed upon it.

5. On the 19th, Mr. Taylor and his assistants were formally reinstated in their original house in Yang-chow, where a stone tablet is to be placed with a notice engraved upon it, stating that the house is rented with the approval of the local authorities and of Her Majesty's Consul, and that the residents are not to be interfered with, or molested in any way.

6. With reference to the illegal detention at the Haikwan Barrier of merchandize belonging to a Mr. Canny of Chin-kiang, referred to in paragraph 7 of the inclosure to my letter No. 36, the Commissioners agreed to pay Mr. Canny all losses and expenses incurred by him consequent on the detention complained of, and to fairly compensate the native servants who had been robbed, punished, and tortured while in charge of the goods.

7. I regret to say that the day after the completion of the above arrangements new complications arose by Mr. Medhurst receiving an official notice from Mr. Canny that a further stoppage of merchandize—*bonâ fide* British property of about 600 taels value—had occurred at the Haikwan barrier.

8. Taking into consideration the intricacy of the navigation of the Grand Canal, and also the distance of the barrier, about 80 miles from Yang-chow, I considered it unadvisable to attempt to proceed there in the gun-vessels, and I therefore requested the Commissioners to place eight junks at my disposal, as it was my intention to embark the force under my command for the purpose of proceeding to Huai-gan, with the object of relieving the goods and of investigating the circumstances of their illegal detention, and also to demand that due respect should be accorded to transit passes for the future, in accordance with the Treaty of Tien-tsin, so that the recurrence of similar acts might be obviated. The Commissioners having requested that I would consent to delay my departure during the space of three days to enable them to communicate with the Superintendent of Inland Customs at Huai-gan I complied with their request, and at the expiration of that time Mr. Medhurst received a despatch from the Superintendent of the barrier expressing extreme regret for the detention of the goods, which he stated had been caused by the acts of subordinates, which he could in no way justify, and also informing him that all British goods had been immediately released and conveyed to their several destinations, and that the transit passes issued by the British Consul at the various ports should henceforth be respected. In consequence of this prompt assurance on the part of the Superintendent that such illegal acts should henceforth be discontinued, Mr. Medhurst and myself deemed it unnecessary to carry out the proposed expedition.

9. All our demands now having been complied, excepting a few minor details, I considered the further detention of the "Tien-chi" might prove an inconvenience in the movements of the squadron by my being obliged to place a prize crew on board of her, the Commissioners had intimated their intention to discharge the crew unless the steamers were released. Mr. Medhurst and myself therefore demanded that the sum of 6,000 taels should be placed at the Consul's disposal, in lieu of the steamer, as a guarantee for the performance, on the part of the Yang-chow authorities, of their assurance to use their utmost endeavours to arrest the civilian K'o, who, from his social position, we deemed

highly desirable to make an example of. Failing the arrest of this man, K'o, the Yang-chow authorities themselves are to be reported to the Emperor for dismissal from office.

10. On the 25th the 6,000 taels guarantee were delivered to Mr. Medhurst, and the same day I addressed a letter to the Commander of the "Tien-chi," informing him that the embargo on the vessel under his command ceased on receipt of the letter.

11. Mr. Medhurst having officially informed me of the successful termination of the mission, I embarked the brigade on the 29th instant, and proceeded with the squadron to the anchorage off Chin-kiang on the 30th.

12. In this, my concluding report of my proceedings in connection with the Yang-chow difficulties, &c., I cannot omit to mention the willing and cordial support I invariably received from Mr. Consul Medhurst, and the perfect unanimity and accord that existed between that officer and myself when a material decision and co-operation were essentially necessary for the success of the mission entrusted to us. I beg at the same time to express my thanks to Major Crossman, R.E., who, whilst at Shanghae, hearing that an expedition was pending, kindly placed his professional service at my disposal, which, I need not add, I gratefully accepted. It affords me pleasure to bring to your favourable notice Commander Lord Charles Scott, R.N., Captain William Hall, R.M.L.I., (who respectively commanded the naval and marine battalions,) and the other officers employed on detached service, as well as the seamen and marines, who performed their duties throughout with zeal and general good conduct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. HENEAGE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

Sir R. Alcock to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Peking, December* 14, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a despatch I have received from Mr. Consul Medhurst reporting the termination of the negotiations in which he has been engaged, with the material aid and support of the Senior Naval Officer and the force under his command at Chin-kiang and Yang-chow. They have been crowned with a fuller measure of success than could have been safely anticipated, and without resorting to any actual force.

How much is this due to the energetic and efficient co-operation of Captain Heneage is evident from Mr. Medhurst's report, and I have to beg you will permit me through you to convey my best thanks to that officer, and those under his command. I have not failed to bring the valuable assistance rendered on this occasion under the special notice of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and although it falls more especially within your province to appreciate the credit due to the whole force as well as to the Senior Officer for the exemplary conduct of all the men while on shore, and the effective discipline maintained, I cannot refrain from the expression of my entire satisfaction at the result. Had there been any casual relaxation of discipline or a single act of drunkenness and brawling in the streets, it is impossible to say how disastrous might have been the results among such a hostile population upon the whole course of the negotiations. That no such untoward incidents occurred to mar the efforts made to obtain a peaceable solution of our difficulties cannot but reflect the highest credit on all engaged, and on the service to which they belong.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

(Extract.) *Yang-chow, November* 26, 1868.

I MAY thus, I think, pronounce the objects of the mission to have been entirely fulfilled, and I trust that the results of my efforts may prove as acceptable to your Excellency as they are satisfactory to myself. The success which has attended them is, I honestly feel, mainly due to the energetic and efficient co-operation which I have throughout received from Captain Heneage. No obstacle has daunted him, no detail has wearied him, but he has followed me in the negotiation from beginning to end, even into its most

vexatious minutiæ, with a helpful counsel and strong support which have been invaluable to me. Captain Heneage also merits at your Excellency's hands high praise for the manner in which he has placed a body of more than 300 men at this distance from the squadron, and for the perfect discipline which he has maintained in the force throughout its fourteen days' stay on shore. The latter feature has been so remarkable as to attract the observation and approbation of the Chinese Authorities, and I need scarcely point out how the slightest laxity in discipline might have irritated the people, and thus have worked prejudice to the very interest which it was our object to promote.

No. 6.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received February 26, 1869.)

My Lord, *Peking, December* 14, 1868.

REFERRING to my despatch of the 11th instant, I have since received two further despatches from Mr. Consul Medhurst of November 26 and December 2, with their inclosures, completing his account of the measures taken at Yang-chow and Chin-kiang and their satisfactory results. As copies of these have been already forwarded direct to the Foreign Office by Mr. Medhurst, I only forward copy of my reply entirely approving of the action taken.

The report Mr. Medhurst makes of the energetic and efficient support he received from Captain Heneage and all under his orders is highly satisfactory, and I have no doubt that to such cordial and sustained co-operation is greatly to be attributed the entire success of the demonstration it was necessary to make. It is peculiarly gratifying to me to be enabled to bring this evidence of what can be done by intelligent and loyal co-operation, under your Lordship's attention; and I trust the valuable nature of the service rendered by Captain Heneage on this occasion may be specially reported to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I may be permitted to add that in my opinion the greatest praise is due to the senior officer and those under his command, for the perfect discipline maintained by the force of 300 men landed in the midst of a disaffected population, because I know from experience that nothing is more difficult to secure under such circumstances. A single act of drunkenness or disturbance might have defeated all the efforts that were being made to arrive at a satisfactory and peaceful termination; and that no such untoward incident complicated matters must reflect the highest credit on the officers, and speaks well for the discipline of and order of the whole force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Peking, December* 14, 1868.

SINCE the despatch of the 12th instant, I have had the satisfaction to receive your despatches, with their inclosures, of the 26th November and 2nd of December, completing the account of your proceedings at Yang-chow and Chin-kiang.

I am now informed why you found it impossible to secure the conviction of Ko, the accused literary graduate; and can only hope that he may yet be found, and dealt with as he deserves if convicted of the acts laid to his charge. I approve of the steps taken by you to this end, and you will, of course, take steps to follow them up in the manner proposed.

I also approve of the discretion exercised by you in dealing with the point raised by the French Mission at Yang-chow.

I am glad to hear that, as I anticipated, you succeeded in obtaining a satisfactory adjustment of the Chin-kiang missionary question. As nothing farther is said of the opium monopoly, and complaints on that head, I infer you saw no occasion for further action.

The report you make of the energetic and efficient co-operation which you have throughout these delicate and responsible operations received from Captain Heneage, the Senior Naval Officer, is highly satisfactory. I have sent a copy to his Excellency Sir H. Keppel, the Naval Commander-in-chief, with a request that he would convey to

that officer my thanks for the important service rendered. By such cordial co-operation and combined effort alone, could results have been obtained which will go far, I trust, to check all farther manifestations of a hostile spirit, and an open disregard of all Treaty obligations ou the part of the provincial authorities and the population under them. This had assumed so menacing an aspect, and its effects were so widely spread, that it became imperative to deal with it boldly, and show unmistakeably that there was both the power and the will to exact redress for the past, and enforce the better observance of Treaty stipulations in future.

I have much pleasure in conveying to you my cordial approval of your conduct throughout the negotiations, and bringing under the special notice of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs your own part in the work, as well as Captain Heneage's material aid.

You will convey to Messrs. Stronach and Allen the expression of my satisfaction at the favourable report you have made of their conduct during their attendance on this special service, which will also be made known to Her Majesty's Secretary of State.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 7.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 2, 1869.

WITH reference to previous correspondenee in regard to the Yang-chow outrage, I am directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister in China, bringing to his Lordship's notice the energetic and efficient support which Mr. Consul Medhurst received from Captain Heneage and those under his orders on the occasion in question, and requesting that the valuable nature of this service may be brought to the knowledge of the Board of Admiralty.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 8.

Memorandum by the Directors of the London Missionary Society, respecting Missions in China.

ON Tuesday evening, March 9, the Duke of Somerset, speaking in his place in the House of Lords, commented in strong terms on the recent proceedings of certain missionaries in Yang-chow; and added, "Nobody is responsible for this mischief but the London Missionary Society." The Directors of that Society have read this statement with considerable surprise, because they are innocent in the matter; and since the reference made to it by Lord Clarendon himself did not clear up all the details, they venture to lay before his Lordship a very brief statement of the case, so far as it concerns themselves.

2. With the proceedings of the missionaries of the "Inland China Mission," who settled in Yang-chow, the Directors of the London Missionary Society had nothing whatever to do. Those proceedings, indeed, differ in many ways from the views and practices which have prevailed among the China missionaries of the London Missionary Society. Since the Treaty of 1842, that Society has employed many missionaries in the Chinese Empire; it had never less than twelve, and in recent years the staff has amounted to twenty. All these missionaries reside in Treaty ports, in the city of Peking, or in the island of Hong Kong. Except on three trifling occasions, when others interfered on their behalf, they have had no reason to apply to any British Consul for personal protection during the past twenty-five years. One of their missionaries was invited by Admiral Hope to accompany his expedition up the Yang-tsze, and aided the Admiral as interpreter. Another was for some years Medical Officer to the Legation at Peking. And a third, on recently quitting Hong Kong, received the public acknowledgments of the Governor and Council of that Colony for the services which he had rendered to its people during the long period of his residence there.

3. It was not because their missionaries had given the Englssh Government any

trouble in China, but because they have never done so, and because the Directors are anxious, whenever practicable, cordially to co-operate with the English Government still, that they recently requested Lord Clarendon to give them his views of the amount of liberty secured to missionaries generally by the Treaties with China which are now in force.

(Signed) JOSEPH MULLENS, *Foreign Secretary.*

Mission House, March 11, 1869.

No. 9.

Consul Medhurst to Lord Stanley.—(Received March 22.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, January* 27, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of the 26th instant, with inclosure, to the address of Her Majesty's Minister at Peking.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, January* 26, 1869.

ADVERTING to my despatch dated the 26th November last, in which I reported my concluding arrangements in connection with the Yang-chow affair. I have now the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the man Koh is at last reported to me officially as having been apprehended.

I had heard of his capture and identification previously from both Mr. Assistant Allen and Mr. Taylor, and it is in reply to an inquiry on the subject which I had in consequence addressed to the Taoutae of this place, that I have now received the official intimation referred to, a copy and translation of the letter is herewith inclosed.

I propose to depute Messrs. Stronach and Allen to visit Yang-chow, and cause the prisoner to be officially identified by Mr. Taylor in their presence, when they will likewise have the opportunity of judging for themselves in how far the pleas brought forward of dotage and insanity can be sustained.

As regards the question of the degree of criminality attachable severally to Koh and Liu-chun, I have suggested to the Taoutae the expediency of punishing both men as principals ;. the one in exciting the mob to violence and arson, the other in actually heading the plunderers in their forcible entry into the mission premises. The Taoutae has claimed permission to investigate the penal code as to the possibility of adopting this view.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Ning, Taoutae, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *January* 24, 1869.

IN reply to your note calling for an explanation as to the delay in reporting the capture of the man Koh, concerned in the Yang-chow outrage, who, you learn, has been arrested, and also inquiring the mode in which he will be punished. I beg to state that it is only this very day that the petition of the Kau-chuan magistrate came to hand. Koh, it appears, is 71 years old, and his full name is Koh Shou-chun. He has long been subject to mental disease, and is generally named "cracked Koh." Mr. Taylor has identified him.

I have directed the said magistrate that if this Koh is proved to be the ringleader, the punishment of Lin-chun and the other must be reduced to that laid down for accessories, and *vice versa.*

I have the honour to request the repayment of the deposit of 6,000 taels, at your earliest convenience, as the conditions have now been fulfilled, viz., the capture of the said Koh, under which it was returnable.

No. 10.

Consul Medhurst to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 19.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, February 25, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of the 24th instant to the address of his Excellency Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, forwarding copy of Mr. Acting Interpreter Stronach's report on his recent visit to Yang-chow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, February 25, 1869.*

REFERRING to my despatch dated 26th January, 1869, I have the honour to submit copy of a report of Mr. Stronach of the result of his visit to Yang-chow for the purpose of causing the prisoner Koh to be identified in his presence.

It is very satisfactory to find from Mr. Stronach's account that no traces of ill-feeling against foreigners appear to exist at Yang-chow.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Mr. Stronach to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Shanghae, February 24, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in conformity with the instructions conveyed in your despatch of the 16th instant, Mr. Allen and myself proceeded to Yang-chow, and that in presence of ourselves, the Prefect, and the Kan-chuan, Magistrate, Messrs. Reid and Rudland of the China Inland Mission testified to the identity of a prisoner brought before us with the civilian Koh, who was a ringleader in the outrage of August last.

The prisoner is an old man and very evidently half-witted. He is stated not to be a Hsiu-ts'ai, although of the civilian class. He wore no decoration, and his appearance indicated that he had experienced the usual Chinese prison treatment. He broke out into a long and incoherent appeal for mercy which had at least the effect of enabling the missionaries to announce, if possible, more confidently the identity of the man, as his voice and manner irresistibly recalled the impressions of the night of terror.

We received every attention and civility from the local authorities, and the bearing of the people was satisfactory. The streets were crowded with idle holiday folk. Not an insulting expression met our ears.

I noticed that the Proclamation narrating the facts of the outrage and the retribution issued on the 20th November by the Commissioners Li and Ying was still on the wall and in neither a better nor a worse state of preservation than other notifications of about the same date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. G. STRONACH.

No. 11.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received April 23.)

My Lord, *Peking, February 4, 1869.*

REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch of the 20th November last, I have the honour to inclose a further correspondence with the Prince of Kung on the Yang-chow disturbances.

It will be seen that His Imperial Highness took exception to Mr. Medhurst's action

in demanding from the Viceroy, as a material guarantee, the steamer which he found off Nanking under his Excellency's orders, and also to his having proceeded up the Grand Canal to Yang-chow with two gun-boats, landing a force of 300 men to accompany him, while he remained in the town.

In my reply, I defended the Consul's action as having been fully justified in my opinion—as regarded the demand for a material guarantee, by the conduct of the Viceroy and the other officials on his first mission, and, with reference to the armed force which he took with him, by the lawless violence which the Yang-chow populace had displayed under the eyes of the local authorities towards inoffensive missionaries.

I further pointed out to the Prince that whatever may have been distasteful to the Viceroy in the measures taken, had been rendered unavoidable by the persistent denial of redress on the part of his Excellency and the authorities under his orders at Yang-chow on the occasion of Mr. Medhurst's first visit. Had they acted with good faith when justice was first demanded, and granted such measures of redress as the Viceroy himself admitted was fitting on the second appeal, the necessity for the Consul's action, and the presence of a squadron off Nanking, would not have arisen, and all further chance of untoward complications might have been avoided. I trust your Lordship will approve the purport of my reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

P.S.—I beg also to inclose copy of a letter received from Mr. Taylor expressing his thanks for the benefit received.

R. A.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

The Prince of Kung to Sir R. Alcock.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, &c., makes a communication.

In the matter of the maltreatment of certain British missionaries at Yang-chow his Excellency the British Minister wrote that, as no satisfactory settlement had been effected at the time, it would be necessary to depute a competent high official to deal with the case. On this the Prince at once directed the Minister Superintendent at Shanghae to depute a high functionary of the rank of Provincial Judge or Intendent to accompany Mr. Medhurst to Yang-chow, there to re-open and settle the case. His Highness received, on the 9th and 23rd December, the joint Reports of their Excellencies the late Minister Superintendent Tseng and the newly appointed Minister Superintendent Ma, notifying the conclusion of the case.

Their Excellencies state that, " on the 1st November, and subsequently, we directed Li-yuen-hua, the recently appointed Provincial Judge of Kiangsu, and late Salt Commissioner of the District of Liang-huai, and Ying-pao-shih, the Intendent of the Su, Sung, Tao Circuit (the Shanghae Taoutae), to proceed to Yang-chow with Mr. Medhurst and settle the case. Meanwhile, on the 3rd November, Mr. Medhurst left Shanghae with a ship (or ships) of war. On the 9th November, as already agreed, Ying Taoutae and Mr. Medhurst came to the provincial capital (Nanking). There was a long discussion; Mr. Medhurst demanded a material guarantee in the shape of the new steamer in which Ying Taoutae had travelled, laying an absolute embargo on it pending the final conclusion of the case.

On the 15th November, Mr. Medhurst took two ships of war up to the Hsuning (South Gate) of Yang-chow. Himself, and with some 300 soldiers he had with him, occupied the Hsing Chiao-ssu within the city. Mr. Medhurst, the military officers, and the interpreter, met by appointment at the Wan Shou-ssu, and the matter was discussed thoroughly and in detail. With regard to the gentry indicated, it was conclusively shown that the suspicion of their having incited and caused the disturbance was the result of mistaken confidence in mere rumours, and as Mr. Medhurst could advance nothing to the contrary, that matter was allowed to drop.

The local officials have at various times apprehended three of the rioters, namely, Liu-chun, Chang Chin-chun, and Ko-piao. The Magistrate has been directed to secure the identification of the principal offender among them by Mr. Taylor and the head borough, that his punishment may be in accordance with his offence.

With regard to compensation, that has been paid according to Mr. Taylor's estimate for medical treatment, damages, and the expenses in procuring lodging caused by his flight

from the city. Mr. Medhurst has given a receipt for 1,228 taels 4 mace and 270 dollars 9 cents, which sums will be handed to Mr. Taylor by the Consul. The missionaries will reoccupy their premises. A joint Proclamation has been issued by their Excellencies Tsêng and Ma, the late and present Ministers Superintendent, and the Ting, the Lieutenant-Governor of Kiang-su, enjoining the military and populace of the three Prefectures of Huaian, Chiu-kiang and Yang-chow to respect the Treaty and not to molest or interfere with missionary establishments. The Prefect of Yang-chow has also furnished Mr. Taylor with a succinct Proclamation engraved on stone, These points were arranged on the 17th, 18th, and 19th of November, Mr. Medhurst expressing great satisfaction at the promptitude of the settlement. He left the neighbourhood (*lit.* port) with his war ships on the 28th November. The matter is thus concluded, &c.

The Prince would observe that directly these disturbances, wherein the missionaries suffered, occurred, the Minister Superintendent ordered the local officials to repair the house, and proposed the payment of 1,000 taels for medical charges, and to make good the losses incurred. At a later date the inefficient Prefect Sun and Magistrate Li were removed from office, while able officials in the persons of the Provincial Judge Li and the Shanghae Taoutae Ying were sent to Yang-chow with Mr. Medhurst to bring about an equitable settlement.

Again, the action taken on the several points agrees in the main with the demands made in his Excellency's despatch of October 10, which were the appointment of a high officer, the apprehension of the principal offenders, and increased compensation. Mr. Medhurst also has expressed himself well satisfied with (deeply grateful for) the promptitude of the settlement.

The Prince has now to forward to his Excellency the British Minister, for his information, copies of the Proclamation issued, and of a note from Mr. Medhurst to the Prefect of Yang-chow, with the above particulars of the closing of the case.

The Prince has now had the honour to receive Her Majesty's rescript, directing him to enjoin the provincial authorities to deal equitably with any missionary cases, should such again occur, in order that missionaries and people may live in harmony, and for the prevention of troubles. It will be for his Excellency the British Minister, on his part, to instruct the Consuls to notify the missionaries residing in the various provinces, that they must attend to their own proper business and not provoke troubles. Should difficulties arise, these should be discussed fairly, temperately, and in good faith.

In the present instance, while the matter is still under discussion, Mr. Medhurst all at once brings forward men-of-war, and would like to detain a new Chinese steamer as a guarantee. He has acted illiberally, and has missed the right way of dealing with the case. Such conduct does not at all accord with the desire to consolidate the friendly relations of the two countries, and it will be for his Excellency the British Minister to warn Mr. Medhurst not to act so for the future.

In reply to his Excellency, the Prince has to forward this statement of the circumstances attending the joint settlement of the Yang-chow missionary business.

A necessary communication, &c., to Sir R. Alcock.

The inclosures are the Viceroy's Proclamation, the inscription on the tablet set up by the Yang-chow Prefect in Mr. Taylor's house, and a note from Mr. Medhurst and Captain Heneage, thanking the Prefect and local authorities for the settlement. One hundred and twenty-two dollars have been left as a present to the official underlings who have been in attendance.

January 2, 1869.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Sir R. Alcock to the Prince of Kung.

Peking, January 26, 1869.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from your Imperial Highness, dated the 2nd instant, informing me of the steps taken for the satisfactory settlement of the questions arising out of the Yang-chow disturbances. I have also received a full report from Consul Medhurst; and the satisfactory nature of the settlement effected is, I conceive, a subject of congratulation for both countries.

I should not, in view of this result, have been disposed to return to the original grounds of complaint, had not your Imperial Highness taken exception to certain steps adopted by Mr. Consul Medhurst, as unnecessary, and not at all in accord with a desire to

consolidate the friendly relations between the two countries, which I feel bound to show were not only justifiable and expedient, but necessary, under the circumstances.

It is objected that Mr. Medhurst thought it necessary to insist upon a material guarantee for the due performance of any engagements entered into, and further, that he took ships of war with him to the city of Yang-chow, and landed with 300 men from the crews of the ships when he took up his temporary residence there.

To these objections I have to reply, that when the Consul first visited Nanking to make appeal to his Excellency Tseng Kwo-fan, Governor of the two provinces, and Superintendent of the southern ports, he proceeded there in one of Her Majesty's ships as was fitting when so employed, and received assurances that his demands for redress should be promptly and satisfactorily met.

He proceeded at once to Yang-chow for the purpose of seeing to the fulfilment of these promises, and found the Prefect and Chih-hsien only, bent on delusive proceedings, and screening offenders.

Seeing the hopelessness of obtaining any effective justice or redress at their hands, he returned to Nanking to make a further representation to the Governor, when unfortunately the Commander of the ship falling sick, she sailed for Shanghae, leaving the Consul behind to prosecute the negotiations. What was the result? His Excellency Tseng Kwo-fan, under pretext of pressing business, refused to grant another interview; and with a contemptuous disregard of all previous engagements and promises, simply offered 1,000 taels, instead of the compensation demanded for losses and injuries inflicted on the missionaries; not offered indeed as a compensation, but rather as a dole of charity. The whole of the proceeding, and the tone of the Governor's official communication, was an insult to the Consul of the Power he represented.

The Consul finding he was not listened to, and being thus insultingly dismissed as it were, returned to his post at Shanghae, and reported to me, as in duty bound, the whole affair.

I lost no time in personally making these circumstances known to your Imperial Highness, and the other Ministers of the Yamên, and received the assurance that justice should be done, and orders transmitted without delay to the Governor of the two Provinces to appoint a Commissioner of fitting rank, with full powers to inquire into all the facts, in concert with Mr. Medhurst, and afford redress.

Warned by the ill-success of the Consul's previous efforts, and the treatment he had experienced, I deemed it necessary that he should be accompanied by a squadron of Her Majesty's ships to attest, and plainly mark the importance attached to his mission, and afford him whatever material support and protection might be required while engaged in carrying out his instructions.

Can it be said after the experience of bad faith, and contemptuous neglect with which he had been treated, more especially by his Excellency Tseng Kwo-fan, from the moment the ship of war left him on the previous occasion, that the Consul was not justified, on his second mission, in requiring from that officer some material guarantee for a more satisfactory result?

The demand was a necessary result of the proceedings of the high authorities at Nanking, which divested mere promises or assurances of all value, and destroyed confidence in the good faith of those who made them. It was not desirable that the same comedy should be played over again, of promises made only to be broken as soon as the squadron and Consul should take their departure; and the Consul had instructions not to leave until a satisfactory settlement was effected, with adequate guarantees for the execution of any engagements entered into. If there was anything objectionable or distasteful to the high authorities in the course taken of laying an embargo on the steamer, his Excellency Tseng Kwo-fan brought it upon himself by his previous conduct, and is alone to blame. As to the Consul's proceeding to Yang-chow with two small vessels, and landing a strong guard while he remained in the city, so far from its ill-according with a desire to consolidate friendly relations between the two countries, and a peaceable solution of the existing differences, I cannot help thinking it was the best possible guarantee for both. The real source of danger in all these cases lies in the supineness or connivance of the local authorities with those who are plotting violence and mischief against inoffensive foreigners; and the impunity which those disturbers of the peace are assured of in advance. The Consul could feel little confidence in a populace that so recently had nearly torn in pieces, and tried to burn alive a whole mission of defenceless men, women, and children, causing personal injury to three of the number (two of them women), as has since been conclusively established by medical examination and trustworthy evidence, and quite as little confidence in local authorities who in spite of all appeals for protection and ten days

warning that men of mark among the literati and gentry were plotting against their lives, and stirring the mob to acts of violence, allowed their culminating outrages to be perpetrated under their immediate jurisdiction, and almost under their eyes.

Had any insult or violence been offered to the Consul while engaged on this mission, it would have been so serious an offence as to render it difficult to maintain amicable relations, and thus have given rise to new complications. The event, I think, satisfactorily proved that the best way to secure peace on the part of the people of Yang-chow, was to be prepared to resist and punish violence.

Your Imperial Highness' observations on some other points cannot be passed over in silence. It is stated that, as reported to you no doubt, there was no foundation for the charges against any of the literati and gentry, whereas, on the contrary, the Consul was convinced the principal offender, one Koh, who was nowhere to be found, had hid himself for no other reason than his consciousness of guilt, and his knowledge that he could be identified by his accusers as having incited the mob. And it is one of the few points yet remaining in the engagements entered into by the authorities at Nanking that this individual shall be produced within two months and confronted with the evidence against him, to the strict fulfilment of which I must draw your Imperial Highness' attention. All the more so, that I am satisfied it is to the assured impunity members of this class habitually enjoy, through the connivance of those who are in office, whenever they incite the inhabitants to acts of violence against foreigners, that these dangerous outbreaks and disturbances are mainly due. If all the literati and gentry were, on the contrary, convinced that swift punishment would follow their misdeeds in this direction, notwithstanding any rank or influence, they would very soon cease to be disturbers of the peace.

The communication of your Imperial Highness closes with a request that I will notify the missionaries residing in the various provinces not to provoke troubles. As a class, I think it must be known all over China that British missionaries are peaceable subjects, offering no offence or provocation to any one, and seeking only to do good to all men. Until some evidence is before me, therefore, that they do not attend to their own proper calling, which is one of peace and good-will, but provoke troubles, I have no grounds for such a notification, and should not be justified in assuming that they required admonishment, or that their conduct laid them open to animadversion. At Yang-chow the vile charges brought against them of murdering children and other crimes were manifestly got up by persons only desirous of rousing the passions of the people against them, and who knew such charges had no shadow of foundation. If otherwise, why did they not produce their evidence in the Court, and establish the guilt of the parties accused? The crime of the local authorities was the greater, therefore, in allowing such libellous reports and placards to be circulated against innocent men and women without an effort to put down and punish all such calumniators, and still less effectually to protect the defenceless strangers trusting to the protection of the laws under their jurisdiction. If peace is to be maintained between the two countries, and friendly relations consolidated, it is essential that all the provincial authorities should be compelled to adopt a different line of conduct in future, and show more respect to Treaty rights and obligations.

I can only trust that your Imperial Highness will see the necessity of this, and enforce a like conviction on the minds of all those in authority throughout the provinces. But more especially does this seem needful in regard to the high officers. If his Excellency Tseng Kwo-fan, when Consul Medhurst first appealed to him for justice on the 11th September, had instituted a searching inquiry into the conduct of the Prefect and Chih-hsien and all concerned in the disturbances, with a sincere desire to arrive at the truth and do justice, there can be no doubt he would have arrived as easily and certainly then, as two months later, on the second visit of the Consul, at the conclusions he notified in his despatch to Mr. Medhurst on the 24th of the 9th month (8th November, 1868), that all the demands made by the British authorities from the beginning were just and reasonable, and should be conceded, and that the Prefect and Chih-hsien had alike failed in their duty and should be removed.

What was acknowledged by his Excellency Tseng Kwo-fan to be right, and a simple act of justice, in November, must have been equally so in September, when first the facts were laid before him; and it was no less obviously incumbent on a high authority in his Excellency's position to do justice at once, instead of denying it until the Consul was sent a second time with a squadron to obtain redress; for whatever danger of future complications there may have been in the interval at Chin-kiang and elsewhere, and of appearance of pressure and coercion in the end, it is manifest that his Excellency the Governor of the Two Provinces was solely and absolutely responsible. It was in his power to have prevented both. It was his duty under the Treaty to have done so, and I cannot help thinking he must now see it would have been his interest also, as it very certainly would

have been in the interests of peace and in accordance with a desire which should animate the authorities of both nations to consolidate existing friendly relations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 11.

The Rev. J. Taylor to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Yang-chow, December* 28, 1869.

PERMIT me to express, on behalf of myself, and those associated with me, our grateful appreciation of the measures your Excellency has taken, which have so successfully issued in our reinstatement in Yang-chow. We desire also to thank you for the indemnity procured for us, and those natives who suffered with us, and for the valuable proclamations obtained from the local and provincial authorities. And we feel the more grateful for these measures, because they will facilitate, as we believe, not only our work in Yang-chow, Chin-kiang, and Nanking, but Christian missions generally throughout the interior of China.

We trust that your Excellency will have the satisfaction of seeing great and permanent advantage accrue to British interests from the important and decisive action taken.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HUDSON TAYLOR.

No. 12.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received April 23.)

(Extract.) *Peking, February* 11, 1869.

YOUR Lordship will have already received Mr. Medhurst's despatch from Shanghae of the 26th of January, reporting the arrest of Ko-li, one of two literary graduates inculpated as principals in provoking the outrages on the missionaries at Yang-chow.

I have approved the steps taken by Mr. Medhurst for the identification and the ultimate punishment of the prisoner, as will be seen by the inclosed copy of a despatch of this date, and at the same time directed him to deduct from the 6,000 taels now in his hands as a security, or otherwise secure, the additional compensation which I am satisfied is fairly due to the three persons injured, from the medical certificates already forwarded, after examination of the injuries.

In my letter to the Prince of Kung, a copy of which is inclosed in my despatch of the 4th instant,* communicating this decision under the power reserved to me by Mr. Medhurst's agreement with the high authorities at Nanking, I have stated the principles laid down in your Lordship's despatch of the 1st of December, that the local authorities should be compelled, out of their own resources, to make ample compensation to the sufferers wherever, as in this case, they were clearly responsible for the mischief which ensued.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Peking, February* 14, 1869.

WITH reference to my despatch of 11th December, directing you to press a further claim of 1,500 taels, in compensation for the members of Mr. Taylor's mission injured by the mob at Yang-chow, and the application of the Taoutae inclosed in your despatch of the 26th ultimo, for the return of the sum of 6,000 taels lodged with you as a security for the fulfilment of the engagements entered into with you at Nanking, I now inclose you copy of an official communication I have made to his Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung on the subject.†

You will see that I have stated and consider the further claim of 1,500 taels justly due from the permanent nature of the injuries received; and that I have instructed you to

* See No. 11.

† See "China Papers, No. 3 (1869)," Inclosure 15 in No. 18.

demand it as strictly in accordance with the power reserved to me when you fixed the smaller sum, subject to my ulterior decision.

I have further, in accordance with the instructions conveyed in a recent despatch from Lord Stanley, intimated that I held the local authorities at Yang-chow to be responsible for the amount, by reason of their neglect of duty. And, under these circumstances, I have suggested that the said 1,500 taels should, in the first instance, be deducted by you from the 6,000 taels now in your hands, leaving it to the proper authorities to recover the amount from those held accountable for the Imperial or Provincial Treasury.

I trust you will have no difficulty in giving effect to these instructions; but as there is no time to receive any answer from His Imperial Highness before the courier leaves, you will, I think, do well to pay only the balance, 4,500 taels, back to the Taoutae pending the arrival of such answer, and lodging the 1,500 taels in the Oriental Bank until the question is finally determined between the Prince and myself, stating in your vindication that such are your instructions.

Your, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

No. 13.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 26, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 4th of February, reporting the settlement of the questions arising out of the missionary troubles at Yang-chow-foo.

The opinion of Her Majesty's Government on those matters has already been conveyed to you in my despatch of the 14th of January.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* See "China Papers, No. 2 (1869)," No. 18.

CHINA. No. 10 (1869).

Further Correspondence respecting the Attack on British Protestant Missionaries at Yang-chow-foo, August 1868.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1869.

[*Price 3d.*]

LONDON:
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Correspondence respecting the Attack on British Protestant Missionaries at Yang-chow-foo, August 1868.

No. 1.

Consul Medhurst to Lord Stanley.—(*Received October* 18.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, August* 27, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch to his Excellency Her Majesty's Minister, dated to-day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, August* 27, 1868.

I REGRET to have to report the commission of a most serious outrage upon the persons and property of certain British Missionaries resident at Yang-chow-foo, about twelve miles north of Chin-kiang. I have not yet received any official particulars of what took place, but the reports which have come down, and which are confirmed by a hurried note from Mr. Assistant Allen, state that a mob headed by the literati attacked and set on fire the premises in which the missionary families resided; that the onslaught was sudden and severe; that the children and ladies had to be thrown out of the windows to save their lives; one gentleman had his eye knocked out; and that the whole of the party have been more or less injured. It is rumoured, moreover, that the attack was threatened for more than ten days before it occurred, and that the authorities took no pains whatever to avert the damage until the missionaries had been actually ejected, when a guard was given to escort them to Chin-kiang.

I propose to proceed to Chin-kiang at once, and I have requested the Viceroy at Nanking to depute an official of sufficient standing to meet me there for the purpose of proceeding with myself to Yang-chow, and holding a formal investigation into the circumstances of the case.

Further particulars of my proceedings shall be duly reported.

A copy of this despatch has gone direct to the Foreign Office.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 2.

Acting Vice-Consul Forrest to Lord Stanley.—(*Received November* 1.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, September* 8, 1868.

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Medhurst's despatch of the 27th ultimo, forwarding a copy of his despatch of the same date to Her Britannic Majesty's Minister, I have

the honour to inclose copies of his despatches dated Chin-kiang, the 31st of August and 3rd of September respectively, with their several inclosures, containing a further report on the circumstances connected with the recent outrage on British missionaries at Yang-chow-foo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. J. FORREST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Chin-kiang, August* 31, 1868.

IN my despatch dated Shanghae, 27th August, 1868, I reported that I was on the point of proceeding to Chinkiang for the purpose of inquiring into the circumstances connected with a serious outrage, which report said had been committed upon the persons and property of some British missionaries residing at Yang-chow, a large city not far from this port; and that I had requested the Viceroy of Nanking to depute an officer to meet me here, and to assist me in investigation.

I arrived here accordingly last night; and this morning I interrogated the missionaries most carefully in respect to the part they had in the affair. The accompanying copy of a statement, with an affidavit, which they then made before me, will suffice to put your Excellency in possession of all the facts of the case.

The following significant inferences may, I think, be drawn from the accounts so given:—

1. That the attack was entirely unprovoked;
2. That it was instigated by the literati and gentry generally;
3. That the outrage was distinctly premeditated, and occupied time in being put into execution;
4. That the local authorities took no pains whatever to prevent or put down the excitement, notwithstanding that they were warned of the possible *émeute*, and repeatedly and courteously appealed to for protection;
5. That when the rage of the mob had been permitted to take its course, and after protection had been tardily accorded, they actually threatened the victims to leave them to their fate, unless they recorded it as their opinion that the attack partook of the nature of a simple disturbance, punishable as far as the actors in it were concerned, with the cangue; and—
6. That since the affair took place, the authorities have done nothing towards expressing their disapprobation of the conduct of the ringleaders. These facts impart to the whole affair such a very serious character, that I have decided upon proceeding to Yang-chow myself, whether the Viceroy's deputy makes his appearance or not, and endeavouring to procure the condign punishment of all persons known to have been concerned; to require reasonable compensation for the sufferers; and to cause proclamations to be issued which shall insure their future immunity from molestation. Should I fail in securing these objects, I propose to carry the whole case to his Excellency Tsêng Kwo-fan himself; and in that event I shall ask for the degradation and punishment of the Chefu and Chih-hsien.

Such are the plans I at present propose to myself; and I have communicated them, together with a copy of the affidavit, to Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer, who I have no doubt will see the necessity of supporting my action by his presence and co-operation. I trust I shall have your Excellency's approval of my conduct thus far.

I am happy to be able to report, that Mr. Assistant Allen, the moment that he received reports of the danger to which the missionaries were being subjected, most energetically hastened to their assistance, and recorded a personal protest with the authorities against their pusillanimous and culpable conduct. They endeavoured to excuse themselves from all direct blame, and showed him a proclamation which had just been issued, assuring him, moreover, that the house was already being repaired, and that the perpetrators of the outrage should all be punished. But he observed no signs of any honest intention to fulfil these pledges, and having no power to insist further, he returned to Chinkiang. A translation of the proclamation is inclosed herewith; and it will be seen with what culpable lenity the entire affair is treated. I have expressed my full approval of Mr. Allen's conduct.

I also have the honour to inclose a translation of a document which is of interest in connection with this affair. It purports to be a letter written by a man at Yang-chow to

a friend in Shanghae, and apparently was never intended for the eye of a foreigner. It curiously corroborates the statement made by Mr. Taylor, that the literati were instigators of the attack, and influenced the local authorities against the foreigners.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Statement, with Affidavit, made by Missionaries from Yang-chow.

APPEARED before me, Walter H. Medhurst, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, Shanghae, on Monday, August 31, 1868, at the Consulate Office, Chinkiang, James Hudson Taylor, George Duncan, William Rudland, and Henry Reid, members of the China Inland Mission, who did collectively and individually make oath and say, that the following particulars of an outrage committed on them and their families at Yang-chow are to the best of their knowledge and belief strictly true, as witness their several hands, the day and date above set forth.

(Signed) J. HUDSON TAYLOR.
GEORGE DUNCAN.
WILLIAM RUDLAND.
HENRY REID.

STATEMENT of circumstances connected with an outrage committed on the China Inland Mission at Yang-chow, on the 22nd and 23rd of August, 1868.

It is now more than a fortnight since I was informed that there had been a meeting of some of the literary and military Siu-tsai, when it was determined to stir up the people by agitating reports "yao-yen," and thus to eject us from Yang-chow. I endeavoured to quiet the fears of my informant, one of the agents or middlemen who had assisted me in renting the house there; but from that time we were frequently annoyed, and sometimes endangered by the throwing of stones at and into our windows. Adopting every means in our power to prevent disturbance, we quietly proceeded with the repairs of the premises and hoped the best.

Ere long small anonymous handbills in manuscript were posted up, and the people began to be very troublesome, but by patiently endeavouring to pacify them, we succeeded in avoiding any outbreak. These handbills proving insufficient to effect the malignant purpose of their authors, larger ones (nearly a yard long) were posted up, calling us brigands of the religion of Jesus, stating that we scooped out the eyes of the dying, opened foundling hospitals to eat the children, cut open pregnant women (for the purpose of making medicine of the infants), &c. This roused the people so much that, though we were able to prevent a riot by taking our stand at the door of the premises and arguing all day with them as they assembled, I felt it incumbent on me to write to the Prefect, and request him to take such steps as appeared to him requisite. I wrote, inclosing a copy of the anonymous placard, on Friday, August 14, as follows:—

(*Vide* Chinese Inclosure 1.)

"J. H. Taylor, Director of the China Inland Mission, to his Excellency the Prefect Sun.

"Some time ago I had the honour to receive a copy of a Proclamation, for which I beg to thank you. Having been pressed with business, and ill (not having yet fully recovered), I have not called to thank you in person. For this omission I beg your forgiveness. At the commencement of this month I rented a house in the Kiung-hua-kuan Street, under your Excellency's jurisdiction, which house is now being repaired. Rude persons and soldiers continually disobeyed your Proclamation, and day by day came to the house, wandering about, amusing themselves, and acting most indecorously. Some of them insisted on going upstairs, and, regardless that there were females there, entered the rooms, and went hither and thither with the greatest boldness and impudence. (Being ill myself) I directed persons to remonstrate with them as to the impropriety of such conduct, but without effect.

"At the present time there are persons spreading unfounded 'yao-yen' containing many scandals. Moreover these are written in large characters on yellow paper, and placarded about in every direction, with the object of making them universally known, if

so be that foolish people believing them, may be collected into a mob and make trouble. What should be done under these circumstances? I now inclose a copy of these 'yao-yen,' the only object of my petition being to beg your Excellency to adopt some mode of repressing them, so as to frustrate their insidious purpose and prevent their their spreading further; thus peace may be preserved. For matters are in such a state that, if they are not stringently prohibited, most assuredly we shall suffer great injury. Therefore I beg beforehand to apprize your Excellency, and again venture to trouble you.

"May I request the favour of a reply.

"With many compliments, &c."

The Prefect promised an answer, which we received on the following day, Saturday, August 15, as follows:—

(*Vidè* Chinese Inclosure 2.)

"A short time ago I received your letter, and made myself fully acquainted with the whole matter. The Yang-chow people have long been frivolous and capricious. Have you informed the Che-heen of your having rented the house. I have not heard him refer to it. The Yang-chow people are very mixed, and like to make trouble, and the local authorities can only put out proclamations commanding and prohibiting, they have not the power to take each man in hand individually and stop him. Since I have learned these things from your letter, you can wait and I will command the Che-heen to put out proclamations, in accordance with the Ch'ang-chin Tao's despatch prohibiting these things.

"In the meantime I send this reply, with salutations, &c."

The same day some of the better disposed people forewarned us that a riot might be expected on the morrow, and advised our immediately adopting every precaution to avoid collision with the people. We at once built up as many of the entrances to the house as possible, and placing two large chairs across the passage which leads from the street to the house, two of us seated ourselves in them, and so closed the way. A crowd of from 100 to 200 persons was assembled, and from time to time we addressed them with the effect of preventing any actual breach of the peace. Moreover we had, a few days before, engaged two of the Tepao's assistants as doorkeepers, who were of some help in soothing the people.

When Sunday came we found the need of all these preparations. From morning till night we had to keep our post at the entrance. It was clear that the attempts to enrage the mob emanated from the respectably dressed persons who from time to time came among them; but our knowledge of what they were saying enabled us at once to answer their remarks. Two or three times there were decided attempts to break into the house, and the windows were frequently assailed with stones and brickbats; but by persuasion and avoiding any appearance of fear or attempt at retaliation, we constrained the majority of the mob to admit, however unwillingly, that right was on our side.

During this day, Sunday 16th, a new placard was freely posted about, more vile and irritating than the previous ones, commencing:—"What a beast is this Jesus whose venom has reached to China." It concluded with a notification that on the 1st day of the 7th moon, the local examination day (the graduates meet for examination in Yangchow on the 1st and 15th of the month), the graduates and people would meet on the exercise ground, and thence come to our house and burn it down, when all, natives and foreigners, would be destroyed indiscriminately.

On Monday the crowding was much less, and we availed ourselves of the lull to circulate a number of handbills showing the foolishness of the slanders, and explaining that we could not at once throw the doors open and let in the people to view the premises for themselves on account of the danger there might be of the falling of scaffolding, and of unfinished walls, &c., but that in two or three weeks time, when the repairs were finished, we would ask them to come again. This seemed to have a beneficial effect, and though there was great crowding all Tuesday, 1st of 7th moon, and several attempts were made by literary men to stir up the mob, especially by Si-i-tsai of the name Kuh, no further damage was done than the injuring of some of the window-shutters and roof, by the missiles hurled at the house from the back. On Wednesday, August 19th, as no public steps had been taken to repress the disorders, I again wrote to the Prefect, as follows:—

(*Vide* Chinese Inclosure 3.)

"Matters being most urgent, I beg you to excuse the absence of complimentary expressions.

"A few days ago I received your reply referring to the light and frivolous disposition of the Yang-chow people, and their fondness for making trouble, and stating that I was to wait until the Che-heen should issue prohibitory proclamations in accordance with the despatch of the Taotae of the Chang-chow and Chin-chiang district.

"Up to the present time I have not seen any steps to repress [these agitators]. Therefore the people are the more daring and fearless, daily crowding about the door, creating the utmost disturbance, evidently intending, and before long, to make trouble.

"It is not because I am alarmed that I come again to cry 'Danger;' what I feel anxious about is this, should loss of life ensue what then will be the consequences? May I beg your serious attention to this question? I came here to propagate religion in accordance with the will of the Emperor as given in the Treaty of Commerce and Amity; ought I then to be subjected to such insult? I request you to refer to the Articles of the Treaty, which state that British subjects are permitted to buy ground and build chapels in the interior, and furthermore are allowed in every place, at their own convenience, to travel without detention, molestation, or hindrance. And that in case of need they may with confidence look for protection, and aid at any time," &c. It is on this ground that I venture to trouble you again. Yesterday a resident of the city, well known to the Tepao, of the family name of Thuh, came to the gate making a disturbance, and to my face falsely charged me with scooping out peoples' eyes, eating the brains and marrows of infants, imprisoning men in pits [for eating], and with loud shouts threatened ere many days were passed to collect a mob and come and beat and destroy us! * using most extravagant language. To this the Constable Lin Pian can bear witness. I would therefore respectfully pray your Excellency to send officers to arrest him, and put a stop to his violence, in order to quiet the streets and lanes, which will indeed be a matter for thankfulness. Wherefore, &c."

To this note the following reply was sent by the Prefect in the afternoon of the same day.

(*Vide* Chinese Inclosure 4.)

"A respectful reply. I received your letter, and have acquainted myself with the whole matter. The Yang-chow people are of various dispositions, and are light and easily moved. From your former letter I understood that for several days past the streets were full of placards posted anonymously and spreading 'yao-yen.' I have already privately sent men to make enquiry and arrest for adjudication; and have directed the two Chih-hsien together to put out proclamations. But persons who get up this kind of report and placard generally do it in the dark; and without either name or surname, it is not easy for me in a short time to lay hold on them. You, coming here in accordance with the treaty to spread your religion are entitled to timely protection and aid; and the Prefect and Magistrates ought to obey the Taotae and issue prohibitory proclamations. Further I have already commanded officers to investigate until they have clear evidence; in accordance with which I will deal with the matter. As to the man known to the Tepao, who dared to make disturbance at your door, I will instantly send for and examine him, and issue warning proclamations. In the mean time I send you this reply; wishing, &c."

Subsequent to the receipt of this, I was informed that the Prefect, finding the man Khu was a graduate, did not send for him, but advised the Huoh Lau Sz to prevent the graduate from making any more trouble, and I concluded that this was in consequence of the representations Mr. Allen had made in Chinkiang. For it was evident that though the Prefect would write a polite note, he feared the unpopularity of taking any decided steps in our favour.

Matters continued to look better until August 22nd. On that day two of the foreign residents in Chinkiang spent a few hours in Yang-chow, and found the city quiet. Their visit would appear to have suggested another excuse for a riot. In the exercise grounds and tea houses, and along the streets a rumour was industriously circulated that more foreigners had come, and that 24 children were missing. I first became aware of danger about 4 P.M., when one of the servants came running into the house, and asked me to come out at once, as both the inner and outer gate had been burst open, and a crowd was already in the premises. Losing no time I went and found it was indeed so, but succeeded in getting them out, and in stationing two of our number at the end of the entrance lane as before, while the gates were repaired by the carpenters then working on the premises. A little later the people began to pelt those sitting at the door, a thing not attempted before. At dark instead of going home the rioters became more [illegible]arious. We sent at intervals two messengers to the Prefect, but they neither,

* This man is a Siu-tsai; the Tepao dare not give me his full name.

returned themselves, nor did any aid come. The attack became general, some of the shutters were dashed in from behind, part of the back garden wall was pulled down, and it was evident that without help we could not long keep the people out. Mr. Duncan and I determined therefore to endeavour to make our way through the mob, and go in person to the Prefect, as there was no hope of Chinese messengers reaching him. Passing through a neighbour's house, and knowing a private way leading towards the Yamên, we succeeded in eluding the rioters about the door, but when we reached the main street we were at once recognised, and severely pelted with stones and brickbats, and but for the protection afforded by the darkness should scarcely have reached the Yamên. The Men-fang were closing the gates as we approached, alarmed by the yells of the people behind us, but the crowd came up, and closing upon us, the as yet unbarred gate gave way to the pressure, and we were precipitated into the entrance-hall. We were taken to the room of the Sz-yie, and kept waiting about three-quarters of an hour before we had an audience; all the time hearing the yells of the mob, a mile or more off, destroying, for ought we knew, not only the property, but possibly the lives of those most dear to us. And when at last we did get an audience, it was almost more than we could bear with composure to be interrogated as to what we really did with the babies; whether it was true that we had bought them, and how many; what was really the cause of all this rioting, &c. At last I told his Excellency that the real cause of all this trouble was his own neglect in not taking measures when the matter was small and manageable; that I must now request him first to take steps to repress the riot and save any of our friends who might still be alive; and afterwards make such enquiries as he might wish, or I would not answer for the result. "Ah," said he, "very true, very true; first quiet the people and then enquire. Sit still, I will go and see what can be done."

He went out telling us to remain, as the only chance of his effecting anything depended on our keeping out of sight; for by this time the number of rioters amounted to 8,000 or 10,000 (the natives estimated them at 20,000). We were kept in the torture of suspense for about two hours, when the Prefect returned with the Ts'an-fu, and told us that all was quiet now, that the Ts'an-fu and himself the Show-pe, and two Hsien, had been in person to the scene of the disturbance; and that they had seized several of those who were plundering the premises and would have them punished. He then sent chairs for us, and we returned under escort. On the way back we were told that all the foreigners were killed, and when we reached the house the scene was such as baffled all description; here a pile of half-burnt reeds showed where one of the attempts to set the house on fire had been made; there débris of a broken wall were to be seen; and strewn everywhere were the remains of boxes, and furniture, scattered papers and letters, broken work-boxes, writing-desks, dressing-cases, surgical instrument cases, smouldering remains of valuable books, &c., but no trace of inhabitants within. It was some time ere I was able to learn that they had escaped, and then it was not easy to ascertain where they were. At last I found them in the house of one of the neighbours under the care of the Kan-tseuen-hsien. On hearing from him that he considered it safe to remove them into the house, I took them back again, and was then informed of what had transpired during our absence.

It would seem that, had the Prefect sent help at once, no harm would have been done, and it is difficult to avoid the conviction that he intentionally avoided it in order to allow time for a sufficient amount of disturbance to make us afraid to remain in the city. After we left, Messrs. Reid and Rudland kept the doors and entrances as long as possible, determined only to retire from point to point as actually compelled, and hoping to retard the progress of the rioters until help might arrive. While they were keeping the people out at the front door, a wall that had been built to close up a side door was pulled down, and they had to retire to a nearer point. In the meantime the windows of the main building continued to be assailed with showers of stone, and the walls at the back were broken through. Mr. Rudland therefore went to try and keep the people at bay there. The hope of plunder being evidently more promising behind the house, and all means of defence being absent, the mob concentrated their efforts in that direction, and the front of the premises was left comparatively open. When Mr. Reed was aware of this he left the servants in charge at the front, and joined Mr. Rudland in the main building, the latter going upstairs, while Mr. Reid remained below. The rioters had already made two entrances into the house, but had not ventured in. It was not long, however, before the bolder of them did so, destroying the furniture downstairs, and taking off whatever of value they were able to remove. Soon, some of them went upstairs, and commenced pillaging the bedrooms. Resistance was out of the question, and they at once began to carry off boxes, &c., and to rifle the heavier cases and drawers. At the same time those below were kindling fires, the smoke of which was almost stifling upstairs; shortly,

Mr. Reid, from the Court below, in a hollow, hoarse voice, as if utterly exhausted, called out, "Mrs. Taylor, come down if you can, they are setting the house on fire, and I cannot help you." By means of sheets and blankets and Mr. Rudland's aid, Mrs. Rudland, our head printer's young wife Ansing, and one of my children, were let down from the projecting roof under the window of the bedroom, where all were now collected. At this point a man came into the room, and Mrs. Taylor expostulated with him, asking him if he were not ashamed to molest women and children, and succeeded in keeping him parleying for a short time; meanwhile, a little Chinese girl and my two younger boys were let down by Mr. Rudland. Our nurse (Mrs. Bohannon) made her way down the stairs with the baby, by following closely a man who was running off with a box, and then rushing through the fire at the bottom of the stairs escaped to the front. The man mentioned above, felt about and searched the persons of the ladies, taking money from Miss Blatchley, a pocket and hair ornament from Miss Desgraz, and her wedding-ring from Mrs. Taylor. The smoke was now thickening, and the noise of falling walls, of the stones thrown in at the windows, and the increasing yells of the mob were truly alarming. Miss Desgraz was let down by the blanket; but then some burning materials were thrown just underneath the window to prevent others being saved. The same man who had robbed the ladies twice attempted to kill Mr. Rudland, and would certainly have succeeded but for the interposition of Mrs. Taylor and Miss Blatchley. Mr. Reid (who had several times been obliged to escape and hide from his assailants) called to them from below that there was not a moment to loose; they must jump down from the roof (from 12 to 15 feet), and he would catch them. He was able somewhat to break Mrs. Taylor's fall, and then a brickbat struck his eye and blinded him, disabling him from assisting Miss Blatchley, who fell upon the stones. While prostrate and helpless upon the ground, almost stunned by the fall and by the injuries they had sustained, showers of missiles were hurled at them. Mr. Rudland dropped himself from the roof and was immediately assaulted with a club, but escaped with bruises, and assisted the others to flee, leaving the house at the mercy of the rioters. Those who had escaped from the house earlier had been concealed under the "liang ting" in the garden, and when all were down they were able to make their way into one of their neighbour's houses in the same compound, as all the rioters were busy at the back of the building, and had left the front free for the time being.

It was past midnight when we returned to the house. A guard of soldiers and some men from the mandarins kept watch through the night. But, when they left at dawn, there were none appointed to relieve them, and the people soon began to re-collect. We were able to keep them out of the premises only for a short time, for now there were five entrances, and the plunder of the preceding evening had whetted the appetite of the people. I had again to go the Prefect and request aid. He did not see me himself, but sent for the Kan-tsuen-hsien, who told me that it was not safe for any of the members of our party to leave the city now; but that if I would write a letter to the Prefect, stating that we were not the parties who had bought children, and without entering into particulars, but simply calling the riot of last night a disturbance, would ask for redress, the Prefect would send this letter to him, and he would put several persons into the cangue, and issue proclamations to quiet the people. "Thus," said he, "we may hope before night to have comparative peace restored. And by to-morrow if you wish to send away the wounded and the females, you can do so with safety, either going yourself, or remaining behind as you deem best." He returned with me to the house, where I found another wall broken down, and further loss and destruction of property. Matters had looked even worse than the night before. At this time the premises in front as well as behind were filled with the crowd, leaving no way of escape; but on this I need not now enlarge, as no personal injuries were sustained, though several were struck with missiles and sticks. I at once wrote to the Prefect, entering somewhat, though not fully, into detail, as I judged that the note might perhaps be used as an evidence against us, to prove that after all the riot had not been a serious one. The following is a translation of the letter:—

(*Vide* Chinese Inclosure 5.)

"Excuse want of compliments, as matters are urgent. Yesterday evening countless multitudes of people really did assemble at our place to set the house on fire; happily, we were pitied and saved by our neighbours. [The mob] also destroyed our tables, chairs, and other furniture, and carried off cloths, dollars, hair ornaments, &c., to an extent not yet ascertained by us. They severely injured the eye of my countryman, Mr. Reid, beating many others; and all this because of "yao-yen" falsely charging me with roasting and eating children. I have never made a practice of opening foundling hospitals

[in our stations], and have never purchased a single infant; and yet have suffered such extraordinary ill-treatment. On what principles can such treatment as this be justified? I must look up to your Excellency and pray you to decide what is to be done. There are many other things, into which I cannot at present enter; but with saluation, &c."

This letter being enveloped and closed, I dispatched it by a messenger to the Prefect; but it was opened on the way by the Kan-tsuen-hsien, and returned to me as unsuitable. I went to him and pointed out that much as we might regret it, we could not alter the past; that he was at liberty to deal as leniently as he wished with the prisoners, but that truth must be told. He replied, "If you persist in sending that letter to the Prefect, I will go back and have nothing more to do with the matter. . You may protect yourselves as best you can, but I forewarn you that the lives of your party will probably be sacrificed." At his direction, therefore, and almost at his dictation, another letter was written as follows:—

(*Vide* Chinese Inclosure 6.)

"The people have wantonly spread 'yao-yen' falsely charging me with opening a foundling hospital, and secretly taking the infants and roasting and eating them, and not knowing that I have never opened any such institution have wantonly maligned me. In consequence, last night an immense mob came and were riotous and lawless in the extreme. The authorities have already taken several of the people, but have not yet punished them. Should the storm again burst forth great will be the injury, and, therefore, I hope your Excellency will quickly take these prisoners and beat them, and make them wear the cangue before our house, as a warning to the multitude, at the same time putting out proclamations to quiet the people. Thus peace and quiet may be happily attained.

"With salutations, &c."

This letter the Chih-hsien took away with him. He promised to make arrangements for our removal from the city, as he said he might be unable to protect us through the night. In the afternoon he engaged four boats, the requisite sedan chairs, and coolies for the undestroyed baggage, and sent us under escort to the south gate, whence on Monday morning we set out for Chinkiang. We had not travelled far when we met Mr. Allen on his way to Yang-chow, who saw for himself the condition of Mr. Reid, as he did afterwards the state of our house at Yang-chow.

I have omitted to state above, that the mob on Saturday night were reported to us to have been armed with knives and spears, as well as clubs.

The amount of our loss I have not yet been able to estimate. On Saturday night the Yang-chow-foo promised Mr. Duncan and myself to make good whatever the loss might be, and to have the house repaired for us. But on the following day the Chih-hsien informed us that we should not be allowed to return to the same premises.

The premises in which we lived were obtained with the knowledge, and partly through the intervention of Mr. Lay. He procured for us a letter of recommendation from the Taotae of Chin-kiang to the Chee-foo of Yang-chow, who eventually gave us a sealed proclamation authorizing our residence under Treaty in the city, and we thereupon succeeded in making an agreement for our premises: 200 dollars deposit was paid by us on taking possession, and a regular lease was drawn out and signed by witnesses. That lease has since been recorded in the Consulate at Chin-kiang.

The members of the Mission present on the occasion of the outrage were as follows:—

Mr. Taylor, Mr. Duncan, Mr. Reid, and Mr. Rudland; Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Rudland; Miss Degraz, Miss Blatchley, and Miss Annie Bohannon. Children four—Herbert Taylor, aged 8; Frederick Taylor, aged 6; Samuel Taylor, aged 4; Maria Taylor, aged 2.

There were also nineteen teachers and servants (native), male and female, on the premises, together with one child.

The whole of the foreigners were dressed in native costume.

During the whole time that the Mission has been stationed at Yang-chow, namely, since the first of June, 1868, every member of it has, to the best of his and her ability, avoided giving the slightest possible cause of offence to any of the people, and has borne with studied patience and endurance any casual insults which may have been offered from time to time. Even our missionary efforts had not commenced in any public shape, but had been entirely confined to personal conversation with visitors to the house. We had no arms or weapons of any kind in our possession from first to last.

(Signed) J. HUDSON TAYLOR,
Director, China Inland Mission.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Proclamation issued by the Prefect and Magistrate of Yang-chow on recent Outrage.

(Translation.)

A PROHIBITORY PROCLAMATION.

THE Prefect and Magistrate of Yang-chow have received the following communication from the English missionary, Mr. Taylor :—

The people have been disseminating false reports that the missionaries keep children in their house, and secretly boil and eat them, but the people know nothing of the matter, and there is really nothing of the sort done. Last night there was a countless crowd of people [round the house] creating a disturbance; and I beg that they may be punished, and a proclamation be issued to quiet the populace.

The Prefect and Magistrate therefore declare that the disorderly proceedings of the populace in the missionaries' house were exceedingly rude and ill-mannered, and they accordingly issue this prohibitory proclamation for the information of the people, forbidding them hereafter to create any disturbance at Mr. Taylor's house. If anything of the sort occurs, the offenders will be severely punished. Disobey not!

The proclamation to be posted in every street.

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

Note from Chiang Yuan, at Yang-chow, to a Friend at Shanghae.

(Translation.)

YOU must have received the letter I last wrote you.

On the 22nd August we had a great commotion (literally, "wave"). The country folks to the number of several thousands burned and completely sacked the houses of the Western missionaries: these barely escaped with life, and were escorted to Chin-kiang by the local authorities.

The cause of this was, that when these missionaries first came a rumour got about that the Tien-chu religionists (Roman Catholics) required men's brains for food. The people of the place were filled with fear and suspicion, and when on the 21st a foreigner was seen to go out of the south gate alone, with a basket, seemingly for the purpose of collecting something, the Magistrate of the Chiang-tu Hsien, was begged to have the place examined. Ten or more children's corpses were dug up, and were found to have been deprived, some of the heart, some of the eyes, and some of the brains. This greatly increased the excitement. (The people) had previously asked the opinion of the most prominent of the gentry. Yeu, formerly Viceroy of the two Kwang, gave it as his opinion that foreigners were very much afraid of the people, and that these had only to collect together, and beat the foreigners to get rid of them.

Li Futai, Wu Taoutae, and Pien Taoutae also held the same language. The people were so emboldened that the local authorities dared not refuse to come and examine (the corpses).

Now Yeu was a fellow-student of the present Viceroy's (literally, of the same year), Li was a pupil of the Viceroy's, and Wu an intimate friend of his father's; and they are all of one mind. My idea, then, is, that foreigners will not be able again to come to Yang-chow and set up a church; they will be killed as they come. If they were allowed to come to Yang-chow, salt trade would be much shackled (literally, pinioned by the arms). Some gossip would be sure to reach Peking if anything (*scil.*, wrong) were to be discovered about an affair so nearly concerning us, and no slight consequences would arise.

What has happened has greatly relieved people's minds; and no doubt you will also be pleased to hear it.

Even if foreigners do write to Nanking, the Viceroy will take no notice of their letters, as Yeu and Li will write him their joint views before they do.

With compliments from your stupid younger brother.

Dated August 23, 1868.

(Signed) CHIANG HUANG.

Note.—The envelope in which the above was forwarded to the Consulate was not the one in which the letter came from Yang-chow, if it did come from there at all. The address is, "To the honoured uncle on the mother's side," while the letter is subscribed as from a "Younger brother"—a form in use between persons in nowise related to each other, and which a nephew would never use to his uncle.

(Initialled) W. G. S.

Inclosure 5 in No. 2.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Chin-kiang, September* 3, 1868.

REFERRING to my letter dated the 31st of August last on the subject of the Yang-chow outrage, I regret to have to report that the Viceroy of Nanking has been induced by the misrepresentations of the Chih-fu to excuse himself from deputing an officer to accompany me to Yang-chow.

A copy and translation of his Excellency's communication on the subject is inclosed herewith, and it will be seen how plausible an account of the affair has been forwarded by the Yung-chow officials to Nanking, and to how ingenious a use they have put the letter, which was extorted from Mr. Taylor by the Kan-chuen-hsien. I have lost no time in endeavouring to disabuse the Viceroy's mind of the false impressions under which he appears to be labouring, and repeating my entreaty in urgent terms that a deputy may yet be commissioned to co-operate with me. A translation of my reply is inclosed herewith.

I regret to say that symptoms of a similar intolerant spirit are beginning to exhibit themselves amongst the Chinese inhabitants of this port. In June last this same Mr. Taylor rented a house within the walls of Chinkiang-foo, taking care to conduct the transaction in a plain and straightforward manner, and to record the lease, after execution and signature, with Mr. Assistant Allen. The neighbours, however, soon took exception to the introduction of a foreigner, and a pretext was at once got up to cancel the lease on the plea of its having been executed by only one branch of the family without the consent of the others. The matter thus came to the cognizance of the Hsien, who took the side of the malcontents, and had some of the parties to the lease arrested. (This Hsien is well known as the person who was dismissed from the Hsien-ship of Shanghae by Ting Futai for bribery and other mal practices in April or May of last year). Here Mr. Assistant Allen interfered and appealed to the Chefu (the Taoutae being absent) who promised that justice should be done, and that a proclamation should be issued by the Hsien in accordance with Treaty provisions. The result may be seen in the accompanying translation of a wordy and indiscreet proclamation by the Hsien, which has been most plentifully posted up all over the city. Many persons are of opinion that to the success which attended this effort at a port open to trade may be attributed the burst of ill-feeling at Yang-chow.

Just at this juncture of affairs I arrived at Chinkiang, and forthwith put myself in communication with the Taoutae. The proclamation I denounced as mendacious in its statements, and calculated to be most mischievous in its consequences; and I begged him to lose no time in causing another and better one to be issued in its place, as well as to secure Mr. Taylor peaceable possession of his property. The Taoutae took up the case in a very fair spirit; he examined himself into the character of the transaction, and the validity of the lease, requesting Mr. Taylor to appear in person and state his case, and he yesterday called to tell me he had decided that the house belonged to Mr. Taylor, and must be given up to him accordingly. He likewise promised that a draft of a proclamation of a more satisfactory character should be speedily submitted to me.

The Taoutae left the Consulate about 3 P.M., and appears to have immediately deputed the Chih Hsien to give effect to his decision. For towards dusk yesterday, I am informed, the Hsien having repaired to the spot was mobbed by an immense crowd who protested against the house being yielded up, and on his declaring that it was not his fault, but the Taoutae's, whose commands he was simply carrying out, the mob rushed to the Taoutae's Yamên, tore down his gates, forced their way into his judgment-hall, smashed some of his furniture, and openly accused him of traitorous collusion with the foreigners. Even the Hsien, I am told, reached his Yamên with his dress all bespattered with mud. The whole town is consequently in a state of excitement, and rumours are at this moment in circulation that this Consulate is to be the next point of attack this evening. Unfortunately the Taoutaes have taken upon themselves to interfere, the house in dispute being situated next door to one tenanted by one of the officials, and their resistance, as may be presumed, introduces a formidable element into the difficulty.

The Taoutae has sent a message begging me not to allow myself to be put out, and promising that he will endeavour to fulfil his promises, notwithstanding the demonstration, so I am in hopes to be able to carry my point yet. The anticipated arrival of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" this evening or to-morrow morning will tend materially to promote this desirable result. A successful assertion of Treaty rights here is likely to have a most favourable effect upon popular feeling at Yangchow, as the two cities

are connected by extensive trading relations, and numerous Yangchow families are permanently resident here.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 6 in No. 2.

The Viceroy, Tseng Kwo-fan, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *September* 2, 1868.

IN reply to your despatch on the subject of an outrage at Yang-chow, requesting me to depute an officer to proceed to that city and investigate the affair, I have to state that I am in receipt of a representation from the local authorities at Yang-chow, stating that the affair had been brought to a satisfactory conclusion; and this, corroborated by the facts that certain Consuls resident at Chin-kiang had proceeded to Yang-chow, and had found the house not to be burnt down, and that in a letter from Mr. Taylor to the local authorities no mention is made of personal injuries having been suffered.

From your having been at a distance, at Shanghae, you could not have been made acquainted with the aspect of affairs at the time the case was brought to an end; and I presume that when, on your arrival at Chin-kiang, you have had a personal interview with the Consuls who went to Yang-chow, you will satisfy yourself that there appears to be no grounds for a second inspection of the locality, and that there is no necessity for me to depute an officer to accompany you.

I may further remark that your despatch arrived at Nanking on the 30th of August between 9 and 11 in the forenoon; and as my officer could not arrive at the time (that day) you fixed, I have not sent him.

I append copy of the letter of Mr. Taylor to the Yang-chow authorities, for your information.

Note.—The letter alluded to above is the one extorted from Mr. Taylor by the Kan-chuan Hsien, and is No. 6 of those attached to his affidavit.

Inclosure 7 in No. 2.

Consul Medhurst to the Viceroy, Tseng Kwo-fan.

Sir, *Chin-kiang, September* 3, 1868.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's reply dated yesterday, from which I regret exceedingly to find that you do not consider it necessary to depute an officer to proceed with me to Yang-chow-foo.

Your Excellency appears to base this opinion upon the Chih-fu's assertion, to the effect that he has satisfactorily arranged the affair, and likewise upon a copy of Mr. Taylor's letter sent up by the Chih-fu, in which no mention is made of personal injuries having been sustained.

Unhappily, the Chih-fu's representation is entirely false. How can the affair be said to be settled when the missionaries' house has been plundered by an armed mob instigated by the gentry; when one of the missionaries has lost an eye; when two women in a pregnant condition have been so bruised and terrified that they are in a precarious condition; when all have been more or less beaten and bruised; when the missionaries have been driven from the city; when the very letter by Mr. Taylor, which your Excellency quotes, was extorted from him under threats of being sacrificed to the fury of the mob; when placards are even now issued, threatening any foreigner with death who may venture to return; and when the local authorities, in deference to the people, have designedly construed a case of organized plunder with violence and arson, into one of a simple street brawl? Surely your Excellency's sense of justice and reason, and your knowledge of what is due to foreigners under Treaty, cannot term this state of things a satisfactory settlement!

Be this as it may be, I have to acquaint your Excellency that I am now here at Chin-kiang, and am prepared to proceed to Yang-chow with an armed escort, if I can procure one, and without if I do not succeed, for the purpose of securing due redress

for the outrage which has been committed; and I have again to entreat you, forthwith, to depute a special officer to act with me so as to smooth the way to an amicable settlement of affairs. A further persistence on your Excellency's part to refuse compliance with the request will occasion me the more regret, because I foresee, from the aspect of affairs, that the Chih-fu has permitted the popular excitement to reach such a pitch that he will find extraordinary difficulty in retracing his steps, and giving me the redress I shall require. Should this prove to be the result, I shall have no other alternative but to request him to accompany me to Nanking, and there be accused by me to you in person upon most serious charges.

I may also add that prompt action is essential in this instance, as the success of the attack at Yang-chow has already begun to bear fruit in a very serious disturbance which occurred in this city last night in connection with the same subject—intramural residence of foreigners—an account of which will, no doubt, reach your ears this day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 8 in No. 2.

Proclamation of Wang, Magistrate of Tan-tu Hsien.

(Translation.)

WHEREAS instructions have been received by the magistrate from his Excellency the Taoutae to the following effect:—

I am informed by Mr. Allen, of Her Majesty's Consulate, that the British missionary, Mr. Taylor, has applied for a proclamation to protect him in case of any insult or obstruction being offered him by the soldiers or populace in consequence of his having rented, for missionary purposes, a house forming part of the Pao-chêng house, the private property of Hsia Lü-chih, within the city of Chin-kiang. The magistrate is directed to report whether the landlord applied for his approval, and whether any obstacles stand in the way of the house being so rented:

And whereas just as the investigation was going on, the widows Hsia (*née* Li, and Hsia, *née* Chiang) appeared and stated that the Pao-chêng house was the common property of them, and of Hsia Lu-chih, and Hsia Chih-to, that Hsia Lü-chih had mortgaged part of the house, secretly and without telling them, to a Christian; that they would by no means give their consent, and begged the magistrate to hear and determine the case. The magistrate then had all the parties summoned, when the two women repeated in their evidence what they had stated before, and positively re-asserted that they would not consent to lease their house to a foreigner. Hsia Lü-chih, on being confronted with them, deposed that the house in question was common property, and that in a moment of stupidity he had omitted to consult Hsia (*née* Li) and the rest, and had stealthily leased it to foreigners; that he was ready to return them the deposit he had received and cancel the lease, and allow them to rent another house:

And whereas by the Treaty the renting of houses from foreigners should depend on the mutual willingness of both parties, and this Pao-chêng house property, being the common property of four parties, is found to have been let to foreigners by Hsia Lü-chih secretly on his own authority and Hsia (*née* Li) and the rest will not give their consent, which they ought not to be constrained to give; the magistrate has directed the money received by Hsai Lü-chih to be returned to the foreigners who shall be at liberty to rent other premises, and has reported to this effect to his Excellency the Taoutae, for the information of Mr. Allen:

And whereas his Excellency the Prefect has given the magistrate directions, at the instance of Mr. Allen with reference to Mr. Taylor, to issue a proclamation to the people in the city to induce them to rent houses to Mr. Taylor:

And whereas the XIIth Article of the Treaty directs that British subjects, whether at the ports or at other places, "desiring to rent houses, shall make their agreement at the rates prevailing among the people, without exaction on either side:"

Wherefore this Proclamation is issued for the information of the inhabitants and the Tipaos. You are to know that from and after the date of this Proclamation, should foreigners desire to rent houses of you, and there be no obstacle or unwillingness on your part, you must make the agreement at the rates prevailing among the people as provided by Treaty, and you must make a true statement of the facts to the magistrate before the transfer is allowed to take place:

Should you be unwilling to rent to foreigners, you are at liberty to follow your inclinations, and no constraint can be used contrary to Treaty.

Obey with trembling! No disobedience! A special Proclamation.

No. 3.

Consul Medhurst to Lord Stanley.—(Received November 16.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, September 23, 1868.*

WITH reference to Mr. Forrest's despatch of the 8th instant, I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copies of my correspondence bearing on the recent outrage on British missionaries at Yang-chow-foo with his Excellency Her Majesty's Minister.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Nanking, September 15, 1868.*

IN continuation of my despatch dated the 3rd instant upon the subject of the Yang-chow outrage and the Chin-kiang difficulty, I have now the honour further to report as follows :—

Firstly, as regards Yang-chow, Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" made her appearance at Chin-kiang on the morning of Saturday the 5th, and Commander Bush at once made arrangements with me for proceeding to Yang-chow on the 7th, accompanied by an escort of about ninety men and a field-piece, in his own boats, towed by a small canal steamer, which Messrs. Jardine. Matheson and Co., of Shanghae, had been so courteous as to place at his entire disposal. As I thought it not by any means improbable that the sudden appearance of such a force before the gate of Yang-chow might induce the authorities and people to imagine that we had come with a hostile intent, and thus bring about a collision, I deemed it expedient before starting to forewarn the Chih-fu of our coming, and to explain its object, which I did in a letter, translation of which I have the honour to inclose.

The 7th September proved to be so rainy that we were compelled to put off our expedition until the following day, but that evening I received two communications, one from the Viceroy and the other from the Chih-sien of Yang-chow, written in the name of the Chih-fu. Copies with translations of both documents are appended. The one, as will be observed, informs me that the Viceroy had at last concluded upon deputing an officer to co-operate with me, and that he had instructed the authorities of Yang-chow to receive me with every consideration; whilst the other, penned no doubt before the change in the Viceroy's intention had become known at Yang-chow, advertised me, in no civil tone, that the affair had been sufficiently attended to, and that neither my presence nor interference was needed. The very inadequate rank of the officer appointed to inquire with me into the affair is a noticeable point in the Viceroy's letter, as also the accusation brought against the Roman Catholic Missionaries as having been the original occasion of the animosity entertained by the people of Yang-chow against the Protestant brethren. A similar story to that told by the Viceroy about the excessive mortality amongst the orphans reared by the Roman Catholic Mission, I had already heard from Father Seckinger at Chin-kiang, who further informed me that the malicious reports as to the causes of deaths had been officially contradicted by the local authorities in a public proclamation, so that the people had not that excuse for their violence which the Viceroy pretends to make out. I have also to request your Excellency's particular attention to that portion of the Chih-fu's letter which quotes the reply and instructions received by him from the Viceroy as being unworthy of the character for energy, intelligence, liberality towards foreigners, and determination to maintain Treaty rights which is usually attributed to that high functionary.

The receipt of the two communications above alluded to occasioned no change in my plans, save that of requesting Commander Bush to leave behind him the field-piece, as calculated, perhaps, to be regarded more in the light of a menace than appeared to be expedient. The deputy of the Viceroy had not made his appearance by 7 A.M. on the 8th, the time subsequently determined upon for our start for Yang-chow; and as the delay in his appointment was attributable to no neglect of mine, whilst more than twelve hours had elapsed since my receiving official notice of his intended approach, I did not

feel authorized in detaining Her Majesty's ship by putting off the expedition until the following morning. To have started in the middle of the day was of course out of the question.

We entered the Grand Canal at its junction with the Yang-tsze at the modern Kuachow, and found it to be a broad fine stream all the way up to Yang-chow, the depth ranging from 10 to 16 feet. The large number and size of the junks we met and passed showed signs of a busy traffic.

We reached our destination about noon, and were told that all the officials awaited us at one of the gates. By some mistake, however, we entered by a different gate, and marched through the city by a more busy thoroughfare than that through which the authorities doubtless had intended to conduct us, a fact which seemed to occasion the Prefect immense alarm, if I might judge by the abject terror depicted upon his countenance when he made his appearance at the yamên. He commenced the conversation by repeating in so many words the exculpations and excuses which had already formed the subject of his letter (Inclosure No. 3), declaring that the populace in their indignation had even published a lampoon upon himself, designating him as "the British Prefect;" and he showed me a placard in corroboration of this statement. I deemed it best not to waste any words in argument, but at once to place in the Prefect's hands a written communication (copy and translation of which I have the honour to inclose), which I had prepared, setting forth all the facts as they had been related to me on oath by Mr. Taylor and his brother missionaries, and stating the nature of the redress which I felt myself compelled to require. I likewise informed him that although the letter did not name the amount of compensation to be made good to the sufferers, I held in my hand a Memorandum of their actual losses (copy herewith inclosed) estimated at 1,128 taels 40 mace, and that I proposed to make this sum up to 2,000 taels, so as to include reparation for the loss to Mr. Reid of the sight of one eye, and for the various injuries, more or less severe, received by the other members of the party as well as sundry expenses to which Mr. Taylor has been put, in consequence of his sudden ejectment.

The Prefect perused the letter very deliberately, merely making deprecatory remarks here and there as he went on, but without directly denying any of my charges. As regards the demands with which the letter closed, he declared his utter inability to comply with that one requiring the seizure and punishment of the gentry whom I had named, they being all men of wealth and influence, and possessed of buttons of far higher rank than his own; but the remainder he said he was quite willing to concede, provided I allowed him time to refer to the Viceroy, in obedience to instructions which he had received to that effect. On my calling for these he exhibited them forthwith, and I thereupon suggested that I should either wait at Yang-chow, pending his visit to Nanking, or that he should repair to Nanking in my company, giving him the option of selecting either course. He preferred the latter, and then, at my request, put upon paper his views in regard to the several demands, and his promise to proceed to Nanking forthwith. The accompanying is a translation of his letter.

This arrangement having been effected, I proposed to the Prefect that he should visit and inspect Mr. Taylor's late premises in my company. He acquiesced in such a very ready manner as to take me quite by surprise, for I had taken it for granted that the authorities would not care that I should see the evidence of their neglect and delinquency; and I was aware from Mr. Allen's account, that, when he saw the authorities the day after the ejectment of the mission, they had positively refused to accompany him to the scene of the outrage. As will be seen in the sequel, however, the Prefect had doubtless an object in this officious compliance with my proposition.

Mr. Taylor's house proved to be but half-a-mile distant from the yamên, a very significant fact, when considered in connection with the number of hours allowed by the Chih-fu to elapse before he went to the assistance of the missionaries on the night of the attack, as proved by their affidavit. We found the premises nearly cleared of all the wooden partitions, folding doors, windows, &c., so common in native houses; a wrenched hinge or smashed frame which had been left here and there showing manifest tokens that the removal had been effected suddenly and by violence. The mortar on the walls showed everywhere unmistakeable signs of the rain of brickbats which had compelled the unfortunate occupants to flee from room to room for their lives, and a few remaining *débris* of broken furniture and trunks collected in one or two of the upstair rooms were sufficient to convince us that a plundering mob had been at work in the house. There were, however, no signs at first sight of any fire having been applied, or any breach having been made in the outer walls; and it was only upon the fact being pointed out to me by one of the missionaries who accompanied the expedition, that I was able to detect that every breach had been most carefully bricked up and cleverly plastered over, and every trace of

burning swept up or scraped away. Even the low front wall of the upper story, over which the female members of the Mission had scrambled to get out on to the tiles, had been repaired, although the tiles below belied the alteration, by the distinct signs they showed of having been trampled upon in the attempt to escape. I took care to point out all these various indications of riot and after-repair to the authorities present, but they received my remarks in sulky silence, much more chagrined apparently at having been detected in their efforts to deceive than at the sight of the wreck which their neglect and incapacity had combined to bring about.

We here left the authorities and returned to our boats, the Prefect pledging himself to start early on the following morning with us on our way to Nanking. During our stay in the city our party was surrounded and followed very naturally by a vast concourse of Chinese, but their demeanour was marked by the utmost quiet and respect, even when the attendants of the Prefect thrashed the front ranks of the gazers with canes in order to make them give way; proving thereby that the plea employed by the Prefect to the effect that the people were beyond his control was entirely without foundation.

The following morning the Prefect made his appearance in a large mandarin boat, and the whole party left on the down trip. We accompanied the Prefect as far as the mouth of the Grand Canal, where we left him in his boat, and proceeded on board Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" at Chin-kiang, promising to take him on board early the following morning on our way up to Nanking.

An account of my proceedings at Nanking shall form the subject of a separate communication. Meanwhile, I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice, in connection with this subject, the very courteous assistance afforded to Commander Bush and myself by Lieutenant de la Barriere, commanding His Imperial Majesty's gun-boat "Le Breton," who was good enough to tow the boats of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," with the escort on board, from Chin-kiang to the mouth of the Grand Canal, and to stay there as a reserve in case of need until we made good our return. Apart from this timely aid, we should have experienced considerable difficulty in reaching our starting-point on the canal, for the "Rinaldo" drew too much water to allow of her reaching the mouth, and the small steamer did not possess sufficient power to tow us thus far.

As this despatch has unavoidably reached such a great length, I beg leave, likewise, to defer my remarks upon the affair at Chin-kiang until another opportunity; and in closing this communication, I venture to add a hope that what I have effected so far may meet with your Excellency's full approval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Consul Medhurst to Sun, Prefect of Yang-chow-foo.

Sir, *Chin-kiang, September* 6, 1868.

IT appearing to me expedient that I should proceed to Yang-chow-foo for the purpose of having a personal interview with yourself in respect to the outrage committed upon the missionaries Taylor and others on the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to acquaint you that I propose to carry out the intention in the course of the present week.

As placards of the most inflammatory character have been issued by malevolent persons against foreigners both before and since the outrage, I have thought it necessary to invite Commander Bush, of Her Majesty's Royal Navy, to accompany me with a suitable escort, but you may rest assured, nevertheless, that our mission will be entirely amicable in its nature, our object being simply to secure from the local authorities a reasonable adjustment of the grievances Mr. Taylor has to complain of.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

The Viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *September* 6, 1868.

I RECEIVED a despatch from you yesterday, at 5 or 6 o'clock P.M., to the following effect.

I have the honour to inform you, with reference to the assault on Mr. Taylor by the populace at Yang-chow, that I have now received a third representation from the Prefect of that city, in which he states that, on the 24th August, about noon, Messrs. Allen, Canny and Sands (Vice-Consuls of Great Britain, France, and the United States of America), arrived from Chin-kiang, and had an interview with him. They told him that the house which Mr. Taylor had leased had been burned down, but he denied the statement, and told them that he had issued a proclamation forbidding the people again to raise a disturbance; sent away Mr. Taylor, under escort, for a temporary absence, and ordered the Hsien to examine and punish those concerned in the affair. The Vice-Consuls made no remarks in reply, but took the draft of the proclamation away with them. Before returning to Chin-kiang they examined the house in question, and found that, in fact, it had not been burnt bown.

The fact that the Vice-Consuls had carefully examined the place before their return led me to conclude that the case had been arranged.

The letter from Mr. Taylor to the local authorities, which you pronounce to have been extorted from him by the Kan-chuan Hsien, would not appear to have been dictated by an outsider. As to the request it contains that the offenders should be cangued, I am informed by the Prefect that he has cangued four men, viz., Hsieh Tseng-fu, Han Tai, Jên Ifa, and Yin Sheh-tsai.

I have commissioned Chang Kai-chi, Magistrate of Shang-yuan-Hsin, Sub-Prefect in the Grain Transport Department, to accompany you to Yang-chow, and further your wishes to have the matter honestly adjudicated on.

This outbreak is attributable to the fact that the Frenchmen Seckinger rented a house in an underhand manner, and opened an orphanage there. The deaths from injuries of the children in the establishment being somewhat excessive, the Ching-Tu. Hsien investigated the subject, and the depositions are before me. Li Ti-i states that fourteen corpses had been buried out of the orphanage. Lin Tung-jen states that forty and more deaths have occurred this year, the children dying from ill-treatment by the wet-nurses. The people hearing "daily reports that such things as extracting the eyes and hearts of little children took place at the orphanage, had long had their suspicions excited. It was then discovered that very many of the babies had died of injuries, and they were all of the female sex."

This statement raised a universal outcry of indignation among the people, and though the Chiang-Tu Hsien proved that the deaths were simply from disease, and from nothing else, nothing that officer could do could keep the disturbance down.

The attack on Mr. Taylor's house is truly detestable, but yet there was ground for the angry feeling.

I have instructed Chang Kai-chi, now on this mission, with reference to the language he is to hold in order to pacify the public feeling. He is to tell them that though the deaths from injuries were somewhat numerous, there was no such thing as extraction of eyes or hearts from the corpses, and the fault was with the doctors and wet-nurses, and not that of the missionaries; that the orphanage is wholly the affair of the French Roman Catholic Establishment, and no fault attaches to the English missionaries. By such arguments the Yang-chow people will at once be disabused of their suspicions, and Mr. Taylor's wrongs can be redressed.

I beg you will be good enough as well to disabuse the people, as to quiet the mind of Mr. Taylor, until such time as the matters can be fully investigated. I shall be happy to meet you at Nanking, at your earliest convenience, to consult on the best manner of bringing about a satisfactory conclusion.

Sun, Prefect of Yang-chow, at present at Nanking, is ordered to accompany Chang to Yang-chow, and to treat yourself with the greatest consideration.

You are requested to give your best attention to the above.

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

Sun, Prefect of Yang-chow, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *September* 6, 1868.

I AM in receipt of your despatch of this day's date, stating that (quotes it, see Inclosure No. 2.)

On the arrival of Mr. Taylor at Yang-chow, for the purpose of preaching, a proclamation was issued for general information. On the 22nd August some female children were secretly buried by the Orphanage established by the French Missionary, Sechinger (Chin-chien-san), and many corpses were dug up also (? by the Orphanage). Now, there had been rumours floating about among the people, that the eyes and brains had been abstracted from some corpses: the burial of these bodies, therefore, created general indignation.

The people went to Mr. Taylor's house, and raised a disturbance, which I, with the magistrates and military authorities, effectually put down. No injuries were caused to, nor property stolen from, the missionaries, as may be seen from Mr. Taylor's own letter. The brawlers were captured on the spot, and have been punished; and Mr. Taylor has been safely escorted to Chinkiang.

I stated the whole circumstances to Mr. Allen, British Vice-Consul, and to the other Vice-Consuls who came to Yang-chow, and paid me a visit; and I also reported them to his Excellency Tsêng, who has given answer as follows:—

"The British missionaries must not return for several months, for fear of further complications. I will refer the case to the Tsung-li Yamên; and when the Yamên, after consultation with the Foreign Ministers, informs me that it has came to the conclusion that missionaries really do not abstract brains and eyes, I will myself issue a proclamation to that effect to the gentry and people of Yang-chow; after which, the missionaries may return, on receiving intimation that they can do so. They will not then experience any annoyance, confidence will be restored between Chinese and foreigners, and no obstacles will remain. But, if before this proclamation is issued, the missionaries go back, under the mistake that the times are favourable, and irritation arises, it will be too late for them to ask that measures may be taken to protect them, or recover their property. This is not only for the best interests of the people, but of the missionaries also."

His Excellency the Viceroy also states, that he has received your despatch of the 27th August (quotes it), and that he had replied to it (quotes the reply, dated 2nd of September.)

You announce it as your intention to come here in person in a few days; but I must call your attention to the fact that the matter is at an end.

The anonymous placards did not contain anything to point out foreigners as the proper subjects of violence.

Mr. Taylor, according to his Excellency's instructions, must quietly await the decision of the Tsung-li Yamên. I myself am going to Nankin to receive his Excellency's commands in person; and if you take occasion from this complication to present yourself here, I shall not be able to receive you.

The people have already been fully instructed as to their duty, by the Viceroy, and the affair is settled; there is therefore no necessity for your troubling the Senior Naval Officer to accompany you with an escort as you propose, as that might raise suspicions among the people. I have addressed his Excellency in this sense, and now beg your earnest attention to the above.

Note.—The above was written by the Kau-chüan Hsien (as witness his seal), on account of the absence at that moment of the Prefect at Nankin. See the Viceroy's despatch of the same date (Inclosure No. 2.)

W. G. S.

Inclosure 5 in No. 3.

Consul Medhurst to Sun, Prefect of Yang-chow-foo.

Sir, *Chin-kiang, September* 2, 1868.

THE British missionaries, Taylor and others, lately residing at Yang-chow-foo, have laid before me a formal complaint in regard to their violent ejectment from your city,

and they have earnestly entreated me, as Consul for this district, to redress the many and grievous wrongs which they have sustained, and to secure for them peaceable possession of their late home. I have likewise received a Report from Mr. Assistant Allen, furnishing me with particulars of his visit to Yang-chow, and interview with yourself.

I have taken most careful affidavits as to what has occurred, from the lips of four of the principal missionaries concerned. The document is too lengthy to admit of a full version being submitted to you herewith, but the following important facts are clearly set forth therein:—

1. That the premises which the missionaries occupied were procured with your knowledge and consent, signified by an authorization under your seal, and with the approbation, moreover, of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at this port, with whom the lease has been duly recorded.

2. That ever since the missionaries first took up their residence within the city, they have been entirely innocent of any offence against the people, either by word or act, and that they have even borne with exemplary endurance, insults and assaults to which they have been subjected from time to time, rather than hurt or annoy a single individual.

3. That the charges made against them, of stealing and doing away with infants, are not supported by the slightest evidence, but have been got up and spread abroad by malicious persons for the express purpose of defaming their character and setting the people against them.

4. That the gentry are known to be the authors of the reports and inflammatory placards which led to the outrage, the names of the principal men being Yen Fuan-shu, Pien Pao-shu, Li Pao-fu, and Wu Wên-hsi.

5. That the missionaries brought the placards to the notice of the local authorities in repeated and courteously-worded petitions, begging that precautions against an outbreak might be taken, and due protection afforded; and that the local authorities evaded their representations, and took no pains to act upon the missionaries' entreaties, although many days elapsed before the placards took effect.

6. That at length, when the attack upon the Mission premises took place, on the evening of the 22nd of August, and Mr. Taylor and another escaped to the Chih-fu's Yamên, and earnestly entreated assistance, they were, knowingly and purposely, detained two hours before any movement was made in their favour, while prompt action would have saved the house and property.

7. That the premises were set fire to in several places, and eventually forced in and plundered.

8. That the attack was made by a mob armed with spears, knives, and clubs.

9. That the attack was so violent, that women and young children had to be cast out of the windows to save their lives, two of the women being at the time in a pregnant condition.

10. That while the women were thus endeavouring to escape, bricks and flaming brands were hurled at them at them to drive them back.

11. That one of the missionaries has lost an eye, that the pregnant women are now lying in a precarious condition, and that the majority of the party have been more or less hurt and bruised.

12. That, after a guard of soldiers was sent on the night of the 22nd, it was again withdrawn, so as to admit of the return of the mob to their work of devastation the following morning.

13. That on one of the missionaries framing a truthful letter to the Chih-fu, earnestly representing the frightful pass things had come to and claiming redress, the Kan-chuan Hsien cruelly and wickedly threatened him with being left to the mercy of the mob unless he so described the affair as not to make it appear a "chiang-an," or a case of plunder with violence, and thereby succeeded in extorting from him a second letter for presentation in place of the first, which utterly misrepresented the facts, characterizing the case as one of simple "tsao-nao" or brawl.

14. That, eventually, after the house had been plundered and the tenants ejected at the risk of their lives, the local authorities failed to give them protection in the Yamên, and reinstate them, but sent them away in charge of a guard to Chin-kiang.

15. That, after they had been sent away, the Chih-fu, supporting the irregular action of the Hsien, issued a proclamation characterizing the outrage as a simple disturbance.

Such are the facts of the case, and they prove that the local authorities have been guilty of closing their eyes, in spite of repeated petitions and warnings, to a diabolical plan to murder and rob innocent foreigners, and afterwards of combining to misrepresent the nature of the crime committed. The facts further prove that the gentry have been

guilty of instigating the inhabitants to commit plunder, arson, and violence upon a number of peaceable, inoffensive men, women, and children.

The conduct of the Chih-fu and Chih-Hsien I must lay before his Excellency the Viceroy, as well as before my own superior, Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, for adjudication and punishment, according to the laws pertaining to such official derelictions of duty.

The conduct of the gentry and people it is for the local authorities to punish according to the laws provided in such cases.

To this end I have to request the Chih-fu forthwith to seize the persons of those whose names I have hereinbefore given, as well as any others who are known to have taken an active part in the affair, and to punish them according to the law provided for in cases of combining to plunder with violence. Should any of the culprits be members of the belted gentry, whom it is beyond the power of the Chih-fu to issue a warrant against, I must require him to report their names to his Excellency the Viceroy for degradation and punishment.

I have further to call upon the Chih-fu to comply with the following requisitions:—

1. That a sum of 2,000 taels shall be paid to me for distribution amongst the sufferers as compensation;

2. That their house shall be restored to its original condition;

3. That a proclamation shall be issued informing the inhabitants that the perpetrators of the late outrage must be punished according to law; that British subjects shall be at liberty to reside and rent houses at Yang-chow according to Treaty provisions; and that any persons interfering with or molesting them shall receive condign punishment.

4. That a copy of the above Proclamation shall be inscribed upon a stone tablet, which shall be erected upon the spot where the missionaries have been ejected.

5. That an invitation by letter or deputy shall be sent to the missionaries requesting them to return to their houses.

6. That all persons of every kind who have been imprisoned in consequence of their alleged connection with the missionaries shall be forthwith released.

The above facts, and the requisition rendered necessary in consequence thereof, I now place by letter and in person before the Chih-fu, and I trust he will be able to favour me with a favourable reply forthwith, so as to avoid any further and disagreeable complications.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 6 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM of claims by the members of the China Inland Mission for losses sustained at Yang-chow-foo on Saturday and Sunday the 22nd and 23rd days of August, 1868.

			$	c.
Surgical instruments, and medical and other books			327	0
House injuries			70	0
Furniture, &c.			70	0
Bedding-clothing			158	0
Watch and concertina			40	0
Sedan-chair			12	0
Sundries			53	50
Miss Degraz's property			124	0
Miss Blatchley's ditto			18	0
Mr. Duncan's ditto			86	0
Mr. Williamson's ditto			83	0
Mr. Reid's ditto			67	0
Mr. Rudland's ditto			22	0
Native teachers and servants, in all 17 persons	$ 43			
Clothes, furniture, &c.	438			
			481	0
			1,612	0

Or, 1,128 taels 40 mace.

I, James Hudson Taylor, hereby declare upon my honour that the foregoing account faithfully represents the value of the losses severally sustained by the members of the China Inland Mission in consequence of the late outrage at Yang-chow-foo, so far as ascertained at the present date; also that I am prepared to substantiate the account

by detailed statements if necessary. I likewise hereby certify that I have undertaken to make good the claims of the teachers and servants in full, and that I have already paid about 200 dollars to them on account.

(Signed) J. HUDSON TAYLOR.

Chin-kiang, September 5, 1868.

Witness to signature:

(Signed) W. H. MEADOWS, *Consul.*

Inclosure 7 in No. 3.

Sun, Prefect of Yang-chow, to Mr. Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *September* 8, 1868.

I AM in receipt of your despatch dated September 2, in which you require the arrest of the gentry concerned in the outrage on Mr. Taylor; and also, 1st, compensation; 2ndly, restoration of the house to its original state; 3rdly, the issue of a Proclamation announcing the severe punishment of the offenders in this case, the right of British subjects by Treaty to rent houses, and live at Yang-chow, and the liability to punishment of every one who molests British subjects; 4thly, the inscription on stone of the aforesaid Proclamation to be placed before Mr. Taylor's house; 5thly, the invitation by letter or deputy to the missionaries to return; and, 6thly, the release of all who have been imprisoned on account of this case.

With reference to the arrest of the belted gentry, I must state that I have not the requisite authority to enable me to satisfy you, and with respect to the other demands, though they contain nothing which I could not comply with, I am under the necessity of referring to his Excellency the Viceroy, as he has ordered me so to do, and I propose accordingly to accompany you to Nanking for this purpose.

Inclosure 8 in No. 3.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Chin-kiang, September* 17, 1868.

IN my despatch dated the 15th instant, on the subject of the Yang-chow outrage, I carried my narrative of proceedings up to the incident of my return to Chin-kiang on the 8th instand, after having visited Yang-chow. I have now the honour to resume it at that point for your Excellency's information.

On landing at Chin-kiang, I found the Viceroy's deputy, Chang-Chihsien awaiting me, I had an interview with him forthwith, when I detailed to him all that I had seen and done at Yang-chow He pressed me earnestly to return thither again in his company, so as to enable him to carry out his instructions, but I was compelled to decline, as I did not see that any good was to be obtained by a second visit, and as it was naturally an object with me not to detain Her Majesty's ship any longer than was imperatively necessary.

I took him, however, to see Mr. Taylor's party in order to afford him the opportunity of questioning them in person, which he did very minutely. Before taking leave I succeeded in persuading him to accompany me to Nanking in Her Majesty's ship, and we parted on the understanding that he was to repair on board the following morning.

When the "Rinaldo" prepared to weigh at the appointed time on the 9th, we looked in vain for Chang-Chihsien, and having waited half-an-hour we eventually started without him. I was informed afterwards by Mr. Assistant Allen, whom I had instructed to see Chang off, that he did leave the shore for the purpose of joining us, but that pretending to be alarmed at the "wind and tide," although, the morning was a calm one, he had ordered his boatman to put back.

We reached our rendezvous with the Chih-fu of Yang-chow in the course of an hour, and sent the small steamer in for him, as had been arranged on the previous day. But he too proved false, he having left, we were told, an hour earlier for Nanking; we, therefore, proceeded on our way, and arrived at Nanking the same evening.

The Viceroy readily acceded to my request for an interview, and I called upon him on the following morning. He received me with more than customary state, and seemed inclined to be friendly; but I found it exceedingly difficult to rouse his peculiarly impassive and sluggish nature to that appreciation of the serious im[redacted] my object

which I could have wished to see exhibited. It was only after pressing my case again and again upon his notice with much patience and earnestness, that I succeeded in wresting from him a promise that I should have reasonable redress within the next day or two, and that his decision should be communicated to me in writing. I gathered from his remarks that the case had been entirely misrepresented to him by the Chih-fu of Yang-chow. He had not been informed that any injury had been received by any member of the missionary party, or that they had lost any portion of their property. Neither had he been furnished with copies of the repeated appeals made by Mr. Taylor to the Chih-fu and the replies thereto, or of the two letters which gave evidence of the compulsion used towards Mr. Taylor by the Kan-chuen-hsien. I carefully pointed out all these facts to him as *primâ facie* proof of the culpability and mendacity of the local authorities, and my representation seemed at the moment to attract his attention. But he persisted eventually in falling back on his original promise, and I was compelled to leave the subject there for the time being, and to address him on other matters which I had in hand.

Just before leaving the Yamên we discovered that the runaway Prefect of Yang-chow had that moment made his appearance. I begged the Viceroy to let him come in and answer for himself before me, but his Excellency refused, on the plea that a war of words might ensue which had best be avoided.

Nothing further transpired until the same evening when the Taoutae of Chin-kiang, who happened to be at Nanking in connection with the Chin-kiang troubles, called on board the "Rinaldo," charged with a message from the Viceroy to myself. He staid about two hours, endeavouring to coax me into a consent to forego all further action, provided the Viceroy gave a charitable gratuity to Mr. Taylor of the sum of 1,000 taels, and he urged the very handsome reception with which I had been favoured in the forenoon as a cogent reason why I should on my part treat the Viceroy with all the consideration possible. I deemed it my duty to turn a deaf ear to this overture, but the very anxious tone in which it was urged led me to indulge a hope that the Viceroy was inclined toward concession, and that I might look for a favourable answer on the morrow.

Most unfortunately, just at this juncture, Commander Bush, who had been ailing for some days, fell so seriously ill that he was compelled to return forthwith to Shanghae, and he very naturally signified his intention to take his ship with him. It was out of the question, of course, that I should accompany Commander Bush, so I removed into a friend's house-boat which happened to be on the spot, and hired a Chinese boat for the accommodation of Messrs. Stronach and Allen, and the Chinese writers.

On the morning of the 13th, instead of the formal reply which I had been led to expect from the Viceroy, there came a note from the Chin-kiang Taoutae, a translation of which I have the honour to inclose, simply stating that he had been charged to inform me that his Excellency had been pleased out of his charity to confer a gratuity of 1,000 taels upon Mr. Taylor, and had instructed the Taoutae of Shanghae to hold that sum to my order. No allusion whatever is made in the note to the redress or compensation for which I had asked. I forthwith addressed a reply to the Viceroy direct, thanking him for his benevolence to my suffering countrymen, but inquiring what course he proposed to adopt as regards ordering redress and compensation to be accorded by the authorities of Yang-chow-foo.

In the hope of expediting matters, I sent a messenger in early on the following day, the 14th, asking for a second interview. An answer came from the Chin-kiang Taoutae late that evening to the effect that the Viceroy had just received news of his proposed translation to the Viceroyalty of Chihli; that he was too busy to see me; and that the Taoutae had been instructed to hand me a final communication on the subject of Yang-chow, which he doubted not would render a further interview needless.

I inclose a copy and translation of the communication so delivered to me, and I doubt not that your Excellency will concur with me in regarding it as conveying a most unsatisfactory solution of the question at issue. Although the letter is evidently intended to discourage all further correspondence as far as I am concerned, I have ventured to reply to it by pointing out, in the plainest language which I could employ consistently with the courtesy due to so high a functionary, the various points in which I conceive his decision to be wanting in that reason and justice which he so authoritatively claims for it; and I trust that the tone and tenor of my communication, a translation of which I have the honour to inclose, may have your Excellency's approval.

It only remains for me now to submit the whole case for your Excellency's superior judgment and authority. I can call to mind, out of my experience of British relations with China, scarcely one instance in which the outrage complained of has been more unprovoked on the part of the sufferers, and in which the evidence of neglect and culpability on the part of the local authorities has been more marked and incontro-

vertible. Few cases can have occurred, moreover, in which the power to grant prompt and reasonable redress was more within the reach of the supreme provincial authority. I sincerely trust, therefore, that I am placing in your hands for adjustment a case in which our grounds of remonstrance may be pronounced radically good; and that if you will find yourself able to secure for it from the Supreme Government at Peking that attention and justice which I conceive the serious importance of the general interests involved must demand.

In closing these Reports of my proceedings in connection with the affair at Yang-chow, I beg to bring to your Excellency's notice, with a view to acknowledgment, if necessary, to Her Majesty's Naval Commander-in-chief, the prompt and valuable assistance tendered to me in my efforts to obtain redress by Commander Bush, R.N., commanding Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo." But for his sudden and unfortunate illness, I believe that he would have supported me by his presence up to the last, and possibly helped me to secure a somewhat more satisfactory termination to the negotiation. I also am doing but simple justice to Mr. Stronach in stating that his assiduity and accuracy in translating both into and from Chinese proved of the utmost service to me throughout the whole of the lengthy and troublesome correspondence which has to be conducted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

P.S.—I find that I have omitted to inclose in its proper place translation of a letter which I addressed to the Viceroy the evening after I saw him, on the subject of the condition in which I found Mr. Taylor's premises when I went there.

W. H. M.

Inclosure 9 in No. 3.

Tsai, Taoutae of Chin-kiang, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *September* 13, 1868.

I AM commissioned by his Excellency Tseng to express to you his deep commiseration at the losses caused to Mr. Taylor by the populace at Yang-chow having mistakenly destroyed his property, and also at the wound received by Mr. Reid on his right eye. His Excellency proposes charitably to bestow the sum of 1,000 taels to meet the expenses required to replace Mr. Taylor's property and to cure Mr. Reid's eye. His Excellency has ordered the Shanghae Taoutae to hand you this sum for distribution on your return to that port.

I beg you will take this as an intimation of his Excellency's intention.

I am also ordered to return the copy of the correspondence which passed between the Yang-chow authorities and Mr. Taylor.

Inclosure 10 in No. 3.

The Viceroy, Tséng Kwo-fan, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *September* 14, 1868.

I AM in receipt of your despatch of the 11th instant, relative to the Yang-chow case, in which you state that you had requested the Yang-chow Prefect to attend upon me, and begged me to order him to submit for my perusal a despatch you had handed him on the 8th. (N.B.—Dated 2nd.)

I have also possessed myself of the contents of your letter, received this day, in which you express yourself very much obliged by a bounty of 1,000 taels, and state that you await information as to the demands set forth in your despatch to the Yang-chow Prefect—namely, the degradation of the belted gentry who instigated the outrage, the inscription of a proclamation on stone, and the compensation for personal injuries and loss by destruction and robbery of property.

The Prefect of Yang-chow has supplied me with a copy of your despatch to him.

I must point out that I deputed Chang, Magistrate of Shang-yüan Hsien, to assist you in your examination of the place at Yang-chow, at your own urgent request twice repeated;—your precipitation in coming to see me at Nanking without having investigated the case with Chang cannot, therefore, be considered as other than a breach of

faith. I granted you the interview solely in consideration of the friendly relations which have subsisted for some years.

The gentry were not implicated in the annoyance mistakenly caused to Mr. Taylor by the populace; it was brought on by suspicions among the people who know no better, and these suddenly changed to rage on account of the excessive number of deaths (at the Orphanage). The gentry whose names you give are of high rank, have always acted as becomes their position and experience, and would never wittingly desire to act contrary to a Treaty made by their Sovereign. I can, therefore, take no action with reference to this demand.

As to the proclamation desired, the Yang-chow Prefect will submit for my correction the draft of one before issuing it.

There is no necessity for engraving this proclamation on stone. To ensure its preservation for any length of time it will be sufficient to have it placed on a board of wood which can be exposed during the day for the information of the gentry and people, and taken in at night.

With reference to the value of the property lost and destroyed, and the medical expenses, I have determined to forward through the Shanghae Taoutae to you a bounty of 1,000 taels for distribution among the missionaries, which will be considered as meant for replacing their lost property and the expenses of curing their wounds.

The Prefect of Yang-chow did not, at the first, commit an infraction of Treaty; there is, therefore, no call to report him to the throne for punishment.

I have directed that officer to return to Yang-chow; to restore the missionaries' house to its original condition; and to issue a proclamation informing the inhabitants that the offenders in this case have been punished by the cangue as a warning, that British subjects have the right by Treaty to rent houses and reside in Yang-chow, and that any person molesting or interfereing with British subjects will immediately be arrested and punished severely. Mr. Taylor is to be invited to return to his house within a period of two months. The Prefect will also direct the Magistrate at once to release all persons who are in confinement through being implicated in the case innocently.

I have already stated to you at the interview the general bearing of the above remarks, and also sent Ts'ai the Chinkiang Faotai to explain my views more minutely in person. They appear to be reasonable and just.

I earnestly hope that the relations of Chinese and foreigners may remain peaceable, and that the silly populace may not cause further disturbanee.

I have addressed the Tsungli Yamên on this subject, and now communicate this despatch to you as a close to the case.

An important despatch, &c.

Inclosure 11 in No. 3.

Consul Medhurst to the Viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan.

Sir, *Shanghae, September* 18, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter, dated the 14th instant, signifying the decision which you have come to in the matter of the Yang-chow outrage.

I observe with great regret that the contents of your letter in no way bear out the promises of a speedy and reasonable adjustment which your Excellency so distinctly pledged yourself to on the occasion of our interview of the 11th instant.

Your Excellency states it as your belief that the gentry whose names were indicated in my letter to the Chih-fu of Yang-chow, could not possibly from their position and experience have been guilty of inciting the people against the missionaries. Such may be your Excellency's opinion, but I think that if you were to institute an honest inquiry on the spot, into all the circumstances of the case, you would discover that your opinion is not founded on fact. It was and still is very generally reported at Yang-chow that the persons I named were at the bottom of the entire movement, and I am told that repeated meetings have been held, both before and since the outrage, by them and others, in one of the public buildings of the city to concert plans for the permanent ejectment of the mission. One influential man, whose surname the Tepao gave as Ko, was actually observed amongst the mob inciting them on, and he went so far as to lay hold of the coat of one of the missionaries, and shake him furiously whilst venting the most angry and foul invective against him. So long as the conduct of such deliberate disturbers of

the peace is allowed to pass by unpunished, there can be no security against the recurrence at Yang-chow, or any other locality of evils, such as that for which I am now seeking redress.

As regards the proclamation, the draft of which your Excellency has desired the Prefect to submit for your inspection, you do not inform me whether it is to be based upon the draft with which I have already furnished him. If this is not to be the case I think it but fair that an opportunity should be afforded me likewise for examining it before it is conclusively issued, otherwise I shall be unable to judge in how far that item of my demands has been satisfactorily complied with.

Your Excellency's remarks on my fourth requisition, namely, that the proclamation should be engraven upon stone, shew at any rate that your Excellency concurs with me in the opinion that the perpetuation of the proclamation would be desirable. Why then cavil as to the method of effecting this? Stone is constantly employed by the Chinese authorities in perpetuating the most common cautions and prohibitions where permanent promulgation is an object. It was but reasonable, therefore, that in an important matter like the one under consideration, affecting nothing less than the safety of life and property, I should ask for a commemoration by inscribed tablet.

The next point touched upon in your Excellency's letter is that of compensation for losses and injuries sustained. When the question of a gratuity of 1,000 taels out of your Excellency's own means was first hinted to me by your messenger, the Chin-kiang Taoutae, I told him distinctly that if given as a charitable contribution to Mr. Taylor or his Mission I could have no objection to receiving it on such behalf, but if it were to be intended as a substitute for the compensation which I had formerly asked for, I could not think of taking it. That officer's note of the 13th instant, announcing the gift of the above mentioned sum, gave me to understand that the former of the two objects was intended, and accordingly I expressed my high appreciation of your benevolence. Now, however, it seemed that the gratuity is meant as a sort of compromise of the demand in the shape in which I put it before the Chih-fu, and such being the case I have no alternative but to refuse it positively. As I look at the matter, the missionaries are entitled to compensation, or they are not. If they are not, they ought to receive nothing; If they are, the amount stated by me verbally to the Chih-fu (as per memorandum appended) ought to be accepted as the basis of adjustment, until it is proved unreasonable or excessive. It is neither courteous nor just on your Excellency's part thus to attempt to press upon me, under the cover of a charitable gratuity, any less amount which you may arbitrarily decide upon as sufficient.

Your Excellency's observations as to the culpability or otherwise of the Chih-fu are utterly inexplicable to me. I am not aware that I charged him with any infraction of the Treaty. If you will take the trouble to refer to my letter to the Chih-fu, you will see that I have accused the local authorities of closing their eyes, in spite of repeated petitions and warnings, to a diabolical plan to murder and rob innocent foreigners, and afterwards of combining to misrepresent the nature of the crime, committed in order to screen themselves from blame. That they committed these faults there is abundant evidence in the copies of the correspondence with Mr. Taylor, in the violence and plunder that ensued,—in the letter extorted from Mr. Taylor by the Kan-Chüan Hsien,—and in the lenient punishment of the cangue afterwards imposed upon four wretched creatures. I maintain, therefore, that they were clearly guilty of dereliction of duty in the strict official sense of the term, and I am astonished that a functionary of your Excellency's known enlightenment and sense of justice, should seek thus to screen the offenders from the blame just imputable to them.

It is gratifying to observe, in the next paragraph of your Excellency's letter, on the subject of the readmission of Mr. Taylor and party to Yang-chow, that the Treaty right to access to and residence within the city is so distinctly admitted. I am at a loss, nevertheless, to comprehend why two months must elapse before Mr. Taylor is to be allowed to avail himself of the privilege. Had your Excellency ordered the Chih-fu to comply with my requisition forthwith, merely premising that I should advise Mr. Taylor to allow the existing excitement time to subside before he ventured to return, I should have felt that you had some reason on your side. But to attempt to confine the inclinations of the people within the bounds of months and days, appears to me to be simply absurd.

The release of all the native prisoners innocently implicated in this unfortunate affair had already been promised me by the Chih-fu when at Yang-chow; so that the single concession which you have thought fit to make, loses much of its value.

I have only further to remark, in respect of your Excellency's observation that I have not kept faith in the matter of the deputy you sent to meet me, that the insinuation

is entirely unmerited. The delay in his appearance was, as you are aware, in no way attributable to any fault of mine, and when I saw you I took care to explain how it came about that he missed me at Yang-chow, and was unable to accompany me afterwards to Nanking. Had your Excellency felt then that I had acted in bad faith, why did you not mention your suspicions to me at the time, instead of introducing it into an official despatch after I had left you?

I am not sorry to observe that your Excellency has furnished the Tsungli Yamên with a copy of your communication. Copies of this reply, and of all the papers relating to the outrage, will also no doubt reach that department through Her Majesty's Minister, and I confess that I shall be very much surprised if they treat the subject with the so-called reason and justice which it has received at your hands.

Few can wish more than I do that peaceful relations may always exist between the Chinese and foreigners. Your Excellency must be aware, however, that nothing is more calculated to bring about the very opposite effect, than a failure on the part of Chinese officials to restrain and punish the people when they show any propensity to over-ride Treaty privileges and obligations, in an insane desire to indulge antiquated and ridiculous prejudices.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 12 in No. 3.

Consul Medhurst to the Viceroy, Tséng Kwo-fan.

Sir, *"Rinaldo," September* 11, 1868.

REFERRING to the cases of the late outrage at Yang-chow, I must beg your Excellency to call upon the Chih-fu of Yang-chow, whom I duly requested to present himself before you to-day, to place before your Excellency the letter which I have addressed him dated the 2nd instant, and to command him to give me the redress therein required. In addition to the facts therein set forth, I beg to call to your Excellency's notice the fact that, when I arrived at Yang-chow and examined the premises in the company of the Prefect and other local officials, I found that, although the entire premises showed manifest signs of forcible entrance and other violence, all the breaches which the mob had made in the walls had been so cleverly repaired as to have rendered it impossible for me to detect them, had not one of the missionaries' sufferers pointed them out to me; that all traces of fire had been carefully scraped or swept away, and that all debris of furniture and fittings had as far as possible been removed. Mr. Assistant Allen, who had witnessed the condition the house was in the day after the outrage took place, and who saw it again in my company, can bear witness to the vast difference between the appearance of the premises upon the one occasion from that presented upon the other. The report of your Excellency's own deputy, should he visit Yang-chow, must therefore fail to describe the true state of affairs.

I also wish to call your special attention to the fact that the local authorities, when requested by Mr. Allen to visit the premises in his company on the first day, persistently refused to do so. Their evidence as to the condition in which the house was left is therefore not to be depended on. Indeed their whole conduct from first to last has been marked by such culpable neglect and deceit that any statement they may lay before your Excellency must be accepted with considerable distrust.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 4.

Lord Stanley to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 20, 1868.

I HAVE to acquaint you that I have received a despatch from Mr. Consul Medhurst forwarding copies of his correspondence with the Chinese authorities in regard to the recent outrage on British missionaries at Yang-chow-foo. Mr. Medhurst reports having communicated this correspondence to you, and I have to observe that he appears to have acted with great prudence and firmness in the matter; and you will convey to him my approval of his proceedings.

I have to instruct you to press the case in question upon the Chinese Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STANLEY.

No. 5.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received November 30.)

My Lord, *Peking, September* 11, 1868.

REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd of May,* it does not seem to me that any new clause of a Treaty is required to give to British missionaries the right they seek of purchasing land, and residing in all parts of the country. Article VI of the French Treaty is perfectly clear on that point, and what is acquired as a right for French missionaries, is equally acquired, by the favoured-nation clause, for the British, as I have recently had occasion to remind the Foreign Board.

But whether it may be consistent with wisdom or prudence to seek to enforce the right, or practicable to do so in effect, having in view the safety of the missionaries themselves, and the maintenance of peace, order, and good government wherever they may elect to settle themselves, is another question.

The inclosed account of popular violence and hostility manifested in Formosa, and still more recently by the outrage of which a party of missionaries with their families were victims at Yang-chow, and narrowly escaped with their lives from the fanatic mob led on apparently by the literary and educated classes, which Mr. Consul Medhurst has already reported to your Lordship by forwarding copy of his despatches to me on the subject, raise serious doubts as to the practicability of such establishments in the interior of China for some time to come.

The Roman Catholic missions in the interior are not exempt from the same sudden outbreaks of popular hostility; and I believe one of the chief occupations of the French Legation here, consists in pressing claims for redress, and making reclamations on their behalf.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK

Inclosure in No. 5.

Acting Consul Gibson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Taiwan, Takow Office, July* 31, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the Protestant Mission Chapel in Pi-tow, distant from Takow about six miles, has been a second time destroyed (on the 30th instant by the servants of the mandarins of that place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN GIBSON.

No. 6.

Consul Medhurst to Lord Stanley.—(Received November 30.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, October* 3, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of my despatches, dated respectively the 24th ultimo and 1st instant, to Her Majesty's Minister respecting the late disturbances at Chin-kiang.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

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* Inclosing a letter from the London Missionary Society suggesting that advantage should be taken of the revision of the Treaty with China to insert a clause, conceding to British missionaries the right to reside and to purchase land in all places in the interior of China, as well as at the commercial ports.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, September 24, 1868.*

IN fulfilment of the promise given in my despatch dated the 15th instant, I have now the honour to continue my narrative of the progress of affairs at Chinkiang, which formed the chief subject of a previous despatch dated the 3rd instant.

The night of the 3rd passed by without the attack upon the foreign quarter which he had been led to expect, thanks to a precaution taken by the local authorities to have the city gates locked and carefully looked to. A curious proof, however, occurred in the course of the day of the timid and temporizing policy resorted to by the authorities in emergencies of this nature. After the attack upon the Yamên of the Taoutae, described in my despatch, the mob repaired to the Yamên of the Hsien and demanded, upon pain of his having the exterior of his premises similarly invaded, that 300 blows should forthwith be inflicted upon Hsia-lu-che, the landlord who had let the house to Mr. Taylor. The Hsien, although aware that the matter was being treated by the Taoutae in consultation with myself, weakly gave his consent, and caused the man to be brought before him; when a mock trial and punishment were gone through the rioters were informed that their wishes had been complied with.

Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" made her appearance, as I have elsewhere reported, upon the 5th instant, and I at once availed myself of her presence to request Commander Bush to call with me, accompanied by a small escort, upon the Tartar General, it being rumoured that the people of the Tartar quarter were still inclined to be troublesome. My object in visiting the General was to request him to punish a Tartar official who had been mainly instrumental in bringing about the disturbance of the 2nd by laying hold of his neighbour, the landlord Hsia-lu-che, and beating him. I also wished to induce the General to issue a proclamation forbidding his men from interfering with British subjects desiring to rent houses within the walls.

The Tartar General at first denied the complicity of his subordinate, or of any of his people in the riot of the 2nd, and he pronounced a proclamation as entirely uncalled for under the circumstances. With a little insistence, however, he yielded both points and gave me a copy of the proclamation to take away with me. I inclose a translation of it.

Just as I was leaving the Yamên the Taoutae with other civil authorities hurried in, and in an alarmed tone strongly deprecated my having charged the Tartar authorities and soldiers with having been concerned in any riot, declaring positively that not a single Tartar was present on the occasion referred to. This was to say the least of it amusing, for only on the day before the Taoutae had assured me that some of the the Tartar troops were amongst his assailants, and that the Tartar officials were continually occasioning annoyance to the civil authorities by their overbearing and turbulent conduct, and he advised me to address the Tartar General direct, requiring him to keep his men under proper restraint.

After having seen the General I communicated a copy of his proclamation officially to the Taoutae begging him to issue a similar notice himself, and to inform me when I might place Mr. Taylor in peaceable possession of his hired house. The Taoutae's reply was to the effect that the question of confirming Mr. Taylor's lease and issuing a proclamation in respect to it had grown into such importance in consequence of recent events that he had determined upon repairing to Nanking in person, and taking the Viceroy's instructions upon the entire subject. Meanwhile, in order to quiet the minds of the people, he had issued a brief proclamation explanatory of the objects of the visit of Her Majesty's ship. I append a translation of this document, which is chiefly remarkable as emanating from a man who prides himself upon having been for some years an attaché of Tsung-li Yamên, and who for a Chinese official possesses unusual intelligence, energy, and appreciation of foreigners.

I heard nothing more of the Taoutae until I met him at Nanking, as reported in another despatch, when he showed me a written reply which the Viceroy had vouchsafed to his representations, and informed me that he had no alternative but to follow out the instructions so received.

A translation of the Viceroy's reply is inclosed herewith. On examining it, I at once discovered that the fact of a formal lease having been executed in favour of Mr. Taylor by all the members of the Hsia family, and of its having been duly recorded in the Consular Archives, and subsequently pronounced by the Taoutae to me personally as a valid document, could not have been represented by the Taoutae to the Viceroy, and

I inquired of the Taoutae why these important features of the case had been withheld. He admitted the omission without hesitation, and excused himself by saying that he had not had the courage to state the whole truth. Under these circumstances I of course declined to receive the Viceroy's decision as conclusive, and the Taoutae eventually entreated me to let the question remain in abeyance until he could see Mr. Taylor at Chin-kiang and consult him as to his willingness to accept the Viceroy's terms.

Here the matter rests at present. Mr. Taylor, whom I saw whilst passing Chin-kiang on my way down, does not appear unwilling to accept another house provided it suits his purpose, and I have advised him, that as the general principle of intramural residence has been so clearly conceded by the Viceroy, it will be to the interest of the mission to accept any compromise which may be offered by the Taoutae upon the basis proposed, rather than to have the discussion indefinitely prolonged with the chance of failing to secure the coveted house after all. It is not improbable, therefore, that the dispute may be amicably adjusted upon these terms.

Before closing this despatch I wish to draw your Excellency's particular notice to the great discrepancy observable between the several modes of treatment adopted by the Viceroy in the Yang-chow and Chin-kiang difficulties. In the former grave charges were brought by me against the Chih-fu and Chihsien, and the facts of the case sufficed to afford abundant evidence that there had been gross dereliction of duty, even according to a Chinese point of view. Yet these functionaries have been pronounced by the Viceroy to have been entirely free from blame, and he has declined to subject them to any punishment. In the Chin-kiang case, on the other hand, I brought no accusation whatever against the authorities, and the Taoutae was in no way to blame either for the misunderstanding about the house rented by Mr. Taylor, or for the riot which followed; whilst the Chihsien only carried out the same exclusive policy pursued by the Yang-chow officials, although to a far less reprehensible extent. Yet the Viceroy comments upon the conduct of both functionaries in severe terms, and one of them is only saved from special disgrace by his already having been deprived of his official charge on another account. The inference I conceive to be plain. It is such as to throw grave doubts upon the Viceroy's justice and impartiality, and to lay him open to the suspicion that he has permitted himself to be influenced by the weight and wealth which the Yang-chow people were in a position to bring to bear in order to screen themselves from blame.

I venture further to repeat here a suggestion which I have already had the honour to submit in a former despatch from Hankow on the subject of the memorials in regard to Treaty revision, and which recurs forcibly to my mind in connection with these cases of popular prejudice and official obstructiveness. It is that a thorough and extended publication throughout *all* the provinces by the Supreme Government of our rights and privileges under Treaty is still a desideratum. Although the Convention of Peking fully provides for such a measure, it has never been carried into effect, and it is my belief that until the entire Chinese population, official, literary, and otherwise, is distinctly informed, by Imperial proclamation that British subjects are to be acknowledged and treated in a friendly spirit, and that the compact with the British nation was an Imperial act, it is hopeless to expect that our merchants and missionaries will be regarded as otherwise than objects of contempt and suspicion by the people at large.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Proclamation by Lien Pu-lung, Tartar General at Chin-kiang.

(Translation.)

THE soldiers under my command have, as is on record, been prohibited from interfering in any way with the relations between China and foreign countries at Chin-kiang, a place where natives and foreigners come in contact with each other. My soldiers are now prohibited from interfering in any questions raised by the renting by foreigners of houses whether within or without the walls—questions which it lies wholly with the local authorities to deal with in the manner pointed out by Treaty.

Should any dare wilfully to disobey I will forthwith punish him according to law No lenience will be shown. Be serious!

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Proclamation by Tsai, Taoutae of Chin-kiang.

(Translation.) *September* 6, 1868.

CHIN-KIANG being a port open to foreign trade, there has always been a foreign man-of-war stationed here to guard the port. This vessel has just returned, after undergoing repairs at Shanghae. The soldiers Mr. Consul Medhurst took with him into the city to-day belonged to it, and the inhabitants have no reason to be afraid.

This proclamation is issued for the information and guidance of soldiers and people. You are required to pursue your callings in peace, and to refuse to listen to idle stories calculated to arouse suspicion or fear.

Should any person disturb the public mind by concocting rumours he will be at once arrested, brought to my Yamên, and severely punished.

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

The Viceroy, Tséng Kwo-fan, to Tsai, Taoutae of Chin-kiang.

(Translation.) *September* 9, 1868.

I HAVE received and read your two petitions.

With respect to the question of allowing religious establishments within the walls of cities, the Tsung-li Yamên gave their decision on the occasion of a French missionary, during the 4th year of Tung Chih, renting a house at Hwei-chi-hsien, in Chin-kiang. The decision was as follows:—"The erection of religious establishments in the interior has been going on for a long time; but as, in point of fact, the missionaries are all foreigners, when any land is purchased for religious purposes, the deed of sale should state in so many words that the land is transferred to the public estate of the Roman Catholic Mission of the place. The purchase of land in the interior by foreigners as their private property being contrary to Treaty, should still be prohibited."

The deeds issued of late years to French religious establishments in Nankin and Anhuei, have all been conformable to this decision. As Chin-kiang is a port open to foreign trade, and as in Kiang-su and Anhuei the erection of an establishment, and the gift of a public office has been sanctioned, the same rule will apply to Chin-kiang; that is, the lease of a house for religious purposes within the walls is what ought also to be sanctioned.

In this case I have no fault to find with you for taking cognizance, according to Treaty, of the lease by Mr. Taylor of the Hsia family's house.

What is wrong in your conduct is that you, on the repudiation of the lease by the Hsia family, failed to give the proper orders to Wang, Magistrate of Tan-tu-hsien, to bring the case to a satisfactory ending by procuring another house, going hurriedly to Soo-chow instead, while you had promised to Mr. Assistant Allen to give these orders.

That Magistrate Wang should omit to rebuke the Hsia family for giving a lease, and then repudiating it, and also omit to quash all further source of complication by producing another house, is all the reverse of what was required of him. I need not proceed in my examination of Wang's conduct, as he has already been deprived of his appointment for his conduct of another case.

As your own remissness, though culpable, does not justify removal or report to the Throne, I will not take further notice of your request to be allowed employment elsewhere.

Two points in this case ought as a matter of duty to be investigated, and the offenders punished; first, the illegal conduct of Hsia-lu-chih in leasing away the property by stealth; second, the conduct of the women in reclaiming against the lease. But to punish the first would arouse the jealousy of the foreigners, and to punish the woman, Hsia (*née* Li), for her pertinacious preference of the former lessee, would excite the suspicions of the silly populace, and might bring on a commotion.

In the 5th and 6th years of T'ung Chih, the French missionary Lei concluded the purchase of the Shuang-liang monastery at An-ching (or Yan-king), but as the gentry and people objected to its being turned into a book office, the local authorities (Foo and Hsien) selected a plot outside the city which he might buy for a church, and found another house inside the city to be leased as an office, and the missionary Lei gladly accepted this. Let this plan be followed at Chin-kiang.

You and the Prefect and Magistrate will rent another and suitable house within the city for Mr. Taylor, and report the result to me. If the foreigner is not pleased with

this plan, I will consult with Mr. Medhurst when he comes to Nanking, and come to some arrangement.

The actual transfer of a house rented for religious purposes from a Chinese, if insisted on, must not be allowed to take place before the whole circumstances are reported to the Magistrate.

Firstly, because the foreign missionaries may not be peaceable, inoffensive men, and may enter into underhand relations for mutual benefit with bad characters.

Secondly, evil-disposed persons might sell land under false title deed, and the missionaries suffer loss by their purchase.

Thirdly, this would be strictly according to the course pursued at Shanghae, where land about to be rented must first be reported for inspection before a legalized deed is granted.

Fourthly, and it also accords with the rule laid down in the Huei-chi case, namely, that purchase for a religious establishment only is to be authorized, not for private tenure.

If these four points be repeatedly pressed on the attention of the Consul and foreigners, they will no doubt give in their adhesion to them.

You must also explain, for the information of everyone, that the propagation of religion is allowed by Treaty, and that no molestation must be offered to the missionaries. Anyone in future concerned in collecting a mob or raising a riot shall not be left unpunished, but whoever he be, whether soldier or citizen, Tartar or Chinese, will at once be arrested and punished for the warning of others.

Inclosure 5 in No. 6.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, October* 1, 1868.

REFERRING to my despatch dated the 24th ultimo, I regret to have to report that my last advices from Mr. Assistant Allen state that the inhabitants of Chin-kiang continued to exhibit a malevolent spirit towards foreigners. The Taoutae has caused a Proclamation to be issued, which is word for word a transcript of the rescript he received from the Viceroy, and which formed Inclosure No. 2 in my despatch above referred to; but it has been answered by inflammatory placards threatening to burn any house let to a foreigner within the walls, and to treat in the same way the Yamên of any official who may in obedience to the Viceroy's instructions countenance a lease of the kind. I have in consequence represented to Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer the urgent necessity of there being a man-of-war stationed at the port, at any rate so long as the present excitement continues.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 7.

Lord Stanley to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 1, 1868.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 11th of September, stating your opinion that no further Treaty provision is required to give to British missionaries the right of purchasing land and residing in all parts of the country.

Her Majesty's Government trust, however, that in the exercise of such right British missionaries will conduct themselves with circumspection, and, bearing in mind the feelings and character of the Chinese authorities and people, do their utmost to avoid occasion of collision; and, instead of pressing for a recognition of their rights by local authorities, who may be inclined to disregard them, suspend for a time all controversy, and submit their complaint to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking.

By this course, at all events, the decision of the case would be removed from the influence of local passion and prejudice; and it will be for Her Majesty's Minister, if satisfied of the propriety of doing so, to insist with the Central Government, as a matter in regard to which the responsibility rests with that Government, that they shall control the local authorities.

In the same manner, if any unprovoked outrage should be committed on British

missionaries, Her Majesty's Minister would appeal to the Government at Peking, and require that the local magistracy, who may have connived at or instigated the act, shall not only be duly punished, but should also be compelled, out of their own resources, to make ample compensation to the sufferers.

It would, doubtless, prove a great check on local authorities if, in all cases where the interference of the Central Government has been appealed to with success in behalf of injured British missionaries, notice of the case should be published in the official Gazette, with an intimation that the publication is designed as a warning of the displeasure with which the Government will view any wrong done to such British subjects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STANLEY.

No. 8.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 6.)

My Lord, *Peking, October 12, 1868.*

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Medhurst's despatches of the 27th and 31st of August, the 3rd, 15th, and 24th of September, and 1st of October, addressed to me in succession, and copies of which he informs me were transmitted direct to the Foreign Office, reporting a series of outrages at Yang-chow offered to a party of missionaries, and similar violence and evidence of hostility at Chin-kiang, I have the honour to forward copies of my replies to the Consul.

Your Lordship will have seen by Mr. Medhurst's despatch of the 17th of September, that in consequence mainly, I believe, of his prompt and decided action, and the material support afforded by the presence of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," there seemed a fair prospect of full redress for the injuries suffered, and security for the future being obtained, when the sudden resolution of Commander Bush to return to Shanghae with his ship, the only one on the spot, left Mr. Medhurst in a humiliating and helpless position, obliged to take refuge in a house-boat, and deprived of all the moral influence and prestige which the presence of the ship of war gave. The result was precisely what might have been surely anticipated by any one in the least degree conversant with Chinese tactics and character. From that moment all negotiation was at an end, and the Viceroy at Nanking, turning a deaf ear to remonstrances, offered to bestow 1,000 taels in charity, and intimated to the Consul that he was too busy to see him again on the subject.

So far as I am informed, Commander Bush's ill health was the motive for this sudden removal of the ship, regardless of the injury that must result to the public interests by such a step. Nor am I informed whether Her Majesty's Consul entered any official protest or otherwise took care to make the Commander understand all the injurious consequences which would inevitably follow his retreat from the scene of action at the most critical moment for the success of the negotiations. If Mr. Consul Medhurst performed this part of his duty, it will remain for Commander Bush to justify his action in the face of such a protest. I cannot admit that his own ill health, grave or otherwise, was any sufficient justification, since it appears to me that unless he wanted further medical advice, or to be attended to on shore, he was just as well on board his ship in the Yangtsze as at Shanghae, and certainly in quite as good a climate in a sanitary point of view. If, on the contrary, he desired to be on shore, or to have further medical advice at Shanghae, large steamers, with the best accommodation, were almost daily passing, and could have afforded him the necessary facilities for returning without the necessity of taking away his ship and leaving the Consul to certain failure, with the necessity of recommencing the negotiations later, under far less favourable conditions, and with a much greater display of force.

This is the necessary result of Commander Bush's action. I must now place the matter in the hands of the naval Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Keppel, and call upon him to repair the mischief by sending such a force to the mouth of the Grand Canal as shall enable him, if necessary, to apply effective pressure, both on the local authorities and populace at Yang-chow and on the Viceroy at Nanking, to whom the Consul will be directed again to address himself, and renew his demands for redress, including the punishment of all offenders, so soon as the Vice-Admiral is prepared to sustain his negotiation. Should the authorities, contrary to my hopes, prove obstinate and

recalcitrant, I have the strongest conviction the time has arrived when it will no longer be possible to avoid a collision, and a resort to such determined pressure as shall compel the local authorities to respect and uphold our Treaty rights. They have long shown a great disposition to treat with neglect all complaints, and either to invite or tacitly connive at popular violence and hostility towards foreigners; to the regret, I believe, of the Central Government, and, to all appearance, without regard to their instructions.

This only makes it the more imperative on the Treaty Powers to take the matter into their own hands, and deal decisively with the local and provincial authorities. There is too much reason to fear that the Viceroys of the maritime provinces, having now gun-boats and drilled troops under their orders, are puffed up by a false idea of their power to resist; and however little either the ships or the ill-drilled levies may be worth in conflict with foreigners, they are foolish enough to think they may disregard all Treaty obligations with impunity, and are even prepared, in the exercise of their *quasi* independent authority, to run all risks on their own responsibility. Perhaps they calculate that if successful, the Central Government will easily condone their disregard of orders forced from the Tsung-li Yamên by the pressure of foreign Representatives at Peking; and although I have no certain evidence of insincerity here, it is only too much in accord with all past experience that they should fail in the energetic assertion of their proper authority over the high officers in the provinces, looking to the double chance of gaining in the end: that is, if the local authorities are coerced and humbled by a foreign Power, they will for some time to come be less dangerous and troublesome, both to the Government at Peking and to us. If, on the contrary, they prove too strong, and hold their own against any pressure brought to bear upon them, foreign Powers may become less exigeant in regard to the assertion of Treaty rights. In a word, it is to be feared that local and central authorities alike, but especially the former, forget that there is a limit to the longanimity of the most peace-loving Power, and require a repetition of the lesson so often received by their predecessors, which only can be given by steady and determined employment of means of coercion. Whether the seizure of a high officer at his post, who absolutely refuses to do justice or respect Treaty rights, as in Yeh's case, or some less decisive action may be necessary, must be determined according to circumstances. As regards Yang-chow, it is probable that a simple blockade of the mouth of the Grand Canal, stopping all the junk salt trade—in which the literati, gentry, and local authorities are all deeply interested—would, within forty-eight hours, bring them each in their turn, to a due sense of their obligations, and the folly of their attempts by violence to resist our just demands. But whatever be the means, recent occurrences in Formosa, at Yang-chow, and at Chin-kiang, have plainly shown the necessity for decisive action.

The popular outbreak at Chin-kiang is nothing but an extension of the impulse derived from the seeming success of the violent attacks on inoffensive missionaries at Yang-chow, with which city Chin-kiang is in close sympathy by trading and other nterests. The practical denial of all redress by Tsêng Kwo-fan, the Viceroy at Nanking,—his contemptuous dismissal of the subject, and refusal to receive Mr. Medhurst as soon as he knew that the latter had been left stranded on the bank by the only ship of war at his disposal, has of course greatly encouraged the reactionary party, and unless the inclosed requisition on the Senior Naval Officer at Shanghae be promptly answered by the dispatch of a vessel to Chin-kiang, it is impossible to say where the mischief will stop, or how costly will be the effort we shall be called upon to make to recover lost ground. I cannot help feeling that a heavy responsibility lies upon Commander Bush, whose action in the precipitate withdrawal of his vessel has mainly brought about this untoward state of affairs, the more to be regretted, because it is for the time irremediable. Some ten or fifteen days must elapse before any despatch of mine can reach the Naval Commander-in-Chief, who I believe is either at Hong Kong or Singapore at the present moment. I have no doubt that, as soon as he learns from me what is the true position of affairs, he will lose no time in repairing to the scene in person, and that he will promptly take such measures in support of my demands as may be found needful. But his Excellency Tsêng Kwo-fan will in the meantime have left Nanking for his new post as Governor-General of the Province, and some weeks must of necessity be lost before any steps can be taken by the Consul to renew his demands, during all which time the local authorities and our most active enemies the literati and gentry will be exulting in a seeming triumph of violence over right, and be all the less amenable to reason or peaceable efforts for redress when the hour for exacting it arrives. This is not the Consul's fault, who was successful as long as he was supported, and only failed when all material force was withdrawn. I think it only due to Mr. Medhurst to say that he showed both energy and good judgment in all his proceedings, and a very laudable

promptitude in grappling with the difficulties of the situation, as well as firmness and moderation in the demands he made for redress.

As regards any action here, I have twice been in conference with the members of the Tsung-li Yamên. The first time Wên-tagên and Tan-tagên came to the Legation on the 19th ultimo, and while deprecating any foregone conclusions until they themselves had advices from the authorities on the spot, they admitted without hesitation that, assuming the facts to be as I represented, full redress must be secured, and they agreed to place in my hands instructions to that effect addressed to the Viceroy Tsêng Kwo-fan, to be forwarded by steamer with my despatch to Mr. Medhurst.

On the 8th instant, having received Mr. Medhurst's report of the failure of his negotiations from the causes already referred to, and the Prince of Kung's reply to my despatch of the 17th of September, I proceeded to the Yamên, and saw the Prince together with the other members of the Board. After the collapse into which the Consul had been thrown by causes over which he had no control, the one important object I had in view was to reopen the whole question it had been the Viceroy's design to close, by insisting upon an inquiry being instituted at Yang-chow, which should be conducted in concert with the Consul, and by an officer of at least equal rank, with full power under instructions from the Yamên, to carry his investigation into the conduct of the Prefect and Che-Hsien, and also the literati and the gentry inculpated. This was, after some discussion as to the discrepancy between the accounts sent by the Viceroy and the Consul, conceded. And having impressed upon the Prince and his colleagues the necessity for a searching and honest inquiry into all the facts with punishment of the offenders whatever their rank or position, together with such security for the future as their punishment could alone secure, in all which they generally concurred, I merely alluded to the similar outbreaks at Chin-kiang, and preceding acts of violence at Taiwan, in Formosa, observed that the same reasoning applied to all.

I am now waiting for the reply to my written communication sent in the next day, copy of which is herewith inclosed, to write to the naval Commander-in-chief and claim such effective support of the Consul as can alone avail to put a stop to these dangerous examples of popular violence and official connivance, and prevent the tendency of these centres of commotion to widen their sweep until all the places to which foreigners have access become unsafe as places of resort or residence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Peking, September* 19, 1868.

REFERRING to your despatches of the 27th and 31st of August, and the 3rd instant, I have to inform you that the Tsung-li Yamên have assured me justice shall be done in the matter of these outrages; and I count upon you, with the support of the senior naval officer, to have impressed the local authorities, and the Viceroy himself, with a conviction of the necessity of an example being made, both of the instigators to the disturbances and the magistrates who so ill discharged their duty in protecting the foreigner. For greater dispatch the inclosed instructions to the Viceroy at Nanking have been forwarded through me for immediate dispatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Peking, October* 9, 1868.

WITH reference to your despatches of the 24th of September and 1st of October, reporting the unsatisfactory state of affairs at Chin-kiang, I inclose, under flying seal, for your perusal prior to delivery, an official requisition addressed to the senior naval officer at Shanghae for a gun-boat to be stationed at Chin-kiang without delay, to remain there until farther steps can be taken for the security of British interests.

I may state for your information in the meantime that, in a long interview with the Prince of Kung and the other members of the Tsung-li Yamên yesterday, I endeavoured to impress upon his Imperial Highness and the Board the necessity for immediate and vigorous steps on the part of the Government here to put down the turbulent spirit which has been manifested so unprovokedly against foreigners, both at Yang-chow and Chin-kiang; and for a full measure of justice, not only by the redress of the injuries inflicted on the missionaries concerned, but by the punishment of all, of whatever rank or position, who can be shown to have been culpably implicated in the violence offered to them.

The result has been so far satisfactory that it has been determined to institute a searching and honest inquiry on the spot into all the circumstances, and I am assured the punishment of those responsible for any wrong done shall surely follow, together with compensation to the missionaries, and their restoration to the places from whence they have been ejected.

I stipulated that this investigation should be conducted by an officer specially deputed by the Viceroy of Nanking, under instructions from the Tsung-li Yamên, and of a rank at least equal to your own; the inquiry to be conducted in your presence, or in concert with you, that you may, as prosecutor, produce whatever evidence you think necessary to elicit the truth and lead to the conviction of all aiders and abettors in the violence of the mob, not excluding the Prefect and Che-Hsien, who are charged with neglect of duty, if not direct collusion with those who disturbed the public peace.

I expect in a day or two to receive the written answer of the Prince, announcing the dispatch of instructions to this effect, when I will communicate farther with you as to your co-operation on the spot with the Commissioner deputed to conduct the inquiry. It will be my duty to take care you have adequate support from Her Majesty's navy, and with this object I propose addressing the naval Commander-in-chief, that he may direct such measures to be taken to that end as shall be deemed necessary to provide for all contingencies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Sir R. Alcock to the Senior Naval Officer, Shanghae.

Sir, *Peking, October* 9, 1868.

THE official reports which reach me of the hostile spirit shown to foreigners at Chin-kiang, in connection probably with what must for the present appear the successful outbreak against the missionaries at Yang-chow, render it essential that there should be at least a gun-boat stationed at Chin-kiang until further steps can be taken for the protection of British interests. I trust, therefore, you will have no difficulty in making this provision. If there be any gun-boat in the Yang-tsze at this moment, there is no call for its presence at either of the other ports to interfere with its immediate transfer to the more southern station. I am about to address the Naval Commander-in-chief on this subject, and also to request material support of the most efficient kind in prosecuting the claims for redress which I am now preparing upon the Chinese Government. As soon as I receive the final answer from the Foreign Board I shall be able to determine the nature of the measures to be taken, and I propose forwarding my despatch to Sir H. Keppel under cover to you, that, being on the spot, you may adopt such measures in furtherance of the public objects in view as may be in your power without farther delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 4 in No. 8.

The Prince of Kung to Sir R. Alcock.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

In the matter of the disturbances in which Mr. Taylor was involved at Yang-chow, the Prince having received on the 19th September your Excellency's account of the plundering and incendiarism committed by the Yang-chow populace, together with a copy of Mr. Medhurst's representation (to the Viceroy), sent copies of these to the

Minister Superintendent at Shanghae with orders to him to depute a trustworthy official to investigate the case thoroughly in conjunction with the local officials, so as to bring this case to an end; to establish friendly relations between the missionaries and the populace, and to prevent the further spread of like occurrences. To your Excellency's further communication the Prince would not reply until he was in receipt of a reply from Shanghae.

He has now received from the Minister Superintendent a despatch to the effect that the deputed officer, Chang, had reported that inquiries showed that the house had not been burnt, and that foreigners had been injured; also that Mr. Consul Medhurst, the Taoutae of Chin-kiang and the Prefect of Yang-chow, had settled the matter among them. It would appear that the missionary Li (Reid) had already quite recovered from the very slight injury done to his eye; that for the damage wrongfully done to Mr. Taylor's house, for demolition and loss of property, and for medical treatment of personal injuries, a sum of 1,000 taels should be paid by the Shanghae Taoutae; that Mr. Taylor's house should be thoroughly repaired; that a proclamation should be issued, distinctly stating, for the information of all, that British subjects had a Treaty right to reside within the city of Yang-chow, and that any one causing trouble or molesting them would be liable to condign punishment; that within two months Mr. Taylor should be requested to return to his former residence; that the affair grew out of the people's own suspicions, sundry of the offenders having already been punished as a warning, the gentry having nothing to do with it; that the gentry indicated were men of high rank, and incapable of wilful disregard of Treaty provisions, for which reason they need not be called to account; that the Yang-chow Prefect had not broken the Treaty, and need not be denounced, &c.

The Minister Superintendent states that he communicated with Mr. Consul Medhurst both personally and in writing.

It seems to the Prince that these troubles were caused, in the first instance, by the very numerous deaths which occurred at the French Orphanage. An ignorant populace got hold of stories about digging out eyes, and extracting brains, their suspicions became anger, and in a moment of excitement they wrongfully made disturbances at Mr. Taylor's.

The Minister Superintendent states that he has ordered the local authorities to repair the missionaries' house, they returning to reside at Yang-chow as before.

Among the whole number of men and women but one was slightly injured, and a sum of money has been bestowed to provide medical treatment, and in compensation for articles lost and despoiled, while the actual perpetrators of the outrage have been punished in the "cangue."

This course of action seems to the Prince to fulfil Treaty provisions, one which could satisfy missionaries and the people, and to be in accordance with what justice requires. He now transmits a copy of the Viceroy's letter to Mr. Medhurst, and a copy of the report made by Chang Kai-chi to the Viceroy, and begs that Mr. Medhurst may be instructed to close the case. It may be that missionaries will be reconciled, and that no such causes of offence will again arise.

On his part the Prince will instruct the Viceroy at once to issue a Proclamation for general circulation at Yang-chow, enjoining all gentry and people alike that there are to be no more such disturbances. Thus Treaties will be respected and friendly relations consolidated.

The Prince trusts your Excellency will concur with him, &c.

Inclosure 5 in No. 8.

The Viceroy, Tséng Kwo-fan, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

THE Report of Ch'ang Kai-Ch'i, the Deputy sent by the Viceroy to meet Mr. Medhurst.

The Deputy received his instructions to proceed to Chin-kiang on the 6th September (at 7—8 P.M.). He was to inquire into and report on the state of affairs at Yang-chow. He had copies of Mr. Medhurst's two letters to the Viceroy and of his Excellency's replies. He took his departure on the 7th September, and reached Chin-kiang at midnight on the 8th, when he was told that Mr. Medhurst had left that morning for Yang-chow. On the 9th he hastened to Kua chow. He met Mr. Medhurst *en route*, and returned with him to Chin-kiang. He asked Mr. Medhurst why, after having requested a Wei-yuen might be sent to Chin-kiang, he had not waited his arrival. Mr. Medhurst made no reply. Mr. Medhurst told him that the missionaries' house had

not been burnt, but that the partitions had been damaged, and there were marks of brickbats on the walls; that only the furniture of the downstairs rooms remained, and that this had been sealed up by the Prefect, and that there was no need of any further inspection of the premises. When the Deputy wished to see and inspect the people, he was told that he should see them when they could be all summoned. Subsequently, he saw and conversed with Mr. Allen, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Lang, and others. From them he learnt that the missionary whose eye had been injured had gone to Nanking. He was told, too, that the women who had jumped from the windows, and who were then assailed with bricks, &c., were in the ninth month of their pregnancy. It seemed to him that in such a case there would have been delivery, and he inquired for the dead infants. Mr. Taylor replied that the ladies had not been delivered, though they were expecting their confinement. It seems to the Deputy, as fourteen days had elapsed and no harm had come to these pregnant ladies, that Mr. Taylor's statement of their jumping from the windows was made on hearsay evidence only. The wounds and bruises they are said to have received from bricks, &c, could not be exhibited through feelings of delicacy, though the Deputy wished to send for an experienced female from the Tai-ta-hsien. When he inquired after the other wounded, he was told that they were all recovered, and that he need not be at the trouble to examine them. The Consul produced no wounded people, and the charges to that effect are unsubstantiated. He asked Mr. Medhurst to go to Yang-chow, but Mr. Medhurst said he had been; that the house had not been burnt, and that he would not go again, nor would he send a deputy.

He agreed to go with Mr. Medhurst to Nanking on the 10th September. He started very early on the morning of that day for Yang-chow, saw that the house had not been burnt, and was told by the neighbours that the Kan-chien-hsien had sent the missionaries' property after them by boat to Chin-kiang. All denied that acts of incendiarism had been committed. As the Prefect had gone to Nanking, and the steamer was waiting, the Deputy left without seeing the local magistrates. He made straight for Kua-chow, but the steamer had left. He was detained on his road by contrary winds, and reached Nanking on the 12th September.

Inclosure 6 in No. 8.

Sir R. Alcock to the Prince of Kung.

Sir, *Peking, October* 9, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Imperial Highness' letter of the 7th instant on the Yang-chow disturbances; and referring to our conversation at the Tsung-li Yamên yesterday, I deem it unnecessary to enter into details in reply. I have already communicated verbally the grounds of my dissatisfaction at the result of the reference made to his Excellency the Viceroy at Nanking by Mr. Consul Medhurst, and of the action taken by that high officer.

In consequence, it has accordingly been agreed that a full and impartial inquiry shall be instituted on the spot by a competent officer to be deputed by the Viceroy under instructions from the Yamên, of at least equal rank to the Consul, and with full powers to investigate any charges that may be brought by the Consul, whether against the Prefect and Chih-hsien or any of the literati and gentry, in order that the truth may be elicited and justice done. That an unprovoked outrage of the most serious character has been perpetrated upon the missionaries, with injury to their persons and loss of property in open violation of Treaty, has been placed beyond all doubt. The only matters for investigation on the spot, therefore, have reference to the circumstances under which the violence was offered, the degree of injury suffered, the amount of compensation due, and the culpability of the several parties concerned. The arrest and punishment of all the persons implicated,—whether the active agents among the mob who sacked the house and attacked the inmates—their instigators and abettors among the better classes, are essential if there is to be any security for the future. The authorities who are likewise charged with having failed to perform their duty in preventing such disorders and protecting the British missionaries, must answer for their conduct.

Immunity to such offenders, more especially if high placed, is wholly incompatible with the Treaty rights of foreigners, and fatal to the best devised measures of protection on the part of the Chinese Government. If such charges can be established by sufficient evidence, I need not insist upon the necessity of their removal and punishment as the only means of doing justice, or averting the recurrence of similar outrages at Yang-chow or elsewhere. Already the bad influence of the violence of the mob, and inertness or

collusion of the local authorities at Yang-chow, has made itself felt at Chin-kiang, and led to similar outbreaks. In Formosa the same grounds of complaint exist, as I stated yesterday, and demand similar remedies. It is in the interest of peace and for the maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries that measures of energetic repression are called for, and none can be so effective as the prompt and severe punishment of all who have taken part in the outrages, irrespective of their rank or wealth.

As soon as your Imperial Highness acquaints me that the necessary order will be sent to his Excellency the Viceroy at Nanking to depute an officer of adequate rank and authority to conduct the inquiry, I will forward instructions to Mr. Consul Medhurst to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Yang-chow and to assist in the inquiry, which I can only hope, in the common interest, will be searching and honest, and so conduce to the firm establishment of peace and good order.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) R. ALCOCK.

No. 9.

Acting Vice-Consul Forrest to Lord Stanley.—(*Received December* 6.)

My Lord. *Shanghae, October* 22, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of Mr. Consul Medhurst's despatch to Her Majesty's Minister, dated the 15th instant, covering translation of a letter from his Excellency Viceroy Tsêng on the subject of redress to be given in the matter of the Yang-chow outrage, as reported in despatches of the 8th and 23rd September last to your Lordship's address.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. J. FORREST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, October* 15, 1868.

REFERRING to my despatches of the 17th September and 1st October last, I have now the honour to inclose translation of a communication which I have just received from his Excellency Viceroy Tsêng, on the subject of the redress to be given in the matter of the Yang-chow outrage, and which, it is very gratifying to observe, conveys a somewhat more favourable decision as regards two points, at any rate, out of the eight urged by me, viz., the grant of a sufficient sum of money to the sufferers, and the punishment of the local authorities.

With regard to the injuries and wounds sustained by the female members of the Mission, on the improbability of which the Viceroy seems to lay such great stress, I must in justice to myself remark that I was informed that they were of such a nature, more especially in the case of Mrs. Taylor, as to preclude the possibility of personal inspection, or even particular inquiry, on my part, and there were no medical men on the spot to whom I could very well apply for the survey pronounced as so essential by the Viceroy. To have taken the opinion of Chinese female experts would have been, as your Excellency will no doubt agree with me, a simple absurdity. The only injury of the existence of which I was able to satisfy myself was that received by Miss Blatchley, who sustained a fracture of the outer prominence of the elbow joint.

Mr. Reid's hurt was entirely confined to the eye. After the external inflammation which had supervened upon the infliction of the blow had subsided, the eye showed no outward signs of injury, and the Viceroy might very easily have concluded that "the wound was merely a slight one." But Mr. Reid assured me that he was unable to see clearly with the affected eye, and Mr. Taylor gave it as his opinion that the nerve had been so severely injured as to make it more than probable that the sight would, ere long, be lost altogether.

Taking all these facts into consideration, I scarcely think that my estimate for compensation for injuries received can be pronounced as in any way exeessive.

I have done no more than acknowledge the receipt of the Viceroy's letter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

The Viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *October* 8, 1868.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 18th September, in which you express great regret that the decision in my despatch dated the 14th September in the matter of the Yang-chow outrage is not a speedy and reasonable adjustment, and in which you offer remarks upon the several points. I am also in receipt of a communication from the Tsung-li Yamên, forwarding copies of the correspondence of the British Minister with reference to the affair.

I now proceed again to offer you observations on each point.

1. In my former despatch I stated that the gentry whose names you gave are of high rank, have always acted as becomes their position and experience, and were certainly not guilty of inciting the people against the missionaries. In the majority of cases it is the graduates, and those who have purchased degrees, who are the leaders of riots. Those indicated by your despatch have held actual office of the second. third. and fourth ranks, and are not of the class above described. Is it possible that men who have held high office should show ignorance of affairs, whilst the graduates and purchased-degree men, a numerous class and endowed with small experience, should show intimate knowledge of affairs (by abstaining from disturbance)? Further, the disturbance took place in the Chiang-tu and Kan-ch'üan Hsiens, while the four gentlemen are of the I-ching Hsien. Are the gentry of I-ching Hsien the only ones to show ignorance, while the men of all the other seven Hsiens in the Hang-chow Prefecture are highly experienced? These two arguments are easily understood. The four gentlemen have become obnoxious to suspicion simply on account of their very high rank. The British Minister evidently quite understands this, as in his note to the Tsung-li Yamên, copy of which has been sent me, his Excellency makes no mention of the allegation that these four gentlemen incited the people.

The severe stricture you pass upon one named Ko, coincides more with the statement you make (*scil.;* of some prominent men being the inciters), but I do not know more than the surname of this Ko, and I cannot tell whether he is a graduate, and neither did you or the Prefect of Yang-chow mention him before. I have directed that Prefect to find out the facts about the man, and I will punish him severely. I think you need harbour no further suspicions with respect to the four gentlemen.

2. In my former despatch I said that the Yang-chow Prefect should submit for my correction a draft of a proclamation before its issue, and to ensure preservation for any length of time, all that was necessary would be to paste it on a board. You now desire an opportunity of examining it before it is conclusively issued, and also demand its inscription on stone. I can assure you that any proclamation issued by me will be conformable to Treaty stipulations, will satisfy what is required by our friendly relations, and will be eminently calculated to promote the interests of the missionaries. Another reason for refusing to submit the draft for your inspection is, that it is a matter in which China is giving information and guidance to its gentry and people.

Hitherto no governmental documents emanating from the Emperor have ever been cut on tablets. What are so treated are matters half official and half private, as the building of or repairs to temples, bridges, or roads, or the fixing of the rate of ground-rent in money and grain. The stipulation in the Treaty allowing missionaries to preach has been made known everywhere, according to the Imperial orders, and there is, therefore, no necessity for cutting it on stone. If it were allowed in Yang-chow, the mission-stations at Chin-kiang, Nanking, Anching, and all other places, could likewise get stones so inscribed. As it is not provided for in the Treaty, the demand cannot be characterized as reasonable, and it is impossible for me to comply with it. I may remark, too, that China, having been long on friendly terms with foreign countries, this sort of inscription would in an uncalled-for manner perpetuate the memory of the affair, like the cicatrice of a great sore. It is far better to leave nothing which may embitter the feelings.

3. The Treaty contains an Article by which the arrest and punishment of robbers, and the recovery of the stolen property, is stipulated for; but there is no mention of compensation. If, indeed, the men who committed the robbery can be indicated by name, they will be forced to deliver up their booty by castigation or fine. This may be described as either "recovery of the stolen goods" or "compensation." But as the names of the guilty parties are not obtainable, any money that I may give Mr. Taylor's party on behalf of the people of the district may well be termed a charitable gift. Tsai, Taoutae, in his note to you distinctly announced that the money I offered was for the purpose of replacing the lost property, and for defraying Mr. Reid's medical expenses. Whether it be called compensation or gratuity. the money shall only be given on one account; if given as a gratuity, no other sum shall be granted as compensation.

As to the actual amount of money, I had a month ago no detailed statement from you of the loss by robbery. I had only heard that the number of things lost was very small, and that Mr. Reid's wound was extremely slight, and I concluded that 1,000 taels would be ample. Your statement, now before me, shows a loss of 1,612 dollars. The medical expenses, which are not included, seem rather excessive. However, as the mere money is a small matter, I will make no difficulty in increasing the amount wherever it may benefit our friendly understanding.

With respect to Mr. Reid's wound, it was merely a slight one; and as to the wives of Messrs. Taylor and Rudland, I must deny their having been wounded at all. This is a very important point; for if they were burnt, how was it that you, after twice demanding that an officer should be sent with you to Chin-kiang and Yang-chow, did not, when that officer, Chang Kai-chi, arrived at Chin-kiang, hold joint inspection on the spot? Chang pressed Messrs. Taylor and Duncan repeatedly to let female experts view the injuries, but was met by long excuses on Mr. Taylor's part, who at last stated that the injuries were solely internal, and begged him not to hold an inspection. Taking a wide view of the circumstances, it may be concluded that the women really had no hurt, though there may have been at the time some report that they had. Mr. Stronach, the Interpreter, when he came here the other day, agreed with me that nothing further need be said about the injuries to the pregnant women.

The sum of 770 taels for medical expenses will, therefore, have to be largely reduced.

4. The statement in my former despatch that the Yang-chow Prefect did not at first commit an infraction of Treaty has raised a suspicion in your mind that I am screening my subordinate officers. My way with those under me is to take note of their character and disposition, as shown by their daily conduct, and of their talents and tact by their conduct in an emergency. I can aver from their daily conduct that the Yang-chow Prefect and Magistrate have no disposition to make light of foreigners, still less to commit a breach of Treaty. When the populace committed the outrage on the Mission, Prefect Sun showed that his talents and tact were insufficient for an emergency, by failing previously to the outbreak to take precautionary measures, and by exhibiting a want of resources on the instant. When he did get news of it, he went in person to repress the disturbance, sent an escort with the missionaries across the river to Chin-kiang, and engaged coolies to move their baggage, which weighed 120 piculs. His merit in this, which is of a piece with his ordinary disposition to treat missionaries with great rather than little consideration, may rank as a considerable set-off. However, the inability of the local authorities to avert disaster, in spite of the two warning letters of Mr. Taylor, has brought about serious consequences. I have discharged Prefect Sun from his office and replaced him by Chao; Magistrate Wang replaces Li, who is discharged from being Magistrate of Kan-chüan Hsien. These changes will set at rest the minds of the missionaries, and will consolidate the bonds of amity.

No. 10.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received December 16.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December* 15, 1868.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Henry Keppel, dated the 5th November, reporting the arrangements he has made for sending a force to demand satisfaction from the Viceroy at Nanking for outrages committed on British subjects at Yang-chow and Chin-kiang.

I also forward a copy of the orders given by Sir Henry Keppel to Captain Heneage, of Her Majesty's ship "Rodney," to proceed to Nanking on this service; also an extract of a letter from Commander Bush, late of Her Majesty's sloop "Rinaldo," reporting his reasons for leaving Nanking.

It is presumed that copies of the other inclosures to Sir Henry Keppel's letter will have been received at the Foreign Office from Sir Rutherford Alcock.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, "*Salamis*," *at Saigon, November* 5, 1868.

IN paragraphs 19 to 26 of my general letter of the 19th October, I had the honour of acquainting their Lordships with the state of affairs at Yang-chow and Chin-kiang, reporting outrages committed apparently under the auspices of the authorities on British subjects.

2. The accompanying letter from Her Majesty's Minister in China* will more fully acquaint their Lordships with the nature of the claims for redress which are about to be repeated by Mr. Consul Medhurst to the Viceroy at Nanking.

3. Sir Rutherford Alcock having in that letter applied to me for effective support in order that the demands shall be exacted if persistently denied to more peaceable efforts, I have the honour to inclose, for their Lordships' information, a copy of my reply to Sir Rutherford Alcock, giving cover to the instructions I have addressed to Captain Algernon Heneage, who accompanies Her Majesty's Consul to Nanking with the "Rodney," "Rinaldo," and "Slaney."

4. The Minister's requisition having reached me after my departure from Hong Kong for the Straits Division, I am anxious to complete my round of inspection before proceeding to Nanking, as in the event of active operations being required beyond a blockade of the Grand Canal to cut off the salt trade, I shall be enabled to reach Nanking and assume charge as soon as a sufficient force can be collected.

5. I have more fully explained this to Sir Rutherford Alcock in my semi-official letters; at the same time I am of opinion that the provincial authorities at Nanking, seeing that we are in earnest, and that they are unsupported by the Central Government at Peking, will at once concede all demands on a mere display of such an unusual force as already has been despatched to their neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. KEPPEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Commander Bush to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

(Extract.) *September* 14, 1868.

OWING to my now serious illness, I determine to return to Shanghae, as I could render no further assistance to the Consul; and the objects of the mission being nearly completed, I left Nanking on the afternoon of the 12th, and arrived here (Shanghae) this morning.

Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

Orders addressed to Captain Heneage.

By the Honourable Sir H. Keppel, K.C.B., &c. &c.

YOUR letter of the 27th October informs me that having read the requisition addressed to me by Her Majesty's Minister in China, of which a copy is annexed, you had determined to embark Mr. Consul Medhurst on the 2nd November, and proceed with him to the anchorage off Nanking, in the "Rodney," accompanied by the "Rinaldo" and "Slaney." The course you have adopted meets with my approval.

Her Majesty's Minister appeals to me to give such effective support to Mr. Consul

* Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

Medhurst in the demands he will be instructed to make as may be necessary to obtain full redress for recent outrages committed on British subjects at Yang-chow.

I intrust you with this important duty until I am enabled to join you; and in the proceedings you adopt, you will be careful to act with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Consul.

Should the Provisional Authorities persistently refuse a compliance with our demands, Her Majesty's Consul will place the matter in your hands.

The measures of coercion to be adopted will be determined by circumstances. It may be necessary to arrest the high officers, should they absolutely refuse to do justice, or respect our Treaty rights; or in respect to Yang-chow, a simple blockade of the mouth of the Grand Canal, stopping the junk salt trade, may speedily effect our object.

You will make yourself acquainted with the force you are likely to encounter, and should it appear that a larger landing-party is required than can be afforded by Her Majesty's ships under your orders, reinforced by the "Zebra" and "Icarus," you will apply to Captain Stanhope for such proportion of the Marines and small-arm men serving in the division under his orders as can be spared, informing him that it is my direction he immediately dispatches such force to Nanking in Her Majesty's ship "Adventurer;" but no commanding officer senior to yourself is to supersede you in the direction of the service with which you are specially intrusted; and should there be any doubt as to the sufficiency of the force at your command to carry out the coercive measures that may be resolved on, you will wait further communication from me, confining your operations in that case to a simple blockade, which is to be notified to the Representatives of other Powers in the usual manner.

Should you find, on the other hand, that you do not require the assistance I have referred to, and that a peaceable compliance with our demands enables you to dispense with the "Rinaldo," "Icarus," and "Slaney," you will dispatch them, without delay, in execution of the orders I have addressed to their commanding officers.

You are to remain in the North Division, where I hope to rejoin you in the "Salamis" as soon as circumstances will admit.

Dated on board the "Salamis," at Saigon, this 5th day of November, 1868.

(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

To Algernon C. F. Heneage, Esq.,
Captain, Her Majesty's ship "Rodney."
By the Commander-in-chief,
(Signed) Wm. Bond Risk, *Secretary.*

No. 11.

Acting Vice-Consul Forrest to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 28.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, November 9,* 1868.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Lordship, copy of Mr. Consul Medhurst's despatch dated the 29th October last, to Her Majesty's Minister, reporting further on the Yang-chow question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. J. FORREST.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, October 29,* 1868.

I HAD the honour to receive your Excellency's despatch dated the 15th instant, with its inclosures, whilst absent at Ningpo; and I lost no time in hastening back to my post, in order to hold myself in readiness to carry out the instructions which it conveys, in conjunction with Her Majesty's naval authorities.

I observe, with sincere gratification, that the position which I have taken up with the provincial authorities in reference to the redress claimed for the outrage committed upon the missionaries at Yang-chow, has secured your Excellency's unqualified approval; and I shall be careful to make the modification in my terms, which is suggested in your despatch under acknowledgment.

As regards the steps which I am required to take in furtherance of your Excellency's wishes, I am informed by Captain Heneage, commanding Her Majesty's ship "Rodney," that he is in possession of ample authority from Her Majesty's Naval Commander-in-chief to support me with all the force at his disposal, consisting of his own ship, the "Rinaldo," and the "Slaney," and that it is necessary, owing to the heavy draft of the first-named vessel, that he should cross the bar on the 2nd proximo; and as there appears to be every probability that Tsêng Kwo-fan will hand over his charge to his successor within the next week or ten days, I have determined upon starting on my mission without waiting for any further communication from the Admiral, to whom, however, your Excellency's despatches have been forwarded.

I will keep you regularly informed of my proceedings by every opportuuity at my disposal.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 12.

Acting Vice-Consul Forrest to Lord Stanley.—(*Received December* 28.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, November* 10, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Lordship, copies of Mr. Consul Medhurst's despatches dated the 3rd and 6th instant to Her Majesty's Minister.

I regret that the inclosure in despatch of 3rd November has been inadvertently taken away by Mr. Medhurst without a copy having been left in this office. I have, however, caused one to be written for, and shall forward it by the next mail.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. J. FORREST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, November* 3, 1868.

ADVERTING to my despatch dated the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Her Majesty's ship "Rodney" left Wusung yesterday accompanied by Her Majesty's ships "Rinaldo" and "Slaney," and that I propose to start this evening to join the fleet at Chin-kiang. Her Majesty's ship "Icarus," which has since arrived in port from Amoy, is, I believe, also ordered to proceed up the river forthwith.

In order to save time and to obviate the necessity of any objectless discussion with the Viceroy when I arrive at his Yamên, I have prepared an official communication (translation of which I have the honour to inclose) which I intend to send on shore as soon as the "Rodney" reaches Nanking, and I shall make it my endeavour to keep the Viceroy as close as I possibly can to the terms laid down in this communication.

Your Excellency will observe that my letter limits the duty of the Commission of Inquiry very much to the prosecution of the perpetrators and abettors of the outrage, and that it claims the right to insist on the concession of the demands which have been already preferred, with certain slight modifications which are provided for, as a preliminary to any proceedings whatever. I took care to adopt this course because I felt that to admit the possibility of discussion by the Commission of my main terms would be to lose my hold of Tsêng, and practically to nullify the objects of the mission altogether. Nor can Tsêng complain, I conceive, of my taking those terms as my starting-point, seeing that from the first no pains have been taken on the part of the Chinese to assist me in substantiating the facts on which my case is based, but that rather, on the contrary, every effort has been made to gloss over and misrepresent them.

I gather from your Excellency's despatches of the 9th and 15th October that your instructions admit of this construction, and I trust that the result may prove that you quite concur in the correctness of the view which I am taking.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Chin-kiang, November* 6, 1868.

REFERRING to my despatch dated the 3rd instant, I have the honour to acquaint you that I have reached this port, and am now awaiting the arrival of Her Majesty's ships, whose progress has been unfortunately retarded by the prevalence of foggy weather.

I find a most wholesome alarm prevalent amongst all classes as regards the advent and intentions of Her Majesty's ships, and I anticipate little difficulty in pressing my claims on the attention of Viceroy Tsêng, who, I am informed, is not to hand over his seals to his successor until the 10th instant.

The question of Mr. Taylor's possession of the premises rented to him within the walls of this city, the details of which have been fully reported in my despatches dated the 3rd and 24th September last, is, I am happy to say, approaching a satisfactory solution. Chiefly owing to Mr. Allen's persistent efforts, Mr. Taylor's right to the house has been so far admitted as to allow of his placing his printing-press and other furniture on the premises, and employing workmen to prepare them for his reception; and yesterday I had an interview with the Taoutae, when he promised me that, on Mr. Taylor's procuring a written consent to his lease by the only member of the proprietor's family who has recorded an objection with the magistrate, which consent Mr. Taylor has volunteered to obtain, the transfer shall be formally registered, and a proclamation in support of it.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 13.

Acting Consul Forrest to Lord Stanley.—(Received December 28.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, November* 10, 1868.

IT is with pleasure I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have just received inteligence, dated the 9th of November, from Mr. Consul Medhurst, to the effect that the Viceroy Tsêng had yielded unconditionally to the demands made by him in connection with the Yang-chow affair, pronouncing them to be very reasonable.

A Grain Commissioner from Huai-gan, and Ying, the Taoutae of Shanghae, had been appointed Commissioners to proceed to Yang-chow with Mr. Medhurst, in order to secure the trial and punishment of the offenders in the late attack.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. J. FORREST.

No. 14.

Sir R. Alcock to Lord Stanley.—(Received January 10, 1869.)

My Lord, *Peking, October* 29, 1868.

REFERRING to my despatch of the 12th instant, I have the honour to inclose a further correspondence on the same subject with Mr. Consul Medhurst, Mr. Gibson, in charge at Taiwan, and the naval Commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Keppel. Mr. Medhurst informs me he has sent his own despatches to my address, herein referred to, direct to the Foreign Office.

The Prince of Kung's reply of the 14th was satisfactory, and in accordance with what was agreed upon in our interview, that he should direct the Viceroy at Nanking to depute a Wei-yuan of proper rank to enter upon a new inquiry, in concert with Mr. Medhurst, with a view to a final settlement by peaceable means.

The rest of the correspondence records the steps I have taken, in communication with the respective Consuls and Naval Commander-in-chief, to resume negotiations, both at Nanking and Taiwan, backed by an adequate force, to be persevered in until full redress should be obtained, and better security for the future.

The Admiral's assurances of his willingness and ability to give all necessary assistance will, I trust, ensure the success of the peaceable efforts I have instructed the Consuls to make, and avert the necessity of asserting our Treaty rights by a resort to force. I have reason to believe that the Viceroy Tsêng Kwo-fan has been warned that he cannot leave for his new post as Governor-General of Chili, to which he has been recently nominated, until he has arrived at a satisfactory settlement of existing differences; to which I attribute the very moderate and conciliatory tone of his last communication to Mr. Medhurst, and the desire shown to make material concessions. The removal of the Prefect and Che-hsien of Yang-chow, with an admission of their inefficiency, if not of their

criminality, and the offer to make reasonable compensation to the missionaries for injuries and losses, are great advances on his curt answer when Mr. Medhurst was left by the "Rinaldo." He is, of course, aware that a naval force is likely to be dispatched to support the Consul more effectively in his farther efforts at a peaceful solution.

In like manner, the removal of the Taoutae from Taiwan cannot fail to have a good influence, and must facilitate Mr. Swinhoe's farther efforts in the same direction.

I venture to hope that by this timely display of determination to assert Treaty rights and obtain redress for their violation, whatever the resistance offered by local authorities in complicity with literati and populace, I shall be enabled, at no distant date, to report the restoration of order, with material guarantees for the protection of British subjects and their interests, both on the Yang-tsze and in Formosa. And if these results can be secured without any resort to measures of open coercion, the victory over bad faith and hostility in provincial authorities will be one of unmixed benefit in our future relations, both with the Government here, and at the more distant localities where the authorities are under very imperfect control.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

The Prince of Kung to Sir R. Alcock.

(Translation.) *October* 14, 1868.

THE Prince of Kung, &c., makes a communication in reply.

On the 10th instant the Prince received a reply from his Excellency the British Minister, to the effect that, as the Viceroy had failed to make a satisfactory settlement of the cases in which the missionaries had suffered violence at Yang-chow, it would be necessary for a competent high officer of at least equivalent rank to be associated with Mr. Medhurst in an investigation; that all concerned in the demolition of the house, and those who plundered and assaulted the missionaries, whether principals or accessories, should be severely punished; that, should any of the graduate or official classes be proved to have incited the people, they should be made an example of; and his Excellency requests that orders may be at once sent to Tsêng Kwo-fan to depute a competent high officer to deal with the case.

The Prince is aware that the Viceroy deputed the Magistrate of Shang-yuan, Chang Kai-chi, to proceed to Yang-chow and make a thorough investigation; and that Mr. Medhurst did not proceed to Yang-chow to assist at the inquiry. However, as your Excellency's despatch insists on the appointment of a high officer to proceed to Yang-chow and hold a *bonâ fide* and searching inquiry with Mr. Medhurst, the Prince is instructing the Minister-Superintendent to depute an able official of the rank of Treasurer, Judge, or Intendant, to thoroughly investigate the case with Mr. Medhurst at Yang-chow. A final settlement can be come to when the Minister's reply is received; meanwhile the Prince replies as above.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

Sir R. Alcock to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Peking, October* 15, 1868.

A VERY serious outrage on some English missionaries living at Yang-chow, a town situated on the Grand Canal, was perpetrated in August last by a Chinese mob, of which the particulars will be found in the deposition made before Mr. Consul Medhurst, in that officer's despatches to me, and also in my official letter to the Prince of Kung, copies of which are inclosed for your information.

It will be seen by Mr. Consul Medhurst's despatch of the 31st August, dated Chin-kiang, to which place he had proceeded in accordance with my instructions, that certain of the literati and gentry were charged with complicity, and were in fact known to be chief instigators of the attack, and the Prefect and Chihsien are equally accused of culpable supineness, if not direct collusion with the offenders. These circumstances gave a special character of gravity to the outbreak, sufficiently alarming in its violence and object without such conditions. The leading facts and the reparation demanded are both clearly set forth in Mr. Medhurst's official letter to the Prefect, dated 2nd September, of which a copy is inclosed.

This was speedily followed by a somewhat similar manifestation of violence and hostility at Chin-kiang, with which port Yang-chow is closely connected by trading relations, and evidently in sympathy with the apparent success of the Yang-chow populace

in driving the missionaries out of their city. Mr. Medhurst's despatch of the 3rd September gives the leading facts.

Notwithstanding the threatening aspect of affairs, I had great confidence in Mr. Consul Medhurst's exertions to obtain prompt redress for the past, as well as better security for the future, by peaceable means, backed by the material support of the senior naval officer with Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" in the vicinity. I have learned with the more regret that this officer determined at the most critical period suddenly to withdraw his ship and return to Shanghae.

Commander Bush has no doubt laid before you his reasons for this untoward resolution.

Mr. Consul Medhurst has simply reported to me in his despatch, herewith inclosed, that the sudden illness of the Commander was the motive assigned. Your Excellency will see by the despatches to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to Her Majesty's Consul, of which I inclose copies. that I cannot see in the Commander's disability from sickness any sufficient reason for the return of the ship to Shanghae. It must have been evident that the success of the negotiation commenced with his support would be compromised by such a step. He has certainly incurred a grave responsibility, and I cannot avoid the conclusion that the complete failure which followed is mainly due to his action. It would have been much better for our position and interests in China that no steps whatever had been taken to enforce redress, than that the Consul should begin, and then suddenly be left in the middle of his work without the material support on which he properly counted for success. Demands once made there is no retreat possible without serious loss of prestige and influence, on which everything depends in the East. Security to life and property, commercial interests and Treaty rights, are all compromised by any false steps in this direction. I feel confident that your own experience in these seas will lead you fully to coincide with me in this conclusion.

The mischief having been done, however, it must be repaired as speedily as possible. We have appeared to retreat before popular violence and a manifestation of bad faith on the part of the Chinese authorities, and it is above all things necessary to prove that such was never our intention, and that just claims for reparation once made, they will be persevered in until completely satisfied.

I lost no time, therefore, in declaring to the Tsung-li Yamên that the action of the provincial authorities, from the Prefect and Chihsien at Yang-chow to the Viceroy at Nanking, were to the last degree unsatisfactory; and in demanding a full and searching inquiry by a competent officer, to be deputed under instructions from the Yamên, into all the facts, in order to secure the punishment of all implicated in such outrages. It will be seen by the inclosed copies of my official letters to the Prince of Kung, after my last interview and his reply, that this point has been conceded; and it only now remains for me to request your Excellency to give such effective support to Mr. Consul Medhurst in the demands he will be instructed to make, as may I think avert the necessity for any more active measures of coercion.

Should these hopes unfortunately not be realized, I am satisfied there is no alternative, consistent with a due regard for British interests in China, but to direct the Consul to place the matter in your hands, in order that you may take such further measures as shall be found necessary to compel the local authorities to meet our demands and do full justice, in accordance with the instructions, I am assured by the Tsung-li Yamên, they will receive from the Central Government.

Judging from past experience, it is quite possible these instructions, if received, may be disregarded by the provincial officers; but if so, it must be at their own risk and peril.

In any case, the latest despatch from Mr. Consul Medhurst, of which I inclose copy, will show that the spirit of the populace at Chin-kiang renders it imperative that Treaty rights should be firmly asserted and maintained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 14.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Peking, October* 15, 1868.

I HAVE received your despatches of the 24th September and 1st October, and, adverting to my despatch of the 9th instant, referring to the Yang-chow outrage, I now inclose, under flying seal, to be forwarded by the first opportunity after perusal, a

despatch addressed to his Excellency the naval Commander-in-chief Sir H. Keppel. You will see that I have entirely approved all the steps taken, as reported by you in these despatches, so far as you were supported by Commander Bush, and up to that point, looking to the serious consequences likely to follow the sudden withdrawal of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," I trust you did not fail to let the Commander know the responsibility he was incurring.

I have now written to Sir H. Keppel to give you such effective support as may enable you to enter into fresh negotiations with the Viceroy at Nanking and the local authorities at Yang-chow. You will wait for some communication from the Admiral on the subject before taking any farther steps, and only proceed to Nanking when assured of the material means of success by the presence of one or more of Her Majesty's ships on the spot.

The demands which you made in the first instance, in your letter to the Prefect of the 2nd of September, appear to me perfectly just and reasonable; and I have to instruct you to insist upon the measure of redress they contemplate.

I have only to remark, in reference to the first of these letters, that, unless any permanent injury has been suffered by any of the missionary party, I do not conceive they can properly claim compensation for anything beyond actual losses and expenses incurred; but the proprietor of the premises, or any persons connected therewith who have suffered in person or property by the violence of the mob or the unjustifiable action of the authorities, should also be indemnified at the expense of those who were responsible; and therefore I authorize you to claim, in addition to the sum required to compensate the missionaries, such further amount as may appear necessary to that end for the other sufferers.

You will acknowledge the receipt of this despatch, and give me the earliest information of any communication you may receive from the naval Commander-in-chief on the subject.

I inclose a copy of the original text of the Prince of Kung's reply, should you find occasion to refer to the exact terms employed in your communications with the local authorities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 4 in No. 14.

Acting Consul Gibson to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Taiwan, Takao Office, September* 22, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency the following events which occurred yesterday, viz., that three ambuscades were planted in the road along which the Senior Naval Officer, I, and our party, would have proceeded to Pi-tau.

About 5 P.M. yesterday an old man* of about 63 came to the office, and informed me that if I wished to go to Pi-tau, for the future I must not follow the road from Ling-a-liao to Pi-tau, as there were armed parties concealed among the hedges and trees to bar our path. I thought the report was a falsehood, and therefore gave it no further attention. Mr. Pickering visited me afterwards, and he had heard the report.

About 9 P.M., I received a letter from Dr. Maxwell. This gave me a succinct detail of the ambuscades. I inclose Dr. Maxwell's letter. Of the report in Dr. Maxwell's letter there cannot be a doubt; the brother of the mandarin at Taku, who came out of Pi-tau yesterday, was his confidential informant. Two chair-coolies who had been employed to carry me up to Pi-tau, and who ran away in the morning of the 21st, also gave me a report almost identical with the above.

In order to make matters doubly sure, I sent my Ting-chai across the bay to find out the particulars; he brings me the report that the men were concealed in three positions, armed with gin-galls, swords, spears, and knives, about sixty or seventy in each position.

From the evidence of these witnesses, I believe the report is a fact. The Senior Naval Officer and I have determined to defend Takao if attacked, he waiting instructions from his superior officers, and I from your Excellency.

The reason that I had for visiting the District Magistrate requires a word of explanation.

It is now nearly four weeks since the Taoutae made definite promises to Lord

* This man I afterwards found out was a person who let his sedan-chairs to coolies.—J. G.

Charles Scott and to myself that he would issue orders to his subordinates to arrest the criminals whom I had charged with murder, stabbing, &c., in my despatch to the Prefect of the 11th instant.

As nearly two-thirds of the criminals are within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate of Fung-shan, my intention was to visit him in order to ask him whether he had received any such orders.

But on the arrival of the letter I sent him to specify a day, he was up at Taiwan. So soon as he returned, he sent me a semi-official letter, an abstract of which I have submitted to your Excellency in my despatch of the 19th instant.

The subsequent steps my despatch of the 21st instant will make known to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN GIBSON.

P.S.—I sent my second Ling-chai all the way to Pi-tau to-day in the afternoon. He has returned and informs me that the men are actually watching now, and he persuades me to enter Pi-tau. I will not, unless I have got a force.

J G.

Inclosure 5 in No. 14.

Dr. Maxwell to Acting Consul Gibson.

Dear Sir, *Takao, September* 21, 1868.

IT was your intention to have gone in this morning to Pi-tau to visit the district magistrate in connection with the charge of poisoning certain persons whose remains are unknown, and of concealing the bones, a charge which, within the last two days, has been brought against my Chinese assistant and myself, by the District Magistrate of Pi-tau. You were prevented from carrying out your intention by the absolute refusal of the District Magistrate to see you. I beg to inform you that it is now a matter of notoriety that this morning, at the time of your expected visit, the city of Pi-tau had in its streets a very unusual number of persons who were armed with muskets, and who made no secret of their intention of resisting the entrance of yourself and party into the city. I have also to inform you that outside the city, from the west gate towards Takao, for a distance of about three miles (about half-way to Pi-tau) there were armed parties of Chinese, from ten to twenty in number, concealed at parts of the road where there were mounds or hedges near by the road which favoured concealment. These parties, as estimated by various people who passed along the road, might amount to upwards of 200 in all. It is well known that all the arrangements of these parties were ordered by the underlings of the Yamên. It is distinctly asserted, and although unwilling to believe that a District Magistrate could be as vile, I see no escape from believing it, that the orders issued from the head of the Yamên were to the effect that these armed bands might, outside the city, kill as many of the approaching party as they could, but that inside the city, if they reached it, there was to be no fighting. The reason for this could only be that under his immediate jurisdiction, *i.e.*, within the city, he desired to be freed from the responsibility of having to answer for any lives that might be lost. The despatch which you permitted me to see this morning, and which agrees in its statements so substantially with the actual arrangements, leaves us no room to doubt that the mandarin has been privy to all that has been going on, and has been determined at all hazards to keep you out of the city. I think it is right to mention that in various places placards were posted up, offering rewards for the apprehension of any Christian, and very large rewards for the killing of any foreigner. These placards gave no name or seal, and were probably only issued to create excitement.

I may take this opportunity of informing you of the origin of the remarkable charge which is now brought against me.

On the day before yesterday, while the Magistrate was engaged on public business in his office, four men carrying an idol chair, and attended by a large crowd, appeared at the gate of the Yamên, shouting and crying that the idol demanded that the Magistrate should go to the chapel, for that there was something wrong there. These men persisted in crying and shouting, and at length the Magistrate sent some of his servants to follow the idol to the chapel. Arrived at the chapel these men entered it, the idol bearers rocking and moving about from side to side after their usual fashion. For a while they could come to no conclusion, but at length one handle of the idol chair was pointed to a certain spot, and continuing to be pointed there, the people around began to dig, and

sure enough they soon came to a large collection of bones, as mentioned in the Magistrate's despatch.

Immediately a cry was raised as to my having poisoned people, &c., and a crowd went to insist upon the Magistrate himself coming to see.

When I tell you that the four idol bearers were connected with the Yamên, of whom one, if not more, is accused of complicity in the outrage of April last, you will see at once where the wretched plot had its origin.

I beg, &c.
(Signed) J. L. MAXWELL.

Inclosure 6 in No. 14.

Sir R. Alcock to Acting Consul Gibson.

Sir, *Peking, October* 29, 1868.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 2nd of September and its inclosure, and seeing the grave and increasing complications with which you have to contend, I have directed Mr. Consul Swinhoe to lose no time in returning to his post. The Naval Commander-in-chief will also take steps to detach an adequate force to second the Consul in the efforts he will be instructed to make to restore security and order, and obtain full justice for past aggressions and outrages, as well as compensation for property seized or destroyed.

I have to approve of the steps hitherto taken, as reported by you in your several despatches, and, until Mr. Swinhoe takes charge, you will continue to maintain, to the best of your ability, and with such means as are at your disposal, the Treaty rights so flagrantly violated, but avoiding any offensive measures, which, if found necessary, will be better undertaken when the force the Admiral proposes sending arrives with the Consul. It is also desirable to give time for the Viceroy at Foo-chow to send an officer to Formosa to supersede the Taoutae, and, in concert with the Consul inquire into the whole of the circumstances connected with such continuous outrages. This his Excellency will be directed to do by instructions from the Tsung-li Yamên, which may not reach Foo-chow quite as early as this will probably be in your hands.

Should you be engaged in any further negotiations in the interval before Mr. Swinhoe's arrival, you will continue to insist on the reimbursement of the value of Messrs. Ellis and Co.'s camphor, together with compensation for losses inflicted upon the missionaries.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 7 in No. 14.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Swinhoe.

Sir, *Peking, October* 29, 1868.

THE serious aspect of affairs, and the increasing complications resulting from the perverse and treacherous conduct of the local authorities in complicity with the populace, render it necessary that you should proceed, without further delay, to your post, and resume charge.

I have already written to his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-chief, requesting he will detach a sufficient force to second you in carrying out my instructions, with a view to the maintenance of important Treaty rights. The restoration of order, as well as compensation for the past and security for the future, are all essential.

The Admiral having stated his readiness to do so, I have now to instruct you to enter into communication with the Senior Naval Officer at Shanghae; and, in the event of the "Rinaldo," or any other ship, being ordered to Takao, you will request a passage may be given you to that port. Failing this, you will proceed by the quickest means. You will also confer with him, and, aided by your local knowledge, give him all the information in your power as to the probable nature of the steps that will have to be taken to bring the authorities and people to reason, and induce the former to do full justice.

To further this object, I have addressed the inclosed communication to his Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung, requesting he will send instructions forthwith to the Viceroy of Fukien to depute a Wei-yüan, of competent rank, to proceed to Formosa,

with full powers to inquire, in concert with you, into all the facts, including the conduct of the local authorities, and to do justice in the premises.

As to the steps to be taken, and the ends to be secured, I must leave much to your judgment on the spot. But the inclosed Memorial of the missionaries, and copy of a further letter of Dr. Maxwell, with Mr. Gibson's last despatch from Takow, will place you in possession of many of the facts, as well as of the general condition of affairs.

Murders have been committed on Chinese catechists, mission-houses and chapels have been destroyed, a British subject has been stabbed, British property in camphor to a large amount has been seized, and, according to Mr. Gibson's last account, they have even proceeded so far as to plant ambuscades on the road to Ting-shan, with the object of attacking and killing Mr. Gibson and his party if they attempted to carry out their intention of proceeding to that place. These are grave acts of spoliation and outrage, rendering life wholly insecure and trade impossible. As these acts are done in open violation of the most important Treaty stipulations, it is a necessity that decided steps should be taken to hold the authorities responsible, and compel them to afford effective protection to both life and property. Their own disgrace, the punishment of the offenders, and compensation for losses inflicted, are the three most important means of securing respect for Treaties in future; and you will, therefore, keep these steadily in view. As far as the Taoutae is concerned, his removal has been already promised by the Prince; but there must be others, more or less culpable, who should also suffer for their conduct.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 8 in No. 14.

Sir R. Alcock to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Peking, October* 29, 1868.

REFERRING to my previous despatch and to yours of the 13th of October, which has subsequently reached me, inclosing a further correspondence with his Excellency the Viceroy of Nanking, touching the outrage of Yang-chow, I agree with you that the tone, as well as the concessions made, are evidences of a desire to meet our reasonable demands, and more satisfactory than the last accounts received from you.

The Viceroy's last letter, however, is very far from meeting all the exigencies of the case. The stone tablet on which he dwells so much is a matter of secondary importance, and probably need not be insisted upon, although his reasons for refusing are not very pertinent or conclusive.

But as regards the refusal to ascertain whether any proclamation he may prepare for circulation is of a tenor to satisfy your judgment of what is required for the future security of British subjects, it is quite clear you can accept none other, and therefore it will be less compromising to the dignity of the Viceroy to consult before issuing, than to be compelled to amend or alter after publication at the requisition of a foreign Power. Nor is there, in truth, any reason why his Excellency should make this difficulty from any concern for the dignity of his office. The Ministers of the Tsung-li Yamên constantly take this course, when the object is to arrive at a common understanding with the foreign Representatives in any matter affecting foreign interests.

The removal of the authorities, and admission of their inefficiency, if not of their culpability, together with the readiness expressed to make the compensation you may find just for injuries to person or property, are all favourable indications which lead to the hope that, if you are enabled shortly to proceed to Nanking, adequately supported by the Senior Naval Officer, a satisfactory settlement may be arrived at without the necessity of resorting to force. As to the time of your proceeding thither, you will guide your movements by the tenor of the Admiral's communication in answer to a despatch inclosed to you under flying seal for transmission on the 15th of this month.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 9 in No. 14.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *"Salamis," at Nagasaki, October* 3, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Excellency's information, the copy of a letter from Commander Lord Charles Scott, of Her Majesty's sloop "Icarus," representing restrictions placed on the camphor trade by the Taoutae of Taiwan, in opposition to Treaty, and reporting the robbery and outrage of which Mr. Pickering was the victim, with the particulars of which you are doubtless familiar.

Should your Excellency's representation fail to secure the compensation that appears due to Mr. Pickering, I shall be happy to despatch an ample force to Formosa, to act on such requisition as you may be pleased to make, with a view to exacting the redress for past outrages and respect for treaty rights now denied to more peaceable efforts.

I hope to meet Lord Charles Scott at Amoy about the 15th instant, when I shall personally ascertain the present state of affairs in Taiwan, after which I proceed to Hong Kong, remaining there about a month.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 10 in No. 14.

Commander Lord C. Scott to the Senior Naval Officer, Hong Kong.

Sir, *"Icarus," Amoy, September* 11, 1868.

THE camphor trade in the island of Formosa has for years been a monopoly of the Taoutae of Taiwan.

The Taoutae of Taiwan holds his rank direct from Peking, and, although the Viceroy of Foochoo has to inspect the island every three years, still the Taoutae is virtually independent of him, and has the right of corresponding direct with Peking.

The Taoutae of Taiwan gets 30,000 dollars annually from the camphor trade, and is therefore unwilling to act up to the Treaty, which allows Englishmen to trade in camphor.

Camphor is in the list of Tariffs, both export and import, and consequently, according to Treaty, not a forbidden article of trade.

Last April, when a merchant sent up to a place called Gawchay (in latitude 24° 16′ N., on the west coast of Formosa) to buy camphor to take to Taiwan, the Taoutae would not stamp the agent's (Mr. Pickering) passport, and ordered his soldiers to seize the camphor (250 piculs) and take Mr. Pickering.

Mr. Pickering escaped (having been fired on by upwards of 100 soldiers) unhurt, and managed to get to Tamsuy, on the north of Formosa.

Mr. Pickering informed me that the Taoutae had offered 500 taels for his head. My visit to the Taoutae has resulted in a promise in writing to the British Consul at Taiwan that Englishmen shall not be interfered with in the camphor trade, but I have failed in getting the 250 piculs of camphor restored, or 6,000 dollars paid instead. All that the Taoutae will promise to do is to refer the matter to the Viceroy at Foochow, and proposes that our Consul should refer it to the Ambassador at Peking. If the Viceroy at Foochow gives a decision adverse to the Taoutae, I do not think the Taoutae will respect the decision, but will appeal to Peking. All the Taoutae wants to do is to delay, as I am told his successor has been already named, and the Taoutae once gone from Formosa, there will be nobody from whom to demand the restitution of the stolen camphor.

The case in point of the camphor seems to me to be a simple case of robbery and attempt to murder; but, unless I proceed to force, I see no chance of recovering either camphor or dollars. I hope that my attempt to carry out the Treaty with regard to the camphor trade will meet with your approval; as, if the Taoutae carries out his promise, the camphor trade for the future will be unmolested. In all that I have done, Mr. Gibson, Her Majesty's Acting Consul (Taiwan), has entirely agreed with me, and I am much indebted to him for his good advice and able assistance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES T. SCOTT.

Inclosure 11 in No. 14.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *"Salamis," at Nagasaki, October* 3, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to place in your Excellency's hands the copy of a letter from Commander Lord Charles Scott, of the "Icarus," representing the rude and insulting behaviour of the Taoutae of Taiwan during a recent interview, as well as various breaches of our Treaty rights committed by that official.

I request that you will be pleased to bring this case to the notice of the Prince of Kung with such demands for redress and apology as in your opinion the case may require.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY KEPPEL.

Inclosure 12 in No. 14.

Commander Lord C. Scott to the Senior Naval Officer, Hong Kong.

Sir, *"Icarus," at Amoy, September* 11, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to request that the conduct of the Taoutae of Taiwan to me on the 27th of August and subsequently, be reported to the high authorities at Peking, as being a gross breach of the Article LII of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

On the 27th of August, at Taiwan-foo, I ordered cargo-boats to come off to the ship to take Mr. Gibson (Consul), myself, and a guard of twenty men on shore to visit the Taoutae. The Taoutae gave an order that no boats were to go off to the ship. (*See* Article XVI of Treaty.)

On the 28th, in reply to a letter I wrote on the 27th, the Taoutae sent, at 6 P.M., to say he would receive me at 4 P.M. the same day, knowing it to be impossible.

On the 29th, when I landed in my own boats and went up to Taiwan-foo, and was received by the Taoutae in accordance with a demand from me, the Taoutae kept me waiting in a hot court-yard for ten minutes and never received me with the salute to which I am entitled.

In the middle, or rather commencement, of the interview which then took place, he got up and left the room in a passion without a word of explanation to me, leaving me with the Chintai, whose behaviour contrasted most favourably with the Taoutae's.

The Taoutae's whole behaviour to me was insulting and discourteous, so much so that I refused to either see or write to him again; but I carried on all my correspondence afterwards through the Chintai (General), who has been my friend in all this business.

I have the honour to suggest that, if you think proper to forward my complaint to Peking, a demand be made either for the removal or degradation of the Taoutae of Taiwan.

I must also state that on my arrival off Taiwan-foo, the Taoutae closed the gates of the city, and gave an order that no foreigners were to be admitted, being a gross breach of the Treaty, as Taiwan-foo is a Treaty port.

I inclose my reasons for requiring cargo-boats on the 28th August, and landing with a guard of twenty men on the 29th.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES T. SCOTT.

Inclosure 13 in No. 14.

Sir R. Alcock to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel.

Sir, *Peking, October* 29, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of two letters of the 3rd instant, the one inclosing copy of a letter from Commander Lord Charles Scott, of the "Icarus," reporting the rude and insulting behaviour of the Taoutae of Taiwan during an interview, as well as various breaches of our Treaty rights, and the other referring to a seizure of camphor. I have not failed to bring the conduct of the Taoutae on this and other occasions before the Tsung-li Yamên, and have received the assurance of the Ministers that it had been determined to remove him from his post.

In regard to various breaches of Treaty, of which he and other officials in Formosa have been guilty, I have already, in my despatch of the 15th instant, informed you that there is little hope of redress without the presence of an adequate force to support the Consul in his demands. And I have now, in view of the serious complications and continued outrages, instructed Mr. Swinhoe, the Consul of Taiwan, in the despatch of which I inclose a copy for your information, to return without delay to his post, and there prosecute the necessary inquiries, taking such farther steps as he may find needful, in concert with the Senior Naval Officer, to enforce a full measure of justice and redress for the injuries inflicted, both as regards person and property.

I trust it may have been in your Excellency's power to detach such a force to the coast of Formosa with that object as will ensure success; and that the Senior Officer will have instructions to give the most effective support to Her Majesty's Consul, and not to desist until that officer is satisfied some security has been obtained for the future against a repetition of such lawless proceedings on the part of the authorities and populace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 14 in No. 14.

Sir R. Alcock to the Prince of Kung.

Sir, *October* 29, 1868.

I HAVE again to draw your Imperial Highness' attention to the state of affairs in Formosa.

I have received a despatch from Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Taiwan, to the effect that when, on the 20th September, he wrote to the Magistrate at Feng-shen, appointing the following day for an interview; that functionary refused to see him. It was reported to the Consul—indeed the rumour was in everybody's mouth—that ambuscades of armed men had been formed at available points along the route by which the Consul must have travelled, had he determined to visit the city. The Consul took steps to ascertain the truth or falsity of the rumour, and I regret to say there can be no doubt of its authenticity.

Mr. Swinhoe, the Consul proper for Taiwan, is at present on duty elsewhere; I have ordered him to return to his post without delay.

The lives and Treaty rights of British subjects in Formosa must be protected, and with this view the naval Commander-in-chief is about to send a naval force to support the Consul as occasion requires.

I have urgently to request your Imperial Highness to instruct the Viceroy at once to depute an officer of competent rank to proceed to Formosa and investigate matters on the spot with Mr. Swinhoe, that these unpleasant complications may be brought to an end.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

Inclosure 15 in No. 14.

The Prince of Kung to Sir R. Alcock.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication in reply.

With reference to the maltreatment of missionaries by certain braves in Formosa, the Yamên, on receipt of his Excellency the British Minister's first despatch in September, sent orders by special express* to the Viceroy of Fuhkien and Chih-kiang to forthwith dispatch a competent high officer to proceed at once and arrange matters.

Three days after the sending of this a despatch from the Viceroy and Governor arrived, which stated that they had already, in the 7th month, ordered Tseng, the Intendant of Hsing-hua-foo, Chuen-chow-foo, and Jung-chun-chow, to proceed to Taiwan, taking his seal with him, and to settle matters with all speed.

The Yamên yesterday received a further despatch from his Excellency the British Minister on the subject. A copy of this was at once sent by special express, with

* 500 li a day.

instructions to the Viceroy and Governor to hasten the equitable settlement of this matter by the said Tseng, in conjunction with Wu, the former Taoutae of Taiwan.

In Mr. Taylor's matters, the Prefect of Yang-chow and the Magistrate concerned, have been deprived of their offices. The Yamên have also sent, by special express, letters to the Viceroy and Governor, enjoining them to arrest and punish, as the law requires, the brawler Ko, and those who robbed and set fire to the house.

The Prince has to submit the above reply for the consideration of his Excellency the British Minister.

A necessary communication addressed to Sir R. Alcock, K.C.B.

November 2, 1868.

No. 15.

Acting Vice-Consul Forrest to Lord Stanley.—(*Received January* 10, 1869.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, November* 17, 1868.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th instant to your Lordship's address, I have the honour to forward the missing inclosure in Mr. Consul Medhurst's despatch of the 3rd instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed). R. J. FORREST.

Inclosure in No. 15.

Consul Medhurst to the Viceroy, Tséng Kwo-fan.

Sir, *"Rodney," November* 8, 1868.

On the 31st ultimo I had the honour to inform your Excellency that I was on the point of proceeding for the second time to Nanking, charged with special instructions from Her Majesty's Minister in reference to the treatment of the Yang-chow difficulty.

I have now to acquaint you that I have arrived off your city in company with Captain Heneage, commanding Her Majesty's ship "Rodney," and other vessels of war, and that we propose to wait upon your Excellency with a suitable escort of officers at 11 o'clock on the 9th instant.

In order to save both your Excellency and myself any useless discussion, I beg to lay before you in writing the propositions which I contemplate presenting for your acceptance.

In the first place I propose to request you to appoint an officer of suitable rank, as promised by his Highness Prince Kung to Her Majesty's Minister, to proceed in my company to Yang-chow, and there to hold in concert with myself a formal Court of Inquiry into the charges which I have made against the official authorities and gentry of Yang-chow, of having aided and abetted in the outrage committed upon the missionaries in August last. I shall expect that the officer so appointed will have authority to summon before him, and, if necessary, to detain for further trial and punishment, any person, whether in or out of office, and whether a member of the literary class or commoner, whom circumstances may render it expedient to examine publicly before the Court.

In the second place, I desire to procure from your Excellency an admission of the justice of the demands which I have advanced in my several letters to the authorities of Yang-chow and yourself, as well as a distinct pledge under the Viceroy's seal that instructions shall be given to the proper authorities to see them all carried into effect forthwith. As regards the amount of compensation which I have to require for the personal injuries sustained, I am instructed by Her Majesty's Minister that save where any permanent hurt can be shown to have been sustained by any of the missionary party, I am not to claim for anything beyond actual losses and expenses incurred; but I am authorized to see that proper indemnification is granted to the native proprietors of the mission premises, or any other natives connected with the mission who may have suffered in person or property by the violence of the mob, or the unjustifiable action of the authorities. This is a point I have yet to decide after further investigation, the result of which shall be duly communicated to you. I need scarcely add that it is essential that the above concession on your Excellency's part should be made before I can consent to proceed with the proposed inquiry at Yang-chow.

I propose further to claim your attention to questions pending in connection with Chin-kiang, and the Huai-kuan barrier. At the former place the missionary Taylor continues to experience obstructions in the way of a peaceful occupation of the premises which have been let to him by Hsia Lu-chih in the city. And I have to lodge a most serious complaint against the Superintendent of Inland Customs at the last named locality, for having more than once vexatiously and illegally detained property belonging to a British subject, whilst being conveyed under transit-pass and certificate, and for having tortured and punished the native servants in charge.

The above constitute the principal questions which I propose submitting to your Excellency's notice, and I have to request that you will be prepared with positive replies in reference to each one, so that any further misapprehension or delay may be obviated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 16.

Acting Consul Forrest to Lord Stanley.—(Received January 10, 1869.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, November* 17, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information copy of Mr. Consul Medhurst's despatch of the 13th instant, with inclosures, to the address of his Excellency Her Majesty's Minister.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. J. FORREST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *"Rodney," November* 13, 1868.

IN continuation of my despatches of the 6th and 7th instant, I have now the honour to report proceedings in connection with my mission to Nanking up to the present date.

The squadron reached Chin-kiang on the evening of the 6th. On the following day I was visited by the Taoutae of Shanghae, who stated that he had been instructed by the Viceroy to hasten after me in order to induce me, if possible, to forego my intention of visiting Nanking with so many ships-of-war. I replied that this was out of the question, and I put into his hands for presentation to the Viceroy my ultimatum (copy of which forms an inclosure in my despatch dated the 3rd instant), advising him to proceed in advance to Nanking, and persuade the Viceroy to prepare himself for an unconditional compliance with my demands. This the Taoutae readily promised to do. On the following morning I embarked on board this vessel, accompanied by Messrs. Stronach and Allen, and the same evening the squadron was anchored off Nanking.

Before leaving Shanghae I had made it a matter of anxious reflection, whether, presuming I succeeded in obtaining the Viceroy's unqualified assent to all I had to urge upon him, a result of which under the circumstances there could be little doubt, I should be justified in requiring him to place in my hands some guarantee for the fulfilment of his pledges; and having in view the well-known evasive and shifty character of Chinese officials from the lowest to the highest, as well as the fact that my requisitions were of such a nature that both time and labour must necessarily be expended in seeing them carried into effect, I came to the conclusion that I could not safely accept any pledges made at Nanking as conclusive or sufficient, and that I should fail in my duty were I not to render success certain by obtaining possession of some material guarantee for their strict fulfilment. Captain Heneage, whom I took care to consult, fully concurred with me in this view, and he was of opinion that the responsibility lay with me to see that so important a demonstration as that being now made did not in any way fail of the objects for which it had been ordered. Fortunately a most simple, and at the same time effective, method of putting the scheme into operation happened to offer itself in the presence in his part of the river of a handsome new steamer called the "Tien-chi," which the viceroy has lately had built for himself at Shanghae, and we determined upon laying an

embargo upon this vessel as soon as we could fall in with her, and taking the first opportunity of requesting the Viceroy to place her at our disposal pending the completion of the negotiations.

We found the "Tien-chi" at anchor off Nanking, and an officer was forthwith dispatched on board to request her commander not to weigh without orders, on pain of having a prize crew placed in charge. It was then about 6 P.M. The effect was electrical. The commander instantly hurried off to report what had happened, and at 11 P.M. he returned bringing with him an official despatch from the Viceroy, in which that officer pledged himself briefly but plainly to accede to all my terms, which he characterized as entirely reasonable. A translation of this letter is appended.

The receipt of the above communication simplified my position materially. It only remained to consult Tsêng in respect to details, and to explain the necessity of my being furnished with the material guarantee which I had made up my mind to exact, as well as to come to some understanding with him as regards the compensation to be given for the losses consequent upon the illegal acts of the Superintendent at the Huai-kuan barrier.

Captain Heneage and myself accordingly waited on Tsêng on Monday the 9th, attended by a suitable escort, and we found him supported by Ting, the well-known Futai of Soo-chow, who had evidently been ordered up to assist his superior in the emergency, for he acted throughout as chief speaker. My first effort was directed towards the arrangement of some compromise of the demand for a stone tablet, as suggested in your Excellency's despatch of the 29th October, which, with another of the same date, reached me whilst on the point of leaving the ship. I found no difficulty in inducing both Tsêng and Ting to promise that a Proclamation should be issued under their seals throughout the three Departments of Yang-chow, Hùai-an, and Chin-kiang, setting forth the circumstances under which the Yang-chow outrage had been committed, and the mode in which redress had been given; provided that the record on the tablet to be erected in the mission premises should be limited to the simple caution that the house was leased to a British subject and must not be interfered with.

My next task was to introduce the subject of the material guarantee. Here Ting opposed me with much vehemence. He used all the arguments he could possibly invent to turn me from my purpose, and at last went to the length of absolutely refusing my request. We had eventually to take leave, hinting that unless an order for the temporary transfer of the "Tien-chi" were received on board the "Rodney" by 5 P.M. that same evening, a boat's crew would be placed in formal charge. I need scarcely add that we found the required order on board on our return to the ship.

In the matter of the Huai-kuan Barrier, the Viceroy fully admitted the culpability of the Superintendent, but pleaded that it would be next to impossible to pursue him, as he had recently given up the seals and returned to the capital, and that in any event the jurisdiction was of so peculiar a character, as to render investigation by a provincial governor out of the question. The Viceroy, however, assured me that the underlings who had prominently figured in the transaction should, one and all, be severely punished, and that he would make inquiries as to the best method of receiving any reasonable compensation for the sufferers. This point I left for the while, intending to give it more mature consideration.

After the conclusion of the interview with Tsêng, we proceed to wait upon Ma, the new Viceroy, who received us with marked courtesy. His manly bearing and quick intelligence contrasted very favourably with the sluggish and stolid indifference, whether natural or affected, which forms so notable a characteristic of the functionary whom we had just left. I availed myself of the opportunity to revive the question of the coal mines, but was met by the same reply as regards the dependency of the subject on the action of the Tsung li Yamên.

On my return to Her Majesty's ship, I deemed it expedient to officialize the arrangements which I had succeeded in effecting as regards the proclamation, and the transfer of the Tien-chi, and to communicate my conclusions in respect to the Huai-kuan Barrier compensation; and I accordingly sent Tsêng the inclosed drafts of the proclamation and tablet notice, and addressed him a communication, copy of which I have likewise the honour to inclose. In reply, I received a conjoint letter from Ma and Tsêng (translation inclosed), which is sufficiently satisfactory as regards the Huai-kuan Barrier matter. But as regards the proclamation, I was much annoyed to find from Ying, Taoutae of Shanghae, who came on board to see me, that Tsêng and Ting had already issued their proclamation without reference to me, and that they professed to have understood me to mean that the tablet scheme had been altogether abandoned. Ying produced several copies of the proclamation, one of which I submit, with the

translation annexed. It will be observed that the document is useful enough in itself, but that it in no way answers the purpose for which I had intended it. I pointed out this defect to Ying, and expressed in very plain terms my vexation at the evasion which had been practised upon me. Ying replied that it was impossible under the circumstances to recall the proclamation, but that as he felt convinced the Viceroy would demur to the issue of a second, the simplest plan was to fall back upon the original scheme of a stone tablet, and to require the Chih-fu of Yang-chow to record upon it a proclamation under his seal word for word in accordance with the draft I had sketched for the Viceroy. To this compromise I have for the time being consented, on the understanding that the proclamation already issued has been widely circulated, a point which I have yet to satisfy myself of. The incident, however, only confirms me in the opinion that I took a very wise precaution in securing the guarantee which I have in hand.

The negotiations at Nanking were concluded yesterday by a formal return visit from Ma, who was received on board Her Majesty's ship with all the honour due to his rank. Tsêng excused himself from attending, but deputed two Taoutaes to convey his apologies.

The squadron weighed again this morning, and we are now at anchor off the mouth of the Grand Canal, arrangements having been made to proceed up to Yang-chow to-morrow morning, Captain Heneage proposes to take with him 300 men of all arms, and the gun-boats "Slaney" and "Dove" are told off to convey the force up the canal. The commander of the "Dove," who was left here to survey the channel during our absence at Nanking, pronounces it to be navigable for gun-boats for fifty miles from its mouth.

My next despatch will, I hope, report the result of the inquiry. Meanwhile, I trust that my proceedings may continue to merit your full approval.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

The Viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *November* 8, 1868.

I HAVE received and possessed myself of the contents of your despatch of this day's date.

With respect to your request for the appointment of two high officers as a Commission to investigate the Yang-chow affair, I have to inform you, that I have directed Salt Commissioner Li and Taoutae Ying to accompany you to that city. They have strict orders to punish, according to the laws of China, those found to have been ringleaders in the disturbance. In case substantial proofs or trustworthy witnesses be produced, incriminating any of the belted gentry, I shall apply for instructions to the Throne, as to the course to pursue. The gentry, however, shall not be summoned on mere empty statement.

I am fully aware that the demands you formerly preferred were reasonable. I am now directing the local authorities to use their utmost exertion to protect, and to prevent natives in the interior, from molesting missionaries; I will guide myself by the principle you have stated in reference to compensation for injuries, &c.

I am informed by Taoutae Tsai that the solution of the difficulty at Chin-kiang only awaits the signature of the woman Hsia (*née* Li) to a document withdrawing her objections, on which being obtained, a proclamation will be issued.

Immediately on the arrival from Huai-kuan of the three employées of foreigners, I issued peremptory summons for the appearance of those who had laid the complaints against them, viz., Chîn Ying and Wang Ping Kuo, and they shall be so dealt with as to bring the case to a close. The interests of foreign merchants shall not be allowed to suffer.

Inclosure 3 in No. 16.

Draft Proclamation in accordance with the Arrangements personally entered into by Consul with Tsêng and Ting on the 9th November, 1868.

PROCLAMATION under seal of Chih-tai and Fu-tai:—

"Whereas ill-disposed persons, on the 22nd day of August, 1868, incited the people of Yang-chow to enter the house rented by the British subjects Taylor and others, and violently assault and plunder the inmates, so as to lead to their eventual ejection from the premises, some of them in a seriously wounded condition.

"And whereas the local authorities were clearly guilty of having neglected to avert the evil in the first instance.

"It therefore becomes the duty of the high authorities, after clear examination into the circumstances, to order the degradation of the city officials, the condign punishment of the ringleaders, the grant of due compensation to the sufferers, the repairs of the house, and the restoration of the former inmates.

"All this having been done as a matter of simple justice, it now becomes the further duty of the high provincial authorities to issue a public proclamation, and this proclamation is therefore issued for the purpose of making it clearly understood to all men high and low that British subjects possess the liberty to enter the inner land for the prosecution of their lawful purposes under a Treaty granted by His Most Gracious Majesty the Emperor, and that any one who presumes to insult or annoy such persons in any way shall meet with condign punishment. Local authorities everywhere moreover are to see that they extend due protection to British subjects who may have occasion to appeal to them for assistance or redress. Let all tremblingly obey."

The above to be exhibited in the cities of Yang-chow, Chin-kiang, and Huai-an, and their several Hsiens.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST,
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul.

Inclosure 4 in No. 16.

Draft for Stone Tablet Notice, by the Chih-fu of Yang-chow.

WHEREAS this house has been duly leased by . to the British subject Taylor with the permission of the local consular authorities.

And whereas Her British Majesty's Consul at Shanghae has requested that a caution against any such interference may be inscribed upon stone, so as to insure peaceful relations.

Therefore this stone tablet is erected, and all persons are hereby warned that any irregular entrance upon and interference with these premises will meet with condign punishment.

Let all tremblingly obey.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 5 in No. 16.

Consul Medhurst to the Viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan.

Sir, *"Rodney," off Nanking, November* 10, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's reply to my letter setting forth the special objects of my present visit to Nanking, and I am much gratified by the frank and ready consent which is given to my several requisitions.

I have also to record my high appreciation of your courtesy and consideration in making, after our interview yesterday, through Ying Taotae the further concession of placing in my hands a material guarantee for the strict fulfilment of all your promises.

By the arrangements thus entered into I doubt not but that adjustment of the Yang-chow affair will be speedily and easily arrived at.

There remains yet, however, the Huai-kuan Barrier difficulty. Although you have favoured me with the assurance that the petty official underlings who committed the irregularities shall be duly punished, I have still to require due compensation to be made

to the merchants and their servants who have suffered in consequence of these acts. I am informed by Her Majesty's Minister, who has had before him the letter from his Excellency Ting Futai, dated the 9th September last, and my reply to that functionary, dated the 15th October, that I am right in asserting the principle that a Chinese functionary, who, in contravention of well understood Treaty rights, occasions loss or damage to a British subject by his acts, is liable to make good such loss, and I am directed to insist upon such compensation being accorded in the cases under attention.

I have, therefore, to request you will either empower the two officials named in your letter under acknowledgment to deal with the Huai-kuan question, as well as that connected with Yang-chow, or to appoint some other and equally suitable functionaries to entertain the matter in consultation with myself. I observed that your Excellency let fall a casual remark yesterday, to the effect that the jurisdiction over the Huai-kuan officials was of a peculiar character, and that the offending superintendent had already given over charge and left for Peking. The transfer of the seals to another man can of course make no difference in the liability of the particular department, or of the Government under whomit works. And the peculiarity of the jurisdiction need present no difficulty in the way of an amicable and just arrangement.

I have to request, moreover, that no time may be lost, as I propose to present myself at Huai-kuan as soon as the settlement of the Yang-chow affair will admit of.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 6 in No. 16.

Proclamation.

(Translation.)

MA, Governor-General, &c.; Tseng, late Governor-General, &c., &c.; Ting, Governor of Kiang-su, hereby issue a proclamation for general information.

Whereas the preaching of religion is sanctioned by Treaty, and all persons are at liberty to become proselytes thereto, according as it suits their convenience, without compulsion either for or against:

We therefore issue this proclamation to give the population, civil and military, of these districts to know that it is imperatively required of them that they carefully observe the Treaty which has been concluded by Our Most Gracious Sovereign the Emperor, and that they must not annoy religious establishments nor raise pretexts for disturbance, nor must they treat foreign travellers with wanton disrespect. Every wilful offender will certainly be visited with heavy punishment, without hope of pardon. Obey with trembling!

A special proclamation issued on the 27th of the 9th moon of the 7th Tung-chih (11th November, 1868).

Inclosure 7 in No. 16.

The Viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan, and Ma, Governor-General of the Two Kwang, to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *November* 11, 1868.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of yesterday.

With reference to the Huai-kuan question, I (Tsêng) at our late interview conceded the point of compensation for damages caused by wrongful acts on the part of the Chinese officials towards British merchants, since the principle was laid down by Her Majesty's Minister at Peking. The Huai-kuan Superintendent will be requested to pay the amount of compensation to you, through the Chin-kiang Taoutae, immediately on receipt of a detailed statement from you.

The official underlings at Huai-kuan who have been guilty of illegal acts have been peremptorily summoned to Nanking for punishment. There will really be no necessity for you to proceed thither. It may be added further that I (Ma) have directed the Huai Yang Taoutae Lin to go to Huai-an, and again place before the Huai-kuan Superintendent Lien the necessity of adhering strictly to Treaty in dealing with foreign-owned goods in transit. Should you still determine to proceed to Huai-kuan, Lin Taoutae has been commissioned to act in concert with you; otherwise Lin will go by

himself, and will see that compensation is granted for the past, and that the Treaty be adhered to in future in all cases jointly affecting native and foreign interests. Even should the Tsung-li Yamên demur to the principle of compensation, we should still fulfil our promise on this point, having passed our word.

It will be very unadvisable to send Ying Taoutae and Li, Salt Commissioner, the two officers appointed to adjust the Yang-chow difficulty, also to take the Huai-kuan question. The press of work at Shanghae, too, will prevent Ying from being long absent from his post.

I, Tsêng, late High Minister for Foreign Trade, did yesterday hand over the seals of that office to Ma. The conduct of the Yang-chow question will be undertaken by us both in conjunction. Ma will take charge of the Huai-kuan question himself.

We request you will accept the announcement above made.

No. 17.

Acting Consul Forrest to Lord Stanley.—(*Received January* 10, 1869.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, November* 24, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information copy of Mr. Consul Medhurst's despatch of the 24th instant, with inclosures, to the address of his Excellency Her Majesty's Minister reporting the settlement of the Yang-chow difficulty.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. J. FORREST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 17.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Yang-chow, November* 20, 1868.

IN my despatch dated on board Her Majesty's ship "Rodney" the 13th instant, I had the honour to acquaint your Excellency that I had brought my negotiations at Nanking in respect to redress for the Yang-chow outrage to a satisfactory termination, and that I was on the point of starting for Yang-chow in company with Captain Heneage, R.N., and a suitable escort, for the purpose of seeing my requisitions duly carried into effect.

The course of the gun-boats up the Grand Canal was somewhat retarded during the first day by repeated groundings of Her Majesty's ship "Dove," but the following morning we were more fortunate, and by 2 P.M. on the 15th instant the flotilla steamed successfully past the city to the anchorage assigned to it of the Hsu-Ning gate. The naval and marine battalion, which have been marched from the bivouac of the previous night, in order to lighten the draught of the vessels as much as possible, reached the ferry opposite the gate at the same moment, and the effect of the simultaneous arrivals upon the thousands of native spectators must have been as useful as it was no doubt interesting. On entering the city we found the Hsing-Chiao-ssu, a very commodious and handsome temple, prepared for our reception, and the arrangements for quartering the men and officers could scarcely have been better had they been superintended by ourselves.

The 16th was occupied in the interchange of ceremonial visits between the two Commissioners and local authorities and ourselves. Their courtesy at every meeting was so marked as to be almost oppressive.

On the 17th the Commission met for the first, and indeed only time, for the single interview sufficed to enable us to arrive at a perfect understanding as to the necessary arrangements.

The first subject of discussion was the degradation of the local officials. The Commissioners assured me that the Chih-fu and Chih-hsien, as in fact I already knew from general report, had been dismissed from office, and that this was the utmost that the Viceroy could do without the consent of the Crown. I therefore signified my readiness to be satisfied with this assurance, provided it was communicated to me officially, under the conjoint seals of the Commissioners.

The complicity of the belted gentry I found myself unable to substantiate. Mr. Taylor, whom I produced before the Commission, professed himself incapable of bringing forward a single individual or fact in support of the generally accepted impression that certain of the gentry had been the instigators of the riot, and I had no

alternative but to abandon the prosecution against the persons whose names had been mentioned. Three men from amongst the lower classes, whom the Commissioners had succeeded in securing, were then handed over to the local magistrate for trial and punishment. I have the honour to inclose, in connection with this item, a letter which has since been addressed to me by Mr. Taylor.

The amount to be paid for compensation for losses as per memorandum inclosed in my despatch of 15th September last, was passed without demur. The fact of permanent injury to some of the missionary party I was prepared to establish by the professional opinion, which I obtained through the courtesy of Captain Heneage, from Dr. Fegan, the surgeon of Her Majesty's ship "Rodney." The injuries described are of so peculiar a character, that I found some difficulty in deciding upon the measure of indemnity which would best comport with justice to both sides. It was eventually agreed that 500 taels should be placed in my hands, subject to your Excellency's decision as to its adequacy or otherwise. In close relation to this head of the negotiation came the question of compensation to Chinese who had suffered in person or property by the violence of the mob, or the unjustifiable action of the authorities, as suggested in your despatch of the 15th October last. Mr. Taylor named two instances of the kind, in which he estimated the losses of one individual at 50 dollars 90 cents, but declared himself unable to convey any idea of the loss suffered by the other, the party concerned having left for Peking. The Commissioners having since very liberally consented to divide 150 dollars 90 cents between the two men. They have also with equally commendable consideration agreed to make good Mr. Taylor's expense in renting another house at Chin-kiang, amounting to 120 dollars.

The allowance for repairs to the house (70 dollars) having been included in the original estimate for compensation, and having been accepted as adequate by Mr. Taylor, did not call for discussion.

The question of the issue of a proclamation, thanks to the evasion practised upon me by Tsêng and Ting, as reported in my last despatch, cost me some trouble to adjust to my satisfaction, and it was only upon my hinting the necessity of a return to Nanking that I succeeded in inducing the Commissioners to fall in with my proposition. The object I sought to obtain was so to frame the proclamation as that the Chinese should apprehend the true nature of the of the outrage which had been committed, and the full measure of punishment and redress which had followed upon it, and I was anxious that the document should be authenticated by the seals of the Viceroy or his deputies. I inclose for your information, in Chinese and English, the result of my efforts, and I confidently hope that it may have the good effect I intend for it. The stone tablet I consented to make a secondary question, and the accompanying is a translation of the notice which has been agreed upon.

The last demand, the restoration of Mr. Taylor and party to their original home, was agreed to at once, and yesterday it was formally carried into effect by the Commissioners and myself *in propriis personis*. I have cautioned Mr. Taylor, however, to abstain for the present from attracting public notice by bringing his family up or obtruding his ministrations too freely upon the people.

The above arrangements were yesterday confirmed by the Commissioners in an official communication of which I inclose a copy and translation, and the amount of indemnity decided upon accompanied the latter in sycee. My reply is also enclosed, from which it will be observed that sundry details remain yet to be attended to in order to render the reparation as complete as I could wish. The authorities will doubtless lose no time in seeing the omission repaired, and I hope to be able to take leave of them by the 22nd or 23rd at latest.

It will afford your Excellency great gratification to learn that our sojourn in this city, so far, has not been attended by the slightest misunderstanding or mishap as far as the people are concerned; on the contrary, our presence appears to be accepted as a thing of course, and the large number of dollars which our many wants introduce into circulation must have its effect in begetting a genial feeling towards the hitherto feared and detested stranger. The city seems to be in a most wretched condition, more than half of it is in ruins, the work I am told of the rebels who have from time to time visited the neighbourhood; whilst the inhabited portions do not contrast at all favourably as regards squalor and filth, with those of any other of the many Chinese towns which I have visited.

A final despatch, reporting the conclusion of the negotiations and the return of the material guarantee shall be forwarded in due course.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 17.

Mr. Taylor to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Yang-chow, November* 19 1868.

AS you desired we went yesterday to the Yamên of the Kan-tsuen Hsien, where we were shown three men, one of whom Mr. Rudland was able to identify as the man who robbed Mrs. Taylor and others upstairs, and who was leader in the plunderiug there. His name is Lin Ching. The other two we could not identify. One of them was, I believe, a military Sin-tsai of the name of Kôh; but not the literary graduate who assaulted and threatened several of us. The other man we believe we several times saw among the disorderly rabble, but we do not know that he was one of the actual rioters.

As to tangible evidence against any of the belted gentry, I regret to say that there is none procurable. There seems to be no possibility of obtaining anything beyond the general rumours which were prevalent two months ago, and it would not be easy now to find persons willing to come forward and testify to them in Yang-chow. We had secured some of the anonymous placards, which stated that it had been agreed that the literary graduates would meet on the exercise ground after the examination on the 1st (I think it was) of the 7th moon, when they would proceed with the people to burn up the house and destroy the foreign residents and native servants indiscriminately, but these, unfortunately, were among the many papers which were burnt in the attack, so that any clue which might have been obtained from them is lost. The absence of Li Tai Ye, the landlord of our house, of Ping yu Shan, landlord of the hotel, and others formerly connected with them renders it more difficult for me to procure anything definite.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HUDSON TAYLOR.

Inclosure 3 in No. 17.

Proclamation.

(Translation.)

LI, Commissioner of the Salt Gabelle, of the rank of Provincial Treasurer, &c., Ying, Taoutae, of Shanghae, Superintendent of Kiang-nan Maritime Customs, of the rank of Provincial Judge, &c., hereby issue a proclamation for general information.

Whereas we have received the instructions of their Excellencies the High Ministers Foreign Trade, Ma and Tsêng, to adjust matters at Yang-chow, we find that on the 22nd day of August, 1868, evil disposed persons excited the people of Yang-chow to enter the house rented by the British subjects Taylor and others. and violently assault and plunder the inmates, so as to lead to their eventual ejection from the premises, some or them in a seriously wounded condition; and whereas the local authorities were clearly guilty of having neglected to avert the evil in the first instance; it therefore becomes the duty of the high authorities, after the examination into the circumstances, to order the degradation of the city officials, the condign punishment of the ringleaders, the grant of due compensation to the sufferers, the repair of the house, and the restoration of its former inmates.

All this having been done as a matter of simple justice, it now becomes our further duty to issue a public proclamation, and this proclamation is therefore issued, for the purpose of making it clearly understood to all men, high and low, that British subjects possess the liberty to enter the inner land for the pursuit of their lawful purposes, under a Treaty granted by His Most Gracious Majesty the Emperor, and that any one who presumes to insult or annoy such persons in any way, shall meet with condign punishment. Local authorities everywhere, moreover, are to see that they extend due protection to British subjects who may have occasion to appeal to them for assistance or redress.

Let all tremblingly obey.

A special proclamation issued on the 5th day of the 1st moon of the 7th year of Tung Chih (18th November, 1868).

Inclosure 4 in No. 17.

Notice to be engraved on Stone Tablet, and placed within Mr. Taylor's premises at Yang-chow.

(Translation.)

The Prefect of Yang-chow.

WHEREAS, this house has been rented by the British subject Taylor under the sanction of his Consul, and of the local authorities.

No idle or improper persons are allowed to enter and create disturbance. Offenders will be arrested and punished.

Obey with trembling! A special notice—obey!

Inclosure 5 in No. 17.

Commissioners Li and Ying to Consul Medhurst.

Sir, *Yang-chow, November* 19, 1868.

IN pursuance of our instructions, with which we have been favoured by the High Ministers for Foreign Trade, Ma and Tsêng, to adjust the Yang-chow difficulty, we now beg to recapitulate point by point the results of our consultations with yourselves:—

1. His Excellency Tsêng has dismissed from office the Yang-chow Prefect Sun, and the Kanch'uan Magistrate Li, for their errors and delinquencies in conducting relations with foreigners.

2. The accusations against the belted gentry are dismissed, as no real proof is found to support the same.

3. Lin-ch'ien, Chang-chin Ch'ien, and Ku Piao, who were concerned in the outrage, have been arrested, and Mr. Taylor has identified them in presence of the Kan-ch'uan Magistrate as being ringleaders. The punishment awarded by Chinese law to ringleaders in a malicious attempt at arson is two months' cangue and banishment in the third degree (beyond the Great Wall); to accessories, the punishment is one degree less.

4. Compensation for losses and expenses is fixed at 1128·40 taels.

5. It is agreed that compensation for bodily injuries be paid to Mr. Rudland, Miss Blatchley and Mrs. Taylor, in the sum of 500 taels, subject to reduction should Her Majesty's Minister consider the amount excessive.

6. We have issued a joint proclamation stating the facts of this case for general information.

7. A notice has been issued by the Yang-chow Prefect for Mr. Taylor to inscribe on a stone tablet.

8. The premises of Mr. Taylor have been repaired, and yesterday that gentleman was invited to take possession of them.

The above points having all been carried out according to our instructions, we now beg as a conclusion to the whole case to address to you this formal despatch, and to request a reply.

We send herewith two boxes containing 1628·40 taels.

Inclosure 6 in No. 17.

Consul Medhurst to Commissioners Li and Ying.

Gentlemen, *Yang-chow, November* 20, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated yesterday, in which you recapitulate the result of your deliberations in the matter of the redress of the Yang-chow outrage.

In reply, I have to observe as follows:—

In regard to item No. 3, it is well that you have arrested and condemned three men as ringleaders in the attack upon Mr. Taylor. There must, however, have been more engaged well known to the officials and people of this city. Lin-piao, the Ti-pao, admits that he knew this "Ko" whom Taylor's accusation has specially criminated, and as he is a civil "Hsiu-tsai," there can surely be no difficulty in laying hands upon him. Moreover, the prisoners already apprehended must of necessity be able to give information as regards their accomplices. I expect, therefore, that punishment shall be visited upon others than those named.

As regards No. 5, you have omitted to officialize the condition agreed upon that, in the event of the 500 taels compensation being considered by Her Majesty's Minister as insufficient, any further sum he may require shall be paid.

As regards No. 6, I have every reason to be satisfied with the proclamation which has been issued; but I have failed to see the document exhibited in more than one spot, and that is the gate of this temple. I need scarcely explain that the proclamation is not for our enlightenment, but for that of the Chinese inhabitants of this city, and that to this end it is essential that the document shall be posted at every gate, Yamên, and temple in the place. Besides, it is as much to your interest as to ours that what is effected now in the way of dealing out redress should be done efficiently. Evil-disposed people have only to discover that the officials are not in earnest in their proceedings, to be encouraged in a repetition of their mal-practices, which will as certainly be followed by further visitations of this nature.

As regards No. 7, I must request that the duty of inscribing the stone tablet shall devolve on the local officials, and not upon Mr. Taylor.

With the above qualifications I have to express myself gratified with the energy and dispatch you have evinced in carrying out the Viceroy's instructions. I hope to be able before taking my departure to notify my entire satisfaction with your proceedings.

The indemnity money, comprising 1,128·40 taels for the mission, compensation for injury 500 taels, the same for Pêng and Wang 150 dollars 90 cents, and rent 120 dollars, I hereby beg to acknowledge the receipt of. Should the result of the assay of the aggregate amount show any surplus in your favour, I hereby hold myself liable to refund it at Chin-kiang.

* * *

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 18.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1869.

I NEED scarcely inform you, that Her Majesty's Government have been awaiting with much anxiety the issue of the very serious question which originated in the attack on British Missionaries at Yang-chow-foo in the month of August last. That anxiety was happily removed a few days since by the receipt, through Mr. Forrest, of copies of Mr. Medhurst's despatches to you of the 13th and 20th of November, reporting that matter had been settled.

But I cannot dismiss the subject without some observations, and although I may expect to receive from you a final report on the matter, the bearing which what has passed has upon my communications with Mr. Burlingame, of which you have been informed by my despatches of the 30th of December last and of the 13th instant,* renders it neccssary that I should not defer making them.

I have before me your despatches of the 12th and 29th October, and Mr. Medhurst's despatches to you of the 27th and 30th August, 3rd, 15th, and 17th of September, 15th and 29th of October, and 3rd, 6th, 13th, and 20th of November.

In the first place, I have to state to you, that I consider Mr. Medhurst to have acted very rightly in proceeding at once to the seat of outrage, and I will not criticize his taking up with him a considerable armed force, under the explanation to the local authorities that it was required for his protection on the road, and that his intentions were amicable, and only directed to obtaining from the local authorities a reasonable reparation for the wrong done to the missionaries.

Mr. Medhurst's proceedings at Yang-chow-foo, and subsequently at Nanking in his endeavours to induce the Viceroy to afford redress, were characterized by prudence and firmness, and as such entitle him to the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

The subsequent stages through which the affair passed, I cannot look upon as equally satisfactory.

Mr. Medhurst very properly reported to you from the first what had happened to the missionaries, and the course which he proposed to pursue, and afterwards when he failed in overcoming the reluctance of the Viceroy to afford redress, he, as in duty bound, placed the matter in your hands.

You, on your part, very properly called upon the Central Government to afford redress, and Her Majesty's Government are glad to recognise in Prince Kung's letters,

* See "China, No. 1 (1869)," Nos. 2 and 11.

and your own comments on them, the fullest admission on the part of the Central Government of their responsibility, and the readiness with which they took measures that proved effectual for bringing the local authorities as well as the Viceroy of Nanking to a proper sense of their respective duties, the result being that full satisfaction was made for the outrage complained of.

Thus far matters followed their proper course; the Central Government was appealed to for redress against the Provincial Government, and proved its willingness and ability to obtain it.

But I will not conceal from you that Her Majesty's Government would have much preferred that the matter should have been left to the action of the Central Government, subject of course to the view which Her Majesty's Government might take of it if that action were withheld or proved unavailing, than that the aid of Her Majesty's naval forces should have been invoked in order to bring pressure or to inflict punishment on the provincial authorities, irrespective of the result of the demand which you had made on the Central Government for redress.

The persons of the missionaries were safe; the injury to their property had been completed many weeks before; there was no immediate emergency to be met; the question of redress due was properly debateable at Peking, and if that redress had been withheld, the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government might without any inconvenient delay have been ascertained as to the course which it would be in such a contingency expedient to adopt.

Her Majesty's Government are willing to make every allowance for the difficulties in which you were placed in having to deal with a question of so unusual a character in the shape that it came before you. My communication with Mr. Burlingame will show you for your future guidance the course which under similar circumstances you should pursue. The active interference of Her Majesty's Naval Forces should only be had recourse to in cases of sudden emergency, and of immediate danger to lives or property, but when once the matter is removed for diplomatic discussion at Peking, Her Majesty's Government should be left free to determine, if occasion should arise for doing so, what is best to be done to enforce upon the Central Government the obligation not only themselves to observe Treaties, but to compel Provisional authorities also to observe them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 19.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received January 20.)

Sir, *Admiralty, January* 19, 1869.

WITH reference to my letter of the 15th December, inclosing the copy of a despatch from Vice-Admiral Sir H. Keppel, on the subject of the outrages committed at Yang-chow on British subjects, and the hostile feeling exhibited towards them at Chinkiang, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, that it appears from the reports of Her Majesty's Minister in China, and of Mr. Medhurst, Her Majesty's Consul at Shanghae, that they mainly attribute the failure of obtaining compliance with the demand made on the Viceroy of Nanking for satisfaction on account of these outrages, to the fact of Commander Bush, of Her Majesty's Ship "Rinaldo," having suddenly left Nanking in that sloop on the 12th August and returned to Shanghae.

On perusal of the papers, my Lords do not find that Mr. Medhurst made any protest to Commander Bush against the withdrawal of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" from Nanking, and Sir Henry Keppel states that the Commander was suffering from dysentery to a degree which did not admit of his removal to another ship, and that he has since been invalided for the preservation of his life; but their Lordships will make further inquiry as to the exact circumstances under which he arrived at the decision to take the ship back to Shanghae.

But assuming that Mr. Medhurst's statement is entirely correct, my Lords would observe, for Lord Clarendon's consideration, whether this case would not seem to point out that it may be advisable for the future that Consular authorities should be cautioned not to call upon the Commanders of Her Majesty's ships of war, which may be within

their reach, for the purpose of coercing local authorities, except in cases of emergency in which life or property may be in immediate danger.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

No. 20.

Acting Vice-Consul Forrest to Lord Stanley.—(Received January 24, 1869.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, November 24, 1868.*

I HAVE the honour to forward for the information of your Lordship copy of Mr. Medhurst's despatch of the 21st instant, and inclosures to Sir R. Alcock, K.C.B., reporting having received full satisfaction with respect to the Huai-kuan Barrier question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. J. FORREST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Yang-chow, November 21, 1868.*

REFERRING to my despatch of yesterday's date reporting my proceedings in reference to the Yang-chow outrage case, I have now much sasisfaction in acquainting your Excellency that I have been equally fortunate in obtaining full compensation for the unjustifiable action of the Superintendent of Customs at the Huai-kuan Barrier.

Immediately after the conclusion of the interview with the Commissioners upon the subject of the Yang-chow affair, I addressed a letter to Lin, the Taoutae of Huai-an-foo, requesting him to meet me for the purpose of adjusting the Huai-kuan claims, as had been directed by the Viceroys, Ma and Tsêng. I herewith inclose translation of my letter. This communication I sent under flying seal to Ying Taoutae, the second Commissioner here, with a request that he would forward it, conjecturing that he would busy himself to see that as little time as possible was lost in complying with my demand. The result proved that I was not far wrong in this supposition. Ying Taoutae excused himself from sending on the despatch on the plea that he had a better plan to propose, whereby time and trouble might be economized. This was nothing less than that he should find the means of paying the compensation himself and recovering it from the Superintendent at his leisure.

I had previously held more than one anxious conference with Captain Heneage as to the practicability of ascending the canal as far as Huai-an, and he had informed me that the reports which he had received from the Commander of the "Dove" as to the condition of the Grand Canal, above this were such as to discourage him from attempting the voyage save under a most pressing necessity. To make the attempt with boats and a few men he very rightly judged to be highly inexpedient after the important and practical demonstration which had been made thus far. Under these circumstances Ying Taoutae's offer appeared to us both to present a most happy method of arriving at a practical solution of the difficulty, and I accordingly closed with it forthwith.

The Huai-kuan claims are set forth in the documents which accompany this despatch. Ying Taoutae, after a brief examination, accepted them as they stood, merely suggesting the deduction of 50 taels from the expense incurred by Messrs. Carnie and Michie in proceeding in search of their goods, and some small items for jade rings, &c., charged by the Chinese. These I acquiesced in, and the actual amount agreed to is shown in the accompanying letter addressed by me to Ying, from which it will be likewise observed that the money has been duly paid.

Allowing every consideration for the natural anxiety felt by Ying to assist his colleague at Huai-an towards a speedy settlement of the question at issue, and to obviate the necessity of any further detention of the force at Yang-chow than is positively necessary, I consider that Ying deserves every credit for the courage which he has exhibited in thus taking upon himself a serious pecuniary responsibity, and I trust your Excellency will not object to bring his conduct in the matter to the favourable notice of the proper authorities at Peking. It is only just to Ying, moreover, that I

should take this opportunity of recording my opinion that to his wise counsels with Viceroys Tsêng and Ma, based upon his better experience of foreigners and their ways, that I owe much of the ready and unqualified submission which they yielded to the pressure that was exercised upon them. His influence at this place, too, has in been every way for the best. Li, his co-Commissioner, I soon found to be one of those silly, apathetic men so common amongst the Chinese official class, and had I no better material to work upon than Li and the local magistrates, I should certainly have been able to effect nothing without using more of threatening and invective than I cared to employ.

The punishment of the late Superintendent of the Huai-kuan Barrier for the share he undoubtedly had in supporting the illegal proceedings of his underlings, I must leave your Excellency to effect through the authorities to whom he is amenable at Peking. As regards the present incumbent and his future acts, I apprehend that the heavy mulct which has been exacted will prove to be a sufficient warning to him not to interfere unnecessarily with foreigners and their property when proceeding legitimately past the barrier.

Your, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 20.

Consul Medhurst to the Taoutae Lin.

Sir, *Yang-chow, November* 17, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, copy of a communication which I have received from their Excellencies Tsêng and Ma on the subject of the claims preferred by British subjects for compensation on account of losses sustained through the illegal detention of their goods and servants at the Huai-kuan Barrier.

The claims are stated in an annex to this letter, and detailed statements thereof can be furnished if necessary. Meanwhile, I have arrived at this city in company with Captain Heneage, of Her Majesty's Royal Navy, who has under his command two gunboats and a force of 300 men, for the purpose of adjusting the difficulty which has arisen out of the outrage committed upon British subjects in August last, and we are prepared either to meet you here or at Huai-kuan, in order to receive the compensation in question. In the latter event, it will be necessary for you to order suitable quarters to be prepared for our reception, and that of the force above-mentioned at Huai-an-foo.

You will much oblige me by giving an early answer to this communication, as Viceroy Tsêng has placed in our hands the steamer "Tienche" as a guarantee for the fulfilment of all the objects of the present mission, and we are anxious to return the vessel as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

MEMORANDUM of Claims.

	Taels.
First claim by Mr. Canny, for manufactures detained, as already recorded in letter to Ting Futai	227 76
Second claim by same individual for manufactures detained	201·83
Third claim by same individual, on account of lily-flowers detained	126·61
Claim for losses and expenses sustained by Mr. Canny's shroff	316·49
	872 69

Besides the above, I shall have to require some compensation to be made to Mr. Canny's shroff and boatman for the punishment which was inflicted upon them, and likewise upon Mr. Bean's shroff for the losses and punishment to which he was subjected. All the necessary facts are already known to the high authorities through Tsai Taoutae, of Chin-kiang.

There, moreover, appear to be some goods missing in consequence of the sudden and violent abduction of . These must be found, or their value, amounting to 896 taels, will have to be made good.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 3 in No. 20.

Memorandum of Losses sustained at the Huai-kuan Barrier.

(No. 1.)

C. F. R. Allen, Esq., Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate, Chin-kiang.

Sir, *Chin-kiang, November 5*, 1868.

I HAVE the honour of informing you that, on the 31st August last, I applied for and obtained a transit certificate to Tsing-kiang-foo for the following goods sent me by Messrs. Gibb, Livingston, and Co., and that, in consequence of my shroff having been illegally imprisoned by the mandarins in that district, I have lost sight of them.

Their value is:—

	Ch. taels.
500 pieces grey shirtings, at 2 taels 40 m. per piece	1,200
250 doz. handkerchiefs, at 8 m. per doz.	200
12 pieces crape lastings, at 8 taels 50 m. per piece	102
	1,502
Less sycee received	606
	896

The man has been subjected to flogging and treated very severely, and as he is still detained a prisoner may I beg you will be pleased to effect his release, and recover the goods or their value.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. BEAN.

(No. 2.)

MEMORANDUM of Moneys extorted from my Shroff during his detention at the Huai-kuan Barrier.

			Cash.
Expenses of quarters at San Yang Huen's yamên :—			
Paid to Chá			170,000
Amounts paid to police and gaolers, extorted			36,000
Cost of clothes, their own having been taken away			14,000
Chow-chow in yamên			45,000
Paid police sent in charge of men from San Yang Hsien to Pao Ying ..			22,000
Ditto from Pao Ying to Yang-chow			25,000
Cost of messengers and boats to here			37,000
Ditto from here			20,000
Detention of cargo-boat 35 days, at 1,500 per day			52,500
Ching Kiang Pu Bank orders stolen			12,000
Total			433,500
			Ch. taels.
Cash 433,500, at 64 per 1,000			277·44
Clothes stolen:—	$	c.	
1 long silk coat, and 1 short ditto	17	0	
1 pair shoes and 1 cap	1	50	
1 jade ring	35	0	
	53	50	
Exchange at 73			39·5
			316·49

(E. and O. E.)

Chin-kiang, November 7, 1868.

For J. M. Canny,
(Signed) F. CARNIE.

(No. 3.)

Claim for Losses incurred in consequence of Detention of Goods at the Huai-kuan Barrier.

	Ch. taels	Cts.
17 bales (850 pieces) grey shirtings, received per "Rona," 9th October (10 bales sold 30th October, 7 bales 6th November), 10 bales (500 pieces) worth 1,150 taels, on which interest for 21 days at 12 per cent. per annum was lost	7	28
7 bales (350 pieces) worth 777 taels, on which interest for 28 days at 12 per cent. was lost	7	15
Loss of market on these 7 bales (350 pieces); on 9th October they were worth 2 taels 22 c. per piece. Sold 6th November, 2 taels 18 c. per piece. Loss 4 c. per piece	14	0
25 bales (1,250 pieces) grey shirtings, received per "Hirado" 12th October. Interest on ditto, 2,762 taels 50 c. for 12 days, at 12 per cent. per annum	10	90
15 bales (750 pieces) worth, 12th October, 2 taels 21 c. per piece. Sold, 24th October, 2 taels 18 c. per piece. Loss, 3 c. per piece	22	50
20 pieces (1,000 pieces) grey shirtings, *ex* "Timsin," 16th October, worth, on 16th October, 2 taels 22 c. per piece. Sold, 24th October, at 2 taels 18 c. per piece. Loss, 4 c. per piece	40	0
	101	83
Expenses of Mr. Carnie's and Mr. Michie's journey to Tsêng Kiang-foo, including loss of time, &c.	100	0
	201	83

N.B.—This trip enabled me to dispose of a quantity of goods, which would otherwise have increased my claim. Five boats and a large number of men were engaged.

(E. and O. E.)

Chin-kiang, November 7, 1868.

For J. M. Canny,
(Signed) F. CARNIE.

(No. 4.)

Claim for Loss of Market and detention of Huai-kwan Barrier, near Ching-chiang-pu, of a cargo of Dried Lily-flowers, coming down under transit-pass to this port.

	Ch. taels	Cts.
198 piculs 49 catties dried lily flowers, costing 754 taels 26 c. Interest for thirty-five days' detention, at 1 per cent. per month	8	68
Selling weight, 180 piculs 20 catties, allowing for cargo drying on voyage 4 piculs, leaves a loss in weight of 14 piculs 29 catties, at 5 taels 10 c.	72	88
Loss of market on 180 piculs 20 catties, sold at 4 taels 85 c.; market price a month ago being 5 taels 10 c. Difference 25 c. per picul	45	5
	126	61

(E. and O. E.)

Chin-kiang, November 14, 1868.

For J. M. Canny,
(Signed) F. CARNIE.

(No. 5.)

List of Lost Articles belonging to Mr. Brown's shroff, Chin-yü-ting.

1 long shirt, grey Hoo-chow silk (double).
1 blue quilted long robe, lined with Hoo-chow silk.
1 light blue Ningpo satin double jacket.
1 rice coloured (yellowish) Hoo-chow silk outer trousers.
1 pouch containing hunting-watch, value 35 dollars, one toothpick, and 12 dollars in cash.
1 folding-fan, in case.
1 jade stone armlet, value 20 dollars.

Inclosure 4 in No. 20.

Consul Medhurst to Taoutae Ying.

Sir, *Yang-chow, November* 20, 1868.

I HAVE received your note of the 19th instant, in which, in the absence of the Huai Yang Taoutae, you take upon yourself the responsibility of adjusting the claims for compensation which I have preferred against the Superintendent of the Hai-kuan Barrier; I have likewise to acknowledge the payment of 872·69 taels on Mr. Canny's account, of 58·40 taels on Yen Sên-tang's, and Chin Yu-ting's account, of 43·80 taels also on Chin Yu-teng's account, and of 896 taels on Mr. Bean's account, making in all 1,870·89 taels.

The amount first named is in excess of that agreed upon by us together on the 18th instant, by 62·77 taels, which represent, if you remember, two deductions, viz., 50 taels from Mr. Canny's account, and 12·77 taels from Yen Sên-tang's account. I therefore hold myself indebted to you in that sum, and I inclose a debit note accordingly, which shall be cashed by me at Chin-kiang on presentation there, through Tsai Taoutae. Should a surplus in your favour appear upon the shroffage of these moneys at Chin-kiang, I likewise hold myself liable to make it good to you.

The 896 taels I accept on the conditions named in your note, but subject to the further qualification which we agreed to on the 18th instant, and which you appear to have forgotten, namely, that should the goods not be recovered within twenty days' time, the money must be considered as conclusively forfeited. I inclose my conditional debit note for this amount accordingly.

These payments, together with the trial and punishment of the underlings of the Huai-kwan Barrier Superintendent, will suffice for the adjustment of the question at issue. I must, however, yet look to you to state to me the nature of the penalty awarded to these men. The reprehensible conduct of the Superintendent himself, I shall request Her Majesty's Minister to bring to the notice of the Supreme Government.

I have much pleasure in adding my hearty acknowledgments to yourself personally for the energetic measures you have taken to secure the adjustment of this very troublesome affair. I shall not fail to bring your services to the notice of Her Majesty's Minister at Peking.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 21.

Consul Medhurst to Lord Stanley.—(*Received January* 24, 1869.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, December* 4, 1868.

FOR the information of your Lordship, I have the honour to inclose copies of my despatches to his Excellency Her Majesty's Minister, dated the 26th November and 2nd instant, reporting the satisfactory termination of my mission to Yang-chow, and my return to my post.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 21.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Yang-chow, November* 26, 1868.

MY despatches of the 20th and 21st instant have already placed your Excellency in possession of all my proceedings in this city up to those dates. They stated how the redress requisite in the Yang-chow matter had, with the exception of some subordinate details, been duly accorded by the authorities, and how, in the Huai-kuan Barrier case, full compensation had been made for the damage which had been sustained.

The details in connection with the Yang-chow affair, a memorandum of which will be found in Inclosure 6 of my despatch of the 20th instant, have, with one exception, that of

the apprehension and punishment of the man Ko, been carried into effect. The Commissioners and local authorities pledged themselves that Ko should be relentlessly pursued until found and brought to trial; but as I could not very well accept such a pledge as sufficient under the circumstances, whilst an indefinite detention of my material guarantee would have proved embarrassing to us, as it would have been unfair to them, I proposed that a reasonable sum in sycee, say 6,000 taels, should be lodged with me as a guarantee that every appliance in the power of the local authorities should be used towards securing the man's ultimate apprehension, and that in the event of the failure of these authorities to produce him within the time prescribed by law for the discovery of such offenders, they should be reported to the Emperor for dismissal from office. This proposition was, after some trouble, agreed to, and Ying Taoutae finding the money, it was paid to me yesterday evening, and the steamer's release granted accordingly. I inclose a translation of the receipt which I have given for the sum pledged. I likewise append translation of the Commissioners' final letter, in which the sentence passed upon two of the condemned men is plainly stated.

In the Huai-kuan Barrier case, the compensation had no sooner been made than a new complication arose, much to my annoyance and to that of the Commissioners, in the alleged further detention of fifty-nine bales of merchandize belonging to the same firm. I lost no time in notifying the Commissioners that Captain Heneage and myself had come to the conclusion that a personal visit to the barrier presented the only effectual method of releasing the goods and preventing a repetition of such unjustifiable proceedings on the part of the Superintendent, and I applied officially for boats to be provided for the conveyance of the entire force on the 27th instant. This had the effect of eliciting a letter from the Commissioners, copy of which I have the honour to inclose. On comparing this letter with Mr. Canny's Memoranda, I found that but thirty-three of the detained bales were amongst those represented to have been passed. At the same time there was no evidence forthcoming to show that the remainder had not passed since the date of the Superintendent's communication, and as it seemed highly improbable, upon the face of it, that the Superintendent would continue to detain goods after the distinct pledge given, and after having been informed of the mulct which had been already paid upon his account, I, after consultation with Captain Heneage, decided upon accepting the Commissioners' letter as decisive, and the expedition was countermanded accordingly. Should I prove to have been in any way deceived, I have protected myself against the risk by a clause which will be observed in my receipt, and by which I shall be empowered, if necessary, to sequester any portion of the amount in hand I may think fit.

I may thus, I think, pronounce the objects of the Mission to have been entirely fulfilled, and I trust that the results of my efforts may prove as acceptable to your Excellency as they are satisfactory to myself. The success which has attended them is, I honestly feel, mainly due to the energetic and efficient co-eperation which I have throughout received from Captain Heneage. No obstacle has daunted him, no detail has wearied him; but he has followed me in the negotiation from beginning to end, even into its most vexatious minutiæ, with a helpful counsel and strong support which have been invaluable to me. Captain Heneage also merits at your Excellency's hands high praise for the masterly manner in which he has placed a body of more than 300 men at this distance from the squadron, and for the perfect discipline which he has maintained in the force throughout its fourteen days' stay on shore. The latter feature has been so remarkable as to attract the observation and approbation of the Chinese authorities, and I need scarcely point out how the slightest laxity in discipline might have irritated the people, and thus have worked prejudice to the very interests which it was our object to promote.

I also have the honour to bring to your Excellency's favourable notice the conduct of Messrs. Stronach and Allen during their attendance on this special service. It has been such as to confirm all previously recorded reports of their efficieney and attention to duty.

In order to inform the public generally of the results which have thus been attained I have taken upon myself to issue a Notification, copy of which I inclose, and I trust its tenour may have your approval.

A Memorandum of all the expenses attending the Mission shall be submitted as soon as the accounts can be closed and made up.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 21.

Receipt.

I HEREBY acknowledge to have received from his Excellency the Taoutae Ying the sum of 6,000 taels, Treasury weight, to be lodged with the Hong Kong and Shanghae Banking Corporation, returnable under certain conditions, viz.: that, in case of failure on the part of the Yang-chow authorities to arrest the civilian Ko within the term allowed by Chinese law for the arrest of persons guilty of robbery, the said authorities shall be reported to the Throne; if Ko be arrested before this term expires, the money will be returned at once.

The retention of the above guarantee is in any case subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Minister.

The steamer "Tien-chi" is hereby returned in sign of the conclusion of the case.

It is understood that any losses caused by further detention of goods at the Huai-kuan Barrier shall be made good out of this sum.

Signed at Yang-chow on the 23rd day of November, 1868.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST, *Consul.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 21.

Commissioner Li and Taoutae Ying to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Yang-chow, November* 14, 1868.

WITH reference to the outrage upon the Mission-house at Yang-chow, we have the honour to inform you that Lin ch'un has been sentenced as ringleader in a malicious attempt at arson to the punishment accorded by law, that is, two months' cangue, and banishment of the third degree;* Chang Chin-chun is sentenced, as having been accessory, to two months' cangue and banishment for three years. The Magistrate has been charged to report the sentences to the high authorities.

The military graduate Ko in consequence of the failure of Mr. Taylor to identify him, and of the want of evidence against him, has been temporarily set at liberty under bail to appear whenever required.

We have given directions to the Kan-ch'uan Magistrate to take the most careful and secret measures to discover traces of the civilian Ko, and to have his constables strictly enjoined to arrest him within a given date.

Able detectives have been dispersed in different directions to discover other accessories to that outrage.

Inclosure 4 in No. 21.

Commissioner Li and Taoutae Ying to Consul Medhurst.

(Translation.) *Yang-chow, November* 24, 1868.

WE beg to inform you that we received at noon this day a despatch from Lieu, Superintendent of Customs at Huai-kuan, in reply to ours, calling on him forthwith to release fifty-nine bales of piece-goods belonging to Mr. Canny, and to undertake, in his public despatch in reply, that no infraction of the Treaty shall ever occur again.

The despatch runs as follows:—

"On the 17th October, when I took over charge of this office, I gave peremptory orders to the clerks and other underlings in all barrier stations under my control, that, whenever goods covered by a Chin-kiang transit certificate arrived at their stations, they are immediately, without the slightest detention, to be passed on. Since then, I received copies of the Treaty and Regulations from your deputy, Hu, and I at once shaped my conduct in accordance with them. On the 21st instant I was informed by Lin, Taoutae, that some piece-goods were under detention; but, on investigation, I found that two lots, both belonging to Mr. Canny, had passed the barrier, one on the 13th November, and one on the 17th. On receipt of your despatch I again took pains to have inquiries made, and the result is that no boat containing foreign piece-goods is found to be detained. I forward a list of boats and their cargoes which passed on the 20th November. I

* *i.e.*, to the nearest frontier, to be slave to the military.

undertake that, in future, the Treaty and Regulations shall be carefully adhered to, and that no infraction thereof shall ever occur again. I desire you will be so good as to communicate the above to the British Consul."

We append the list of goods passed on the 20th November, and, in return, beg that the document by which the steamer was placed in your hands may be forwarded to us to enable us to report the definitive conclusion of the case.

LIST of Goods passed on the 20th November.

———	Grey shirtings,	5	bales	(250 pieces).	
Mr. Bean,	„	8	„	(400 „)	Chin-chang-pu.
Mr. Canny	„	3	„	(150 „)	Hsu-chow.
„	„	3	„	(150 „)	Chin-chiang-pu.
„	„	4	„	(200 „)	Hsu-chow.
„	„	7	„	(350 „)	„
„	*T*-cloths	1	„	(50 „)	„
„	Grey shirtings,	7	„	(350 „)	Chin-chiang-pu.
„	„	3	„	(150 „)	„
„	„	5	„	(250 „)	Hsu-chow.
———	„	1	„	(50 „).	

Inclosure 5 in No. 21.

Notification.

Yang-chow, November 26, 1868.

THE Undersigned has much satisfaction in announcing, for general information, that a due measure of redress has been afforded for the outrage committed upon British subjects in this city in August last, and that the Huai-kuan and Chin-kiang difficulties have been satisfactorily adjusted.

In the matter of Yang-chow, the local authorities who held office at the date of the outrage have been dismissed, and indemnity has been paid on account of the losses and injuries sustained by the missionaries, their servants, and their native friends, as follows:—

	Taels	c.
Losses of missionaries and servants, inclusive of repairs to premises	1,128	40
Injuries (subject to opinion of Her Majesty's Minister as regards increase or decrease of amount)	500	0
Chinese landlord and carpenter, 270 dollars 90 c.	197	75
	1,826	15

A proclamation by the Viceroys Tsêng and Ma, and Futai Ting, has likewise been extensively promulgated, and another by the Commissioners Li and Ying (translations of which are appended; a large and handsome stone tablet has been erected upon Mr. Taylor's premises bearing a cautionary inscription (a translation of which is also annexed); the missionary party, including the female members, have been invited back and formally reinstated; two of the ringleaders in the riot (one of them recognized by Mr. Taylor as the individual who robbed the ladies and led the plunderers up-stairs) have been sentenced, one to the cangue for two months and banishment into slavery for life on the frontier, and the other to the cangue for two months and banishment for three years; and a sum of 6,000 taels has been lodged in the hands of the Undersigned as a guarantee that a literary graduate named Ko, who has absconded (the sole member of the gentry against whom any positive evidence has been forthcoming), shall be produced and duly punished by the local authorities within the time specified by law for the discovery of such offenders, failing which the local authorities themselves are to be dismissed from office.

As regards the Huai-kuan barrier, compensation has been made on account of losses sustained by the British subjects concerned, as well as on account of the losses and injuries sustained by their servants, as follows:—

	Taels	c.
Compensation to Mr. Canny	506	20
Compensation to his shroff for losses and expenses	303	72
Compensation to Mr. Bean's shroff, for losses	43	80
Compensation to Mr. Canny's and Mr. Bean's shroffs, for ill-usage	58	40
Compensation to Mr. Bean for value of goods lost sight of, to be refunded provided said goods are produced within a given time	896	0
	1,808	12

The guarantee of 6,000 taels above referred to is likewise to be held liable, during its retention, for any further damages which the Superintendent of the Huai-kuan barrier may be proved to have occasioned in contravention of the Treaty.

In connection with Chin-kiang, the only difficulty experienced was in the peaceable occupation of certain premises rented by Mr. Taylor within the city walls. These have been duly made over to him, and a lease formally signed and recorded.

The satisfactory solution of difficulties, which at one time assumed very serious proportions, is mainly due to the hearty co-operation of Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer, but for whose energy in taking up the matter in the first instance, and perseverance in carrying it through to the end, a less happy result might have been looked for.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST,
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul.

(Translation.)

Ma, Governor-General of the Two Kiang and Imperial Commissioner for Foreign Trade, &c.; Tsêng, lately Acting Imperial Commissioner for Foreign Trade and Governor-General of the Two Kiang, &c.; Ting, Governor of Kiang-su, hereby issue a proclamation for general information.

Whereas the preaching of religion is sanctioned by Treaty, and all persons are at liberty to become proselytes thereto, according as it suits their convenience, without compulsion either for or against.

We therefore issue this proclamation to give the population, civil and military, of these districts to know that it is required of them that they carefully observe the Treaty which has been concluded by Our Most Gracious Sovereign the Emperor, and that they must not annoy religious establishments nor raise pretexts for disturbance, nor must they treat foreign travellers with wanton disrespect. Every wilful offender will certainly be visited with heavy punishment, without hope of pardon.

Obey with trembling.

A special Proclamation issued on the 27th day of the 9th month of the 7th year of Tung Chih (11th November, 1868).

(Translation.)

Notice to be engraved on Stone Tablet and placed within Mr. Taylor's premises at Yang-chow.

The Prefect of Yang-chow.

Whereas this house has been rented by the British subject Taylor under the sanction of his Consul and of the local authorities.

No idle or improper persons are allowed to enter and create a disturbance. Offenders will be arrested and punished.

Obey with trembling.

A special notice. Obey.

(Translation.)

Li, Commissioner of the Salt Gabelle, &c.; and Ying, Taoutae of Shanghae, Superintendent of Kiang-nan Maritime Customs, &c., hereby issue a Proclamation for general information.

Whereas we have received the instructions of their Excellencies the high Ministers for foreign trade, Ma and Tsêng, to adjust matters at Yang-chow, we find that on the 22nd day of August, 1868, evil-disposed persons excited the people of Yang-chow to enter the house rented by the British subject Taylor and others, and violently assault and plunder the inmates, so as to lead to their eventual ejection from the premises, some of them in a seriously wounded condition; and whereas the local authorities were clearly guilty of having neglected to avert the evil in the first instance, it therefore became the duty of the high authorities, after clear examination into the circumstances, to order the degradation of the city officials, the condign punishment of the ringleaders, the grant of due compensation to the sufferers, the repair of the house, and the restoration of its former inmates.

All this having been done as a matter of simple justice, it now becomes our further duty to issue a public Proclamation, and this Proclamation is therefore issued for the purpose of

making it clearly understood to all men, high and low, that British subjects possess the liberty to enter the inner land for the pursuit of their lawful purposes, under a Treaty granted by His Most Gracious Majesty the Emperor, and that any one who presumes to insult or annoy such persons, in any way, shall meet with condign punishment. Local authorities everywhere, moreover, are to see that they extend due protection to British subjects who may have occasion to appeal to them for assistance or redress.

Let all tremblingly obey.

A special Proclamation issued on the 15th day of the 10th moon of the 7th year of Tung Chih (18th November, 1868).

Inclosure 6 in No. 21.

Consul Medhurst to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Shanghae, December* 2, 1868.

IN continuation of my despatch dated at Yang-chow the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I left that city on the 28th of November, distributed the several sums paid as indemnity as I passed through Chin-kiang on the 30th, and returned to my post here on the 1st instant.

Whilst at Chin-kiang I was informed that the few bales regarding the continued detention of which at Huai-kuan there had appeared to be some doubt, had all been passed on since the date of the Superintendent's letter of apology, a translation of which formed Inclosure No. 3 in the despatch above alluded to.

Before taking my final departure from Yang-chow, a member of the French Roman Catholic Mission there, whom I happened to have a conversation with, called my attention to the fact that the Proclamation which had been issued by the Commissioners was so exclusively directed towards the toleration of the efforts of British missionaries in that locality that, practically, it would have the effect of confirming an interdict which had been laid upon the French Mission and Orphanage by the literati simultaneously with their attack upon Mr. Taylor's Mission. Feeling convinced, upon reflection, that it would be inexpedient, even in our own interests, to leave it in doubt that the persons and privileges of foreigners generally were to be respected, and being naturaly anxious to assist the subjects of a friendly State as far as lay in my power, I presented the missionary with a sealed copy of the Viceroy's Proclamation (see Inclosure 3 in despatch of the 20th of November last) for exhibition in his own premises, and procured for him the local authorities' official order declaring the admission of orphans into the French establishments to be lawful and right. This, with what has previously been done in the interest of the British missionaries, will, I trust, have the effect of rendering toleration of all foreigners and their religions an understood thing throughout Yang-chow. At Huai-gan, the neighbouring Fu to the northward, I regret to say the Roman Catholic missionaries at present find the city gates persistently closed against them. But this is a subject, I believe, which is now pending reference to His Imperial Majesty's Minister; and apart from this I could not very well have made a special point of it in my negotiations with the Commissioners, seeing that I had no acquaintance with the merits of the question in dispute, and was in possession of no instructions to prefer any demands in reference thereto.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

No. 22.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received January 25.)

Sir, *Admiralty, January* 23, 1869.

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 19th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of the Earl of Clarendon, a copy of a letter dated the 22nd instant, from Commander Bush, late of Her Majesty's sloop "Rinaldo," explaining the circumstances under which he withdrew that sloop from Nanking on the 12th August last, whilst negotiations were pending respecting the outrage perpetrated by Chinese upon English missionaries living at Yang-chow.

I am, &c.

(Signed) JOHN HENRY BRIGGS.

Inclosure in No. 22.

Commander Bush to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *London, January* 22, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, inclosing copies of letters from Sir Rutherford Alcock and Mr. Medhurst respecting the outrage perpetrated by Chinese upon some English missionaries living at Chang-chow. In compliance with their Lordships directions, I beg to offer the following explanation :—

In the beginning of September, 1868, I received a letter from Mr. Medhurst, asking me if I could send him a guard to Chin-kiang, to escort him to Yang-chow, to protect him from insult or injury whilst he visited the house lately occupied by the missionaries, and, if possible, he would be glad of my presence and advice.

As I had previously received a requisition from Sir Rutherford Alcock for a gun-boat, or some other vessel to accompany Mr. Medhurst to Nankin respecting the working of some coal-mines, and considering that a guard unsupported by the presence of a man-of-war might induce an attack from a disorderly and ignorant mob, which would have brought about the gravest complications, I determined to take the "Rinaldo" to Chin-kiang ; although it is almost without precedent that such an important port as Shanghae should ever be left even for one day without the presence of a man-of-war.

I arrived at Chin-kiang on the morning of the 5th of September, and in a conversation with Mr. Medhurst respecting the outrage, he gave me to understand most distinctly that he was acting wholly and solely on his own responsibility, I therefore put the case to him, "Should the officials of Yang-chow refuse to receive us, or admit us into the city, what course should we pursue ?" He replied, we should have to return, as I should not be justified in forcing an entrance, or, in fact, making any hostile demonstration whatever.

After visiting Yang-chow with the Consul—accompanied by a guard composed of nearly the whole of the ship's company, to prevent the possibility of his being insulted by the mob—I proceeded on the 10th of September to Nankin, and on the morning of the 11th September, being myself unable to leave my bed, I directed Lieutenant Farquharson, Senior Lieutenant of Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo," to proceed with the Consul to wait upon the Viceroy, accompanied by a guard of honour. On their return to the ship in a conversation with Mr. Medhurst he gave me to understand that the Viceroy had expressed his willingness to comply with his, Mr. Medhurst's, requests, and that he, the Viceroy, would send a letter to that effect that night or the next morning.

Considering the presence of the "Rinaldo" no longer necessary, as I had protected the Consul from the possibility of being insulted at Yang-chow, I determined to return to Shanghae, having offered to remain if Mr. Medhurst considered the presence of the "Rinaldo" necessary. He told me that the ship remaining would do no good, but that he should wait for the letter from the Viceroy in a house-boat belonging to a Mr. Canny, Acting Vice-Consul.

At the time of my withdrawing the "Rinaldo" from Nanking, it never entered my head that the presence simply of a small man-of-war could have the slightest effect in influencing the action of the Viceroy of Nanking, one of the most important functionaries in the Chinese Empire, and who has been for years intimately acquainted with foreigners.

Under no circumstances whatever would I have allowed the ship under my command to be used as a threat to compel a compliance to the Consul's request, however just, without an official communication from the Minister at Peking, or from my own superior officer.

In this case I did not consider there was any urgency, as communication with Peking was frequent and uninterrupted. Had Mr. Medhurst considered the presence of the "Rinaldo" absolutely necessary, an official communication to that effect would have ensured it, and explained my absence from Shanghae to my Commander-in-chief.

Events have proved that the Viceroy only yielded to the Consul's requests when backed by a considerable naval force, whose first act was to seize a valuable steamer belonging to him.

I have not the slightest doubt that had I made any hostile demonstration whatever with the very small force at my command, his Excellency would have complied with equal readiness, and I should have deservedly lost my commission for making war with China on my own account. A very long experience in China has convinced me that the pendant of the "Rinaldo" might have floated idly over the waters of Nanking for months without

in any way influencing the sluggish and impassive natures of the Chinese officials, whilst the first shell or the first seizure would have brought them at once to my feet.

Had Sir Rutherford Alcock been on board the "Rinaldo," it is probable your Lordships would not have had to call upon me for an explanation.

I leave it to your Lordships' judgment if Her Majesty's ships are to be employed without having sufficient authority to threaten, without the power to strike.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM BUSH.

No. 23.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 27, 1869.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter from the Admiralty,* inclosing a copy of a letter from Commander Bush, reporting the circumstances under which he withdrew the "Rinaldo" from Nanking.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 24.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Alcock.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 28, 1869.

WITH reference to your despatches respecting the attack on British missionaries at Yang-chow-foo, and to my despatch to you of the 14th instant on the same subject, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter that I have received from the Board of Admiralty,† by which you will perceive that the circumstances under which Her Majesty's ship "Rinaldo" was withdrawn by her Commander from the Yang-tze-Kiang, while the discussion between Consul Medhurst and the local authorities was still in progress, will be fully inquired into.

The concluding paragraph of the Admiralty letter calls, however, for more specific notice. The object of it is, the expediency of placing the employment of Her Majesty's vessels in the ports of China for the coercion of local authorities under strict regulation.

You will have seen by my despatches of the 30th December, and of the 13th and 14th of January, that Her Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to this point; and I have accordingly to instruct you to explain to Her Majesty's Consuls that the special purposes for which Her Majesty's ships of war are stationed in the ports of China, and employed on the coasts, are to protect the floating commerce of British subjects against piratical attacks in Chinese waters, to support Her Majesty's Consuls in maintaining order and discipline among the crews of British vessels in the respective ports, and, in cases of great emergency, to protect the lives and properties of British subjects, if placed in peril by wanton attacks directed against them either on the part of local authorities or by an uncontrolled popular movement.

As regards this last point, Her Majesty's Consuls must constantly bear in mind that the interference of naval force, either on their representation, or on the part of naval officers acting on their own estimation of facts before them, will alone receive the subsequent approval of Her Majesty's Government, when it is clearly shown that without such interference the lives and properties of British subjects would, in all probability, have been sacrificed; and even in such a case Her Majesty's Government will expect to learn that the alternative of receiving them on board ship, and so extricating them from threatened danger, was not available.

Beyond this the circumstances of the case must be of a very peculiar nature which would be held by Her Majesty's Government to justify a recourse to force.

Her Majesty's Government cannot leave with Her Majesty's Consuls or Naval Officers to determine for themselves what redress or reparation for wrong done to British subjects is due, or by what means it should be enforced. They cannot allow them to determine

* No. 22.

† No. 19.

whether coercion is to be applied by blockade, by reprisals, by landing armed parties, or by acts of even a more hostile character. All such proceedings bear more or less the character of acts of war, and Her Majesty's Government cannot delegate to Her Majesty's servants in foreign countries the power of involving their own country in war.

My despatches to which I have referred will have enabled you to point out in unmistakeable terms to Her Majesty's Consuls the course they are to pursue when an emergency calling for immediate action as the sole means of protecting British life and property has passed away. They must appeal to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking to obtain redress through the action of the Central Government; and he, on his part, if he fails to obtain it, will submit the case for the judgment of Her Majesty's Government, with whom alone it rests to decide as to the course to be thereupon pursued.

I shall furnish the Board of Admiralty with a copy of this despatch, in order that they may send corresponding instructions to the Admiral in the China Seas.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 25.

The Secretary to the London Missionary Society to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(Extract.) *Mission House, Blomfield Street, February 5, 1869.*

THERE are two important matters which the Directors of the London Missionary Society desire to submit to your Lordship's attention, and upon which they would be glad to obtain your judgment at an early period:—First, as recent events in China, and the visit to London of the special Chinese Embassy, have brought afresh to your Lordship's notice the stipulations of the Treaties with China, and among them those clauses which concern the residence and journeyings of missionaries in that Empire,—since also the English communities in China have been pressing on the Government the importance of increasing their privileges when the Treaty shall be revised,—the Directors of the London Missionary Society would be glad to ascertain from your Lordship the views which Her Majesty's Government now hold of the range within which, according to existing Treaties, missionaries in general may freely move. Because, while the opportunities for their usefulness have grown great and numerous, the Directors are anxious that the operations of the missionaries of the London Missionary Society shall be so conducted as in no way to embarrass Her Majesty's Government, or even inadvertently to complicate the relations between the two Empires. That is the only ground on which they would venture to trouble your Lordship in the matter.

No. 26.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary of the London Missionary Society.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 10, 1869.*

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th instant, requesting his opinion in regard to certain matters in China, and New Caledonia, in which the London Missionary Society is interested.

For greater convenience Lord Clarendon desires me to reserve the latter point for a subsequent communication, after obtaining from Lord Lyons a report which he will be called upon to furnish; and to confine my present letter to the questions which you put in regard to missionary privileges in China, and specifically as regards the right of locomotion.

Lord Clarendon is glad to receive from the Society the assurance that the Directors are anxious that the operations of their missionaries should be so conducted as in no way to embarrass Her Majesty's Government, or even inadvertently to complicate the relations between the two Empires. This assurance does honour to the Society, and entitles any representations they may make to the most liberal consideration.

With the exception of the VIIIth Article of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, there is no specific engagement with China which can be cited in a British Treaty as applying to missionary pursuits.

That Article provides that persons teaching or professing the Christian religion shall, whether Protestants or Roman Catholics, be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities; and while peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the law, shall not be persecuted or interfered with.

Any other privileges British missionaries are entitled to enjoy in China are provided for by other Articles of the Treaty applying to British subjects generally.

Lord Clarendon is not prepared to place any abstract construction on those Treaty provisions. So much must always depend on the circumstances under which, and the grounds on which, Treaty privileges are claimed, that specifically to define the practical extent of any such privileges, would be more likely to mislead than serve as a sure guide for action.

Lord Clarendon considers that in all cases of a doubtful nature, where a British missionary desires to receive counsel or directions, his safest course would be to apply to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, and be guided by his advice.

This course is more particularly to be recommended at the present time, inasmuch as it is clear that a strong feeling prevails among the authorities and people of China against the establishment of mission-stations in the interior of the country; and it would be highly imprudent in missionaries to persist in disregarding the opposition either of the Chinese authorities or people, and braving their animosity, however unjustifiable or misplaced.

It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to protect a missionary establishment in places where no Consular authority is at hand to require the local authorities to exert themselves in its defence; and it is no less impossible to suppose that the feelings of Parliament would be enlisted in favour of measures of coercion to avenge a wrong done to missionaries, which, even if they did not end in war, would, for a time, at least, paralyze British trade, and might be open to much question in point of justice as between country and country.

The London Missionary Society can, in Lord Clarendon's opinion, render no better service to their missionaries than by inculcating on them circumspection in regard to their own conduct, and the utmost consideration for the feelings and character of the people among whom they dwell. The missionaries will do well to follow in the wake of trade, when the people have learnt to see in it material advantage to themselves, rather than seek to lead the way in opening up new locations. In the former case they will find people prepared to receive and listen to their instruction; but, in the latter, there is too much reason to believe that their proffered instruction will be rejected, and their persons exposed to indignity and even danger.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

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on 01 February, 2020